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EUROPE

POLAND, RUSSIA,

AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

A MEMORIAL,

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL,

Addressed to the British and French Nations,

BY

GENERAL L. MIEROSLAWSKI.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE:

PUBLISHED FOR THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

1855.

HUNGARIAN REFERENCE LIBRARY NEW YORK, N. Y.

Paris, March 23rd, 1855.

My dear Sir and Ally,

The patriotic and enlightened perseverance with which the Newcastle 'Foreign Affairs Committee' continues to vindicate the cause of Poland's restoration as the only true guarantee against the humiliation and ruin of the Western Powers in the war which they have declared against Russia, has inspired me to state the facts of 'the Polish question,' the facts as they exist, which statement I have herewith the honour to forward.

In your capacity of Secretary to the Newcastle Committee, and as a strenuous advocate of our common cause, I hope and trust you will, to the utmost of your power, circulate the information contained in the succeeding pages among your representatives, and the various committees and societies of free England, to whom neither the cause nor the result of the great struggle carried on between the Christian world of the East and West can be a matter of indifference.

The heart of my country, dear sir and friend, is well known to me. Be assured of the gratitude of a nation, which, although prostrated into the grave, has never grown cold in its feelings nor its alliances, a nation which by its resurrection will become greater and mightier than ever, and the time will come when

A MEMORIAL, &c.

ALL the misfortunes of the present war against Russia originated in one fundamental error, and your military disappointments will continue until yourselves and allies are ruined, if you do not at once change the entire political and moral basis of your operations.

In undertaking a war against a great power, the first thing needful is to become thoroughly acquainted with the nature of that power, the second to make choice of such arms as are best calculated to produce an effect upon the hostile nation. Then, according as you feel ready to employ all these arms or not, you will, or will not undertake the war; for primitive errors of judgment cannot be corrected in the midst of military operations except at an exorbitant price. And this is the case with the war against Russia.

Before taking up arms the Western Powers seem to have purposely closed their eyes and refused to be enlightened as to the real character of the Russian empire. They set up a conventional Russia, in order to have to attack her in her invulnerable points and with weapons which, various and formidable though they seem, have, to the great astonishment of the cleverest statesmen and generals of Europe, been found quite powerless. Thus, without pretending to justify all the strategical faults which were committed in the last campaign, we cannot but think that the greater part of them were unavoidable, and that the greatest military genius could only have compromised his reputation on the ground to which the war has been confined by diplomacy. Strategy by land and sea could be employed only within the limits settled beforehand by the policy of the governments, and when those limits constitute a *champs-clos*, benefiting exclusively one of the belligerent parties, no ability on the part of the commander, no bravery on that of the soldiers, no superiority of organization or discipline can compensate for the disadvantage of position. There is, therefore, in our opinion, a manifest injustice in making the gallant chiefs of the English army responsible for the sacrifice of that army. Like unto Bellerophon, they were sent to fight Chimera; but without any winged horse, and restricted to merely cutting off one of the monster's claws. Nelson in the place of Sir Charles Napier and Wellington in that of Lord Raglan, would, perhaps, have slain a few hundreds more Russians and lost some scores less English, supposing that the one had been more reckless in bringing ships which cost millions against stones

which cost only the sweat of the slave, and that the other had laid siege to the north of Sebastopol instead of the south; but would not the hero of Trafalgar, his only trophy a handful of stones, have had to retire before the Baltic ice, and would not the conqueror of Waterloo have had to leave the trenches of Sebastopol to seek the real Russia elsewhere? No more than Napier and Raglan could Nelson and Wellington have made the Tzar capitulate by attacking his dead extremities, while leaving his vital parts intact under the safeguard of diplomacy. The commissioners of inquiry are not in your docks, your invincible war-ships, or in your heroic battalions, but at the inaccessible hearth of the old political clique, who have determined that their enquiries shall be confined to two cemeteries without egress. It is the treaties of 1815 which should be called to the bar of Parliament, and not the brave officers who are consigned to destruction in order that these treaties may not be infringed.

Whatever be the result of your enquiry, you are now none the less reduced to the alternative of a truce which, after having ruined and humiliated the West, will have settled absolutely nothing, and will leave Russia more powerful, insolent, and dangerous than ever, or of a new campaign, the whole aim and character of which must be altered without delay, under pain of irreparable disasters. There is, consequently, every reason why you should now become acquainted with that which you would not previously take the trouble to learn regarding Russia. Notwithstanding two years of immense and useless efforts, notwithstanding that England has already sacrificed a milliard of money and her only European army, you must begin by asking yourselves: "What is Russia, and in what does her invincibility consist?" This question the Poles alone can answer; for the Poles alone have, without losing their nationality, lived in the midst of that earthly hell for the instruction and redemption of mankind.

Russia is not a nation like Poland, nor a conventional state like Prussia, nor an old dynastic aggregation like Austria, nor a colonial power like England, nor a voluntary association like America, nor a compact and finished centralization like France. Russia is a vast absorbing machine, destined to assimilate all the Slavonic nationalities, and thus acquire the means, on the decline of the Western nations, for overwhelming Europe and the whole world. She is, therefore, above all, a continental power; and if she already seeks to obtain a footing on the Black Sea and Baltic, it is prematurely, through school-boy impatience, and only with the excess of her organic resources. Her gigantic but delusive naval constructions have acquired no real maritime character. They can aspire to that character only when, masters by means of their land forces, or political superiority, of the whole shores of the Black Sea and Baltic, the Tzars can dispose of the Greek and Scandinavian marine. But these objects are to be attained by land and not by sea if they are to be attained at all: by land alone could the Tzar ever bring the Bosphorus within his grasp. Until then he may have pontoons, amphibious batteries and a floating bridge from Cape Chersonesis to the Golden Horn, to second the operations of an army which shall have already passed the Balkans; he may have another floating bridge to aid the movements of an army marching to set right the succession of Denmark for Holstein Gottorp; but there is not

even a shadow of naval squadrons worthy your being uneasy about. If, then, you desire to prevent his ever having a navy, it is not his pontoons and the batteries behind which he hides them which must be destroyed, but the vast laboratory of these continental crimes itself, which will to-morrow supply him with four times the amount you may burn to-day, and also with the keys of the two snares into which the charms of Sebastopol and Cronstadt are drawing you. Where, then, is this laboratory of the present and future Russia? In what soil is nourished the spreading but invisible roots of this gigantic tree, of which you see and cut off only the superfluous thorns?

In Poland, and no where else.

It is by the possession of this country and not by her possession of two large lakes—better closed against her than you—that Russia sustains herself as an invading power, and laughs at the whole world. Poland, by far the most populous and productive portion of the empire, furnishes Russia with her three essential elements of growth and domination:

1. GEOGRAPHICALLY.—It is by the possession of this isthmus, extending from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and uniting the almost island of Europe to the Asiatic continent, that Russia has become, not only a European power, but the only aggressive power in Europe. It is by that possession only that the Baltic and Black Sea, both fed by Polish streams, have become Russian lakes. Moreover, it is by the aid of this immense tract of land that, penetrating into the bosom of the west, isolating, watching, sequestrating, and disarming all her neighbours, Russia has rendered every coalition against her illusory and vain, if not wholly impossible, whilst she finds herself at the head of a permanent and indissoluble coalition against civilization. Thanks to this excellent arming place, whilst the rest of Europe cannot take the slightest precaution against Russia without overthrowing treaties, setting armies in motion and risking treasures, and all to end, perhaps, in a confession of impotence, Russia, alone and silent, without declaring war against a great power, finds herself in peace and comfort with everything to her satisfaction, and with bayonets and cannon at the gates of Vienna and Berlin. By the presence of the Russians on the Prosna, on the upper and lower Vistula, the parade grounds of the Tzar cut Prussia into three sections and Austria into two. Russia is thus ever ready to finish in five days in the very heart of Germany a war which for two years the allies have been seeking at Archangel, at Anapa, and in Kamschatka. In fine it is by the possession of these four-fifths of Poland, that, seated on horseback between Europe and Asia, Russia holds these two powers bowed down, weary and uneasy by her continual falsehoods, in her position inaccessible, conquering without needing to stir, crushing when she acts, but crushing still more when she does not move.

2. ECONOMICALLY.—The five dismemberments of Poland, from 1772 to 1832, have added to the empire of the Tzars fifteen governments, consisting of a total superficies of 11,292 geographical square miles, and a population of 16,000,000, this making an average of 1,500 inhabitants to the geographical square mile. Now, with the exception of some dozen large towns and their immediate radius,

all the other European parts of the empire have but an average of 300 inhabitants to the same space. It is evident that these five Western governments represent in Russian economy a power of action and of production five times greater than the other portions of the empire, and as an implacable policy forces the Tzar to exhaust as much as possible those fifteen governments, viz.: Courland, Witepsk, Mohylew, Minsk, Wilna, Grodno, Wolhynia, Podolia, Küew, Bialystok, Augustow, Lublin, Mazovia, Kalisz, and Kielce, while he promotes the slow and gradual growth of the empire, of which the heaviest burdens are most assuredly borne by Poland. This has been especially the case since what the diplomatists with satisfaction call *the assimilation of the Kingdom of Poland*, that is to say since the time when, by the suppression of all internal limits, the vessels of separation and circulation were broken by the tyranny of the Tzar throughout his empire, these fifteen Polish provinces suffer, toil, produce, and think for the forty others, which are only deserts perpetually being colonized, or rapacious excrescences.

Save in cases of barbarian conquest, these sorts of absorption have frequently taken place between neighbouring peoples without ultimate harm to mankind; but in these cases it was generally men more civilized, more intelligent and more valiant who thus ennobled, so to speak, those who were morally and economically their inferiors, by admitting them to their city. The degrading and sterile domination of the Tzars over Poland can lay claim to no such title. Accomplished not even by the superiority of arms—which would be at least a reason for resignation for the Poles—but by the diplomatic complicity of the two great German powers. That pretended conquest is a cause not yet judged in history, and that cause yet remains intact as well in the opinion of the oppressors as in that of the oppressed. The vanquished in appearance are superior in everything, numbers excepted, to their shameful conquerors. Assimilation transforms, and puts new blood into the veins of, the latter, without enfeebling the former. It results, only, that instead of the benevolent and pacific power which during four centuries protected and guaranteed the laboratory of all the European nationalities against the submersions of the North and the East, Europe, hesitating and stupified, sees installed a frightful military laboratory, a permanent camp of barbarians, barbarians at once disciplined and hardy, Russians, brave and intelligent even as Poles, warlike, alike in defeat and in victory, provided with all the instruments and secrets of civilization to destroy civilization. It is not the dreary marshes of Bothnia, Finland, Archangel, the Caspian, or European Tartary, or the useless fortifications of Petersburg, Cronstadt, or Sebastopol which furnish the Tzars with these formidable means of domination and perpetual menace. These means are supplied by the populous and fertile governments of the West, all torn from Poland. Does not the grain of those provinces pay for the luxuries of the whole empire in time of peace and fill the magazines in time of war? Is it not with their horses that the Tzar improvises and mounts his cavalry? Is it not with their cattle and leather that he feeds and equips his soldiers? Where does he find wood, hemp, and tar for his fleets? In the North-East of Poland. Whence does he take his regular squadrons? From

the South of Poland. With what wool does he clothe and with what iron does he arm his battalions? With the wool of the Lower, and the iron of the Upper Vistula. But it is, above all, from the serried, intrepid and cheerful population of the Polish plains that he at pleasure fills up his quickly-thinned ranks; for, whilst he could not raise a regular and sufficient contingent from the thin population of Great Russia without entirely depopulating it, ruining the domains of the crown, and exasperating the nobles, whose able-bodied serfs are their only riches, he has only to extend his arm towards the West to find five times more quickly fives times more than what he requires, while he knows, moreover, that he will only be ruining rebels while he charms the rest of his empire, and obtains the high approbation of neighbouring states. It will now be easily understood by what easy prodigy those Russian armies, which, even after the conquest of the Polish provinces, and up to the time of the *assimilation* were never anything but great empty skeletons, have within the last fifteen years risen to an effective and perfectly solid force af 700,000 men, of which 500,000 are in permanent activity and 200,000 in reserve. Besides this force, always ready to take the field, Russia possesses another army for service in the interior, and numbering 315,000 men. Then, again, she has an irregular army of 126,000 Cossacks, to guard her vast frontiers and for skirmishing. The Polish element is strictly confined to the grand active army. Excluded from the corps of the Guards and the Grenadiers, that element necessarily forms the numerical majority of the six corps of infantry, of the six divisions of light cavalry, and of the three corps of reserve cavalry, which constitute the remainder of the 700,000 men. In fact, four or five-sevenths of these troops, serving fifteen years in activity and ten years in reserve are natives of the fifteen Polish governments of the empire. Particularly in the fifteen divisions of the Cavalry of Reserve, where, with the exception of the superior guards, uniform, flag, all is Polish. It is, in a manner, Southern Poland in its entirety enslaved and militarily colonised for the *regular* service of the Tzar, in the same way that the Cossack population beyond the Dnieper are for his *irregular* service. In those departments giving scope to genius, such as the artillery, the intelligence and education, if not the number of the Poles prevails. In short two-thirds of the cavalry attached to the six corps of infantry of the line, and four of these six corps themselves, are almost entirely recruited in the Polish provinces. In proof of the correctness of the above, here is a more general calculation, one which cannot be contested.

It is known that the existing army has been raised by taking three soldiers from every hundred inhabitants, and as the Polish provinces contain 16,000,000 inhabitants, the number of men raised would amount to 480,000. Allowing 30,000 for the stationary artillery and marine, and 150,000 killed, dead from disease, or invalided, there would still be about 300,000 Poles in the grand active army; for we know that the Polish element does not enter into the *interior* service or the *irregular* service. If we add to this calculation the superiority of civilization, of activity, which distinguishes the Western population of the empire; above all, if we take into account the promptitude with which every Polish peasant becomes an excellent soldier, whilst it takes ten years' drill to make one

of the peasant of the Wolga (this difference was established beyond doubt by the Russian and Polish armies of 1830), it will easily be seen that there is no exaggeration in affirming that it is Poland which constitutes the sinew of the Tzar's forces, and that it is Poland alone which at this moment gives him the means and the audacity to brave united Europe.

Seeing how the Russian empire derives its power from this continental laboratory—this generating reservoir, the reader will be convinced of what we have said relative to the false and eccentric maritime ambition which characterises the Russian government. If the floating armaments of Sebastopol and Cronstadt have any importance, it is but this secondary importance that they consist of the moving *material* of the grand active army. The navy is supplied from the same forests, from the same mines, from the same regions, from the same population, and from the same arsenals. It is but the artillery put on board ship instead of being drawn by horses, it is but magazines propelled by oar, steam, or sail, it is but artillery-men working as galley-slaves, and all this at vast expense, and yet there is no navy: these efforts have been made twenty years too soon. Thus, you see that, like disguised engineers as they are, the Russian admirals, at the moment when their fleets were expected to act, destroyed those fleets with as little compunction as if they had been bridges thrown across the Danube by Gortschakoff, or the environs of a town which hindered the defence of the place. On nearing their three-deckers of 120 guns, you found that they were only harbour-booms; but you were obliged to touch them before you could believe it.

In fact the Russian admirals are not so presumptuous as they seem to be. They know very well that the Tzars cannot make any serious attempt upon the Turkish shores of the Black Sea and the Scandinavian shores of the Baltic—until they have firmly established their autocracy in the centre of continental Europe, by the help of that important tract of land which, under the name of the Kingdom of Poland, cuts Germany into five pieces, and calls upon the Slavons of Prussia, Austria, and Turkey to form one single empire, stretching from the Adriatic to the Pomeranian isles. But this continental domination once guaranteed to her by the complicity of Austria and Prussia in the partition of Poland, the Tzar can, without risk, perpetually threaten Constantinople and the Sound, even though the fortune of war be against him, though Sebastopol and Cronstadt become adjuncts to Cherbourg and Gibraltar, and the Baltic and Black Seas Anglo-French lakes. So long as the Tzars remain masters of the important isthmus which joins those two seas, no maritime disadvantage, no check experienced by them at the extremeties of their empire, can retard for a single year the growth of their fundamental power. This is a state maxim which every native of the West should make his children learn by heart, and which you should engrave in uneffaceable letters on the fronts of all your ambassadors' palaces, on the prows of even your smallest ships, and over the gates of all your arsenals. Unless this elementary truth be patent to every full grown Englishman, you will pass the last century of your history between commissions of inquiry directed against your naval and military chiefs, and truces, all the expenses of which you will

have to pay. During these truces, the Tzar will rebuild his batteries and pontoons, and seize upon your first misundertsanding with other states to accomplish by land that which you thought you had prevented him from accomplishing by sea. Thus his maritime phantasmagoria has accomplished his object by misdirecting your attacks from his only vulnerable part. And when, by force of obstinacy, and the sacrifice of men and money, and after having drowned popular enthusiasm in waves of blood, you shall have overthrown these defences, you will find the Russian empire stronger than on the day of Mentschikoff's arrival at Constantinople, and on the throne of that empire you will find a young and vigorous Tzar instead of the old and dying one. Then, conquerors, you will conclude a peace which will give you possession of the Black Sea for a couple of years, but which will give the vanquished possession of Europe for a couple of centuries.

If, on the other hand, whilst keeping possession of the Black Sea because you are there and of the Baltic whilst you may, you should none the less continue to seek the heart of your enemy, and to seek it with the points of your bayonets in Poland, your dead heroes of Inkermann and Balaclava would rise from their graves to embrace us, their brothers in arms, every hole made in your ships by the bullets of Sebastopol would be filled up with a portion of the imperial purple, and all that you have been vainly asking for two years you will readily obtain without asking for it. In short, attack Poland, disorganize the Tzar's armies, his arsenals, his hierarchy, his plans of resistance, his hopes of a resumption of offensive operations, by provoking the defection of 300,000 Poles, by whom alone he is able to bear up against you, and then see whether he will continue to amuse himself by disputing with you the possession of the Crimea and Finland! Let these 300,000 Poles learn that their old flag (which they believe to have been consumed in the fire of the battle of Warsaw) is once more found and is borne by your van-guard on the the Baltic shore, and you will soon see how many remain under the banner of the Tzar of the 100,000 men who hold the Crimea, of the 70,000 who hold Caucassia, of the 60,000 who defend Bessarabia, of the 100,000 who watch the shores of the Baltic, and of the 250,000 who threaten Germany. Can you now conceive the importance of Poland to Russia both in a military sense and economically? But this is not all: for,

3. Politically.—Poland gives the empire of the Tzars all her titles and all her means of international and monographical suzerainty. It is well known that it was by the partition of Poland between herself and the two great powers of Germany, that Russia has succeeded in binding central Europe to her own fortunes, in tying the hands of the whole of Germany, and in acquiring in every continental congress such a preponderance that no sincere and durable coalition against the Tzar is possible whilst Poland remains dismembered. According to the stupid prejudices which, in the diplomatic free-masonry of Europe, have survived the continual violation of the treaty of Vienna by the makers of that treaty themselves, the Polish booty of the Tzars must not be touched—that is to say, a serious war against Russia must not be begun, without the consent of the two

other partitioners of Poland. Why not say at once, without the consent of Russia herself? So long, moreover as the German powers make the conservation of the their shreds of Poland the pivot of what they call the European equilibrium, that equilibrium will never be anything more than the progressive, constant and guaranteed advance of the principal spoliator of Poland; for they will feel every attack directed against their accomplice to be directed against themselves, and will consider any proposition of an alliance with states guiltless of this great crime as an insolent proposition of repentance and suicide. And if, from madness, hypocrisy, or miscalculation, one or both of them should yield for a moment to the temptation of lifting their hands against their suzerain accomplice, their new allies could not count on their aid longer than until they sustained some reverse, for, in that case, composed as they are of shreds and patches, fully exposed to the lion wrath of Russia, and threatened with destruction or, at least, with irreparable calamities before France and England could come to their assistance, in what quarter would they seek their salvation? Evidently in a sudden return to their hard but accustomed Eastern vassalage, and in a redoubling of their servile fury against the West. This return to the old yoke, so completely foreshadowed by the events of 1813, will be the more inevitable, in consequence of Russia being, thanks to that infernal partition of Poland, always in such a position with respect to them as to make pardon as easy and profitable as punishment. How, then, can any statesman having either common sense or memory seriously offer the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin the Anglo-French alliance in exchange for the Tzar's protection whilst Poland remains dismembered? How, too, can any one imagine that the Scandinavian states, placed within grasp of the claws of the polar bear, should dare to express their real fears and their real sympathies before the complete and final disarmment of the vindictive beast, by the separation of Poland, has guaranteed their permanent freedom of choice? How can it be expected that all those uncles, nephews, cousins, fathers-in-law, descendants and collateral relations of the Tzars, who for a century have been labouring so earnestly to place the tumbling German dynasties under the protection of Romanoff and Holstein-Gottorp in competition with Hapsburg-Lorraine and Hohenzollern-Brandenbourg, should abandon the throne which supports them and insures their safety before that throne be finally levelled with the dust? How can it be expected that Poland herself should think of moving, whilst even those powers which have so pompously declared war against Russia, carry on that war as Louis XII. carried on his war against Pope Julius II., by distinguishing the sacred from the profane—that they should be overjoyed at the roar of cannon, already fired perhaps to celebrate the signature of a peace, which would be for them the eternal peace of the tomb?

Nor is this all the impious security which the possession of the holy sepulchre of modern Christendom gives to its principal possessor. Beside and under the mask of the worn-out politics of congresses, there is the serious and ever-young politics of races and nationalities;—beside and under the official and mechanical political system which is manufactured and which requires to be yearly adjusted

with lever and pully, there is the organic and natural political system, the *peretuum mobile* of humanity; beside and opposed to the motionless equilibrium of diplomacy, there is the ever-rising sap of races and the quickly-circulating blood of nations. Is it supposed that the cabinet of St. Petersburg, because principally profiting by that political system and that equilibrium established by the Congress of Vienna, will not endeavour to take advantage of the second? To suppose so is a gross absurdity; for what advantage would the Tzar have in his mastery over the only nationality which has yet completely disengaged itself from the Slavonic chaos—the only one of the Slavonic nationalities which is conscious of its identity, if he were not to employ it for the purpose of welding together the the less homogeneous portions of the Slavonic race? Poland is, therefore, as indispensable to him ethnologically as diplomatically.

The 15 to 16,000,000 of Poles which Russia is now endeavouring to assimilate constitutes the very kernel of the Slavonic race. The three purest and most ancient tribes of that family, the Lecho-Chrobates, the Lettes, and the Russians, were established as a central nation and formed a historical community for four centuries and a half on the capital isthmus of Europe, where they were free from all foreign alluvion, and where they dominated over all the other tribes of the same race in spite of all and every written convention.

And, firstly, the political, religious, and social homogeneousness of Poland causes that one of the three partitioners who possesses two-thirds to be irresistably impelled to the acquisition of the remainder, and he, accordingly, thinks, commands, and acts as the presumptive heir of all Slavonia. And the remainder of the race, enslaved from the middle age till now by the Nazegues, the Mongols, the Turks, and the Germans have preserved, beneath the ice of their slavery, all their physical vigour, to commence their tardy national existence only in our own day. The whole of this race, consisting of 85,000,000 of men, occupying something like three-fourths of the surface of Europe, and united by a similarity of language, customs, and prophecies, are profoundly agitated in the expectation of their Mahomet or Messiah. Russia promises them the material conquest of the world on condition of their being firmly united in obedience, and offers to be their Mahomet; whilst Poland, the antithesis of Russia, promises them liberty in a federation of distinct, peaceful and equally-balanced nationalities. She, too, therefore, announces herself as their Messiah; but both undertake to free them from the supremacy of other races, and to give them their turn of taking the initiative in the annals of mankind. It will be readily understood how great an interest Russia has in destroying, if possible, that Polish competition—that Polish antithesis, by first absorbing her in her empire and then making use of her against the other constitutional Slavonic nationalities. It will be equally understood why Russia helps Prussia and Austria to destroy the rival religion in their portions of the spoil of Poland, until the hour strikes (and it has not yet struck) for Russia to raise without competition the banner of that which is called Panslavism against Germany and against the world.

Whilst Russia and Poland represent the two opposing historical poles of the Slavonic race, giving the latter a choice of two diametrically opposite destinies, that race as yet consists only of rudimentary, passive and malleable nationalities

taking part in the struggle between the two champions with all the irresponsible unconsciousness of their age, and are ready to follow the strongest and most fortunate. If the Western powers, for whom the present question will soon become as it now is for us, one of life or death, will give timely aid to Poland, all the other Slavonic nationalities will find themselves at once liberated, without their even having the trouble to enquire whence their safety came. The crushing and devouring mechanism of Russia once decomposed by the separation of Poland, all idea of Panslavism is over for ever, as is likewise the conquering autocracy, and the peril perpetually hanging over the pacific maturity of Europe. The face of affairs in the East would be completely changed at once, and, instead of troubling the West, it would quietly set about the development of its diverse nationalities. From that monstrous assemblage called the Russian empire there would be disengaged amongst others a real and fundamental nationality, called Muscovy, and whose mission would thenceforth be to form of the East of Europe and the North of Asia a confederation similar to the United States of North America.

But should Russia prevail in this duel, all the Slavonic nations, carried away by the conquering torrent like submerged flocks—all confounded in one terrible army under the most impetuous despotism that ever existed, will fall at once upon Germany and Turkey, quickly overcoming the tardy and hesitating resistance of the West by their servile and disciplined masses and by their ethnological unanimity. Poland once assimilated to the Russian empire, all the antidotes, all the warnings, all the promises of liberty addressed by the West to the other Slavonic nations will be unheard in the tumultuous vertigo of their aggressive outbreak; for, with the exception of Poland, none of those tribes have the remembrance of having been independant, or are conscious of political liberty. They have had only the experience of the social yoke of the Turks and Germans, so that even the most absolute Tzar, providing he deliver them from this social yoke which they understand and abhor will be looked upon by them as more than a liberator: he will be to them an avenger.

In presence of that ethnological tempest which would raise Bulgarians, Serbs, Bosnians, and Montenegrins against Turkish domination—would raise 17,000,000 of Galicians, Slovakes, Serbs, Moravians, Bohemians, Croats, Dalmatians, and Illyrians against Austria—would raise 4,000,000 of Pomeranians, Posnanians, Silesians, and others against Prussia—in presence of that blind and furious attack directed against the south and centre of Europe by the disciplined fanaticism of the Russians, combined with the enslaved valour of the Poles, what could be effected by, and what would become of, the most sapient combinations of diplomacy? What then would be the use of all their balances of power founded on the conventions of cabinets, and on the oppression of other nationalities? Where, in that hour of danger, would the West seek auxiliaries to stem the invading torrent of a whole race, the only aggressive race in Europe, because the only race that possesses nothing, and that has all to win back from its spoliators? Would it be the Greeks, who in Turkey form a counterpoise to the Slavons of the Danube? Would the Roumanians, the Hungarians and the Italians arrest

the ruin of Austria? Would the natives of the Rhine provinces fight the Posnanian vanguard of Panslavia?

There remains, you will tell us, to stem this torrent the permanent alliance of England and France. Admitting this union to be eternal, in spite of our experience of human fickleness, of what avail would be all their naval and military strategy against such a continental revolution? Will they continue to remain in the Black Sea, when the Bulgarians and Greeks themselves form the advanced guard of the Panslavian empire on the Bosphorus? Will they have more influence on the Scandinavian states by four months' cruises, than Russia, the terror and Suzerain of Germany will have by continual continental vigilance? Does not the neutrality of Denmark during all the wars of the empire suffice to show that amphibious states are always obliged to make their maritime interests bow to their fears and the continental influences brought to bear upon them? Do not outlying states always yield to the influence of the ruler who reigns in the centre of their system? Suppose that Napoleon had succeeded in establishing his continental system, in ruling all the shores of Europe without keeping a single ship of war, what would have become of the naval and colonial power of England, hard pressed by that continental blockade on the one side and American competition on the other? Well, Panslavism, with the assimilation of Poland to begin with, is the 'continental system' of Russia; but it is more extensive and dangerous than Napoleon's great bonfire, for it depends, not on the lottery of battles and the passage of a meteor, but on undying races who win campaigns whilst they lose battles, and who have enough of Napoleon in themselves to do without Napoleons. They are, it is true, at the service of the most far-seeing, and might as well be made to overwhelm the Tzar as the West; but from this it becomes the more evident that if the West does not hasten to appropriate the Polish crater, the Tzars will soon make of it a Vesuvius, utterly indifferent to the mock sea-fights of the Pompeians. It is then only, when, mistress not only of two muddy and closed lakes, but of an immense extent of coast, of really maritime populations, of illimitable resources and communications, and of the keys of the almost island of Europe, that Russia will be able to accomplish in five years that which Peter, Anne, Elizabeth, Catherine, Alexander, and Nicholas have scarcely begun in a hundred and fifty. Panslavian Russia, suzerain of the Greeks, Scandinavians, and Germans, will no longer shrink from a sea fight, but will rather seek it in your own waters, by keeping on good terms with the Americans, with whom nothing on earth can prevent her dividing the Globe. To convert into a reality this dream of our imagination—an imagination diseased as was that of the good man Noah talking to the statesmen of his day, but one of two things are required: either the immediate conclusion of a peace exceedingly advantageous for you, or, the continuation of the war in the way you have conducted up to the present time. The 'continental system' of the Tzar would be best served by the first; but, failing that *Pletwitz armstice* the other will prove useful to him. Go on, then, if it so please you.

For what has Russia been called to account since her plans are said to have been unveiled, the alliance of England and France made certain, and the German

Powers each day more and more compromised in the coalition? She counts on three great probabilities;—1. That in the weariness of an interminable war the *entente cordiale* will be destroyed by the very cause which gave rise to it. 2. That that honey-moon will last longer than usual, as France and England, having finished and forgotten their era of ethnological transformation, have lost the consciousness of the peril with which they are threatened by this species of revolution in the east, and are, consequently, incapable of attacking their enemy in that part in which he is really vulnerable. 3. That if France and England be disarmed in consequence of their ignorance of this peril, the German Powers will be equally disarmed by their too great consciousness and too great fear of the same.

This third token of security for the Tzar is worthy of our most earnest attention; for, combined with the diplomatic prejudice which insists in making Germany take part in every war against Russia, renders the latter eternally, and, so to speak, mathematically unattackable. At once the accomplices and liberator of Russia for their respective shares of Poland, insolvent debtors of Russia for their portions of Slavonia, subalterns of Russia in the unalterable hierarchy of the vanities of Vienna, Munchengrätz, and Cracow, supported by Poland against the revolutionary winds of the West, but taken in the rear by Russia if the West attacks them, immediately crushed in front if the West sustain them, and crushed on both sides if they remain isolated, these unfortunate German Powers having only the manner of their death to choose have chosen the slow death of a steady vassalage to Russia, and which they seek to disguise under the palms of the Holy Alliance. Russia has no real fear of their revolting, for the Tzar knows that at the decisive moment they will prefer, as the least of two evils, the alliance and protection of Russia. Their task is hard, but, at least, it is familiar to them, and they will not readily abandon it to run the risk of novelties of which no official science could reckon in advance the effects. By dazzling the eyes of Austria with some portion of Turkey, those of Prussia with the supremacy of Germany, and frightening both by speaking of the conquering ambition of France and the terrible phantom of her revolutions, the Tzar, vigilantly watching their hours of weakness, cares little for their ephemeral mutinous fits; for these two artificial states existing by expediency and empiricism, the embarassment of the moment will always suffice to bring them to a full stop should they attempt to stray from their allegiance to the Tzar.

Western diplomacy, unable to understand the ethnological terrors which agitate these two states, thinks to set them permanently against their tyrannical creditor by offering them the support of France and England against him! Small consolation truly for the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine when the furious waves of the ocean of Panslavism shall be beating against the walls of Trieste, Vienna, and Egra! Small consolation for the house of Hohenzollern-Brandenburg when Custrin, Stettin, and Breslau shall have their real names restored by their real defenders! Notwithstanding their ability, therefore, Western diplomatists have no idea of the manner in which they are annoying and compromising these poor but proud houses by proposing to them such a misalliance. What, then, should

they propose to them in order not to offend them, in order not to make of them implacable enemies in the event of any Russian success? At most an armed neutrality which will last until some catastrophe puts an end to the useless and ruinous expeditions to the Black Sea and Baltic. But is not that armed neutrality itself, suspending until then its sword of Damocles over these expeditions, more profitable to Russia than to the allies of Turkey? Is it not manifest, for example, that the invincible resistance of the Russians in the Crimea is solely owing to the liberation of Gortschakoff on the Pruth by the Austrians taking the place of the Turks in the Danubian Principalities? Is it not equally clear that ever since the blockade of the Baltic coasts was established, the commerce of Russia has continued to exist only by the King of Prussia allowing Russian merchandise free transit through his dominions? Can it be denied, above all, that the safety of the Tzar's Polish provinces, whether guaranteed by this armed neutrality, or, still better, by a defensive alliance of the German states with the West, will have the effect of rendering Russia completely invulnerable, and the greatest successes of her enemies elsewhere illusory? Moreover, if two years of costly and bloody apprenticeship which the Western powers have benevolently inflicted upon themselves, has been of any use whatever to them, it has been by showing that in Russia they have an adversary whom they have neither conquered nor even for a single moment checked in the working out of her dark designs, so long as they shall not have overwhelmed her, and torn her asunder piece by piece, nationality by nationality, until they have penetrated to, and laid bare, his Muscovite core.

But, it will be asked, how is Russia to be conquered, that is to say, dismembered, without passing over the body of Germany, and thus, before Russia has been crippled, to provoke a continental coalition against France, a coalition from which the naval assistance of England would be unable to save her? To this question there is and ever will be but one reply: *Raise Russian Poland without the concurrence of the German Powers, and by this means save those powers as surgeons save their patients—without them and in spite of them.* You will never get these sick men—sick in body and in mind, with whom anger takes the place of courage and suspicion of reason, to free themselves by any self-performed operation from even the most painful and dangerous of their ailments; but if you have the address to ease them without asking them, they will recover courage and reason along with health. Prussia and Austria continue to hold their respective slices of Poland only from emulation towards Russia, and this emulation, as odious as it is ridiculous, prevents their seeing that what they deem an essential condition of health is only a sad infirmity. Save them, then, from Russia, and you will restore them to health and wisdom.

Never did Providence more clearly point out the way for a Western crusade in favour of Poland than by the two seas upon which that isthmus rests. And if the German Powers continued to oppose Poland's restoration they would have no better claim to continued existence than Russia herself, and they would thus show that they only sought a pretext for war against the West. But whilst Russian Poland was being raised by means of the naval forces of England and

France, Prussia and Austria would be squabbling about German supremacy, and before they had settled this question a Poland would have sprung up to calm them. In the event of that course being taken neither Austria nor Prussia could raise the slightest national feeling—the least approach to the enthusiasm of 1813, against the West, and, as soon as they saw that you could, and that you were quite determined to rëestablish Poland through Riga and Odessa, their choice would soon be made. It is not unlikely, even, that in proportion as they felt themselves cured and protected from the North wind by the Polish bulwark, they would forget their prejudices against the raising of that bulwark, and benevolently open their Zolverein to the productions of the West, even if they did not supply a York and Schwartzenberg contingent to the crusade. Only, a Poland already established, aiding this contingent, would prevent a repetition of the disreputable pleasantry of 1812 and 1813. From whatever point of view the question is regarded it is equally clear that a Poland, as embryonic as you will, but militant and independant, is absolutely requisite before you can be indifferent to the favourable or unfavonrable disposition of the German powers. So long as you shall not have taken Riga and Odessa for your base, and the plains of the Dwina and the Dnieper for your concentric line, of operations—so long as you shall not have a Polish force for your van-guard, and either Brzesc, Litewski, or Smolensk for your last objective point, the disposition of these powers will always be unfavourable to you. They will treat with you only at the last to refuse you permission even to pronounce the name of Poland. If they dare not interdict the way of the Danube to a French army finding it easier to attack Russia on the Vistula than in the Crimea, they will consider their not doing so such a mighty favour, will make the Frenchmen's debt of gratitude so onerous, and will so din them on their route with their grievances, that when the said army reaches Poland it will have entirely forgotten what it came there for, and will be able to return again only by Anapa or Petro-Pawlosk. A Western army which should take this route without having first excited Poland to insurrection by the help of the fleets, would find itself in the position of the crusaders, depending upon the hospitality of the Greek emperor to enable them to reach the Holy Land, only the faith of these Western soldiers not being quite so great as was that of Peter the Hermit and Conrad, they would be satisfied with one attempt, and, before they reached the source of the Vistula they would understand with M. Thiers that 'that damned Poland is untouchable.'

It is in fact untouchable, as everything else is impossible when you do not set to work in the proper way. But touch it a little from the sea shore on the North and on the South, without asking permission of any intermediary, and you will soon find yourselves perfectly successful with the aid of those very intermediaries whose help you did not solicit. Only be careful to ask nothing from the German Powers, and you will be astonished at the amount of service they will offer to do you. Only find means to carry on the war absolutely without them for three months in Lithuania or Podolia, and you will find them complaining of your being tardy and lukewarm in establishing for them Poland against Russia. But this means you have no need to discover, inasmuch as you have

possessed it ever since you commenced hostilities with the Tzar. You hold this means in your hands for the first and perhaps for the last time in the annals of European conflicts since, by an alliance which never existed before, you can, on the Continent, hold Germany in respect without interfering with her, whilst by sea you can effect a landing in Poland, without any one presuming to gainsay the act.

It is true that, possessing this means, if you do not use it in a frank and proper manner, it will be just as if you possessed it not. And you will *not* use it in a frank and proper manner, if, when you have taken possession of Riga, instead of attacking Cronstadt, seized Odessa in place of besieging Sebastopol, you have no ulterior intention than that of vexing the Tzar and showing the Vienna conference the range of your cannon. The range of your guns is known, and it is not doubt of their power which inspires the friends of Russia with hope. It is rather the belief which they entertain that were you masters not only of Riga and Odessa but of Warsaw itself, you would not employ your advantages in restoring Poland. It is this hope, founded on all you have done during the last two years, which you must hasten to destroy, unless you mean to conclude a peace which will give Russia all that the war might prevent her obtaining, for ever break up the Western alliance, and throw Poland finally into the arms of Panslavism.

It is not, consequently, worth your while to take Riga and Odessa unless you mean to raise the whole of the isthmus between them in insurrection. But this raising of the people in insurrection in itself implies conditions, neither the gravity nor extent of which we wish to disguise; for we abstain from all diplomacy and leave the exercise of that art to those who better understand it than we do. The first of these conditions is that in sending your artillery to Riga and Odessa, you should, as a nation, feel that it is not merely to establish warehouses, as on the coasts of Asia and Africa, that you send them, but that it is to resuscitate an allied, sovereign and free power, a power transmitting its freedom to all the vassals of Russia. If you like not this prospect, think no more of what we have said, leave your artillery where it is, and subscribe at Vienna the three articles of peace above cited. If, on the contrary, by one of those outbursts of patriotism, better than any amount of reflection, and which, more surely than all diplomacy and trading, acquires the empire of the world, you clear this first fosse and accept the costs of a *real Poland*, do not think your trials are then ended. You will also need to learn how to build up that at once delicate and formidable power called a nation, from which Napoleon with all his military and governmental genius, could never obtain anything more than squadrons and battalions, similar to so many others and useless like so many others. But all the mistakes of that great captain, after he came forth from his old Charlemagne world, arose from the fact of his having been born with only the sense of that world, and, consequently, altogether incapable of understanding the Slavonic nationality in general and Polish patriotism in particular. The warnings which he received on this subject, whether from Poles or from Providence, irritated him without enlightening his understanding. It might be said that he perished because of

his not understanding Poland. These warnings and the obstinacy which persisted in disregarding them may, at least, serve to guide the generation which God has called to redeem his faults. But there is at the present day two opinions diametrically opposed to each other as to the means of restoring Poland. The first of these opinions is an exaggeration of the faults of Napoleon, and the second a peurile fanfaronade. The holders of the first say to you: Raise up a Poland, but without the assistance of the Poles; confide the work to the discreet sagacity of the diplomatists, but do not allow the dead to interfere in the work of their resurrection, for they will spoil all. The second say: Poland needs no foreign help; leave her to make her revolution by herself, only holding yourselves ready to sustain her better than you did in 1830.

We will not say how much of hypocrisy or blindness there is in the first of these two pieces of advice; but the second deserves a reply, because it may be given in all sincerity by those who are ignorant of the state in which Poland is at this moment.

Well, then, no; Poland will not rise in insurrection unless an armed, but Polish hand be extended to her from without. She will not rise in insurrection spontaneously, because her social and national organism is at this moment decomposed, at least materially, just as we hope to decompose the monstrous machine of the Tzar, in order to render it harmless. Her provinces are, so to speak, disarticulated, and guarded carefully by her three partitioners. Her population is likewise dismembered—divided into passive instruments of tyranny, in patriots, banished, enchained, or disarmed, and in economical slaves, whose lives and labour only fatten conquest. The whole of the male military population is embodied in the three armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia: 300,000 in the first, 100,000 in the second, and 60,000 in the third. It is from these depôts of stolen goods that you must obtain the 460,000 soldiers of the future Polish army. The 150,000 additional pairs of arms which could be taken from the plough in Poland without causing the army to perish of hunger in six months, will also rise; but they will not rise of their own accord, kept in mental darkness, scattered and crushed as they now are beneath a double oppression, social and political. In place of that half million of Poles carried off or paralyzed during the last two years, so foolishly expended by you, there has been crowded on that great battle field of humanity half a million of grave watchers, who, until the cemeteries of Poland open beneath their feet, will form one single army. These are, be assured, the picked troops of this moral empire. Whilst you seek them at the extremities of Russia and in the several camps, they remain silent and motionless at the centre of Europe relieving each other on guard at that overthrown altar whereon they have sworn their oath of eternal alliance. This is why this altar cannot at this moment rise up again of its own accord. But for this dismemberment, for this oppression, for this purely mechanical hinderance, however heavily it may seem to weigh, there is a remedy as simply sovereign: it is to chemically dissolve the heaviest of the three burdens which press upon Poland and render her motionless—to dissolve it by abstracting from it that Polish element by which it is held together—it is to decompose the Russian

army by means of some Polish armed force, in the same way as the hardest and most voluminous bodies are reduced to powder by means of oxygen gas. To gather this dissolving force, in a free and active condition, it is necessary to seek it not within the territorial limits of Poland, whence it is banished, but without those limits—in the Polish emigration. It is by means of the Polish emigration and only by means of the Polish emigration that you can break the first link of the chain by which the living nation is kept bound down in its triple sepulchre.

Remark that the Polish emigration is a special representation of all the phenomena of Poland's sufferings. That emigration is not, like so many others, either a party vanquished in civil war, or some noble remnant of a noble army, or a surplus population proceeding to colonize foreign lands, or yet a particular and limited caste: it is, on the contrary, the inexhaustible, illimitable and perpetual *élite* of the entire Polish society; it is the free and faithful manifestation abroad of all the internal thoughts and forces of the fatherland paralyzed by tyranny. Consequently, that emigration has neither fixed age nor fixed numbers; for it represents in succession every generation that has endeavoured to cast off the yoke of the foreigner since 1830, and it will represent all those that are to follow until their continual martyrdom tires the continual rigours of Providence. Keeping for its home use only its representations of grief, patience and servitude, the Polish nation communicates to the other nations her militant and resurrectional hopes by this perpetual embassy. Thus, when you would know what entire Poland hopes, desires and promises, it is useless to turn to the nation still gagged and bound; her emigration replies and acts for her until such time as the nation may freely dispose of itself.

But the Polish emigration is not only the verb of Poland, it is also her sword. Only the point of this sword is in the body of Russia; the hilt is out of Russia, out of Poland, and whoever shall seize it will be able to pierce Russia through and deliver Poland with the same blow. The portion of that militant expansion of Poland which you have seen amongst you during the last three and twenty years, is only the mobilized vanguard of the nation—a vanguard inseparable from the endless reserves which only await the beat of a drum to fall in behind it. The number of the emigrants wandering in France, Switzerland, Belgium, Algeria, the East, England, America, and even in Australia, would give no correct idea of the military force to be derived from them; for besides them there are:—1. The emigrants now in Prussia and Austrian Poland, who are flying from the Muscovite conscription, and who are more or less numerous exactly in proportion as they have more or less hope of forming a Polish army out of Poland. 2. All those who, in Russian Poland, are waiting to take in their turn the place of those obliged to fly. 3. All those who, in the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Armies, are waiting for the apparition of a Polish flag on the horizon of Europe. The numerical fighting force of the Polish emigration has, therefore, no other limits than those which the national conscience recognises as necessary in sending abroad such soldiers of the national cause as cannot, in the present state of affairs, find employment at home. It depends entirely upon the amount of sincere solicitude shown to consult that conscience by the other na-

tions interested in the salvation of Poland, whether the Polish emigration w be made use of or disarmed in the present war against Russia. If, like Napole the first, and like some recruiting officers of the present day, who are repudiat by the Polish national conscience, you seek in the Polish emigration only mat rial aid—only blind and stupid machines of war to replace those of which bulle and cholera have deprived you, you will find the emigration thoroughly worthle for that purpose. There are amongst us, as in every other emigration, a fe immoral and needy individuals, who will ask of you money and military appoi ments,—the least depraved for money only, in order to have to furnish y with, in exchange, a neither greater nor less quantity of blood than you co obtain from the quarter of a dragoon's horse purchased at half price from yo own breeders. Believe in our experience and buy two horses. The true s diers, those who give their swords only with their hearts, will refuse you bot and your enemies will take advantage of the fact to persuade you that there no Polish emigration any more than a Polish nation.

But if you understand by the Polish emigration those continual crowds delegates which, for three and twenty years, Poland has been sending to eve free people and every free government, to bid those peoples and governmen aid her meditated insurrection; if you mean that invulnerable and immort soul of the nation which has escaped all temptations as well as all the discourag ments of slavery;—if you mean those Knight-errants of Liberty who have nev broken their vows of self-sacrifice, and whom no trial their laws render nece sary has yet daunted; if, respecting those vows and laws, if you, in accepti the Polish emigration for what it really is, seek only a lever of insurrection a military organization for Poland, and in Poland exclusively, your good fai will be rewarded by the only decisive victory which it is possible to obt

ployed as you might have employed them, would already have opened in the Russian empire a breach the breadth of the whole of Poland.

Give us, then, a foot of earth to unfurl our banner, arms for ourselves and for the country we go to free, freedom to choose our way, and the support and escort of your fleets; do to raise up a Poland only a quarter of what you did to free Spain and Greece; risk for the salvation of an entire nation that which Pitt was so prodigal of for the purpose of restoring a miserable party; do for your perpetual security in Europe and Asia that which your sea-captains do daily for the security of Chinese commerce; in allying ourselves with you we ask no more. Accomodating allies, paying at once for what we have with our blood and reimbursing ourselves at the expense of the enemy, we will cost you, to deliver you for ever from war by victory, only a third of what diplomacy asks to make war permanent, and hardly a hundredth part of what you paid Austria to lose for you the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. Russia being an essentially continental power, and unable seriously to pretend to any maritime expansion until she has extended and consolidated her domination on the Greek and Scandinavian coasts, to attack her naval extremities is absolutely profitless.

2. That continental power of Russia depending solely on the dismemberment of Poland, Russia is vulnerable only in her portion of Poland.

3. But this one vulnerable point of Russia being constantly protected by the German Powers having been sharers in the partition of Poland, the Tzar possesses by his conquest of that country a firm hold upon Germany, the protectorate of Panslavism, and the certainty of being able to retake by land, not only all that may be taken from him on his present seaboard, but also the two naval Keys of Europe.

4. Thus, to reach this one vulnerable and accessible side of the Russian empire, it is requisite to cease asking permission of the German Powers, and to take a road which they cannot interdict. Only when this road has been found and the restoration of Poland taken in hand, will the said powers deny their vassalage to Russia and be forced to act in concert with the West.

5. This lateral way to Poland was opened up on the day when the fleets entered the Black Sea and the Baltic; for Poland is the isthmus which joins those two seas, and both ends of that isthmus are comprised in the Russian part of Poland.

6. When France and England shall have understood that the extremities of that isthmus are Odessa and Riga and not Sebastopol and Cronstadt, they will have to learn how they are then to act in order, from these new bases of operations, to raise up a veritable and useful Poland, a Poland which shall prevent Russian successes in all time to come.

7. That they may not be deceived on this point, we warn the Western Governments that, on one hand, disgusted by cruel experience of five attempts at resurrection by diplomatic means, leading, as could be seen, to nothing but a a sixth and mortal dismemberment, and on the other decapitated, depopulated, and paralyzed internally by her three united oppressors, Poland will respond in arms only to the call of her emigration already armed, and landed in the country. This would be the triumphant return of that delegation of the Polish nation to the other peoples of the earth, which has continually been renewed during the last three and twenty years.

8. Then, any war undertaken against Russia can only end in an armistice, a sure preliminary of Russia's crowning triumph, unless the Polish emigration be armed, with the exclusive aim of opening by means of that vanguard the two gates of Poland, on the Black Sea and on the Baltic.

WHERE, O POLAND, ARE THY LANCES?

Where, O Poland, are thy lances?
Europe needs them once again,
Westward horde on horde are pouring,
Poles, for you we look in vain;
Comes the savage Cossack, onward
Spurs the Tartar with loose rein,
Where, O Poland, are thy lances?
Europe needs them once again.

O, for Kosciusko's legions,
Those Poniatowski led,
They who charged at gory Grochow,
Those who with Dombrowski bled,
Hearts that, Frenchmen, for your glory
Poured their streaming blood like rain;
Where, O Poland, are thy lances,
Europe needs them once again.

Yes, we need them in the struggle
Looked for long, where Europe fights
Armed for all that makes her glory,
Arts and freedom, thoughts and rights:
Shall the Tartar's trampling horse-hoofs
Make the boasts of ages vain?
Where, O Poland, are thy lances?
Europe needs them once again.

Shall no more thy snow white eagle
Sweep the battle as of yore?
Shall we see thy countless pennons
Streaming down the charge no more?
Must we for thy old war-cry
Henceforth listen all in vain?
Where, O Poland, are thy lances?
Europe needs them once again.

W. C. BENNETT.

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REPORT

OF

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OF THE

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THE POLISH ANNIVERSARY:

[*Commemorated at Hanover-Square Rooms, London, November* 29, 1853.]

As the revival of Polish agitation in England, again to make the sacred cause of Poland dear as of old to English hearts,—as the first public manifestation in England of the European Central Democratic Committee,—and as the first open recognition of English Republicanism as one with European Republicanism,—for many a day there has been no meeting so important as that which celebrated on the evening of the 29th of November last the twenty-third anniversary of the POLISH INSURRECTION. It was the first public gathering of representatives of European Nationalities, in Poland's name and in their own to demand help of England, and to proclaim on English soil the new campaign against the Unholy Alliance of Kings.

MR WORCELL (Member of the Polish Central Democratic Committee and of the European Central Democratic Committee) took the chair, and, excusing himself from speaking, on account of illness, called on his friend Mr Linton to read the following

ADDRESS OF THE POLISH COMMITTEE.

In calling together, for a general and solemn commemoration of the twenty-third anniversary of the Polish Revolution, the representatives of so many different nationalities, the Polish Democratic Committee needs to explain its motive: that motive is the new era which the passage of the Danube by the Turks seems to be opening for the oppressed and down-trodden peoples.

While Poland was not called upon to resume her interrupted but unended struggle, the commemoration of her last national effort was merely an encouragement for her sons to persevere, and an occasion for profound and sad, although glorious, lessons for them.

And when the end of our revolution shall have been attained, old errors amended, old omissions supplied, and the people of Poland established in the

fullness of their national, political, and social rights, then this same anniversary, celebrated on our own reconquered soil, will be an occasion of joyful and glorious congratulations, a grand, universal, national festival.

But now, when our chief enemy is for the first time since 1830 stayed in his onward course toward the fulfilment of his hereditary ambitious schemes, when this enemy happens to be the key-stone of European absolutism, but for whom four years ago the whole rotten edifice of the unholy alliance of kings against peoples would have crumbled to pieces everywhere, from Hungary to Venice and to Rome,—now, when Russian Tzarism, this Tartar-Byzantine excrescence ingrafted upon the oaken stem of a stout and strong Slavonian race, is tottering under the weight of its own crimes, it is for us, the eldest and most aggrieved of its victims, before beginning the great battle of Humanity, to call forth to our sister nations—'The hour of deliverance strikes.' Therefore this anniversary is neither a mere commemoration of past events, nor a posthumous triumph for bygone glory, but an appeal from Poland to Europe and to the world, a manifestation of life in the shadow of death, a link between the past and the future, a summons, an act of alliance, an oath, like that at Grutli, on the altar of universal brotherhood, nor an oath only, but a deed.

Therefore you see here, side by side with Poles, the men who proclaimed the Republic at the Hotel-de-Ville in Paris; those who upon the abandoned Papal throne planted their sublime banner of *God and the People;* those who at Berlin, Vienna, Dresden, and Carlsruhe, made kings to doff their hats in homage to the peoples' royal will; those who in Hungary threw off allegiance to an emperor, and transferred the sovereign power from him to the enfranchised slaves—to the whole people of Hungary.

Therefore you see beside us the noble sons of future, free, democratic, progressive Russia, who, successors of the Mouravieffs and Pestel, have entered into fraternal alliance with the democracy of Poland, forming at once a treaty between two hitherto divided nations, and between the martyrs and future conquerors of Russian freedom.

Therefore, also, we have invited to this fraternal gathering of nations those sons of England who sympathize with freedom even beyond their own shores and believe in international duties as well as national rights. We hereby fulfil our own sacred duty, and render a worthy homage to the hospitable land which affords us shelter, by placing our fraternal manifestation under the protection of the English people, and consecrating upon English soil an altar to universal brotherhood.

To you all we have something to say; from each something to hear.

The time for contention and dispute between fellow-democrats, the season of mere words, is passed. The time of union for common action is come: union arouud the most conspicuous banner, and with the most strongly organized body. Here then we have no new matters to settle, no still undecided resolutions to pass. We have but to express a ready will and give the pledges of our fidelity. Each of the different nationalities will give its own, and these united in a single fascis, by the ties of fraternity, will constitute our common standard in the ensuing struggle.

Poland, who has convoked you, begins by laying down her pledge; that pledge is the Revolution of the 29th of November, 1830, of which the blood and glory of Grochof and Ostrolenka,[b] the voluntary exile of her innumerable sons, her suppressed conspiracies, her martyrs, the Cracow manifesto of 1846, the massacres of Gallicia, the prisoners of Berlin and Kufstein, those condemned to the mines in Siberia, the combatants at Ksionz and Miloslav, at Rome, Dresden, Baden, Isaschek, and Temesvar, and wherever liberty's banner has been uplifted, are but continuations. What Poland was on the twenty-ninth of November, 1830, what she has been since, she now is. Ready again in the fullness of her life, at the first call of events, to complete the work which on this night twenty-three years ago she boldly began. This is Poland's pledge.

Listen to what we have now to say.

Now that the war is begun, beware of an untimely peace!

Beware of the wounded wolf! If not killed, he will kill you.

So will Russian Tzarism, if Turkey should be constrained to conclude a peace upon the Pruth out of respect for former unjust and liberticide treaties, before the peoples are up, before the nations that have fallen a prey to Russia are again free to repel its power, before Poland has arisen to separate Russia from her accomplices, and fill her hand with work for the sake of even her own subjects.

If Turkey be so constrained, the three partitioning powers will be not only as strong as ever, but much stronger, as their own internal enemy will have been again cheated of his hopes, and left a prey to their revenge.

Then Russia will have only recoiled to better spring upon its prey, to seize Constantinople, to become at one fell swoop master of the East and of the West —lord of Europe.

What, then, is it we all have to do? The oppressed to become free: the free not to allow their rulers to stop the progress of the struggle toward freedom. Of this struggle the war in Turkey is but the beginning.

This, on the twenty-third anniversary of her revolution, is Poland's last cry from her tomb. When once she has risen again she will have but to congratulate Europe upon the final conquest of liberty for all.

M. Zdenowick (Member of the Polish Central Committee) read the same address in Polish, and M. Gouache in French.

Mr A. Herzen (a Russian) spoke for Russia:—

Citizens!—It is five years, this 29th of November, since my friend Michael Bakounin appeared at the tribune, at a Polish Meeting held in Paris. He then proposed an alliance between Democratic Poland and the revolutionary Russians.

Poland amnesties us: breaking the partnership which naturally exists between a people

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[b] The battle of Grochof (a village near Warsaw), was fought on the 25th of February, '31. That of Ostrolenka, on the 26th of May in the same year.

At Ksionz, April 29, '48, the Poles, who had trusted the 'revolutionary' King of Prussia, were treacherously attacked by the Prussian forces. 400 men fought their way through 4,000. On the 30th, at Miloslav, Mieroslawski, with 3000 men, mostly armed with scythes, completely routed General Colomb, with 10,000 Prussians.

The Hungarians owed the victory of Isaschek to the valour of the Polish Legion.

and its government, she reaches forth her hand to us, for she knows how deep a hate possesses us against the rule of Petersburgh, and she begins to love us for this hate.

I present myself before my Polish friends not as an isolated individual denying his country, seeking to have his origin forgotten, but, on the contrary, I boldly avow both my love for Russia and my not-to-be-shaken faith in the revolutionary future of my country.

And it is thus that they accept me, as the accidental representative of a future Russia, of a Russia which abhors the misdeeds of its government, which seeks to wash out the blood of the Polish martyrs by labouring for the emancipation of Poland.

Citizens! when the Poles reach out their scarred hands to Russians in sign of reconciliation, is it possible to doubt the existence of revolutionary elements in Russia? To the Poles, the implacable and natural enemies of official Russia, belongs the honour of having better judged the Russians than others have done.

There are yet some men who can not fit together in their heads the words *Revolutionist* and *Russian*. In pronouncing the word Russia, they think always of the Tzar, the Knout and Siberia, of a half-savage people kneeling before a Dalai-Lama in uniform and jack-boots, and, going no farther, they pass judgement. They talk of the fraternity of peoples, the alliance of nations, and are content to judge one of the vastest countries in the world in this fashion.

Since absolutism has ceased to be only Russian, since it has become continental, European, it is easier for us to explain our position.

It is seldom that the governmental formrepresents the complete formula of the popular life, especially in a time of crisis like ours, when Humanity is changing its skin, when the whole world is giving way, and a new world knocks at the door; when governments prove to us every day their impotence, not only to give liberty to the peoples, but even to keep them in slavery.

And this is not all. The historical development of Russia has been entirely different from that of the West; moreover the expression of revolutionary tendences and even the tendences themselves of this country do not coincide with the phases of the European revolution— *the past revolution:* but perhaps they have as much affinity with *the future revolution.*

Russia is a country of the greatest contradictions, of the most flagrant antinomies. Communism below and despotism on high, and between the two a fluctuating nobility, fearing a jacquerie from beneath and the hulks from above, and carrying at its heart, along with a revolting degradation and depravity, revolutionary passions concentrated and ardent. It is from them have come forth the Pestels and the Mouraviefs, the Petrochofskys [c] and the Bakounins.

With us there is no stopping half-way, we are stationary or go right to the end.

Pestel asked no less than a social revolution. Before 1825!

If Bakounin has been sometimes misunderstood, it has been on account of his socialism.

All that chains you to the old world has no existence for us. Russia breaks at once all the bonds of religion, tradition, and authority, has nothing to manage, nothing to conserve, nothing to love. But very much to hate. Its position with regard to the old world is precisely that of the proletarians: it has had nothing but misery, serfdom, tears, and shame.

So these two disinherited ones will have a common resurrection: the social revolution.

It is true we are but a small minority in Russia; and we have remained the more pow-

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[c] Petrochofski was the founder of a secret society, and the chief of the last conspiracy discovered in Russia,—that of 1849. He was condemned in 1850.

erless through having kept ourselves too far aloof from our own people and much too near to the political parties of the West. These parties had a transitory meaning for Europe; but none at all for Russia. This has at last been felt; and there our future begins.

However, no illusions. We are still feeble; but do you really believe that the emperor Nicholas is as strong as he is said to be? I will throw some doubt on it.

They make of the emperor of Russia a sort of bugbear, a bluebeard; they have so talked and written about him, that they have really taken fright. The continent has fallen so low that from all points of Europe they see approach, like the commander's statue (in Don Giovanni), the Emperor Nicholas on a block of ice, threatening notes and protocols, commanding armies of spies, diplomatic agents, and German princes. This position has been made for him by the Reaction. But the weakness, the dastardliness, of the conservatives does not constitute a real force for the Tzar. It is not of his own essence.

At last, thank God! his head is turned, and for once he thinks that he is really the arbiter of Europe and of Asia: so he descends into the arena. Well, what has he done after all his noise and ultimatum, and Menschikof and Gortchakof, and catholic Te-Deums at Olmutz and Lutheran parades at Potsdam, and manifestoes with texts from the Bible and texts from the treaty of Kutchuk-Carnardzi?

All he has managed to do for the orthodox Greek church has been to get himself well beaten by Omar Pasha and to pick the pocket of a poor Wallachian Hospodar. Events may change, but the honours remain with Abdul-Medjid.

And yet, Citizens! Russia herself is strong. But the imperial power such as it now is can not call out this strength: it is a vicious and degenerate institution.

Russian imperialism, which from its beginning has been nothing but an *anticipated Bonapartism (cheers)*, is neither Russian nor Slavonian. It has no root, is provisional, temporary, a dictature, a perpetual state of siege elevated to the height of a governmental principle. It corresponded to the exigences of a given time, but the country, becoming enfeebled under the somnolent rule of the Tzars, required awakening, strengthening, and to be launched upon new ways. Thus perhaps imperialism was necessary in the time of Peter; and thus it has become absurd in the time of Nicholas. And this is why his sad, gloomy, and heavy reign has been so astonishingly barren and void of capacity.

The imperial power had reached its height at the moment of the fall of Napoleon: when Alexander entered Paris with his suite of kings, whom he kept from pillage and from theft. The grand vocation to which he was called by the madness of the Napoleon epoch crushed him. He was not the man for such a part; his bent figure perfectly expressed that a too-heavy load was weighing on him. Distraught and melancholy, he went to stretch himself, alone and unnoticed, in a little port of the Black Sea.

Hardly were the news spread of his death, when the true heir made his rights respected. The true heir was not Constantine, nor Nicholas.

It was the insurrection upon Isaac's plain. *(Loud cheers)* The struggle was imminent, perhaps the defeat also: but the character of the struggle is too closely connected with the person of the conqueror not to say some words of him.

Alexander had been taught by La Harpe and educated by Catherine. He had witnessed the great revolution, had been a player in the bloody stake for empire. He had acquired a certain intellect like his cotemporaries and the civilized manners of a well-bred man.

The man who followed Alexander, the Agamemnon of the Reaction, was quite another thing. His reminiscences went not beyond the barracks of the imperial guard. He had been educated in the guards, and on the parade-ground. He was under age when his father went mad and was assassinated. His mother, a good simple German, was all-

absorbed in etiquette and farming. His eldest brother had enough to do with Napoleon; and Constantine could only deprave him. No one looked on him as the future Emperor: the heir of the throne was Constantine. No charitable soul ever took care of him to prevent his heart from hardening in this atmosphere of pacific bivouacs and riding-schools. He ascended the throne, knowing nothing of the spirit of his time; he took the revolution for an insubordination. He wrote, referring to the insurrection of December 26th, that it was on the day of *the defence of the Winter Palace.*

Along with that he has a barrack hatred of science, the officer's hatred of whatever is not military, the superior's hatred of everything like a reply; a frantic love of absolute power and passive obedience; and all this without any determined object, without an ideal without even any eccentricity.

One can not say he has wanted time. His sad reign has lasted twenty-seven years, and he has absolutely done nothing, except as autocrat, for his autocracy.

The type of his works is the war in the Caucasus, which, after absorbing whole armies, is exactly where it was twenty-five years back.

He has decimated, martyred, oppressed, assimilated Poland; and he dares not move a battalion, for Poland is always ready to rise against him.

In Russia he has persecuted books and schools, professors and authors, thought and speech. And in 1849 they discovered revolutionary clubs at three paces from the Palace.

He made war upon Turkey in 1828: that is to say he let some hundreds of thousands of men perish in that country of typhus and the plague, without really obtaining anything.

When he conquers you may be sure that he has bought some Georgey, some wretched Pasha, some traitor or other.

Decidedly he is a very unhappy man. *(Laughter)* And he feels it. Wherefore he is so restless and so sombre.

The life which thirty years since yet remained in the Winter Palace, and which he drove away, will never return to it. No great capacity, no intellect beyond the common, comes to his aid. Nicholas governs the state by his ordinances, by his copying clerks. It is easy; but nothing comes of it. Theft, collusions, perversions, are organized into a system.

He would dispatch an army: it dies upon the way, of famine and misery. He would emancipate the peasants: they point out to him the bloody series of his predecessors, slain by the nobles. He no longer would emancipate: they foretell a jacquerie and Pougatchof.[d] The minister of the interior denounces to him one of the chiefs of the police, guilty of extortion practised on the inhabitants of Petersburgh:—'I know it'—replies Nicholas—I sleep tranquilly, for this man watches over me.'

Do you think such a government is strong?

The Emperor of Russia hazards a war against Turkey, knowing very well that if monarchical Europe likes not to see him at Constantinople, it likes less to see the Republic —the real republic, understand—at Paris. The European Monarchies, from the ferocious carnage-colour of the King of Naples to the 'honest and moderate' tone of the kings of Belgium and Turin, dare not engage in a serious war against the Tzar. There is too much of the Tzar in their own bosoms.

Nor is it any the more for a Bonaparte, a wretch covered with blood, French and

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[d] Pougatchof was the Cossack leader of a formidable insurrection at the beginning of the reign of Catherine II. He maintained his position during a whole month, and had four provinces under him. He was at length put down, and, being betrayed to the Empress' generals, was executed at Moscow on the 10th of June, 1775. This revolt cost the lives of 100,000 men.

Roman blood, a despot by birth and a tyrant by race, to strike a blow against his colleague at Petersburgh. He has too much need of him. Besides it is not for kings, our enemies, to work for us.

Let us work for ourselves, and join our forces. 'When'—wrote to me, some days since, my venerable friend Michelet—'the Poles unite with the Russians, what hate can hold out?'

To our union, Citizens!—to Poland so great in her unequal struggle, so persevering in her heroism, so sublime in her misfortunes! But also to the revolutionary minority in Russia!

Permit me to exclaim in Russian—Long Live Poland independent and Russia free!

Mr W. J. LINTON followed:—

Why are we Englishmen here to-night? Why does an Englishman stand among the Refugees to speak his word for European hopes? Because, while there are Englishmen who are not ashamed of the faith of Milton and of Cromwell, England shall not be divorced from Europe. Because, while there are Englishmen who desire to be worthy of England's old republican glories, it is their duty to stand by the republicans of other lands and guarantee their promises of the Universal Republic. Therefore we Englishmen listen to-night to the chiefs of the European army; therefore I am bold to speak my English word for England: and one word methinks ought to be enough——War! *(cheers)* If England as one man would earnestly and distinctly speak that word, the hopes of Freedom would be as swift as they are sure.

War!— War against the Tzar, war against despotism, war against wrong. What other can be the duty of England, the duty of every nation—a people organized to serve God, to worship the True and the Everlasting?—There was a time when England was so organized: when Vane sate at her council-board, when Milton spoke her will, and Blake and Cromwell did it. In the day when England had an honest government and men for rulers, a far less wrong than this invasion of Turkey had kindled such a beacon on her white-faced cliffs as should have lit the remotest lands along their path of vengeance.

Now, if Richard Cobden's word is to be taken, we ought to be heedless of injury to others, neglectful of honour, abandoners of Duty. And indeed such cowardice might be but consistent beneath the rule of all those creeping things called statesmen now hiding in the crown that once was worn by an Elizabeth and an Alfred. With a Court (I have nothing to do here with private respectability) which is kin and kind to every rascal royalty in Europe *(cheers)*,—with such vice-royalties as Aberdeen and Palmerston and Russell, the petty intriguers who have not the manliness to be anything else than the tools of Austria and the Tzar *(cheers)*,—it might be but consistent that the whole country should be cowardly to the core.

But Hampden's England can not be so vile. The self-seeking, commercial, diplomatic, peace-mongering shabbinesses that have made England seem but as a nest of vermin are not natural to our life. We are not a people of dastards. There is a heart, I believe, even under the sleekest broad-cloth; I know there is under the worst coat of the working-man. I am here to-night to say that the true-hearted honest working-men of England have but one wish in this matter,—that their word is mine,—that their voice is unanimous for war. War against the Tzar. War for European freedom.

I believe that every patriot soul in England is eager for this righteous war. (*Loud cheers*)

I believe that if our government dared ask the people's will—that word War would be so thundered back, the very reverberation would shake them from their seats. They do not ask it, for it might drive them too far and spoil the game they intend to play: the

game of Nicholas and Gallician Metternich, the game of the tyrants everywhere, to whom, whether it be arms or armistice, they are plotting to betray at once the liberties of Europe and the honour of this England. They are base enough for that while we are fools enough to leave them power.

'Why do we leave them power?'— Why are not all men honest? Why is Wrong crowned, and Apathy easily bribed, and honester Thought so circumspect, so cautious, and so constitutionally afraid? Need I say more? I would not blush too deeply for my countrymen in the presence of the leaders of insurrectionary Europe. But believe that, however slow-thoughted we may be, England at length begins to know her duty—to perceive that interest is but the follower of duty. Her wrath is rising at the shameful tricks that have been played in her name, dishonouring her through Europe; she begins to see that these treaties of Vienna were a conspiracy against England too; that even into her own side pierced the dagger that murdered Poland. No! not murdered. Poland can not be murdered. The mangled limbs shall be found and brought together, and the life that now lingers in these noble remains reanimate a living and a mighty nation.

War with Russia. I know as well as Cobden and Aberdeen what that means. I know that it means war against Austria and Prussia too. I know that, honestly carried out and no sham war to procure a despots' peace, it means the resurrection of Poland, the insurrection of Italy and Hungary. I know that it means convulsion in Europe; the shattering to pieces of the Tzar, and the Pope, and the imperial tyrant of whatever name. I know too that in their fall all the lesser tyrannies will be dragged down both at home and abroad. No wonder it is dreaded by old women and whigs and waiters on providence and hangers-on at courts. I know it means a new arrangement instead of the present dismemberment of Europe. It means the enfranchisement of the peoples. It means a Polish nation and a Russian nation, a Germany rid of her hydra-headed monarchy, an Italy with Mazzini again at Rome, a France gloriously avenged of her present ignominy, an England worthy of what England was. Let it mean all this. And if all this was calamity, still we would say—'let justice be done, though the heavens fall.' As it is, however, I say—let justice be done and these glad heavens descend swiftly upon our sad and storm-bewildered earth.

War with Russia must include the real means of making it successful. It must mean not only a fleet in the Black Sea, but in the Baltic also. It may mean the bombardment of Petersburgh, the sending subsidies and men to clear a way to Warsaw. It means every honest boldness which can be serviceable for the utter prostration of continental despotism. That is what the war is for.

It is so understanding it, that in the name of the Democracy of England, in the name especially of the Republicans who would organize that democracy, I am bold to add one English voice to your battle-shout:—War against the Tzar! Down with the Emperor and the Pope! War to the death against Wrong! Life and freedom to Poland and Italy! to France and Germany! to Russia and to England! Many an English heart pours forth its prayer through me; and would that my voice was trumpet-toned to rouse the deadest sleeper in the land, till the whole people rose as one man to echo it, a practical people to pray fervently and effectually—God speed the European Republic!

Here in London we celebrate once more the anniversary of the Polish Insurrection. May the next be kept at Warsaw! The first feast of European Redemption.

The ties which bind England to Poland are not but of yesterday. Two hundred years ago our greatest Englishman dedicated his work on Education to a Polish friend. Now Poland is one glorious lesson dedicated to us and to the world. Her martyrs tread our honoured streets. Let us pave their homeward way with help such as may suit their

worth. If we can not give them national, let us at least give persona. ·lp. Let it be said in the future: the English people always deserved well of Poland. God ·.ed her certain triumph!— Again I say—God speed the European Republic!

DR ARNOLD RUGE (the German Member of the European Central ⊥ ·no-cratic Committee) spoke next in German:—

Our friends, the Poles, have wished me to say a few words to-night in the name of the Germans. In the name of those disgraced and debased Germans who have betrayed both themselves and their dearest interests to the Russians, I have nothing to say: but in the name of history, and those eternal principles of freedom which indissolubly unite us to the Poles, I am about to speak: for it is the duty of every one to do so, if he can.

The relation in which the Germans and the Slavonians stand toward each other is of such importance to the continent that every difficulty rises from its perversion; while every political question may be settled as soon as the Germans and the Slavonians come to a proper understanding.

The first relation was that of the Germans as conquerors, extirpating the Slavonians, their language, their manners, and their traditions. From the Elbe to the Baltic the Slavonians have entirely disappeared.

A later and more friendly relation was that of the Germans and the Poles in the middle ages, which lasted so long as their religion and their institutions remained similar. But when the Poles preserved both their aristocracy and Catholicism, and the Germans introduced their Reformation and their despotism, an estrangement took place; the Polish Republic fell under the weight of its own errors, and under the blindness of the German cabinets, which through the partition of Poland lost their only friends among the Slavonians.

Since then the Germans find themselves opposed by the combined force and hatred of all the Slavonians directed, if not commanded by, Russia.

When the Revolution of 1848 occurred, the Slavonians—Russians, Croats, Chekhs—supported the counter-revolution: thus avenging on the Germans the oppression they had experienced at their hands. The Germans, even those bragging Nationalists, understand now that they are indeed the slaves of the Slavonians.— Their Emperor resides at Petersburgh.

It is true the Germans have organized the Russian tyranny, and are at this moment the real springs of the army and the police, the Tzar's only means of government. But now the question is no more a national one, it has become a party-question. The parties are either for the revolution or for the counter-revolution.

For her own freedom's sake, then, Germany should not only have freed the Poles from the prisons of Berlin, but likewise redeemed the revolutionary Polish nation from the reactionary Russians. If by their education the Chekhs, Croats, and Russians—slighted as they always have been—have sided with the reaction, the Poles have been reared for revolution. Their fate has deprived them of all other hope, and it is only through a revolution that they can expect the regeneration of their republic. Hence, wherever there has been a struggle for liberty, the Poles have been found in the foremost ranks.

Why then did the Germans of 1848 mistake their duty and their interest?—Because our revolution was only a half one, and our people only nationally and tyrannically minded. The great nation of forty-four millions was determined not to lose a single village in which the German tongue was spoken: a rage for declaring war against the Poles, the Italians, and the Danes, a fear of dividing these forty-four millions by losing the Chekhs and other small populations, dominated the parliamentary majorities, and,

judging from the absurd Schleswig-Holstein question, the public opinion of that period also.

The majorities, and that public which could be enthusiastic for Radetzky at Milan, for Father Colomb in Posen, and for Wrangel in Holstein, have had time to become conscious of all their stupidity. Freedom perished, and tyrannical Germany, the great nation of forty-four millions, with all its German-speaking villages, is now nothing but an appanage of Russia. The linguistic and geographical policy of the national German fools has extended the frontiers of Russian tyranny to the North Sea and the Rhine.

The Polish question is a question of European freedom. The whole counter-revolution conspires against the Poles; it is therefore only a general radical revolution which can solve the problem of a free Poland. The democratic and social republic alone has no geographical and territorial interest, but a human one. That interest alone is the interest of *every free man*, and consequently the right policy of the German nation. And indeed the Germans will not become free until they learn to understand this: not to possess a large territory, but to consist of free citizens makes the greatness of a nation.

But for that reason also may the Poles confide in the German democrats. When the Germans shall thoroughly understand their own interest—and they are daily learning it in a terrible school—then they will perceive that it is one and the same with that of the Poles: namely, to be members of a free commonwealth.

We, who already in 1848 declared this against all national and tyrannical desires, are now in exile; and our opponents of that time—where are they? All of them remain under the old yoke. But we shall return; our principles will once more move the peoples; and then we shall solve the Polish Question.

Dr Paul Darasz (a Pole, and brother of the late Albert Darasz) spoke in French. It was less to excite sympathy for the Poles that he appealed to the meeting, than to assert the immortal and unquenchable spirit of Polish nationality. *(cheers)* He then quoted some eloquent passages from an address made in the French Chamber of Deputies, in 1846, by Victor Hugo, on the subject of Poland; and referred to the writings of Salvandy, minister of Louis Philippe, for analogous sentiments in favour of the independence of that country. The whole of Europe, for nearly a century, had been crushed under a semi-savage state like Russia; Austria and Prussia were but its tools; and Poland now supposed to be overcome, Turkey was to be the next prey. It was no moment for diplomatic accommodations, when throughout Europe all was anarchy, revolution, and war. Passing under review the position of the European states, he showed the need of Polish freedom for the sake of European civilization, pointed out the duty and interest of England to take part with the peoples against despotism, and bade his countrymen be ready for the approaching combat.

Dr Ronay (a Hungarian clergyman) addressed the English part of the audience in their own tongue. After some preliminary remarks, he said:—

On the shores of the mighty Danube, in the beautiful valley of the Carpathian mountains lies Hungary, my dear and ever memorable father-land!—and beyond the Carpathian range, lies Poland, united centuries ago with Hungary by an alliance sealed with the blood of its noblest sons!

There live the people of Hungary and Poland; their hearts, although darkened by misfortunes, still foster the smouldering fire of freedom; their arms, although chained, are still strong to break their fetters, to forge them into weapons and to level to the ground

the impious chain-manufactories of Austria and Russia, where the crafty forgemen are crowned tyrants.

There on both sides of the Carpathians still exist our races, and amongst the ruins of their homes, and amongst the ruins of their broken hearts, rises once more the hope of freedom, the hope of future glory and happiness.

The noble Padisha, the only European prince who does not profess Christianity, and yet the only one who faithfully and fearlessly fulfils the injunctions of Christianity, has drawn his victorious sword. What will be the result?

The Sultan can stand against his enemies, but he can not stand against his friends.

The greatest difficulty in the arrangement of the Eastern affairs is, that the Sultan has only one Constantinople instead of five; had he five, each of his faithful friends, and each of the spotless defenders of the Christian faith, would take one, and drive him back, no matter where, perhaps into the barren wilds of Siberia.

However you may confide in diplomatic sincerity, I hold the firm conviction that in our days, more harm, more insult, more injustice has been done to humanity by the pen of ministers than by the sword of soldiers.

I have no faith in diplomacy, but I have a strong and unswerving faith in destiny; and the destiny of our race can not be slavery, and the destiny of the human mind can not be darkness; it must be light, it shall be the sacred light of civil and religious freedom.

The day of retribution is not far off; and when that day shall come, when the star of freedom shall rise, I trust there will also rise a man from amongst the people of England, who, with the few words of your immortal Nelson, 'England expects that every man will do his duty,' shall join the great struggle for universal freedom, shall gain the victory over the tyrants, and secure freedom and happiness all over the civilized world!

Then turning to the Poles, and speaking in Latin, he concluded:—

What should I say to you, brethren! on this solemn day? Whilst with one hand we perform the funeral rites for those who fell gloriously for their country, with the other let us uplift the arms and ensigns of liberty, that, inspired with the heroic spirit of the Turks, we may lay down our lives and give our blood for our country.

What should I say to you?

I have one word, and this word is written in the pages of the Bible:—'Put not your trust in princes!' (*cheers*)

I have one word, which more than once hath made the sceptres of the tyrants to tremble; and this word uttered from a manly breast is:—Let us die for liberty!

I have one last word, the expression of my whole soul, and this word is:—

Fatal catastrophe of servitude and sarcophagus of liberty, that on which was inscribed the end of Poland ('Finis Poloniæ'). The record of that day of loss be obliterated, and on the banner of liberty be inscribed in characters of flame—The beginning of Poland!—the beginning of Hungary!

Mr Linton then read the following letter to the Chairman of the Meeting, from Mr Mazzini:—

My dear Friend,—Nothing but illness could prevent me from attending at your anniversary meeting. I am hoarse, neuralgic, feverish, coughing. Unable to take the least part in your proceedings, I would only prove a trouble to the bystanders. I, however, am the loser. Soul, mind, affection, you have me all. We have stuck our flag to the mast, some twenty-two years ago, since the first days of our proscription. Old in years, not in spirits, we still hold by it—brothers as ever, brothers for ever. Poverty, deceptions, betrayals, schisms and feuds,

all the bitternesses of a long exile, all the curses of prevailing materialism and indifference, have assailed us by turn. But we, thank God! did not flinch. We have spurned the devil and his temptations. We have seen our beacons one by one disappearing, and darkness prevailing all around us. But our guiding star was on high, far above all temporary events; and we never missed it. There was no darkness in our soul. Despair is the darkness of the soul; and we could not despair. We had long ago clung to things immortal: God, duty, liberty, self-sacrifice, ever-living and progressing collective Humanity. In that common faith we had grasped each other's hands, and no darkness could make us loosen the grasp, and nothing will. Depend upon me, God has blessed, not our efforts, but our constancy, our long-kept brotherly alliance. In Savoy, in Lombardy, in Rome, whenever there has been a summoning for us to act against lies and oppression, we have been ready to perish together. Therefore we shall one of these days, conquer together; and, meanwhile, let our souls, in this commemoratory evening, renew once more our alliance. Through all my feeling I do commune with you all, my proscribed brothers! and spite of bodily absence, in faith, hope, and a firm determination of carrying on to the last the sacred struggle for Truth and Liberty, for the emancipation of our own countries, and for the still higher aim—unity of mankind.

I send a short address to your Polish Central Democratic Committee. Perhaps you will be so good as to read it to your countrymen present. And as to the English sympathizers who will be in the room, all that I could have said to them about the actual moment, and about the precious opportunity of reviving an active, regular Polish agitation throughout England, will be more eloquently said by the friends and colleagues whose names are on your list. But, could I venture to suggest to you and to your countrymen the course I should wish to see adopted, I would say:—

Stand up resolutely on the high ground which befits our cause, and the frank, straightforward men whom you want to become its supporters. Do not narrow the question to the proportions of an interest. Speak to them of duty. You are sure of having your appeal responded to. There is still lurking within the soul of every honest British citizen a spark of the old sacred fire which burned in the hearts of Milton and Cromwell. Stir it up boldly, and never fear. The people for whom Nelson had no other speech than the concise one—'England expects to-day every man to do his duty'—has not been, can not be, corrupted by the crooked, weak, immoral policy of diplomacy. Speak to them of duty. Tell them that their actual duty is War: war, for the purpose of ascertaining whether Europe is to be given up defenceless to the successive encroachments of despotism, or to be the free, orderly, peacefully-progressing God's Europe: war, for the purpose of solving once for all the problem of ages, whether man is to be a passive slave trampled upon by brutal, organized force, or a free agent, responsible for his own actions before his Maker and his fellow-brothers: war, because it is a sin and a shame that interference should be always allowed to despots for evil-doing, never applied by the good and free to the improvement or protection of the nations: war, because it is unworthy of England to stand impassive by a murderous conflict, and to repeat the words of the Accursed—'Am

I my brother's keeper?'—war, because nations die from dishonour as much as from tyranny: war, because it is never too late for expiating, and an expiation is wanted to the sinful, unprincipled, un-English policy, which immoveably saw —nay, lent directly or indirectly an arm to—the fall of Poland, the fall of Hungary, the fall of Venice, the fall of Rome: war for the noble aim of seeing Truth and Right restored, tyranny stopped in its reckless career, nations happy and free, God's earth smiling anew, religious and political liberty enthroned, and England proud and powerful with the sympathies and blessings of benefited peoples. Tell them these things. Tell them that had Poland been, had Hungary been, had Italy been, war would not now be a sad unavoidable necessity, a heavy duty to be fulfilled. Tell them that there is an unity of life in mankind which does not allow wrong to be done or tolerated without the consequences falling soon or late on the whole; that as cholera comes to bid us to take care that there should not be abject, filthy, degrading poverty throughout the land, so war comes as a teaching that there can be no permanent peace, no mutual trust, no stability of human affairs, unless justice, right, and liberty are first made the ground for a true balance of power in Europe. And tell them, lastly, to beware. War is, to all probability, unavoidable. Let it be for God's and Humanity's sake, *the War*, the one good, true, decisive battle for a high principle, the last battle for many generations to come. Let it be the war of England, not of Lord Clarendon and Lord Aberdeen. Let them watch closely the conduct of their government; and let them not allow English brave blood to be spilt for the mere object of achieving a poor, immoral, transitory diplomatic contrivance, leaving the evil to grow again out of its root a few years after, and causes of war to perpetuate themselves. They would sin to us, to themselves, and to the future destinies of England. Ever yours, Joseph Mazzini.

Mazzini's second letter, in French, was read by his countryman Colonel Pianciani. As follows:

Brothers! Our alliance dates far back. It was in 1831, the first year of your exile, that we grasped hands on the soil of France, that an oath of brotherhood was pronounced between Italy and Poland. This oath we have never broken; we never shall break it.

The Italian National Party had then chosen for its device the words—'*Ora e sempre*' (now and ever): constancy, without which is no virtue. This still is its device. And I repeat, in its name, on this sacred day, 'now and for ever' Poland and Italy are sisters, sisters in suffering, in their object, and in the struggle to attain it.

You are the reserve of the army of Freedom. It may be that circumstances will summon us and Hungary to form the vanguard. For us, perhaps, to begin the conflict; for you, Poles! to decide the victory. But the same battle-cry—the cry which you have taught us—'*For your liberty and ours*'—will arise from our ranks in the first charge as in the last, and, heard above the whole army, will unite us, come what may.

But now no more superfluous words between us. You this night, in the name of your great memories, begin the battle-watch. Henceforth our word is Action.

At this hour there are but two parties in our ranks: the party of those who

discuss, dissolve, and wait, and the party of those who know that it is for us and for our works to create the Future: the party of the Greeks of the Lower Empire, and the party of the Greeks of Marathon: the party of discouragement and inertness, and the party of action. We are of the last. It is standing and with our loins girt for the fight that we ought to grasp hands to-night.

Action rendered sacred by the Idea, nourished by enthusiasm and faith: action, one, compact, ceaseless, daily and hourly. May each ask himself in the evening, without a blush: *What hast thou done to-day for the sake of thy Country, for the sake of the Country of Countries—Humanity?*

No more factions, no more exclusive and intolerant sects, among us. Union, abnegation, love. The word that our friend Ledru-Rollin lately threw to France polluted by an usurpation without glory, without mission, without future, ought ceaselessly to circulate in our ranks.

God master in heaven; the People, free and associated, sole interpreter of his Law upon the earth: this is our republican faith. It comprises everything; it opens the way to every progress, to every holy and fruitful thought.

Under the shade of our common flag let all dissensions be extinguished! In the face of the noble and vast collective object to which we are vowed, let individuality be effaced, sacrificing itself until the days which shall follow that of triumph.

Here are our wishes. They are yours also. And more than all others you have a right to preach them: for more than all you have suffered, more than all you have fought. Your brother, Joseph Mazzini.

Colonel Pianciani then spoke in French:—

Twenty-three years since a noble nation dared to break its chains. Heroically it fought and fell. 'Poland is dead', said diplomacy: and the Tzar, as if to justify the saying, flung over her a bloody shroud, and over her sons a cloak of ice.

Poland is very dead. How doubt what diplomacy affirms? Yet is she only so dead that the Tzar has need of a hundred thousand men to guard the sepulchre.

An old French minister said that 'order reigned at Warsaw.' Yes! order as such men understood it,—the order of confiscations, scaffolds, exile and transportation, the disorder of Force in place of Right, gendarmes for magistrates and hangmen for court of appeal.

M. Gisquet, the French prefect of police, has said that the Poles gave him much trouble. It was not the Poles, but France, whose generous feelings could not bear to see the skeleton of Poland. Well, after eighteen years this skeleton went to the Tuileries and helped the French to kick out their shopkeeper government.

The example of Poland has been followed: everywhere there has been the same sacrifice, the same heroism; for the tyrants are everywhere. The gibbet of Rome is the same as that of Arad: the transportation to Siberia the same as that to Cayenne.

The peoples have been defeated. Why?

Because they have not the right to rise in insurrection? The justice of our cause is an axiom; the right of the people is like the sun: there is no need to prove it.

Not by force. The tyrants have wealth; but strength is with the millions, with us.

I must speak frankly. Men who have rendered great service during the time of revolutions, who have provoked and directed them, have, and the nations also have, committed great faults. It is our fault that we have lost, in treating a revolution like an art. Men do not *make* revolutions, they can only help and hasten or retard them. The results

of a revolution must be the consequence of its instincts:—the instincts of revolution now are the relief of the masses, the destruction of all privilege—both of authority and capital.

Is this socialism? It is good. I would have not the socialism which ruins the rich, but that which enriches all; not that which pulls down, but that which elevates; I would not have the socialism which would deprive me of the coat that keeps me from the cold, but I would have that which gives a coat to the shivering poor man.

Our other fault has been the want of solidarity. In 1848, while Lombardy gave herself to the kings, who when their danger was passed gave her to the hangman, while Croatia fought against the Magyars, and the diet of Frankfort helped Austria to crush Italy,—the kings remained united, understanding the strength of solidarity.

They say that the revolution we invoke is disorder.

We invoke it as the only way to put an end to disorder; as we desire war only to establish a lasting peace, and as we would accept even the frightful necessity of the guillotine if there should be no other means of finishing once for all with that judicial assassination which is called death-punishment.

Prolonged applause: amid which some one called out—*Leave ideas to do it!*

Leave ideas to do it. Ideas will not make a revolution. Ideas must be unchained before they can act. Let ideas act in Rome at the bottom of the dungeons of the Inquisition,—in France under the most absolute despotism,—in Russian Siberia,—or at Spielberg. Leave all to ideas when you have neither press nor tribune. Ideas can only act where there is liberty.

Ideas have a great and noble mission to fulfil: theirs the negation of the false, the assertion of true principles. The work of ideas is accomplished.

Who believes in the divine right of kings? Who believes in the infallibility of the Pope? Who believes in the omnipotence of capital? The opposite affirmations have been established by ideas. It is for deeds to realize them.

The only realization is under the government of the Republic, which is only to be won by our right arms, by the courage which will dare the battle as of old it dared the scaffold.

For me that word Republic says all. Since there is no republic without democracy, none without socialism. These words have been turned from their true meaning, as all good and sacred things may be abused. It is ours to restore their grand and noble signification. The flag of the Democratic and Social Republic will be the true standard of the peoples, and under that sign they shall conquer.

Mr James Watson's name was the next on the programme of the meeting: but Mr Thomas Cooper spoke instead, saying only a few words expressive of the sympathy of English working-men with Poland, and then giving place to M Ledru-Rollin, who addressed his audience in French:—

Citizens!—Looking at affairs here below for the last two years, truly one would say that they are governed by folly, and that a mysterious hand amuses itself with defeating human previsions. All seems given up to hazard, to the unforeseen and the extravagant; and yet for whoever attends to the broad outlines of the drama, it is evident that its approaching denouement will be the triumph of freedom and the advent of democracy.

I say that at first sight all seems directed by folly. Europe everywhere silent: Poland [illegible] by craft and barbarism, Hungary surrendered by treason, Italy stifled under [illegible], even France herself—that great France of the Revolution—gagged and [illegible]. The tyrants had but, it seems, to make merry over the carcases of the peoples; [illegible] tyrants stirred afresh, brings all again into question, and gives back life to this vast field of death.

What is this man? The highest expression of savage despotism, whom for twe years the tyrants have been accustomed to consider as their regulator and their Nest This man, say I?—this god: in his immeasurable pride he has declared himself to be G

I quote from the catechism used throughout his vast empire.

'The Tzar is the Vicegerent and Minister of God, to execute the Divine command: a consequently disobedience to the Tzar is identical with disobedience to God himse who will reward us in the world to come for the *worship* and obedience we render to t Tzar, and punish us severely to all eternity should we disobey and neglect to worsl him. Moreover God commands us to love and obey the Tzar, not from worldly co sideration, but from apprehension of the final judgement.' *(Long and loud laughte*

You have reason to laugh. This is the very height of madness. It is Heliogabu proclaiming himself the heir of the Sun; it is Alexander ordering himself to be adored Babylon,—Alexander less the genius and the greatness, Alexander gone mad. Take c of history, Nicholas! human infirmities are hereditary. Your father Paul died mad; yc brother Constantine mad; your brother Alexander close upon it.

O inexhaustible law of progress, that laughest at obstacles! So varied as is thy theat what matter who are actors—peoples sublime in their enthusiasm, holiest martyrs, buffooning kings? Even these last, when the peoples sleep, shall fire the signal cannon, the fight be needful to give the peoples their virility. Now, O fecond law! I penetr thy secrets. Thou wouldst first have the peaceful expansion of the new idea; then, wh martyrdom has ripened it, and men's characters become prepared, thou wouldst have last melee of kings and peoples, leaving the issue of liberty to our proper courage. Th sayest: the career is open; Liberty is yours, would you buy it with your blood.

This the war has in perspective. But shall we have war? I answer, yes! inevitab and pushed to the utmost. All their diplomacies, their congresses, can not conjure it aw

Why? Because it is necessary for the two men who dispose of the largest armi

It is necessary for Nicholas as chief of so many peoples, and as head of a religion.

For the first his prestige rests only on the reputation of his gigantic and formida

terrors, unless prevented by the Polish and Hungarian Legions, who will push their triumphant phalanxes to their native land, where also there are crimes to be chastised and a country to be reconquered. At their heroic tread the wide earth shakes, the peoples are up. O France! my country, well-beloved, whose fibre is so electric, whose genius is so enthusiastic and so martial, so world-renowned for defeating kings, it is then that I look to thee. The Turks victorious: there is liberty.

And supposing them vanquished. Then will Napoleon say to Nicholas: Representatives of the same principle—absolutism, why should we quarrel? Keep what you will of the Ottoman Empire, and I keep Italy. It is logically necessary that we destroy the constitutional states,—those half-closed vents whence some sparks are yet escaping. Let Austria take Piedmont and me Belgium, and order will reign on the continent. As to England, on whom we both have to be revenged, let us draw a line of custom-houses around her, and let her perish in her isle.

In this extremity England will have but two alternatives: either to join the peoples to overthrow their tyrants, or to attempt a new coalition against France. But we are not in 1792. A coalition can not now deceive the Peoples; the universal conflagration of a coalition, again, is liberty. But thus to show the phantom of revolution behind this war is 'to hurt the Turkish cause.' Not so: it is to serve it. The Turks must learn that they have nothing to expect from their allies; that their sole trust must be in their own energy and in the insurrection of the nationalities around them.

Vainly has the hideous spectacle of Crime triumphant, and Force over-mastering Right, thrown trouble in some failing consciences, till they cry out:—Nought is true,—nor eternal right, nor morality, nor truth; the world is but a vicious circle wherein the peoples successively rise and fall, grow great and are abased without advancing. Civilization, pendulum-like, is doomed to oscillate unchangeably between two poles which it can never overpass. Detestable blasphemy! thought given the lie to by facts. Far from recoiling, the moral world gravitates and proceeds. To speak only of the exact sciences during the last fifty years, what a progress of which the most civilized antiquity had no suspicion! Let us not calumniate our age. Never has human genius penetrated farther or soared more high. Behold the law of perfectibility, not the law of revealed books, but the law of Nature. Two only bands have enchained it until now: the priest and the king. Let them disappear!

Meanwhile honour to those among us—Poles, Wallachs, or Hungarians—who in the service of our holy cause are already on the scene of action!

And may the genius of France again find recognition in this last struggle by the repetition of her cry—Vive la Republique Democratique et Sociale!

M. STANIEWICZ (a Pole) concluded the proceedings, with a few words in English, scarcely heard amid the reiterated cheers which followed the speech of Ledru Rollin. The sentiments of all the speakers were also enthusiastically responded to by the fervent and thoughtful audience which filled the large Hall of Hanover-Square-Rooms: the various nationalities being pretty equally represented, and a goodly number of ladies being also present.

POLAND.

MEMORANDUM

OF THE

POLISH CENTRAL DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE:

TO THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

PRINTED FOR THE POLISH DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

1854.

POLAND.

MEMORANDUM OF THE POLISH CENTRAL DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE:

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

POLAND, every way oppressed as she is, may worthily understand the grandeur and the bearing of American policy. She does understand them; she appreciates both the inner meaning of the manifestations of American sympathy with the elements of the European future, and also the reserve imposed on those manifestations by existing international relations; and, respecting that reserve, but profiting by the last and perhaps the most significant of those manifestations, she, through us, would place in the hands of the Government of the New World those informations which she knows to be indispensible to every State preparing to actively influence the future destinies of Europe.

It is to this, by their position, by their power, by the renovating principle which in the strength of their youth they inaugurated in modern history, that the United States of North America seem to be called. In proclaiming themselves independent, and at the same time republican, in the face of a world yet altogether monarchical, they boldly took the initiative of that progressive movement which was to draw all peoples after them, and assured themselves the first place in the new order of things created by them.

And, as if the Republican principle itself had needed to preserve the affiliation of its historical development along the ages, the only great Republic of the worm-eaten Europe of that day, Poland, expiring under the violence of royal conspirators and the deleterious influence of monarchical elements which had been introduced into its bosom, sent the latest of the heroes of her past to die under the walls of Savannah, and borrowed from the war for American Independence the hero-initiator of the future—Kosciusko.

To the American monument of Pulawski responds the mound raised to Kosciusko upon his natal shore by the hands of all Poland; and, since the mighty shades hovering over them grasp hands athwart the thickness of the terrestrial globe, the indissoluble pact is sworn of the common destinies of America and Poland.

For since then Poland has not one instant ceased to live in the shroud with which the kings had wrapped her; and, at the moment in which America is preparing to give back to her old mother, Europe, that youthful life whose germs were hers, and to preside over her future destinies, Poland finds herself ready to reënter the lists and to reconquer the existence which the monarchies refuse her.

It is this last fact which should be known to America; it is of this that we are to inform her, and we are competent to do it: for, representing in the Emigration the renovating principle of Poland, that of its future vitality, we have, since 1830, mixed in all the manifestations of Polish national life, from those of the martyrs of the expedition of Colonel Zaliwski, in 1834, to those of the prisoners issuing triumphantly in 1848 from the dungeons of Berlin, and the unknown names which since, even until now, have borne witness to the vitality of their country before the inquisitors and the executioners of Vienna, of Berlin, of Warsaw, and of Petersburg.

It is also we, the Polish Democratic Society, who have furnished chiefs to those sons of Poland who, wanting battle-fields in their own country, have sought them, since 1849, in Hungary, in Italy, in Germany, bearing the Polish flag wherever floated that of Freedom, of which it was the inseparable companion.

But it is not of the subterranean life of Poland that we would bear witness, nor even of that eccentric life which, lacking scope to manifest itself within, broke the vase and spread itself beyond, in the form of Emigration or of Legion. All that is known, ascertained, incontestable; and more, all that is of the past. What we would bear witness of is the near future of Poland and those elements of the present which already guarantee its infallible advent.

Confidants of the secret thoughts of our people through a thousand channels, worn underneath bars, frontier-barriers, and seas, by the repressed love of liberty on one side, and the exile's love of country on the other, in order that they might communicate together and concert the means of reunion,—we simply tell you—IT IS so, and establish the fact. But if it is not permitted us to furnish the proofs of its existence, of that general, universal disposition of men's minds which but dissembles itself the more carefully as it thereby assures itself a prompter and completer satisfaction, of that sullen fermentation, progressing in a manner so uniform, though rapid, as to be imperceptible until the moment in which the vase is broken,—we can and are about to prove *that it cannot be otherwise*, and that if the Cabinets of our oppressors misunderstand this fact, and by the measures which they take and the events which they provoke are rendering it inevitable, it is because the principle upon which they base themselves is a principle of death, a fatality, blinding them, and pushing them to self-destruction.

One of the grounds of security upon which our oppressors are so foolishly slumbering is the apparent inaction of Russian-Poland in 1848. This inaction was fatally imposed upon it by its position then, and this position is now reversed.

Nowhere more than in Poland has a general movement need of time to ripen and burst forth,—for a double reason peculiar to this country: on the one hand the want of great centres of population and the difficulty of communication between widely-strown villages, and on the other the marked separation between the people and noble class.

This separation is one not only of interests, but also of habits, of beliefs, of affections, and, in most of the provinces, of dialect or language. The only sentiment which unites them is their love of country, but that so differently conceived that the proper moment for rising could not be the same for both classes unless it should be imposed upon them both by European events. It is to the treasons of the nobility that the people attributes the defeat of the efforts in which it has taken part since 1794; and, though the nobles may be now ready to join in a popular movement because they are convinced that without it their own force would be insufficient, the people would not obey the appeal of the nobles unless it obtained from them farther guarantees than they have already given. For the Polish nobility alone the meaning of 1848 was clear: so the people remained every where passive, except in the Grand Duchy of Posen, where, being nearer to events, it better understood them and responded with an ardour of patriotism which even the nobles, whose policy was one of expediency, thought it necessary to calm. Besides, it needed, for the mutual understanding of the two classes for a common movement, and still more for any concert between populations dispersed over an immense territory, more time than elapsed between the triumph of February and the fall of Rome and Hungary, without taking into consideration the bad effect produced on the public mind by the dealings of the French Government with the partitioning Cabinets, the massacres of June, and the triumphs of the Reaction at Vienna, Berlin, and Dresden, in Baden and in Lombardy, the bloody suppression under the very eyes of the French ambassador of the rising in the Grand Duchy of Posen, and the bombardment of Cracow and Lemberg. The Russians, waiting, were concentrated in Poland for the deadly blow they were purposing to inflict in Hungary upon the European Revolution; and Poland had to remain a moveless spectator of the grand drama played under her eyes without the great majority of her inhabitants comprehending what it meaned.

Both time and a direct appeal were wanting.

Now she has already had the one and is about to hear the other.

And it was not at the first shot fired on the Danube that the time of preparation began, but indeed in that same year 1848 which appeared to have made so little impression upon the Polish people.

What the massacres of Gallicia, organized by Metternich and conducted by Szela, had hindered in 1846, the revolution of 1848 accomplished. The serfs of Gallicia were emancipated, were admitted to the national representation, saw their former lords hold out their hands to them and sit down beside them on the legislative benches; and, although the Austrian Government has endeavoured to have the honour of this attributed to itself, yet, since it has

afterward exacted from the peasants the price of the ceded lands and the abolished soccage labour, since it has also done away with the Representative Chambers to which the revolution had called them, some hundred thousands of emancipated peasant-proprietors now in Gallicia are to the millions of Polish serfs under Russian domination a living testimony of what they have to expect from the revolution in Poland.

This great, this decisive question, of the future destinies of Poland,—this of the emancipation of the serf and of the throwing open the land to be cultivated by him for his own use, free from all feudal charge and without indemnification for the proprietor, which had been discussed and affirmatively resolved in the Polish Emigration for a number of years,—has been since then regarded by the class of territorial proprietors in Poland as in fact decided; and the peasants' unbelief of the promises of their lords, till then not followed by deeds, has had to give way to the evidence of the accomplished fact in the provinces which the revolutionary movement had passed over. This immense progress toward the fusion of the classes, from which the independence of Poland must proceed, has been found accomplished since 1849. The propaganda of the alliance between the national and the social ideas thenceforth slowly extended among the unemancipated people and progressed there uninterruptedly, while above it each of the triumphs of the Reaction threw trouble, disheartening, and too often doubt and apostacy in the souls of the noble and privileged classes. From this arise the erroneous judgments of tourists in Poland as to the spirit of the populations, of which they never touch but a single surface-layer, without ever having time or means to sound its depth.

It was in this disposition of mind that the affairs of Turkey found Poland. Their action on the masses was doubly decisive.

Certainly the nobility could see and did see in it a complication from which the derangement of the European equilibrium might issue, and thence an occasion for new national efforts. But, accustomed to judge of events from the relations of the journals, and reading there how all the powers of Europe were determined to maintain peace, or at least the *status quo* of territorial divisions, by confining the war to the limits of Turkey, it thought, conscious of its own powerlessness, that it might content itself with waiting some deliverance from without, something like the Napoleonist intervention of old time in the affairs of Poland. From that nothing could result, except, at very most, a change of masters.

But the people judges not from such premises; and consequently it arrives at very different conclusions. It has traditions, and believes in them; it has impulses, and it follows them. Its acts are determined by its feelings more than by its reason; or, rather, the popular reason, which we improperly call instinct, takes special count of its affections, its wants, its faith, and the facts which meet its understanding, without complicating them with calculations and arguments beyond its reach. Now, the events which are passing in Turkey, by their proximity as well as by their notoriety, are especially of nature to impress it and to determine it to a rising.

For a year past it has seen its fields traversed by two immense avalanches of soldiers coming from the North and precipitating themselves southward into the two yawning gulfs of Wallachia and the Caucasus. There the Turkish scimitar lays them low; for the cannon roars, the Te-Deums in the churches resound unechoed, but none return to bear witness of the victories they have won. On the contrary, mysterious voices whisper in the ear that word—Defeat; and the faces of every regiment that arrives are more downcast and more pale than those that went before. And yet these armies are not enough, they are being exhausted, they are shriveling up: for sealed papers come to the village-registrars, which, when they are opened, condemn nine of every thousand peasants to the hell of military service. At this mournful news the steppes are peopled with fugitives, the forests with rangers, and in the villages only old men, women, and children are left. The cholera never so unpeopled them as now the pitiless fear of the Tzar. For how can the Tzar be without fear, whom even the Turks are beating, while England and France are arming against him?—France who, formerly, in spite of England, could pass one night at Moscow, and only be driven thence, according to the popular sentence, by the generals *Frost* and *Famine*. Now France is no more in the eyes of the people of Poland the France of 1812, but that of 1848. It is the Revolution which enfranchised our brothers in Gallicia; it is emancipation; it is freedom; it is Poland. Heretofore between the free peoples and Poland rose the insurmountable wall of the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian forces, united together in one fascis of royal conspiracy; to-day this conspiracy is dissolved, Russia isolated, and her army, the principal barrier, removed from the West to the South. Between the West and Poland there is no more barrier; access to Poland is left free to the European Revolution: for what matters to the people the letter of Napoleon III and his conservative assurances? Does it know them? Can they have on its imagination the same influence as the memory of the revolutions of France, Vienna, Berlin, Venice, Rome, and Hungary? All these revolutions, which, six years ago, did not move it, have since appeared to it clothed with the prestige of the past. Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, Venice, Hungary: they all mean *Liberty*. Poland, it is Liberty; and more, it is independence, glory, bravery. And liberty is the abolition of the Russian recruiting system, the abolition of soccage labour, the abolition of a vexatious police; it is the proprietorship of the land; it is freedom for religious worship, free-trade, markets open for its grain and cattle; it is, in a word, wealth, prosperity, well-being. This is how the good sense of the people of Poland sums up the present question, and solves it with one single argument: the Turks can beat the Russians—why may not the Poles?

Under these circumstances, any appeal would determine them to rise,—no matter whence it might proceed, from a town, the fields, or the forests, from a Cossack or a noble, from the steppes of the Ukraine or a fleet in the Baltic,—provided it is sufficiently noised abroad to be heard throughout the country, and of sufficient duration to reach its farther frontiers. But this appeal has

already reached them, and now stirs their minds, reheartens them, and sharpens their scythes and lances. And this appeal is an old legend, an accredited prophecy, an article of the popular faith; it is the apocalyptic prediction of the Cossack *Wernyhora*.

This prophecy, uttered after the confederation of Bar, on the banks of the Dnieper, and conceived in a sense eminently Polish, has since penetrated into all the provinces of Poland and found believers every where among the people.

This prophecy, in old yellow manuscripts, passing from hand to hand among our grandfathers, was preserved by them, if they were noble, with that sort of veneration which attaches to a curious monument of the visionary patriotism of old time; but, if they belonged to the people, was learned by heart as a confirmation of their hopes and a guarantee of their realization. After having very clearly predicted the total dismemberment, the utter fall of Poland, it indicates in apocalyptic images the fruitless efforts which will be undertaken for its relief, and ends with the prediction of an universal cataclysm, terminated by a war, in which the Turks, allying with Poland, shall come to water their horses in the Vistula, but which shall be decided by the maritime intervention of England. Then, says Wernyhora, all Poland will rise, glorious and triumphant, and engage in one great and last battle, in a locality of the Ukraine, which he mentions by name, and pursue the fleeing Russians into a defile, also mentioned, where our final triumph shall be sealed by their utter extermination. In the minds of the great majority of the people of Poland, the names mentioned in this prophecy have passed into the condition of a sacramental formula; they are part of the articles of its belief, and have taken over its determinations the authority of a commandment of the Most High.

Here again may find place what has already so many times in history put the systematic doubt of scepticism to the proof: the pretended effect will have determined the cause, the prediction will have produced its own fulfilment, and the fact will have taken place solely because it had been announced. It is not only very natural, but also necessary, inevitable, fatal, in the eyes of whoever knows the circumstances and dispositions of the people as we know them. The people of Poland, following the events of the present war, will rise because it will find motives determining it to rise and will not be able to hinder itself from obeying them; it will rise because those motives are suggested to it, not by a system of policy of which it understands nothing, nor by conspirators in whom it could have no confidence, and who, moreover, once discovered, would draw into one ruin both their plans and the end they proposed to attain,—but by greater events having a clear and positive meaning for it,—by a redoubling of oppression caused by the conscription and by military and police exactions,—by the wandering life to which all the young and robust generation have been reduced, and the mutual contact into which it has been thrown in the forest depths, which served it as a hiding-place,—by the recollections of 1848, which only by now have had time to ripen in its mind,—by the hopes of freedom and amelioration which it connects with

them,—by its legitimate desire of holding territorial property,—by its love of family, of kindred, and of country, and its hate of the foreign oppressors,—by the spectacle of the fear and consequent weakness of those whose defeats on the Danube are the first satisfaction accorded to its thirst for vengeance, as well as an encouragement to its daring,—by the vague belief that the peoples which triumphed six years ago continue to live, all stricken down as they are, and that they will, like itself, profit by the divisions of their oppressors,—by its traditions, its beliefs, its recollections, and its prophecies. It will rise, in fine, because, for the first time since the partitionings, not only throughout the eight palatinates of the so-called kingdom of Poland, as in 1830, or in the Grand Duchy of Posen and the Republic of Cracow, as in '46 and '48,—but also is Lithuania and Volhynia, in the Ukraine, in Podolia, in Gallicia, every where, even to Little Russia beyond the Dnieper, and White Russia beyond the Dzwina,—its passions find themselves in accord with the desires of the nobles, who this time will obey the appeal of the people, even though they should not conspire on their own account, and will throw themselves into the ranks to win at the point of the lance some compensation in consideration and renown for the position lost to them by the revolution. And now what will be the consequences of this rising to the future of Europe? This, for the sake of our cause, and in accomplishment of the duty which we have to fulfil toward the peoples, our brothers,—this is what we are about to examine.

As Mr Drummond very pertinently said in the English House of Commons, without Poland there can be no useful or profitable issue to the war of Europe against Russia. Leave that its frontiers of 1826, and the first misunderstanding between England and France, to say nothing of Prussia and Austria—heterogeneous bodies whose interests draw them together without however uniting them—will open to it again the way to Constantinople, which, besides, is accessible to it from two opposite sides,—from the North across the Danube and the Balkan, from the South across Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus. And *henceforth* Constantinople is necessary to Russia, not only as its outlet to the Mediterranean, but because it must have the Greco-Slavonian world in order to reconstitute for its own advantage the Empire of the East. The Slavonian world alone would have no historic meaning; would remain incomplete, or must bring Austria and Europe down upon it, as it would be forced to incroach upon them; besides, that is less rooted in Russian traditions than the Byzantine tendences, which since Vladimir the Single-handed at Kijow and John Basilides at Moscow have pursued Tzarism even to the Winter Palace, and there, in our days, baptized the grandsons of Catherine, and then the sons of Nicholas with the names of Alexander, Constantine, and Michael. Authentic or apocryphal, the Testament of Peter I reveals the real thought of the Tzars: Poland as the means, Constantinople for the end. If we would not that Russia should have Constantinople, we must not leave it the means of conquering it; we must take from it Poland, its first stage on the road to the Empire of the East. Master of Poland, Russia sooner or later renews the empire of the Porphyrogeniti.

And Poland in the hands of Russia serves it to attain a double end, an end yet nearer, in the normal situation of Europe, than the destruction of the Ottoman Empire; an end which Russia is attaining pacifically, silently, by the aid, not only of its underground agents, its hired writers, the secret societies it organizes in the border-countries, but also by the growing influence of its religious, commercial, and industrial relations: we are speaking of the concentration at Moscow and Petersburg of the direction of all the Slavonian peoples, of that grand system of absorption which they name *Russian Panslavism*. Let it keep Poland, and some fine day Russia will see its protectorate invoked by all the Slavonians of Germany and Turkey, from the Styrian Alps in the West and the Hartz Mountains at the North to the Balkan at the South and Varna in the East,—hauling then into its immense net those Roumanian populations for which it now contends with Turkey, and adding to the crowns of Kazan and Astracan those of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Illyria, Croatia, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. Then it will no longer need to displace a large number of its troops; it will have only to excite troubles, and, after having let the Germans and Turks be driven out by the Slavonian populations, to step in to stop the effusion of blood and to establish an order of things permitting it to act as protector against all future oppression. The Slavonian Empire will be founded at one swoop.

The reason of this is that Russia is at the present time the only great Slavonian power; and so offers to the Slavonian populations oppressed by the German, Ottoman, or Magyar races, the only element wanting to them for constituting themselves nationally—the leverage of its strength.

No!—Russia has no force of attraction on a great portion of these peoples but that of its material power. Silesians, Moravians, Illyrians, Dalmatians, Croats, and now an immense majority of Tcheks, belong to a different faith, to the Latin Church; and in their language approach much nearer to the Poles, who with them constitute the Western branch of the Slavonian dialects, than to the Russians. And as to the Slavonians of the South, who, without belonging to the Russian church, belong yet with it to the great Eastern church, having Constantinople for religious metropolis, it is independence and liberty, and not Tzarian despotism to which they aspire, for which they invoke assistance, and not domination, and an assistance they would gladly exchange for the friendship and brotherly support of a free, a strong, and a republican Poland. Even among the Cossacks of Little Russia, there are none who do not, in their hatred of Tzarism, turn their hopeful eyes toward an alliance with a Poland reconstituted upon new bases, in whom they know, from the Polish pupils of their university of Charkow, so numerous since the closing of the universities of Wilna and Krzemieniec, that they would find not a master but a friend.

Let Poland rise then (and we have proved that she will rise), and risen let her maintain herself in the rank of independent nations rejoicing in the plenitude of their rights, and Russia will find itself deprived of all possibility, either of putting itself at the head of the Greco-Slavonian world by the conquest of

Constantinople, or of establishing the Panslavonian empire, of which else in a very near future the possession is unfailingly assured to it.

Poland then is a necessary element of the new European equilibrium, an indispensable guarantee for the security of the Western States, and consequently a condition *sine quâ non* of any definitive treaty, an end forcefully prescribed for the operations of the present war, if any profit is to be drawn from it for Humanity, for Europe, or for the belligerents themselves.

However, we can not, and we should not, dissemble that the rising of Poland will completely alter the conditions of the present struggle, and that if, on the one hand, it assures the security and progress of the peoples allied with Turkey, it may, on the other hand, menace more than one of their governments, detach Austria and Prussia from the alliance, and remake, to the advantage of Liberty and Right, that map of Europe which was drawn by Despotic Force.

It is in vain that the governments of France and England assure their respective countries of the acquisition of the two great German powers to their confederation against Russia. This acquisition is owing only to the assurance given by Napoleon to Austria and Prussia of his help against any revolutionary attempt. Now France may keep down Italy and by maintaining tranquility there hinder any outbreak in Hungary. But when Lord Clarendon, in the same speech in which he announces to the House of Lords the good news of the Austro-Prussian alliance, lets peep out the possibility of the reëstablishment of Poland (if it is that which he really means under the denomination of portions of territory taken from the neighbouring powers) he forgets that this reëstablishment would be a death-blow to his two allies. The Poland of 1815, even if augmented by all the provinces which have fallen to Russia, would not satisfy the exigences of the awakened national sentiment. The limbs violently separated by their dismemberments would rejoin each other. Deprived of Gallicia and the Grand Duchy of Posen, Poland would not feel itself living with that proper life which alone can assure its existence and stability, for it would not be on the recognition of its rights but on the conveniences of the intervening powers that its new existence would be dependent. Gallicia and Posnania would rise and proclaim themselves Polish; and then Austria and Prussia, not finding in their alliance with France and England the promised security, would seek it in new combinations hostile to the two powers. But such an arrangement will never be: for Poland conscienciously feels her duty in the present crisis, and will rise without waiting for permission, knowing that to wait is to abdicate. Then Hungary will follow it, and with Hungary Italy; then the populations of Germany,—Dresden, Berlin, Vienna, Carlsruhe, Hesse, and Schleswig,—will feel themselves revive; then France seeing her government on a wrong tack, and involved in inextricable complications for the sake of its alliances with worm-eaten despotisms, will return to the Republic, and the year 1848 will be repeated, with more experience and consequently with more perfectness and success. We know not if all this enters into the calculations of the English government; but it all

results from what we know to be the dispositions of the Polish populations; and this is why we submit it for the consideration of the only government altogether disinterested in these matters, or rather the only one that can find in it a satisfaction of the principle after which it exists, the Government of the United States of North America.

We do not think it necessary to discuss here the supposition—inadmissible according to us—of the consequences to result from a completely passive attitude on the part of Poland. Let it suffice us to establish summarily that for each of the other oppressed nations—Italy, Hungary, France, &c.,—the difficulties thrown in the way of their emancipation, on the one hand, by the Franco-Austrian alliance; being immense, and those occasioned to the allied powers, on the other hand, by the insurrection of the Greek provinces, being very great, those powers would be led to conclude a hasty peace on the first advances made to them by Russia, leaving intact in Europe an order of things so oppressive and monstrous, that, even if the dangers now menacing them from Russia should be removed, revolution would remain imminent and peace be less assured and more precarious than ever.

It is to prevent this return to the deplorable *status quo* of the present time that, to make use of a celebrated remark applied to the Supreme Being, if the insurrection of Poland is not in the order of inevitable destinies, it ought to be invented; the more necessary is it, consequently, this insurrection being a fact foreseen, to take count of it in all plans relative to European affairs and for every State preparing to influence them to take some pains to facilitate its bursting forth and the bearing of its fruit, for the general well-being and for its own stability in Europe.

We should think ourselves unjust toward the United States if, misunderstanding the generous nature of their intentions with regard to Europe, we were to insist upon the advantages which its emancipation would render to their influence, their power, their commerce, and their material prosperity. It is so fine a thing for colonies, emancipated by their own heroism and elevated to the rank of powers of the first order, to return to the mother-country youth, vigour, development, and political progress, for the germs of civilization which they had taken from her and the liberty that they had known how to snatch with armed hands from her unjust ambition,—that mere views of material interests, however vast they may be in themselves, seem as nothing compared with it. Without stopping farther then at this, and without availing ourselves of the recollections which the sons of the heroes of the War of Independence preserve of their fathers' Polish comrades—Pulawski, Kosciusko, Niemcewicz,—after having demonstrated the benefits which the rising of Poland in the present war, upon the rear of the Russian armies, would bring to Europe, by striking her enemy to the heart and putting an end to the war of kings, as well as by deciding the final European revolution,—after proving that in the present situation nothing else but this rising could have the same effect,—we will content ourselves with explaining the conditions which may facilitate its success.

These conditions are of two kinds: moral and material.

The moral consist of the collectiveness, the unity, and the universality of the effort; and depend consequently to a certain extent on the support which the insurrectionary government will find in its spontaneous recognition by free nations. This government will only be installed by the insurrection itself,—that is to say, by the armed people; and will make itself known to friends and enemies by its blows upon these last. But before it can become a power, it must have been a party, an association, a principle; and it is in this state of embryo that the epoch begins in which the sympathetic and effective, if not the official, recognition of free nations is especially necessary to it. To sympathize with and to assist the party is to ally with the government which shall issue from it. Now, as there are two classes and two sorts of interests in Poland, there are also two parties in the Emigration: that of privilege and monarchy, round which rallies the Polish aristocracy,—and that of democracy, representing the people, its aspirations and its rights. We have shown above how only from this last the insurrection and its government can proceed, and how the individuals belonging to the first will come perforce to join it,—the party of the aristocracy now resting all its hopes and basing all its calculations upon the initiative of the Cabinets of France and England, the object of whose policy is quite another thing from the restoration of Poland. In the choice of the party with which henceforth the different governments ought to connect themselves there can be no mistake. With the monarchical party, that of pretenders and diplomatists, the monarchical cabinets will be connected: we do not deplore it. But to the democratic party, that of the people, of the national and humanitarian revolution, to the party recognized by the European Committee, allied with France, with Italy, with Hungary, with Germany, with Moldo-Wallacia, with revolutionary Russia,—to that belongs henceforth the alliance, the support, the recognition of republics already constituted. Its flag has from the beginning been carried in the Emigration by the Polish Democratic Society, from whose hands the country received it and adopted it in 1846, and toward which to-day the Polish people turn their eyes, to see what greeting it meets with from the peoples, what support it may hope for in its efforts. Every mark of sympathy from America for the Polish Democracy is more than an encouragement; it is a redoubling of strength for the coming insurrection of Poland.

Connected with the moral conditions of a successful rising is the written and oral, the public and private, the printed and epistolary propagandism which must precede action and move it from a directing centre. It is upon us this task devolves and to us that the disposal of the material means necessary for its accomplishment is entrusted. We pass then to the material conditions of a successful rising.

Of these conditions the Central Committee of the Polish Democratic Society is in a clear way of realizing one of the principal: the disarming of a portion of the hostile forces in Poland, through their defection at the moment of action.

For this it has been only necessary to revive in the Russian army the remembrance of the generous intentions of Pestel, Mouravieff, Bestujeff, Ryleieff, and Kachowski, and to knit between the democrats of the two countries a sincere alliance, based upon the recognition of common objects and of mutual rights. This alliance has been concluded at London; a centre of Russian propagandism has been established; numerous, varied, and popular writings have been published; communications opened; and the ardour with which the writings are demanded, and new materials furnished, proves that the revolutionary representatives of the two countries do not mistake as to the existence of the elements they represent and the effect they reckon upon producing.

There remain for the preparatory period, perhaps already very limited, the gathering of the refugees, especially of those who are most distance from their country, at fixed points whence they might be transported nearer and kept in readiness to enter the country armed at the first moment of the insurrection; the means of transport for them and also for those who must precede them; and, while waiting, their keep and outfit.

For the period of action supplies of arms and munitions of war, of which the arsenals in the enemies' hands can furnish but a very small part, and that not immediately nor everywhere. The supplies of arms should be contracted for and kept ready in depots where they might be handy at any moment for the use of the insurrection.

For both periods funds, with which the insurrection, notwithstanding the revolutionary means of which it ought to make use, will probably be ill-supplied at the beginning, but which, rich in the immense resources of the Nation, once constituted, it can easily reimburse. This need can only be met by the national credit, the resources of the class which now contains the germ of the future revolution being null, and the wealthy classes being interested not in nourishing but in retarding the insurrection, waiting the country's restoration from Cabinets which are disposed to do nothing for it. It is then for the States which would have a Poland restored by the hands of her own sons,—that is to say, the only Poland capable of filling the part of protector and civilizer, to which she is called,—it is for the States, which feel the necessity of a Poland, which believe in the actual present existence of the elements of her approaching resurrection, and which can reckon upon her,—it is for them from to-day to open an account with her, not with the object of provoking a rising, which in every case is inevitable, but, by facilitating and hastening her success, to ward off many sufferings, many struggles, and much of bloodshed from Poland, and many mistakes and calamities from the other peoples of Europe.

This is what the Central Polish Democratic Committee, strong in its convictions and in the truth of the facts here brought under notice, and confident of the wisdom and generosity of the Government of the United States, submits to it, in witness of its unbounded confidence and as pledge of the decisive part which Poland will take in the approaching struggle of the peoples. It will

believe it has attained its aim, if in its relations with the governments and with the peoples of Europe, during the present crisis, the Government of the United States keeps count of the facts and assurances contained in this communication.

On behalf of the Polish Democratic Society,

The Polish Central Democratic Committee,

STANISLAUS WORCELL,
ANTHONY ZABICKI,
LEO ZIENKOWICZ.

38, *Regent's Square, Gray's Inn Road, London:*
March, 1854.

Kossuth ex Governor
Hungary. with the Author Co.

A LAST APPEAL!

WAR—PEACE,

OR

AN ARMED TRUCE:

WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONDITION,
CONDUCT, AND PROSPECTS OF THE
BRITISH SOLDIER.

BY WILLIAM ADAMS SMITH,
RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE CRIMEA.

Portsmouth:
HENRY LEWIS, 114, HIGH STREET.
LONDON: HAMILTON AND CO.
1856.

Dedicated to The Times.

The author has presumed to dedicate his little Pamphlet to the leading Journal of this Country, as a trifling tribute of respect for its unflinching advocacy of right, and its consequent influence in inducing the nation to take part in a just and honorable War; and in the confident hope that, exercising the same patriotic spirit, it will not cease to warn us against adopting a dishonorable peace.

Dedicated to The Times.

THE author has presumed to dedicate his little Pamphlet to the leading Journal of this Country, as a trifling tribute of respect for its unflinching advocacy of right, and its consequent influence in

PREFACE.

It may be proper to explain in a few words, why the publication of the annexed Address has been delayed till now. Having recently delivered it in a public Assembly in the Borough of Portsmouth, a request was made from the chair for permission to print it, to which request I was most happy to accede, upon the understanding, that I should be allowed first to deliver it in some other places.

It may indeed be objected, that as the War is virtually at an end, (if Peace be not actually signed,) the allusion to many of the circumstances of moment whilst the war was going on, is now out of place; and that many of the arguments then urged, are consequently both needless and ill-timed. I have nothing to say in reply to the first objection—though not a very important one. To the second—that the War being concluded, the reasons urged for continuing it, or for insisting upon more stringent conditions of Peace, must *now* be unavailable—I answer—that the argument, if good for any thing, is good for the *future*, if not for the past: a future perhaps not far distant—and will suggest the question put by Mr. Cobden in his pamphlet, entitled,

"What Next," though eliciting a very opposite conclusion. Most assuredly at this moment we know little of the precise terms of the Peace, though it may be easy enough to conjecture, even to pronounce, unhesitatingly, from our previous knowledge, that the terms will not prove sufficient for the exigencies of the case—viz: the restoration of that balance of power, upon which the future tranquillity and security of Europe must depend, and for the honour of England.

I appeal to the history of the past, and to common sense, can we expect a lasting or a satisfactory Peace for England or for Europe, whilst the wrongs of Poland, Italy, Hungary, remain unredressed or unnoticed? Why should those wrongs, which for three quarters of a century have troubled the peace of Europe, why should they *now* cease to do so? Are the Poles, Hungarians, Italians, one whit better satisfied to submit to their Oppressors now, than formerly? Will these nations, after being led on to indulge in anticipations of speedy deliverance, will they be more inclined

After the specimens we have had of Russian ambition, aggression, and perfidy, from the time of Peter the Great up to the present hour, can there be any faith in parchment treaties unless secured by material guarantees, such as the restoration of Poland would most assuredly afford? Who that has eyes to see is not profoundly impressed with the conviction that the Leviathan Monster is only scotched—not killed; and but waits his opportunity? I can hardly blame our present Prime Minister, should the exigences alluded to, be unprovided for in the pending negociation. He stands almost alone in his advocacy of what should be done for the common security—unsustained in the Conference by any but the weakest of the contracting powers. Austria, who has stepped in so opportunely and so craftily, to save Russia in her dying agony, is content by the proposed terms of Peace to obtain a large share of the spoil, having incurred little, if any, of the risk, or waste of the War.—Prussia, whom all the Belligerents with one common consent unite to despise, has made a good market of her *sham* neutrality and duplicity, and would advocate a Peace (if she were listened to) at the price of any degradation.

France has placed herself in her own eyes and those of Europe, on a pedestal of military glory, by the capture of the Malakoff; and is satisfied to accept this as the grand finale of the War. England, the main support of the War, and who has sacrificed more than all the Allies put together, in contending for justice to others,—has looked for nothing for herself, and will gain nothing—on the contrary, she has failed, I regret to say, even to add to the prestige of her military or naval fame; for the glory which her Army has won by its bravery and noble spirit, has been lost or neutralized by the inefficient administration in the Crimea of her vast resources, and by the lament-

able incompetency of her Generals.—I assert then, that the people of England, whatever other nations may be, are not satisfied to rest upon their arms in this state of affairs; whether we consider the welfare of Europe, or the honor of their Country.

But the opposing weight at home is equally oppressive with that in the Conference. The House of Peers, which studies the preservation of its own exclusive and strained privileges, (at the expense of the national welfare) more than the good of its country, is ready at any moment to vote either that the terms of Peace are too stringent or too lax, as it may suit its convenience, or further its grand object of removing the ministry, and placing Lord Derby in power, and thereby to roll back the tide of popular progress. The Tories, the D'Israeli's, the Walpoles, et hoc genus omne, (the men who, by refusing the Turkish loan, would have deprived Turkey of the means of carrying on the War,) still cling to Russia as the firmest representative of despotic order,

I want Peace—any how—at any rate," was the too common language at one time among a certain class in the Crimea; and true enough, those who had sufficient influence to obtain their leave of absence, did go home, (if they had no yachts in Balaclava harbour, or elsewhere, in which they could comfortably ensconce themselves,) and gained a cheap and safe promotion, luxuriating in their own country at the expence of the braver, and more honorable, but less influential, Officers, who remained in the field to do double duty, or who were killed in the service. These holiday Soldiers who only entered the Army for the epaulets and the pride of the thing, are only detained from throwing up their commissions by very shame; and it will soon be found, should a real reform take place at the Horse Guards, and our sprigs of family and men of fortune discover at last that favor and connection are no longer the exclusive stepping-stones to Brevets, Staff-Appointments, and all sorts of illegitimate promotion, the profession of Arms will be denounced, and deserted as vulgar by the fashionable idlers, and left to a less aristocratic, but most assuredly, to a more efficient and honorable class of men. I am far from insinuating that the personages alluded to, are not fully as forward in the actual fight as their compeers—no doubt of it. I wish, however, that they had the same regard for the honour of their country as for their personal honour. I repeat, they are brave enough,—but they are not soldiers in the proper and full sense of the term—they are not campaigners prepared and trained, cheerfully to encounter the hardships and privations incident to a state of war; and to tell the truth, they are most lamentably ignorant of their professional duties—they know it—and *are not ashamed of it.*

Such are the powerful combinations both at home and abroad, at work against the continuation of this War. The only support that our able Prime Minister can hope to receive, in order to counteract this formidable but unpatriotic phalanx, must be derived from the middle and more disinterested classes—the men who not only forced the reluctant Aberdeen faction into an honorable War, but have saved the Country, *once at least* from a mean and treacherous Peace.—Truly we may be a "Nation of Shopkeepers," as we were once rather contemptuously termed, but Shopkeepers as we are, there seems to be less anxiety on our part to *sheath* the sword once drawn in the cause of justice, (still unsatisfied) than has lately been evinced by our Allies across the water—always so brave and so generous, not long since so chivalrous! It may be too late to secure the future tranquillity of Europe, if those who pull the wires are determined it shall be so;—but never were our fleets and armies in finer order to accomplish the great work, nor our Soldiers and Sailors in

LECTURE.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THE Address which I now propose to deliver, originated with the opening of a club room, at Scutari, on the Bosphorus, erected out of a Fund placed at the disposal of the "Times" Newspaper, for the benefit of the convalescent soldiers at the before-mentioned place. Having sojourned in different parts of Turkey and the Crimea for a period of fifteen months, I could not fail to observe with the deepest interest and the highest admiration, the patience under suffering and the bravery of the British soldier; an interest which no time can efface from my mind, and which ultimately led to my delivering a lecture, as I have before stated, at the opening of the club.

Now, I must inform you, that it is not my intention to go into the history of the war, nor of its management:—the one is recorded in all the public Journals; the other in the Report of the Sebastopol Committee; and in that later Report of Sir John Mc Neil and Colonel Tulloch, the Commissioners sent out by Government for the special purpose of ascertaining the truth of the most lamentable and unfortunate *circumstances stated to have* taken place. And here,

I hope, I may be excused, in passing, for alluding to another point, not immediately connected with the subject before us. Indeed it is utterly impossible for any man who has the honour of his country at heart, or who has any heart at all, not to be moved by the sufferings of the bravest Army, and of the noblest spirits that ever left the British Shores, and I maintain, that with such feelings it is also impossible to deny to the "Times" the just and honorable triumph, however melancholy, which it has achieved, in the Report of the two Commissioners, corroborating most of the facts originally promulgated by that Journal, strengthening others, and heightening the color of the whole, as if the horrors of the Campaign had been but too faintly described—the great merit of the leading Journal is, that whilst it sought out, detected, and exposed the iniquities now universally admitted; neither slander, misrepresentation, abuse, threats, nor cajolery were able to deter it from holding up the great and powerful



I say nothing of the truly English spirit which the "Times," and indeed the Press generally, both Whig and Tory, have manifested from the commencement of this War: a spirit worthy of the Nation they so faithfully represent.

My present and indeed principal object, is to consider how far *War*, when waged in defence of right, may be considered as advantageous and desirable, and how far *Peace*, when procured *by any means*, and at *any price*, may be deemed the *reverse*. I shall also speak of the honorable interest which the Nation has taken in the War, and of the condition, conduct, and prospects of the British Soldier. I am well aware that preliminaries of Peace have been already signed, and that it might appear *too late* to discuss the War, as if no steps had been taken to procure Peace. But whatever may be the result of the Negotiations, we know one thing, that we have a most wily enemy to deal with—that "there is many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip"—and that the best way to procure Peace is to be prepared for War, nor appear to be afraid of it. As the Emperor of the French has most wisely said in his late Address to the Legislative Assembly: "let us await with dignity—let us be equally prepared either again to draw the sword, or to extend the hand to those we have honorably fought."

I confess that in my youthful days, I looked upon war as an unmitigated evil, come how it might; nor did I regard the Soldier with a much more favorable eye: but in those days the Soldier was not only a Soldier, but a Constable and a Policeman, to put down *with musket and* bayonet, any disturbance,

local or political, that might arise. This unhappily gave our Military a party character, as the mere instruments of those in authority, and unavoidably brought them into frequent contact with their countrymen, and, naturally enough, made the former very unpopular, almost as much the terror of the peaceable citizen, as of the evil doer. Again, it is true that years ago, our army greatly distinguished itself; but a 40 years' interlude of peace is rather a long holiday, and there is a corrupting power in the leisure of peace, or to speak more plainly, in the *idleness* of peace, as well as in the more active and destructive business of war;—this also was a sad drawback upon the popularity of our Soldier. But all this has now been changed. Our Army, generally speaking, has enough to do in foreign service, whether in peace or war, and Soldiers are no longer called

wrongs committed upon weak and unoffending Nations call for redress by arms, Englishmen, I know full well, will never reject the cry for aid in defence of right and justice. *In such a time, I would be a Soldier with all my heart!*

In the case before us, a just and righteous War has been undertaken by the nation, on behalf of a weaker ally, and has called out energies and virtues on the part of our brave army such as the enervating effects of the long Peace had contributed to place too much in abeyance. Notwithstanding the (as I must call it) unmanly, unpatriotic whining of certain Peacemongers, of the men who to rouse our fears and deter us from our course, magnify the resources of the enemy and depreciate our own—the men who shout for Peace *at any price*, no matter how dishonourable or disgraceful; I assert that, independent of all other considerations, a great good, not only political but *moral* has accrued to the nation in consequence of this War. Through the false doctrine and teaching of these *once* popular Orators, the nation was fast sinking into a morbid and selfish effeminacy, regarding nothing, looking to nothing but to pecuniary gains and material enjoyments—the honour and dignity of the nation, at home and abroad, its former ascendancy amongst foreign States, that of civilization over barbarism, of liberty and constitutional freedom over tyranny, were considered as nought. But this war on our parts, of right against might—of truth against hypocrisy, an hypocrisy as monstrous as the original outrage; for the God of supreme justice has been in the course of this War blasphemously invoked by the Potentate of Russia to grant special favour to an act of injustice and

aggression against the Turks, because, forsooth, they were Turks! and yet the same benevolent Deity was called upon, on former occasions, with the same mock religious zeal, to grant success to the Russian arms against the Poles, who were Christians!

This War, or rather this gross violation of all national rights, raised up at last a just indignation in the hearts of the British People. But I tremble, when I look back, so apathetic, as I stated before, was the nation becoming before the contest actually commenced; so apparently callous had it become to all wrongs, injuries, and insults, but those affecting its own selfish interests; beholding the liberties of all other Nations swept from their view like dust before the wind—in some cases, as in that of Poland, their very existence annihilated and ignored. So nearly was the ancient spirit of our forefathers flickering to its own extinction under the mean and sordid

victories; not a man has left the shores of England, or indeed ever leaves them for the East, but amidst the applauding shouts and acclamations of his countrymen. The British Soldier is enjoying, both at home and abroad, a popularity never before experienced by any army, in any age, or in any country. He has been contending with all his heart and soul, not only for his own personal honor and for that of his country, but for *justice.*

But still War is denounced as the greatest, the most intolerable of all evils. I can however tell you of one thing which is worse—Tyranny and Oppression raging over the land, over whole continents, unresisted —until its flood gathering force as it advances, breaks at length, all but irresistible, upon our own shores—only the last to be overwhelmed—that is still worse. Let the "Peace at any price" Advocate ponder upon this, if the enslaving of other nations be unable to move him. *A War to put down liberty, to establish or maintain a wrong is a Curse. A war waged for right is glorious, always—doubly glorious, and an inestimable blessing when successful in establishing it.* To go forth to defend the right, to resist oppression, is the noblest mission to which a free man can devote himself, and yet in both cases it is *War;* and I denounce those as cowards, as traitors to the cause of truth and justice, who having the means, magnificent Fleets and Armies dare not, or will not, raise an arm, or unsheath a sword to check the march of lawless Power.

A man who, beholding an *act* of oppression committed upon another, and having the strength to put it down, refuses to do so, has not the spirit to inter-

fere, is *a coward—the basest of cowards—the meanest of men*, and so it is with Nations. What a brand, what a burning brand it is to put upon the front of a whole People, to denounce them as a nation of *Cowards;* and yet I tell you, my Friends, that at the commencement of this War, and during its progress there *were* such Nations, standing by, listless, apathetic, aye trembling, whilst this great contest for the liberty of the whole civilized world was raging in their view. Thank God, I thank God, over and over again, that France and England were no parties to this treachery, to this dastardly conduct. There they stood in all the grandeur with which those who faithfully and fearlessly espouse the cause of truth and justice must always be invested: there they stood, and indeed now stand, firm and immoveable against the mightiest force that ever took up arms; and they will reap their reward in the salutary fear of the shameless and defeated Aggressor, and in the respect, admiration, and gratitude of the surrounding nations, whom they have saved and emancipated.

What, I ask, and where, would this great and free country have been, hitherto the only asylum for the oppressed of all nations, had our ancestors denounced *all* war indiscriminately, for right or for wrong, as some of our modern pseudo philanthropists? Was it not war, and civil war too, the most heart-rending of all wars, that gave us Magna Charta—that drove from the throne of these realms the worst of all Tyrants? Was it not by arms that the most glorious of all revolutions was accomplished, the corner stone of our liberties? Had William III. landed upon these shores accompanied only by an army of Quakers and Pacifi-

cators humbly beseeching King James to abdicate, would the Royal Bigot and Tyrant have decamped quite so readily? It was through war, a war in which this nation had no interest but that of a generous sympathy for the oppressed, that Cromwell, the Protector, redressed the wrongs and revenged the cruelties perpetrated on the helpless Waldenses, our Protestant brethren in the remote Valleys of the Alps.—Had a "Peace at any price" Advocate been Protector in those days, in the place of a bold and generous soldier, this glorious leaf of English History, upon which every Englishman looks back with pride and exultation, would have been a blank, or a blot, or a disgrace.

It is a recorded saying of some great man, that "a wrong done to an individual is a wrong done to the community at large;" so, a wrong perpetrated upon one nation, is a wrong committed upon the community of nations, and should be treated as such. War is the Physic of Nations—a nauseous draught occasionally, but as necessary to the body politic, as for the natural body, checking the rabid fever of ambition in Kings and Emperors and Potentates. If unjust wars have carried misery in their train, other wars have not only cleared the road to freedom, but have been the precursors to civilization. Few nations if any, either ancient or modern, have been great in Commerce, Arts, or the works of Peace, that have not, both *attained and retained* the means of becoming so by their prowess in arms; for by *arms* alone could they defend their supremacy against the assaults of their jealous rivals.

It might weary my hearers if I attempted to heap instance upon instance, the nations which, in the

records of history, stand as landmarks to all succeeding ages, pointing out the close connection between power and commerce, and all the benefits which the latter brings in its train;—power, not of the loom and spindle (honoured though they deserve to be) but power such as *this* world has always bent before, and *must ever bow to*; the power of might, of *Armèd Might.* I may be allowed to give one or two cases illustrative of this connection. Going back to the earliest times; it is worthy of note, that in the case of Tyre, whose history we chiefly gather from Holy Writ, the Prophets, (especially Ezekiel,) seem hardly to know which to dilate upon, her commercial or martial pre-eminence. Thus "the wise men who were her Pilots, the Ships of the Sea, which carried her merchandise," come in close contrast "with the Men of War who hung their Shields upon her Walls, and made her beauty perfect"—"thy riches, thy merchandise, and all thy men of war that

two Republics, after the great victory gained by Genoa in the year 1280, *one* of the stipulations was, that the ships of Venice were to be excluded from the *Black Sea*. Essentially commercial as were these two rival States, it is both curious and instructive to note, that *it was not war itself*—for never did their commerce flourish more, than during the time of their mutual contests, it was *not war itself*, I repeat, *but the inability to continue it*, that gave the signal for the downfall at once of their commercial prosperity, and their liberty.

Again, iniquitous in themselves, and frequently horrible in their execution, as were those early Spanish conquests in America, doubly horrible in the ghastly mask of religion which was thrown around them, yet whose commerce, save that of Spain and Portugal, flooded the markets of the world, when Cortez fought his way to the Capital of Montezuma, and Pizarro, in blood and slaughter, swept from the face of the land the Incas of Peru? It may be too bold to assert, that both War and Conquest are *always* inseparable from the internal prosperity and greatness of a nation; but it is not too much to say, that what conquest or peace have obtained for commerce, it has been invariably necessary to defend by arms. In the glorious days of Columbus and Vasco de Gama, Spain and Portugal marched in the van of civilization. Where and what are they now? In military prowess below contempt—snatched at one time by the arms of England from the very brink of destruction as a nation—and at this very moment relying upon this country as a continual defence against their more powerful and warlike neighbours;—the

Provinces they once conquered, now independent states, their commerce dwindled to nothing, almost extinct.

At one period of their history, the Dutch ruled the Seas both in commerce and war, and it was not until their naval supremacy fell away, that their Commercial Marine took a secondary rank.

Of the ability of our North-American friends to protect their commerce I need hardly speak.—Would that I could find my own country always as ready to resent the insults upon her people, and to protect their rights, as, with all her faults, our spirited but rather petulant offspring, has always shown herself!

It would be strange, now that the light of civilization begins to dawn upon us from the East, to omit to mention the great good that has been accomplished, both political and social, through this war, now in duration not three years. By one sweeping Firman of the Sultan *all* Nations under his rule, are put upon an equality in civil rights with his Musselman subjects, and *every* christian Church will for the future be protected in the exercise of its holy service. But the social changes that are already taking place are not less interesting if less important. The Sultan has attended at a Soiree of the English Embassy at Constantinople, and has eaten salt and shaken hands with our Ambassador; and many similar changes are taking place in Turkish Society generally. I will give you rather a ludicrous instance, personal to myself, of what customs were a few weeks ago and what they are now, and what individual enterprise amongst other means may accomplish.

I was going up the Bosphorus in a Turkish Steamer; *he vessel* was just starting when I arrived at the

pier. Now, I must inform you, that the Turkish steamers are divided into two compartments; the fore part for the men, the stern for the ladies. The bows of the vessel were far out, but the stern still hung to the pier. What could I do? I could not leap into the bows, so, according to the too pressing advice of a kind Frenchman, who seemed much interested in my welfare, and who seeing my difficulty, ejaculated "En avant, n'ayez pas peur, Monsieur." I flung myself, by a bold effort, straight into the stern amongst the yashmacs of the ladies. Unfortunately the boat moved whilst I was in the air, and I found myself planted horizontally on the tops of the ladies' heads; oh! miserable man that I was! in the agony of the moment I would cheerfully have changed my religion, become a Turk, and disgraced myself for ever, to escape from my tortures. I cried out "Allah!" fortunately no one took advantage of the exclamation. Even when I came to my senses I would willingly have exchanged places with any bold dragoon at the battle of Balaclava, or infantry man at Inkerman. I should then have met my antagonists on equal terms and might have gained some glory for my courage, or compensation for my wounds; but here patient submission was my only resource; the imprint of nails, and the impression of fists my only medals. Blows with parasols, and luncheon bags stuffed with provender hard as bricks, cuffs and scratches, aided by vollies of the most unintelligible jargon of Babylonian vituperation, left an impression upon body and mind which time alone can obliterate; and, to crown all, when I had escaped from claws, and cuffs, and scratches, whom *should I see but my* treacherous friend the

Frenchman, who had recommended the exploit, *grinning* a condoling address from the shore: "Oh Monsieur, quel malheur!" But what had I done in my desperation and frantic plunges? I had scattered shawls, yashmacs, and every article of Turkish female dress to the winds, and as far as I could observe, or indeed as far as I care, the Turkish ladies may lay aside the yashmacs altogether for all time to come, for I am sure of one thing, that my fair countrywomen have nothing to fear from the most *open* and liberal competition. I believe *now* that the Christian Voyager runs no such risk as I incurred; the stern and the bows of the vessel are alike free to him, and I also think I may fairly place this rapid *social* reform to the account of the War as much as to my own unfortunate audacity, for it can hardly be said that this Revolution was accomplished by very

But, though there is much, doubtless, to reprobate in many of the circumstances attending our conquests there, yet we cannot pass over the many blessings inseparable from the light of civilization, come in what guise it may. Aye! even in that of a Conqueror, breaking the yoke of Tyrants innumerable; putting a stop to the endless barbarities and assassinations which the death of every oriental Despot, and the consequent struggle for succession gave rise to; reducing fierce and intractable Enemies to mild and peaceable Subjects; staying the murderous car of Juggernaut; snatching spite of herself, the widow, from her couch of consuming fire; rooting out the treacherous plundering Thug; checking corruptions; replacing the rule of the sword with law and justice; sweeping away from one quarter of the globe, with a rapidity which the force of arms alone can accomplish, horrors too frightful to describe, too numerous to recount. Such, the results of War are *blessings*, and will remain for all time to ameliorate the condition of successive generations; whilst the blood which has been shed to obtain the good, will only be remembered as an useful and a worthy sacrifice.

I cannot bring to mind an instance in the world's history of any settlement being made by any European Nation in a less civilized quarter, which even when based upon the fairest principles of mutual benefit, was not driven sooner or later to defend itself by arms. Perhaps Penn's treaty with the North American Indians is the strongest case an opponent could select in reply to the argument; but the dreadful massacres perpetrated a few years after, in *the very territory guaranteed* by that treaty, massacres

which have been commemorated by one of our greatest Poets, show most emphatically the madness of exposing to the rapacity of others, life and possessions undefended and defenceless.

Heaven forbid that I should not do honor to the sacred name of *Peace*, but it is to *dis*honor that precious gift, *nay more*, sooner or later to insure its loss, to purchase it by a mean surrender of national Rights, and national Independence to power and aggression. Imperial Despoilers ravage the lands, destroy the cities, organize murder, and imbrue their hands in the blood of weak, unoffending, and supplicating nations, and they call it Peace! Yes! it was to purchase such a blood-stained Peace as this, that all Europe stood by unmoved, and abandoned unhappy Poland to be partitioned *four times over* by the potentates of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; to obtain such a peace as this, the most solemn treaties for her protection have been torn to shreds in the face of our Plenipotentiaries, without remonstrance or remorse; through such a peace as this, hundreds of thousands of citizens have been doomed to exile, and to misery in the wilds and wastes of Siberia. Oh! that a Dudley Stuart were now in being, to represent her wrongs and enforce her claims!

It is this our indifference to the liberty of other Nations, this deference to aggressions which do not *directly* affect ourselves, that abandoned the Hungarian nation, not to the tender mercies of their Austrian Ruler (for Austria was unable to compete alone with her brave subjects, contending for their constitutional rights) but left her to the merciless inroad and sword of the Cossack Barbarian. It is the same morbid

diseased love of Peace, *at any cost*, that has abandoned the fertile plains of Italy to the degrading rule of the meanest and the most insignificant of Tyrants, leaving the noblest of patriots to rot unheeded in their dungeons, when the booming of a single gun from a British man of war would have been the signal for the bursting of their prison doors, the welcome herald of their freedom.

It is this mean sacrifice to *Peace where there is no Peace*, this spiritless fear of war, that has so frequently brought down upon us national insult from the pettiest of despots, and compromised the national honor. Again, grant that wounds or death in battle are sad and trying things—there is no gainsaying it. Many a lowly cottage as well as lordly mansion, has, and will still have, should the war be protracted or renewed, to mourn the loss of many a beloved relative, who has disappeared from the scene, and will return no more to gladden the family hearth. Perhaps I see in this very hall the near and dear relatives of some of those noble and daring spirits who have been struck down in their early youth, full of hope and promise; and yet, tell me, my Friends, even in the first depths of your affliction, could he have died a more honorable or a more glorious death? Yes! every cabin in his native village will do honour to the memory of him they have lost.—The childless mother, or the widowed wife in her lone cottage, when she silently displays the medal for bravery, or that inscribed with the names "Alma," "Balaclava," "Inkerman," transmitted as an heirloom to the family, will recognize in the respect paid to themselves, the honour in which their lost son, husband, or brother, was held. These medals,

either on the breasts of the living or preserved in the families of those who have died bravely in the service of their country, are as honourable to *them* as the coronet which once glittered on the brow of a Nelson, or a Wellington, and which have been transmitted to *their* descendants. I can almost fancy some stout and manly hearts whispering to their owners—I would willingly die this brave man's death to be so honored and so lamented! But we have been looking on the darkest side of the picture. New regulations have been lately introduced, under the auspices of our beloved Queen, of one who has in her reign set a glorious example to Monarchs as well as to their people, by which much greater facilities will be afforded for the promotion of the private soldier than heretofore. I was informed the other day that there were no fewer than five officers in the 55th Regiment who have risen from the ranks by their merit. I could mention the names of friends of my own, most excellent officers, who have attained rank in the same way. But it is necessary that all should understand, be he a military man or a Civilian, (for none of us can foresee what may be our own lot,) that this promotion can only be attained like the Medal, by good conduct and bravery. All will now depend upon the personal exertions and merits of the soldier himself—his first object must be to raise himself in the scale; to make himself fit by assiduity and sober habits for the promotion to which he aspires. I repeat—sober habits, for in inebriety a military man, be his rank what it may, is neither fit to command nor to obey. He is neither fit to perform the duties of an Officer nor of a Private. B

even this will not do alone; there must be a certain amount of what is called learning—reading—writing —and some knowledge of figures; and, my Friends, addressing *you in civil life*, whose lot it is *not* to share the soldier's toils and dangers, but who still are the ardent well-wishers of our brave defenders, how much can each and all of you contribute to the comfort, to the happiness, to the elevation of the British soldier, by fostering his education, both moral and intellectual, in early life; to give him that knowledge and those habits which may fit him by his language and deportment, not only for the rank to which he aspires, but for association with those gentlemen to whose rank he may be raised—it is the deficiency in these respects which forms at present the great barrier to the promotion of the private soldier, a difficulty which he himself would be the first to acknowledge upon his hardly earned elevation.

Gladly do I now pass on to speak of the nobler qualities of the soldier, a more abundant theme to descant upon. I have visited all the Camps, from Gallipoli on the Dardanelles, to Yanikali on the Sea of Azoff, and I have also lived under canvas in the Crimea for months, and I repeat, that taking him for all in all, I am proud to be the compatriot of the British Soldier. "Soldier, with all thy faults, I regard thee much." I have heard of, as well as witnessed, feats of bravery as well as acts of generosity and humanity on his part, worthy of the noblest spirits—such as would do honor to the hero of some fictitious tale, and I have listened to these stories of real life, told by the soldiers themselves, of themselves, or *of their* comrades, with as little

pride or vain-glory, as if they had been recounting ordinary every-day occurrences.—I have seen him evincing a fortitude and patience under suffering, such as would afford a bright example to many, his superiors in condition. But if he has indeed borne his sufferings like a man, rarely uttering a complaint, how frequently have I heard him expressing the deepest gratitude towards those, who, either at home or on the spot, have done their best to relieve his wants and his pains. Talking one day with a severely wounded soldier in Scutari Hospital, I alluded to the gratitude which the country owed the Army for their bravery; the poor fellow, however, was dwelling upon *his own* gratitude, and whispered "Miss Nightingale—the Ladies; we know well that neither our country-men, nor country-women have forgotten us." Another man, sinking fast for want of proper attention in the first instance, said, "I suppose in so great a crowd of sick and wounded, they could not well look after us all." I spoke to one wounded man of the likelihood of Peace, and of his return home; he replied, "aye, but a *good Peace*: we are willing to go through a great deal more for that. Much as I should like to return home to see my friends after my long absence, I would willingly die in the assault could we but take Sebastopol."

Long before I left the Crimea, however, in November last, I am glad to say that the soldier's condition, both in Camp and Hospital, was much improved, and in acknowledging the favorable change, he seemed to have entirely forgotten all his past sufferings; and I must add, that in the matter of health

I thought the general appearance of the soldier was even superior to that of the men at Aldershot, where I have been lately. No more in the field than in the hospital has his high spirit bent under disappointment; although it cannot be denied that the results of his victories have not been so conspicuous as the victories themselves have been glorious.

Even after the unfortunate assault upon the Redan and Malakoff on the 18th of June, (to which assault I went down with the 50th Regiment,) the principal disappointment seemed to be, that it was thought prudent by the Generals to retire so soon—that is, after *eight* hours firing. I almost think our brave men would have continued the contest, and taken the city themselves, had they been permitted, even without the *assistance* of their Generals. I shall never forget when the brave fellows mustered in their Camp at half-past one o'clock in the morning, it being quite dark, to march down to the attack; their spirited Colonel was addressing a few words of encouragement to them, when a private in the rear rank, highly gratified with the pluck of his superior officer, (though certainly rather in contravention of military discipline) roared out "Bono, Bono, Johnny." No! never desponding or out of sorts, our gallant Soldiers are more anxious, *even* under temporary failure, to renew the contest, than after a decided victory.

I was conversing with a Trooper at Kadikoi, soon after the battle of Balaklava, at which he fought. After describing the battle as well as any Officer could have done, and, pointing out to me the disposition of the Troops on the field, which was

immediately under our feet, and after telling me he had heard his Regiment was going home, and how sorry he was for it, as he had been all through the campaign, and wished to see it out, by re-entering into some other Regiment; he went on to inform me what part he had taken in the battle, and how very fortunate he had been in his escapes. He said—I will use his own words—"our Regiment made several charges through the enemy, backwards and forwards: I had three horses killed under me, picking up fresh ones as I could, and not a scratch did I receive; (he seemed to think more of his luck in not receiving a scratch, than of anything else.) At last, (he continued,) I found myself close to a Russian mounted Artillery-man: my sabre raised to cut him down, I looked at him for a moment however, saw he was unarmed, and could not find it in my heart to do it. When my comrades and myself mustered again in the field, I found so many of them gone, that I shed tears, and he added, poor fellow, "as big as peas!" Was not this a humane and generous Soldier? and I warrant ye, as brave as he was generous. His name was "Isaacs," of the 4th Light Dragoons. I could not help writing to his father, to tell him what a noble son he had. I trust he is doing well, and has obtained the promotion he so well deserves. Truly may I say, that I had rather be this plain John Isaacs, Private of the 4th Light Dragoons, with his solitary medal for bravery—the man who so generously spared his helpless and unarmed enemy—than the Emperor Nicholas when he bore the Imperial diadem on his head, and *all his* orders on his breast, conferred upon him b

his brother Potentates and Despots—even though inscribed, emblazoned, and ensanguined with all his victories gained over patriot Poles and Hungarians.

I can also tell you similar tales of the Infantry, their courage and noble conduct at Inkerman, when no more than 8000 British troops, though taken by surprise, resisted no fewer than 50,000 Russians, fighting with them hand to hand, foot to foot, not less than 8 hours, with a determination which our enemies themselves could not but wonder at and admire. Groups of five and six men standing up against whole columns until they were cut to pieces or mowed down on the spot; sometimes overwhelmed for the moment by the enormous numbers and weight of the masses opposed to them: still they returned again and again to the charge, until our brave allies, the French, coming up—General Bosquet at their head—one universal shout and cheer of welcome rose from our men now almost exhausted, when the gallant General waved his hat in return for the salute, and the two brave armies united drove the enemy headlong into Sebastopol. And these were the men whom the Russian General *before* the battle, pledged himself to his imperial master to drive into the Black Sea! Oh that field of Inkerman! There is not a man who laid down his life or nobly fought in that glorious battle, to whom his grateful country does not owe her preservation and her honour.

It would indeed be an omission, were I to forget to record to their glory the noble conduct of some of our soldiers at Alma, where the Russians were stabbing and putting our unresisting men to death on the field. Did our brave men retaliate the barbarity?

No, they contented themselves with taking away the Russian muskets and making the murderers prisoners! (See note in Appendix relative to the treatment of our Soldiers by the Russians.)

And whilst speaking of the bravery and merits of the soldier we must not forget "Poor Jack," who has been rather neglected. Our jolly Tars, their cool courage and spirit—for there is no jealousy between the services—soldier and sailor—each rejoices in the others honour and success—Jack who could not find enough work to do on board ship must have a Naval Brigade to himself on shore. It was fine to see him stretching away from his quarters to go to his batteries, travelling at such a pace with his big stick; I thought when I first beheld him that some one had given him a free ticket for the play. One morning the Union Jack was knocked off the flag-staff by a Russian shot; Jack swarms up the pole to put it up again—No! that is not enough, four others must follow to help him, the shot and shell flying about them like hail, luckily they all came down unhurt. Another day you would see them galloping along the trenches on ponies, the man in front playing the fiddle. It was an every day occurrence, after discharging their great guns, to jump upon the parapet in face of all the Russian rifles to see the effect of their shot. These brave fellows, like the equally brave soldiers, will go with their officers any where; and no wonder, when they have such leaders as Captain Keppel, late of the St. Jean d'Acre, a true descendant of the first Admiral, who, upon my asking him (the Captain) one day in his tent why he left *his fine ship* to go through all the hard work of the

Naval Brigade on shore, replied "I *want a Medal;*" and the British army and navy also, when they have had their chance, have all fought as if they were determined to have their Medals too.

And yet with all these proofs before us of the fatal results to liberty of *Peace procured at any cost*—and on the other hand, of what war has accomplished for freedom and civilization; of the accumulated instances of the bravery the magnanimity of the one sex, of the self-devotion of the other, we are imperiously informed that *all wars* are an unmitigated evil, without a redeeming point or advantage. No doubt the seasons of peace are favourable to the cultivation of intellect and knowledge, and may minister to material enjoyments and luxuries—but war has also its moral uses, like adversity, it brings out in full relief all the nobler feelings and loftier virtues, and tries the very soul of man. It were almost worth this war and its sacrifices, to have seen the self-devotion of that noble band of Heroines, who to relieve suffering, voluntarily doomed themselves to pass through more misery than could be found on the field of battle itself; searching by night and by day, through the dying and the dead, through pestilence and horrors unspeakable, for the wretched objects of their commisseration and their care. It was once said of some celebrated family that "all the sons were brave and all the daughters virtuous." For the ladies no more might possibly be required, though I must say that gentle words and kind looks are a great enhancement of their other merits, and cast a cheering grace over the severer virtues. But for the men, they might have added that they were generous and *humane as well as brave*, for what can be finer in the

manly character than bravery when united with generosity and humanity? I am proud to say that my countrymen have almost universally shown themselves as generous and humane in victory as brave in battle.

Before I conclude, I cannot omit to mention a matter, personal to myself, however unimportant it may appear: I mean the extreme courtesy I always experienced from the British Soldier during my long sojourn in Turkey and the Crimea. Never did I meet with a single rude word in all my various conversations and enquiries, and this courtesy took a much wider range, for however deplorable may have been the sacrifice of the blood and treasure of the land, it is no small alleviation of our pains and our sorrows to reflect, that one result has been to cement so closely and so cordially—let us hope for ages to come—the union between the two great Empires of France and England—an union reaching from the monarchs on their respective thrones, down to the lowliest peasants in the cabins of both countries.

It has been demanded what we are fighting for? If we say for the security of dependent nations, they reply, "What is that to us? What the salvation of any other country than our own from tyranny and despotism—Let them perish." The precepts of that beneficent power who has made of one blood all nations of men, teach a different lesson. I humbly reply, that the Nation which regards as nothing the freedom of other States, will not long preserve its own, nor is it worthy of it. Or again, a taunt is thrown out, that we are fighting for *glory only*, for a barren glory, whose base is selfishness or

ambition. Was it a barren glory, or was it not the terror of our arms after repeated victories, that secured for Europe and our own happy land, if not uninterrupted Peace, at least comparative tranquillity of 40 years' duration? No! it is no barren glory for which we are fighting. We are contending for the most solid and the most resplendent of all glory —a glory founded on truth and justice—such alone as will secure a lasting and honorable Peace from those whose only weapon has been either fraud in diplomacy, or the sword in battle. We seek under the benignant reign of Queen Victoria, that glory, which in former days shed an imperishable lustre over the reign of another of our Queens, when she sent her brave soldiers to defend her persecuted Allies on a foreign shore. A voice came not long since from the gallant Men of Kingston-upon-Hull, in which they declare that though they have been injured by this war, more than any other city in the united Empire, still they implore her Majesty to conclude no peace which shall not secure the safety of her Allies, and of Europe, and redound to the honor of her Kingdom and her Crown. Honor, everlasting honor, I say, to the men of Kingston-upon-Hull! "Beware of entrance to a quarrel, but being in, bear it, that the Oppressor may beware of thee."

Now, my friends, believe me, trust me, when I say that that which concerns the safety and honour of our common country, the question of War or Peace, is no Party matter as it has been wrongly said, unless we are willing to suppose that there is *any* Party in this country indifferent to that honour and to that welfare. Heaven preserve us from that greatest of all *calamities, a nation* or any part of one, willing to

barter its honour, aye even in victory, for a hollow an ignoble peace! Why should we not pronounce in this hall with the same noble voice as the men of Kingston-upon-Hull, that we are ready and determined to make any sacrifice for justice—*this is not party, but patriotism and public virtue.* Such a tongue can never be silent in a hall filled with Englishmen, though it may not be consistent with the forms of this assembly to come to a specific vote upon the question: let us at any rate understand what are our sentiments whilst *Peace and War are trembling in the balance;* and *before it be too late.*

Fail *now* to demand the reward of all your sacrifices, the independence and freedom of other nations as well as of your own—fail now, I repeat to seize the prize which British valour and British blood have so gloriously won; and British valour which has marched and reigned triumphant for centuries, wherever the British flag has been unfurled, will be but a bye word, a laughing stock, and a contempt, —and the blood of your countrymen will indeed have flowed in vain! I ask for nothing either in word or deed which can tarnish the British name; but remembering this, tell me, my Friends, should the appeal be made to you by an almost unanimous nation, led by a patriot Queen, answer me, I repeat, whether in despite of a false philanthropy, of the meanest and most sordid feelings, and the most unmanly fears; will you not prefer recourse to Arms. War if you please, however painful, trying, or self-sacrificing yet with honor—with honor I repeat, to a Peace however gainful or profitable, even tranquillizing for the moment, but with *dishonor, degradation,* and disgrace!

APPENDIX.

The following are a few of the statements I received from the lips of the Soldiers themselves, whilst I was in the Crimea, relative to the treatment they had experienced at the hands of their Enemies.

Hugh King, of the Grenadier Company, 57th Regiment, said,—

"I was marching a Prisoner to Veronich, some Convicts behind the Party, when the Officer in charge of the Company came up and halted the Party, took the Soldiers out one by one (about 14 of them,) struck them with his fist and the flat of his Sword, and afterwards manacled them, the Soldiers, and beat them besides.—A Polish Soldier who did not beat them enough was struck by the Officer with his Sword—*the Polish Soldiers behaved very kindly to us—they were the only friends we had—the Russians would never let the Poles speak to us.*"

John Mc Cann, 13 Light Dragoons.

"After losing my horse at the battle of Balaclava, and being shot twice in the head, I fell to the ground, and a Cossack came up and shot me in the side—the ball came out at my shoulder. I turned over on my face, and he ran his lance through my back and left me for dead.—We were taken by night to Simpheropol, where we were almost starved—had it not been for an English Gentleman, Newman, and an English Lady, Salvillier, married to a Prussian, *we must have died.* I saw a Russian Orderly beat one of the 8th Hussars, who was wounded (arm off) for asking for some tea.—The Soldier reported it to his American Doctor, *who beat the Orderly,* and reported him to the Governor, who, as usual, took no notice.

After leaving the Hospital we were put into a common Cell in the Gaol. Veronich was almost the only place at which our men were tolerably treated.—Some English people at Karakoff treated us very kindly; amongst the rest, Mrs. Harvey, Miss Hardcastle, Madame Broglia, Mr. Eldrege, Mr. Dean, and several French Ladies, Madame Thomarseul for one:—Mr. Christopherson also at Veronich, was the only Englishman there who was able to do any thing for us, and he did all he could.—At Odessa we were not allowed to speak to any one who could speak English. A Lady there, gave us Shirts, Tea for the Sick, Chickens, Tobacco, Soap, &c., &c,"

Corporal Mahomy, 55th Regiment, taken Prisoner in the Trenches.

"The Russians took all my clothes which were ordered upon complaint to the Governor of Sebastopol to be returned but never were. (Were they *ordered* to be returned?)

William Sullivan, 55th Regiment.

"Had my medal for service in China on my breast. A Russian Officer commanding the parties who took them,

A COMPARISON

OF

FACTS WITH OPINIONS.

BY

WASHINGTON WILKS.

[illegible]

PALMERSTON

IN THREE EPOCHS:

A COMPARISON

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WASHINGTON WILKS,

AUTHOR OF A "HISTORY OF THE HALF CENTURY"



LONDON:

WILLIAM FREEMAN, 69, FLEET STREET.

1854.

PREFACE.

If ever regard to the public interest could be honestly averred as the motive for what might seem a merely professional performance, the writer of the following pages believes he may make that averment. Deeming the right estimation by a people of their most conspicuous and influential countrymen, a matter of moral as well as political importance, he has seized the present moment of more than even usual interest in Lord Palmerston, to exhibit, in a portable form, the leading facts of that statesman's career, for comparison with current opinions respecting him.

PALMERSTON IN THREE EPOCHS.

Epoch I. — That of English Alliance with Continental Absolutism.

The septuagenarian Marquis of Lansdowne has been connected, by more than rumour, with Lord Palmerston's latest political evolution;—the two have, at any rate, been colleagues and fellow-partizans for more than twenty years. Palmerston commenced his public career, however, as the competitor of the noble marquis (then Lord Henry Petty) for high senatorial honours. Lord Henry was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the original Ministry of "All the Talents." The event which necessitated that unlovely coalition—the death of William Pitt (Jan., 1806)—caused a vacancy in the representation of Cambridge University. It was daring in Lord Henry at twenty-six—though a Cabinet Minister—to aspire to the honour;—still more so in Palmerston—son of an Irish peer, nineteen, and M.A. of St. John's — to venture rivalry. The Minister triumphed; but his Chancellorship was of brief duration. The death of Fox did not destroy, but it shook the coalition; and in March, 1807, the Duke of Portland became Premier, with Castlereagh, Canning, Perceval, and Eldon, for colleagues. From this Government of almost unmitigated Toryism and incapability, Palmerston received a seat and a place — *a seat for* the private borough of

Bletchingley, and a place among the Lords of the Admiralty. Nearly three years later, Castlereagh and Canning carried their life-long quarrel to Putney-heath;—Canning was wounded in the thigh, and excluded from office; Perceval succeeded to the Premiership, Castlereagh to Canning at the Foreign Office, and Palmerston to Castlereagh as Secretary-at-War. It was in the former capacity that his first reported speech was made (February, 1808). It was a defence of that corsair expedition to Copenhagen which is one of the worst crimes and blunders in the war which was itself originally a crime and a blunder. The specific object of his lordship's speech was, resistance to a motion for the production of papers—an object long since become familiar to the now veteran debater. "In this case the Government are pledged to secrecy," he said; adding, "I object generally to making public the working of diplomacy, because it is the tendency of disclosures in that department to shut up future sources of information"—a tendency so little obvious that we must regard the attempt at generalizing from a particular case as an instance of juvenile indiscretion.

If to Lord Palmerston may be justly awarded a share of the praise merited by the vigorous prosecution of the war to a successful issue, he must also take his portion of the blame incurred by the many faults of the Perceval and Liverpool Administrations—the refusal of inquiry into the Walcheren disaster—the errors of perception or will that left Sir John Moore unsupported, and superseded Wellesley by Burrard and Dalrymple—the worse than folly of fighting the Berlin Decrees with the Orders in Council; of adding a war with America to our engagements in the old world; of humiliating France by the reinstatement of the Bourbons; of defrauding thirty-two millions of people by the treaty of Vienna, and tarnishing the fame of British generosity by the deportation of Napoleon to St. Helena. For these mistake and offences—to which must be added the obstinate conse

vatism and flagrant tyranny of the Liverpool Administration in home affairs; resistance to Parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation; the massacre of Peterloo,* and the enactment of the Six Acts; — Palmerston must be held jointly responsible with his more conspicuous and now silent colleagues. He alone — or nearly alone — survives; but the oblivion that is hardly due to the dead cannot be claimed by the living—least of all, when appeals are made for that extraordinary confidence and uncritical admiration which are the national homage to a type of national sentiment.

The great and characteristic event of this epoch—the first of Lord Palmerston's career — was the Treaty of Vienna. To it we must look for the true spirit and ultimate object of the war to which it put a termination—just as it is in the last scene of a play that we read its principle and moral. Detached scenes of the great epic are capable of different interpretations. In the eager unanimity with which the peoples of England and the Continent armed to resist threatened or actual invasion—in the generous zeal displayed for the liberation of Spain, and the sympathy that waited on every achievement of German patriotism —we read the popular idea of the great struggle. In the arrangements of the Congress at which Castlereagh was England's representative, we read, on the other hand, the idea with which her rulers had originated, prosecuted, and completed the war—namely, the repression of democratic principles. Of that idea, the restoration of the Bourbons in France, Spain, and Italy—the reconstruction of Germany—the cession of Belgium to Holland, of Finland to Russia, of Venice and Lombardy to Austria—and the re-

* Lord Palmerston has expressed, in one of his vindicatory orations, an objection to be held responsible for events prior to the commencement of his official life, or with which he was not directly concerned. The slaughter of the Manchester Radicals, it should therefore be said, received his individual expression of approval. When the Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire was requested to convene a meeting on the subject, Lord Palmerston signed a counter-requisition, and *defended himself*, in the House of Commons, for so doing.

partition of Poland—were the very legitimate expression. It is true that England stipulated, in the case of Poland, Germany, and Spain, that the new governments should be constitutional; but the stipulation was only made on the exertion of Parliamentary pressure, and was not in any one case enforced. It was understood, both at home and abroad, that the kings whose thrones English blood and money had helped to repurchase, were free to rule by the divine right of justice or the diabolical rule of force, as they pleased. The history of the next ten years shows how liberally the understanding was acted upon. Even the dull pages of "Hansard" and the "Annual Register," glow with the record of kingly crimes under cover of this Treaty; and of the protestations of Grey and Holland, of Brougham, Horner, and Romilly, against England's being accessory thereto. But neither chronicle records that Palmerston ever rose to denounce the criminals or disclaim the alliance. Let the case of Sicily show how much of shame such silence should entail:—

Sicily, like Hungary, started a-head of England in the path of representative government; and preserved her domestic political rights through many centuries of dynastic vicissitude. When, in the beginning of the last century, the Duke of Savoy was elected King of Sicily, he was bound by an article in the treaty of Utrecht to maintain its ancient constitutional institutions. The same obligation was renewed by Ferdinand the First of Naples, to whom the crown descended. He had, however, an Austrian wife —one of those fair furies in which the court of Vienna is prolific—and was instigated by her to violate his engagements. The Sicilians, by the aid of Lord William Bentinck — the representative of England at Palermo — defeated repeated attempts on their liberties. But the Treaty of Vienna restored Ferdinand to the throne of which Murat had deprived him; Sir W. A'Court, unsupported from home, could give the Sicilians no effectual aid in defer

of the constitution which he had guaranteed; Ferdinand violating his oath, extended to his Sicilian subjects the blessings of Austrian rule; and it was not till a Sicilian insurrection roused the English people to the tale of their wrongs, that Lord W. Bentinck found a hearing for that tale in Parliament (June 23, 1821). Of Lord Castlereagh's reply, Sir James Mackintosh said, "he could not adequately express his indignation and abhorrence at such a shameful abuse of terms;" the people who had been assured of our protection, had been left to be "dictated to by foreign mercenaries in a manner which would have been degrading to an Asiatic slave." A minority of thirty-five voted for Bentinck's motion—and Palmerston, Secretary-at-War, was no doubt* among the silent, unrecorded sixty-nine.

The Sicilian insurrection of 1820 was not a solitary outbreak. It had been preceded by a revolt of the Spanish army and people against their priest-governed sovereign; which was presently followed by a similar movement in Portugal. It was nearly simultaneous with the proclamation of Grecian independence—an intended rising in Austrian Italy—and the discovery of a conspiracy in the Russian army. Earlier than any of these were those ominous occurrences in Germany which led to the convention, by Metternich, of a second congress of Vienna (December, 1819)—the object of which was to tighten the fetters of the Teutonic peoples. Austrian armies suppressed the Italian risings from Milan to Naples; and France prepared to restore to Ferdinand of Spain, by armed invasion, his lost prerogatives. It was to aid in and generalize this design that the Congress of Verona met in the summer of 1822. To that Conference Castlereagh was about to repair—the session of Parliament having closed—when he was smitten with that fell terror which drove him to suicide. After an interregnum of a few weeks, Canning succeeded Castlereagh

* "*Hansard*" gives the names of the minority only.

as ruler and mouthpiece of England's foreign relations. And with that event ended this first epoch in Palmerston's career—*the epoch*, we may surely say, *of English alliance with continental despotisms.*

EPOCH II—THAT OF ENGLISH INTERVENTION IN FAVOUR OF INDEPENDENT NATIONALITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

England was not unrepresented at Verona. The Government sent thither the Duke of Wellington, in place of the Marquis of Londonderry. If the change had been only that of the one man for the other, it would have been of no small advantage. But it was much more—even a change of policy. The Duke bore instructions from Canning, the new Foreign Secretary, "frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any such interference" as that proposed in Spain and elsewhere, "his Majesty, come what may, will not be a party." The honest soldier delivered his message promptly and boldly—even made it understood that England desired a very different settlement of the Italian question—and withdrew from the Conference; which terminated without any positive result. ENGLAND HAD BROKEN WITH THE DESPOTS—and their apprehension may be measured by their peoples' joy. Thus far, her intervention was only that of a moral influence. Canning declined—wisely and justly, it has long been universally admitted—to go to war single-handed for Spanish independence against France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. He contented himself with promulgating, in state papers and speeches, that every people has the exclusive right to select its own form of government; and with declaring that England was equally ready to recognise monarchies and republics. He carried out both the principle and the promise in the case of the revolted South American colonies. France, elated by her success in the mother-country, threatened the *re-conquest* of the new Republics. Canning instantly recog-

nised their independence by accrediting to them consuls; and distinctly declared that French invasion would be resisted, on the principle that no power has a right to interfere between another power and its revolted subjects. The warning was effectual — for it was felt that England could afford on her own element to act upon impulse and conscience, if on the land she must be ruled by prudence. But not even in the immediate presence of hostile Europe did Canning hesitate to carry out an engagement he conceived to be binding. The party of reaction in Portugal—headed by the Queen, her second son Don Miguel, and the French ambassador — deposed the constitutional king, shut up the Cortes, revoked popular concessions, and were about to introduce a Spanish army to keep down the Portugese Liberals, when a British squadron in the Tagus—despatched by our Government immediately on receiving intelligence of these events — stopped the reaction and the invasion together. An almost unanimous vote justified this splendid instance of administrative vigour. It was on the express and exclusive ground of our obligation by treaty to defend Portugal from external attack that the responsibility was incurred, without an hour's hesitation, and the justification awarded by an applauding nation. "We go to Portugal," said the orator whose words were deeds, "in the discharge of sacred obligations. When there, nothing shall be done by us to enforce the establishment of the constitution; but we must take care that nothing shall be done by others to prevent it from being fairly carried into effect. Internally, let the Portuguese settle their own affairs; but with respect to external force, while Great Britain has an arm to raise, it must be raised against the efforts of any power that shall attempt forcibly to control the choice, and fetter the independence, of Portugal. . . . We go to Portugal, not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions, but to defend and preserve the independence of an ally."

Throughout these years of brilliant speech and action, Palmerston retained his place as Secretary-at-War. He did not fling it up at the announcement, so unwelcome to some of his colleagues, that Canning was to re-enter the Cabinet, despite the King's angry aversion, and in a place of rule. Nor did he desert his sovereign and colleague with Wellington, Peel, Eldon, and a dozen others, when Canning was elevated to the Premiership. He was even one of the group known as "Canningites," who attempted to carry on the Government under Lord Goderich, joined the Wellington administration, seceded with Huskisson, and subsided into Whigs, as the Tories finally subsided into hopeless opposition. But what part did he bear in the defence of Canning's measures and the promotion of Canning's ends? For aught that "Hansard" or other historian records, he may have done nothing beyond his duty when an admiralty lord, as defined by his witty leader, "to make a house, to keep a house, and to cheer the minister." He spoke but once on

us use threats in negotiation without being prepared for war," his lordship's smartness must be suspected of having been spent on an antagonist imagined for the occasion.—Towards the close of the speech occurs another passage which may perhaps be revived against its author:—

"If Spain is divided, our interference is on principle questionable; if she is united, our interference is unnecessary; if, being united, she is successful without our aid, much will have been gained and nothing lost; by our abstinence we shall have preserved unbroken our own resources for future occasions, if any should occur, in which our own honour, interests, and safety, shall be more directly concerned, and Spain will have had fuller and freer scope to develop that national energy which, while it will make her more worthy of her independence, will qualify her better to enjoy and to maintain it."

Epoch III—That of Vacillation: alternate Intervention and Non-intervention.

Canning dead and Palmerston in opposition, we find him starting into oratorical prominence, and attacking the Wellington Ministry for a course of foreign policy which seems clearly defensible on Canning's principles, however lacking the inspiration of Canning's spirit. In the early part of 1828, there had been another revolution in Portugal. Don Miguel had taken oaths, as Regent, to observe the constitution; but the very next day gave token of a directly opposite intention. Presently, he got himself proclaimed king, and a civil war was the consequence. The stipulated time for the departure of the troops sent by Canning arrived, and the English Government saw no reason to continue them at Lisbon; neither would they permit the Constitutionalists of Portugal to make use of British harbours for the equipment of armaments. This seems literally in accordance with Canning's maxims—that English obligations to Portugal consist exclusively in her defence against foreign aggression; and that to every nation must be left the management of its internal affairs. Nevertheless, Palmerston complains *that the Government* has converted England, in

the opinion of all foreign peoples, from "the patron, no less than the model, of constitutional freedom, as the refuge from persecution, and the shield against oppression," into "the key-stone of that arch of which Miguel, and Spain, and Austria, and Mahmoud, are the component parts." He assents to the maxims of his late chief, but evades their application by an ingenious discrimination between two courses of action supposed to be identical in substance; and contributes to political phraseology a term for which he was himself to furnish much employment:—

"The ground upon which my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Peel), has defended the doing of all that has been done, and the not doing of all that has been omitted, is the principle of non-interference; that is to say, the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbours; and that one nation has no right to control, by force of arms, the will of another nation in the choice of its government or ruler. To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound—it ought to be sacred; and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation. But in all discussions it is of great importance to come to a clear understanding of the precise meaning of terms used in debate; and let us, therefore, strip the word 'interference' of an ambiguity which tends to perplex and confuse. If by 'interference,' is meant interference by force of arms, such interference, the Government are right in saying, 'general principles and our own practice forbade us to exert.' But if by 'interference' is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling in every way, and to every extent short of actual military force, then I must affirm, that there is nothing in such interference which the law of nations may not in certain cases permit; and that the whole history of the connexion between England and Portugal has been almost one unbroken chain of such interference on our part; nay, more, that the complaint to which the present Government is most justly exposed, is, not that they have not interfered, but that they have interfered only on the wrong side."

His Lordship offers no proof that they had "interfered" or "intermeddled" "on the wrong side." They seem to *have maintained* a strict neutrality—to have withheld the

encouragement of sympathy and approval no less rigorously from the Absolutists than from the Liberals. They thus inaugurated a new epoch of English relations to foreign peoples and powers—initiated a rule which their critic and censor assented to, but was urging them to violate, and yet to violate without effect. Canning's policy—despite the maxims quoted above—was not that of absolute non-intervention. He *interfered to enforce non-intervention.* He interfered, sometimes by words only, sometimes by arms, but always on the side of international independence and popular rights. He interfered by the declaration of principles, by protests against their violation, by the recognition of successful rebellion,—once by the menace, and once by the employment, of force. Palmerston, as his colleague, disclaimed the protest and the menace, as the weapons of braggarts and dastards—as his successor, insisted upon "intermeddling in every way and to every extent *short of actual military force.*" He had already entered upon the epoch of vacillation and incertitude — shall we say, already commenced the debasement of great principles and interests to the service of personal or party aims?

It is a long story that we have now to tell, and one that is made up of many separate sets of events. We will observe in the telling an order of connexion rather than of time, and indicate the divisions of the subjects by the names of the countries immediately concerned. We begin with—

Poland.

Lord Palmerston found, on his return to office as Foreign Secretary, in the Ministry of Earl Grey (November, 1830), a revolutionary King on the throne of France, and the Poles in arms against the barbarous tyranny of the Russian Grand Duke Constantine. The revolt was accompanied by an appeal to the Constitution guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna. The Czar Nicholas declared it "horrid treason," *and sent an army to inflict* a horrid punishment. As

England was a principal party to the guarantee in question, and as it was known that France, and even Austria, was ready to co-operate in requiring its observance, the people who had rapturously applauded the French Revolution, and the establishment of a Reform Ministry, of course confided the cause of Poland to the hands of Palmerston. But silence bred suspicion—and, on August 8th, 1831, there came a petition from the Westminster Union for the dismissal of the Minister who had not even deigned to acknowledge their memorial. On Mr. Hume asking if the Poles were to be left to the mercy of Russia, Lord Palmerston said he must decline to give explanations, but "whatever obligations existing treaties imposed would receive the attention of the Government." The assurance silenced, if it did not satisfy —so notorious was the right of interference given to England by the compact of 1815. A week later (August 16), Colonel Evans moved for papers relating to the Polish war. Lord Palmerston opposed the motion, but reiterated the assurance above given. In April following (1832), Mr. Cutler Ferguson brought on a discussion—when Lord Althorp apologized for the unavoidable absence of his noble friend the Foreign Secretary. To another motion by the same hon. member—seconded by the Conservative Lord Sandon—for the production of unimportant papers (June 28), Lord Palmerston assented; begging the House "to excuse him from entering into any discussion or explanation of the conduct pursued by Government" in this business:—

"He was sure there was no person who must not see that, with reference to all the interests concerned, and on every account, he should best discharge his duty by not entering into any statement of that nature. At the same time, he was bound in justice to add that the Government of this country was not blind to the rights conferred upon us by the treaty of Vienna. No man could entertain a doubt that Great Britain possessed a full right to express a decided opinion upon the performance or the non-performance of the stipulations contained in that treaty. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that England lay *under no peculiar* obligation, individually and independently, to the

other contracting parties, to adopt measures of direct interference by force. For the reasons, then, which he had already stated, he took for granted that the House would not expect him to explain at length the communications which had taken place between his Majesty's Government and their agents at foreign courts, upon the subject of Poland."

On another motion by Col. Evans (August 7), his Lordship made a general defence of Russia—taunting the hon. member to whom he had refused the facts with having "nothing but surmises on which to found his opinions;" adding—

"With respect to Poland, he could also say, without touching at all on the question of Russia having broken her faith to the Poles on the subject of a constitution, that in the late war the Poles were the aggressors, for they commenced the contest."

Being asked whether Poland was to be left to extermination, his answer was a model of literal exactness:—"To exterminate Poland, either morally or politically, is so perfectly impracticable, that I think there need be no apprehension of its being attempted." When it was seen, with horror, that the Russian idea of order was indeed that of desolation—and even the "physical," as well as "moral," extermination of Poland appeared not improbable—Palmerston again presented himself (July 9, 1833) as the apologist and eulogist of the Czar:—

"Some expressions had dropped in the course of the debate with regard to the persecutions of the Poles which required some little notice. He thought no blame on this score attached to the Emperor of Russia personally. It was well known that the present Emperor of Russia was a man of high and generous feelings, and if it were possible for the Emperor to follow the bent of his own inclination, he was convinced that none of the atrocities which had been spoken of would have been practised against the Poles. . . . . The severities which had been practised upon the Poles were, in his mind, the clearest proof that the power of the Emperor of Russia was by no means unlimited."

This same regard for the reputation, rights, and feelings of Nicholas, compelled him to oppose a grant of money to his escaped victims (March 25, 1834):—

"The *gallant colonel (Evans)* had grounded the claims of the peti-

tioners to relief on the circumstances of an infraction by Russia of the treaty of Vienna, to which treaty this country was a party; and had stated that England would have had a right to secure the Poles from the grasp of Russia by force of arms. He (Lord Palmerston) admitted that England would have had a right to go to war with Russia if she had thought proper; but Government did not think that, under all the circumstances of the case, it would have been expedient for England to go to war with the Emperor of Russia. The mere fact of this country being a party to the treaty of Vienna, was not synonymous with our guaranteeing that there would be no infraction of that treaty by Russia. He must repeat that while there must be a feeling of sympathy in every heart in favour of the unfortunate Poles, Government could not hold out any hope of extending pecuniary relief to them." *

Scarcely in keeping with this doctrine, though quite harmonious in results, was the language of the note in which he declined the intervention of France and England, proposed by M. Talleyrand:—

"The intervention of the two Courts could only be by force, in the case of a refusal on the part of Russia, and the amicable and satisfactory relations between the Cabinet of St. James and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would not allow his Britannic Majesty to undertake such an interference."

In a speech to the House of Commons—July 9, 1833—he had represented the military power and advantages of Russia and her allies as the reason why England waived her right to interfere. In this note, it is the "amicable and satisfactory relations" that constitute the objection. And—still stranger inconsistency!—the right to interfere is given up:—"The time was not yet come to undertake such a plan with success against the will of a sovereign *whose rights were indisputable.*"

What "rights," but those of conquest? "Indisputable!"—why, the writer had himself challenged them! In Hansard's report of the speech above alluded to, we read:—

"By the treaty of Vienna, the assignment of Poland to Russia was

* A grant of £10,000 per annum was afterwards gracefully assented to by *Lord Althorp.*

regarded as an European arrangement, to which the European powers were parties. That treaty defined the relation in which Poland should stand to Russia, and on that ground alone, he contended, the other powers had a right to require of Russia that the constitution should not be touched. This opinion was one which had not been concealed from the Russian Government. It had been communicated by anticipation to the Russian Government previously to the capture of Warsaw, and whilst the contest was yet undecided. When Warsaw fell, and Poland was at the disposal of the conqueror, before any definitive arrangement was made, that opinion was again distinctly and unreservedly conveyed to the Russian Government. Russia, however, took a different view of the question, and contended that by the revolution and by the re-conquest of Poland, it was put in the same situation as that in which, according to their argument, it stood prior to the treaty of Vienna and the grant of a constitution. . . . . The reply of the English Government was, that having taken into full consideration the statements of the Russian Ministry in support of their view of the case, England still adhered to the opinions before expressed, and thought that the true interpretation of the treaty of Vienna required that the constitution of Poland should remain as it did before the revolution, Russia having no right to touch it. Austria and Prussia, however, took the same view of the case with Russia, whilst France supported the opinion of England."

Thus we have three several positions taken up in his Lordship's speeches and notes on this subject:—(1) That the Poles were aggressors, *i.e*, rebels; (2) that England had a right even to make war on behalf of these rebels; (3) that this right had been asserted by letter to the sovereign "whose rights were indisputable." And we have, also, three intimations of an incongruous policy secretly pursued —(1) that the obligations imposed by treaty should certainly be enforced; (2) that conjoined remonstrance against the violators of treaty was declined; (3) that a result declared to be impossible was quietly permitted to be accomplished—that result being, the extermination of the kingdom of Poland.

Such were Lord Palmerston's first performances in the character of Foreign Secretary; such the establishment of his *claims upon the admiration* and confidence of Lord

Dudley Stuart, himself (to repeat Douglas Jerrold's witty compliment) " true as the needle to the Pole."

Belgium and Holland.

The union of these two countries was the arbitrary act of the Congress of Vienna. The Belgians, always uneasy in their compulsory alliance, revolted in July, 1830. The issue of the struggle would doubtless have been with the Dutch (for the Northern powers threatened intervention), but for the intervention of France and England, who, much to the displeasure of Russia and Austria, recognised Belgian independence, agreed in the recommendation of Leopold to the new throne, and compelled the cession of Antwerp.—Thus the aid claimed by the Poles, in virtue of the Treaty of Vienna, but refused, was given to the Belgians, who could pretend to no such claim. Lord Palmerston was the Minister who made the refusal in the one case, and the concession in the other. What was the rule of this differential policy? His speeches offer no clue to its discovery. He has, in fact, at different times, repudiated and defended his share in this transaction. Thus, in the House of Commons (April, 1832) he argued that he did but acquiesce in an inevitable event—while in a speech to the electors of Tiverton (July 31, 1847), he ranks the independence of Belgium among the claims of his party to the confidence of the country:—

"They (the Belgians) rebelled; and the question was, whether they were to be put down by force, or whether they were to be protected and allowed to become an independent nation, to be governed according to their own laws, to their own religion, to their own constitution, and without being subject to any foreign nation. What was the course which the Government with which I was then associated took? We obtained for them all their objects."

In another point of this affair, he seems to disregard Canning's maxim of international independence. In the *House of* Commons' speech above-mentioned, he contends

that the European powers had a right to prescribe the limits, and to nominate the head, of the new kingdom.

Spain and Portugal.

Lord Palmerston's most conspicuous diplomatic achievement is undoubtedly the Quadruple Treaty, by which England, France, Spain, and Portugal banded themselves against the absolutist pretenders to the peninsular thrones. This, too, certainly appears inharmonious with that principle of neutrality to which we have heard his Lordship so emphatically assent; "It is sound,—it ought to be sacred." Still less harmonious, however, than the event, is the following sentence of a speech in which it was defended:—"In the case of a civil war, proceeding either from a disputed succession or from a long revolt, no writer on national law denies that other countries have a right, if they choose, to take part with either of the two belligerents." The principle that had not been held "sacred," is no longer paraded as "sound." Neutrality or intervention are now but the alternatives of policy—a matter of 'choice.' Lord Palmerston chose to interfere on this occasion on the side of peninsular constitutionalism, "for the interests of England," "for the preservation of the peace of Europe." The well-balanced sentences of 1823—the epigrammatic alternative of Spain united and successful, Spain disunited and helpless—were forgotten. England not only "intermeddled," but actually "interfered"—and with "the happiest effect" Lord Palmerston told the electors of Tiverton (July, 1847), though the state of the two countries has ever since been that of suppressed anarchy; though a British squadron in the Tagus is essential to the peace of Lisbon, and Palmerston's own Minister was kicked out of Madrid in 1849.

Cracow.

There remained, after the repartition of 1815, a fragment and memorial of *the ancient* Polish nationality in the free

state of Cracow — described by Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, as a "miserable little government" (March 1, 1848); to his constituents, as "a lamp of freedom in the midst of despotism." The mutual jealousies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, led to the stipulation in the Treaty of Vienna, that "the town of Cracow, with its territory, be for ever free, independent, and strictly neutral. . . . no armed force to be introduced upon any pretence whatever." The exhaustive explicitness of this engagement did not prevent Russia occupying Cracow during the war of 1831—nor even its triple occupation, five years later, by the forces of the three powers. In the one case, a military advantage—in the other, the right of search for fugitives —was held by the authors of the infraction to be excluded from the number of possible "pretences." On the first occasion, Lord Palmerston made no remark—on the second, no remonstrance, because, as he afterwards stated, "it was difficult to give effect to remonstrance." But this reason must have been a reflection, not a motive—for, when first interpellated (March, 1836), he declared the occupation to be of quite a temporary character; and went on to suggest circumstances palliating, if not justifying, the act which he admitted was contrary to treaty. A month later, it was moved by Sir Stratford Canning, that a consul be sent to Cracow, as a check upon the proceedings of the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian consuls, and as a joint representative with the French consul of the two Western powers who were parties equally with the Northern powers to the establishment of Cracow. With this natural and forcible proposition Palmerston volunteered compliance, and thus induced Sir Stratford to withdraw his motion. Nothing more was said on the subject in that session of Parliament, nor until March 22nd, 1837; when an inquiry from Lord Dudley Stuart elicited that Lord Palmerston "had altered his intention, had not sent a consul or agent to Cracow, and it was not his intention at present to do

so." Thereupon Lord Dudley gave notice of a motion for papers on the subject. It has been repeatedly stated in print, that Lord Dudley meeting Lord Palmerston in the lobby of the House, and being requested to withdraw this notice, refused, adding that he could never again take the noble lord's word. This story Lord Palmerston condescended to contradict in his place in Parliament; but Lord Dudley did not add the invited disclaimer. When his motion for papers was to have been brought on, Lord Palmerston absented himself, and the House was counted out.

A second occupation of Cracow, ending in its absorption into the Austrian dominions, was made in February, 1846; a few days before the infamous proclamation in which an Austrian prefect offered monies to the Polish peasants for the heads of their landlords. Notwithstanding that this proclamation, its virtual adoption by the authorities at Vienna, and the massacre of two thousand Gallician landholders—notwithstanding that these Austrian atrocities were known to Lord Palmerston,—and notwithstanding his experience of Russian faith,—he declared in the House of Commons that "he had too high an opinion of the sense of justice and of right that must animate the governments of *Austria*, of Prussia, and of *Russia*, to believe that they could feel any disposition or intention to deal with Cracow otherwise than Cracow was entitled by treaty engagements to be dealt with." That this speech was not ironical—was not conceived in the bitterness of an indignation controlled by prudence—is but too evident from what follows—viz., his assurance to the House, that "on the part of the British Government everything should be done to ensure a due respect being paid to the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna;" and his beseeching the House not to be influenced by Mr. Hume's more reasonable than courtly distrust of his Lordship's intentions: 'he was in possession of better information than Mr. Hume, and was convinced that the occupation of Cracow was only temporary.'

This was in the last month of the session of 1846. Parlia-

ment was informed on its reassembling in 1847, by a paragraph in the Queen's speech, that Austria had incorporated Cracow, and that Palmerston had protested. Remonstrance, declined as an ineffectual bar to the encroachments of 1836, was deemed not inadequate to the *fait accompli* of eleven years' later! As if to exaggerate the disparity between Russo-Austrian achievement and Palmerstonian diplomacy, the proffered co-operation of France in this posthumous assertion of Cracovian right was refused. France having stolen a marital march on the Spanish crown, was disqualified from joining impeccable Albion in a post-dated protest against the theft of the last symbol of Polish independence.—And this was the second time, moreover, that Palmerston had flung back the hand of France when outstretched against Russian aggression.

There is yet one other circumstance which excites suspicion of Lord Palmerston's sincerity in promising to enforce against Russia the Treaty of Vienna. That power was entitled under this treaty to receive from Holland

Hungary.

In the beginning of the year 1848, there was scarcely one of all the continental states in which Government was not an open or a disguised despotism. The most conspicuous, if not the solitary exception, was that of Hungary. There an ancient constitution was seen putting forth its powers for the recovery of a gallant people from an insidious bondage. It was in the last month of the previous year that the Diet met. Such was its composition that it was foreseen a ministry independent of Austrian influences would soon be established, and, probably, organic changes effected. These results were realized with such pacific rapidity that on the 21st of March Mr. Blackwell, our minister in the Hungarian capital, reported to Lord Ponsonby, at Vienna, "the revolution is complete." The independent ministry—at the head of which was Count Louis Batthyany—proceeded to Vienna, received the sanction of the Imperial Government, and the solemn ratification of the reforms. Nevertheless, Lord Ponsonby wrote from Vienna to Lord Palmerston (May 3rd), "The great object of dread to the Hungarians is the Russian power." This announcement, at first sight so inexplicable, became intelligible when it was found that Austria was making war by her semi-barbarian Croats upon the Hungarian people, who had sent an army of some 100,000 men to serve the Emperor in Italy. Though thus deprived of their natural defenders, the Hungarians chased their invaders over the frontier; and had it in their power to coalesce with the revolutionists who then possessed Vienna, and who slew Count Latour on discovering his treachery to the Hungarians, in that he had commanded the invasion he professed to deplore.

Lord Palmerston, kept duly informed of these proceedings, contented himself with this solitary instruction to our ambassador at Vienna :—

(No. 47.)

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

"Foreign Office, Sept. 29, 1848.

"*With reference to your Excellency's* despatch of the 20th instant,

reporting the disagreements of the Hungarian Diet and the Reichstag, I have to say that it is much to be wished that the Austrian Government may be able to pursue a course of policy which may keep together, and reunite in a closer and firmer manner, those discordant elements of the Austrian Empire, whose differences seem at present to threaten it with dissolution. But such a result can hardly be accomplished, as some persons about the Court of Vienna appear to think, by military force alone."

A few weeks before writing this despatch (September 1), his Lordship had been asked in the House of Commons by Lord Dudley Stuart, why a Russian army had invaded the Moldo-Wallachian principalities (immediately adjoining the Hungarian territory). He replied that the Russian army had entered at the request of the Prince of Moldavia, to maintain the quiet of the provinces, and without orders from St. Petersburg; that the corps was not large, and its stay would be but short. He did not add that he said this on the authority of the Russian ambassador in London, nor that he had been forewarned by Lord Ponsonby of an apprehension of Russian invasion of Hungary. That warning was repeated in the following letter:—

(No. 74.)

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.

"Vienna, Nov. 20, 1848. (Received 27th.)

"In an instruction to his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, of Nov. 7, your Lordship says: 'There are some who imagine that the advance of that force in those (the Danubian) provinces is not wholly unconnected with the events which have been passing in Hungary; and that the Emperor has contemplated the possibility of his being asked by the Austrian Government to assist in restoring order to Pesth.'

"With reference to the above, I venture to trouble your Lordship with a few words.

"The Austrian Government, I am pretty sure, has not asked the Emperor of Russia for assistance anywhere, although the most amicable relations exist between the parties; but I have little doubt that, should the Austrians receive a severe check in Hungary, the Emperor of Russia would give the most efficient aid to the Emperor of Austria in that country; and also, that should there be any attempt in Gallicia at insurrection, the Russians would, even without being

applied to, march troops into that province to put down the insurrection there.

"I will add that I think the Emperor of Russia will give the strongest support to the Austrians, should they be attacked anywhere by a power likely to put the Emperor of Austria in danger."

Lord Palmerston did *not* inform the British public of the doubt thus cast upon Baron Brunow's good faith, nor does he appear to have demanded more explicit information from that personage. By this time (December), the Austrian Government having re-established itself at Vienna, and substituted Francis Joseph for Ferdinand the Fifth, was making open but unsuccessful war upon Hungary—whose Envoy Plenipotentiary thereupon addressed to Lord Palmerston the following:—

(No. 78.)

* * * *to Viscount Palmerston.*

[Translation.]

"Dec. 11, 1848.

"The undersigned, Envoy Plenipotentiary of Hungary to the Central Power of Germany up to the month of October of the current year, has quite recently received from his Government instructions, of which he herewith encloses a copy, to proceed to England, and to afford to the Cabinet of her Britannic Majesty accurate information as to the actual state of the kingdom of Hungary, in the hopes that if his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs should take cognizance of the same, preliminary negotiations may be entered into of a nature to consolidate order in the territory of the Hungarian Crown, and to re-establish that tranquillity which has been violently disturbed by insane intrigues, and which threaten to give way to a revolution, of which the effects will be felt through one-third of Europe, unless respect for the laws and for plighted faith shall prevail against the unskilful endeavours and foolhardy experiments of a policy at once revolutionary and reactionary.

"The undersigned, in having the honour to announce his arrival to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, flatters himself that he will grant him an interview for the purpose of communicating the mission with which he has been charged by the President of the National Committee of Defence, acting as Provisional Government for Hungary, and of affording every information on Hungarian affairs which the Government of *her Britannic Majesty* may see fit to require of him.

So just and simple is the cause which he serves, that the undersigned flatters himself that he will easily throw the light of truth on the Hungarian question, which for nine months has been misrepresented by the malevolence of some and the ignorance of others, and that he will prove the urgent necessity of treating this question, and of resolving it, in an European point of view.

"The undersigned considers he may add to the notification of his arrival, that during the insurrection called the Rákoczyenne, at the commencement of the last century, Great Britain mediated between Hungary and Austria. This fact alone conclusively proves that the relations of the Hungarian Crown to Austria have always been considered as being within the domain of international law, as a portion of those questions which have to be decided by the concurrence of the Great Powers."

To this communication his Lordship replied by the Under-Secretary :—

(No. 79.)

Lord Eddisbury to * * *

"Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1848.

"I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst.; and, in reply, I am to say that Viscount

of Hungary, except as one of the component parts of the Austrian Empire,' has profoundly affected me.

"I thought the principle was everywhere acknowledged, that Hungary never formed a part of the Austrian Empire. I repeat it—never; not even before the month of March of the current year.

"Article 10 of the Diet 1790-1, which is intituled, 'De independentia Regni Hungariæ,' &c., distinctly states:—'Sua quoque Majestas Sacratissima benigne agnoscere dignata est: quod licet successio sexus feminei augustæ Domus Austriacæ per Articulos 1 et 2, 1723, in Regno Hungariæ partibusque eidem adnexis stabilita eundem quem in reliquis regnis. . . . . Juxta stabilitum successionis ordinem inseparabiliter ac indivisibiliter possidendis Principem concernat: Hungaria nihil ominus cum partibus adnexis sit regnum liberum et relate ad totam regalem regiminis formam, huc intellectis quibusvis dicasteriis suis, independens, id est; nulli alteri regno aut populo obnoxium, sed propriam habens consistentiam et constitutionem.' To be independent, to have its own consistence—these expressions exclude the possibility of forming a part of any other organization. The Crown of Hungary could, and can, rest upon the same head with the Crown of Austria, without Hungary forming part of the Austrian Empire.

"It is utterly impossible, my Lord, for the Envoy of the Hungarian Government to select as the mode of the communications which he may have to make to the Cabinet of her Britannic Majesty, Baron Koller, whose functions emanate from a Ministry at open war with Hungary, and which, in advising his Majesty the Emperor of Austria to crush the Hungarian Constitution, dreams of usurpation and conquest.

"But there are countries which may not be conquered—Hungary is of that number. And the Government of that country flattered itself that Great Britain would listen to the information as to the actual state of the countries appertaining to the Hungarian Crown; that Great Britain, seeing that among all territories called Austrian, it was Hungary alone that remained excluded from the ultra-Democratic tempest—and, looking to the immense resources of the kingdom, would draw the inference that Hungary is qualified to form the centre round which further provinces may group, and will group themselves, capable of forming a sufficiently great and extended political organization to afford guarantees for order, and for wise and beneficent liberty; the Government of Hungary was happy to believe that Great Britain, in the interest of Europe and her own, would hold out a ready and firm hand to assist Hungary in the accomplishment of this work."

The correspondence was resumed, and closed by the following:—

(No. 82.)

Lord Eddisbury to * * *

"Foreign Office, Dec. 19, 1848.

"In reply to your letter of the 15th inst., I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to say that her Majesty's Government can take no cognizance of those internal questions between Hungary and the Austrian dominions to which your letter refers; but that the British Government has no diplomatic relations with Hungary, except as a component part of the Austrian Empire, and can receive communications respecting Hungary only through the diplomatic organ of the Emperor of Austria at this Court."

This correspondence was not laid before Parliament on its re-assembling, but neither was it confined to the knowledge of the writers. The document next in order in "Correspondence relative to the affairs of Hungary," shows that it was transmitted to Vienna:—

(No. 83.)

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

doubtedly the passage of Russian troops through Turkish territory, for the purpose of interference in the civil war in the Austrian dominions, was an infraction of the neutrality which the Porte had determined to adopt in regard to that civil war, and was a fit subject of remonstrance on the part of the Porte."

A few days after writing this letter (March 3rd), he says, in the Commons, the "Russians entered Transylvania for the protection of the frontier towns; they did not, I think, take any other part in the hostilities going on." A month later he receives information from St. Petersburg which must, at least, shake his reliance on Baron Brunow :—

(No. 147.)

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.

"April 5, 1849 (April 16).

"I feel assured that the Russian Government have not only taken measures to secure the kingdom of Poland against any act of aggression from the side of Hungary, but that they are also prepared to come to the assistance of the Austrian forces in Gallicia, should they be found unequal to resist any body of insurgents which may be brought against them."

Still he seems to repose on the Baron's word, and writes, a week after receiving Mr. Buchanan's letter, the following :—

(No. 157.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, April 24, 1849.

"With reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 5th instant, on the subject of the measures taken by the Porte in consequence of the late events in Hungary and Transylvania, I have to acquaint you that Baron Brunow has stated to me that it is not the intention of the Emperor of Russia, in consequence of the retreat of the Russian detachment from Hermanstadt, to order his troops to advance into Transylvania, or to take any part in the civil war now raging in that province or in Hungary; but that his Imperial Majesty will content himself with bestowing on the commander, and officers, and men of that detachment, his approbation of the manner in which they made their retreat, after having held in check for many hours a very superior *force.*"

Another week elapses, and the warning voices from Constantinople and St. Petersburg are echoed from Vienna:—

(No. 164.)

Mr. Magenis to Viscount Palmerston.

"Vienna, April 28, 1849 (received May 3).

"The opinion which has existed for some time past, that the Imperial Government is unable to terminate the civil war in Hungary within any reasonable time without Russian assistance, gains ground rapidly, and the painful conviction of its necessity being felt by many persons, they are anxious that that assistance should arrive at once.

"Without being able to state positively that the required military assistance has been asked for on the one side, and promised on the other, I can hardly doubt that arrangements of that nature have been come to between the Government here and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. . . . I had the honour to state to your Lordship, in my despatch of the 24th instant, that I could hardly doubt that the double motive of combating Polish anarchy, and of overthrowing revolutionary principles in Hungary, would ensure the compliance of the Russian Government to any application from hence for aid, and that opinion is daily strengthened by what I learn from Hungary."

Four days after comes from Vienna the official announcement of Russian intervention, repeated, with details, within some sixty hours:—

(No. 168.)

Mr. Magenis to Viscount Palmerston.

"Vienna, May 1, 1849 (received May 7.)

"I have the honour to transmit, in translation, an article which appeared in the official part of the 'Vienna Gazette' of this day. It states that the Hungarian contest had for some months past acquired such an extension, and proved so clearly the union of the revolutionary party in Europe, that it was the common interest of all other States to assist the Imperial Government in its struggle there: and that, consequently, the military assistance of Russia had been asked for, and promised by his Imperial Majesty with the most noble promptitude and in the most ample manner."

(No. 171.)

Mr. Magenis to Viscount Palmerston.

"Vienna, May 4, 1849 (received May 10).

"The consent of the Emperor of Russia to the Austrian application *for military* assistance was received here yesterday

"The Russian auxiliary force is to consist of three corps d'armée; the first under the orders of General Rüdiger, to enter by Cracow; the second by the Bukowine; and the third under General Lüders from Wallachia and Transylvania, and Lower Hungary.

"The total amount will be upwards of 120,000 men of all arms, and Marshal Paskiewitch is to have the supreme direction of the whole, though I cannot say whether he is to cross the Austrian frontier or take any active part in the military operations.

"The Emperor of Russia is said to have met at Troer, on his return from Moscow to St. Petersburg, the feldjäger, who was the bearer of the application for military assistance, and to have given on the spot all the orders necessary for the advance of the three corps mentioned above, and sent back the same courier with his promise to grant the military assistance which was required."

On May the 11th Lord Palmerston communicates to the House of Commons this intelligence of events which give the lie to his Russian authority, accompanying the information with the statement, "Her Majesty's Government had taken no steps to offer their mediation between Austria and Hungary, and the Austrian Government had no desire for such mediation." He did not add that Hungary did earnestly desire such mediation, and had been coldly repulsed—nor that within a few days past Hungary had asked the Queen of England to nominate a Sovereign to the throne vacated by Austrian perjury: a fact learnt for the first time from Kossuth's speeches in England.

Though Austria did not desire English mediation between herself and the people whom England had pronounced, by the mouth of her Premier and the act of her foreign Minister, rebels—and though to Hungary it was refused—Russia was surely open to rebuke for her interference. Not so, thought Lord Palmerston. Here is the notification from St. Petersburg of that interference, and the opinion which it elicited:—

(No. 172.)

Mr. Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston.

"Petersburg, May 2, 1849 (May 15).

"Having every reason to believe that orders had been sent from hence

to Warsaw for the entrance of a Russian force into Gallicia, I called upon Count Nesselrode this morning, and expressed a hope that his Excellency would give me some explanation respecting the reports which were in circulation upon the subject. The Chancellor said that orders had been sent to Marshal Paskiowitch, authorizing him to furnish troops to the Austrian authorities, if they applied for them; and his Excellency gave me to understand that they would not be restrained from proceeding wherever the necessities of war might call for their services: 'Dieu sait où les événements de la guerre les mèneront.'"

(No. 179.)

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Buchanan.

"Foreign Office, May 17, 1849.

"Much as her Majesty's Government regret this interference of Russia, the causes which have led to it, and the effects which it may produce, they, nevertheless, have not considered the occasion to be one which at present calls for any formal expression of the opinions of Great Britain on the matter."

There was yet another nation immediately affected by this general violation of national rights. Turkey was, if not disposed to aid the Hungarians, quite averse to being made an instrument of their destruction. The Porte absolutely refused to the Austrians permission to re-organize their broken forces in Turkish territory; and in this the Porte had the countenance of Sir Stratford Canning, and Sir Stratford the approval of his superior at home:—

(No. 213.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, June 26, 1849.

"I have to acquaint your Excellency that her Majesty's Government quite approve of the communication which, as stated in your despatch of the 5th instant, you made to the Porte with reference to the question of allowing the Austrian forces under General Puchner to pass through the Turkish territory, with the ultimate object of commencing hostilities against the Hungarians."

But when the Porte was disposed to resist the Russian use of her provinces, as retaliation by aiding the Hungarians, the British Minister urged neutrality and submission:—

(No. 219.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, July 2, 1849.

"Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you describe yourself to have held to the Porte with the view of inducing it to maintain a strict neutrality in regard to the contest now going on in Hungary. The Porte ought, for its own sake, to maintain and assert the neutrality of the Turkish territory, as far as it is able to do so without coming into hostile collision with its stronger neighbours."

(No. 224.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, July 7, 1849.

"The wisest course which the Porte can pursue in the midst of the important events which are happening in Hungary, is to remain perfectly neutral, and take no part in the contest; to husband her own resources, while, at the same time, she places herself in a respectable state of defence."

(No. 244.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, July 26, 1849.

"I have to state to your Excellency that the Porte seems to be acting wisely by not committing [herself] by taking any active part either way in the war now carrying on in Hungary."

From Sir Stratford's reply to these letters, it is evident that he acted upon them with extreme reluctance. Reporting his communication of their purport to Reshid Pasha, he adds:—

(No. 265.)

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.

"Therapia, July 25, 1849.

". . . . . Fresh reinforcements having lately passed through the Principalities to the army commanded by General Lüders, I could not refrain from again pointing out the serious embarrassments which may result from the Porte's connivance at proceedings so utterly at variance with the principles of a neutral policy."

So unequal was the measure meted out to the different intruders into Moldavia, that General Bem, having followed the retreating Russians over the Turkish frontier, Turkish

troops were sent to compel his retirement. At this juncture, Sir Stratford again visits the Turkish minister, and writes home :—

(No. 281.)

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.

"Therapia, August 5, 1849 (received August 20).

". . . . Such was the apparent state of things on the night of the 1st instant, when I saw Reshid Pasha at his house on the Bosphorus. His Highness did not allow me time to open the subject of my visit. He answered of his own accord on the question of Hungary, with reference more particularly to the late incursion into Moldavia. My language was directed to the importance of the present juncture, of the danger to which the Porte was exposed by allowing herself to be drawn gradually away from the neutral position which it was her interest to occupy, and to the advantage which might be derived from the adoption of a firm and prudent course with respect to the late occurrences in Moldavia and Wallachia. I was careful, at the same time, to repeat that her Majesty's Government would counsel nothing which might be reasonably regarded as leading the Porte into collision with her powerful neighbour, but that it

the House of Commons, a speech, of which the following is the principal portion:—

"I do believe, from the information I have received—and I do not pretend I may not be mistaken,—but I firmly believe that in this war between Austria and Hungary, there is enlisted on the side of Hungary the hearts and souls of the whole people of that country. I believe that the other races, distinct from the Magyars, have forgotten the former feuds that existed between them and the Magyar population, and that the greater portion of the people have engaged in what they consider a great national contest. It is true—as my hon. and gallant friend has said—that Hungary has for centuries been a state which, though united with Austria by the link of the Crown, has, nevertheless, been separate and distinct from Austria by its own complete constitution. That constitution has many defects; but some of these defects were, I believe, remedied not long ago, and it is not the only ancient constitution on the continent that was susceptible of great improvement. There were means, probably, within the force and resources of the constitution itself to reform it; and it might have been hoped that those improvements would have been carried into effect. But, so far as I understand the matter, I take the state of the case to be this: Without going into the details of mutual complaints as to circumstances which have taken place within the last year or year and a half, I take the question that is now to be fought for on the plains of Hungary to be this—whether Hungary shall continue to maintain its separate nationality as a distinct kingdom, and with a constitution of its own, or whether it is to be incorporated, more or less, in the aggregate constitution that is to be given to the Austrian empire? . . . . It is, therefore, much to be desired, not simply on the principle of general humanity, but on the principle of sound European policy, and from the most friendly regard to the Austrian Empire itself—it is, I say, devoutly to be wished that this great contest may be brought to a termination by some amicable arrangement between the contending parties, which shall, on the one hand, satisfy the national feelings of the Hungarians, and, on the other, not leave to Austria another and a larger Poland within her empire. . . . Her Majesty's Government have not, in the present state of the matter, thought that any opportunity has as yet presented itself that could enable them, with any prospect of advantage, to make any official communication of those opinions which they entertain on this subject. I say official, as contradistinguished from *opinions expressed* in a more private and confidential

manner; but undoubtedly, if any occasion were to occur that should lead them to think the expression of such opinions would tend to a favourable result, it would be the duty of the Government not to let such an opportunity pass by."

Why and to whom "private and confidential" communications of opinion were made in lieu of those official declarations for which an opportunity was still desired, does not appear. We have given above every one of Lord Palmerston's despatches on the general subject up to the date of this speech; and it will be observed that our ambassador at Vienna is informed of the feeling of the Home Government only by a copy of the correspondence with the Hungarian Envoy. What opinion *could* Lord Palmerston express, however privately and confidentially, in favour of the people whom he had refused to recognise save as Austrian subjects? And what opportunity of remonstrance could have been more favourable than the moment in which foreign assistance was obtained for the suppression of a domestic revolt? Lord Palmerston seems to have thought that the accomplishment of that object was an event disposing to moderation and meekness. For, on the 1st of August, when "the whole disposable force of the Russian Empire has been brought to take part in the war,"—when the hasty and ill-provided Hungarian levies are surrounded by 300,000 Imperial troops,—a letter is despatched from London to Vienna, offering at length to mediate "if Austria desires it." The despatch would fill several of these pages: it is therefore too long for entire quotation; and it may be as justly described in a sentence as illustrated by extract. It is simply a diluted paraphrase of the House of Commons' speech—an historical review of events, with reflections proper enough to a magazine article, but containing nothing more positive or practical than the declaration that "Her Majesty's Government would rejoice to hope for an early termination by arrangement of the war," and believes "that matters have *not yet gone* so far as to render such an arrangement im-

possible."—Before a reply could be received from Vienna, Baron Brunow had addressed to Lord Palmerston a communication the substance of which is repeated in his lordship's reply :—

(No. 295.

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunow.

"Foreign Office, August 24, 1849.

"Baron Brunow is right in supposing that her Majesty's Government must rejoice at learning that an end has been put to the deplorable war in Hungary, which has caused so much bloodshed and such loss of valuable lives; and her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that generosity and sound policy will alike impel the Austrian Government to make such arrangements as to Hungary as shall be satisfactory to the national feelings of the Hungarians, so that the present cessation of hostilities may lead to general contentment and permanent tranquillity in that country."

Why Lord Palmerston did not express to Baron Koller, the Austrian ambassador, the satisfaction and confidence thus expressed to the Russian ambassador, and why the offer of mediation had not been delivered to Baron Koller in London, instead of to Lord Ponsonby in Vienna, does not appear. The task imposed on that noble lord seems to have been very reluctantly performed, and to have drawn down a humiliation keenly felt :—

(No. 283.)

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.

"Vienna, August 14, 1849.

"Prince Schwarzenberg returned here on the morning of the 12th, and I hastened to see him, and, in accordance with your Lordship's directions, to deliver the copy of your despatch of the 1st instant, and to enter upon the subject of attempting to make peace with the Hungarians. *I was well prepared for the reception that subject would meet with.* I have already told your Lordship that I thought the time still to come when it could be hoped the Austrian Government would listen to it; and so the fact has proved to be, for Prince Schwarzenberg explicitly said, that nothing of the sort could be done at present.

"I see no good in continuing to urge on this Government things which it is determined not to do, for I see no means by which it can be forced to change its conduct.

"When I spoke of General *Haynau's* proclamations, &c., the Prince,

in very civil terms, told me that *the Austrians were the best judges of their own affairs.* He accompanied this with the declaration that he entertained the highest possible respect for the British Government, and felt the most sincere and anxious desire to see the Austrian Government and nation and the British Government and nation united by the strongest terms of intimacy, as they were, in fact, by their common interests."

Even Prince Schwarzenberg seems to have had more consideration for Lord Palmerston's subordinates than had Lord Palmerston himself; for the Prince's verbal reply is sugared honey compared to his written response to the recommendation which Lord Palmerston appends to his congratulations on the suppression of the Hungarian 'insurrection,'—to quote Lord John Russell's phrase, and verbalise Lord Palmerston's non-recognition:—

(No. 301.)

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

"Foreign Office, August 28, 1849.

"I have to instruct your Excellency to express to the Austrian Government the satisfaction which her Majesty's Government have felt at hearing that the calamitous war which, for the last two months, has desolated Hungary, has been brought to a close by a pacification which her Majesty's Government hope will prove, in its results, beneficial to all parties concerned. The eyes of all Europe will of course now be directed to the proceedings of the Austrian Government in a matter which has excited so deep and general an interest; and her Majesty's Government would fail in the performance of their duty if they were not to instruct you to express the anxious hope which they feel, in common with the people of this country, that the Austrian Government will make a generous use of the successes it has obtained, and that in the arrangements which may be made between the Emperor of Austria and the Hungarian nation, due regard will be had to the ancient constitutional rights of Hungary. A settlement founded on such a basis, with such improvements as the altered circumstances of the present times may require, will be the best security, not only for the welfare and contentment of Hungary, but also for the future strength and prosperity of the Austrian Empire. Your Excellency will read this despatch to Prince Schwarzenberg, and will give him a copy of it."

(No. 326.)

Prince Schwarzenberg to Count Colleredo.

"Vienna, Sept. 19, 1849.

"Lord Ponsonby, in acquitting himself of the order of his Government, has successively communicated to me two despatches, copies of which I herewith enclose to your Excellency, the one and the other having reference to the affairs of Hungary.

"Events have taken upon themselves to reply to these communications of the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty better than I could have done. There is no cause for surprise if the results to which the Hungarian insurrection has led are different from those which Lord Palmerston had anticipated, inasmuch as, destitute of the necessary elements on which he could form a competent opinion on this matter, he was reduced to information such as that promulgated in England by the agents of the Hungarian insurrection, whose interest it was to represent the events of which their country was the theatre in the falsest light, and to give the colouring of a generous and heroic impulse to an attempt which the English law qualifies as high treason, and which it punishes without fail with death or transportation. I might here terminate my despatch, did I not wish to consign to it one further observation to which I attach a certain value in the interest of the amicable relations which happily subsist between the two Governments, and for which we, for our part, shall always be anxious to preserve a character conformable to the feelings of ancient and loyal friendship which Austria glories in professing for the powerful and noble country of Great Britain.

"The world is agitated by a spirit of general subversion. England herself is not exempt from the influence of this spirit—witness Canada, the island of Cephalonia, and finally, unhappy Ireland. But wherever revolt breaks out within the vast limits of the British Empire, the English Government always knows how to maintain the authority of the law, were it even at the price of torrents of blood.

"It is not for us to blame her. Whatever may, moreover, be the opinion which we form as to the causes of these insurrectionary movements, as well as of the measures of repression employed by the British Government in order to stifle them, we consider it our duty to abstain from expressing that opinion, persuaded, as we are, that persons are apt to fall into gross errors in making themselves judges of the often so complicated position of foreign countries.

"By this conduct we consider we have acquired the right to expect that Lord Palmerston will practise with respect to us a perfect reciprocity.

"You will read this despatch to his Lordship, and you will give him a copy of the same."

This despatch is nearly the best of the "Correspondence relative to the affairs of Hungary." Whether it gives to the volume a climax and completeness calculated to enhance the Editor's proud satisfaction in laying it before Parliament, the reader may be left to judge.—But before we quit the subject, he should note two other documents—the first illustrating, by the circumstance that it is the fifth of its kind, Lord Palmerston's urgency in keeping the Porte virtually hostile to the Hungarians; the second illustrating his very cordial manner to the last, in communication with the Russian ambassador who had so grossly abused his credulity:—

(No. 300.)

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

"Foreign Office, August 27, 1849.

"I have received your Excellency's despatch of the 5th instant, reporting the communications that had passed between you and the Porte on the subject of the late incursion of Hungarians into Moldavia; and I have to acquaint you that her Majesty's Government entirely approves of your proceedings on this occasion."

(No. 319.)

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunow.

"Foreign Office, Sept. 14, 1849.

"Viscount Palmerston presents his compliments to Baron Brunow, and has the honour to return to him the circular despatch which Baron Brunow had the goodness to communicate to Lord Palmerston on the 5th inst.

"Lord Palmerston begs, at the same time, to thank Baron Brunow for this interesting communication, and to express the sincere satisfaction with which her Majesty's Government have learnt the announcement contained in the concluding passage of the circular."

Italy.

The story of Sicily, brought up to 1821, is resumed in 1848. In February of that year of revolutions, the Sicilian Parliament, constituted according to the charter of 1812,

intervention, that we had looked, our great desire being, that the Pope should be restored by the spontaneous action of his subjects."

From the Hungarian correspondence we learned that Lord Palmerston had become so enamoured of non-intervention as (1) to ignore the existence of a nation with which England had been in diplomatic relation not a century and a half before — as (2) to restrain the Turkish Government from asserting, by consistent action, its neutrality in the Hungarian struggle — and as (3) to forbear from even remonstrating with the power which had alike violated its own proper neutrality and the integrity of the Turkish territory.—But from these facts relative to Sicily and Rome, we gather that Lord Palmerston sometimes acts upon his own earlier maxim —that in case of a civil war, a third power has the right to side with either of the belligerents—for (1) he sided with the Sicilians against Naples, and (2) with the Pope against the Romans;—and that though he once ridiculed the employment in diplomacy of promises and threats, he gave effect neither to his encouragement of the Sicilians nor to his remonstrance with Naples; but, nevertheless, was so bent upon the restoration of the Pope, that when his "subjects" evinced their "spontaneous" objection by standing a six weeks' siege, he still assented to the intervention in which he declined to take any active part—that is, disliking to employ the forces of Protestant England for the reduction of Republican Rome, he made a catspaw of military and Catholic France.

Turkey.

When assailing the government of the Duke of Wellington for tardiness in executing the treaty by virtue of which Greece was constituted an independent kingdom, Lord Palmerston alluded to the government of Turkey in this very uncomplimentary fashion: "There are three things which will not wait—time, fire, and the Sultan." In the war with Russia, his Lordship asserted Turkey was the aggressor;

and to the treaty of Adrianople he virtually assented by accepting undisputed its consequences. In 1830, he expressly dissented from the alleged necessity for maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. When, in 1831, Mehemet Ali threatened to march on Constantinople, Palmerston refused even to mediate; and thus threw the city into the hands of Russia, whose forces actually encamped on the shores of the Bosphorus, and carried away with them the fatal treaty of Unkier Skelessi—for assenting to which Turkey was visited with a hostile demonstration. The intervention refused in 1832 was accorded, however, in 1841; and with such precipitancy that a rupture with France was long imminent.

Lord Palmerston's present opinion of Turkey, it does not come within our purpose to exhibit or investigate. But his dealings with her in the matter of the Hungarian Refugees are equally relevant and important.

On the 25th August, 1849, Sir Stratford Canning wrote home that a demand had been made by Austria for "decided measures" against a body of Hungarians, who had taken refuge in Wallachia, and for "the extradition of all refugees, Poles and Hungarians." The Russian envoy had seconded the Austrian demand,—and Sir Stratford submitted that the Ottoman ministers were "fairly entitled to support." This note was received at the Foreign Office September the 9th. Thirteen days after (September 24) Lord Palmerston replied, that the treaty of Belgrade, on which Austria based its claim, clearly did not apply to the "officers and soldiers of the Hungarian army;" and that if the demand were pressed, it ought certainly not to be complied with.

There is nothing remarkable in this despatch but its date. Why were thirteen days allowed to elapse in a case of the highest exigency—when the lives of Kossuth, Dembinski, Bem, Perczel, Meszaros, and their eighty compatriots, were suspended on the courage of the Turkish Government? This thought was evidently in Sir Stratford's mind every hour after

that in which a courier might have arrived—for on the 3rd of September he writes again:—

"On grounds of humanity, not unmixed with considerations affecting the Porte's character and future policy, I have not hesitated to advise a decided resistance to the demand of extradition. I have further endeavoured to dissuade the Turkish ministers from pledging themselves to any measure of restraint not clearly prescribed by the terms of treaties, and from contracting any engagement, not leaving a certain latitude of action for the future. . . . . The Council met on the 30th ult., and decided that the Porte could not, without dishonour, give up the refugees, though in maintaining its refusal every practical exertion would be made to assuage the resentment which that proceeding might create. Ali Pasha, in sending me a message to this effect, added, that in a few days a vessel would be sent to receive the refugees on board at Varna, and convey them to some island in the Archipelago—Rhodes, for instance, or Candia, most probably the latter. . . . .

"The importance of preparing her Majesty's Government for the worst is so evident, that I hope to be excused for adding, on this occasion, that, notwithstanding the mild tone of M. de Titoff's ostensible notes, indications of impatience and resentment have lately appeared in the language of the Russian Ministry and of its agents."

The next day brought an alarming proof of Russian "impatience and resentment"—Prince Radzevil, bearing an autograph letter from the Czar, to which an answer was to be obtained in forty-eight hours. The Porte did not revoke, nor even reconsider, her decision. 'Our answer is already on its way to your master,' was the substance of the reply with which Prince Radzevil had to content himself. But how grave was the crisis in the opinion of the English minister, is evident from his writing twice that day to Lord Palmerston, and even requesting Admiral Parker to bring up his squadron to the Dardanelles, as a demonstration of British support. On the very day of the Austrian Internuncio's interview with the Sultan (September 5th)—when he was to insist that the refugees be at least sent into the interior well guarded, and to warn the Porte that the escape of a single

fugitive would be taken as a declaration of war both by Russia and Austria—Sir Stratford writes :—

"In the meantime, there is no indication of a change in the intentions of the Porte, though the serious, not to say alarming, nature of the position is deeply felt. The Sultan's firmness will, however, be put to a severe trial, and so will that of his enlightened minister ; nor can I pretend to say what counsels will ultimately prevail. The first impression of every one is, that the Porte is placed in a most painful and dangerous dilemma, between the conflicting sentiments of honour and humanity on the one side, and of apprehensions, the natural result of its present isolation, on the other. The resource of an appeal to Europe may sustain it for the present—but the ultimate issue will naturally depend upon the prospect of support from England and France."

In the absence of assurances from these Powers, the Turk looked to his own defences, called out his reserves, and collected 65,000 men around the capital—the representatives of the Northern Powers suspending diplomatic relations.

Meanwhile, Fuad Effendi was on his way to St. Petersburg, where he met the reception generally awarded to the straightforward and the brave, even by the most cruel and aggressive. At his audience with the Czar on the 16th of October, the latter readily lowered his demand from surrender to expulsion. But the British minister was without instructions, and was obliged to confess it. It was not till two days later that there arrived from London "a friendly representation,"—ten days before the date of which orders had been sent from London to Admiral Parker to do more than Sir Stratford Canning had invited him, without avail, to do on his own responsibility. When this became known at St. Petersburg, "good-will" was turned to anger and defiance ; and at Constantinople, satisfaction was converted into alarm. The affair that would have been quickly and satisfactorily settled by the removal of the refugees from the frontier, became the subject of notes that now "lie floating over many a rood" of parliamentary paper—extending from this date to the following April, and terminating in the deportation of Kossuth and his companions *to an Asiatic* prison, where they languished till August, 1851.

That Lord Palmerston was wholly guiltless of this result—whatever may have been his intention—is scarcely reconcileable with the following facts:—That he left Sir Stratford Canning's first despatch unanswered thirteen days; that he withheld from Vienna and St. Petersburg the communications that could have been quickly and effectually made to those capitals, till communication was unnecessary; that he left the Porte to make and maintain her own decision while support was needed, and offered it when it could only embarrass; that he was the first to suggest, in despatches to Vienna and St. Petersburg, that "the Sultan has duties of good neighbourhood to fulfil towards Austria," apart from treaty engagements; and that thus he provided for Austria ground for demanding that the refugees over whom she had previously been declared to have no right, be "*interné*" and "*surveillé*"—that is, the subject of indefinite detention in pestiferous Kutayah.

So much as this we deduce from the Blue-book. We have read statements, not thus officially authenticated, but which, while we should regret to believe them, are entitled to a place here. It is stated that a design to aid the Hungarians, by supplying them with arms from a point exactly on the Turkish frontier, was defeated by being divulged to the British Embassy. A still more startling assertion is that of the draft letter from the Sultan to the Czar, having been interpolated by Sir Stratford's own hand, in a sense unfavourable to the refugees. The authors of these and similar statements never hesitate to excuse the ambassador at the expense of the minister; and how grateful is Kossuth to his reputed deliverer from an Austrian gallows and a Turkish prison, he perhaps intended to signify by declining an invitation to the Foreign-office or Broadlands. And the deputation of inhabitants of Finsbury, to whom was made the famous Palmerstonian address of November, 1851, must surely have recalled, with new emotion, on becoming acquainted with these facts, the language of the affable Foreign Secretary, who "felt it highly

gratifying to have been instrumental in aiding the cause of the patriotic Hungarians and Poles, who, without British intervention, would no doubt have been doomed to perpetual imprisonment, and sacrificed their freedom, if not their lives, in the cause of their country's independence." Well might the minister who, saying this, knew the decision taken by the Porte while *he* was looking up the Treaty of Belgrade, go on to defend secrecy in diplomacy!

France.

'England has never been in alliance with France but in subservience to Russia,' is a saying attributed to M. Odillon Barrot. It is not a rule that can be made absolute — not, at least, from the evidence at present before us. But there is a startling significance in the circumstance that French co-operation was, in three several instances of European importance, declined by Lord Palmerston—in the affairs of Poland, of Cracow in 1835, and of Cracow in 1846; and that twice within ten years the two countries were nearly committed to war through his acts—namely, in 1840 and in 1850. It is equally noteworthy that whereas the government of the Duke of Wellington allowed some months to elapse before recognising the kingship of Louis Philippe—a precedent by which Lord Palmerston defended his non-recognition of the Roman Republic—his Lordship congratulated Louis Napoleon on his conversion of a republic into a military despotism, with such informal haste as to afford a pretext for his dismissal by equally sympathetic colleagues.

Such are the leading Facts of Lord Palmerston's career, so far as we can collect them from Parliamentary records and Foreign-office blue-books. They do not constitute an entire biography even of his foreign statesmanship; but they are drawn from the proper materials for such a work, and have been collected with an impartiality which no biographer could exceed. If we were to fill up the last Epoch of his

career as minister and partizan, we should have to note that in 1835 he was compelled to take refuge from rejection by South Hants in the representation of little Tiverton, which was vacated for his accommodation; that he bequeathed to his successors in office the Chinese war and the Affghan expedition; that he embarrassed rather than facilitated the settlement of every diplomatic difficulty which arose while he was in opposition; that it was the repugnance of an old colleague again to sit with him in the Cabinet, which deprived the Whigs of the honour of effecting corn-law repeal, or of the opportunity of compromising the question with the fixed duty for which Lord Palmerston has a notorious preference; that in 1848, a motion preliminary to his impeachment was debated for two nights in the House of Commons; that in 1849, a testimonial, in value £500, was subscribed by one hundred M.P.'s, and the object of their admiration banqueted at Drury-lane Theatre; that in the next session, the House of Lords censured his policy by a majority of thirty-seven, and the Commons sanctioned the principles of that policy by a majority of forty-six; that as Home Secretary in a second ministry of "All the Talents," he set police spies on the illustrious refugee whose "internment" and surveillance in Turkey he was the first to suggest—though he congratulated the Commons of England that the odious word had no equivalent in their tongue; and that in December last he quitted the Ministry of which he is still a member, on the alleged ground of objection to Parliamentary Reform.

In collating Opinions of this man of long and complicated career, let the first place be given to that which was among the last utterances of one of his most illustrious and experienced contemporaries, Sir Robert Peel—'We are all proud of him.' And let in the second place be inscribed the declaration of one almost equally eminent and experienced, Lord John Russell—'The Minister not of Austria, nor of Russia, nor of France, but of England.' In the one sentence we *read the universal* acknowledgment of Lord

Palmerston's ability as a debater; in the other, a claim to the confidence of his countrymen as eminently a representative of national sentiment and a promoter of British interests.

Than on this latter general proposition never, perhaps, was the feeling of contemporaries more violently divided. The expressions of that feeling range between the emphatic testimony of Lord John Russell, and the solemn denunciations of Mr. Urquhart. There are, of course, many degrees of difference betwixt these opposite poles. It seems to have been the opinion of Sir Robert Peel, that the antagonist whom he complimented with evident sincerity on his Parliamentary talent, was a politician of very ill-defined principles, and very ill-regulated energy; for we find him asking on one occasion, 'What, or whom, does he really represent?' To that question, Sir Robert's more conservative followers might have answered, He is that Æolus of revolution against whom Canning declaimed in Latin verse—

[redacted]

entrusted to him; that he had always been high-minded, straightforward, direct, and true; that the honour of England had remained unsullied in his care; that he had been the champion of humanity, the promoter of civilization, and the abettor of constitutional and of well-ordered freedom in every country of the world. I could have proved this—all this. But I have changed my purpose. . . . I felt that the speech of the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Anstey) did not call for any animadversion, and that my noble friend ought to listen to it with an apathy with which commiseration ought not to be unmixed."—(*Speech on Mr. Anstey's Charges*, Feb. 23, 1848.)

The post-prandial orators of Drury-lane re-applied each one or more of the colours which only Shiel's matchless idealism could combine into the picture of a perfect Foreign Minister. Lord Dudley Stuart once characterised the Palmerstonian policy as that of "crouching to the strong and bullying the weak;" and has often since risen to blame, but always concluded with praise. Mr. Roebuck once sketched with caustic, but has since learned to "approve the principles while he often differed from the details of the noble lord's policy." Mr. Cobden, with the Manchester and Peace party in general, openly repudiate his leadership, declaring him at once pugnacious and cowardly, noisy and insincere; the betrayer of continental liberty, and the covert opponent of domestic improvement. A gentleman who writes to the newspapers in M. Kossuth's name (Capt. Mayne Reid), declares, in the teeth of a London Tavern meeting clamorous for Palmerston as Premier, that, "to trust to Lord Palmerston for help to the cause of continental liberty, is to try to suck balsam from the upas." Mr. Anstey brings up the rear of witnesses to character with a monster motion and a five hours' speech, supported by Mr. Urquhart in the tones of a prophet divulging his burden of guilt and woe.

It is pretty clear that the general—perhaps the nearly unanimous—feeling towards Lord Palmerston at the present moment, as for some years past, is that to which Lord John Russell, with great dexterity, gave aphoristic expression. If the daily press *be a correct* index of public opinion, even

Mr. Shiel's screaming panegyric was not too highly pitched. The "Times" and "Chronicle," having recovered from the ten days' deflexion, occasioned by the event of December last, daily praise Palmerston by implication, if not by invidious specification. Others of the diurnals, unfettered by such delicate considerations, worship him with drum and cymbal, fife and fiddle, chiefly in the vocative case and the subjunctive mood. Their idolatry takes, avowedly, the latent form of all hero-worship—adoration of one's magnified and perfect self. That he is the "Minister of England," they proclaim the sum of all ministerial merit—as truly it is; though its ceaseless iteration commend neither the poet nor the theme. The "Morning Herald," having asserted that Lord Palmerston is "the only man who commands to any considerable extent the sympathy and confidence of the people of England," further asserts, with idiom racy of the soil, "He is English to the back-bone;" "in resigning office, he threw himself upon the British feeling of the nation;" "he peremptorily refused to

him in the highest position in the land," that we may have again "a thoroughly English Government." "Men of all diversities of political feeling and opinion, who love their country more than party," are declared to "centre their hopes in Palmerston alone," as being "the only man for the crisis." And lastly—of our quotations, that is—"the voice of thunder" that is to demand "a thoroughly English Minister," is represented as only a verbally different demand from that of "Palmerston for Premier."

Nearly a century and a half has elapsed since Dean Swift drew his famous picture of John Bull as a foreign politician—the right-hearted but wrong-headed, the strong-armed, testy, meddlesome islander, who is for fighting everybody's battles and paying everybody's debts. A pamphleteer of the Manchester and Peace party ("A Member of Parliament") reproduced this picture somewhile since, as one might show a wine-drinker the picture of himself. Doubtless the hon. pamphleteer regards the popular enthusiasm for Palmerston as ample justification of his satire. We, however, think otherwise. We do not believe in the John Bull of Dean Swift as an existence of these times. The insular pride, prejudice, and meddlesomenesss have abated as intercourse has extended and debt accumulated. The British lion, as we know him, is in love with the virgin Peace, and has his claws clipped regularly as any husband his beard and whiskers. The Englishman of to-day prefers any trade to that of war, and would as soon keep gunpowder at his hearth's side as a bellicose minister in the Foreign Office. He is just as little revolutionary as warlike; he is not charmed by classical associations nor bedazed by Platonic theories. He is wofully indifferent to principles of policy, and overlooks details for the general result. He is averse to speculation, but is generous in his sympathies. Hence, though he will no longer fight for kings or people, he will give to either a refuge from the other. He has, too, a strong sense of justice, and will call out *for fair play even when he* cannot make up his mind

to enforce it. Though slow to decide, he is vigorous to act, as one strong, and proud of his strength. Disdaining finesse, because unconscious of weakness, he opposes only practical common-sense to the theorist and the diplomatist.—A statesmanlike embodiment of this character Lord Palmerston may not be, and yet have inspired his countrymen with the belief that he is such. The journals quoted above are entitled moreover to this interpretation of what they mean by 'English.' Thus, the "Morning Post" describes Lord Palmerston as having a "strong hand, and one prompt to work"—his statesmanship as "liberal and sagacious"—his policy, "straightforward and honourable"—as a man of "vigorous mind, forcing timid dulness into honest and decisive action." The "Morning Advertiser" believes he would, as Premier, "as if by intuition, detect, and with consummate skill would defeat, the machinations" of certain plotters. We can affirm, too, from a pretty extensive acquaintance with the English press, that it is for the sup-

Englishman, of whatever rank or party, who may read these pages, What has Palmerston ever done that you should trust to his conduct of foreign affairs? What single quality, the possession of which would entitle him to your admiring confidence, do his acts evince? The extermination of Poland, the absorption of Cracow by Austria, the subjection of Sicily to Naples, the restoration of Rome to the Pope,—are these results of which Palmerston is guiltless, or only misfortunes which do not forbid him to be proud? The silent abandonment of Hungary to Russia, the humiliation of Turkey in her grandest moments, the suggestion of Kossuth's detention abroad and the menace of his liberty in England, invariable cordiality with the representatives of Nicholas, and hasty fraternization with Louis Napoleon,—are these the fitting achievements and habits of the Protestant, English, and, Liberal statesman *par excellence?* We ask not for the principle that has governed the policy so fruitful in disasters though so dazzling in its progress. We do not demand whether Palmerston acts by the maxims of Chatham or of Canning —whether his motto be Antigallican Alliance, or Constitutional Propagandism. The answer to that inquiry we were obliged to anticipate in the relation of events. But we ask for the proofs of that sagacity and vigour—that shrewdness in detecting, and energy in defeating, designs against the general good of the European family, which *have* been displayed by statesmen of English indifference to philosophical rules of political action. Nearly every event of his administration places us in the dilemma of distrusting his wit or his sincerity. We have seen him promising to enforce treaty engagements for the maintenance of Polish independence—yet declining the most obvious methods of giving effect to his promise, lamenting the impossibility of averting what he had declared could not happen, and privily denying the existence of the rights he had pretended to champion. We have seen that, by a positive breach of faith with the House of Commons, *he withheld* the recognition of Craco-

vian independence when it is threatened, and delays even remonstrance till remonstrance is ludicrously late. We have seen that the Hungarian people, profuse professions of sympathy for whom he makes in public, he privately ignores—denies, on authority previously impeached, the intention of Russia to invade Hungary through Turkey—is warned of the deception practised upon him, and shows no suspicion—is humiliated by the demonstration of his credulity, yet displays no resentment—expresses only regret while England is raging with indignation—offers to mediate when conquest has given the rein to revenge — makes Queen Victoria learn with gratification the fall of a kingdom to which she might have given a sovereign—and accepts with the meekness of a saint, the insult he has provoked by the ill-timed interference of a bungler. To exhaust the illustrations of this melancholy theme would be to rewrite all that has been already written. The humiliating story turns up on every page. The English statesman who is all intellect, nerve, and heart, in the popular conception, is the dupe of every knavish diplomatist that has an end to serve in duping him—is always too late when helpless right is to be defended against lawless might—always in a perilous hurry when some trumpery squabble is to be settled. The Protestant standard-bearer assists to carry back to the chair of temporal dominion the runaway Pope. The vigilant and invincible guardian of English honour submits with equanimity to rebuffs from big Austria and little Naples—and advises the Turk not to assert the sacredness of his territory against stronger neighbours. The experience of twenty years of nearly uninterrupted power, and forty of unreserved opportunity for observation, has not furnished a solitary maxim of statesmanship or a single example of administrative vigour. The "juvenile Whig" is still the epithet that expresses the jaunty freshness of the politician of seventy. No one can argue *from the past* of Palmerston what will be his future, or *devise* a case in which his course of action would be clear.

This only can be predicated of his home politics—that difference of opinion will be no bar to participation of office; and this only of his foreign policy—that while a great power has nothing to fear from his enmity, a little one has everything to dread from his favour.

Whence, then,—it may be asked,—whence his signal domestic success, the high popularity to which testimony has been borne? what the source of an influence which makes him a ministerial necessity, an inevitable member or supporter of Whig, Conservative, and Coalition Cabinets in succession? where the secret of Liberal admiration and of despots' hate? It is—we reply—in the contrasted secrecy of his official operations and the fascinating candour of his public bearing that the solution of the enigma is found. In his first Parliamentary speech, and in his very last colloquy at the Foreign Office, he dwells upon and defends the silent system as necessary to the right conduct of international relations. True, he has more than once asserted, and in language that added to the natural force of the sentiment, the right and duty of Englishmen to inform themselves on the precise state of these relations. But he has never volunteered information that was worth having, and has almost invariably refused it whenever requested, or withheld it till it could be of no avail for action. He has even supplied to the duller spirits who have sometimes copied his example without imitating his address, a formula for the refusal of State papers: 'If they are of present interest, it would be obviously inconvenient, if not dangerous, to produce them—if they refer to occurrences long past, they are evidently only of historical value.' * Thus he reduces every inquirer into the science of which he is a master, to the unenviable position of a marplot or an antiquary. A Malmesbury or a Clarendon may use with advantage this ingenious resource against an inconvenient pursuit of knowledge — but only

* "If the papers bear upon a question now under consideration, their production would be dangerous; if they refer to questions that are gone by, they can *obviously be of no use.*"—*Speech of March* 17, 1837.

Palmerston's self is equal to Palmerston's method of appliance. He alone of modern Secretaries has the art of refusing with a grace that charms the disappointed into gratitude, a severity that strikes him into silence, a wit that ridicules without rudeness, or an effrontery that can be insolent as well as audacious. Does a hon. and gallant member, or a hon. and verdant member, move for papers which it is not intended to grant,—'My hon. friend, if he will allow me to call him so [the hon. and blushing member bows a gratified assent] will, I am sure, believe me,' &c., &c. Does a Lord Dudley Stuart, or some other representative of unenfranchised nations in our Parliament of uncrowned kings, put an awkward question, or threaten a more awkward debate,—a few dashing sentences, and personal complaints, elicit cheers from the House and 'satisfaction' from the troubler. Does a Hume, or Cobden, or Bright, or Anstey, make trial by question and reality—repeat or renew an interrogatory, till all evasive forms of speech are exhausted in reply—an appeal to personal honour, even an imputation of political 'ignorance' is resorted to with well-feigned feeling. Meanwhile, the business of which information has been sought in vain, is being quietly transacted through sealed despatch boxes; and it is not till the politics of the hour have become a chapter in history — till a people is betrayed, governments irritated, markets deranged, a nation crushed—that England discovers, through the smoked glass of garbled correspondence, that all this has been done in her name, by the aid of her power, and by the man whose health she drinks with the toast, 'Civil and religious liberty all over the world!'

Palmerston's foreign administration—it may be said, apologetically—is not necessarily in accordance with his own aspirations and sympathies; it may have been diverted from his ends by national indifference, by the opposition of colleagues, even by the influence of the Court. The first of these excuses has been thrown out by Palmerston himself. *It may* be ranked for wit and hardihood, with his taunting

the friends of Poland on the vagueness of their knowledge, while he "kept to facts,"—and kept the facts to himself. Most patient and self-wronged people! It was your devotion to the usurped prerogative of the Austrian throne—your reliance in Muscovite assurances—your tardiness to remonstrate and refusal to interfere—that sacrificed Hungary!—What an experiment was this on English gullibility! Scarcely less so, we suspect, will prove the cry which is now raised to cover Palmerstonian disgrace. Court influence may be—we believe it is—a real element of English politics, and a mischievous one. Unconstitutional interference has certainly been practised, unless facts have conspired with reckless partizanship to delude the nation and slander the palace. But who, if not Palmerston, must have been accessory to the cheat? Who so well as he could have long since exposed and crushed it? Of whom but of him is it alleged by his own friends, that he purchased a triumph over Prince and Premier, by disloyalty to the Queen and nation; that worst disloyalty—the concealment of royal dishonour? Accepting for undistorted fact the current explanation of Palmerston's ignominious dismissal in December, 1851, and undignified retirement and return in 1853, how shall we longer trust the honour of the Empire to a man who is so careless of his own?

One other consideration may be urged—that the Palmerston policy is at worst substantially that of his order and his craft, of aristocratic diplomatists generation after generation; and that, in this case, to ostracise ability for lack of principle, is but to promote equally defective dulness. In the immediate premiss to this conclusion we heartily concur. We confess inability to point to any possible Foreign Secretary of these times, who would have done much better than Palmerston; because we are unable to discover between the Whig and Tory houses of the ruling class any material difference on material questions. If Palmerston sacrificed the Sicilians and

ignored the Hungarian patriots, Russell dubbed the latter rebels, and Aberdeen stigmatized the Milan insurgents, assassins. If an Irish peer, elevated to high office by natural force, praised the imperial clemency of Nicholas, did not our English aristocracy mob him with their worship? Haynau was treated at Bankside to a taste of British indignation, but in Belgravia he is remembered as the martyr of plebeian brutality and an insufficient police. It is well to be angry at the detection of marital influences on international interests, but it would be better to neutralize the more diffused and dangerous spirit of class sympathies—the sympathies of the Bedfords with the Potemkins, the Sutherlands with the Esterhazys. It is this very fact—namely, that we are restricted in our choice of Foreign Secretaries to families all tainted with timid hate of democracies—which constitutes, we think, the gravity of the present crisis. But for the monopoly of Government and the secrecy of diplomacy, we believe that the now inevitable and measureless struggle of armies would be unnecessary — or, if necessary, yet a

we cannot bear alone, and yet on none can shift the blame. In the commencement of a contest of terrible realities, it will be the best augury of victory that we have dismissed a "Captain of Shams" into the limbo of exploded reputations.

A. & S. COCKSHAW, PRINTERS, HORSE-SHOE-COURT, LUDGATE-HILL.

SPEECH

OF

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON TUESDAY, THE 25TH OF JUNE, 1850,

ON

MR. ROEBUCK'S MOTION

ON THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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On Monday the 17th June, 1850, Lord Stanley moved in the House of Lords the following Resolution :—

"*That while the House fully recognizes the right and duty of the Government to secure to Her Majesty's subjects residing in foreign states the full protection of the laws of those states, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by Her Majesty's command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other powers.*"

The House divided at three o'clock on the morning of Tuesday the 18th June, and the numbers were—

For the Resolution :—

Present - - - -	113
Proxies - - - -	56
	169

gainst it :—

Present - - - -	77
Proxies - - - -	55
	132

Majority for the Resolution, 37.

On Monday the 24th of June, Mr. Roebuck moved in the House of Commons the following Resolution :—

> " *That the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country; and in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world.*"

The debate was continued on Tuesday the 25th, on Thursday the 27th, and on Friday the 28th of June, and at a quarter before four o'clock on the morning of Saturday the 29th the House divided, when the numbers were :—

For the Resolution - - - - -	310
Against it - - - - - - -	264
Majority for the Resolution -	46

On the night of Tuesday the 25th of June, Viscount Palmerston spoke as follows :

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SPEECH.

LORD PALMERSTON (who was received with loud cheers by the Members on the Ministerial benches) said,—Sir, anxious as many Members are to deliver their sentiments upon this most important question, yet I am sure they will feel that it is due to myself, that it is due to this House, that it is due to the country, that I should not permit the second night of this debate to close, without having stated to the House my views upon the matters in question, and my explanation of that part of my conduct for which I have been called to account. (Cheers.)

When I say that this is an important question, I say it in the fullest expression of the term. It is a matter which concerns not merely the tenure of office by one individual, or even by a Government; it is a question that involves principles of national policy (cheers), and the deepest interests as well as the honour and dignity of England. (Cheers.) I cannot think that the course which has been pursued, and by which this question has assumed its present shape, is becoming those, by whose act it has been brought under the discussion of Parliament, or such as is fitting the gravity and the importance of the matters which they have thus led this House and the other House of Parliament to discuss. (Hear, hear.) For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and to take possession of the citadel of office; or, if without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here, should themselves have proposed to this House to come to a similar resolution. (Cheers.) But, be the road what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering *whether they will* adopt the resolution of the

House of Lords, or the resolution which has been submitted to them by my hon. friend the Member for Sheffield. (Hear, hear.)

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy, which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honour, and with the dignity of the country; and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilized countries in the world. Even the person who moved it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. (Hear, hear.) But none of the modifications contained in the speech were introduced into the resolution adopted by the other House. (Hear, hear.) The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled, for that is the meaning of the resolution, to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. (Hear, hear.) The country is told that British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the Government and tribunals of the country in which they may be. (Hear, hear.)

The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited to constitutional countries. The House of Lords has not said that the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic countries, but even to constitutional countries where the courts of justice are not free; although these limitations were stated in the speech. The country is simply informed by the resolution, as it was adopted, that, so far as foreign nations are concerned, the future rule of the Government of England is to be, that, in all cases, and under all circumstances, British subjects are to have that protection only, which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to be, may give them. (Hear, hear.)

Now, I deny that proposition; and I say it is a doctrine on which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act. (Cheers.) Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing; I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them, when that law is available for such purpose. That is the opinion which the legal advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases; and it is the opinion on which we have founded our replies to many appli-

cations for our interposition in favour of British subjects abroad. (Hear, hear.) And allow me, at the first moment when I have occasion to mention the legal advisers of the Crown, to say, that I heard with pain aspersions cast from a quarter from which they ought not to have come, upon the person who is the legal adviser of the office which I have the honour to hold. (Hear, hear.) I should have thought that a person who by his own experience must have known, not only the learning, but the independence of mind, and the sense of justice that characterise the distinguished individual who holds the office of Queen's Advocate, would have abstained from those aspersions which have been cast upon that meritorious officer. (Hear.)

Perhaps I may have deviated from the strict orders of the House in what I have said; but I felt it due to an honourable-minded man to give my testimony on the earliest occasion that presented itself, to the independence and integrity of his character. (Hear, hear.)

I say then, that if our subjects abroad have complaints against individuals, or against the Government of a foreign country, if the courts of law of that country can afford them redress, then, no doubt, to those courts of justice the British subject ought in the first instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon decisions manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them. It has been said, "We do not apply this rule to countries whose Governments are arbitrary or despotic, because there the tribunals are under the control of the Government, and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to be applied to nominally constitutional Governments, where the tribunals are corrupt." But who is to be the judge in such a case, whether the tribunals are corrupt or not? (Hear, hear.) The British Government, or the Government of the State from which you demand justice?

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the laws of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country, the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the Sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where not long ago a decree was passed, that any man who was found with concealed arms in his possession should be

brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. (Hear, hear.) Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife, which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said, that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot. (Hear, hear.)

Now, what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? and yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country. (Hear, hear.)

I say, then, that our doctrine is, that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had—and those cases are many—to confine a British subject to that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive. (Cheers.)

Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we have made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the origin of our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece; because those circumstances are elements, that must enter into the consideration of the course we have pursued.

It is well known that Greece revolted from Turkey in 1820. In 1827, England, France, and Russia determined upon interposing, and ultimately, in 1828, they resolved to employ forcible means in order to bring Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece. Greece, by protocol in 1830, and by treaty in 1832, was erected into a separate and independent State. And whereas nearly from the year 1820 up to the time of that treaty of 1832, when its independence was finally acknowledged, Greece had been under a republican form of government, with an Assembly and a President, the three Powers determined that Greece should thenceforth be a monarchy. But while England assented to that arrangement, and considered that it was better that Greece should assume a monarchical form of *government*, yet we attached to that assent an indispensable *condition*, that Greece should be a constitutional monarchy.

The British Government could not consent to place the people of Greece, in their independent political existence, under as arbitrary a government, as that from which they had revolted. Consequently, when the three Powers, in the exercise of that function which had been devolved upon them by the authority of the General Assembly of Greece, chose a Sovereign for Greece (for that choice was made in consequence of, and by virtue of the authority given to them by the General Assembly of Greece), and when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was chosen; the three Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, at the same time declared that King Otho would, in concert with his people, give to Greece constitutional institutions.

That choice and that announcement were ratified by the King of Bavaria in the name and on the behalf of his son. It was however understood, that during the minority of King Otho, the establishment of the constitution should be suspended; but that when he came of age, he should enter into communication with his people, and, together with them, arrange the form of constitution to be adopted. King Otho came of age, but no constitution was given. (Hear, hear.) There was a disinclination on the part of his advisers to counsel him to fulfil that engagement. (Hear, hear.) The Government of England expressed an opinion through various channels that that engagement ought to be fulfilled. But opinions of a different kind reached the royal ear from other quarters. (Loud cries of Hear, hear.) Other Governments, naturally, I say it without implying any imputation, are attached to their own forms. Each Government thinks its own form and nature the best, and wishes to see that form, if possible, extended elsewhere. Therefore, I do not mention this with any intention of casting the least reproach upon Russia, or Prussia, or Austria. Those three Governments at that time were despotic. Their advice was given, and their influence was exerted to prevent the King of Greece from granting a constitution to his people. (Hear, hear.) We thought, however, that in France we might find sympathy with our political opinions, and support in the advice which we wished to give. But we were unfortunate. (Hear, hear.) The then Government of France, not at all undervaluing constitutional institutions, thought that the time was not yet come when Greece could be ripe for representative government. The King of Bavaria leaned also to the same side. Therefore, from the time when the King came of age, and for several years afterwards, the English Government stood in this position in Greece with regard to its Government—that we alone were anxious for the fulfilment of the *engagement* of the King, while all

the other Powers who were represented at Athens, were averse to its being made good, or at least were not equally desirous of urging it upon the King of Greece. This necessarily placed us in a situation, to say the least of it, of disfavour on the part of the agents of those Powers, and on the part of the Government of Greece. (Hear, hear.) I was sorry for it; at the same time, I don't think the people of this country will be of opinion, that we ought, for the sake of obtaining the mere good-will of the Greek Government, to have departed from the principle which we had laid down from the beginning. (Cheers.) But it was so; and when people talk of the antagonistic influences which were in conflict at the Greek Court; and when people say, as I have heard it said, that our Ministers and the Ministers of foreign Governments were disputing about the appointment of mirarchs and nomarchs, and God knows what petty officers of the State, I say that as far as our Minister was concerned, that is a statement entirely at variance with the fact. (Cheers.) Our Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, never, during the whole time he was in Greece, asked any favour of any sort or kind, for himself or for any friend. No conduct of that mean, and low, and petty description was carried on by any person connected with the English Government. It was known that we wished the Greek nation should have representative institutions, while, on the other hand, other influences were exerted the other way; and that and that

down, (Mr. Cochrane,) who, in a pamphlet, which all must have read, or ought to read, has detailed instances of barbarity of the most revolting kind practised by the police. I have here depositions of persons who have been subjected to the most abominable tortures which human ingenuity could devise—tortures inflicted upon both sexes most revolting and disgusting. (Hear, hear.) One of the officers, a man of the name of Tzino, at the head of the police, was himself in the habit of inflicting the most diabolical tortures upon Greeks and upon foreigners, Turks, and others. (Hear, hear.) This man Tzino, instead of being punished as he ought to have been, and as he deserved to be, not only by the laws of nature, but by the laws of Greece,—this person, I am sorry to say, is held in great favour in quarters, where he ought to have received nothing but marks of indignation. (Hear, hear.)

Well, this being the state of things in Greece, there have always been in every town in Greece a great number of persons whom we are bound to protect—Maltese, Ionians, and a certain number of British subjects. It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between the Maltese and Ionians, and their own fellow-subjects. We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have their heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, (cheers), nor do I believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. (Cheers.) Then, I say, that in considering the cases of the Ionians, for whom we demanded reparation, the House must look at, and consider what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nominal in some cases, but the granting of which, would be an acknowledgment that such things should not be done towards us in future. (Hear, hear.)

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere, in a spirit, and in a tone, which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom, the discussion took place. (Cheers.) It is *often more* convenient to treat matters

with ridicule, than with grave argument; and we have had serious things treated jocosely; and grave men kept in a roar of laughter, for an hour together, at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another;—at the nationality of one injured man, or the religion of another; as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity (hear, hear); as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redress; or, because a man is of the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage. (Hear, hear.) It is a true saying, and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of human wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind, ought to bring to the task, generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts. (Cheers.)

Now, Sir, with regard to these cases, I would take first, that which I think would first present itself to the mind of an Englishman—I mean the insult offered by the arrest of the boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship *Fantome*. The time has been, when a man aspiring to a public situation, would have thought it his duty to vindicate the honour of the British navy. Times are changed. (Cheers and counter-cheers.) It is said that in this case there were only a few sailors taken out of a boat by some armed men—that they were carried to the guard-house, but were soon set at liberty again — and why should we trouble our heads about so small a matter? But did we ask anything extraordinary, or unreasonable on account of this insult? What we asked was an apology. I really did not expect to live to see the day, when public men in England could think that in requiring an apology for the arbitrary and unjustifiable arrest of a British officer and British seamen in the performance of their duty, we were making a demand "doubtful in its nature and exaggerated in its amount." (Cheers.) Now, what is the history of this case? for circumstances have been referred to, in connexion with it, which do not appear from the statement of the case itself. The son of the vice-consul, who had dined on board the *Fantome*, was taken ashore in the evening by the coxswain and a boat's crew, and landed on the beach. The coxswain accompanied the young gentleman to his father's house, and on returning to the boat, was taken prisoner by the Greek guard. The guard went down to the boat, and, finding the seamen in it were without arms, began thumping them with the butt-ends of their muskets, and wounded one man in the hand by a thrust with a bayonet. The guard then took *the seamen* prisoners, and carried them to the guard-house,

where after a certain time they were released through the interposition of the vice-consul, and they returned to their ship. Excuses were given for this proceeding, and the gist of them was this—that the guard thought the boat belonged to the *Spitfire*, and that it had been seen landing rebels, one of whom had escaped; this supposed rebel being a boy of fourteen years old, who had returned quietly to his father's house.

The matter to which these excuses related, occurred a little while before, in consequence of the disorganized state of Greece—a disorganization, by the by, which arises entirely from the acts of the Government; because it has been, and still is, the practice of the Government, instead of punishing brigands, to amnesty and pardon them; and indeed it is even supposed that the officers of police sometimes go shares in the plunder. That, however, is a matter of opinion; but it is a fact that the robbers are almost always pardoned; and such is the encouragement thereby given to the system of plunder, that the robbers go about armed in bands, and sometimes actually attack and occupy towns.

An instance of this kind happened at Patras. Merenditi, the leader of a band of robbers, attacked Patras; the governor had an armed force under his orders, but, either from a determination to follow the example set by the Government of showing deference to the robbers, or because he thought that discretion is the better part of valour, he fled, and left the town to the mercy of the banditti. The inhabitants, finding themselves deserted by their natural defenders, threw themselves on the protection of the foreign consular body; and begged and entreated that the Consuls would intercede for them, and make some arrangement with the robbers. Our consul accordingly, at the intercession, and with the authority of the principal inhabitants of Patras, entered into an arrangement with the leader of the robbers, by which that leader consented to forego the plunder of the town, on condition that he should receive a certain sum of money, and be conveyed away from the town in safety by one of the British ships of war. (Hear, and a laugh.) The people of Patras were thankful. The money required by the robbers, which was reduced by negotiation to one-half of their original demand, was collected and deposited in the hands of the vice-consul. Merenditi marched down to the quay to embark; when the governor, who had run away from danger, now advanced boldly with his men, and endeavoured to attack the robbers' rear-guard, and to take some of them prisoners before they could embark. Our officers, however, said "No. There is not only honour amongst thieves, but honour to be observed towards thieves. (A

laugh.) We were asked to make an arrangement, and to give our guarantee—we will abide by that guarantee, and protect this man and his band." (Hear, and laughter.) Accordingly he was protected, and went off with the ransom paid by the inhabitants of the town. This was the matter which was alluded to, when the Greek authorities said, that the guard supposed the boat's crew, whom they made prisoners, had been landing rebels from the *Spitfire*—they pretended to suppose that the boat had landed some of Merenditi's band. Surely no defence is necessary for having demanded an apology for an insult offered to the British navy. (Hear, hear.) I am induced to believe that the Governments of other countries would have taken more severe measures under similar circumstances.

I now come to the case of the Ionians, who were plundered in the custom-house at Salcina. These men were passing by in their boats; they were summoned to go in by the officer in command, and when in, they were robbed. The men who robbed them were dressed like soldiers, but were *said* to be banditti. The Customs officer alleged that he was beaten by the robbers, and compelled by them to order the Ionians to enter the Custom-house. It must be remembered, however, that a Greek vessel lying in the Custom-house was not plundered; while the Ionians were plundered, stripped of their clothes, and severely beaten. It is absurd to compare a case of this kind, with that of travellers attacked by robbers in passing through a country.

If the Government officer was not acting in connivance with the robbers, still, when foreigners were decoyed into a Greek custom-house by one of its officers, and were there beaten and plundered, the Greek Government must be held responsible for what was done. This, however, is said to be a case in which the unhappy Ionian boatmen ought to have gone to law. I should like to know whom they could have prosecuted? In this instance, our demand was moderate; we asked nothing for the indignity and injury the men had suffered, but simply the amount of which they had been robbed.

I next come to the case of the two Ionians, who, very innocently, as they imagined, on a national festival, according to the custom of their own country, ornamented their little booths, in which they sold trifling articles, with flags. The police interfered, and took down the flags. Some discussion arose about indignity offered to the British flag. The matter was not satisfactorily explained, but we let it drop. We did not insist on that; and, if that had been all, nothing further would have been said. But the Ionians were arrested, manacled, and thumbscrewed; and in that state paraded through the

town, and put in prison. It was said, "How could they go to prison except through the streets?" True, but there was no necessity for taking them through streets which did not lie in their way. They were paraded, by way of insult, through the streets of Patras, and dismissed next day, because no charge could be maintained against them. Then it was said that the application of the thumbscrew had not maimed them for life. Had that indeed been the case, the men would have been entitled to compensation; but for a very little thumbscrewing, applied only during an evening walk, no compensation ought to have been required. (Laughter.) I am of a different opinion. Thumbscrews are not as easy to wear as gloves, which can be put on and pulled off at pleasure. We therefore felt it necessary to require, in this case, the moderate compensation of 20*l.* each, for the men who had been ill-treated; and the more so, because of the habitual infliction of torture by the police.

Then came the case of two men, whose houses being infested by disagreeable insects, thought proper in hot weather to sleep in the streets. They were taken up by the police, carried before an officer, and severely flogged with a whip, in the sight of persons who deposed to the fact. What right had the Greek authorities to flog these men? They had committed no offence; there had been no trial, no condemnation, no sentence. (Hear, hear.) In this case, also, compensation was demanded, as a token that persons under British protection, cannot be ill-treated with impunity.

Then I come to the case of Mr. Finlay. It is said that he is "a cannie Scot;" that he speculated in land, buying in the cheapest, and wishing to sell in the dearest market. His land was taken by the King of Greece, for purposes of private enjoyment. Nobody will deny that it is fitting the Sovereign of Greece should have a palace; and, if it was necessary to take Mr. Finlay's ground for its site, or for the garden attached to it, Mr. Finlay himself made no objection to that. All that Mr. Finlay wanted, was to be paid for his land. It is said that Mr. Finlay bought his land at a very cheap rate. That was a matter with which the Greek Government had nothing to do; they had only to pay Mr. Finlay what was the value of the land at the time when they took it from him.

The conduct of the Greek Government in Mr. Finlay's case was very different from that of Frederick the Great in a similar case towards one of his subjects, a man of humble rank. This man refused to sell to his sovereign a little bit of ground on which a windmill stood, the ground being necessary for the completion of a magnificent plan of a residence for the monarch. The conduct of the King of Prussia

was very different from that of the King of Greece. The King of Prussia, though a conqueror in the field and the absolute monarch of a great country, respected the rights of a subject however humble; and not only left the monument of the independence of his subject, standing in the midst of his ornamented grounds; but used to point to it with pride; feeling that it was a proof, that though he was great and powerful, he knew how to respect the rights of the meanest. (Hear, hear.) For fourteen long years Mr. Finlay was driven from pillar to post, put off with every sort of shuffling and evasive excuse, and deprived of compensation for his land, unless he would take what was wholly inadequate.

In 1843 came a revolution. Till 1843 the Greek Government had continued arbitrary; the King declining, under the circumstances I have mentioned, to grant a constitution. In 1843 the patience of the Greeks was exhausted. They rose in Athens, and extorted by force, that, which had been refused to reason. When the constitution was granted, courts of justice were established, which were not indeed independent, because the judges were liable, not only to be removed from one court to another, but to be entirely dismissed at the will of the Sovereign; still in 1843 there were courts to which Mr. Finlay might, as it has been stated, have applied. But they had no competence with respect to events which had happened before their creation. Mr. Finlay, therefore, had no remedy. (Hear, hear.) But I have heard it most triumphantly, distinctly, positively asserted, that this case exhibits the bad faith of the English Government; for that at the time when Mr. Wyse made his demands on the Greek Government, we and he knew that the case of Mr. Finlay was absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. (Hear, hear.) No such thing. (Cheers.) That is an assertion absolutely, finally, and conclusively at variance with the truth. (Cheers.)

There had been an agreement made for arbitration in this case; and a most curious sample it affords of the manner in which things are carried on in Greece. Mr. Finlay said, "I will submit my claim to arbitration." "By all means," was the reply of the Greek Government; "you shall name one arbiter and we another." But Mr. Finlay has been described as "a cannie Scot," and looking far into the future, he foresaw a possibility, which might have struck a man even not so far north, that the two arbiters might differ; and he suggested that an umpire should be appointed. The Greek Government said, "You are quite right. We see how it is, and we will appoint one." (Laughter.) But Mr. Finlay, *being a* sensible man, did not like to submit his case to a *tribunal,* where there would be two to one against him, and

so he declined that arbitration. The Greek Government then gave up this unreasonable proposal, which they had made just as if it had been quite a matter of course, and a commission of arbitration was agreed upon, consisting of two respectable people, and an umpire properly appointed. If that arbitration had gone on, and the money awarded by it had been paid, Mr. Finlay's case would have been absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. But by the law of Greece, arbiters so appointed must pronounce an award within three months, or, if they don't, then the arbitration falls, and drops to the ground. The commissioners could not make their award, without certain documents, which could only be furnished by an officer of the Greek Government. This officer, by some unfortunate accident, did not furnish them (hear, hear, and laughter), and the arbitration fell to the ground by efflux of time.

Therefore, when Baron Gros came to inquire into the matter, he found this case just as it had been, when Mr. Finlay first made his complaint. Baron Gros said to Mr. Finlay, "Why, your claim is settled." "Settled? No," said Mr. Finlay. "Why, have you not received your money?" "Not a farthing; and I don't know what amount I am to receive." In short, his case was exactly in the same state, in which it was before the arbitration had been agreed to.

That was a case in which we made no specific demand. The only specific demand was, that Mr. Finlay should receive whatever the value of his land should be found to be. We fixed no sum; we were unable to fix any; and the sum he received afterwards was the amount which the two arbiters, one named by Mr. Finlay, the other by the Greek Government, were prepared to award, splitting the difference between their respective estimates. I don't think that in that case, the claim was either doubtful in justice, or exaggerated in amount.

Then we come to the claim of M. Pacifico, a claim which has been the subject of much unworthy comment. (Hear, hear.) Stories have been told, involving imputations on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of these stories. All I know is, that M. Pacifico, after the time to which those stories relate, was appointed Portuguese consul, first to Morocco and afterwards at Athens. It is not likely that the Portuguese Government would select for appointments of that kind, a person whose character they did not believe to be above reproach. But I say, with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject, that I don't care what M. Pacifico's character is. (Hear, hear.) I do not, and cannot admit, that because a *man may* have acted amiss on some

other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say, that you are not to give redress to a man, because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will; punish him if he is guilty, but don't pursue him as a Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in a house which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as some people have described it; but it does not matter what it is, for whether a man's home be a palace or a cabin, the owner has a right to be there safe from injury—well, in a house which is not a wretched hovel, but which in the early days of King Otho was, I am told, the residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief of the Regency,—a house as good as the generality of those which existed in Athens before the Sovereign ascended the throne,—M. Pacifico, living in this house, within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes' walk of a guard-house, where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob. Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation to the British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities. Application was made to the Greek Government for protection. No protection was afforded. The mob, in which were soldiers and gensdarmes, who, even if officers were not with them, ought, from a sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented plunder—that mob, headed by the sons of the Minister of War (loud cries of "Hear, hear"), not children of eight or ten years old, but older,—that mob, for nearly two hours, employed themselves in gutting the house of an unoffending man, carrying away or destroying every single thing the house contained, and left it a perfect wreck. (Hear.)

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody? I venture to think it is. (Cheers.) I think that there is no civilized country where a man subjected to such grievous wrong, not to speak of insults and injuries to the members of his family, would not justly expect redress from some quarter or other. Where was he to apply for redress at Athens? The Greek Government neglected its duty, and did not pursue judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions as it might have done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits. The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government *as actors* in the outrage. The Greek Government were *told to* "search a particular house; and that some part of

M. Pacifico's jewels would be found there." They declined to prosecute the Minister's sons, or to search the house. But, it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied to a court of law for redress. What was he to do? Was he to prosecute a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute them criminally, or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was he to find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying, during the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they were threatened. He states, that his own life was saved by the help of an English friend. It was impossible, if he could have identified the leaders, to have prosecuted them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico to have succeeded in a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of that assault? Would that have restored to him his property? (Hear, hear.) He wanted redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution was out of the question, to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty, of failure in a country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually removed upon grounds of private interest and personal feeling. Was he to prosecute for damages? His action would have lain against individuals, and not as in this country against the hundred. Suppose he had been able to prove that one particular man had carried off one particular thing, or destroyed one particular article of furniture; what redress could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which, as his legal advisers told him, it would be vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico truly said—"If the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted; if he is poor, he has nothing out of which to afford me compensation if he is condemned."

The Greek Government having neglected to give the protection they were bound to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford redress, this was a case in which we were justified in calling on the Greek Government for compensation for the losses, whatever they might be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. (Hear, hear.) I think that claim was founded in justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If the Greek Government had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected to the account sent in by M. Pacifico,—if they had said, "This is too much, and we think a less sum sufficient," that would have been a question open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first, or Mr. Wyse afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and no doubt some satisfactory arrangement might thus have been effected with the Greek *Government*. But the Greek Government

denied altogether the principle of the claim. Therefore, when Mr. Wyse came to make the claim, he could not but demand that the claim should be settled, or be placed in train of settlement, and that, within a definite period, as he fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico's statement of his claim was exaggerated or not, the demand was not for any particular amount of money. The demand was, that the claim should be settled. An investigation might have been instituted, which those who acted for us were prepared to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly. (Hear, hear.)

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. (Hear.) "Oh! but," it is said, "what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a Power!" (Hear, hear.) Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it to be held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. "No," it is said, "generosity is to be the rule." We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it. (Loud cheers.)

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back our demands, a force which should make it manifest to all the world that resistance was out of the question? Why, it seems to me, on the contrary, that it was more consistent with the honour and dignity of the Government on whom we made those demands, that there should be placed before their eyes a force, which it would be vain to resist, and before which it would be no indignity to yield. If we had sent merely a frigate and a sloop-of-war, or any force with which it was possible their forces might have matched, we should have placed them in a more undignified position by asking them to yield to so small a demonstration. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, so far from thinking that the amount of the force which happened to be on the spot was any aggravation of what is called the indignity of *our demand*, it seems to me that the Greek Government, on

the contrary, ought rather to have considered it as diminishing the humiliation, whatever it might be, of being obliged to give at last to compulsion, that which had been so long refused to entreaty. (Hear, hear.)

Well, then, however, did we, in the application of that force, either depart from established usage, or do anything that was unnecessarily pressing on the innocent and unoffending population of Greece? I say the innocent and unoffending population, because it was against the Government, and not against the nation, that our claim for redress was directed. (Hear, hear.) The courses that may be pursued in cases where wrong is done by one Government towards the subjects of another, are various. One is, what is commonly called "reprisals;" that is, the seizing something of value, and holding it in deposit until your demands are complied with; or, if you fail in that, and don't choose to resort to other methods, applying that which you have seized, as a compensation for the wrong sustained. That is one method. Another is the modified application of war —such as a blockade—a measure frequently adopted by the Governments of maritime States when they demand redress for injuries. Last come actual hostilities. Many instances of such measures have been quoted in this debate as having been adopted by the Governments of other countries, especially by the French Government, when they have had a demand to make for injuries sustained by their subjects; and, by-the-by, when people complain of the peremptory manner in which our demand was made, and the shortness of the time allowed for consideration, I wish to call to the recollection of hon. gentlemen what was done by the French squadron no longer ago than 1848.

There was an insurrection at Naples, in May, 1848. The great street of the town was filled with barricades, and the troops had to force those barricades. To do that, they were obliged to occupy the houses right and left, in order to turn those defences; and as they forced one house after another, and passed on from house to house, they neglected to leave any guards behind them. They were followed by the Lazzaroni, and the houses were plundered. Some French people whose shops were thus rifled, complained to the French Minister, and to the French Admiral—there being then a French squadron before the port of Naples. The French Admiral, Admiral Baudin, quite cut out Sir W. Parker, and, being applied to by those French citizens, he sails up the bay, lays his ships broadside to, in front of the palace, and writes a note to the Government to say, that he has been called on by his countrymen to protect them; and he adds—that letter being *dated half-past* one on the 17th of May

—that unless by three o'clock of that very day he obtains a satisfactory assurance (cheers)—a satisfactory assurance that his countrymen shall be efficiently protected, reserving, he says, for future discussion their claims for compensation—but "unless in one hour and a half I get, on board this ship, a satisfactory assurance that they shall be efficiently protected, I shall land the crews of my fleet, and will take care of them myself." (Hear, hear.)

Well, then, I say that Sir W. Parker acted with the greatest moderation in enforcing our demands. He began with reprisals, not with a blockade, wishing to avoid all unnecessary interruption to the commerce of other countries. But he made reprisals in a way which I believe has not often been adopted. The Government was the offending party, and he took possession of vessels belonging to the Government. Now, that is not the usual plan, and for very good reasons.

Vessels belonging to Governments are armed. They may feel it to be their duty to defend themselves. To seize armed vessels would therefore probably lead to bloodshed; and reprisals are generally effected by seizing merchant vessels belonging to the country on whom the demand is made. But, the disparity of force being so great on this occasion, Sir William Parker began by seizing the few armed vessels belonging to the State. He then gave the Government time to reflect upon that demonstration. It was not attended to. Even then he did not immediately proceed to make reprisals upon merchant vessels. He first laid an embargo upon them. He gave notice that he had placed a lien upon them, and that they must not quit their ports. That failed; then he took merchant vessels, but only a limited number; and placed them under the custody of his fleet, avoiding to subject commerce in general to any greater degree of restraint, than was unavoidably necessary for the execution of his instructions. (Hear, hear.) It has been said, that we seized upon fishing-boats and interrupted the coasting trade. I don't believe that. On the contrary, I believe that the embargo did not extend to fishing-boats, or to vessels of small tonnage employed in the coasting trade of the country.

Well, sir, in that state of things, the French Government offered us their good offices and mediation. We readily and cheerfully accepted their good offices. We accepted them by a note of the 12th of February, which has been laid on the table, and in which we distinctly stated the grounds and conditions on which, and the extent to which, those good offices were accepted.

There could be no mistake between the English and *French* Governments upon that point. We took as our

precedent the course that was pursued in the sulphur question at Naples, when M. Thiers was Minister. In that case, we stated, that reprisals would be suspended the moment any French Minister on the spot declared himself authorized to negotiate. In the present case we went further, and said, that the moment the good offices of France were officially offered and officially accepted, we would send out instructions that the further making of reprisals should be suspended. In both cases we said we could not release the ships that had been detained, because by so doing we should give up the security which we held in our hands against the offending Government.

It has been stated that a misunderstanding arose between the Governments of France and England, in the course of the mediation, good offices, or whatever it may be called. I cannot say that there was any misunderstanding between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, because it will be seen from his own despatches laid before the French Chamber, that he clearly understood the conditions on which the good offices of France were accepted. (Hear, hear.) He repeatedly states that England gives up none of her demands—that is to say, that she gives up none of the principles of her demands; and that the only questions which the French negotiator is competent to discuss, are those which do not involve the negation of the principles of our demands. Well, what were those questions? They were only the amount of money to be given to Mr. Finlay and to M. Pacifico, but not the question whether those gentlemen were to receive anything or nothing. (Hear, hear.)

Then the question arose between us, what were the circumstances under which the good offices were to cease and coercive measures were to be resumed; and it was distinctly understood on my part, as well as on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Mr. Wyse was not to take upon himself to determine, when Baron Gros' mission had failed; and that it was only when Baron Gros should have announced that his mission had ceased, that Mr. Wyse was to resume coercive measures. (Hear, hear.) It was further agreed between us, and especially on the 9th of April, that if a difference of opinion arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, on those points which Baron Gros was competent to discuss, Mr. Wyse was not to stand out absolutely on his difference, and that if he did not find it possible to give way, he was, instead of saying, "Now, Baron Gros, your mission is at an end," to refer home for further instructions. It is said that it was wrong of me not to have sent out to Mr. Wyse information of that understanding come to on the 9th of April with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Well, but in the first

place I had already sent to Mr. Wyse, on the 25th of March, instructions which, if acted on in the spirit in which they were written, would render such a reference home altogether unnecessary. And they did render such reference home altogether unnecessary; because at last, when Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse came to the point of difference as to the amount of money to be paid, and Baron Gros said, "I would counsel the Government of Greece to pay 150,000 drachmas," while Mr. Wyse said he was ready to accept 180,000 drachmas, Mr. Wyse at last, much more prudently than if he had referred this difference home, and had exposed Greek commerce to the restraint to which a continuance of the *status quo* would have subjected it for a whole month, said, "I will, if other things are agreed to, come down to your amount—I will waive my own opinion, and accept the sum you are willing to recommend the Greek Government to give." (Cheers.) Therefore practically, I say, and in the result, the case did not arise to which those instructions could have applied.

Those instructions, if they had reached Mr. Wyse, would not have applied to the difference which did arise between him and Baron Gros; for that difference was this,—it turned upon the claims of M. Pacifico. Baron Gros, on the 16th of April, was willing to recommend to the Greek Government to take an engagement to investigate the claims of M. Pacifico, in regard to the destruction of his Portuguese documents; and to pay him whatever might be the amount which, upon investigation, he might prove to be entitled to on that account; and to make a deposit of 150,000 drachmas as a pledge for the good faith with which they would execute that engagement. The only difference between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse upon that occasion was, that Baron Gros proposed that the deposit, which they had both agreed should consist of shares of the Bank of Athens, should be left in the Bank of Athens; whereas Mr. Wyse required that it should be deposited either in the Bank of England, or, if the Greek Government preferred it, in the Bank of France. That seemed to be a difference that might be easily settled. But, on the 22nd of April, Baron Gros altered his opinion. He retracted his opinion upon that point, and stated that later information from Portugal had convinced him, that M. Pacifico's claim, in reference to the destruction of his Portuguese documents, was wholly unfounded. (Hear, hear.) Baron Gros said he would no longer consent to recommend the Greek Government to enter into any engagement to pay anything to M. Pacifico on that account. He would agree to an investigation, but only provided that Portugal, and not the Greek Government, should pay what might turn out to be due. But this was a point which Baron Gros was not

competent to discuss. (Hear, hear.) This new view of his, would have been a negation of the principle upon which one of our claims rested (hear, hear); and, there being a difference of that kind between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse had no occasion to refer for fresh instructions—for he had received detailed instructions from me in a despatch, dated the 25th of March, sufficient to guide his conduct upon that point.

Baron Gros then withdrew from the negociation, and that withdrawal was officially communicated, not only to Mr. Wyse, but to the Greek Government also. On the 24th, however, he received a despatch from General Lahitte, giving an account of the conversation which had passed between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th; an account, by the way, which was not quite accurate, because it made me say that, if *any* difference arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Mr. Wyse should refer home for instructions; whereas all that I agreed to was, that such reference should be made in the case of irreconcileable difference between them, as to the amount of money to be paid by the Greek Government for those claims, in regard to which we had not specified fixed sums; that is to say, for Finlay's land and for Pacifico's losses of furniture and goods at Athens. Baron Gros then proposed to withdraw the note, by which he had announced officially the cessation of his functions, and he asked that his draft of arrangement, together with Mr. Wyse's draft, should be referred to London for decision.

An impression has gone abroad that on that occasion (the 24th) Baron Gros received, and communicated to Mr. Wyse, not merely an account of the conversation between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th of April, but an account of the essential bases and an announcement of the expected arrival of the draft of convention which had been proposed to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the first time on the 15th, discussed on the 16th, agreed to on the 18th, and sent off on the 19th (hear, hear); and Mr. Wyse is greatly blamed by many persons, both here and in France, upon the assumption, that, whereas Baron Gros had informed him, on the 24th of April, that the English and French Governments had come to an agreement as to the essential bases of the convention to be signed between England and Greece, and had morever told him that the convention itself would shortly be received at Athens—yet, nevertheless, with this knowledge of the facts, he renewed coercive measures, and compelled the Greek Government to yield to his own demands. This assertion, so far as Mr. Wyse is concerned, is positively untrue.

(Cheers.) It is totally and wholly untrue. He received no communication from Baron Gros on the 24th, and none earlier than the 2nd of May, relative to the draft of the convention agreed upon in London. (Hear, hear.) Whether Baron Gros received the information or not on the 24th by the *Vauban*, I leave to be settled between him and his Government. (Hear, hear.) The explanations of General Lahitte would indeed lead to the inference that he did not.

The statement to which I refer was made by "our own correspondent" of *The Times*. (Laughter.) I may say, in passing, that one person who has spoken on this subject elsewhere, has had the substance of his speech claimed publicly by the *Morning Herald* as a compilation from its leading articles; and another has obviously been more indebted to *The Times* than to the blue-books for the statements on which he has founded his assertions. (Cheers and laughter.) But the correspondent of *The Times* stated distinctly—and upon that statement public opinion in this country has been formed—that Baron Gros did inform Mr. Wyse on the 24th, that he had received by the *Vauban* a statement announcing the London convention, and that, in spite of that information, Mr. Wyse resumed coercive measures. I understand that the French Government say that this is an entire mistake; that no information respecting the convention could have been communicated to Mr. Wyse on the 24th, because Baron Gros did not receive any by the *Vauban* which arrived on that day. (Hear.) The complaint, therefore, against Mr. Wyse, come from what quarter it may—and I have no doubt it was sincerely believed at the moment it was made—that complaint can no longer be maintained, and is withdrawn. (Hear, hear.)

With respect to the other complaint, that I did not write to Mr. Wyse an account of what had passed on the 9th of April, the simple reason why I did not, was, that he was already in possession of instructions which were sufficient; that I could not have written till the 17th, and that on the 15th another arrangement was proposed, which provided an immediate settlement on the spot, and which therefore rendered any further reference to me by him, out of the question. (Hear, hear.) But it was said that if the French Government could have sent information to Baron Gros by the *Vauban*, why could not we have sent at the same time similar information to Mr. Wyse? Why, solely because we were in London, and the French Government was in Paris (hear, hear), and that if a steamer had been despatched by *us from* Portsmouth, it could not have got round to Athens *so soon as a steamer* despatched by the French Government

from Marseilles or Toulon. (Hear, hear.) But, as I have said, the convention of the 15th having been agreed to, all further reference to me by Mr. Wyse was rendered unnecessary, because that convention was to be presented as an ultimatum to the Greek Government, by the British and French diplomatic agents.

And when it is said that those demands of ours on the Greek Government were so much repudiated by the Governments of Russia and of France; and that by putting forward those claims, we ran the risk of involving this country in a war with those Powers, I must be permitted to say, that, with respect to Russia, the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow, of the 19th of February, totally negatives that assertion. In that despatch Count Nesselrode admits that he was aware, as long ago as 1847, that our patience might be exhausted, and that we might have recourse to coercive measures against Greece to enforce our claims; and he says, moreover, that if lately, when we determined to enforce our claims, we had asked Russia to give us her assistance, she would have endeavoured to persuade the Greek Government to come to an amicable settlement with us; and if the efforts of Russia to that effect had been unsuccessful, Russia could not then have expected, that we should indefinitely postpone coercive measures out of deference to her. (Hear, hear.)

With respect to France, the much talked-of Convention of the 19th of April was to be recommended by France to Greece in a way which made its acceptance pretty certain; and in that convention there was at once a full acknowledgment of the principle of all our demands, and of the amount which we thought it just and right to require. (Hear, hear.) I am sorry that the convention did not arrive before the other settlement took place, but that was not the fault of our negotiator. It was not he who put an end to Baron Gros' functions, but Baron Gros himself. Baron Gros formally and officially withdrew from the negotiation, and that by a written communication, not addressed to Mr. Wyse alone, but to the Greek Government also.

But it is said he was willing to retract it, and that on the 24th of April he wrote to Mr. Wyse to say:—"Send me back my note, and I will give you back yours." Now to this, Mr. Wyse said—"I cannot exactly do what you wish, but I have another proposal to make to you. You ask me to refer to England, and to maintain the *status quo* till I get an answer; but to keep the Greek vessels in custody till that answer arrives would subject Greek commerce to great inconvenience. Instead of this, I propose, that if the Greek Government will send me

180,000 drachmas, with a letter stating that that sum is in satisfaction of all our claims excepting M. Pacifico's claim on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents, I will" do—what? Refer home? No. Continue the *status quo?* No. "I will immediately release all the Greek merchant vessels. I will only retain the few Government vessels as a pledge, leaving the wording of the apology in the case of the *Fantome*, and the compensation for the loss sustained by M. Pacifico by the destruction of his Portuguese documents, to be settled by future discussion." The effect of that arrangement would have been, that the points on which Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros differed, would have been left open for future discussion; that coercive measures, as far as Greek commerce was concerned, would have been entirely suspended; the Convention of London, of the 19th April, would have arrived in time; but the Greek Government indeed would, by that Convention, have had to pay probably a larger sum than the 180,000 drachmas. But what was Baron Gros' answer to that? He said, on the 24th, "I have withdrawn from the negotiation, and I cannot therefore officially transmit to the Greek Government your proposal." Therefore it was not merely by his official notes of the 22nd April to Mr. Wyse and M. Londos, that Baron Gros withdrew from the negociation, for he repeated his withdrawal in answer to this proposition; but he intimated in a private letter that he had made it known to the Greek Government. "To-morrow (the 25th)," he said, "I believe you will have, before 5 o'clock of the afternoon, your letter and your money."

Now was Mr. Wyse in a hurry to resume coercive measures? Did he catch at the first moment at which he might have been authorized to resume hostilities? Far from it. He waited from the 22nd to the 24th, and from the 24th till 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 25th, and it was not till after that hour had passed, at which Baron Gros had led him to expect, that he would receive from the Greek Government an acceptance of his conciliatory proposal; it was not till that hour had passed without any communication arriving, that he announced, through the British Consul, that the embargo would again be established. It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Wyse did not put an end to Baron Gros' functions, or show any impatience to renew coercive measures. Baron Gros himself put an end to his own functions, in spite of Mr. Wyse's repeated entreaties that he would not do so; and when Baron Gros had formally withdrawn, Mr. Wyse, instead of at once resuming coercive measures, made another and a very conciliatory proposal; but Baron Gros'

answer to this, was a renewed declaration that he had withdrawn from the negotiation, and that his official functions had ceased. (Hear, hear.)

Since then, negotiations have taken place between the Governments of England and France, which, I am happy to say, have been brought at last to a satisfactory conclusion. We are ready to accept such parts of the proposed convention as are still applicable to what remains to be done. Having received and distributed to the claimants the 180,000 drachmas, we don't insist upon the difference between that sum and the sum that was to be required by the convention. The apology written by M. Londos is retained, and cannot be returned to him, in order that instead of it, he may send us the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be settled, is the investigation of the claims of M. Pacifico on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents. With regard to these claims, by the arrangement of the 27th of April, a material security was given in the shape of a pecuniary deposit. The convention, of which I had drawn up the details, contained on that point a diplomatic guarantee, instead of a substantial guarantee; for it was a convention to be ratified by the two Sovereigns, providing that a commission of arbitration should be named by the three Governments to investigate that claim, while by Mr. Wyse's arrangement this investigation was to be made not by a commission, but by the British and Greek Governments jointly. We are perfectly ready to substitute the one arrangement for the other, if the Greek Government choose to adopt it; but we do not intend to urge it upon them, if they do not. If they prefer the arrangement of the convention, we are prepared to conclude a convention to that effect, superseding the corresponding part of the arrangement which was concluded at Athens.

There is, however, one point in Mr. Wyse's arrangement, which was not included in the draft of the convention, because it applies to circumstances of which we were not aware, at the time when the convention of London was framed. Mr. Wyse exacted an engagement on the part of the Government of Greece that they should not put forward, nor support, if put forward by others, any claims for compensation arising from losses or injuries consequent upon the coercive measures to which we had recourse. The motive of Mr. Wyse for requiring that engagement was, that he understood the Government of Greece had been collecting and beating up for claims of that kind, which they meant to put forward to a very large amount. We attach no value to that engagement as bearing in any manner whatever upon the validity of any such claims. Such claims can have no

just foundation whatever; and if they were put forward by the Greek Government, or by other persons supported by the Greek Government, our answer could only be—"These claims have no foundation in right or reason, and we utterly and entirely reject them." But the value of that arrangement was, that by shutting the door against such claims, it prevented the Greek Government from raising discussions which might interrupt the good understanding and friendly relations between the two countries. (Hear, hear.) The British Government are willing, instead of that engagement, to accept the good offices of the French Government, whose good offices with the Government of Greece under existing circumstances have some value, and who will advise the King of Greece not to put forward any such unfounded claims. France, therefore, will advise the King of Greece not to bring forward or to support any such claims, and with that advice we shall be content.

Thus terminates all difference between the Governments of England and France in regard to these matters (hear, hear, and cheers); and I believe that if it had not been for discussions which are now taking place in the French Assembly, the distinguished individual who represents the French Government at this Court, might have been present to hear the debate of to-night. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) So much, then, with regard to the affairs of Greece, and the course which we have pursued in regard to them; but there still remains the question of the far-famed islands of Sapienza and Cervi.

Now, with respect to these islands, my opinion is clear and decided. That opinion, as has been already stated this evening, is supported by the opinion of my predecessor in office, Lord Aberdeen, as appears by a despatch from him to Sir Edmund Lyons, which has been laid on the table. The case is simply this:—There are certain islands on the coast of Greece, which originally belonged to Venice, and which, by the treaty of 1800, between Russia and the Porte, were erected into a separate State. The seven great islands, and all the other islands, great and small, inhabited and uninhabited, on the coast of Albania and of the Morea, were placed under feudal relations to Turkey; and were secured by the guarantee of Russia; and it was declared that the constitution which that State might give to itself should be communicated to, and be sanctioned by the two protecting Powers. At that time the Morea, and the other parts of Greece belonged to Turkey. In 1803 these islands made their constitution, which, I presume, was communicated to, and sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers; and in 1804, in execution of that constitution, they made a municipal distribution of the smaller

islands, allotting them respectively to the seven larger islands; and in a public decree, which I cannot doubt must have been made known both to Turkey and Russia, Sapienza was aggregated to Zante, and Cervi to Cerigo.

Now, can any man suppose that, if Cervi and Sapienza had been part of the Turkish territory at that time, the Sultan would have allowed his vassals of the Ionian State to appropriate to themselves what belonged to him? or that Russia, who was still more vigilant, and was under engagement, by guarantee, to defend and maintain the territory of this Ionian State, would have permitted a proceeding, which on such a supposition, would have thrown on her the duty of defending for the Ionian State islands which belonged of right to Turkey? But these islands have always been considered by the British Government, ever since the Septinsular Republic was placed under the protection of England, as belonging to the Ionian State; and it is well known that officers quartered at Cerigo have been in the habit of going to Cervi for purposes of amusement, and that that island has always been held to be part of the Ionian territory.

The boundaries of Greece were settled by the Protocol of February, 1830, with the exception of an improvement in the northern frontier, which was afterwards arranged between the Three Powers and the Porte, and in the settlement of which we were much assisted by an hon. and gallant friend of mine, the Member for Portarlington, who was employed in surveying that improved line. A map was attached to the Protocol of February 1830, and a red line, of which we have heard much, was drawn upon that map to mark part of the boundary which was established by the Protocol; but that red line was mentioned in the Protocol, only as marking the northern boundary of Greece, east and west from sea to sea, and it did not apply to the islands. The islands which were to form part of the Greek State, were enumerated by name in the Protocol, and neither Cervi nor Sapienza were included in that enumeration.

It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the public acts which constituted the Kingdom of Greece included either of these islands within its territory. If, then, the Greek Government has taken possession of either of these two islands, it is the Greek Government that has intruded upon the territory of the Ionian State; and the British Government has not, by demanding the evacuation of those islands, wanted to intrude upon the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. But this question did not form part of the demands made by Mr. Wyse on the 15th of January. It is a separate question, and remains open for fair discus-

sion between the Governments of Greece and England, and of England, France, and Russia. (Hear, hear.)

Our applications about these islands had remained unnoticed by the Greek Government for ten years. It may be asked, then, why did we renew them at this particular time? Because the Greek Government committed last year an act of aggression on the island of Cervi, which they had never committed before. A boat going between Cerigo and Zante with convicts, was driven by stress of weather upon Cervi, when the convicts were liberated, and other acts were committed as if the island had been Greek territory. It became necessary, therefore, to call for an answer to our application, and if no answer was given, to take possession of the islands—an operation which could be performed by a boat's crew, without involving any greater employment of force. But, as has already been stated, the Greek Government hearing that these islands were to be taken possession of, at last broke their ten years' silence, and made a reply; and a discussion being thus opened, the forcible occupation was suspended. With respect to the Government of Russia, that Government was made aware so long ago as the beginning of last October, of the instructions we had given for the occupation of those islands.

Having disposed of the matter of Greece, I now come to the wider range, which was taken last night by the right hon. baronet (Sir James Graham) the Member for Ripon. (Loud cries of Hear, hear, and cheers.) That right hon. baronet took, I think, a proper view of the question before the House, because the resolution which has been proposed is not confined to one particular act of Her Majesty's Government with regard to foreign affairs, but does fairly involve and open the consideration of all the topics to which the right hon. gentleman adverted. (Hear, hear.) I agree, however, with those hon. gentlemen who have contended that the resolution does not imply an absolute and entire approval of every act that has been done by the Government; and, indeed, it would be unreasonable to propose such a vote to the House; because it could hardly be expected that so large a number of men, possessing different degrees of information, holding different views, and not knowing exactly in all cases what have been the grounds upon which the Government have acted, though they may approve of the general principles which have guided the conduct of the Government, should implicitly approve of everything we may have done.

The right hon. baronet was justified in taking that *larger range* into which he expatiated last night; but I

must be allowed to set him right as to the first point upon which he touched. He stated what was quite true, that when he was a member of Lord Grey's Administration, he concurred with me in many acts of foreign policy of which I was the organ, which involved very active interposition in the affairs of other countries. He instanced the negotiations in regard to Belgium, and its separation from Holland. He has done justice to the views which guided the Government of that day, in their opinion that the independence of Belgium would be a measure advantageous to the peace, present and future, of Europe. But then, he says, that case was different from the acts of the present Government, because every step in that affair was taken with the concurrence of all the five Powers who were parties to the negotiation. The right hon. baronet said that there were, to be sure, some things which went beyond mere negotiation; there was the siege of Antwerp (a laugh), and the embargo laid by us upon Dutch ships. He had concurred, he said, in both those measures; but were those measures, steps taken with the full consent of all the five Powers? (Loud cries of "Hear, hear.") Were those acts, measures of such a description, that they rendered it quite impossible that the friendly relations of this country with other Powers could be disturbed thereby? (Renewed cries of "Hear.") The right hon. baronet must, I am sure, recollect that Austria, Russia, and Prussia dissented from those measures ("Hear, hear," and cheers); that they protested against those measures (renewed cheers); that in consequence thereof they withdrew for a time from the conference (hear, hear); and that a Prussian army was collected near the banks of the Meuse, the presence of which rendered it necessary for the French to send a very large force to Antwerp, much more than was required for the mere siege of the citadel, and also to have a reserve ready in case of need. (Hear, hear.) I know very well that when people are out of office their memory is not so quick and retentive as to things which happened while they were in power as it would have been if they had remained in (a laugh), but on this point the right hon. baronet made an important mistake, especially as bearing upon the particular question now before the House.

I agree with the right hon. baronet that in regard to the affairs of Belgium the Government of England came to a wise determination. I think that the arrangement which in 1815 had been thought conducive to the peace of Europe, and by which, through the union of Belgium with Holland, a Power of some consideration was to be formed in that particular part of Europe, interposed between Germany on one side and France on the other—I think that that

arrangement, which originally, by those who framed it, was, and not without reason, expected to prove advantageous to the peace of Europe, had by the course of events turned out to have a contrary tendency. The people of Belgium and of Holland evidently could not coalesce; and if certain Powers of Europe had combined at that moment to compel a reunion between these separated portions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I doubt whether that reunion could have been effected without the immediate explosion of a war in Europe of the greatest magnitude: and I am quite sure that if it had been effected, it could not have lasted, and the foundation must have been laid thereby of future and inevitable disturbance. (Hear, hear.) We carried out our opinion upon that point to a practical result. (Hear, hear.)

It is not to be disguised at this time of day, that our opinion on that matter was not shared by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. They would much rather have seen the two countries reunited; and if that reunion was at that time impossible, they would have been glad of any arrangement which might have tended to render a reunion thereafter more easy. This was no breach of faith on their part; they acted, I am bound to say, with great good faith and honour in the whole transaction; but they had that opinion which differed from the opinion of England and France. (Hear, hear.) Nevertheless our arrangement prevailed; and was that, now, an instance of a policy which deserves the censure and condemnation of Parliament and of the country? (Cheers.)

I remember being taunted in this House by being told of my "little experimental Belgian monarchy." It was predicted that the experiment would not succeed; it was said that there was no national feeling among the Belgians; that they would, on the first opportunity, throw themselves into the arms of their nearest neighbour; that we were only laying the foundation of another change; and that our arrangement was only "a transition state." Why, if ever there was an experiment—call it so if you will—that fully and completely succeeded, the erection of Belgium into an independent State was that experiment. (Hear, hear.) In times when almost all the other countries in Europe have been convulsed from top to bottom, Belgium has remained undisturbed. (Hear, hear.) The people have shown the most admirable devotion and attachment to their Sovereign; the Sovereign the greatest confidence in, and love for his people; the nation has made rapid advances in industry and in the arts, in everything which distinguishes a civilised state (hear, hear); all this reflects the greatest honour upon the Belgian people; and they *have*, moreover, acquired a spirit and sentiment of nationality *which* entitles them to the respect of every other country in

the world. (Cheers.) I say, then, that so far as we were concerned in effecting that arrangement, I think that is a case to which we can refer with pride and satisfaction (hear, hear), and in regard to which we can justly claim the approbation of Parliament and of the country. (Hear, hear.) But it was not altogether without encountering difficulty, not only in other countries, but at home, that we were able to bring that long negotiation to a successful issue. (Hear, hear.)

Then the right hon. baronet says that he was also a party to another operation which differed in some degree from pure and mere diplomatic intervention—the interference of this country in the affairs of Portugal by the Quadruple Treaty of 1834. I think the right hon. baronet was in office when the Quadruple Treaty, in regard to Portugal, was concluded. What was that Treaty? We have been accused—I, especially, have been accused—of "running a muck" through Europe, interfering here and there in the internal affairs of every other country; and, I presume, from the general tenour of the speech of the right hon. baronet, that it is upon that tendency to interference in the affairs of other countries, among other things, that he founds his disapprobation of the conduct of foreign affairs under my management as the organ of the Government. (Hear, hear.)

Now, a question arose in Portugal between the claims of Donna Maria, represented by her father, Don Pedro, and those of Don Miguel, her uncle. Did it very much signify to England, in the abstract, whether this young queen was to be Sovereign of Portugal, or whether Don Miguel, who was actually in possession, should remain upon the throne? Not much certainly; but we looked upon the question, not as a simple choice between one Sovereign and the other, but—what it was in reality—as a question between absolute government on the one hand, and constitutional government on the other. (Hear, hear.) But what interest, you will say, had we in that? Why, we might have had a selfish interest in favour of despotism; because it is manifest that if you want to exercise influence over a country, you are more likely to have it where the Government rests in a Court and a Cabinet, than where it rests in an assembly representing the nation. But we scorned that sort of influence in Portugal. (Hear, hear.) We knew, in espousing the cause of a constitution, that that particular kind of influence on our part would cease; but we felt that we should reap other advantages, which would more than counterbalance any disadvantage arising from that source. We knew that the prosperity of Portugal was concerned in the issue (hear, hear); that the best chance for the cessation of the manifold

abuses, administrative and others, which had so long prevailed to keep down Portugal in the scale of nations—that the best chance of applying a remedy to those evils, and of giving full development to the natural resources of Portugal, would consist in securing to it the inestimable advantages of a free constitution (hear, hear); and, therefore, thinking as we did, that right was on the side of that party with whom waved the constitutional banner, we, and the right hon. baronet with us, espoused that cause; and we concluded a treaty between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, by means of which, through the exertion of force, Donna Maria was seated upon the throne of Portugal. (Hear, hear.) I think that course was wise—was perfectly defensible; and I think the right hon. baronet is entitled to share with me (laughter) in the merit of having been above all narrow-minded prejudices (renewed laughter), and having concurred in that act of forcible interference, for the purpose of giving to Portugal the blessings of representative government (Hear.)

But I shall be told that as late as 1847 there was another insurrection in Portugal, and another interference. Now, no man of common sense can suppose, that when you plant free institutions in a soil, in which none have hitherto grown, they are at once to attain their full maturity, and to bear their utmost fruit. (Hear, hear.) It takes time to educate men for the well administration of representative government (hear, hear); it takes time to reconcile the governors to submitting themselves to the control of representative Institutions (hear, hear); and in the early stages of constitutional experience you find, on the one hand, that the representatives of the people do not bring sufficient moderation and sense, and judgment, to the exercise of their functions; and on the other, that the members of the Government are too jealous of the restraints imposed upon them, and are constantly striving either to elude those restraints, or to break through them. The history of all constitutional countries, and especially of our own, will furnish abundant instances to exemplify this truth. (Hear, hear.) But has Portugal derived no benefit from her Constitution? Let any man compare her present condition with what she was under arbitrary Government. (Hear, hear.) There may now be abuses and misgovernment requiring correction, but the condition of Portugal is no more to be compared with what it formerly was, than is light with darkness. (Hear, hear.)

Now, what did we do in 1847? Our conduct in 1847 was again approved by the right hon. baronet. (Hear.) *Portugal* was then in a state of revolution; the Throne was *in the utmost* and most imminent danger; the Government

applied to this country for aid under the engagements that Quadruple treaty to which the right hon. baronet was a party—and also applied to France and to Spain, other parties to that treaty. We did not acknowledge that that treaty was in force or applicable to the then existing state of things; but we had to consider the case upon its own merits, without reference to the Quadruple Treaty, but with reference to the general obligations, the standing and permanent treaty obligations of this country towards Portugal. I know that many of my hon. friends on my right, thought that it would have been more prudent and more consistent with the principles which ought to govern the conduct of England, to have let the contest go on, between the Liberal party and the other party; but I thought then, and I think now, that our determination was right. (Hear, hear.) I am convinced that though for the moment we put down, or at least disarmed, the Liberal party, we saved that party, both individually and collectively, from great dangers and from serious evils. (Hear, hear.)

My conviction is, that if we had declined, the other Powers, Spain especially, would have interfered; unless we had taken ground which would have involved England in war—unless we had said, "If you interfere, you are at war with England;" and if we had said that, who will tell me what those other Powers in Europe, who sympathized with Spain might have said; and what support Spain would have received in such a war, from countries with which it would not have been the policy of England to engage in hostilities. (Hear.) My conviction is, that if we had not adopted the course we did, and by which the civil war was put an end to at once, without further effusion of blood, that civil war would have been put down by foreign interference, but not with the conditions which we attached to the termination of the contest.

The conditions we exacted were—ample and complete amnesty for all engaged in that civil war; a revocation of all illegal edicts which had been issued by the Government at variance with the Constitution; the convocation of the Parliament as soon as the elections, which should immediately take place, were concluded; and the formation in the mean time of a Government consisting neither of members of the party of Cabral—the party then representing the arbitrary principle, the high Tory principle, (laughter and cheers,)—nor of members of the Junta of Oporto. (Hear, hear.) These terms were accepted; there was no further effusion of blood; the Constitution continued in full force; and Portugal *is now in the enjoyment* of that Constitution;

and practically, it is working as well as under all circumstances, and considering how recently it has been established, could perhaps have been expected. (Hear.) "Oh, but," said the right hon. baronet, "you have Costa Cabral as minister, and your object was to get rid of him." (Hear, hear.) Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is, that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. (Hear, hear.) If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, "Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy." (Cheers.) Why it is like shooting a policeman. (Laughter, and cries of Hear, hear.) As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings and spirit and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty Foreign Ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place, who does not act upon the same principles. (Cheers.) When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, "Oh, it's all spite against this man, or that man, Count this, or Prince that, that makes you do this." So the right hon. baronet says, our object in 1847 was merely to get rid of Costa Cabral; and, he adds, Costa Cabral being now in office, our purpose has been defeated. Now, as regards mere personal considerations, we did not care who was Minister of Portugal; but we felt that there was in that country much popular excitement, that party was arrayed against party, class against class, that there were bitter animosities ready to break out, and, we knew perfectly well, that if a member of the Cabral faction was, at that particular time, made Minister, there would be a renewal of civil war; we accordingly excluded, not for ever, but merely for a time, and until the Cortes should decide who was to have their confidence, and who should be Minister, all men of the extreme parties, whether of the Cabral faction or of the Junta faction. I therefore cannot admit the triumph which the right hon. baronet thinks he has obtained at my expense, by the fact that Costa Cabral, in spite of our proceedings in 1847, is now, in 1850, Minister of Portugal. (Hear, hear.)

Now come we to Spain. It is perfectly true that the right hon. baronet was not in office when the Additional Articles of 1835—additional to the Treaty of 1834—were concluded. But what was the Treaty of 1834—the Quadruple Treaty? It was a Treaty to expel from the Peninsula not Don Miguel only, but Don Carlos also, who *was then* at the head of troops in Portugal; and, therefore *so far as the* spirit and provisions of that treaty of 1834 went—

the right hon. baronet cannot ride off by saying, that it confined itself entirely to Portugal, and did not extend to interference with Spain. (Hear.) Don Carlos was at the time in Portugal, at the head of troops, with the purpose of getting back into Spain; and, had Don Miguel been successful in Portugal, there is no doubt that Don Carlos would have availed himself of the circumstance to enforce his claims upon Spain. (Hear, hear.) Don Carlos having been expelled from the Peninsula under the treaty of 1834, came to London for a time, and then returned to Spain. Hostilities were resumed in Spain; and the Additional Articles of 1835 were then concluded, for the purpose of giving to the Queen of Spain assistance, to enable her to retain the Crown and to expel Don Carlos from Spain.

This was a case exactly similar to that of Portugal in the preceding year. (Hear, hear.) We had no particular interest, in the abstract, in determining whether the Sovereign of Spain should be an infant Princess, as Isabella then was, or a full grown Prince; the mere abstract question between Isabella and Carlos was one in regard to which we had nothing at stake, and which the then Government of England would probably not have thought it proper or useful to interfere with. Questions of succession to a Crown have, indeed, at all times been matters with which Foreign Powers have concerned themselves; but it has only been when some distinct interest has made it worth their while to do so. But in Spain, as in Portugal, the question was between arbitrary rule and constitutional and parliamentary Government (hear, hear); and in relation to Spain, as well as to Portugal, we thought that the interests of England, in every point of view, commercial and political, would be benefitted by the establishment of constitutional Government. (Hear, hear.)

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent (hear, hear), that Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards, is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. (Hear, hear.) Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account, and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. (Hear, hear.) It is to our advantage that so long as we have given no offence to Spain, and she none to us, differences with other Powers should not involve us in war with her (hear, hear); and we considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government *controlled by* a representative and national

Assembly, than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, on grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful—the Carlist cause failed; the cause of the Constitution prevailed. But it is said by the right hon. baronet, that General Narvaez is Minister of Spain—I cannot see in that, any defeat of the policy of England; General Narvaez, indeed, is Minister of Spain, but the Constitution is in force (hear, hear), and that Constitution has of late been more strictly observed, than it was at the period to which the right hon. baronet referred.

The right hon. baronet finds fault with a certain despatch which in July, 1846, after the change of Ministry in this country, I wrote to Sir Henry, then Mr., Bulwer at Madrid; and the right hon. baronet says, Here is an instance, not only of the interference of the noble Viscount, but of the manner and tone he uses. Now as to manner and tone, there have been certain communications made to other British Ministers by persons in whom the right hon. baronet has confidence, which are certainly couched in terms which may possibly admit of the application of some of those phrases which the right hon. baronet has applied to me. (Hear, hear.) There was a certain despatch, for example, addressed by the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons, our Minister at Athens, which has already been read elsewhere, and which I have got a copy of here (laughter), and which I think is a very curious specimen of the manner, in which the most mild and uninterfering of Foreign Ministers (laughter) can, when he so likes, deal with the internal arrangements of other Governments. (Laughter.)

Everybody knows who Sir Richard Church is (hear, hear); a most distinguished soldier, who fought nobly in the cause of Greek independence, and for a long time was properly respected and honoured by the Greek Government. But in 1843 he was supposed to sympathize with the party who extorted the Constitution from the King. I believe that what he then did, was a great service to the King; and that he was very instrumental in saving King Otho from dangers to which he would otherwise have been exposed (hear, hear); but, however, in 1844 he incurred the displeasure of the King, and he was removed from the appointment of Inspector-General of the Greek Forces, which he had held; and he was succeeded by General Grivas, a person whose conduct, at

appears from the despatch in question, had not been altogether free from imputations of disloyalty. Well, here are the instructions given on the subject to Sir Edmund Lyons, by the Minister who never interfered with the internal affairs of other countries, and especially with their purely domestic matters:—

"Sir,—Her Majesty's Government have learned with deep concern the dismissal of Sir Richard Church from the post of Inspector-General of the Greek Army, which post he had so honourably and successfully filled for many years;" perhaps so far, it was natural for the English Government to regret the dismissal of a meritorious English officer.—"Their regret is increased by finding that General Grivas, who was so recently engaged in open rebellion against the throne, has been appointed to succeed him." As to this point, one would have thought the King of Greece was himself the best judge. ("Hear, hear," and a laugh.) "Her Majesty's Government do not propose to interfere in the matter; since, however unjust the deprivation of General Church may have been, and however injudicious the elevation of his successor, these acts were certainly within the competence of the Greek Government." This is very handsome and candid. ("Hear," and laughter.) "But," continues the non-interfering Minister, "though Her Majesty's Government abstain from interfering, they deem it an imperative duty on their part—considering the position in which Great Britain stands with regard to Greece, as a creating and guaranteeing Power, to express"—they do not interfere—"to express in the strongest terms their sense of the injustice done to Sir R. Church, one of the best, most disinterested, and most efficient supporters of Greek independence, by an abrupt and ungracious dismissal, unaccompanied by any word of commendation or acknowledgment of his great services to Greece, and also their sense of the excess of imprudence and impolicy (hear, hear) exhibited in the appointment to one of the most responsible offices under the Crown, of a man whose recent conduct has shewn him to be an enemy to the Throne and a deliberate perverter of order and discipline."

This was written by the Minister who never interfered with the internal arrangements of other Powers. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) "Her Majesty's Government," continues this mild despatch, "consider themselves fully warranted by the overt acts of General Grivas himself, in instructing you to make known these sentiments distinctly in their name to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as to the King himself (hear, hear,)—as well as to the King himself, should a favourable opportunity present itself; and at the *same time to warn* His Majesty seriously,—

(hear, hear, and laughter)—seriously and solemnly of the danger to which he will expose his country and his Throne by a perseverance in so fatal a line of policy as that which he has lately pursued." (Hear, hear.) The writer of this despatch condemns me for my despatch of the 19th of July, 1846, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer (hear, hear),—a despatch which was not to be communicated to the Sovereign (hear, hear); and the concluding paragraph of which the right hon. baronet might as well have read, when he read the other portion of it (hear, hear), because, after stating to Sir H. Bulwer, that having just come into office, we thought it was essential that we should explain to him the views we entertained as to the position of Spain, and as to the conduct of the Spanish Government, the despatch concluded with the following passage:—

"It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation to a grinding tyranny, that Great Britain entered into the engagements of the quadruple alliance of 1835, and gave, in pursuance of the stipulations of that treaty, that active assistance, which contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. But Her Majesty's Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions, to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these matters. But, though you will, of course, take care to express on no occasion on these subjects, sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you; and although you will be careful not to express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons, who may have the power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government." (Hear.) Now let the House, after comparing these two despatches, say whether it is from that quarter that we deserve the condemnation that has been passed upon us? (Loud cheers.) "If I am worthy to be so treated, I do not deserve to be so treated by you." (Hear, hear.)

But it is said, nevertheless, to me, "You cannot be commonly courteous or civil, even in your reconciliations; your strong language led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain, and when matters have been arranged again, you have spoiled the grace and courtesy of the reconciliation by your manner of accepting an apology." (Hear, hear.) I am told, "You mentioned Sir Henry Bulwer *in your* note, in reply to the apology of the Spanish *Government*, as the person whom you would have pre-

ferred to send to Madrid; and that was enough to disgust the Spanish Government and the Spanish people." (Hear, hear.)

Now, at the time when the conduct of Sir H. Bulwer became the subject of discussion in this House, there was not a man of any side, who did not do him justice; and no one expressed himself more handsomely in regard to Sir H. Bulwer, than did the right hon. baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir R. Peel.) (Cheers.) Sir, it is not always fitting to tell diplomatic secrets to the House of Commons. (A laugh.) Yet I am obliged, in vindication of myself, to do so on this occasion; and to tell the House, but of course in strict confidence, that those two notes—namely, the note of apology from the Spanish Government, and our note of answer, were mutually communicated to, and approved by each Government beforehand. (Much cheering and laughter.) Yes, those notes were communicated confidentially, and were agreed to by both Governments before they were officially interchanged. (Loud cheers.)

However, Sir, the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Graham) says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance, as regards another country, namely, France. He says, that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages, there arose differences between England and France, which led to no slighter catastrophe, than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question, to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his Administration, and with it the throne of France! (a laugh.) Why, Sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of a sense of their own dignity and honour,—what will they say, when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their Government and their monarchy? (Much cheering.) Why, Sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their Ministers—(tremendous and prolonged cheering, which prevented the noble Viscount from concluding the sentence)—I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing *for no other* reason than that he had

upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country; and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land (loud cheers), why I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such a cabal; and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. (Cheers.) If, then, the French people had thought that I, or any other foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever, in the post which he occupied. (Cheers.) No, Sir, the French Minister and the French Monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. (Cheers.) And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson, from the events which then took place.

We had, indeed, a difference with the Government of France relative to the Spanish marriages. I do not wish to open again questions that are gone by, or to remind the House or the country of the grounds of complaint which we had then, as I think justly, against those who are now no longer in power. But, since I am pressed upon this matter, and as it is one count of the long indictment preferred against me, I must say, in my own defence, that the dissatisfaction which we felt was not groundless. I must say, too, that I formed my judgment from communications made to me by the noble lord (Lord Aberdeen) whom I succeeded in the office I hold—from statements from his own mouth, made to me in that interview which always takes place, between the Foreign Minister who goes out, and the Minister who comes in. I learned from that source, that promises had been made in regard to these marriages—not only by a Minister to a Minister, but between far higher personages (hear)—promises, the like of which, so far as I am aware of, have never before in the history of Europe been broken; and yet those promises were deliberately broken. (Loud cheers.) If we felt dissatisfaction then at those marriages, that dissatisfaction was just and well-founded; and upon every ground of national interest and honour, we were entitled, nay, bound, to express it. (Loud cheers.)

Before I quit this subject, I must say that in my opinion the policy which we have pursued in regard to France has been consistent with the interests of this country, and ' been characterized by an observance of the principles the hon. and learned gentleman, Mr. Roebuck, whose tion we are discussing, thinks ought to govern our

foreign policy, and which are calculated to preserve, as they have preserved, the peace of Europe. (Cheers.) Our prompt acknowledgment in 1848 of the Government established in France, and the kindly relations which we have maintained with the successive chiefs of Administration in that country, sufficiently show that we have been animated by a kindly feeling towards the French nation; and that in our opinion the maintenance of friendly relations with that country is not only consistent with our interests and our dignity, but also forms a firm foundation for the peace of Europe. (Loud cheers.)

The right hon. baronet (Sir J. Graham) has insinuated that Lord Normanby, in the period immediately preceding the events of February, 1848, had been in too intimate connexion with some of the persons whom he describes as the parties who overthrew the throne of France. I know not whom he means, but this I know, that the person with whom Lord Normanby was perhaps in the most frequent communication, because he was an old and intimate friend, was Count Molé; and I have yet to learn that he is a man who was likely to do anything to overthrow, either intentionally or unintentionally, the monarchy of France. (Hear, hear.) But, if that insinuation was meant to convey an imputation that Lord Normanby had done anything, or had held any intercourse, inconsistent with his position as the ambassador of a friendly power, then I say that imputation is totally and entirely unfounded. (Cheers.)

Well, Sir, I leave the sunny plains of Castile and the gay vineyards of France, and now I am taken to the mountains of Switzerland, as the place where I am to render a stricter account.

The charge against me in regard to Switzerland is founded upon a book of Count D'Haussonville's, which relates a private conversation said to have taken place between individuals, who were little supposing that what they were saying or replying would figure in an octavo volume (a laugh, and "Hear, hear"); and still less that it would become a ground of serious accusation against any one in Parliament. Now, as far as I can collect the charge from the speech of the hon. member for Bridport (Mr. B. Cochrane), who entered into the subject more in detail than the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Graham), the charge is, that in July, 1847, I declined to accede to a proposal of the Duke de Broglie to mediate between the two parties in Switzerland—that I changed my opinion in November, and agreed to mediate; and that I then purposely delayed the mediation, in order to defeat it; and that while I was sending despatches to Switzerland for the purpose of offering a mediation, I was privately directing

Mr. Peel to urge on the events of the war, so that the mediation might come too late.

Now, as to the first charge, I plead entirely guilty; that is to say, when the mediation was first proposed, it did not seem to me to be a case, in which this country ought to interfere. The House will remember that a dispute arose between different portions of the Swiss cantons. The seven peculiarly Catholic cantons formed a Sonderbund, or separate league, and the other Cantons arrayed themselves in an opposing aggregation. The cause of the quarrel was, that the majority of the cantons required the minority, that is to say, the seven cantons of the Sonderbund, to expel the Jesuits, and this the minority refused to do. There were other points in dispute between them, but those were minor questions. It was likely that this quarrel would lead to an appeal to arms. The majority contended that the separate league of the Sonderbund was inconsistent with the act of confederation, and they accordingly intended to put it down by force of arms. Well, on the 29th of October I wrote a despatch to Mr. Peel, our Chargé d'Affaires in Switzerland, and I will read that despatch, in order to show what were the opinions of the British Government in regard to the civil war then on the point of breaking out; and be it observed, this despatch was actually written a very few days before the civil war actually began. I will read this in order to show how inconsistent with the opinions thus expressed by me to Mr. Peel, and which he was instructed to make known to M. Ochsenbein, is the report of Count D'Haussonville as to the opinions which he understood Mr. Peel to say he was instructed to express to the Diet on our part.

"Sir,—With reference to your despatch of the 18th instant, announcing the assembling of an Extraordinary Diet to decide upon ulterior measures for carrying into execution the decrees already passed respecting the Separate League existing within the Swiss Confederation, I have to desire that you will state to M. Ochsenbein, that her Majesty's Government, animated by the sincerest wish for the welfare of Switzerland, most earnestly recommend the Vorort to pause and well consider all the possible consequences of the step, before they actually commence civil war against the seven smaller cantons. Her Majesty's Government concur with the majority of Cantons, in thinking the Sonderbund at variance with the Federal Compact; but at the same time it must be remembered that this union has not any active or aggressive measure for its object; and there does not seem to be any practical evil that must necessarily flow from the abstinence of the Diet from any measures of coercion, for the purpose of enforcing its

demand, that the Sonderbund should be dissolved. On the other hand, evils of great magnitude seem likely to be produced by a recourse to such measures. The first and immediate consequence will be a civil war between the differing sections of the Swiss nation; and as civil war is one of the greatest calamities which can befall a people, great must be the responsibility which will weigh upon those, who, without an overruling necessity, shall take the first steps in such a conflict. The next evil will be the too probable interference of foreign Powers as allies of one of the parties engaged in that civil conflict; and thus to the bloodshed and devastation which attend civil war, and the lasting bitterness and resentments which survive such conflicts, may be added the permanent establishment of foreign influences in the internal affairs of Switzerland, essentially impairing the political independence of the country.

"The majority ought moreover well to weigh their chances of success or of failure, in the conflict, in which they are preparing to embark. In order to succeed they must conquer the Seven Cantons; are they likely to be able to do so, even if none but Swiss were to be engaged in the war? Considering the nature of the country of some of these cantons, and the character of the people, it may well be doubted whether even in that case, the Diet would be able to do so. But is it not probable that those neighbouring Powers, who have already supplied the Seven Cantons with arms and ammunition and other warlike stores, would, if the Seven Cantons were reduced to extremity, and were to call for succour, afford them effectual assistance of a still more decided kind; and in that case is it not certain, that the attack of the Diet would fail; and if that attack should fail, either by the unaided reasistance of the Seven Cntons, or by the interposition of stronger Powers, would the attacking cantons remain in the same relative situation, in which they now stand towards the other party? Most assuredly not. On the contrary, they would be the beaten party in a war begun by themselves; and the experience of all times shows, that defeats of such a kind, are attended with inevitable evils to the defeated party. Her Majesty's Government entreat the Vorort to take these reflections into their most serious consideration; and truly rejoiced would Her Majesty's Government be, if the Directory were upon mature reflection, to abstain from a course so replete with hazard, and so pregnant with danger to Switzerland.

"I have to desire that you will read this despatch confidentially to M. Ochsenbein, and that you will say, that the communication is prompted solely by the friendly interest which Her Majesty's Government take in the welfare of the Swiss nation."

This despatch was sent on the 29th of October, and on the 4th of November Mr. Peel wrote an answer, reporting at great length a conversation he had had with M. Ochsenbein upon reading to him my despatch of the 29th October. In that conversation M. Ochsenbein stated, that he looked upon civil war as one of the greatest of evils; but he said that the majority of the cantons had no other course but to accept the conflict offered to them by the Sonderbund; and he gave reasons why it was impossible for them to avoid pursuing the course they had resolved upon. This despatch was received at the Foreign Office on the 9th of November. On the 6th of November the Duc de Broglie communicated to me a despatch from M. Guizot, which is also in the blue book, but gentlemen seem rather to take their information from pamphlets and foreign newspapers, than from the official documents in the blue books. That despatch contained a proposition from M. Guizot, for a joint declaration to be made by the five Powers, for the purpose of putting an end to civil war in Switzerland.

I have been blamed for not accepting this proposal, and for delaying to give an answer to it till the 16th. It has been said that any verbal alterations which I had to propose, might easily and quickly have been settled, and that a delay of so many days could not be required. Now, what was the proposal which the French Government made? They proposed that the five great Powers, England, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should make collectively a declaration, which should contain, first a statement that they would recommend and support the arbitration of the Pope in regard to the religious question pending in Switzerland. Now that religious question was, whether the Jesuits should be withdrawn or not. The Sonderbund of course would have been glad to accept the arbitration of the Pope, which they would naturally have expected to be given in their favour; but the cantons who wished to get rid of the Jesuits would not have done so. Secondly, it was proposed that we should offer to the States of the Confederation the mediation of the five Powers, for the settlement of all political questions. It was further proposed that a conference should be assembled for this purpose, at some place in the neighbourhood of Switzerland; and that the twenty-two cantons should be invited to send each a deputy for the purpose of examining and determining, in conjunction with the five Powers, two things—first, the means of conciliation between the contending parties; and secondly, the modifications that should be made in the federal compact. Then it was proposed that the two parties should be required *immediately* to put an end to the civil war; and that

should be given to understand, that if they refused our propositions, and should proceed with the war, the five Powers would consider the confederation as no longer existing, and deem all their engagements towards it rescinded; and that in such case the five Powers "aviseraient," a diplomatic expression understood as conveying a menace. (Hear.)

Now, in the first place, we felt, that the proposed arbitration of the Pope was certain to be rejected by the majority of the cantons; and that the proposition that the twenty-two cantons should send representatives to confer with the five Powers as to the alterations to be made in the federal compact, would not be accepted. Then besides, we could not agree to declare, that if the Swiss refused our proposal, we should consider the confederation as no longer existing,—that confederation having been established by the Treaty of Vienna. Much less could we consent to declare, that we should consider the engagements contracted towards that confederation as ceasing to exist; for the main engagements taken by the great Powers towards the Swiss confederation by the Treaty of Vienna, are, that they will respect the neutrality of Switzerland, and the integrity of its territory. In fact, the proposition of the French Government amounted in other words to this, that if the Swiss refused our conditions, we would compel them by force of arms to adopt our views. (Hear, hear.) That was a proposal we could not possibly agree to, and it required some consideration to determine what we should propose instead.

On the 16th, in a despatch to Lord Normanby, we made our proposal, which was, to offer the mediation of the five Powers, unaccompanied by any threat, direct or indirect, as a consequence of refusal; leaving the Swiss to accept or reject our mediation as they pleased. The basis of the arrangement which we offered to propose was, that the Jesuits should be withdrawn, either by an act of the Sonderbund cantons themselves, or by a consent to be obtained from the Pope; that the Diet should then declare formally, that it had no aggressive intention against the Sonderbund; and that the Sonderbund, upon receiving this assurance, should dissolve their separate league, which was at variance with the federal compact; that both parties should then disarm, and that peace should thus be permanently restored. (Hear, hear.)

Now, I think that was a fair and just proposal, and it was one entirely in accordance with those principles which we think should regulate the foreign policy of this country. (Hear.) Some communications took place between us and the French *Government on the* subject of this proposal, and

with regard to the wording of a note, which each of the Powers should present to the contending parties in Switzerland. That note was agreed to between me and the Duc de Broglie on the 26th of November; but on the 16th of November I had received from the Consul-General of Switzerland here, a note, founded on a decision come to by the Swiss themselves, which gave us small hopes of success in the proposal we had agreed to make, though we still persevered in making it. It was a formal declaration on the part of the Diet. that they would admit of no foreign interference in their dispute with the Seven Cantons. (Hear, hear.) The note to which I have just referred as agreed upon between me and the Duc de Broglie, was sent, not to Mr. Peel, but to Sir Stratford Canning, who was going to Switzerland; but he had to go through Paris on his way, in order to communicate with the French Government.

I should state that he was told, that if, on his arrival in Switzerland he found the civil war at an end, there would be no use in presenting the note, and he was to abstain from doing so. Now in the mean time, while these communications were going on between the French and British Governments, the French Government had communicated their first proposed draft of note to Russia, Austria, and Prussia; and when we came to an agreement with France for the adoption of our draft of note, the question arose whether the representatives of those three Powers, in Switzerland, would be authorized to present our note instead of the original French one; and Sir Stratford Canning wrote from Paris on the 3rd December, that he believed that the representatives of some of those Powers had not at that time authority to present our note.

Now, I am at a loss to divine how it is possible that Mr. Peel could have said, as it is alleged he did, that he would rather resign than present our note; and that to do so would be at variance with all his former instructions. Was not our offered mediation, to be accepted or rejected, as the two parties might choose? Did it imply any alternative of force? And did it not go on the basis, of a settlement of the Jesuit question according to the wishes of the majority? Did it not provide security for the Sonderbund against hostile aggression by the other cantons? And did it not thus re-establish peace, and put an end to the disputes, that threatened civil war? (Hear, hear.) Now, how it was possible that Mr. Peel could say, that such a note was at variance with the despatch of the 29th of October, and with his previous instructions, passes my comprehension *to understand.* (Hear.) I therefore wholly disbelieve that *statement.* (Hear, hear.) The only explanation I can

possibly give of it is this, that the note of which Mr. Peel and M. Bois le Comte were then talking, must have been the original French note (hear, hear); that they must have been talking of the original French note that M. Bois le Comte had seen; and if that was the note they were talking of, then Mr. Peel was right in saying, that such a note would have been at variance with his former instructions, and that he would not present it. (Hear, hear.)

Now, as to the assertion that Mr. Peel sent word to General Dufour, who was in command of the army, to make haste to finish the war, before mediation could come, I must say that I wholly disbelieve that statement. (Hear, hear.) All I can say is, that I never wrote a single syllable, private or public, that would justify such a message; and I have never had any intimation, written or verbal, that Mr. Peel ever did anything of the kind. I have been told by Sir E. Lyons, that he had a conversation on this matter with Mr. Timperley, the chaplain, who is said by M. Bois le Comte to have been the bearer of this message; and that Mr. Timperley told him that he had been sent by Mr. Peel to General Dufour's head-quarters to obtain information, but that he neither took nor delivered any such message from Mr. Peel, as that which has been asserted. I must say, that the manner in which this supposed admission is said to have been extracted from Mr. Peel, does not entitle the story to any great confidence. (Hear, hear.) I confess I would rather be the object, than the worker of a manœuvre such as that. (Loud cheers.)

Here were two Ministers, representing two great powers—France and Spain, taking advantage of the intimacy of private intercourse between them and a diplomatic agent of another power, and, by a preconcerted scheme, endeavouring to extract from him indirectly and by stratagem, an admission of something, which they thought he had privately done. But, after all, even supposing he did speak the words attributed to him, still, for aught I know, he may only have been giving them as good as they brought (laughter), and may have been mystifying them, just as they sought to entrap him. (Hear, hear.) He might have replied to them, jokingly, "Yes, gentlemen, we were quite as sharp as you were." I can only say that Mr. Peel had no authority whatever from me to take any such step. I do not believe that he did take that step; I have no ground for believing so. As far as the evidence of Sir E. Lyons and Mr. Timperley goes, it directly negatives the assertion. (Hear, hear.) We should have been glad if the proposed mediation had succeeded, because it would have restored peace to Switzerland, and *would have left* the minority in a better

position with relation to the majority. But circumstances rendered it impossible, not from any studied delays on our part, but simply by reason of the time requisite for coming to an understanding with the French Government, upon the arrangements which the Five Powers were to propose.

It is said that Switzerland is an instance of the bad effects of our interference. But Switzerland may be quoted as an instance of a country, where the principles we have advocated have led to a good result; for while almost all the surrounding nations of Europe have been more or less convulsed, the people of Switzerland have quietly effected changes which I believe to be improvements in their internal organization; and those persons who were at one time looked upon as being what the hon. member for Bridport calls "Red Republicans"—M. Ochsenbein and others—are now acknowledged to be, as in truth they always have been, lovers and maintainers of good order (cheers); and far from being revolutionists and disturbers of the public peace, they have proved themselves, not only sincere supporters of good order in their own country, but also discouragers of disorder in others; for they have gone great lengths in expelling from Switzerland persons who were justly supposed to have resorted there, for the purpose of disturbing the peace of neighbouring countries. (Cheers.)

Now, travelling from the rugged Alps (cheers and laughter) into the smiling plains of Lombardy, I find I have been accused of great injustice to the Austrian Government by withholding a certain despatch written by Prince Metternich to Count Dietrichstein. The simple facts of the case are these:—The Austrian Government sent to their ambassador here a despatch, which was to be communicated to us, inviting our opinion on certain questions connected with affairs in Italy. We answered that despatch, and we afterwards laid before Parliament the despatch and answer, in order to give Parliament a view of our opinions and intentions in regard to those important matters. Well, another despatch was received afterwards from Prince Metternich, and it is said that it contained such a denial of the imputation cast upon Austria of an intended interference in the affairs of the independent states of Italy, that we ought to have laid that also on the table of the House. It was, to a certain degree, a denial; but there were things going on, which came to our knowledge, which led us not to attach to that denial all the value it might have been perhaps entitled to. There was the occupation of Ferrara; and communications were made to Tuscany, that changes in the organization of the *Government*, and even the establishment of a national guard, *would lead* to the military occupation of the Tuscan ter-

ritory by Austria. (Hear, hear). Indeed, many things were going on in Italy which led us not to attach any vast value to the communications made to us. But if the withholding of that despatch had been considered by the Austrian Government to be such an injury to them, as it is now stated to have been, let me ask what was Count Dietrichstein doing between February and August? It was in February that the first despatches were laid before Parliament; and it was in August that the other was moved for, in the House of Lords. But if Count Dietrichstein was asleep upon his post, Prince Metternich surely had his eyes open. The despatches which we laid before Parliament in February were well known. But there was the Austrian Ambassador in this country, he, the views of whose Government it is said were misrepresented by the absence of the second despatch; what prevented him from coming to me of his own accord, or by order of his Government, any day in any week, or any week in any month, or any month in that half-year, and saying, "You are acting unjustly by us. There is another despatch in your possession, which you have not produced, and I call upon you, as an act of justice to my Government, to lay that despatch also before the two Houses of Parliament?" This course was open to him, but no such course was adopted. (Hear, hear.)

With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us, of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement, to be run at, as the fomentors of revolution. (Cheers.) It is the easiest mode of putting them down; it is the received *formula.* It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government, to say, "Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the only way of getting rid of him, is to set the world at him, by calling him a revolutionist."

Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. (Hear, hear.) In the first place, there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men, who fly to arms, who overthrow established Governments; and who recklessly, without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. (Hear, hear.) But there are revolutionists of another kind; blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human

improvement; until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent, breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth, those very institutions, which a timely application of renovating means, would have rendered strong and lasting. (Loud cheers.) Such revolutionists as these, are the men who call us revolutionists. (Cheers.) It was not to make revolutions, that Lord Minto went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties.

Then, with respect to the war in Lombardy, it is said that we ought to have prevented Sardinia from making an attack on Lombardy. A perusal of the blue books will show, that we did apply those arguments, which we thought most likely to have force with the Sardinian Government, to induce it, not to take up arms against Austria; and it was not until after the revolution had broken out in Milan, and when the Austrians were for a time defeated, and expelled from the greater part of Lombardy, in a manner which can only be accounted for, as being the result of a panic, it was not until after those events, that the King of Sardinia, being invited by the people of Lombardy, moved and went to their assistance. I do not mean to say that there is in all this, any justification, (if you look to treaties or to international rights) for the invasion of the territory of a neighbouring Sovereign. As regards right, the King of Sardinia was entirely wrong, and there is nothing to be said for him on that score. But, at the same time, there are feelings and considerations, which may at least explain conduct, which one cannot justify, and which one must condemn. He was appealed to by his Italian neighbours; the spirit of his own country was up; and he said, and not without some foundation, that if he had resisted the impulse which urged him on, that impulse might have been sufficient to overthrow his own throne. That was not a consideration which ought to weigh against the reasons and motives which should prevent the invasion of the territory of a neighbour. Nevertheless, man is man, and we ought not altogether to throw out of the account, circumstances of this kind.

Well, the Austrian Government sent a special envoy to London to ask our mediation between them and the people of Lombardy; and in the course of the communications we were told, that Austria would consent to an arrangement, the basis of which should be that, Austria should relinquish all right and title to Lombardy. Now, if Austria contemplated that result, are we to be run down for *thinking that* such an arrangement would have been conducive

to the well-understood interest of all parties concerned? We, however, thought at that time, judging from the prevailing feeling in Italy, that this arrangement would not be accepted, unless it were to include also, the relinquishment of some portion of the Venetian territory. Our opinion was borne out by what afterwards happened; for when we declined to undertake the negotiation, because the larger basis was not agreed to, the Austrian Government sent agents to Milan to offer such an arrangement, confined only to Lombardy, and the proposition was rejected as too narrow by the people of Milan, who then thought their chance better than it turned out to be. So much for the outrage we are said to have committed on our old and faithful ally by a scheme; (cheers) which was a proposal emanating from Austria herself.

Now with regard to the mission of Lord Minto, the honourable gentleman who spoke last, the member for Bridport (Mr. Cochrane), acknowledged that during his late visit to Rome he had found that Lord Minto had been invited thither by the Pope himself. It is perfectly true that Lord Minto went to Italy in consequence of a wish on the part of the Pope, conveyed to Her Majesty's Government through the Nuncio at Paris, and through other, but unofficial channels. It was not a little curious that the wish expressed by the Pope seemed to point precisely to Lord Minto, as the person to be sent to Rome. We were told that the Pope was desirous of improving the administrative institutions of his Government; but that he was thwarted in his plans, by great difficulties, from within and from without; and that he would be glad to have the assistance of some person who might aid him by advice, and at the same time, as representing England, afford him moral support. We were told that if, as was then the case, the state of our law did not admit of our sending a regularly accredited Minister to Rome, the Pope would be glad if we would send thither unofficially some confidential agent. That what was wished was, that this person should be entirely in the confidence of Her Majesty's Government; that he should be conversant with the institutions of this country; that he should be a man of rank; and if possible, a person who could combine with these qualifications, diplomatic experience. If a form of words had been to be devised, which should exactly describe Lord Minto, it could not have been done more correctly.

Accordingly Lord Minto, who was going abroad for a short time for health and recreation, was requested by Her Majesty's Government to proceed to Rome; and to Rome he went, taking Turin, and Florence in his way; with

instructions to give both at Turin and Florence, if consulted by the Governments, and asked to do so, such advice in regard to internal improvements and reforms, as his judgment and experience might suggest.

But neither at Turin, nor at Florence, nor at Rome, did Lord Minto advise the immediate establishment of representative and parliamentary government. He well knew that the foundations must be well laid, before you can raise the superstructure; and that good municipal institutions, and the reform of many practical abuses, and especially a sound administration of justice, were necessary as preliminary measures. His advice as far as it was adopted, bore good fruit; and if it had been more fully acted upon, and if no unexpected events had happened elsewhere, his visit to Italy would have been attended with still greater advantage to that country.

When Lord Minto was at Rome, a civil war had broken out between Sicily and the King of Naples. Both parties had applied to Lord Napier, then our *chargé d'affaires* at Naples, to mediate between them. The Sicilians founded their application upon the former connexion between England and Sicily, and upon the share which the British Government had had, in the remodelling of the Sicilian Constitution in 1812. The Neapolitan Government founded their application upon the well-known interest which has always been taken by the British Government, in the welfare of the kingdom of Naples. Lord Napier, however, did not undertake the office. He said to the Neapolitan Ministers, that he would willingly go to Palermo, and endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the Sicilians and the Neapolitan Government, if he could be authorized to propose to the Sicilians, such conditions of arrangement, as he thought they would be likely to accept. The Neapolitan Government was not willing at that time to authorize such proposals, and Lord Napier did not go to Palermo. But afterwards the King of Naples, hearing that Lord Minto was at Rome, expressed a wish that he should come to Naples. Her Majesty's Government had not originally intended, that Lord Minto should go further than Rome; but in consequence of a conversation which I had in December, 1847, with Prince Castelcicala, I had sent Lord Minto instructions to go on to Naples, if he should receive through Lord Napier an intimation, that the Neapolitan Government wished him to do so. He did receive such an intimation, first through Lord Napier, and afterwards by a messenger who was specially sent to him by the Neapolitan Government, and who met him on the road between Rome and Naples.

The object he had in view, and the mission which, when he arrived, he was requested to undertake, was to employ his good offices, to effect a reconciliation between the Sicilians and the Neapolitan Government.

The reply which he gave to those who asked him to undertake the task, was, that he would go to Palermo with pleasure, if he had a fair prospect of being able to do good; but he said, he knew something of Sicily; and he forewarned the Neapolitan Government, that unless he was authorized to offer certain conditions to the Sicilians, his going to Palermo would be of no use whatever. He did all that man could do, to induce the Neapolitan Government to accede to those terms. He was engaged on one occasion, from five o'clock in the afternoon, till one in the morning, in deliberation with the King and the Ministers, discussing the arrangements to be proposed to the Sicilians; and then, forsooth, we are accused, of uncalled-for interference in the affairs of Sicily. The result was, that he was authorized to propose an arrangement which the Sicilians might reasonably have been urged to accept; and to Palermo, with that arrangement he went.

Oh, but it has been said, Lord Minto went to Palermo, not to do a service to the King of Naples, but to inflict a treacherous wrong, by secretly encouraging the Sicilians to separate Sicily from the Crown of Naples. Well, what happened? He knew that the conditions of which he was the bearer, fell short of the demands of the extreme party in Sicily; those terms were a compromise, and involved concessions to be made by both sides. He had represented that it was of great importance, that these proposals should not be known in Sicily, till he should arrive there, and be able to explain to the leaders, the reasons which would make it wise to accept them. On his arrival in Sicily he found that the Neapolitan Government had already made these conditions known in Palermo; and that those conditions had already been canvassed, discussed, run down, and condemned by both parties at Palermo. Still, however, if nothing else had happened, he might perhaps have succeeded in the object of his mission. But just at this moment arrived the news of the French revolution. This was a spark that set fire to all the combustible matter throughout Italy. No wonder that the news turned the heads of the Sicilians, and made them suddenly determine no longer to acknowledge the King of Naples as their sovereign.

Lord Minto on reaching Palermo, was told of this new determination, and was at the same time informed, that it was the intention of the Sicilians to receive him with great honour, as the representative of a power, that was going to support them in their independence. Lord Minto, however,

said, that he came on the part of the King, of Naples and of Sicily, and unless he were received by the Sicilians as subjects of that sovereign, he would go back to Naples. In deference to his wishes the Sicilians consented to discuss an arrangement based on the principle of security for their liberties, combined with allegiance to the King of Naples. Was that a revolutionary proceeding? (Hear, hear.) Negotiations followed, but the Sicilians unfortunately would not accept the terms, and they were certainly good ones, offered them by the King of Naples. Upon this statement of facts, was not Lord Napier justified in saying, in July following, that the English Government had been acting a friendly part towards the King of Naples? (Hear, hear.)

Then it has been made a matter of complaint, that the English Government made known to the King of Sardinia, that if the Duke of Genoa were chosen King of Sicily, and were in actual possession of the Crown—not if it were merely accepted by him as has been represented (hear, hear,)—he would be acknowledged by England. It was at that time the opinion, not of England alone, but of the Neapolitan Government itself, that the King of Naples had no chance of recovering possession of Sicily. The Neapolitan Minister in this country was instructed to express, on the part of his Government, a hope, that the English Government would not prematurely acknowledge the independence and separation of Sicily; but would wait till the whole of the island had declared itself for separation. Now, would it have been wise and right on our part to acknowledge the Duke of Genoa as King of Sicily? On that point I expect to have the approval of hon. gentlemen opposite. Events indeed have shown that the opinion then entertained as to the probable result of the war in Sicily was incorrect; but it was then generally thought, that the King of Naples had no chance of re-establishing his authority in that island. The choice then lay between a monarchical and a republican form of Government for Sicily as a separate State. Looking merely to the interest of the King of Naples, independently of other reasons, it was desirable that there should not be a republic established in immediate neighbourhood of the Kingdom of Naples; and the King of Naples himself was not insensible to that consideration. The offer, however, made by the Sicilians to the Sardinian Government, that the Duke of Genoa should become King of Sicily, led to no result.

Under these circumstances, I am justified in denying that the policy which we pursued in Italy, was that, of *exciting* revolutions, and then abandoning the victims we *had deluded*. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, I main-

tain that we gave advice calculated to prevent revolutions, by reconciling opposite parties, and conflicting views. Ours was a policy of improvement and of peace; and therefore the Government deserves, not condemnation, but praise. (Hear, hear.)

We have been told, however, that if it had not been for the war in Lombardy, the *indispensable* interference of Russia in Hungary, would not have taken place. What might have happened, if that which did happen, had not happened, I cannot undertake to say. (Hear, and laughter.) But when I look at the deep-seated causes of contention between Hungary and the Austrian Government; when I look to the comparative resources and power of the conflicting parties; I cannot persuade myself that even if a part of Radetzki's army had been available for the war in Hungary, and the whole of it could not have been sent thither, the aid, the *indispensable* aid, as it has been termed, of Russia, (hear, and laughter), would not still have been required. I, therefore, do not feel that the English Government is chargeable with any of the bloodshed which resulted from that Hungarian contest.

With respect to the questions which arose last autumn about Turkey, no blame has been imputed to Her Majesty's Government for the course which we pursued on that occasion, in answer to the appeal made by Turkey to this country and to France, for moral and material assistance. On that point all parties are agreed. It is a proud and honourable recollection which Englishmen may treasure up, that on an occasion like that, all party differences were merged in high and generous national feeling; and that men of all sides concurred in thinking, that the Government of the Queen would not have been justified in rejecting an appeal so made, on such a subject.

But it has been said that we ought to have confined our interference, at first, to sending a despatch, and that we should not have sent our fleet until we knew whether our despatches would produce the desired effect. That would have been a very imprudent and unwise course of proceeding. The agents of the Two Imperial Governments at Constantinople had used most menacing language to the Porte; had demanded the surrender of the refugees in the most peremptory manner; (hear, hear,) and had said, that if they did not receive a categorical answer within a limited time, they would suspend diplomatic relations. In short, they intimated that a refusal of their demands might lead to war. We had no means at the time of knowing whether this violent and peremptory language was or was not authorized by the Courts of Russia and of Austria; and

whether those Governments were prepared to enforce by actual hostilities the threat so held out. It was impossible to say what might occur in the interval between the 6th and the 26th of October; between the day when the despatches of the British Government were sent off to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, and the day when, if it were necessary on the receipt of the answers to send a fleet, that fleet, sent only after the answers were received, could reach the place where its services might be required. (Cheers.) The Government did, what men of prudence would do, who mean to do that which they profess. (Loud cheers.)

But it has been said that the sending of this fleet was a threat against Russia and Austria. I utterly deny that the sending of the fleet was a threat against either the one or the other. A fleet at the Dardanelles was not a threat against Austria. If it had been in the Adriatic, it might have been so regarded. A fleet in the Mediterranean was not a threat against Russia. Had it forced its way through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and had gone up to the Black Sea, and had anchored off Sebastopol, it might have been so considered. But a fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles could be a threat against nobody; it must be manifest to the world that it could only be a symbol and source of support to the Sultan. (Loud cheers.) It was a measure purely of defence, and not a measure of offence.

But then we are told that our fleet, by anchoring within the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, violated, not the treaty of Unkiar 'Skelessi, as was said by mistake, but the treaty of London, concluded in July, 1841, between the Five Powers and Turkey, with respect to the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The British Government are accused of violating that treaty by ordering Sir W. Parker to enter the Dardanelles.

Now by the treaty of 1809, between England and Turkey, England bound herself to respect the rule of the Turkish empire, by which, while Turkey is at peace, the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are closed against the ships of war of foreign powers. But it was not till the treaty of 1841, that the same engagement was also taken by all the other Four Powers. I concur entirely with the right hon. baronet (Sir Jas. Graham) in thinking that this was a wise and politic arrangement, eminently advantageous to Turkey, and conducive to the peace of Europe. Because when it is considered how easy it would be, if these narrow straits were open to the armed ships of other countries in times of peace, for any maritime power, when *she had* a discussion of any kind with the Turkish Government, to support the friendly representations of her Minister

at Constantinople by the, of course, accidental visit of a large fleet off the Seraglio point—whether the fleet came from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, it appears essential for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, that no armed vessels of other powers should, when the Porte is at peace, be allowed to enter either of those Straits.

By the Treaty of July, 1841, Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, all bound themselves to respect that regulation of the Porte. It so happens, however, that that treaty did not specify precisely what those Straits are, whether they comprise the whole distance between the Mediterranean and the sea of Marmora, and the whole distance between the sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, or whether they consist only of such portion of those channels as are technically called the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles. At the entrance of the Dardanelles from the Mediterranean, there is a broad bay between the outer and the inner castles, and it is from the inner castles to the Sea of Marmora that the channel continues narrow. At the inner castles reside the Consuls; and it is there that tolls are taken from vessels passing; and there the firmans are delivered to allow vessels to pass up. In regulations established by the Porte in 1843 it was stated in general terms, that foreign ships of war and merchantmen should be admitted to this bay between the outer and inner castles for safe anchorage, and to wait there to know whether they would be allowed to go further. When the fleet under Sir W. Parker arrived at Besica Bay, which is on the coast of Asia Minor, the Turkish Government, who expressed great gratitude to Sir S. Canning for the arrival of our fleet, stated an apprehension that the anchorage in Besica Bay, in certain states of wind and weather was not safe for large ships; and they offered to send an authority to admit the fleet under Sir W. Parker, and not only it, but the French fleet also, into the outer anchorage of the Dardanelles, at times when it would be dangerous for them to remain at Besica Bay. That was communicated to the British consul at the Dardanelles, and to the Turkish Pasha in command there.

A week or ten days after Sir W. Parker had arrived at Besica Bay, the wind coming on to blow from the quarter from which it made that open anchorage insecure, Sir William Parker went with his squadron to Barber's Bay, the anchorage between the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles. But I had written to Sir Stratford Canning specially to desire that in order to avoid all cavil and discussions, the fleet should not enter the Dardanelles, unless wanted at Constantinople for *the purposes* for which it was sent.

Sir Stratford Canning accordingly communicated with Sir William Parker, and after the squadron had remained a week or ten days in Barber's Bay to refit, it left that anchorage, and returned to Besica Bay, with the understanding that if stress of weather should again drive it thence, it should not return to Barber's Bay, but should seek shelter elsewhere.

The Russian and Austrian Governments afterwards made representations both to the Porte and to Her Majesty's Government on this matter; stating that they considered the entrance of the British fleet into Barber's Bay as a contravention of the Treaty of July, 1841. It might have been contended that the presence of the British fleet in the outer bay was not a violation of what was intended by the treaty; because the treaty bound the Five Powers to conform to the regulations of the Porte in regard to the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and the standing regulations of the Porte admitted ships of war, as well as merchantmen, to enter into and remain in Barber's Bay, and to wait there for a decision whether they could be allowed to go farther up or not. But the Government did not think it wise, right, or proper to take their stand on so narrow a ground. Having desired that the treaty of July, 1841, should be concluded, they thought it better to adopt the strictest interpretation of that treaty, the interpretation put upon it by Russia, that the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be held to mean the whole distance between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora on the one side, and between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmora on the other; so that if British ships of war should not enter the bay between the inner and outer castles of the Dardanelles on the one side, Russian ships of war should not, on the other hand, be allowed to anchor at Buyukdere in the Bosphorus, where merchant ships from the Black Sea are in the custom of stopping. (Hear, hear.) It is needless to mention that this prohibition does not apply to light ships, such as corvettes and steamers, employed for the missions at Constantinople; the firman of the Porte being first obtained for their passing.

I believe I have now gone through (loud cheers) all the heads of the charges which have been brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that the foreign policy of the Government, in all the transactions with respect to which its conduct has been impugned, has throughout been guided by those principles which, according to the resolution of the hon. and learned gentleman, ought to regulate the *conduct of* the Government of England in the management *of our foreign affairs.* (Cheers.) I believe that the princi-

ples on which we have acted are those which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. (Cheers.) I am convinced these principles are calculated, so far as the influence of England may properly be exercised with respect to the destinies of other countries, to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civilization, to the welfare and happiness of mankind. (Cheers.)

I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters the means of attack upon Her Majesty's Ministers. The government of a great country like this, is undoubtedly an object of fair and legitimate ambition to men of all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy and to influence the destinies of such a country; and, if ever it was an object of honourable ambition, more than ever must it be so at the moment at which I am speaking (cheers). For while we have seen, as stated by the right hon. baronet, the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side—while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled; institutions overthrown and destroyed—while in almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean; this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind. (Loud cheers.)

We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual freedom is reconcilable with obedience to the law. (Hear, hear.) We have shown the example of a nation, in which every class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it; while at the same time every individual of each class, is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale,—not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality; but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties, with which his Creator has endowed him. (Loud cheers.) To govern such a people as this, is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land; and therefore I find no fault with those, who may think any opportunity a fair one, for endeavouring to place themselves in so distinguished and honourable a position. (Cheers.) But I contend that we have not in our foreign policy done anything to forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not, perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the opinions of one person or of another—and hard indeed it is, as we all know by our individual and private experience, to find any number of men agreeing entirely in any matter, on which they may not

be equally possessed of the details of the facts, and circumstances, and reasons, and conditions which led to action. But making allowance for those differences of opinion which may fairly and honourably arise among those who concur in general views; I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question now brought before it; whether the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad (hear, hear,) are proper and fitting guides for those, who are charged with the Government of England; and whether, as the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say "*Civis Romanus sum*;" so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident, that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and wrong. (The noble lord on resuming his seat was greeted with loud and prolonged cheering.)

THE

Danubian Principalities:

CLAIMS TO INDEPENDENCE CONSIDERED.

BY

CHARLES BLIND.

.... Some neighbouring nation
Hath stuff'd these hollow vessels with their power,
To beat us down ....

SHAKSPERE.

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Our utmost care has been used to make this short retrospect of facts correct. If the popular sources of information have ever deceived us, our apology is, that they are the best which exist, and that Secret Diplomacy chooses to throw darkness over its own deeds. At the same time, the general facts are too public, and many documents too definite, to enable us to hope that in any great or material point the case is more favourable to our Ministers than we have here narrated.

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THE

AUSTRIAN ALLIANCE.

It is matter of recent memory, that in the affairs of Bosnia and of Montenegro, Austria was the bitter and dangerous enemy of the Turks. In the autumn of 1852, the Emperors of Russia and of Austria had many secret interviews, which were fully discerned, by others than professional statesmen, to involve projects hostile to the Sultan, or (as a well-known humourist of the day graphically expressed it), a scheme to "finish the *Porte*" together. This opinion was not confined to any one class of politicians, and it was afterwards confirmed by Sir G. Hamilton Seymour, in a secret despatch since published. It may not be amiss here to quote Sir George's words. On February 21st, 1853, he wrote, concerning the Czar: "The sovereign who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour—if not *of* its dissolution, yet *for* its dissolution—is at hand. This assumption would hardly be ventured, *unless some intimate understanding existed between Russia and Austria.*"

Again, on March 9th, 1853, he wrote: "Three points appear to me to be *fully established* by the imperial memorandum:—*the existence of some distinct understanding between the two imperial courts* upon the subject of Turkey," &c. . . "Assuming, as a certain and *now acknowledged* fact, the existence of an understanding or compact between the two Emperors as to Turkish affairs, it becomes of the deepest importance to know the extent of the engagements entered into between them. . . Its basis was, no doubt, laid *at some of the meetings between the sovereigns which took place in the autumn;* and the scheme has probably been worked out since, under the management of Baron Meyendorff, the Russian envoy

at the Austrian court, who has been passing the winter at St. Petersburg, and is still here."

Thus warned, the English ministry nevertheless, when the Czar had invaded the soil of Turkey, adopted Vienna as the centre of mediation between Russia and the Porte. Baron MEYENDORFF was at that time at Vienna, and is closely connected with the Austrian minister. The celebrated Vienna note, which all but ruined the Sultan's cause, was the result. Nothing saved him from his own allies but the eagerness of Russia to follow up the advantage, when our determination to preserve "peace at any price," seemed to her to have been fully ascertained. NESSELRODE, by acknowledging the Turkish interpretation of the note to be correct, rescued the Sultan from his false position.

Such was the first result of our attempt to admit Austria into our councils; yet, unwarned even by experience, the ABERDEEN Ministry has obstinately persevered in the same course. At the present crisis, it is suitable to review more minutely the series of affairs in reference to Austria, in order to judge whether a Ministry which pursues such a course of policy deserves the confidence of the nation.

We will not go back to the affairs of Bosnia, where revolt was stirred up by Austrian intrigue. Suffice to say, that towards the close of 1852, *just after the conferences between the two eastern Emperors*, Montenegro revolted, and obtained more than sympathy from Austria. The Montenegrins surprised a Turkish fort in profound peace, and cut off the heads of two to three hundred Turks. Austrian officers are stated to have been in the country, to advise, encourage, drill, and direct the rebels. OMER PACHA was sent by the Sultan against them, and on the 7th of January, 1853, assembled his army at Scutari, on the southern frontier of Montenegro. Upon this, several Austrian battalions in Italy received orders to march into Dalmatia, and the Vice-President of the Montenegrin Senate proceeded to St. Petersburg, *via* Trieste, to ask aid from the Czar, who for years past has openly defrayed more than half of the Montenegrin Government expenses. Respecting the conduct and sympathies of Austria, we extract the following from a journal remarkably free from any defined party spirit (*Illustrated London News*, Jan. 22nd, 1853):—

The Austrian journals declaim against the Turkish expedition to Montenegro, and the employment of Omer Pacha, who is termed *the irreconcileable enemy* of the empire; the ground of Austrian indignation against the Turkish general being, that he foiled all the intrigues of Austria and of Austrian agents in Bosnia. The Austrian journals openly accuse *perfidious Albion* of spiriting on the Moslems to the attack of

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Montenegro. General Baron Kellner, adjutant of the Emperor of Austria, and General Mamula, governor of Dalmatia, have arrived at Cattaro, an Austrian port at the foot of the Montenegrin territory.

As to the moral rights of the Turco-Montenegrin question, we might be diffident, had we not the joint testimony of Sir G. H. SEYMOUR and of the Czar. The former, in his secret despatch, of February 22nd, 1853, writes:—

I ventured to remark that the wrongs were at least divided between the Turks and Montenegrins, and that *I had full reason for believing that the provocation came from the latter.* The Emperor, with more impartiality than I had expected, admitted that there had been wrongs on both sides; that certainly the mountaineers were addicted to brigandage, and *that the taking of Djablak had caused him great indignation.*

Nevertheless, at this very time, the Czar had as his representative in Montenegro, the Colonel KOVALEFSKY, to drill and organise the mountaineers; and as soon as OMER PACHA entered Montenegro, the Austrian court sent LEININGEN on a special mission, who, reaching Constantinople on January 30th, 1853, denounced war on the Sultan, if the Turkish forces were not withdrawn. We gather from the Emperor NICHOLAS'S excuses for this act, in Sir G. H. SEYMOUR'S letters, of February 22nd and April 20th, what was the pretence; viz.: the *cause of humanity;* the dread lest OMER PACHA should "exterminate" the Montenegrins; the false assertion that "they were threatened with utter devastation." (Just so, in January, 1849, the cause of humanity and the fiction of BEM'S "atrocities" were used to justify the Russian invasion of Transylvania.) Yet, in their behaviour to the revolted Greeks and to those Wallachians who had sided with Russia, the Turks have shown that they forgive enemies far better than either of the Christian emperors.

On February 3rd, LEININGEN presented his ultimatum, and demanded an answer, Yes or No, to each point, within five days. Unsupported by the Western Powers, the Sultan's Cabinet drew up a most conciliatory reply, and sent orders to OMER PACHA to withdraw instantly from Montenegro. The settlement between Austria and Turkey is reported as follows:—"The reëstablishment of the integrity of Montenegro," (yet the integrity had never been threatened;) "suspension of hostilities, political refugees in OMER PACHA'S army to be sent into the interior;" (it was pretended that they would inoculate the Austrian territories with disaffection;) "*possession of Klek and Sutonia guaranteed to Austria;* protection assured to the Christians of Bosnia," (which protection

the Sultan had, in fact, supported by OMER PACHA's arms against refractory Mussulmans;) "*the right of entry at three per cent. reëstablished between Austria and Bosnia;* and *the Sublime Porte to pay four million piastres to Austria as indemnity.*" Who would not imagine that Austria had been actually at war, and that Bosnia, as well as Montenegro, had been in question? As a comment on the whole, the Montenegrins, during the peaceable retreat of OMER PACHA, attacked his rear-guard, defeated DERVIS PACHA with much slaughter, and captured six thousand florins; but the Sultan was forced to leave the mountaineers to impunity, or his difficulties with Austria would have recurred. Two Austrian officers, volunteers in Montenegro, received Austrian decorations for their brave conduct. And this is the Austria whom we have been pressing on the Porte as a friend and ally!

We happen to know, that when first the troubles from Montenegro arose, refugees among us, well versed in the craft of the Eastern despots, distinctly declared that Austria was feeling the pulse of the West *for Russia.* Said they,—"Just as in January, 1849, the Czar, before venturing on a bolder game, first tried the temper of Turkey and of England, by sending into Transylvania ten to twenty thousand men, under pretence that the Saxon towns themselves called on them in the cause of humanity; so now, if England and France, thinking Montenegro a little country, do not support the Sultan against Austria, Russia will presently make *her* move."

And so it proved. The news of the diplomatic victory of Austria had no sooner reached St. Petersburg, than Prince MENCHIKOFF was sent to Constantinople. On March 2nd, he paid his official visit to the Grand Vizier, but pointedly omitted the same usual compliment to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the able FUAD EFFENDI, who, in consequence, resigned his post.

After this, none can reasonably doubt that Austria and Russia were, in the strictest sense, *accomplices* against Turkey, and playing into one another's hands; and that the Czar was right in saying to Sir G. H. SEYMOUR, "What pleases me, pleases Austria." As to FUAD EFFENDI, he was hated by Russia, because he had made a concession to France concerning the Holy Places: probably also, because, in 1848 and 1849, he had been unmanageable by Russian intrigue, when their armies occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, and used those provinces and their resources for war against Hungary. The despatches in our Blue Book of Hungary exhibit FUAD EFFENDI in an honourable light; and in quelling the revolts in Thessaly, he has shown energy and humanity combined. However, the Sultan's Cabinet was dismayed

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at MENCHIKOFF's insolence, and FUAD's resignation was accepted.

All must see, that a state which allows its ministers to be expelled by a foreign power, is already enslaved; and assuredly, England would regard it as an unendurable insult, if her ally, the French Emperor, were even to hint his desire of Lord CLARENDON's resignation. Unhappily, the offence, begun so insolently by MENCHIKOFF, has been continued by the Western Powers, who have ejected one minister of the Sultan after another, until they could attain such as would be supple towards Austria. But this topic will occur below.

RIFAAT PACHA, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, was reported likely to yield to the demands of Russia. The whole affair was deeply wounding to the Turks, who were still more affected when Admiral DUNDAS declined to obey the call of Colonel ROSE, to bring his fleet toward the Dardanelles. It was too clear that the Sultan's Cabinet were terrified into yielding up the independence of the country; that their Western Allies were no support, and the Turks must trust to themselves. The French Government, indeed, was on the alert, and instantly ordered the French fleet eastward; but it was recalled at the protest of Lord ABERDEEN. This fact is cardinal concerning the English Ministry. Up to this date they had a valid excuse for timidity, in the extreme uncertainty what warlike designs LOUIS NAPOLEON was cherishing. But from the day that the French fleets were ordered so zealously to the Dardanelles, it was manifest that in supporting the just cause of Turkey we had no longer anything to fear from France.

In these critical affairs, the ABERDEEN cabinet thought it needful to bestir themselves to win the friendship of Austria. Their mode was, by seizing Mr. HALE's rockets, and endeavouring to implicate KOSSUTH in a charge of felony. An article in *The Times*, notoriously from the pen of a gentleman in the office of the Privy Council, insolently triumphed in the hope that KOSSUTH would shortly be committed to Newgate. But the charge vanished into smoke, ridicule, discredit, and disgust against the Ministry.

Meanwhile Austria combined with Russia to demand the expulsion of the refugees in Turkey; and five Italians were ordered to quit Smyrna. After this came the MENCHIKOFF ultimatum, of May 5th, which was at length rejected by the Porte. An open breach having taken place, and Russia preparing immediate invasion, the Vienna papers, in June, announced that "the good offices of Austria with the Porte had been accepted by Russia!" Austria, the tool and accomplice of Russia, volunteered to be sole mediator, but refused (as Lord JOHN RUSSELL

stated in Parliament on August 16th) to join the conference of the other powers. However, when the occupation of the Principalities followed, and England and France entered into serious joint consultation, the Czar avowed that he would accept no proposals except from Austria, and Austria suddenly discovered that *all* the powers concerned in the treaty of 1841 must confer. A note was already drawn at Paris. It was now transferred to Vienna, amended there, approved by Russia, concealed from the Sultan, adopted by the Four Powers, and finally pressed on the Porte. Men so acute as those in the two Western Cabinets, could not have fallen into blunders so portentous, had they not been led astray by false aims. By committing an act of war, the Czar had forfeited all rights of treaty; he therefore pretended not to be at war, *in order that* he might still appeal to the treaties. (These were Lord PALMERSTON'S words to a deputation, in October, 1853.) The Western Cabinets allowed him to do this, and even aided him in it. Again, he seized the territory of Turkey, *avowedly* that he might negociate to advantage: they eagerly proceeded to yield to him that advantage, instead of declining the negociation until he should have evacuated the Principalities. Lord CLARENDON has himself explained, more than once, that fear of European revolutions (that is to say, tenderness to Austria), was and is his main principle. Hereby the Four Powers were made the mere tool of Russia, who played on them through Austria, to the great peril of the Sultan.

Diplomacy has not revealed how much damage was done by the Austrians to the original Parisian note; but on one point we may be pretty confident. The original note must have contained a distinct demand of the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, which, as late as August 8th, Lord CLARENDON avowed to be a "*sine qua non* of any negociation whatever." Great was the disgust of Europe to find that no word of this was contained in the note. *It must have been blotted out by the Austrians.* This is a warning how we shall fare with such Ministers, if Austria has a voice in settling the terms of peace.

While the Russian embroilment was arising, the Austrian Government was pursuing a most hostile course to the Sultan. Their consul at Smyrna hired Greek desperadoes to seize and carry off a Hungarian refugee—Mr. COSTA, an incipient American citizen, who, after narrowly escaping being stabbed and drowned, was rescued from an Austrian vessel by the intrepidity of the American Captain INGRAHAM. A very similar affair took place at Beyroot, where an Austrian ship carried off by violence a Hungarian, who jumped into the sea, and was claimed by the American consul. Such coincidences are no accident.

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Joined with the stormy behaviour of Baron BRUCK, the Austrian internuncio at Constantinople, they prove that Austria thought this a convenient time to humiliate the Sultan, by usurping the executive of Turkey in the rudest and most piratical form. This is but a counterpart to the scenes which preceded the partition of Poland. In each instance the obvious aim was, to accustom the subjects to see the existing authority set at nought, and also to terrify that authority into submission.

Simultaneously, Austrian battalions, one after another, with great munitions of war, complete as for a campaign, were sent without cessation toward the frontier of Servia. To mark still more pointedly the hostile aims of the Austrians, the son of Prince MILOSCH, pretender to the princedom of Servia, was brought down by them to the frontier. ALEXANDER, the Reigning Prince, after a vain expostulation with the Austrian Court, called out the militia, appealed to the representatives of England and France, and referred to the Porte for orders. The Servians responded to his call with the greatest zeal. Bullets were cast, swords were sharpened, even young girls practised firing, and the Prince received addresses of devotedness from all parts. An army of observation was assembled on his frontier: meanwhile the Sultan concentrated troops in Bosnia, and decided to repel by force any attempt of the Austrians to enter Servia.

With indignation and shame we reflect, that while all this was going on, the Western Powers were allowing Austria to be mediator and referee between Turkey and Russia, refusing to suspend the Vienna conference, or to protest against the hostile conduct of Austria, for which there was no reason existing or pretended, except the obvious desire to paralyse the Sultan's forces, all of which were wanted against the Russian invaders. The Servians were able to afford him 80,000 men, and no one has a right to say that they would not have done so, but for the threats and intrigues of Austria. Ultimately, they replied to the Porte, that they could not give aid against the Emperor of Russia, *because he was their co-religionist.* This has been believed too literally. They feared to assign the deeper reason—they were afraid of Austrian invasion. But this reply was most acceptable to Austria, as giving her, next year, a pretext for offering to invade Servia *in the interests of the Sultan*, a portent not dreamed of before the battles of Oltenitza and Citate. When it was found that the Austrian intrigues had won over the ambassadors, and that the Sultan's Cabinet was beginning to vacillate, the Servian Government at length, on April 17th, 1854, addressed a most energetic protest to the Porte; in which they say:—"Even admitting that the

Russians should attempt to enter Servia, the entrance of the Austrians would be a very unfortunate measure. The Servian nation entertains *so great a distrust* not to say *pronounced hatred* of Austria, that *the whole action of the Servians would be turned against the Austrian troops*, and all the energy of the nation would be employed against this enemy, *in whom is seen the personification of a grasping ambition.*" How blank was the ignorance, or how gross the treachery, of those Western statesmen, who could wink at the Austrian 90,000 men threatening the Servian frontier, and calmly continue their Vienna note, and other endless palavering, without giving one mark of lessened cordiality to Austria! No wonder that they refused information to Parliament. Did they know? or did they not know? that Austria was threatening Servia, and depriving the Sultan, not only of 50 or 80 thousand good Servian troops, but of 30 to 50 thousand Turks beside, who, with all their cannon, were kept in reserve, for fear of an Austrian invasion? If they did not know, they were preternaturally blind; if they saw and knew, what name fitly denotes their conduct toward the Sultan, the pretended object of their solicitude?

Affairs so scandalous and alarming were called *treachery and betrayal* by the unsophisticated Turks, whose excitement became intense. It was generally said by European observers, that if the Sultan accepted the Vienna note, he would be dethroned. Indeed, it was reported that on September 12th a deputation of the Ulema waited on him, to demand that he would either declare war or abdicate. Certainly a petition, signed in English fashion, was widely circulated, requesting him either to declare war or make an honourable peace. All true patriots felt the conduct of the Western Powers to be quite unendurable.

Russian diplomacy is as acute as ever. It had fully discerned how the *cabinets* would be minded, and it had worked them to do its will. There was only one thing which NESSELRODE had not calculated, (and by this one error he spoiled his work,)—he had not understood, as despots never understand, the spirit of *peoples*. The Turkish people did not allow the Sultan to yield, and the English people were universally disgusted by the Vienna conferences. Hardly ever has there been in the English press such an unanimity: even *The Times* abandoned the Vienna note to scorn. It was rejected by the Turks, and condemned by Europe: our Ministry incurred deep dishonour, and Lord CLARENDON fell into alarm not of the Russian armies, but—of the spirit of the Turkish people.

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Composed as society is in Turkey, all patriotism has a religious tinge. The Christians have no "country" but their church, and the Turkish state is founded on religion. Necessarily, therefore, the patriotic call to resist Russia came loudest and strongest from that party of Moslems, whose religion is of the more old-fashioned cast. RESCHID PACHA, then Foreign Secretary, was leader of the moderates, and has been eminently serviceable in the great reforms by which Christians are gradually receiving the successive rights of citizenship. Deeply anxious that no fanaticism should disgrace the Turkish cause, he unawares threw dishonour on his co-religionists by very needlessly representing to the English and French ambassadors that he had *fears for the safety of the European Christians*, whom the Government might not be strong enough to protect. In consequence, four vessels were detached from the combined fleets and came into the harbour of Constantinople, to receive on board any European Christians who might be in danger. But no violence followed. On the 26th September, the Grand Council voted for war, and war was actually decreed by the Sultan on the 4th of October, which happened to be the first day of the Turkish (lunar) year. The enthusiasm of the people poured into a loyal and healthful channel, and every true friend of Turkey ought to have wished that that enthusiasm may be lasting.

Lord CLARENDON has told us that such was not his view: nor was such the view of the French Cabinet. In fact, on the very day that the Sultan declared war, the French Minister, DROUYN DE L'HUYS wrote a despatch (sanctioned by Lord CLARENDON) to explain for what purpose the fleets were at length to enter the Dardanelles, viz., *not* to make war upon Russia, but, to display the intimate concord of France and England, and "to save the Sultan from having recourse to *religious enthusiasm* and *fatal auxiliaries*." Both of the Western Powers dreaded lest the Sultan should excite the religious enthusiasm of the Turks. What did this mean? Lest he should stir them into a fanaticism against Christians in general? Impossible: for the *fatal auxiliaries* intended are the Christian Hungarians, Poles, and Italians. The proof of this is complete; and it shows that *religious enthusiasm* is merely a diplomatic phrase for libelling patriotic spirit. Lord CLARENDON, in a later dispatch, December 24th,—written after the victory of Oltenitza and after the calamity of Sinope,—speaks of the Turkish national spirit as a quality dangerous to the peace of Europe which it is essential that the Western Powers should keep under control. He is writing to Lord COWLEY, our ambassador at Paris, and explains

why, in case of allying themselves to Turkey, the Western Powers must secure a right to dictate to the Sultan terms of peace which they think good enough for him; viz., *because* they cannot permit the peace of Europe to be dependent on the national spirit of the Turks, which is evidently now beyond the Sultan's control. He might seem to think that the Turks were the authors of the war. This very strange view is explained by a letter of Lord CLARENDON, on March 23rd, 1853, in the celebrated Secret Correspondence. He is addressing Sir G. H. SEYMOUR, and says:—

Her Majesty's Government desire to uphold the Turkish empire, from their conviction that no great question can be agitated in the East without becoming a source of discord in the West; and that every great question in the West will assume a revolutionary character, and embrace a revision of the entire social system, for which the continental governments are certainly in no state of preparation. The Emperor [Nicholas] is fully cognizant of the materials that are in constant fermentation beneath the surface of society.....[and that] the first cannon-shot may be a signal for a state of things more disastrous even than those calamities which war inevitably brings in its train. But such a war would be the result of the dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish empire; and hence the anxiety of her Majesty's Government to avert the catastrophe.

If this paragraph is carefully studied, in connexion with the date, it will be seen that, under diplomatic generalizations and smoothness of phrase, is concealed a train of thought, which, expressed with common straightforwardness would run thus:—

We can assure the Emperor Nicholas, that we care as little as he can about the Turkish empire for its own sake. But we foresee, that *discord* is inevitable between the Eastern Emperors and the Emperor of the French (who has already been too active in sending his fleet eastward), if the two former, as hitherto, take common counsel to partition Turkey, and shut France out: and since France alone cannot otherwise contend against them both, she will arouse the *revolutionary elements* in Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Bohemia, Italy, and *involve all the German Princes in a struggle for which they are certainly in no state of preparation.* The overthrow of the German monarchies would be a calamity far greater than the worst calamities of war. It is *not* European war which in itself her Majesty's Government so much deprecates, as the advantage which it would give to five nations which are in irreconcileable hostility with their rulers; and *hence* our anxiety to prevent the Emperor of Russia from aggressions, which otherwise, as in the case of Hungary, would "seem to demand from us no particular expression of opinion."

In the opinion of at least two of our Ministers the Czar has done no honour to "the word of a gentleman." The English public also have found from the Secret Correspondence less truthfulness in our Ministers than could have been wished. To lay no stress on mere

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flatteries, however gross, we see that on March 23rd Lord CLARENDON elaborately explained to the Czar why he deprecated "the dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish empire." Yet, on January 31st, 1854, if we may believe our journals, he avowed in the House of Lords: "During the early part of last year we had no ground for feeling any distrust in the conduct of Russia." . . It was only after the conclusion of that [MENCHIKOFF'S first] settlement, that we became aware, for the first time, that other and ulterior objects were sought by Prince MENCHIKOFF." Thus, he tells us, he did not know till May 5th the design of dismembering Turkey, which he had gravely dissuaded on March 23rd! May we suspect that this forgetfulness rose out of the fact, that, not suspecting that this Secret Correspondence would ever come before the public, he neglected to refresh his memory by perusing it?

Whatever the explanation, we must admit that Lord CLARENDON has been eminently consistent. The preservation of the Austrian and some other despotisms is the *end* at which he professes to aim; the upholding of Turkey is only a *means* to this end; and of course the end must not be sacrificed to the means. War with him is an evil, but the overthrow of despotism is a greater evil. The "*peace* of Europe" means its *slavery*. He probably never foresaw all the practical inferences which inevitably blossom out from such a root; but they have blossomed, and they will blossom, into treachery and ruin. To diplomatize for the maintenance of despotisms which cannot stand against their offended subjects, is in every case bad enough; but to carry England into war, *nominally* for the support of an injured sovereign, *really* lest his overthrow involve the overthrow of a perjured house, his enemy, and the common curse of Europe, would be something worse. We refuse to believe that this was the ultimate aim of the war, which Lord CLARENDON consciously held up to his own mind; yet his conduct, developed out of this fundamental idea, has been exactly in consistency with it.

An immediate inference is, that Austria, (like a sick boy, who, however naughty, must not be punished,) may act as unjustly as she pleases, and Turkey is not to be allowed to resent it; for this would draw after it precisely the calamity which it is Lord CLARENDON'S main object to avert, viz., the uprising of oppressed* nationalities.

* It was extremely offensive, in a debate of December, 1854, to hear the youngest member of the Ministry protest against the war being directed to favour "those who *are called* the oppressed nationalities." Is the Duke of Argyll quite ignorant of the history of Poland and Hungary and Bohemia and Italy?

The Turks indeed at length, in October, 1853, chose their course boldly. Even RESCHID PACHA gave M. DE LA COUR, the French Ambassador, to understand that if France feared Russia, Turkey did not; and also assured Baron BRUCK, that *if Austria joined Russia against the Porte, the proffered assistance of the* REVOLUTIONARY PARTY *would be at once accepted.* Thus it is beyond question explained, what M. DROUYN DE L'HUYS meant by the "fatal auxiliaries;" viz., injured nationalities, whose insurrection might possibly vex even the imperial throne of LOUIS NAPOLEON. To save "the peace of Europe" from so calamitous a result, was an object worthy of the talents of both the Western Cabinets; and if the report of Constantinople does not speak falsely, Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE betook himself most diligently to the problem which the ABERDEEN cabinet recommended to his efforts.

It was firmly believed in certain circles, and with no small reason (though we may not here indicate our sources of information), that the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Hungary and Turkey, was actually on parchment, and that KOSSUTH was confidently expected in Constantinople to sign it on the part of Hungary. Austria, many weeks before, had taken the alarm. Baron BRUCK could not be blind to the fact, that the Turkish patriots discerned their deep error in having allowed their soil in 1848 and '49 to be made a fortress for battle against Hungary;—that they knew their present troubles to be a direct result of having allowed Hungary to fall, and that the Ulema in particular were zealous for KOSSUTH. Accordingly, the Austrian authorities sent through Hungary a solemn declaration, to be signed by the principal men everywhere, to the effect, that "*if* KOSSUTH were to appear on the frontier of Hungary, and call them to arms, they would not obey him." This document, with its signatures, was actually laid before the Turkish minister: a most impotent proof that KOSSUTH was a nobody.—Lord REDCLIFFE'S proceeding was far more to the purpose. Having been accustomed to advise the Sultan almost since his boyhood, he succeeded in obtaining from him a secret promise, to imprison KOSSUTH, if he could not hinder his landing. We say, this was kept *secret from the Cabinet*—(a strange mode for a British minister to pursue, toward a sovereign who desires to reign constitutionally;)—for it certainly was *not* known to some of the most important personages in the Cabinet. Whether RESCHID PACHA was in the secret, can only be surmised. KOSSUTH is believed to have all but fallen into the trap. He was happily warned of it by a most certain informant, whom it is not proper here to name: but the fact of the

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Sultan having made this promise to the ambassadors, has been long since published in England, and was boasted of by a semi-official journal in Vienna.

We cannot help digressing for a moment, on the hazards to which the nearest interests of the Sultan are unhesitatingly exposed by his allies, for the convenience of Austria, his open enemy. If KOSSUTH had landed at Constantinople (as might easily have happened) immediately after the battle of Sinope, and the Sultan (to fulfil his secret promise to us) had imprisoned him, it might have produced a revolution and the loss of his throne; most certainly, he would have lost the love of his subjects, much more their enthusiasm. Turkish patriotism would have been humiliated and weakened, and a severer wound given to the empire than NICHOLAS is able to deal. And this is the act of Ministers, who think their tortuous secret diplomacy to be a mode of doing things *safely!*

About the same time, the Turkish Ambassador in Paris put the plain question to the Emperor's Cabinet: "Do you object to our using Hungarian and Polish officers, or forming a Polish legion?"† and received the frank reply: "The Sultan, in so dangerous a war, must use such measures in his armies as his own safety seems to require; it will not become the Emperor to object to them." We cannot doubt that the Turkish Ambassador in London was instructed simultaneously to put the same question here: he can scarcely have had the same answer. Since finally the Sultan did not dare to do, what, for military reasons, would have been good, he must have been hindered by the English Government refusing to support him against the threats of the Austrians, before whom *he was helpless from the day that he had promised us not to ally himself with Hungary.* Such is the aid which we give to an ally.

But unless report and the newspapers greatly mislead us, (and for two years past they have told more truth and earlier truth than the Ministry condescends to give to Parliament), Lord STRATFORD resolved to push his victory over the men whose energy and patriotism had accepted the war-challenge of Russia, and signally punish them by expelling them from their high stations. These were the Seraskier MOHAMMED ALI PACHA, brother-in-law of the Sultan—the Captain of the Guard;—the Kapudan

† At the end of October, 1853, our journals stated that the refugees in Turkey were estimated as 4,000 in number, of whom 800 were Germans, arrived from the United States *for the express purpose of the war.* How great a value is there in such enthusiasm! But (it seems) we would not allow the Sultan to take advantage of it.

Pacha, or head of the Admiralty;—and the Sheikh-ul-Islâm, or chief of the whole religious order. These eminent persons were regarded as partizans of KOSSUTH, as well as leaders of the war-party, and as such they were necessarily offensive to Austria, and to those who cared more to court her than to strengthen Turkey. MOHAMMED ALI PACHA had been Grand Vizier; but when Prince MENCHIKOFF's ultimatum was refused, and the Porte saw war all but inevitable, he took the active part of Seraskier (minister of war), and to his energy and popularity the armies of OMER PACHA owed much. The proclamations of the Ulema, which had so great an influence in rousing the enthusiasm of the Turks, and determining the Sultan to the war, were of course imputable to the Sheikh-ul-Islâm, whose authority could have stopped them: nevertheless, to attack him was a peculiarly dangerous operation, and the ambassador even of Austria would counsel caution.

First of all, MEHEMET, captain of the guard, was put out of the way, by the decent excuse of appointing him to inspect the troops in Asia. Let it be supposed there was no foul play here: yet it is not by mere accident that all the four, and besides these, finally the Grand Vizier, MUSTAPHA PACHA, have been put aside, in the very crisis in which they ought to have been retained.

Next, the Kapudân Pacha was got rid of, as a convenient scapegoat for the Western Powers after the battle of Sinope. By dismissing him from his post, the ambassadors at once sheltered themselves from blame, and ejected a "too warlike" minister. Yet the facts were these. On November 22nd, 1853, Lord STRATFORD in solemn divan publicly introduced to the Sultan Admiral DUNDAS and others, expounding in a set harangue that these were the officers of the fleet which her British Majesty had sent to defend the Sultan from unjust aggression. Lieut.-Col. WILLIAMS, in his careful Pictorial History of the war, omits this important session and speech; we know not whether by accident, or because he was rightly ashamed of his country's doings. But so it was, that to defend the Sultan was at that time so far from being within the instructions of the Admirals, that our ships might not even enter the Black Sea, keep a look-out on the Russian fleet, examine the defences and dangers of the coast, report on the need of fortifying harbours,—do any single thing, or give any piece of naval advice, which might have been of use. The reason was, that the Western Powers had accepted the Czar's *promise*, that he would "remain on the defensive in the Principalities," which they interpreted to mean, that he would not use his fleet offensively in the Black Sea. We

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do not know whether to believe what was confidently stated, that our ambassador moved the Porte to forbid the Turkish Admiral "SLADE" (our countryman) from convoying the Turkish squadron; on the ground that "there was no necessity, and it might lead to some unhappy collision." Certain it is, that on November 28th, six days after Lord STRATFORD'S address, the battle of Sinope took place, and the ambassadors cried out, Who would have thought it?—The fault was then laid on the Kapudân Pacha, for believing what the ambassadors had believed: he ought, moreover, to have known that Sinope was too exposed, and the fortifications insufficient. Indeed! and was it a new fact that Turks are deficient in naval science? Ought not our own sailors to have discovered the danger, and to have warned them, if really our fleet was sent to defend them? M. DROUYN DE L'HUYS tells us more truly: the fleet was sent only as a show, "to display the intimate concord of France and England, and to save the Sultan (not from Russia, but) from religious enthusiasm and fatal auxiliaries." *That* is why the Turks suffered the massacre of Sinope; and then, to cover our treachery, the Kapudân Pacha was ejected.

At the beginning of 1854, the two men of most marked character near to the Sultan, were the Seraskier MOHAMMED ALI, and RESCHID PACHA, Minister of Foreign Affairs. To expel the former was virtually to elevate the latter, and it is impossible to doubt that our ambassador really entered into an intrigue with RESCHID (his close coadjutor during the Sultan's whole reign) to elevate him at his rival's expense. That rival was ejected from the Cabinet, and our ministerial journals assigned as the reason,—"because he was too warlike." In Constantinople itself the rumour was strong, that the Seraskier had given offence to the ambassadors by vehemently advising the Sultan not to let French or English soldiers enter Constantinople until their governments had declared war against Russia. "If they want to help us," said he, "let them go straight to the Danube and fight; but until they have declared war, their armies in Constantinople will be more dangerous to us than the Russians in the Principalities." He was deposed without any avowed reason.

But a reason needed to be found against the Sheikh ul Islam, and it was found ingeniously. The religious order, in warm delight at the Sultan's patriotism, voted to the war the sum of 200 million piastres, or about two millions sterling, a sum in Turkey probably equivalent to eight millions in England. The Sultan rejected the offer, "lest it give to the war a *religious* colour;" a notion so utterly un-Turkish, as well as intrinsically absurd, that it

can only have proceeded from Western (if not from malignant) counsel. Not long after we had declared war, the ministerial papers reported, as a piece of news glorifying to the Western Ambassadors, that we were demanding a great social reform in Turkey as the price of our assistance; that Christians and Turks were to be put on an equal footing in the eye of the law; and that the vast estates of the Mosques were to become the property of the crown.

Only a few weeks later, Lord JOHN RUSSELL dropped tears in Parliament over his beloved Reform Bill, which he sacrificed on the altar of unanimity, aware that in the crisis of war he must not arouse keen antagonisms. Yet the Sultan, in a war that threatens, not his honour, but his independence, and almost the political existence of the Turks, is expected to enact by a *coup de main* a great religious reform, delicate in theory, arduous in practice, startling to the Turkish intellect, convulsive to their institutions. We pretended to ally ourselves with the Turks, and proceeded to overthrow the foundation of their empire. Well did they propound the parable, that the Czar desired them to cut out some leaves of the Korân, but their Western Allies bid them throw the whole book into the Bosphorus. What, indeed, is *meant* by the equality of Christians before the law? May a Christian be Grand Signor? May Christians fill the cabinet, or the highest posts of army and navy? May Christians be judges in courts of law? Is a Christian's evidence to be merely heard and *weighed* by a Moslem judge, or is the judge bound to receive the Christian's evidence, in spite of his conviction of its falsehood? The latter seems to have been the interpretation put on it by the Sheik ul Islam, and not unreasonably; for that Christian evidence should be *admitted*, had been decided by a previous enactment. It is reported that he exclaimed —"God forbid that I should accept the evidence of an infidel, as equal to that of a true believer." In short, he opposed the doctrine of Christian equality, and the ordinance for secularising the property of the mosques; and he was ejected from his office. A tamer successor was appointed, and the ordinances were enacted—*upon paper*.

Nevertheless, to this day they have been dead letters. No other result has come from them but the deposition of a patriotic pontiff, hateful to Austria and esteemed by his co-religionists. Such has been Lord STRATFORD'S triumph. The Sultan could not do more, in the courts, than make the evidence of Christians admissible; and he had done that already. To please us, he refused the free gift of 200 millions: he has not dared to seize it with the hand of power. Thus he has lost his subsidy, and his

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exchequer is left empty. Can any one help believing our newspapers, when they boast of these pernicious acts as coming from our ambassadors? No Turk *could* have suggested anything so unpractical. Moreover, from an English point of view, the affair of the subsidy was monstrous. There being in Turkey no House of Commons to sanction taxes, the closest analogy is, for the wealthiest corporation to vote a subsidy itself. This was done, and was rejected—for what? in order that the Sultan might assume the despotic position of levying taxes without control, and this, against the Korân, his fundamental law! Lord STRATFORD is a Tory, but he cannot have wished to intensify Turkish despotism: he may have been duped by Austria, and by his own desire to eject the Sheik ul Islam. Be this as it may, the spirit of the Turks was deeply moved against us. One of our lieutenants has complained, that the Turkish children spat upon him in the streets of Constantinople. The popularity of the Sultan was so shaken, that he thought it necessary to make public visits to his deposed brother-in-law, MOHAMMED ALI PACHA, in demonstration that he had in no respect laid aside his warlike policy. So ended our first great intrigue for driving out of the Sultan's councils those patriotic men who knew the weakness as well as the wickedness of Austria, and had dared to accept the challenge of Russia.

After the battle of Citate, there was not the remotest danger of Russia being able to force an entrance into Servia; but it was also now manifested that to aid Russia was a dangerous game for Austria. Accordingly, the Austrians, in February, 1854, changed their pretences. Intrigues were set on foot in Servia, to give colour to the rumour that a great Russian plot was about to burst, which the Austrian armies were needed to suppress. Exiles in London had positive news from Vienna that Lord WESTMORELAND received encouragingly the Austrian proposal to occupy Servia *in the interests of the Sultan!* and our ministerial papers often alluded to this as a probable and desirable result. Lords ABERDEEN and CLARENDON attested in Parliament their high hopes of Austrian alliance. The latter even boasted of his success in securing the alliance of Austria and Prussia, and appealed to the marching of fresh battalions into Transylvania, as a proof of Austria's adherence to us. At this very time, the Austrian Cabinet was praised for their manifesto, that if the Russians crossed the Danube, Austria *would not look on with indifference;* though it was a clear announcement that to have crossed the Pruth was not offensive to them. Moreover, when, soon after, the Russians did cross the Danube, the Austrians remained

as before: the Russians in Little Wallachia showed no fear of the Austrian armies in their rear, by which they might have been annihilated; and Lord JOHN RUSSELL expounded to Parliament, that—it was much to be regretted, but really—Austria was very vulnerable to Russia, and could not afford to be so spirited as he could have wished! In February, moreover, the exiles in London were surely informed, that the Austrian Cabinet had implored of our Ministry to give to NICHOLAS until March 23rd (quarter day?) to withdraw from the Principalities. We gave him longer time still. As the late Lord BEAUMONT observed, it seemed to be our desire to allow the Czar to gain a victory, in hope that after thus recovering the credit of his arms, he would make peace. This odious policy was imputed to us at Constantinople somewhat earlier, and it has received a painful confirmation from the siege of Silistria. *Why* Silistria was not relieved earlier, when OMER PACHA had great forces doing nothing at Shumla? is a very dark question; but we have some unpleasant lights in the change of Turkish Ministers. After the Seraskier MOHAMMED ALI was displaced as "too warlike," RIFAAT PACHA was put in his place, a man who had been acceptable to MENCHIKOFF as foreign secretary. Before long, he was removed, and RIZA PACHA succeeded him. Certain it is, that under RIZA PACHA the Turkish army has been ill-provided. One report represents him as Russian in his politics, another as a personal enemy to OMER PACHA. We do not know what is the truth: we know that our papers gloried in the change as effected by the ambassadors. We further know that while all parties expected from week to week that Silistria must inevitably fall, OMER PACHA with a powerful army sat at Shumla, unable to obtain leave from Constantinople to succour it. RIZA PACHA might have given him leave, we presume, but for a long time did not. The discredit of this has been strongly laid on the Western Powers in a very dispassionate history of the war by the *Illustrated London News*, of September 30th, 1854.

The knot was untied by a new change of ministry, which all our accounts regard as a *fresh triumph of* RESCHID PACHA, the friend and partizan of Western policy. Early in June, the Grand Vizier MUSTAPHA PACHA (who came into power when resistance to MENCHIKOFF was first decided, and who therefore represents the war party), was removed, and was succeeded by MOHAMMED KEPRESLI PACHA, formerly ambassador in London, and reputed to belong to the modern or European school of politics. The immediate result was the treaty dated June 14th (negociated and signed by our friend RESCHID PACHA),

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which called Austria to occupy the Principalities; and, almost simultaneously, Silistria was relieved. The first troops came to relief on the 13th of June, and the rigorous assault which virtually terminated the siege, was on the 15th; after which the case of the Russians was hopeless. There is everything to indicate, that, but for secret treachery, OMER PACHA might have cut short the siege a month earlier; and that in some mysterious mode (which will be learned by future historians, when diplomatic crimes are disinterred), RESCHID PACHA *bought* of Austria by the treaty her permission to relieve Silistria.

NEVER was it clearer, what policy to pursue, than toward the Principalities in Oct., 1853. Obviously, the Sultan ought to have proclaimed to the Moldo-Wallachians that he restored the constitution which in 1848 the Russian armies forced him to overturn; that henceforth he gives to them the same freedom as to Servia; that they shall be under no foreign protector, but hold their freedom by their own arms, and by aid of fortresses along the Pruth, as soon as the Russians can be expelled: moreover, with a view to this, a Wallachian legion ought immediately to have been organized, including in it the Wallachian exiles, patriotic men, the flower of their country, whom the Sultan, fatally yielding to Russian threats, had expelled in 1848. By such a proclamation, immediately on declaring war, he would have given to the Wallachians something to fight for, and would have secured the loyalty of the Principalities to his own empire. His ministers at that time were men bold enough and discerning enough. Against Austria, they were preparing to ally themselves with the Hungarians and animate the Poles: it is unimaginable that, against Russia, they did not feel their right and duty to animate the Moldo-Wallachians; yet they did nothing of the kind. There must have been *some* sinister influence. It was not from within; for at this crisis even RESCHID went along heartily with the war party. It was not Austria; for they were meeting her threats by threats. It surely must have been the Western Powers. No doubt it was. For at that very crisis their dispatches show, that their great effort was *to repress Turkish enthusiasm*; much more, then, would they dread to kindle the flame of liberty in the Principalities, which would be of all things most dangerous to Austria. If the Magyars of Moldavia and the Wallacks of Wallachia once become free, how can the Magyars and Wallacks of Transylvania be kept in slavery? "The first cannon shot," writes Lord CLARENDON, "may be the signal for a state of things more disastrous even than those calamities which war inevitably

brings." Let law and right and liberty perish, but let the HAPSBURGS stand. Let Moldo-Wallachia be trodden down, and trodden under the heel of Austria.

Had the unfortunate Wallachians been consulted, they might perhaps have made as energetic a protest as the Servians against Austrian occupation; but their mouths have been gagged, they have been treated as a conquered people: Austria insults them and eats up their remaining strength. Austria, the pretended ally, has virtually deprived the Sultan of *three* provinces,—Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia,—all of which she has paralyzed for this war; and while obtaining leave to occupy the two latter, did *not* take on herself to defend the Dobrudscha, but carefully left open to the Russians that road of invasion. The policy of Austria is no accident: it was all foreseen and predicted: no diplomacy will now reverse it: Austria will never again withdraw from the Principalities except by compulsion, or in exchange for some great advantage. Already she has made the Allies feel the difference. Witness the ignominious lowering of Lord JOHN RUSSELL'S tone, an evident result of the increased strength of the Austrian position, which at once threatens Turkey, and by cutting off Hungary defies the Western Powers. Moreover, it effectually prevents our establishing any real barrier against Russia. Surely RESCHID PACHA was a pure traitor to admit Austria into such a position, unless by compulsion. His policy has all along been that of the Western Powers. If he did it willingly, it is our policy; if unwillingly, that is our fault; for it is our statesmen who have sedulously made Turkey the helpless victim of Austria.

Lord CLARENDON has spoken in a tone of great innocence concerning the Austrian occupation of the Principalities. He had nothing to do with it. He did but acquiesce in that which the Sultan's Cabinet decided on. But had our Government nothing to do with displacing two Seraskiers and one Grand Vizier? Were not these changes all acceptable to Austria? Did not our Ministerial newspapers bid us to rejoice in them? Did not *The Times* for weeks and months try to accustom the English public to the idea, that Austria must occupy some province of Turkey? First it was Servia; then it was Montenegro; lastly it was the two Principalities. To occupy, *whether as enemy or as friend*, was Austria's fixed desire; and after we have seen the underlings of a Ministry work for an end, we cannot think it to leave no responsibility on the leaders, when it is gained and is accepted by them. The correspondent of *The Times* continues to inculcate that Austria is to keep the Principalities.

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And *what* has this Austrian occupation done? First of all, it has permitted (as was confidently predicted) the armies of GORTCHAKOFF to come away to the Crimea, and attack us at Inkermann. If there had been *no* Austria, they must have remained to keep the Principalities (if they could) from OMER PACHA, and Sebastopol would probably have fallen in the middle of November last. Or if, in anxiety for Sebastopol, they had abandoned the Principalities, as now; in that case OMER PACHA could have freed and armed the inhabitants. Instead of this, the Austrians have restored STIRBEY, a Russian partizan, to the princedom of Wallachia, who was living as a Russian pensioner at Vienna. This man has thoroughly carried out their wish to prevent the people from being free and strong, and the Porte from having any available dominion among them.

In July, KOSSUTH at Glasgow denounced the admission of the Austrians into the Principalities as "a political crime." At that time, and a long while after, the ministerial prints trumpeted it as a great victory of English diplomacy: Lord CLARENDON *now* washes his hands of it, as no business of his. Yet he tries to defend it. He admits that the Austrian generals did stop OMER PACHA'S pursuit of GORTCHAKOFF, but, he says, it was a mistake: Count BUOL disavows it: it shall not happen in future. Meanwhile, the mischief has been done; and we know that it is the system of the Austrians to have a Minister to talk liberally, and a general to act insubordinately. Just so, RADETZKY disobeyed his own Ministry, and was thanked for it in due time. Just so, JELLACHICH rebelled, was proclaimed a traitor; and was made dictator of Hungary to reward his treason. But Lord CLARENDON is too wise to acquaint himself with facts so disagreeable.

Moreover he assures us, in proof of Austrian sincerity, that Baron HESS offered to "coöperate" with us, and declined only when he found we were bent on going to the Crimea. Is such credulity fit to conduct the foreign affairs of England? If the offer had been sincere, must it not have come from Count BUOL? for Austria had not yet declared war. If the general could have thus diverted us from the Crimea, would not that have been highly acceptable to Russia? Did he not know that there were neither beasts adequate for four great armies,—Austrian, Turkish, English, French,—nor forage in exhausted provinces? Finally, if Austria, after twenty one months' preparation and two forced loans, could not repress the Russians on a single point, while we were making simultaneous attacks in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, she confesses weakness; she is no ally for us; she has no aid to give,

but she wants our aid. And this is the truth. Austria is not one of the "Great Powers." Unaided, she cannot resist her own subjects: she has no strength to spare. English politicians go on deluding themselves about Austrian alliance, unable to remember or to realize that the old Austria no longer exists. Before 1848 the Archduke of Austria was also King of Hungary; but he is so no longer. He forswears the title, its obligations, and its good-will: he has received Hungary as a conquered province from the hands of Russia. He has no European title to it, and nothing but hatred from the conquered. And this is the Prince whom our Cabinet fancied it could incite *against* Russia. Our readers will surely remember how often we have pointed out the vanity of this hope.

Nevertheless, this Austria has caught our Cabinet in its own craftiness, and evidently exerts immense influence. Early in the war, the Western Allies avowed to Europe that we propose no terms of peace to Russia, but wait for the Czar to ask for peace. Since then we have been superior in many great conflicts; we have been beaten in none; yet we have been seduced by Austria into taking the initiative of negociation by naming Four Points, and hat, without the Sultan's assent;—as though he were a nobody. In one of these, instead of abolishing the protectorate of Russia, we leave to her this tool of mischief, and propose to *confer a like tool on Austria*, and to claim the same for Prussia, France, and England! and this, with Montenegro before our eyes! this, when the quarrel of France and Russia about the Holy Places all but involved Turkey in war! Since then, the Allies have made the treaty of December 2nd (which, we trust, Parliament will refuse to ratify), granting to Austria, without any obligation whatever on her part, the right to claim our aid against Russia whenever she pleases, and a real security that we will not recognize the just claims of Hungary or Lombardy, if either nation profits by the preöccupation of Russia and France to revolt against Austria. Yet in this very month (January, 1855), Baron HESS has avowed, that he cannot act against Russia, unless aided by 100,000 Prussians; CORONINI, instead of repelling the Cossack foragers in Moldavia, has written to his government for orders! as *The Times'* correspondent from Vienna dolefully complains (Jan. 18th); which justifies the belief, that in no case will Austria break with Russia, even so far as to fulfil the engagements of her treaty of June 14th.

The mystery of iniquity involved in secret diplomacy often forbids our confidently selecting the true explanation of facts which are disgraceful to our Cabinet upon every explanation: we are forced to state the case after

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the manner of a dilemma. Thus, first, as to the fortification of Gallipoli. The English press deludes itself and its readers with the tale, that Sir JOHN BURGOYNE made a great blunder, and that both the Western Cabinets were misled by him. We cannot believe them to be such arrant simpletons. The events of 1828-9 were before the public. It had become notorious, that not only was NICHOLAS digracefully repulsed in 1828, but that in 1829 DIEBISCH reached Adrianople so weak, that had the Turks known his condition, his army never would have escaped.* Yet at that time the Ottoman power was far weaker than now, and Russia had no dangers from Circassia and from Poland. How is it possible that, after the battles of Oltenitza and Citate, the Western Cabinets should think that the Russian armies were going to march over the Danube and over the Balkan, and past Adrianople, and to threaten Constantinople, in two or three months, and this while we commanded the sea? We hold this to be such obvious insanity, that though ten BURGOYNES had said it, neither LOUIS NAPOLEON nor Lord CLARENDON would have believed it. *If* our fortification of Gallipoli was *sincere*, it was prompted by *fear of Austria*. Only the combination of Russia and Austria against Turkey, (in the opinion of old NAPOLEON,) would unite England and France in a war to save Constantinople. Our prevailing opinion, or our hope, is, that Gallipoli was fortified against *Austria*. If so, what are we to think of Ministers who held the hands of the Turks, and would not let them strike Austria? But if we reject this hypothesis, what remains? Why, the Turkish theory, that we fortified Gallipoli against the *Sultan*. Since in the treaty of alliance he refused to allow the Western Powers to impose on him what peace they pleased, (which Lord CLARENDON professes to desire in his despatch of Dec. 24th, 1853, to Lord COWLEY,) the object was to be effected by seizing a post from which we could command the castles of the Dardanelles; a post from which, once occupied by the Turks, the utmost efforts of the Greek Emperor was unable to dislodge them. While we write, the two Cabinets, by their military position, exercise a most unjust influence over the Sultan in regard to the terms of peace. They are now reported to be trying to patch up a compromise,

* The Sultan had massacred the Janissaries, and caused wide-spread disaffection among the Moslems: his fleet had been destroyed by us at Navarino: his treasury was drained by the seven years' Greek war: the Christians were disaffected by the massacre at Scio and the long struggle: the army was in transition to European discipline;—and the new method was not yet learnt.

which will open the Bosphorus to foreign ships of war: they foresee that it will be resisted: but as they are themselves within the Dardanelles, and the Austrians in the Principalities, the Sultan is helpless;—the partition of Turkey is begun. Well did the patriotic Seraskier say that the Western Powers in Constantinople might be as bad as the Russians in the Principalities!

But again; why did not France and England at least show their flags at Silistria? A single thousand men from each army could have found plentiful means of transport, and would have exceedingly inspirited the Turks. How much more obvious a policy, than to rot at Varna, or to wander in the swamps of the Dobrudscha, searching in vain for an enemy! Why also, in the first instance, were orders sent out to the admirals *not* to destroy the stores and ships at Odessa, by which that Russian army was supplied, which was fighting against the Turks along the Lower Danube? That such orders were sent, is clear from the apologies made by the admirals for having destroyed the stores and ships. *Both* of them, (not DUNDAS only) impute their attack singly and solely to the affront offered to their flag of truce, and HAMELIN winds up his apology by the emphatic self-justification, that he "did enough to avenge the insult to the flag, *and no more.*" Certainly, the simplest explanation is that of gross treachery, — that we *wished* the Russians to win a great advantage over the Turks, (as by taking Silistria,) in order that we might seize the opportunity of compelling the Sultan to accept such terms of peace as England, France, Austria, and Russia would then concoct. We cannot forget that the Sultan's Ministers who accepted the war, have been ejected by our intrigue, and that the blame of the war has been cast on the Turks by our ministerial newspapers, by the "Edinburgh Review," and recently by a ministerial partizan in "Frazer." Yet it is too horrible to believe, that in pursuit of a dishonourable peace, the Western Cabinets would deliberately expose their own allies to be massacred. Did then the same Austria, who begged, not in vain, that we would delay our war six months, also obtain of us a second half-year of ruinous inaction, gaining for Russia the only thing she needed against us,—*time?* We know not yet what is the exact truth; but every imaginable explanation covers our Cabinet with disgrace.

Now, what have the Turks reaped from Austria? First, from the affairs of Bosnia and Montenegro, down to the treaty of June 14th, Austria was their public enemy, threatening and paralyzing Servia; yet, by acting through us, she forbade the Sultan to ally himself to the Hungarians and Poles, to have a Polish legion, or to

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use refugees as officers in his European army. Worse, far worse, Austria by our aid expelled all the most energetic men from the Turkish Cabinet, won access to the Principalities, stopped the Turks from pursuing the Russians, exhausted the Sultan's exchequer, and fatally damped Turkish enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is the only influence by which Turkey can resist her foes; and both the Western Powers, since October 4th, when the Sultan declared war, have avowed their desire to check that enthusiasm. Through our machinations the Sultan's treasure is spent in vain, his exchequer is unrecruited, his troops have triumphed at Oltenitza, Citate, Silistria, and Giurgevo, for the benefit of Austria only; his army is dissipated, and the zeal of the nation will not again rally, since it believes that we have installed treachery in its Cabinet.

And what has England reaped from Austria? First of all, to be *principals* in the war, in which it was amply sufficient to be *secondaries*. To give to Turkey anything more than *maritime* aid was wholly uncalled for, had we but allowed her to pursue her own course towards Austria. Next, we are threatened with the incubus of an enormous fleet, (which will now entail an army also,) to do nothing but watch Russia; as if she did not equally need to be watched at Bomarsund as at Sebastopol. Or are we to forget, that the Duke of NEWCASTLE, in the name of the Ministry, recently told Parliament, that the independence of Sweden would soon have been a jest, if the fortifications of Bomarsund had been completed? Thirdly, we are to be perpetually liable to new war, perpetually embroiled with Eastern affairs, and permanently crippled for everything else, if our Ministry gain their present aim. This is our penalty for being resolved to save Austria from the just vengeance of oppressed and betrayed nations.

But she cannot be saved. The house of Hapsburg has no moral position whatever: alone in all Europe it is a power resting undisguisedly on mere violence. It dares not to appeal to its millions as do the Emperors of Russia and of France. Essentially weak itself, it must always lean either on Russia or on France, and make its protector omnipotent in Europe. Thus Austria necessarily overthrows European equilibrium. It is also a nuisance, by keeping *Germany*, *Italy*, *Poland*, and *Hungary* weak. For the safety of Europe against Russia and against France, the most essential condition is, the consolidation of these four countries into great states, according to their historical and natural affinities. If our Ministers, fawning upon the imperial name, continue the immoral effort to support Austria, they will cause royalty

to be hated even in these three kingdoms as a European mischief.

They have chosen to make us *principals* in this war, without consulting Parliament, and they are bound to conduct it for great ends. They have hitherto acted treacherously to every interest but that of Austria. They have sacrificed the Alanders, they have ignored the Circassians in the Four Points, they have talked much for *the Christians* of Turkey, yet they have betrayed the Moldo-Wallachians, and showed themselves ready to betray the Servians. From beginning to end their conduct has been treacherous. During the Secret Correspondence they argued against the frankly disclosed intentions of NICHOLAS to dismember Turkey, yet afterwards negociated as if the Holy Places alone were in question; and held the hands of the Turks against Austria and Russia alike, as long as they could. They sent in their fleet as a bait and blind to the Sultan, and caused to him the massacre of Sinope. Even when war was declared, they forbade their fleet to destroy the most important stores of the enemy. They sent out an army, at first also as a mere show; for they asked of Parliament money to take it to Malta, *and back!* It was at first to be 10,000 men, with an aged commander, in spite of Lord GREY'S emphatic warning. The numbers were increased to 26,000, not because they were wanted against the enemy, but (as the papers announced) because Lord RAGLAN'S dignity required so many. We ourselves printed the report, strongly attested at the time, that Lord RAGLAN on quitting this country declared that the army would not fire a shot in the East. They did not go to fight, but to occupy the Sultan's strongholds, and hinder his alliance with nations oppressed by Austria. Old generals do as well as young ones for that. The spirit of the French army (it is credibly rumoured) mutinied against inaction. The miserable expedition into the Dobrudscha was first devised to pacify them, and the expedition to Sebastopol ruinously delayed. No good results can come until this nation demands a Cabinet which will respond to the cry, No Secrecy, No Austria, No Dynastic aims, No gagging of Parliament; but a Peace which will enable us *effectually to disarm*, or a War to establish free nations against Russia from Circassia to Poland.

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THE

Danubian Principalities:

THEIR CLAIMS TO INDEPENDENCE CONSIDERED.

BY

CHARLES BLIND.

.... Some neighbouring nation
Hath stuff'd these hollow vessels with their power,
To beat us down ....

SHAKSPERE.

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

INTRODUCTION.

At the Vienna Conferences of 1855, on the motion of the plenipotentiary of Louis Bonaparte, a project was worked out according to which Moldavia and Wallachia were to be endowed with an independence similar to that bestowed upon Servia. At the same time, the French envoy proposed effecting a union, administrative as well as political, of the two Principalities. The representatives of the other contracting powers lent willing ears, or at least offered no show of resistance to these proposals. Russia, in so acting, probably thought she was assisting in a further humiliation of her traditional foe, the Turk. Prussia acquiesced from her sense of confidence in the profound wisdom of the Czar. Austria, at that time all-powerful in the Danubian Principalities, by reason of her military occupation there, did not care to dissent from the proposition, her own ambition leading her to entertain hopes of securing the new throne of united Moldo-Wallachia for one of her archdukes. Sardinia, in her consent, was actuated, no doubt, from a wish of creating a precedent for the cause of Italian nationality and independence. England, lastly, neglected to object, either from apathy or from subserviency to her French ally. In fact, it was quietly, and well-nigh unanimously, arranged by their several excellencies, each for his own particular reason, that the Ottoman empire should be denuded of two of its most fertile dependencies.

The betrayed Turk alone, very naturally did not share this opinion. The government of the Porte protested against any diminution of its sovereignty, and firmly refused to consent to the severance of its Moldo-Wallachian fief from the rest of the empire.

At the Paris Congress, 1856, the question was treated nearly in the same spirit as in 1855, at Vienna. The Porte offered the same expostulation as the year before. Since then, however, the aspect of affairs has undergone a considerable change. Russia and France, it is true, still stand together, plotting to bring about the separation of the Danubian countries from Turkey,—a circumstance the less to be wondered at, as Count Paul Kisseleff, to whose efforts Russia owes her former extent

of influence in the Principalities, is at this moment the Czar's ambassador at Paris. Prussian policy, also, so far as it exercises any European authority, still pursues the same aim, in common with the courts of St. Petersburg and the Tuileries. Sardinia, since the conclusion of the war, has lost much of the position it held during that time in the arena of European politics; but, within the sphere of its own immediate influence, the court of Turin continues to maintain its opinions of the Vienna Congress. It is confirmed in them by the flattering insinuations of the Russian diplomacy.

England and Austria, however, within the last few months have gradually more and more opposed the project of creating an "independent Roumania." In England, the public press has of late entered somewhat more deeply into the question. The more it has inquired into it, the wider has the conviction spread of the manifold dangers, and comparatively small and dubious advantages, that would accrue to Europe from the overthrow of the political relations which bind Moldavia and Wallachia to the government of Constantinople.

It will be apparent from the above, that at present there are three despotic powers—Russia, France, and Prussia, and one constitutional government—Sardinia, in favour of the scheme of union and independence. The opposite view is held by one constitutional power—England, and two despotic governments —Turkey and Austria. This chaotic division of alliances may, perhaps, appear to many sufficiently bewildering to exclude the

Turkey, the Sclavonian element predominates throughout Servia and Montenegro. There, therefore, the Russian propaganda is most active and successful. This large extension of a kindred race from the centre of Russia into the heart of the Ottoman dominions, is undoubtedly a danger to Europe; for, unfortunately, the majority of Sclavonian tribes are so deeply immersed in superstition and barbarism, that they are easily converted into willing tools of a crafty despotism. The Sclavonian movements of Jellachich, Hurban, and Stratimirovitch in 1848 and 1849 — movements which aided in making the grave of Hungarian liberty, and similar Pan-Sclavist intrigues in Bohemia in 1848—intrigues which proved the finishing blow to the struggles for freedom of the German provinces of Austria—are still too fresh in the memory of all those who have studied the history of 1848, to need any recapitulation.

With these experiences at hand, there can be no doubt that it is necessary to raise up bulwarks against the Pan-Sclavist invasion, by means of nationalities different or opposed to that stock. The Magyar and the Turk *are* such nationalities. In them, Central Europe possesses allies against Russia and her avowed or secret agents. However, not only Magyars and Ottomans, but also the *Latin* race inhabiting the Danubian provinces, would appear to have a common interest with Central Europe in opposing Muscovite encroachments. Indeed, by a lucky geographical chance, the Moldo-Wallachians are wedged in, like a dividing wall, between the Sclavonians of the north and the south,—between those under Russian rule and those subject to the Porte. To strengthen the independence of the Moldo-Wallachians would thus appear, on the first hurried glance, a consummation both desirable and necessary. And no lack of arguments have, in fact, been advanced to this purpose, all of them calculated to make an impression on those who judge from hasty premises. It is said, for instance, that the Roumans of the Principalities are "the veritable descendants of the ancient Romans;" that "the language they speak is a Latin dialect;" that they "widely differ in character from the surrounding Sclavonians;" and that, under a national administration, they would form no slight impediment to the advance of Northern Autocracy.

Fair and plausible as this line of argument may seem, we must still offer a few objections.

We will not here deeply inquire into the Moldo-Wallachian claim to a classic origin. Certainly, it would be easy enough to show, judging the question ethnologically, that the thinly sown Latin race of the ancient Dacians became, in the centuries immediately following the fall of the Roman empire,

so swallowed up or modified by the invasions of Goths, Kumans, Petchenegs, and a flood of Tartar tribes, that any remnants of the original Roman element must have been completely re-moulded. The Principalities have always served as one of the great gateways through which the tide of migration flowed. Each roll of that human ocean left its impress behind. Thus, the "purity of their pedigree" is not the best claim for the Moldo-Wallachians to advance for national independence.

This, however, is not the chief point in question. It is not any antiquarian consideration of ethnological claims, but the urgent political wants of the epoch in which we live, that ought to furnish us with reasons for a sound judgment of the cause before us.

And here, first and foremost, it must be said that from a general European point of view, it appears scarcely wise to mortally offend Turkey—as yet the strongest anti-Russian element in the East—by inflicting on her a violent spoliation of her Danubian dependencies; *thus making the Porte disinclined to any further resistance against Russia.* It was the Turk who, in 1854, in spite of all dissuasion and menace from corrupted European diplomacy, drew the sword to defend Moldo-Wallachia. During a whole year, the Turks sustained this struggle at their own risk, and shrunk not from sacrificing in the cause the blood and treasure of their nation. It was only *after* the Russian army was beaten on the Danube, that the Western Powers entered the lists, and stood beside the Turk in a contest involving the interests of all Europe. The world knows that, when offering their succour to the Porte, the Western Powers promised in a solemn treaty, to keep faith with their ally. If Europe now would violently tear away from Turkey those very Principalities, for the defence of which England and France announced that they appeared in arms in the East, such a flagrant proceeding is very inadequately described as a breach of confidence, and might well merit a much severer condemnation. From such monstrous treachery the government of Constantinople would, no doubt, take warning how it again stands in the breach, and bears the brunt of the battle with the Russian giant.

Viewed in this light, a humiliation and curtailment of the Ottoman power is more than an international crime: it is a political fault, being as much at variance with the dictates of sound policy as it is with good faith. The nations of Europe could hardly expect henceforward but that the betrayed Porte would decline to conclude alliances with them. All their offers of so-called friendship and military co-operation would be held at Constantinople as so many delusions, mockeries, and snares. The influence of Russia in the East would grow in the same ratio as Ottoman confidence in Frankish honour would diminish.

And, after all, this terrible risk would be incurred to promote a political experiment, the issue of which is more than doubtful. For, well weighing every chance, the project of a separate Rouman state, in whatever form it may be constituted, is fraught with more danger than advantage. It offers far greater certainty of failure than success. While we have before our eyes the evidence of the resolute and courageous attitude Turkey maintains against Russia, we have no guarantee whatever as to the part an independent Moldo-Wallachia would assume. The reason of this want of security is obvious enough. In spite of the difference between Sclavonian and Latin nationality, Russia possesses even now in the Danubian provinces important centres of influence. Of the boyard aristocracy, the "upper ten thousand" are almost all sworn to the Russian interest. Among the peasants, there is no vestige of political or national feeling. They are easily made the dupes of intrigues through their priests. A middle class, properly so speaking, does not exist in Moldo-Wallachia. These are elements which certainly form no counterpoise against, but would seem rather to be favourable to, the encroachments of ambitious Autocrats.

The similarity of religion between the Russian and the Rouman—both being Greco-Catholic—is another circumstance not to be overlooked. The Turk, on the contrary, both by national descent and by religion, is the natural enemy of the Muscovite. It may be fairly argued from these premises that the Ottoman race offers, as yet, more guarantees to hold its ground against the Russian than the untried Rouman.

From a liberal point of view we may further remark that the establishment of an independent Roumania would rather tend to delay for an indefinite period, than to facilitate, the advent of true progress in the Danubian countries. Let us suppose the case of a united Moldo-Wallachia, under a government of its own. Let us cast a glance at the probable consequences thereof. The newly constituted political body would naturally be regarded with aversion by Turkey—for it is difficult to suppose that Turkey would willingly acquiesce in a diminution of her power. The new-fangled state would be watched with a jealous eye by Austria—for Austria has a Rouman population both in the Bukovina and Transsylvania, and must consequently be apprehensive of a Rouman propaganda. Thus regarded in a hostile spirit by two sides, where would Moldo-Wallachia turn for countenance and aid? An alliance with a free Hungary is as yet impossible. Equally so with a free Poland. With no other resources, the weakly offspring of European diplomacy would throw itself into the arms of the Czar, trusting that the jealousy

of the European powers would prove strong enough to protect it from the penalties of such a dangerous inclination!

In other words, Roumania would be a second Greece—a mere cat's-paw of Russia. Such a state of things as this could only lead to the ruin of both Moldo-Wallachia and Turkey in general. The latter, edged in by pretender states and rebellious vassals —such as Greece! Montenegro! Servia! the Danubian provinces! Egypt! Kurdistan!—would be in imminent danger of a catastrophe of which the policy of the Winter Palace could not fail to reap every advantage. What benefit, therefore, can the most sanguine anticipate to the liberal cause from this new territorial arrangement?

Let us, however, assume, on the other hand, that the new government of Bucharest or Jassy would keep aloof from Russia, —that it would tread on the road of social and political reform,— that it would adopt as its first principles the suppression of feudalism, the emancipation of the peasantry, the substitution of a free proprietorship for the glebe slavery that now prevails among the people. What even then would be the consequence?

Why, with the existing ignorance of the peasantry, with the predominating influence of the Greco-Catholic priests, and the want of a free-minded middle class, the nobles would in a very short time be again triumphant. Furious at the intended curtailment of their feudal rights, they would once more sell the country to the Cossack. The good intentions of a few well-meaning men would be swept away before the storm of aristocratic reaction,—a reaction which would of course be openly aided and abetted by Russia.

At present, with Turkey firmly exercising its supremacy over the Danubian countries, the Muscovite leanings of the great boyard families are still kept down to some extent: for the Porte has a certain efficient mode of dealing with traitors. Let, however, Ottoman supremacy be weakened, and the door will be opened wide to every description of Muscovite intrigue.

The danger which the establishment of an independent Roumania would offer to the territorial integrity even of Hungary is not the least of the objections we entertain. In subsequent paragraphs this point, which is of interest to all advocates of Continental freedom, will be dilated on more fully. We confine our remarks here to asserting that every disarrangement of the map of Turkey appears to us premature so long as Central Europe is still enslaved by despotic dynasties, which are unwilling or unable to counteract Russian policy. With a free Germany, a free Poland, and a free Hungary, there would be no danger in re-organizing the Danubian and Balkan countries.

But with Germany, Hungary, and Poland at the mercy of the Czar and the Czar's minions, it would be far sounder policy to leave the map of Turkey as it is.

After this introduction, we proceed to the treatment of the historical and diplomatic aspect of the question.

I.

One of the most powerful arguments the advocates of the union and independence of Moldo-Wallachia bring forward is taken from the treaties of 1393, 1460, 1513, and 1529, which the Porte concluded with the then ruling princes of the Danubian countries. The adherents of the Rouman idea of the day declare these treaties to be still legally in force, and draw from them most important points against the right of Turkey to interfere in Moldo-Wallachian matters, and against Turkish supremacy in general.

Before entering more fully into these "treaties," we must make here a remark as to the date of their conclusion. That of 1393, drawn up at Nicopoli, between Bayazid I. Ilderim, and Mircea I. of Moldavia, was, as an historical reference will show, signed not less than *sixty years before Constantinople even had become an Ottoman city!* Those of 1460 and 1513 were drawn up at a time when Bosnia, Epirus, and several other countries which form now the most integral parts of Turkey, had yet to be conquered by Turkish arms! This simple statement will go far to show the value of the "treaties" in its true light.

The Ottoman empire, it cannot be forgotten, is a political creation comparatively of recent date in the history of Europe. If the early transactions by which it was gradually founded, were to be taken as the basis of its *present* constitution, the natural consequence must be, that the Ottoman dominions are to be broken up, or at least so far crippled as to be unworthy any longer of the name of an empire. It would be as well to declare at once that the Byzantine laws are the only ones recognised by European diplomatists, and that the Turkish rule is an invasion which must be repelled at all risks and hazards. This would be a more straightforward and honest procedure than to attempt to undermine the integrity of the Ottoman empire by reviving defunct clauses in mediæval documents, and other pettifogging quibbles.

Still, we will dispassionately inquire into the contents even of

these alleged treaties. Let us see whether, after all, they really do bear out the assertion that the sovereignty and independence of the two Danubian provinces has been guaranteed by them.

The first question to solve is—Does any "treaty" at all exist in the sense we attach to that word?

The answer is, emphatically,—NO!

The treaties between the Sultans and the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia were not treaties between equal powers. They were not treaties even in the sense of those conventions concluded between the haughty Romans of old and their allies, or, more correctly speaking, *protégés*. They were merely *capitulations*, by which a weak power, on the brink of annihilation, sought to obtain some concessions and favours from the irresistible invader. Indeed, "capitulations," and not "treaties," is the proper word by which they were originally designated. An unbiassed perusal of these documents will, moreover, make perfectly apparent the spirit in which they were conceived.

"Through our great clemency"—the document of 1393, for instance, commences—"we (the Sultan) *deign to consent* that the Principality of Wallachia, *which has been subjected to our invincible force*, shall govern itself after its own laws, and that the Prince of Wallachia shall be *permitted* the right of making peace and war, and of deciding questions of the life and death of his subjects." Can this, we ask, be construed into the language of a treaty between two powers? Is it not more the tone assumed by a conqueror, who, from some political motive, thinks prudent to abstain from further pressing on a country that already lies at his feet?

In Articles 2 and 3 of this same document, some important privileges are granted to Wallachia. It is stipulated that all Christians, who, after having embraced the religion of Mohammed, should return to Wallachia, and then again become Christians, are not to be persecuted for so doing. In the same way, all Wallachians who should pass from their country into the possessions directly subjected to the Turkish sceptre, are to be held exempt from the *haratch*, and other contributions. Art. 4 lastly stipulated that the Christian princes of Wallachia were to be elected by the metropolitan, the boyards, and the "nation."

But in Art. 5, the Sultan plainly declares again that he has granted all these privileges from his sovereign mercy and forbearance, and he significantly continues—"As we have inscribed the Prince of Wallachia *on the muster-roll of our other* SUBJECTS, he, too, must pay annually to our Imperial treasury, three thousand red piastres of the country, or five hundred silver piastres of our coin." Now, considering that this charter—for, a treaty, we repeat, it is neither in spirit nor letter—was granted

full sixty years before the capture of Constantinople, it must be owned that the position of the Prince of Wallachia does not appear in that document to have been a very influential or prosperous one, taking his place as he did with the other "subjects" of the Sultan on the muster-roll of the conqueror. What traces have we here of the "sovereignty" of Wallachia, which the advocates of the Unionist scheme would have us believe had been secured by the capitulations?

The document of 1460, drawn up at Adrianople by Mohammed II., for the benefit of Vlad V., Prince of Wallachia, exhibits the country in a hardly less dependent position. It is true some further stipulations are more explicitly stipulated in favour of the Principality. The local administration of Wallachia is guaranteed the free exercise of its functions, and a promise is given that no Mussulman mosque shall ever be erected on Wallachian territory. But, on the other hand, the Sultan takes the country under his and his successors' permanent "supremacy;" and instead of the former payment of three thousand piastres annually, he now levies "a *tribute* of *ten* thousand."

The privileges granted to Bogdan, Prince of Moldavia, by Selim I., in the document of 1513, are similar to those conferred upon Wallachia. Moldavia having submitted without an armed struggle, it was spared the humiliation of being styled a conquered country by the Turkish rulers; whilst in speaking of Wallachia in the capitulations, no such consideration is shown. However, in Art. 9, it is said that, "*as a sign of submission*," Moldavia must engage to send every year to the Porte, "by two Moldavian boyards," the sum of four thousand Turkish ducats, that is, eleven thousand piastres, as well as forty falcons, and forty mares in foal. Art. 10, moreover, stipulates that, in case of preparations for war on the part of Turkey, the Prince of Moldavia is bound "to furnish the Imperial army whatever contingent may be demanded of him." This stipulation, in point of fact, allowed the Porte to draw an unlimited number of fighting men from the Principalities. The document of 1529, granted by Sultan Soliman II., to Peter Rares, Prince of Moldavia, is scarcely more than a repetition of that of 1513. The only remarkable passage in it is that of Art. 9, which styles Moldavia an independent country, whilst Art. 1, of the same document, speaks of its "submission to the Ottoman empire."

The extracts we have given are sufficient to show that, even so early as before the time of the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, the Prince of Wallachia—that is, the ruler of the most important of the two Principalities—had been inscribed on the list of the *subjects* of the Sultan. How the Rouman publicists

of our day can draw from all this the inference that there had been treaties of alliance with Turkey, is to us a mystery.

It is true the rights reserved to the Danubian princes were important,—at least, in words. But it must be borne in mind that it was Turkish policy, at the epoch of the establishment of the Empire, not to press too heavily on the frontier provinces, in order the better to secure their fidelity to Ottoman rule. It ought also to be remembered that the right of making peace and war, although nominally conferred by the Sultan on the Moldo-Wallachian princes, was in reality but a shadow of a right. The power of declaring war against the Porte was, of course, legally out of the question, and a matter of rebellion. To enter into a war injurious to Ottoman interest, was, we need scarcely say, equally prohibited, and viewed in the light of an indirect revolt. What, then, remained to the Principalities? The doubtful privilege of being permitted to embark, on their own account, in wars which were either indirectly favourable to Turkey, or wholly unconnected with the interests of the Porte. It was evidently no very extensive exercise of sovereignty to be allowed entering on wars of such a prescribed character.

Be that as it may, we think it idle to endeavour defining by some precise phrase, taken from the international code of Western Europe, a state of things which offers such a confused aspect as the early relations between the Turkish invaders and the countries they gradually subjected. The Rouman publicists of our days have taken no little pains to unravel the problem, to what category of the international code the relations between Moldo-Wallachia and Turkey belong. Have the capitulations of 1393, &c. established the Sultan as a "sovereign," or as a "suzerain," or as a "protector" in the old Roman sense? Have the Principalities, by submitting to the Osmanlis, lost their sovereignty, or preserved it? Have they become subjects, or remained free men? Have they only concluded treaties of "unequal alliance?" or have they divested themselves of the most important functions of their autonomy? Are Moldavia and Wallachia in the position of those German states which, through their character as members of the Confederation, lose a portion of their independence? Or how, and in what category, are the relations of the Principalities to be classified?

The endeavour is indeed a vain one to apply the technicalities of our Western laws to these Eastern matters. Is it possible to forget that the foundation of the Ottoman empire presents features altogether different from a legal state of things? Can we shut our eyes to the fact that the capitulations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were signed at a time when the very basis of the Turkish realm had yet to be settled? All the

erudition so prodigally lavished by those who exhumed these antiquated documents, becomes worse than useless when opposed to the political necessities, nay, the very existence, of the present Turkish empire. We repeat, if the doctrine is right of those who take the early conventions as a proper basis for the actual organization of the East, there is no reason why the Byzantine empire, as existing before the invasion of the Osmanlis, should not be taken as a point of departure. It is yet to be seen whether Europe, with the Muscovite arch-enemy lying in wait at her gates, will lend her hand to such a dangerous overthrow of Turkish rule.

II.

In the foregoing we have dissected the capitulations on which, under the name of "treaties," so much stress is laid by Moldo-Wallachian writers. We now proceed to develope the causes, that in later centuries have so fundamentally altered the relations between the Principalities and the Porte.

Even at so early a date as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we already see an Ottoman "supremacy" over the Danubian countries stipulated for and recognised. The course of events, however, converted this protectorate into a more substantial suzerainty, which gradually approached the idea of sovereignty. The procedures were these. The Turks having left, at the time of their first inroad, very considerable privileges to Moldavia and Wallachia, the princes of these countries, in subsequent epochs, strove to make use of their privileges to re-acquire a position of full independence, and, consequently, revolted against Turkey. Whether, even at that time, Muscovite policy had anything to do with these insurrections, we will not inquire. Certain it is that, as early as the fifteenth century, the Czar of Moscow cast a wistful glance on the Danubian provinces, and worked hard to injure, by underhand means, Turkish influence in that quarter. Ivan III.—the same that married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor—is known to have entertained very strong notions respecting a claim on his own part to the inheritance of "Eastern Rome." He, in furtherance no doubt of that idea, allied his house and his political interests with Moldavia. The successors of Ivan equally kept their attention fixed on the Danube.

Be that, however, as it may, the Porte could not but see with

apprehension the rising spirit of hostility so rampant at the courts of Moldavia and Wallachia. It is at the Danube that Constantinople must be protected. At the Danube, therefore, the Turks could not allow any enemy to establish himself. No wonder then, when Turkey observed her policy of conciliation had no effect in Moldo-Wallachia, that she resolved to draw tighter the reins of centralization, and to subject the Principalities to a more efficient *régime*. A battle gained by the Turks over the insurgent Prince Michel, in 1595, gave the desired occasion. The revolted Wallachians having met with a signal defeat, *the province was declared a Turkish pashalik*. Subsequent rebellions of the Danubian princes served even further to induce the Porte to take the administration of the Principalities more directly in her own hand. The Hospodars, in many instances, from that time, were formally appointed by the Porte at Stamboul, instead of being elected by the boyards and the clergy, as had been the usage heretofore.

However, we must state here that even the advocates of Roumanian independence declare that, from the period of 1393 to 1716, the liberties of Moldo-Wallachia were comparatively safe. The "real and permanent usurpation" on the part of Turkey, they contend, dates only from the eighteenth century. What, then, we may ask, could have been the reason that induced the Porte, about the year 1716, to encroach even further on Moldo-Wallachia?

The reason is soon told. It is, unfortunately, one which justifies the Turkish procedures:—the Moldo-Wallachian Hospodars had degenerated into *the willing tools of Russia*.

This fact is so well ascertained that not even the boldest writers in the Roumanian interest — and their temerity in handling historical facts is of a somewhat startling character— have dared to pass it over in silence. "Before the Russian intervention," says, for instance, one of these writers, "Turkey was always careful to respect the right of treaty reserved to the Roumans. Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century, when the envoys of Poland claimed, at Carlowitz, a portion of Moldavian territory, the Porte replied to them: "'The Principalities have not been subjected by force of arms; they have made their submission of free-will in virtue of capitulations which engage the Porte to respect their territories as well as their liberties.'" Such moderate language on the part of a despotic government like Turkey is worthy of remark, more especially when remembering the manifold conflicts that had taken place between the Ottoman suzerain and the rebellious Danubian princes. But it must be acknowledged Turkish patience was too sorely tried when the Hospodars sought to destroy the very integrity of the

Ottoman empire, through dangerous alliances with that scheming deviser of universal dominion, Peter I. !

It was during the war begun in 1710 that Peter I. made overtures to the Hospodars to secure them as allies against Turkey. To Dmitri Cantemir he offered to render the princely dignity hereditary in his family, and to place his successors for ever under Russian protection. Dmitri Cantemir eagerly closed with this proposal. In the treaty thereupon concluded, he consequently was styled "Most Serene Highness, Lord and Sole Master of Moldavia, Confederate [*collegator*] of Russia." A similar engagement was drawn up between Peter I. and the Wallachian prince. Both Hospodars then invited the Czar to enter their country with his army; and when he had crossed the Pruth, assisted him to the best of their ability against Turkey. Fortunately, their designs were frustrated. Peter, surrounded by the Turks, very nearly fell into the hands of his enemies, and only owed his personal safety to the circumstance of his mistress, and future Empress, Catherine, having bribed the vizier in command of the Ottoman troops.

These evidences of an eager desire, on the part of a powerful faction in Moldo-Wallachia, to become the tools of the Muscovite, of necessity altered the Ottoman policy. Still, many of their provincial rights remained untouched; but, at the same time, in all important state matters, the seignorial *hatticheriffs* were henceforth promulgated at Jassy and Bucharest, as in any other province of the empire. The Turks had become too well acquainted with the military importance of the Danubian countries to allow them to become the prey of so grasping a power as Russia. The rapidity with which Muscovite ambition developed itself after Peter I., in both Europe and Asia, put the Porte more and more on her guard. Turkey beheld her rule secretly and openly attacked by the Autocrats in the Black Sea, in Greece, on the Caucasus, and the Danube. Who, under these circumstances, can wonder at or blame Turkey for taking those measures necessary for the preservation of her Danubian outposts?

It is important these facts should be deeply impressed on the mind of Western Europe. The autonomy of Moldo-Wallachia was only forfeited as a punishment for the intrigues her princes had indulged in with the unscrupulous court of Russia.

III.

In the preceding pages it has been shown that it was Russia that first stood godfather to the project of restoring Rouman independence. The motive that actuated her in this, is easily to be detected. At various epochs it was ever a favourite plan of the Czars first to detach some province from a neighbouring state under the pretence of independence, in order thus the better to prepare it for final incorporation with their own empire. Peter I. pursued this policy. Catherine II., when victorious against the Turks, strove to carry it out with even greater perseverance. The annexation of the Crimea, which she brought about by her cunning, offers, in this respect, a lesson which may well be studied to-day.

When, towards the end of the last century, the Czarina was bent upon gaining a footing on the Black Sea, one of her first acts tending to this aim, was to favour the movement then made in the Crimea for the forming that peninsula into an independent kingdom. Taking advantage of the jealousy the Khans of the Crimea felt towards their Ottoman suzerain, the Russian government espoused the cause of the Tauric Tartars, and thus contrived to bring about a severance of the ties which for centuries had bound the peninsula to Constantinople. Consequently,

Republics,"—under a Russian protectorate! In this latter plan, it is true, she met with a decided failure. The insurrection she caused Alexis Orloff to foster in the Peloponnesus, by means of paid Russian agents dressed as Hellenic priests, utterly miscarried. In the question of Moldo-Wallachia too, she did not succeed to the full extent of her desires. Still, the steps she took in that direction are important enough to be recorded here. They give a clue to the pertinacity with which the idea of an independent Moldo-Wallachia is, from epoch to epoch, regularly brought forward.

Already in 1772, at Foksani, Catherine had proposed to render the Danubian provinces independent. The project at that time was at once shelved. In the deliberations preceding the treaty of Kudji-Kainardji, Russia repeated her demands. She ostensibly paraded the right of Moldavia and Wallachia to a national administration of their own. In fact, Russia, on this occasion, contrived to give to the Hospodars the unusual title of "sovereigns," and to confer upon them the privilege of being represented at Constantinople by diplomatic agents. At the same time, Russia took care to assure to herself the important right of interference, under cover of guaranteeing the constitution of the Principalities against Turkey.

Of course, the title of "sovereign" thus liberally awarded to the Hospodars, only was meant to serve as an instrument wherewith to batter down the Ottoman suzerainty. In the same way, the privilege of a diplomatic representation at Constantinople was conferred by Russia upon the Principalities, merely with a view of having in the Turkish capital Rouman agents in the interest of the policy of St. Petersburg.

Shall we go over the history of the Danubian countries since the beginning of the present century? It is too well known that Russia, from Catherine II. down to our days, has never ceased to busy herself with an apparent advocacy of the self-government of Moldo-Wallachia, whilst, at the same time, drawing them more and more into the meshes of her own policy. Every stride made by the Autocrats since 1774, was an effort to convert the Hospodars from vassals of the Porte into subjects of the Muscovite protector. Sometimes, Russia worked on this behalf by mere diplomatic intrigues; sometimes, by military invasion; sometimes, even by getting up sham insurrections. The insurrection of Ypsilanti, 1821—in appearance a national rising—was one of these Muscovite concoctions. Ypsilanti was as undoubtedly an agent of St. Petersburg as Capo d'Istrias, the "Hellenic hero," acted in the pay of the Czar.

The influence Russia acquired in Moldo-Wallachia after the

war of 1829, and her further progress in 1849, through the treaty of Balta Liman, are matters of notoriety. On both these occasions, the Emperor Nicholas did not so much care to insist on guarantees for the independence of the Principalities as to make stipulations for his own right of interference. It is altogether remarkable, that the government of St. Petersburg, in the course of time, gradually dropped the idea of Moldo-Wallachian independence, only cultivating that of Russian influence. Thus, in 1848, we find the Czar Nicholas pronouncing himself, in a note of the most violent terms, against the establishment of an independent Roumania, which had been the object of the Revolution of Bucharest. The interest the Czars felt in the scheme of independence only lasted so long as they were able to direct the movement.

The policy of Russia, in this matter as in others, was always a policy of expediency. No wonder, therefore, that Alexander II., since the recent war and the Peace of Paris have done away with the Russian protectorate, has resumed again the advocacy of "independence." In the present situation of Europe, he evidently hopes, that if only the Danubian countries are once out of the power of the Sultan, they will soon fall in the grasp of the Czar. No sane man can indeed believe that if a "free Roumania" were established, Russia would contemplate in quiet the constitutional development of such a country on her frontier. No sooner would the Principalities be severed from Turkey, than the agents of St. Petersburg would begin convulsing the new state by means of the nobility and clergy. Complications would arise; and at a fitting time, when Europe would either have no leisure, or no disposition, to occupy itself with the East,—the Autocrat would pounce upon the young and weakly realm with the utmost facility!

IV.

We come now to another feature of the question that has not yet received its due share of attention. We allude to the danger which would result to the territorial integrity of Hungary if the advocates of an independent Moldo-Wallachia were permitted to carry their views.

That the influence of the Magyar element in Hungary, even under the present infamous despotism of the House of Hapsburg, still acts as a barrier against the progress of Russian Pan-Sclavism, we scarcely think necessary to prove. Blot out

Hungary, as an essentially Magyar state, from the map of Europe; let the principle be proclaimed, that, in future, there shall not be any more a Hungarian nation or state, but that each of its races, Magyar and Slovak, Croat and Rouman, German and Ruthene, shall be entitled to form a separate community,—and the gate of Eastern Europe will be swung open to Russia. Now, this, we contend, is the very danger that would accrue to us through the premature formation of an independent Roumania.

The fact is, the champions of Rouman nationality are far from being content with merely severing the Danubian countries from the Turkish empire. They also proclaim—at least, they have done so but a few years ago—their intention of detaching from Hungary a great number of districts, under the pretence of national affinity with the Rouman stock. Not only Moldavia and Wallachia, but Transsylvania, the Banate, and, if possible, half Hungary—"Hungary up to the Theiss!" —are to be part and parcel of the new Rouman state. This, since 1848, has been the openly proclaimed project of agitators from Jassy and Bucharest. The fury with which they attack the principle of territorial integrity in Hungary, the malicious envy with which they treat everything Magyar, surpasses even the enmity they display against Turkey. They heap upon the Magyars—who, like the Osmanlis, are the real anti-Russian element in Eastern Europe—the most poignant insults; they pronounce them to be "intruders from Asia," who might be, without injustice, rejected into the wilderness from whence they came; they taunt them with "barbarism," and give us clearly to understand that the dominion even of Russia is to be preferred to the continuance of the Magyar race in its present position.

It is well here to bring into recollection the part played by a portion of the Roumans of Hungary in the revolution of 1848 and 1849. During that gigantic struggle, which won the admiration of Europe for the cause of Hungary, a number of Roumans allowed themselves to be made the tools of both Muscovite and Austrian agents. They lent their ear to the infernal insinuations of despotic emissaries, and *contributed to overthrow the Hungarian cause by rebellion against the revolutionary government.* We may leave it uninvestigated how far the gold of Austria and Russia exercised influence in these deplorable occurrences, and how far the sentiments of race and religion had to do with them. Certain it is, that the Roumans rebelled against the provisional government of Hungary at the very time when the Austrian enemy in front, and Russia in the rear, brought up their military forces against the Magyars!

Thus, the Roumans facilitated the defeat of Hungary. Thus,

they acted as allies of tyrants. Thus, they opened the door to Russian invasion.

We may draw therefrom an inference as to what we have to expect from the "liberalism" of an independent Roumania.

Since the time that the Hungarian revolution was strangled by the hangman of Arad, the Rouman intriguers in the pay of despotism have ever continued in their efforts to tear in pieces the territorial integrity of Hungary. In common with some of the Sclavonians, they beleaguer the court of Austria with petitions, demanding a complete separation from the Magyar comitats—so as to enable the Rouman and Sclavonian population "to belong in a more direct manner to the Austrian crown." *Divide et impera*, the motto of the Imperial court, they have chosen for their own.

In order not to be misunderstood, we owe a word of explanation for our reasons in declaring against the idea of dismembering Hungary. In nowise do we advocate the establishment of monster empires where a variety of nations are, without any natural cause, huddled together to gratify some morbid dynastic ambition. Thus we do *not* acknowledge the constitution of the present Russian empire, nor that of Austria, to be tenable before the tribunal of political reason. We believe the cause of civilization could derive nothing but benefit, if these overgrown empires were broken up and remodelled. We would have a Poland for the Poles, and, therefore, the injustice of partitions atoned for; Italy for the Italians, consequently Lombardy and Venice disconnected from the government at Vienna, and restored to a united Italian commonwealth. We wish Germany for the Germans, which includes the union of Schleswig-Holstein to the mother country. At the same time, we readily own that the German body has no right to keep Hungary tied by force to herself. But while we thus would see great national bodies constituted within the sphere of their own race and language, it appears to us a dangerous and senseless experiment to break up political organizations like Turkey and Hungary into small and powerless duodecimo states.

It is the characteristic of Hungary and Turkey, not so much to present the features of a strong national unity, as of a medley of fragments of races. Turkey can boast of a host of them, numbering in their ranks the Osmanli, the Sclavonian, the Shkipetar or Albanese, the Tartar-Bulgarian, the Rouman, and the Greek. Hungary exhibits nearly an equally varied arrangement. Leaving out minor shades, we there find the Magyar, the Sclavonian (the latter with many discordant branches), the Rouman, the German, besides a heterogeneous number of fragments of Asiatic and European races.

The great migrations and invasions of bygone centuries have turned the whole eastern quarter of Europe topsy-turvy. Everything there is so disjointed that one must either be prepared to carry out the separation of nationalities with such nicety as to constitute almost every province, nay, even sometimes simple towns, into distinct states; or else one must be content to see an empire formed of several races, taking as a matrix that nationality which offers the most guarantees for antagonism against Russia. Here lies, in our opinion, the urgent necessity for maintaining the existence of both Hungary and Turkey.

The necessity of combining, in the fold of one state, many nationalities does, however, not imply, *per se*, any supremacy of one race above others. In Turkey, it is true, the problem is not easily to be solved, how far perfect equality of position among the different races there, would be consistent with the maintenance of the empire. But in Hungary, the question has become more simple. The statesmen of Hungary at least, in their glorious revolution, although staunchly and justly upholding the principle of territorial integrity, did not hesitate to declare the full emancipation of all nationalities within the precincts of the empire. A decree of the Revolutionary Diet placed all inhabitants, of whatever origin, on a footing of perfect equality in political and civil rights.

Unfortunately, this was not what the Rouman agitators were content with. They wanted to dismember and mutilate Hungary. They intended taking away from her the very districts which form a strong military position. Hungary was to be deprived of her Carpathian wall; she was to be parcelled out and cut up, and thus rendered an easy prey to that barbarian power which brought about the partition of Poland.

V.

After this discussion on the merits of the Roumanian question with regard to Hungary, we revert again to Moldavia and Wallachia, in order to briefly touch on the constituent elements of their population.

When a new state is to be formed, as a first question it may well be asked,—Which are the classes of the community in whom the political power will chiefly be vested? Is it to be the popular classes? or the middle class more especially? or is

it, perchance, the aristocracy? If the popular classes, what is their degree of political education and general progress? If the nobility, what is its relation to neighbouring despotic powers?

Now here we must at once allude to a fact calculated to cause the most serious reflection. It is that a middle-class, as already indicated in the beginning of this article, can scarcely be said to exist in the Principalities! "The middle-class,"—says one of the most zealous defenders of Rouman independence, himself a Rouman by birth,—"has scarcely begun to form itself in Moldo-Wallachia." (*Le tiers-état commence à peine à se former*). There remains, therefore, the peasantry and the aristocracy. Unfortunately, the most numerous class, the peasantry, are so deeply sunk in ignorance and superstition,—they are so completely under the thumb of their Greek clergy, who, on their part, are naturally looking to Russia as to the great protector,—that in them, in the peasants, a liberal element cannot be hoped for as a support for the new state of things. Then, as to the majority of the influential noble families, they are wedded to the Russian interest; they owe their very rise to the Muscovite protectorate, and continue faithful to the power that elevated them. It has often harassed the Porte to find a sufficient check for the philo-Russian zeal of these boyards. Moreover, the Porte has also had frequently to do battle against them, on account of the rapaciousness they exhibited in their dealings with the unhappy people that is bound to the glebe.

It is well to keep in remembrance this latter circumstance. The tyranny of great landowners, as well as the licentiousness of monasteries in the Principalities, would have grown to dimensions still more intolerable, had not the despotic rulers of Turkey found it good policy somewhat to abate the growth of feudalism and clerical arrogance.

Thus, after all, in looking over the available strata of the population in Moldo-Wallachia, there remains nothing but a party of lesser boyards who, it may be, are imbued with patriotic and liberal sentiments. We will grant, for argument's sake, that *they* are bent upon most extensive reforms, political and social,—that *they* are fully decided to wage war against the philo-Russianism of the great families, the ignorance of the peasantry, and the Muscovite leanings of the clergy. Still, the question arises,—Are these boyards of the lesser nobility strong enough to impress their own feelings on the policy of the young state? We greatly doubt it.

These are serious reflections, not to be reasoned away by hollow and high-sounding phrases. To create at the very frontier of the Czar's dominions a new realm, which, by nature,

has no protection from aggression, and by the constitutive elements of its population no real power against Russia, seems to us a venture too hazardous to inspire us with any confidence. A risk like this *might* perhaps be made, without any remarkable danger, if the general aspect of European affairs were more reassuring. But with the great despotism of the North still overhanging Eastern Europe like a cloud, it seems a game too frivolous to set the fate of Turkey on the cast of one die.

VI.

A last point remains to be treated of. In order to give a full insight into all the intrigues that are played in the question at hand, we have to allude still to the various candidates for the new Rouman throne. It is to be understood that we only give them from the indications put forth in the semi-official press of France, Germany, and other countries. The list, in any case, is instructive and curious enough. We find mentioned as aspirants:—

1. Prince Constantine Frederick Peter of Oldenburg, general in the service of Russia, and president of the civil and ecclesiastic department of the Russian senate.
2. A Prince of the House of Nassau, related to the Russian dynasty.
3. Prince Bibesco, ex-Hospodar of Wallachia; and
4. Prince Stirbey the younger;—both of families that owe their rise to Russia;
5. The French Marshal de Pelissier, Duke of Malakhoff.

The last-named candidature is certainly one of the most astounding. We transcribe the recommendations offered for it, from a French memorandum, published at Paris:—

"In the present state of things," the memorandum says, "when a prince is to be given to Moldo-Wallachia, who is the foreigner upon whom the choice of the people could fall? Is he to be a Russian? *No;* for this would bring back the very danger the recent war has undertaken to dispel. Will he be an Austrian? *No;* for Austria, being a contiguous power, would thereby obtain a dangerous amount of political influence. Will he be an Englishman? Again, *No;* for though Englishmen are able to protect, they are unable to organize a country: witness their incapacity to organize themselves. [!] It is, therefore, necessary that the Prince of Roumania should be a Frenchman; and on which Frenchman could the consent of the cabinets, the suffrages of the

people, and the investiture by the Sultan more appropriately be united, than on that general whose name has found an echo everywhere—to whom the supreme command of the armies of four nations was entrusted — who has himself consolidated the throne of the Sultan, by the capture of Sebastopol, and who, by thus carrying out the policy of the Powers, has ceased to be exclusively the man of France, and created himself, for the time, the man of all Europe! Let not the Roumans deceive themselves. Their future is still black with threatening clouds. The first want of their new state will be military institutions, fortresses, a disciplined army! They certainly cannot obtain these advantages, save at the hands of a warrior equally gifted with high administrative qualities and heroic courage—a man, in fact, worthy to command the descendants of the soldiers of Trajan."

The memorandum plainly enough adds: "The election of the Marshal-Duke of Pelissier to the throne of the Grand Duchy of Roumania, would besides *develope the influence of France in the East.*"

This quotation may be sufficient to judge of the disinterestedness of the motives which have led the government of Louis Bonaparte to stand up, in official notes, as the champion of Moldo-Wallachian "independence."

CONCLUSION.

We hasten to conclude. Having now passed in steady review the chief features of the Moldo-Wallachian question, we believe there is no difficulty in arriving at a proper judgment. History, as we think we have shown, offers ample warning against undertaking the risk of the proposed political experiment on the banks of the Lower Danube. The general situation of the moment no less urgently forbids us to follow the course into which the plausibility of certain writers endeavours to lure Europe.

True, the "classic origin," the early history of Moldo-Wallachia, connected as it is with that of Rome, may inspire us with sympathy for the country. Reason, that sterner guide, should, however, teach us how dangerous an indulgence it becomes to yield to the influence of poetical reminiscences, when we have to deal with hard, political realities, so little corresponding with the phantasms of our dreams. What advantage accrued to civilization and the welfare of mankind from the

fever of enthusiasm that seized upon Western Europe, more than a quarter of a century since, for a "resurrection of ancient Hellas?" The unreflecting visionaries only served on that occasion the cause of the barbarian North. The frenzy of enthusiasm was turned to a most unromantic purpose. To the classic inebriation followed a hollow and hideous deception. As the German poet sang, with so deep feeling:—

> "Alle unsre Blüthen sind gefallen
> Vor des Norden's schauerlichem Weh'n."....

Has not the result of the Greek episode cured the day-dreamers? Have they yet to learn that, in place of the descendants of ancient Hellas, they handed over Greece to a semi-Sclavonic, semi-Albanese race—a people more distinguished by its Greco-Catholic fanaticism and Russian leanings, than by any aspirations towards pure freedom? Are the schemers of "academic" policy again to mislead Europe by their theories of Latin nationality and Daco-Rouman classicism?

Let Moldo-Wallachia become independent *without Hungary, Germany, and Poland, being beforehand established as strong democratic commonwealths,* and you will have only founded a state, Russian by all the ties of religion, and thus placed in the hands of the plotters of St. Petersburg an ever-ready handle for interference. Let Moldo-Wallachia be independent—and the Czar will possess, in the flank of Turkey and in the rear of Hungary, an important strategic position, equally dangerous to the independence or territorial integrity of these countries as his establishment in Russian Poland is to the security of the German Confederation. It has always been the policy of the Muscovite to acquire influence by thus pushing his own weight like a dividing wedge into the neighbouring realms.

May it not be said that Europe, forewarned as to the policy of the Autocrats, would henceforth keep a careful watch on the banks of the Danube. Idle consolation! Is it already forgotten how monarchical Europe remained inactive even long after the armies of Nicholas had crossed the Pruth, and how a full year passed before the courts of France and England offered their military aid to Turkey? If the Western courts exhibited so little eagerness in coming to the rescue when the fate of Constantinople, nay, of all Turkey, trembled in the balance, can we feel any degree of certainty that more alacrity would be displayed when only Jassy or Bucharest became in danger? What, moreover, entitles us to assume that an Anglo-French alliance is perpetual, or can always be possible?

From Austria, no sane man could well expect any strong opposition to the designs of Russia. The wavering policy of the

Court of Vienna is too fresh in the memory from the events of the late war, to allow us to consider the tottering despotism of the Hapsburgs as a rampart against Muscovite aggression. Under such circumstances, would it not be madness to believe in the strength of the position of Moldavia and Wallachia? Would not their "independence" become, on the contrary, a continual menace and source of war?

We know full well that these arguments are anticipated to some extent by the advocates of the Rouman nationality. They are prepared, at least some of them, to meet us with an assertion that, if the necessity can be shown, they are even ready to "acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte,"—provided "Moldo-Wallachia be virtually declared independent!" It is, however, not the *word* "Turkish suzerainty," but it is its real and efficient existence which alone can prevent the Danubian countries from falling a prey to Northern encroachments. Unless Turkey, therefore, continues to exercise a strong influence in Moldo-Wallachia, the nominal acknowledgment of some shadowy suzerainty will not avail her. We all remember how the acknowledgment of Ottoman supremacy was paraded when the kingdom of Greece was yet in an embryo state. At that epoch, also, hypocritical diplomatists declared their readiness "to respect the rights of the Porte." But how long did the comedy last? Was not the Turkish suzerainty suddenly juggled away, and the Hellenic state forthwith developed to its full Muscovite bloom?

Surely, these are facts worthy of being well weighed by Europe. Whatever be at this moment the sentiments expressed by the partisans of Moldo-Wallachian union, their real aim, we may rest assured, is to throw overboard entirely the Ottoman supremacy, and to perpetrate, if possible, even bolder deeds. Fortunately, warnings as to the real nature of their designs are not wanting. Now and then some startling revelation comes from Bucharest which we would do well to treasure up, in order the better to understand the forthcoming debates in the Moldo-Wallachian divans. Thus, in a print that has of late circulated in the Principalities, the prospect is held out of "gradually annexing all European Turkey to the new state of independent Roumania," and, by this means, "creating a Greco-Catholic empire, with Constantinople as its capital!"

It would be difficult to have exhibited more plainly to the eyes of men the cloven-foot of Northern Autocracy.

PREMIER POINT DE LA QUESTION D'ORIENT

LES

PRINCIPAUTÉS

DE MOLDAVIE ET DE VALACHIE

DEVANT

LE CONGRÈS

PAR

PAUL BATAILLARD

ARCHIVISTE-PALÉOGRAPHE

PARIS

TYPOGRAPHIE DE CH. LAHURE

IMPRIMEUR DU SÉNAT ET DE LA COUR DE CASSATION

rue de Vaugirard, 9

1856

PREMIER POINT DE LA QUESTION D'ORIENT.

LES PRINCIPAUTÉS DE VALACHIE ET DE MOLDAVIE

DEVANT

LE CONGRÈS.

Attentif depuis plus de dix ans aux événements qui se succèdent sur les bords du Danube, ayant le rare privilége de connaître la Moldo-Valachie, non-seulement par les études qui me portaient vers cette terre foulée par tant de races, mais par de longues relations avec un grand nombre des plus dignes représentants de cet infortuné pays, j'ai cru pouvoir apporter quelques lumières dans la première question que vont débattre les délégués des grandes puissances de l'Europe. Tel a été, du moins, le sentiment des amis roumains qui m'ont engagé à prendre la plume. Eux et moi, par malheur, nous y avons songé un peu tard; et, pour ne pas arriver lorsque tout sera décidé, j'ai dû renoncer tantôt à me développer, tantôt à me condenser davantage, et à donner à cet écrit une forme plus correcte. Tel qu'il est, Dieu veuille qu'il ne soit pas tout à fait inutile!

Les questions que je traite ici sont, à n'en pas douter, les plus capitales que comportent les circonstances actuelles; et je les crois mal connues dans nos pays de l'Occident : c'est ce qui m'a décidé. Forcément étranger aux débats de la politique quotidienne, j'ai pensé que, dans un moment où vont se décider de grandes destinées, je pouvais mêler utilement ma voix inconnue à celle des intérêts du jour sans l'y confondre, l'élever au-dessus des luttes de partis sans lui faire perdre son accent. Lorsqu'il s'agit du sort d'un peuple qui, du fond de sa misère et des extrémités de l'Orient, vient identifier sa cause avec la nôtre, et vers lequel se tournent, par

occasion, les sympathies de l'Occident ; lorsqu'il s'agit, tout à la fois, de résoudre une question qui tient l'Europe en alarme depuis un demi-siècle, et de prévenir le retour des complications désastreuses qui viennent de mettre le deuil dans tant de familles, il ne doit rester dans une âme française qu'un sentiment, l'amour de l'humanité, qu'une idée, le salut de la civilisation.

Dans cet écrit, où j'ai la certitude d'être l'interprète des vœux et des espérances du peuple Moldo-Valaque, en même temps que j'ai la conscience de représenter les intérêts de mon pays, ceux de l'Occident, et ceux même de toute l'Europe, j'avais un double devoir à remplir : exprimer dans leur généralité les vérités que je crois fécondes sur la politique nouvelle à suivre en Orient ; mais aussi, au risque de les restreindre, les approprier aux conditions du moment, pour leur donner quelque chance de succès ; c'est à cette dernière tâche que je me suis surtout appliqué.

Ainsi, cet écrit est destiné aux diplomates autant qu'au public ; nous voudrions pouvoir dire — à tous les diplomates ; nous voudrions, dans une cause si générale, pouvoir adresser un égal appel de logique et d'équité aux délégués de toutes les puissances réunies au Congrès. Mais il est manifeste que les trois nations alliées sont les seules qui représentent aujourd'hui, dans la question d'Orient, les intérêts européens sans mélange d'intérêts contraires ; et c'est pourquoi il n'appartient qu'à elles de faire prévaloir la vraie solution. Dans ce qui touche les Principautés, l'intérêt hostile de la Russie est assez évident, puisque ces deux pays ont été en partie l'occasion et l'objet de la guerre, et doivent être un des principaux points sur lesquels reposera la conclusion de la paix. Les intérêts particuliers de l'Autriche dans cette question ne sont pas moins certains ; et, pour ne pas entrer ici dans des explications qui trouveront leur place plus loin, il nous suffira de citer, en preuve, l'empressement qu'elle a mis à occuper la Moldo-Valachie au moment où les Russes l'évacuaient ; ce simple fait donne l'image exacte de sa politique. Quant à la Turquie, il ne nous sera pas difficile d'établir que son intérêt est entièrement conforme à celui du peuple moldo-valaque, et plus directement attaché, que celui d'aucune puissance étrangère, au développement de cette nationalité ; mais il serait puéril de dissimuler que la Turquie a souvent méconnu ses propres intérêts les plus vitaux, et nous avons à craindre que, soit sous l'influence de l'Autriche, soit par un reste de vieux préjugés, ou plutôt encore sous la double action de

ces deux causes se prêtant un mutuel appui, elle ne fasse obstacle au moyen, cependant le plus efficace, de mettre fin à ses démêlés avec la Russie, et de déjouer aussi les convoitises de l'Autriche.

C'est donc seulement sur les trois puissances alliées que nous pouvons fonder notre espoir, et c'est à elles que nous nous adressons.

Avant d'entrer en matière, quelques mots, à l'adresse du public, sur le peuple qui va surtout nous occuper.

La race *roumaine*, qui peuple non-seulement la Valachie et la Moldavie (sans oublier la Bessarabie et la Bukowine, portions détachées de la Moldavie), mais qui s'étend aussi sur la Transylvanie et le Banat, et qui compte des membres épars en nombre considérable, de l'autre côté du Danube, dans la Turquie d'Europe, est une race toute latine, comme son nom l'indique; le territoire qu'elle occupe en masse compacte, et que nous venons de circonscrire, est à peu près l'ancienne Dacie Trajane. Ainsi ce peuple roumain est frère des nations de l'Occident continental, par ses origines, ses traditions toujours vivantes, sa langue admirablement conservée au milieu de tant de vicissitudes. Si nous ne devions nous resserrer ici dans les plus courtes généralités, nous ajouterions, car c'est là un trait de conformité singulier avec la France, que la race latine paraît s'être entée en Dacie sur des débris celtiques. Quoi qu'il en soit, les Roumains sont comme un îlot de l'Occident, providentiellement jeté au milieu de la mer des populations diverses qui couvrent l'Europe orientale. Pour nous restreindre à ceux de la Moldo-Valachie, il suffit de jeter les yeux sur une carte, pour voir qu'ils séparent nettement les deux grandes branches de la race slave, les Slaves du nord (Russes, etc.), et les Slaves du midi (Serbes, Bulgares, Bosniates, Monténégrins, Illyriens, Croates, etc.). C'est un point important qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue dans toute la question d'Orient, car il doit nous donner en partie le secret des répulsions que le czar a trouvées dans les Principautés, et des efforts qu'il a faits pour empiéter sur ce pays, en vue de se mettre en relation directe avec les populations slaves et grecques sur lesquelles s'exerce sa double propagande orthodoxe et panslaviste, — comme aussi il doit nous expliquer les aspirations des Moldo-Valaques vers les nations occidentales, et l'appui solide que nous sommes assurés de trouver chez eux.

On sait, en effet, que presque toutes les populations grecques et

slaves de la Turquie d'Europe (les Bosniates et une partie des Albanais exceptés) appartiennent, aussi bien que les Moldo-Valaques, au culte chrétien du rite grec ou orthodoxe, dont le czar s'est fait le patron.

Pour compléter ces indications sommaires, nous ajouterons que la Valachie renferme environ 2 millions et demi d'habitants, la Moldavie 1 million et demi, et la Bessarabie, que l'on projette de rendre au moins en partie aux Principautés, 1 million; total, pour ce seul groupe de Roumains, 5 millions au moins.

I.

BUT A ATTEINDRE CONTRE LA RUSSIE ET L'AUTRICHE.

Quel était l'objet de la guerre? Quel doit être l'objet de la paix? D'arrêter la Russie dans ses projets séculaires d'envahissement du côté de l'Orient. Pour se rendre compte des moyens d'atteindre le but, en ce qui touche les Principautés, il suffit de rappeler les moyens que la Russie a employés avec une si prodigieuse persévérance pour marcher à l'accomplissement de ses desseins; ils ont été de trois sortes :

1° Les moyens moraux, la propagande incessante, qui tend à faire considérer le czar par toutes les populations non turques de la Turquie, c'est-à-dire par les populations de la Turquie d'Europe presque entière, comme le protecteur et le futur sauveur de la religion et de la nationalité : c'est ainsi que la Russie a fomenté le mouvement hétairiste, le mouvement panslaviste; c'est ainsi qu'elle a soulevé la question des lieux saints; et c'est ainsi qu'elle tient encore sous son influence la masse principale des nations gréco-slaves de l'Europe orientale A cet égard, il faut le dire, on conçoit l'erreur de ces populations et le succès des intrigues russes. La vérité est que la Russie est, de toutes les puissances européennes et chrétiennes, celle qui a toujours paru s'intéresser le plus à leur sort; c'est à elle notamment qu'a été due en grande partie l'indépendance de la Grèce, et, à elle seule, la demi-indépendance de la Servie. C'est que tous les moyens sont bons à la Russie, c'est qu'en effet elle sera prodigue, non-seulement de promesses, mais de bienfaits réels et de libertés même pour les peuples qu'elle

veut asservir, jusqu'au jour où, son but atteint, elle les tiendra sous sa main de fer.

2° Il faut ajouter les moyens diplomatiques, qui, en même temps qu'ils doivent faire éclater aux yeux des populations chrétiennes de l'Orient la puissance de la Russie et l'intérêt qu'elle leur porte, ont continuellement pour objet de créer des points de litige entre elle et la Turquie, des prétextes pour intervenir entre cette dernière puissance et les populations soumises au croissant. Tel est le but principal du protectorat russe dans les Principautés, tel est le dessein de toutes les stipulations relatives à la Valachie et à la Moldavie, insérées dans les divers traités des deux puissances rivales, dessein merveilleusement servi, il faut le dire, par la situation de suzeraine que la Turquie se trouve avoir dans ces Principautés.

3° Mais ces deux actions propagandiste et diplomatique ne suffisent pas encore à expliquer la situation de la Russie à l'égard de la Turquie, le degré auquel elle est parvenue à entamer sa puissance et la facilité avec laquelle elle entre de plain-pied sur son territoire, chaque fois que sa politique la pousse à une invasion. A ces deux moyens généraux, elle a dû joindre des moyens plus particuliers, des plans stratégiques dont le principal objet a été réellement de s'assurer le libre accès de la Turquie par les Principautés. Ainsi, à mesure que nous pénétrons plus avant dans la question, nous voyons l'action de la Russie se resserrer et se concentrer plus spécialement sur le pays moldo-valaque. En effet, il importe essentiellement à la Russie, dans ses plans d'agression contre la Turquie, de pouvoir mettre tout de suite le pied chez son ennemie sans rencontrer aucun obstacle, et elle a employé toute son habileté à obtenir ce résultat. Pour l'atteindre, l'action de la propagande était insuffisante et presque stérile. La propagande russe n'a plus et ne peut plus guère avoir en Moldo-Valachie d'action sérieuse. Indépendamment des instincts de race et des aspirations nouvelles qui entraînent ce pays vers l'Occident, la Russie, à cause de son voisinage immédiat, y est trop bien connue maintenant. Sans doute, elle se représente toujours, dans ses proclamations et dans les traités, comme la bienveillante protectrice des Moldo-Valaques; mais depuis que ses cruelles invasions leur ont apporté tant de calamités, et depuis qu'elle s'est emparée elle-même d'une portion de ce territoire moldo-valaque dont elle avait garanti l'intégrité, elle ne peut plus, en Roumanie, tromper que le petit nombre de ceux qui ont un intérêt sordide à se lais-

ser sciemment tromper; et il faudrait que, par un absolu déni de justice de la part des puissances occidentales, ce peuple fût réduit aux dernières extrémités, pour que la Russie parvînt encore à l'égarer.— La Russie ne pouvait donc s'appuyer sur les sympathies des Moldo-Valaques pour lui ouvrir le chemin de la Turquie. — Mais précisément parce que le point d'appui moral lui manquait sur eux, elle avait d'autant plus besoin de s'y créer une situation matérielle très-sûre et très-forte, et pour cela il lui suffisait de les affaiblir. Ainsi, l'action morale devait ici se transformer; elle ne pouvait plus s'appeler propagande, il importait qu'elle fût positivement désorganisatrice et qu'elle opérât par tous les dissolvants. Ce qu'il fallait au czar, dans les Principautés, c'était une nation non-seulement sans armées, mais sans armes, sans forteresses, sans finances, sans industrie, sans existence politique, sans développement intellectuel et moral, en un mot, sans tout ce qui donne à un peuple la force et la vie; et c'est à quoi, sous les faux semblants d'une protection pleine de zèle pour la prospérité de ce pays, elle s'est appliquée avec son habileté et sa persévérance accoutumées. Nous n'énumérerons pas les procédés qu'elle a employés pour assurer ces résultats, par la double raison que les manœuvres de la Russie sont maintenant percées à jour, et que la nécessité d'écarter toute action et toute influence de sa part est maintenant un point de départ établi. Mais pour ne citer qu'un seul fait, qui garde toute son importance, ne s'est-elle pas suffisamment démasquée en allant jusqu'à priver les Principautés de leur frontière du nord-est, de cette forte ligne du Dniester, qui faisait leur principale valeur stratégique, et qui devait être le véritable rempart de la Turquie, comme celui des Moldo-Valaques eux-mêmes, contre ses envahissements? C'est qu'il lui faut, comme nous l'avons dit, la certitude d'entrer là librement chaque fois que sa politique le réclame; sans cela, tout le fruit de ses efforts séculaires est presque anéanti. Outre qu'elle n'aurait pu abuser si longtemps les nations occidentales sur le rôle de protectrice qu'elle prétendait jouer dans les Principautés, si le pays avait pu tourner sa force contre elle; outre ce motif, qui perd aujourd'hui de son importance devant l'Europe plus éclairée, la Russie en avait bien d'autres : c'était par ses irruptions soudaines dans les Principautés qu'elle pesait chaque fois sur les destinées de l'empire ottoman, qu'elle intervenait comme médiatrice entre la Porte et les peuples chrétiens, et qu'elle maintenait parmi eux son pres-

e, en ruinant moralement l'autorité du sultan; c'était là aussi
'elle entretenait sans frais ses armées, les Principautés étant
ellement ses greniers d'abondance pour chaque campagne. Mais
raison capitale de l'importance que la Russie attachait au libre
cès des Principautés, et ce qui rend très-vraisemblable l'opinion
créditée que le but prochain de sa récente entreprise contre la
ırquie était de s'emparer définitivement de leur territoire, c'est
e par là elle se mettait en communication directe et perma-
nte avec les Slaves méridionaux. La Moldo-Valachie, en effet,
ec ses cinq millions d'habitants de race latine, demeurait la seule
rrière morale qui la séparât de cette masse de populations qui,
algré les efforts de quelques Slaves intelligents, sont toujours
êtes à se lever à son appel; et cette barrière morale pouvait
ujours, à la faveur de quelque circonstance imprévue, comme il
ait failli arriver en 1848, se changer pour la Russie en obstacle
atériel. Le plus sûr était donc pour elle de réduire définitivement
pays sous sa domination. Ainsi, affaiblir les Moldo-Valaques
squ'à l'impuissance, et finalement les faire passer sous le joug, tel
ait le but prochain de sa politique en Orient. Les Principautés
aient et sont encore pour elle la clef de la Turquie d'Europe.

Avant de tirer la conclusion des considérations qui précèdent, La voie de
est le vérit
chemin d
Russie v
Constantin
marquons en passant qu'elles prouvent surabondamment, ce
ous semble, que le véritable chemin de la Russie vers Constan-
nople, n'est pas, comme on l'a dit quelquefois, la mer Noire,
ais bien la voie de terre. Sans doute une flotte peut être d'une
rande utilité à la Russie, dans une entreprise sur Constantinople;
ais la création d'une flotte est l'affaire de quelques années; tan-
is que c'est par des efforts poursuivis pendant un siècle, que le
zar s'est préparé la voie du côté du Danube et des Balkans. Une
elle persistance indique assez la juste importance que la Russie
ttache à cette route stratégique. Cette route, en effet, n'est pas seu-
ement un passage, elle est en même temps une immense conquête.

La conclusion naturelle de ce qui précède, c'est que la Moldo- Moyen
à
opposer
Russie
alachie, ayant été jusqu'ici le point central de toute la stratégie
ilitaire et diplomatique de la Russie dans ses entreprises pro-
ées sur l'Orient, et en même temps l'obstacle qu'il lui importait
anéantir pour développer sa stratégie propagandiste, c'est ce
oint-là qu'il s'agit de fortifier contre elle. A la place d'une nation
faiblie, appauvrie, démantelée, paralysée dans tous ses éléments
vie par le régime que lui ont imposé de concert la Turquie et

la Russie, — faire surgir comme par enchantement une nation forte, en la replaçant dans les conditions nécessaires au développement de ses grandes ressources militaires, de ses inépuisables richesses agricoles, et de sa vitalité nationale si persistante qu'elle a survécu à quinze siècles d'invasions; créer ainsi une barrière décisive entre la Russie et la Turquie, que les czars ont désignée de longue main pour leur proie, entre cette même Russie, et les peuples greco-slaves qui sont le levier le plus puissant dont les czars disposent pour l'accomplissement de leurs desseins; de cette nation ressuscitée faire une alliée certaine, inaliénable de la Turquie, non-seulement contre la Russie, mais contre l'Autriche, dont les convoitises suivent ici à la piste celles de la Russie; élever en même temps à un degré inconnu l'influence des nations occidentales en Orient; donner, par l'exemple de la régénération moldo-valaque, une direction nouvelle aux aspirations, impossibles à étouffer, des populations chrétiennes, grecques et slaves, de l'Europe orientale; apporter par là, dès à présent, à la Turquie, l'autorité morale qui lui manque pour accomplir les réformes si bien intentionnées, mais d'une application si difficile, qu'elle cherche à réaliser parmi ses sujets chrétiens : ce serait là sans doute une belle solution de la question d'Orient, et cette solution est facile, car elle dépend tout entière de la reconstitution de la Moldo-Valachie en une nation forte.

Vues Autriche.

Mais nous n'avons encore examiné qu'une des deux faces du danger qui menace et les Principautés, et la Turquie, et l'équilibre européen. Avant donc de proposer les moyens de reconstituer la Moldo-Valachie en une nation forte, suivons cet autre chemin parallèle qui nous ramènera au même but.

La direction que la Russie a donnée à ses efforts nous a indiqué l'obstacle que nous devons lui opposer. Les succès qu'elle a obtenus dans ses entreprises graduelles et patientes, souvent obliques et déguisées, doivent nous enseigner tout ce qu'on peut redouter d'une autre puissance qui reprendrait sa tâche en sous-œuvre et qui, lui succédant, la supplantant en apparence, s'engagerait dans les mêmes voies, et poursuivrait les mêmes fins. Or, cette puissance existe; elle est établie sur le terrain même de la contestation, elle a déjà commencé son œuvre, et d'autant plus dangereusement qu'elle a su exciter moins de défiances. Cette puissance, c'est l'Autriche.

L'Autriche, dont les destinées sont et resteront indissolublement liées à celles de la Russie jusqu'au jour où l'une de ces deux puissances croira avoir acquis sur l'autre une prépondérance décisive, l'Autriche n'a pas des vues moins positives que sa puissante voisine sur une partie au moins de la Turquie d'Europe et sur les Principautés. Nous citions plus haut son empressement à occuper ce territoire aussitôt après les Russes; mais ce n'est là qu'un signe entre beaucoup d'autres plus concluants encore. Ne sait-on pas que les derniers événements ont été pour toute l'Allemagne l'occasion d'exprimer des prétentions, dès longtemps nourries en secret, sur les Principautés, sur le Danube, et jusque sur la mer Noire? Indépendamment des journaux qui se sont faits l'écho de ces prétentions, une foule de brochures et même de gros volumes ont été publiés pour établir comment on pouvait d'avance convertir le Danube en fleuve allemand et germaniser les Principautés, ainsi qu'on a fait de la Bohême, en les colonisant. Cette perspective nouvelle de l'Allemagne a été précisément une des raisons de la prépondérance que l'Autriche a prise dernièrement vis-à-vis de la Prusse, dans la Confédération germanique. L'Autriche, un instant affaiblie et comme effacée, a retrouvé toute son importance en se posant comme représentante, en Orient, des intérêts allemands, qui ne tendent à rien moins qu'à faire de la Confédération une puissance triplement maritime, dont la domination s'étendrait jusqu'à la mer Noire. L'Autriche ne pouvait laisser échapper une pareille occasion d'influence vis-à-vis de la Confédération germanique, lorsque ses intérêts particuliers la poussaient dès longtemps dans la même voie. Elle possède déjà, en effet, plusieurs portions du territoire roumain, la Transylvanie et le Banat, provinces importantes acquises de longue main, et la Bukowine, qu'elle a trouvé moyen de se faire attribuer en 1776. Comment supposer qu'une puissance comme l'Autriche, qui n'est qu'un composé de nations diverses, c'est-à-dire dont le principe se fonde uniquement sur la conquête, qui possède déjà plus du tiers de la population roumaine, et qui est poussée dans cette voie d'envahissement par toute l'Allemagne, n'ait pas ses desseins sur les pays roumains qui s'étendent le long de sa frontière?

En réalité, l'Autriche a un triple intérêt à maintenir les Principautés dans l'état d'affaiblissement auquel elles sont réduites : par là elle se prépare les occasions de s'ingérer dans leurs affaires intérieures, comme a fait la Russie; par là elle laisse la Turquie

à découvert, ce qui lui est nécessaire pour l'accomplissement de ses desseins d'agrandissement du côté de la Turquie en général et des Principautés en particulier; par là enfin elle prévient un danger, réel ou chimérique, qui certainement la préoccupe : si elle n'absorbe pas les Principautés, elle craint que la force expansive de la nationalité roumaine n'entame un jour son empire par la Transylvanie, le Banat et la Bukowine ; et pour exprimer d'un mot cette préoccupation, elle craint d'avoir sur son flanc de l'est un autre Piémont. Ce sont là, nous ne le nions pas, des intérêts autrichiens; mais, précisément, parce que ce sont des intérêts autrichiens, ce sont des intérêts anti-européens, des intérêts hostiles à ceux des nations occidentales. Et la preuve c'est que, tandis que les nations occidentales confondent généreusement leurs intérêts avec ceux de la paix du monde, l'Autriche emploie tous ses efforts et toute son habileté à empêcher le moyen le plus efficace d'amener cette paix en Orient; tandis que les puissances occidentales visent à relever les Moldo-Valaques, à les rendre forts, ayant bien senti que c'est là le point capital de la question, — l'Autriche, qui veut tout le contraire, s'applique déjà à neutraliser, par d'habiles restrictions, tous les avantages qu'on se promet.

Nous pourrions citer plusieurs faits particuliers qui révèlent déjà la pensée secrète de l'Autriche. Mais il doit nous suffire de montrer ici que cette pensée, elle ne peut pas ne pas l'avoir.

Quant aux moyens d'action qu'elle emploiera, il faudrait entrer dans toutes les éventualités futures pour les prévoir exactement. Sa politique en effet est de ne suivre aucune ligne droite, de profiter également de toutes les alternatives contraires, de laisser les questions s'embrouiller, les conflits s'engager, puis d'intervenir, et pour prix de son concours auprès des uns, pour compensation de ses intérêts lésés auprès des autres, pour garantie de l'équilibre européen auprès de tous, de prendre sa part du butin, et finalement de se retirer du combat, dont elle n'a pas couru les dangers, tout à la fois avec les profits de la guerre, et avec les suffrages de la Confédération et de l'Europe elle-même, qui la déclarent la plus habile et la plus sage des nations.

L'Autriche, en effet, soit qu'on la considère chez elle, ou au dehors, dans la Confédération ou dans le concert européen, ne règne que par la division et ne grandit que par le désordre. Se donner pour un point d'appui et d'équilibre nécessaire, en opposant les classes, les races, les nations et les puissances les unes aux

autres et tous les intérêts entre eux, voilà le secret de sa politique. On comprend dès lors toutes les belles chances que lui offre une question aussi complexe que la question d'Orient, et toute l'habileté qu'elle emploiera pour faire en sorte que la solution prochaine ne soit pas une solution.

Sans entrer davantage ici dans un sujet qui demanderait de longs développements, et en nous réservant d'en dire plus long sur les points particuliers où nous rencontrerons l'Autriche déjà à l'œuvre, qu'il nous soit permis de faire une simple observation pour ceux qui douteraient encore.

Comment se fait-il que l'Autriche, elle si habile, si pénétrante, si voisine du théâtre de l'action, et si intéressée, ce semble, à empêcher l'agrandissement de la Russie en Orient, ait été la dernière à s'émouvoir des entreprises de cette puissance! De bon compte, si la France et l'Angleterre n'avaient tourné leur action commune sur l'Orient, croit-on que l'Autriche serait venue appeler leur attention sur les événements qui se préparaient? Pouvait-elle cependant voir le Danube devenir russe et la puissance moscovite l'envelopper depuis la mer Noire jusqu'à l'Adriatique? Non; la Prusse, éloignée du théâtre des événements, arrêtée par ses sympathies de principe et de famille, embarrassée d'ailleurs par sa situation dans la Confédération germanique, pouvait bien se laisser subjuguer par l'influence du czar; mais l'Autriche! elle avait trop à perdre pour être dupe; il fallait donc que de fait ou d'intention elle fût complice.

Devant un but commun les intérêts même les plus contraires en apparence se prêtent un mutuel appui. Jusqu'ici l'Autriche a laissé faire la Russie, bien certaine, le jour venu, d'avoir une part de la proie que la Russie convoite. Maintenant c'est l'Autriche qui a le rôle actif, et, pour mieux le jouer, elle continuera l'œuvre de la Russie sous prétexte de sauvegarder contre elle les intérêts européens. Ces deux puissances sont trop fines pour se tromper mutuellement, mais elles s'entendent à demi-mot et sourient de leurs propres ruses. Elles savent bien qu'elles ne peuvent maintenant, et de longtemps peut-être, vivre et grandir que l'une par l'autre; toute la question pour elles est de savoir laquelle des deux primera l'autre au moment de l'agrandissement définitif, et s'il y aura alors pour elles part tout à fait inégale ou part proportionnelle dans les bénéfices de la partie. Mais tant que le moment décisif n'est pas venu, il est un point sur lequel elles s'entendent

parfaitement, c'est de dévoiler le moins possible leurs menées réciproques.

Le jeu diplomatique qui a pour double but de laisser la Turquie ouverte à toutes les agressions, et d'abuser à cet égard les puissances occidentales, n'est donc pas interrompu; il a seulement passé en d'autres mains. La Russie a perdu du terrain de ce côté, l'Autriche va tâcher de le regagner.

De fait, si elle parvient à laisser ou à replacer les Principautés dans des conditions telles, que d'une part la force nationale du peuple moldo-valaque ne puisse se développer, et que d'autre part des conflits soient encore presque inévitables entre ce peuple et la Sublime Porte, on peut dire que le protectorat des Principautés lui est inévitablement dévolu. Car enfin, s'il devient nécessaire d'exercer une sorte de police dans les Principautés pour y rétablir l'ordre intérieur, ou si les circonstances exigent une intervention entre le suzerain et la nation vassale, qui exercera ce double ministère? Si même les Principautés, demeurant ce qu'elles sont, un pays sans force contre toute agression, on juge prudent d'y maintenir des garnisons étrangères, qui les occupera? Toutes les puissances signataires du traité? Oui, nominalement; mais en réalité ce ne pourra être, le plus souvent, qu'une puissance limitrophe; on ne voudra pas de la Russie, ce sera donc l'Autriche.

Quand on considère que, dans le moment même où l'attention et les forces de l'Occident étaient toutes portées de ce côté, l'Autriche a eu assez d'habileté pour remplir déjà, plus ou moins, tous ces rôles; quand on voit, entre autres faits de détail, que, sous les yeux de la France et de l'Angleterre unies par la plus étroite alliance, et lorsqu'elle paraissait annulée à Constantinople comme à Londres et à Paris, elle a eu, par son voisinage et par sa dextérité, assez d'empire pour faire rétablir en Valachie, contre le vœu des populations, contre les intentions de toutes les puissances, un prince comme Stirbey, nommé par la Russie, traître à son pays, rebelle à la Porte, et qui n'avait d'autre mérite que d'être venu chercher refuge chez elle et de s'être fait sa créature, il est bien permis de dire : « Que sera-ce lorsque les circonstances seront plus favorables pour elle! »

sance des ités.

Les circonstances ou les traités ont beau lier également en apparence des puissances intéressées et des puissances désintéressées, des puissances limitrophes et des puissances éloignées, la partie n'est pas égale. La convoitise et la proximité fournissent

aux unes des moyens d'action que n'auront jamais les autres. Comment empêcher les petits empiétements de chaque jour? Le plus souvent on les ignore; en eût-on connaissance, on ne peut, à chaque bagatelle, mettre l'Europe en feu. On patiente, on ferme les yeux; mais le jour vient où, de tous ces petits nuages amoncelés, qui n'étaient que vapeurs fugitives, sort un orage qui menace d'engloutir le monde.

Ce n'est donc pas sur les traités qu'il faut compter pour arrêter les convoitises soit de la Russie, soit de l'Autriche. C'est sur le terrain même de ces convoitises qu'il faut leur trouver un obstacle, et, quoi qu'on fasse, on n'en trouvera pas d'autre qu'une Moldo-Valachie régénérée.

Résumé d qui préc

Pour nous résumer, nous avons vu que la Russie puisait sa force contre la Turquie et contre l'équilibre du monde européen dans une triple stratégie, stratégie propagandiste qui s'appuie sur tous les Grecs et les Slaves de la Turquie d'Europe, stratégie diplomatique qui a son centre d'action à Constantinople, et qui porte tout particulièrement sur les Principautés, stratégie territoriale qui a pour double but d'annuler les Principautés et finalement de les absorber. Aujourd'hui l'œuvre séculaire de la diplomatie russe en Orient est anéantie par l'abrogation des traités et l'abolition du protectorat; mais, au même moment, la diplomatie autrichienne prend un rôle non moins important, non moins dangereux, et, pour peu que les circonstances s'y prêtent, l'Autriche hérite forcément du protectorat des Principautés. Quant à l'action propagandiste de la Russie, elle est à peine entamée : que disons-nous? elle va trouver un aliment tout nouveau dans les réformes que, sous l'influence occidentale, la Turquie doit introduire dans la condition civile et politique de ses sujets chrétiens, réformes louables, nécessaires, mais bien difficiles et mal acceptées[1]. Ainsi on peut dire que la propagande russe garde au moins toute sa force; et voilà qu'à côté de cette machine de guerre, s'en dresse une autre qui viendra en aide à la première, jusqu'au jour où elles se heurteront dans une conflagration générale de l'Orient, à savoir les intérêts allemands. Que reste-t-il donc à opposer à tous ces éléments hostiles et désorganisateurs? Un mur d'airain

1. Cela s'explique : l'égalité civile et politique exige l'égalité des charges, impôts, service militaire, etc. Jusqu'ici tous les rayas ont été exempts de ce service, et tous les Levantins, tous les habitants de Péra notamment, n'ont jamais payé aucune sorte d'impôts.

sur la question territoriale ! Il n'y a pas d'autre conclusion, d'autre solution possible.

Tout est là en effet. Qu'il existe aux confins de la Turquie, en face de la Russie et de l'Autriche, un peuple armé qui soit à l'abri des troubles intérieurs et des conflits diplomatiques, et qui ait un intérêt indestructible à défendre la Turquie contre ces deux puissances, puisque ces deux ennemies naturelles et nécessaires de la Turquie sont de toute nécessité les siens : voilà aussitôt la barrière trouvée aux envahissements diplomatiques, propagandistes (orthodoxes ou allemands) et finalement militaires ou territoriaux.

ue peut la o-Valachie.

Le peuple moldo-valaque n'apporte point ici de présomption ridicules, il ne veut faire illusion ni à l'Europe ni à lui-même. Il sait très-bien, et nous aussi, — premièrement, qu'il lui faudra un peu de temps pour se relever de ses ruines matérielles et morales et secondement, qu'il ne saurait jamais se poser comme une puissance à lutter contre la Russie ou l'Autriche, et encore moins contre toutes deux réunies. Nous ferons remarquer toutefois qu'une nation de cinq millions d'âmes qui se lève tout entière au nom de son indépendance est bien forte, surtout lorsqu'elle s'appuie sur des conditions géographiques très-favorables. La Moldo-Valachie doit être et elle aspire à devenir la Suisse de l'Orient !

L'éloignement et, plus encore, le schisme qui isolait les Moldo-Valaques des nations occidentales, a empêché celles-ci de connaître les exploits merveilleux de leurs ancêtres, du temps d'Étienne-le-Grand et de Michel-le-Brave ; mais le peuple roumain ne les a pas oubliés.

Au surplus, quand même il faudrait aux Moldo-Valaques un certain nombre d'années pour acquérir une force de résistance respectable, ils n'en seraient pas moins, dès avant cela, le mur de séparation qu'il s'agit d'établir entre la Turquie et les deux puissances qui convoitent ses dépouilles. Le grand point, en effet, c'est, 1° que tout prétexte soit ôté à ces deux puissances d'intervenir subrepticement dans les affaires de la Turquie, d'empiéter peu à peu sur elle et sur les Principautés, et 2°, qu'il leur devienne impossible d'entrer de plain-pied sur ce territoire, ou même de s'en emparer par un coup de main. — Ce qui importe, avant tout, c'est que la situation soit nette diplomatiquement et militairement, c'est qu'on ne puisse pas envahir les Principautés moralement ni matériellement, à petit bruit, et sans qu'il y paraisse par des empiétements insensibles et successifs. Le jour où l'on ne

pourra franchir ni la limite des traités, ni celle de ce territoire, sans que ce soit par le fait une déclaration de guerre à l'Europe, ce jour-là l'Orient sera tranquille.

II.

PROPOSITIONS DE VIENNE. — LA SUZERAINETÉ NON DÉFINIE.

Est-ce là le résultat qu'on peut attendre du développement des propositions formulées par la cour de Vienne en ce qui concerne le premier point des garanties de paix? Nous devons l'avouer, les termes de ces propositions nous inquiètent : et comment en serait-il autrement, quand c'est l'Autriche qui a tenu la plume pour la rédaction de l'acte?

On commence par établir l'abolition complète du protectorat russe dans les Principautés. C'était là en effet la première chose à faire, et nous n'avons ici qu'à applaudir. Mais les conditions mêmes qui ont amené l'ingérence de la Russie dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés, et celles qui sont résultées de cette ingérence, quels les rapports des Principautés avec la Porte, ces rapports déjà faussés avant que la Russie intervînt sous le prétexte de les redresser, ces rapports qui depuis ont été complétement dénaturés, sont-ils changés, améliorés, éclaircis? C'est tout le contraire qu'il faut dire; sur ce point capital où devait surtout porter la lumière, tout semble avoir été obscurci à dessein : on reconnaît bien là la main de l'Autriche.

Dans le court examen que nous allons faire de ce texte important, mais qui heureusement n'a rien de définitif, nous devons distinguer tout d'abord ce qui est de stipulation plus ou moins obligatoire vis-à-vis de la Russie, et ce qui n'est que bases provisoires d'arrangements entre les autres puissances, ou même simples termes de rédaction appartenant plus particulièrement à telle ou telle de ces puissances. En effet, sur ce qui touche directement la Russie, il est difficile de rien changer aux propositions faites et acceptées; et c'est pourquoi nous écarterons, quant à présent, la question de délimitation de son territoire avec les Principautés, tout en nous réservant de montrer plus loin combien l'arrangement adopté à cet égard est regrettable. Mais tout ce qui est étranger à la Russie, l'abolition de son protectorat sur les Principautés étant préalablement établie, c'est-à-dire tout le

reste des propositions formulées dans le premier point, est modifiable à volonté; et c'est pourquoi nous croyons utile de signaler les dangers qui s'y trouvent renfermés.

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« Les Principautés, est-il dit en commençant, conserveront leurs priviléges et immunités sous la suzeraineté de la Porte. » Voilà d'abord une question bien grave tranchée sans plus d'examen, le maintien de la suzeraineté. Mais encore de quelle suzeraineté veut-on parler? de la vraie suzeraineté établie par les anciennes conventions des Principautés avec la Porte, ou de la suzeraineté abusive qui s'exerce de fait depuis si longtemps? On comprendrait que cette question ne fût pas résolue dans un acte qui ne contient que des bases si générales; dans tous les cas, nous osons dire que les puissances occidentales n'ont pu avoir un instant la pensée de la résoudre dans le dernier sens : c'est ce dernier sens cependant que l'Autriche a eu le talent de faire prévaloir dans sa rédaction. L'expression *conserveront* et même celles de *priviléges et immunités*, sont déjà de mauvais augure, car ces dernières sont les expressions consacrées par le régime actuel du pays et non celles qui rendent l'esprit des traités; mais aucun doute ne peut rester devant les termes que nous allons souligner en reproduisant la suite de cet article : « et le sultan, de concert avec les puissances contractantes, *accordera* en outre à ces Principautés, ou y confirmera une organisation intérieure conforme aux besoins et aux vœux des populations. » Dans l'article suivant que nous voulons citer à part, on voit encore que tout armement dans les Principautés ne se fera que *d'accord avec la puissance suzeraine.* Tout cela est contraire aux traités, comme nous le démontrerons plus loin : tout cela c'est la suzeraineté convertie en souveraineté. Est-ce ainsi qu'on fera de la Moldo-Valachie une nation forte? Mais, qu'on y songe, cette suzeraineté abusive et non définie, c'est précisément là ce qui a servi de point de départ à toutes les intrigues diplomatiques de la Russie à Constantinople, et c'est par cette porte qu'elle est entrée dans les Principautés et jusqu'au cœur de la Turquie. Qu'arrivera-t-il si les priviléges et immunités, que personne d'ailleurs ne saurait plus définir, ne sont pas strictement respectés, ou si la Porte les entend d'une façon et les Moldo-Valaques d'une autre, ou seulement même si une puissance, intéressée à supposer et à fomenter des malentendus, prétend que le suzerain et le tributaire ne sont pas d'accord? Les puissances oc-

cidentales interviendront pour vider le différend ! fort bien, elles interviendront toutes ensemble aujourd'hui ; mais demain, leurs préoccupations étant ailleurs, elles chargeront l'Autriche d'y pourvoir ; et après-demain, l'Autriche, si ce n'est la Russie elle-même, y veillera toute seule — à sa manière. Dès lors toutes les difficultés diplomatiques renaîtront, des droits exclusifs de protection et d'ingérence se rétabliront peu à peu au profit d'une puissance envahissante, au profit de l'Autriche sans doute pour commencer. Cela est presque inévitable dans le cas même où la quadruple alliance de la France, de l'Angleterre, du Piémont et de l'Autriche ne serait jamais troublée ; que sera-ce si elle se dissout ? et comment croire qu'elle puisse être perpétuelle ?

Dans ces conditions, « l'organisation intérieure » qu'on promet aux Principautés ne sera qu'un champ de plus ouvert à toutes les influences contraires, à toutes les intrigues intérieures, à tous les conflits de l'étranger. Nous vous en conjurons, prenez garde à l'Autriche !

Mais poursuivons : il est écrit dans les propositions de Vienne : « *D'accord avec la puissance suzeraine*, les Principautés adopteront *un système défensif permanent* réclamé par leur situation géographique ; *aucune entrave* ne saurait être apportée *aux mesures extraordinaires de défense* qu'elles seraient appelées à prendre pour repousser toute agression étrangère. » Ici, qu'on nous permette de le dire, ce n'est plus seulement une possibilité de conflit entre la Porte et les Principautés qui est ouverte au profit des intrigues extérieures, c'est le conflit en permanence, lequel ne peut se terminer qu'en réduisant cet article à une lettre morte, et en annulant de plus toutes les améliorations, de quelque genre qu'elles soient, qu'on promet aux Principautés ; et c'est bien sur ce double résultat que comptent l'Autriche et la Russie. En effet, comme il est essentiellement dans les tendances d'un pouvoir faible de redouter tout ce qui peut faire la force d'une nation qui lui est subordonnée, et de se persuader que tout élément de résistance développé dans cette nation doit tourner contre lui, la Porte, tant que sa suzeraineté lui permettra de s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures des Principautés, ne pourra jamais se résoudre à favoriser l'extension de leurs ressources militaires : si elle s'y décide un jour, elle adoptera le lendemain un parti contraire ; de là des tiraillements incessants, des réclamations irritantes des deux parts. Si la Turquie laisse élever des forteresses, ou en élève elle-même en

Moldo-Valachie, elle prétendra les occuper, et alors, nous le disons avec une conviction profonde, l'œuvre d'alliance entre les Moldo-Valaques et les Turcs, cette œuvre qui a demandé un si long temps pour s'accomplir, et à laquelle les chefs roumains de 1848 sont fiers d'avoir efficacement coopéré, — car c'est sur elle que doit reposer la paix de l'Orient, — cette œuvre d'alliance est anéantie. En effet, ces hommes sont bien parvenus, la Russie aidant, à convaincre le peuple que ses intérêts étaient conformes à ceux de la Turquie, et à le faire sympathiser à distance avec la cause turque; mais quant à l'accoutumer à un contact quotidien et prolongé avec les Turcs, c'est à quoi de plus habiles qu'eux ne réussiraient pas aisément. Comment, en effet, détruire en un jour cette opposition si radicale dans les mœurs, dans la religion, dans tout ce qui constitue les traditions et les habitudes des deux peuples? Comment faire oublier aux Roumains que les Turcs qui, d'après leurs stipulations, n'ont le droit de mettre le pied chez eux que pour les défendre, n'y sont jamais venus qu'en ennemis, ou tout au moins en étrangers, traînant à leur suite tous les malheurs de la guerre, tous les vices d'une organisation militaire mal réglée? Non; pour effacer de telles impressions populaires, pour confondre dans la bataille des éléments si disparates, il faut des circonstances extraordinaires, il faut précisément les émotions de la bataille et le sentiment du danger commun. Que les Turcs viennent dans les Principautés confondre leurs rangs avec ceux des Roumains, quand ils leur auront donné autre chose que la misère et l'oppression, quand la Moldo-Valachie sera une nation, quand le salut commun sera menacé, alors, nous pouvons le promettre, ils seront les bienvenus! Mais nous ne pouvons croire qu'il entre dans la pensée des puissances occidentales de leur accorder, comme une chose sans conséquence, le droit exorbitant, qu'ils n'ont jamais eu, de tenir garnison dans les Principautés.

Ce droit, les Turcs l'ont en Servie, et voyez ce qui arrive : les canons de Belgrade sont braqués sur la ville, au lieu d'être dirigés contre l'extérieur. Ce droit, les Turcs l'ont usurpé quelque temps dans les Principautés, et voyez quel en a été le résultat : les Russes, en les chassant, et en leur rappelant que c'était là une usurpation, se sont rendus un instant populaires parmi les Roumains.

En introduisant les Turcs en permanence dans les forteresses moldo-valaques, on ne pourvoit à rien; d'un côté, en effet, les Turcs,

qui n'ont ni assez de troupes ni assez d'argent pour défendre leurs propres forteresses et les tenir en bon état, ne pourront pourvoir à la défense des Principautés démantelées, et ils se trouveront d'ailleurs noyés dans une population devenue forcément hostile, et contre laquelle se tourneront leurs préoccupations ; et d'autre part, on annule toute force intérieure ; car, ainsi que nous le disions plus haut, la puissance suzeraine s'alarmera toujours du développement des ressources militaires roumaines, qu'elle considérera comme un instrument d'indépendance.

Ainsi les Principautés resteront sans défense, ou sans défense sérieuse ; et, soit que la Porte les laisse désarmées ou prétende s'y armer elle-même, le pays sera mécontent, et ce sera une cause permanente de différends entre la Porte et les Moldo-Valaques. De là encore, et plus que jamais, l'ingérence presque inévitable, dans les Principautés, de l'une des deux grandes puissances voisines.

De là, comme de tout ce que produira la suzeraineté illimitée, une autre conséquence encore : comme, d'une part, il est impossible d'attendre d'une puissance suzeraine froissée par des malentendus sans cesse renaissants, aucune disposition favorable au développement et à la prospérité du peuple tributaire ; comme, d'autre part, les ingérences que nous prévoyons auront précisément pour double objet immédiat de perpétuer ces malentendus, et d'empêcher la régénération des Moldo-Valaques, en semant la division, la corruption et les intrigues parmi eux, les améliorations intérieures qu'on promet tomberont à néant.

On représentera alors les Moldo-Valaques comme un peuple remuant et avili, impossible à régénérer, aussi incapable de se gouverner que de se défendre. Pendant ce temps-là l'Autriche et la Russie triompheront secrètement : car les Principautés seront devenues pour l'une ou l'autre de ces deux puissances une proie certaine, et toute la Turquie d'Europe restera ouverte à leurs ambitions.

A l'appui des considérations que nous venons de faire valoir, qu'il nous soit permis de citer un seul fait qui prouvera à la fois combien il est facile d'alarmer la Porte à l'endroit de tout armement qui serait fait pour sa défense, et combien l'Autriche a de prise sur elle par ce côté. Certes, s'il y eut jamais un moment où une levée du peuple moldo-valaque contre ses envahisseurs fut indiquée comme utile, désirable, et en même temps sans aucun

danger possible pour les prérogatives du sultan, puisqu'il avait le trois armées alliées à son service, c'était bien au moment de l dernière campagne du Danube ; sur plusieurs points le pays éta prêt à se soulever contre les Russes; la Porte, après quelques hés tations, s'était décidée à adresser un appel aux Roumains ; des che avaient été choisis. Sur une parole de l'Autriche, ce projet fi subitement abandonné. Ceci pourtant se passait, lorsque l France et l'Angleterre avaient les yeux sur les Principautés leurs armées dans leur voisinage : le fait n'en resta pas moi comme inaperçu. Si cependant la Moldo-Valachie ne doit p prendre les armes dans des circonstances ultérieures analogu à celles de l'année dernière, il est bien inutile de chercher à faire une sentinelle avancée de la Turquie.

III.

PREMIÈRE SOLUTION. — L'INDÉPENDANCE.

endance, e peut.

La conséquence forcée de tout ce qui précède, — nous le diso presque malgré nous, car nous ne voudrions pas qu'on pût no accuser d'être trop absolu dans nos conclusions, — c'est qu pour faire une Moldo-Valachie vraiment forte, vraiment abrit contre les invasions diplomatiques et militaires, il faudrait, po première condition, la faire indépendante.

Mais comme il est de notre devoir, en même temps que de pr senter la vérité dans toute sa lumière, de ne négliger aucune d chances qui peuvent rester à ce malheureux pays d'obtenir d améliorations quelconques, et de se rapprocher des conditio qui doivent lui permettre de prendre une part efficace à la défen de la Turquie et au maintien de l'équilibre européen, nous che cherons les moyens subsidiaires, non de conjurer tous les péri mais de les amoindrir.

Nous ne pouvons cependant quitter cette grande question l'indépendance, sans la montrer sous son véritable aspect.

upture ıtrat entre Porte et ncipautés.

La question de droit est bien simple : nous ne parlons pas droit abstrait, mais de celui qui résulte de la teneur des trait Les stipulations des Principautés avec la Sublime Porte, en accordant sur ces Principautés certains droits que nous examin rons plus loin, les subordonnent tous à une condition, c'est qu'e

les protégera contre tous leurs ennemis; c'est uniquement pour obtenir cette garantie qu'elles doivent lui payer tribut. Or, la Porte a-t-elle rempli ses obligations envers les Moldo-Valaques? Loin de pouvoir les défendre, elle a été bientôt réduite à ne pas pouvoir se protéger elle-même; et, au lieu de sauvegarder les droits qu'elle leur avait garantis, elle a été obligée d'en faire la monnaie dont elle payait ses défaites. En retour du tribut que les Principautés lui ont toujours compté exactement, elle avait garanti l'intégrité de leur territoire; et elle-même, lorsqu'en 1699, à Carlowitz, les ambassadeurs polonais demandaient la cession de la Moldavie, elle déclarait que « le sultan n'était pas en droit de céder cette principauté à qui que ce soit, parce qu'elle s'était soumise à l'empire de son plein gré et n'avait pas été conquise par le sabre : » et cependant, en 1776, elle livrait la Bukowine à l'Autriche ou la lui laissait donner par la Russie; et, en 1812, par le traité de Bucharest, elle cédait positivement la Bessarabie aux Russes. En retour du même tribut, elle assurait également aux Moldo-Valaques leur entière autonomie, leur parfaite indépendance intérieure : et cependant, sans parler des empiétements qu'elle a commis elle-même, ses traités avec la Russie, surtout depuis 1812, n'ont été qu'une suite d'actes par lesquels elle livrait l'administration intérieure du pays à l'influence étrangère.

Les Moldo-Valaques, eux, ont rempli fidèlement leurs engagements; ils ont toujours payé le tribut, — souvent au centuple, car, outre que le chiffre en a été démesurément augmenté, outre qu'il a fallu y ajouter en toutes occasions des *présents*, chaque fois que la Turquie a eu besoin de bois pour ses flottes, ce sont les forêts des Principautés qui le lui ont fourni, et chaque fois qu'elle a eu besoin de leurs denrées pour ses troupes, elles les lui ont livrées pour la moitié ou le quart de leur valeur. Ses engagements à elle, la Turquie les a violés : régulièrement et en bonne justice, le contrat est rompu.

Si, au lieu de considérer les engagements dans le passé, on les considère au point de vue de leur exécution possible dans le présent, on arrive à la même conclusion. En effet, pourquoi les Principautés sont-elles tributaires de la Porte? Pour qu'elle les protége contre tout envahissement : c'est là l'unique cause de sa suzeraineté, ne l'oublions pas. Eh bien, est-ce que la Turquie est en état de protéger ce pays? Loin de là, sans doute, puisque les puissances cherchent aussi bien que nous, dans la reconstitution

des Principautés, des éléments de force extérieurs pour la garantir contre les invasions.

Et cette impuissance de la Turquie à protéger les Principautés et à garantir toute sa frontière du nord, on ne peut ni s'en étonner ni la lui reprocher trop vivement. Car il ne faut pas perdre de vue que sur les 10 millions et demi de population dont se compose la Turquie d'Europe (sans compter les 5 millions de Roumains des deux principautés, qui ne sont pas *sujets* turcs comme nous le verrons), il n'y a que 2 millions de Turcs, et tout 4 millions de musulmans de race turque ou autre, en sorte qu'il reste 6 millions d'habitants, orthodoxes de race slave ou grecque, c'est-à-dire, par la force des choses, plus ou moins hostiles à la Turquie et plus ou moins dévoués quant à présent à la Russie. Comment donc, de ses deux millions de population turque en Europe, la Porte pourrait-elle tirer la force suffisante pour garantir et défendre ce grand territoire mal soumis qu'on appelle la Turquie européenne?

Quoi qu'il en soit, il reste établi qu'au point de vue de l'accomplissement des engagements dans le présent comme dans le passé les stipulations des Principautés avec la Porte n'ont plus de raison d'être.

La question de droit était nécessaire à vider pour écarter toute obscurités; mais on aurait tort de voir là de notre part aucune intention d'irriter le débat, de rien faire ni rien dire de désagréable à la Porte. Ce qui nous domine, au contraire, c'est la préoccupation des intérêts de la Turquie et de l'équilibre européen, c'est la conviction que l'indépendance des Principautés serait la meilleure garantie de ces intérêts.

tions de la Porte.

Cette vérité, la Turquie elle-même l'avait presque acceptée. De 1848 à 1853, nous l'avons vue très-disposée à reconnaître qu'il n'aurait pas de meilleur rempart ni de meilleur soutien pour elle qu'une Moldo-Valachie indépendante. Comment, depuis lors, la vérité s'est-elle obscurcie à ses yeux? C'est ce que nous n'avons pas à examiner; mais nous sommes bien convaincu que s'il nous était donné d'entrer dans le secret de toutes les influences, nous y rencontrerions bien vite celle de l'Autriche.

Cette situation, bien regrettable, est précisément ce qui nous fait un devoir de rechercher les moyens secondaires d'atteindre le but qu'on se propose, pour le cas où les puissances occidentales trouveraient, dans l'opposition de la Turquie et de ceux qui sont

intéressés à la laisser sans défense, un obstacle insurmontable au moyen le plus héroïque.

Mais avant de passer à cette autre partie de notre tâche, ne manquons pas de le dire, cette indépendance qui réaliserait le vœu le plus ardent des Moldo-Valaques, ils sont prêts à l'acheter par tous les sacrifices compatibles avec cette indépendance même et l'honneur de leur nation. Remarquez-le bien, tandis que leurs ancêtres, si redoutables alors, mais entourés d'ennemis, — Hongrois, Polonais, Turcs, Bulgares et autres, — mais dévorés par les luttes intestines, mais reniés et méconnus par toute la chrétienté, faisaient alliance avec le grand Bajazet et le puissant Mahomet II, pour se ménager au moins un point d'appui certain dans les circonstances désespérées, les Roumains d'aujourd'hui, bien déchus, hélas! mais forts de l'appui moral des nations occidentales qui a manqué à leurs pères, et confiants dans le sentiment de régénération qui les anime, ne demandent que le droit de verser leur sang pour la défense de la Turquie et pour la sécurité de l'Europe. N'importe : ce droit, qui se résout ici dans l'abrogation de leurs traités avec la Porte, ils l'achèteront, si l'on veut, et nous sommes autorisé à le dire, du même prix que leurs ancêtres ont payé les promesses contenues dans ces mêmes traités; si la Turquie tient à avoir de leur part une marque de déférence en même temps qu'à ne pas se priver d'un avantage fiscal, ils consentent à lui payer, en reconnaissance du bienfait le plus clair qu'ils auront finalement reçu d'elle, la valeur du tribut établi, non plus en arrérages, ce qui serait en contradiction avec le principe d'indépendance, mais en capital.

Les Rou
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rembours
du tril

Que la Porte se décide à cette solution, et nous promettons qu'elle ne s'en repentira pas. Cette nation, qu'elle aura rendue à son indépendance, n'oubliera jamais un pareil service. Elle ne demande qu'à signer avec elle un traité d'alliance perpétuelle contre ses ennemis extérieurs, qui sont la Russie et l'Autriche. Elle ne peut aller au delà, bien entendu; elle ne peut entrer dans les démêlés qui pourraient survenir entre la Sublime Porte et ses sujets chrétiens : de ce côté, c'est la neutralité de la Moldo-Valachie qui importe; cette neutralité dans les affaires intérieures de tout Etat, cette neutralité, qu'il s'agit précisément d'établir en Orient est de droit public, elle est d'intérêt européen, et, avec l'indépendance, elle devient de droit et d'intérêt roumains.

IV.

SECONDE SOLUTION. — L'UNION SOUS LA SUZERAINETÉ CONFORME AUX TRAITÉS.

1. LA SUZERAINETÉ DÉFINIE.

Si cependant l'indépendance de la Moldo-Valachie rencontrait des obstacles insurmontables, quel serait le moyen d'approcher du but qu'on se propose? Nous répondons sans hésiter : l'union des deux Principautés en un seul État sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, cette suzeraineté étant nettement définie conformément aux anciens traités.

Cette solution présente deux points comme on le voit, et, pour plus de clarté, nous commencerons par celui des deux qui se rapporte à la suzeraineté du sultan : il est bien simple.

zeraineté. Tous les rapports des Principautés avec la Porte sont réglés par trois traités très-courts, dont il est essentiel de donner ici le résumé.

Le traité conclu par la Valachie avec Bajazid Ier, sous forme de hatti-humajun, signé par ce prince, à Nicopolis, en 1392, est le premier qui ait créé des liens entre les Principautés et la Turquie. Par ce traité, Mircea Ier s'engageait à payer au sultan un tribut annuel de 3000 piastres rouges du pays, ou 500 piastres turques; mais en même temps ce traité déclare expressément que la Valachie « se gouvernera d'après ses propres lois, » et que « le prince conservera le droit de faire la paix et la guerre, et celui de vie et de mort sur ses sujets, » en sorte qu'il n'entame aucunement la souveraineté du peuple valaque.

de 1460. Les Valaques, après avoir plusieurs fois refusé de payer le tribut, et avoir même battu les Turcs en plusieurs rencontres, furent obligés, par les circonstances, non par la force des armes, de conclure, en 1460, à Andrinople, un nouveau traité plus onéreux que le premier, quant au chiffre du tribut qui est porté à 10 000 piastres, mais qui est plus explicite encore dans les clauses qui garantissent l'indépendance intérieure et extérieure des Valaques, et dont la forme même est remarquablement modeste pour un acte émané de cette chancellerie orientale, qui avait, surtout alors, pour habitude d'employer des expressions si majestueuses. Il ne faut pas oublier, en effet, que cette *capitulation* (c'est le terme consacré), signée par le sultan seul, suivant l'usage, émané

Mahomet II, le puissant conquérant qui porta à son apogée la
ndeur musulmane. — L'acte commence par ces simples mots :
rt. 1er. Le sultan consent et s'engage, pour lui-même et pour
successeurs, à protéger la Valachie, et à la défendre contre
t ennemi, sans exiger autre chose que la suprématie sur la
veraineté (c'est-à-dire la suzeraineté) de cette Principauté, dont
voïvodes seront tenus de payer à la Sublime Porte un tribut
dix mille piastres. » Au fond, voilà tout le traité, il commence
r un engagement du sultan au profit de la Valachie, en retour
quel engagement on lui reconnaît une suprématie nominale
i n'aura d'expression réelle que dans le tribut annuel. Nous
ons une suprématie nominale, car tout le reste du traité, qui
t en onze articles, n'a pour objet que de bien établir qu'il ne
ra rien ôté aux droits de souveraineté de la nation valaque ; ainsi,
t. 2 : « La Sublime Porte n'aura aucune ingérence dans l'admi-
stration locale de ladite Principauté, et il ne sera permis à au-
n Turc d'aller en Valachie, sans un motif ostensible. » Art. 5 :
La nation valaque continuera de jouir du libre exercice de ses
opres lois, et les voïvodes auront le droit de vie et de mort sur
rs sujets (c'est le droit de souveraineté du temps, à l'intérieur),
mme celui de faire la paix et la guerre (droit de souveraineté à
xtérieur), sans être soumis, pour aucun de ces actes, à aucune
sponsabilité envers la Sublime Porte. » On stipule ensuite une
ule de garanties de détail, mais dont plusieurs sont très-remar-
ables, comme celles-ci : que « les *sujets valaques* qui auraient
casion d'aller dans quelque partie que ce soit des possessions
tomanes, ne pourront être forcés à payer le haratche ou la taxe
capitation, à laquelle sont soumis les rayas » (art. 7), et que
si un Turc a un procès en Valachie avec un *sujet du pays*, sa
use sera entendue et jugée par le divan valaque, conformément
ux lois locales » (art. 8); « qu'aucune mosquée ne pourra jamais
re établie sur aucune partie du territoire valaque » (art. 10), etc.
Parmi les clauses de ce traité, il n'y en a qu'une seule qui de-
ande quelques mots d'explication. L'article 4 porte : « Les
ïvodes continueront d'être élus par l'archevêque, les évêques et
s boyards, et l'élection sera reconnue par la Porte. » On a induit
e là que la Valachie s'engageait à faire reconnaître ses princes
ar la Porte; d'accord, c'est là le signe moral de la suzeraineté
u sultan, comme le tribut en est le signe matériel; mais il faut
jouter bien vite que cet article engage également la Porte à

L'investit
obligée

reconnaître tout prince que la nation aura mis à sa tête; et, lorsqu'on voit cet article mêlé à tous ceux qui ont pour but d'assurer à la Valachie la conservation de ses droits comme nation, on ne peut douter que ce fût là principalement le sens intentionnel de cette disposition. Quant à l'expression : « les voïvodes continueront d'être élus par l'archevêque, les évêques et les boyards, » elle n'est que l'équivalent, en un point spécial, de cette autre expression : « la nation valaque continuera de jouir du libre exercice de ses propres lois, » et elle n'entraîne aucune obligation dans la forme selon laquelle cette jouissance aura lieu, — pas plus que le droit de vie et de mort reconnu au voïvode n'oblige les princes actuels de Valachie à distribuer la vie et la mort parmi leurs sujets : ce qui nous conduit à dire que les Valaques restent libres de choisir la forme de gouvernement qui leur convient, sous la seule condition qu'au moment de son avénement leur roi héréditaire, prince temporaire ou à vie, voïvode ou président, quel que soit le nom qu'ils veuillent donner au chef de ce gouvernement, fera hommage au sultan, et recevra de lui l'investiture féodale, comme y étaient tenus autrefois beaucoup de souverains.

Sur cette question de l'investiture obligée, nous savons bien qu'il y aura toujours matière à discussion, c'est-à-dire matière à intrigues et à calamités, autant pour la Porte que pour les Principautés elles-mêmes. Si l'on voulait s'armer ici de tous les arguments du droit féodal, si l'on voulait chercher à prévoir l'impossible, supposer l'investiture réclamée par un intrigant et un usurpateur, on aurait la chance de faire introduire dans la clause quelque exception pour les cas extraordinaires, ce qui serait tout simplement l'annuler. Il y aurait à discuter là-dessus pendant des heures. Tout ce que nous dirons, c'est que nous avons retourné la question dans tous les sens, et qu'en consultant à la fois l'autorité du texte et celle de l'histoire des Principautés, nous n'avons trouvé à cette question d'autre solution vraie que celle-ci : point d'exceptions, de restrictions quelconques. C'est d'ailleurs le seul moyen d'éviter, sous le régime de la suzeraineté, le retour de toutes les complications, de tous les malheurs auxquels on cherche un remède. Si nous insistions sur ce sujet, ce serait uniquement pour prouver à la Porte l'intérêt qu'elle aurait à réduire sa suzeraineté au tribut annuel, et à se démettre elle-même de cette prétendue prérogative de l'hommage et de l'investiture, qui

au fond porte atteinte à sa dignité et à sa liberté, et qui ne peut que lui créer des embarras. Ce qui nous dispense d'en dire plus long, c'est que nous avons lieu d'espérer que cette question, beaucoup plus grave qu'il ne paraît, se tranchera d'elle-même. Nous renvoyons sur ce point à la fin du présent mémoire.

Mais reprenons l'analyse des capitulations. Pour la Valachie, il n'y en a pas d'autre que les deux que nous venons de faire connaître, et dont la seconde est définitive. La Moldavie, elle, n'en a qu'une.

La Moldavie ne reconnut l'autorité du sultan qu'en 1513; et, comme c'était tout à fait de son plein gré, *la seule chose* qui fut exigée du prince (Bogdan), c'est qu'il enverrait tous les ans à la Porte un *présent* (peschslesch) déterminé. Ce n'est qu'en 1583 que le présent fut converti en tribut, par une sorte de violence dont on pourrait contester la validité.

Les clauses du traité de 1460 ne s'appliqueraient donc pas à la Moldavie. Mais les deux Principautés ayant été de fait soumises au même régime, nous consentons à reconnaître, pour l'une comme pour l'autre, le plus onéreux des trois traités.

Résumé capitulati

Or, nous venons de résumer tout le fond de cette capitulation de 1460, qui est l'unique fondement de la suzeraineté de la Porte. Ses clauses se réduisent à celles-ci : d'un côté, tribut et hommage ; de l'autre, protection contre les ennemis et investiture obligée. Quoique la Turquie ne puisse donner aux Moldo-Valaques une protection efficace, et quoiqu'il y ait quelque chose de bien suranné dans l'hommage féodal et même dans le tribut, qui d'ailleurs n'a plus de cause, — que l'on conserve ce régime, si la Porte et les puissances représentées au Congrès le trouvent bon ; mais qu'on le ramène du moins à la simplicité primitive qu'il n'aurait jamais dû perdre, et qu'on le définisse nettement comme nous venons de le faire. C'est le seul moyen d'éviter à l'avenir les complications de toute sorte et les ingérences étrangères qui ont dénaturé les rapports des Principautés avec la Porte, et de leur laisser la possibilité d'une existence nationale.

En effet, depuis la conclusion de ces traités, c'est-à-dire depuis 1460 pour la Valachie, et 1513 pour la Moldavie, une foule de dérogations y ont été apportées par un ensemble de circonstances très-complexes et dans l'exposé desquelles nous n'entrerons pas, par la double raison que ce serait faire l'histoire des deux Principautés pendant trois ou quatre siècles, et qu'une telle étude n'est pas

Les
itulations
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ir valeur.

nécessaire à notre objet. Tout ce qu'il importe de savoir, c'e
que l'autorité de ces capitulations, malgré leur ancienneté, e
au-dessus de toute contestation, qu'elle n'a jamais été attaquée
— ni par la Russie, qui au contraire a toujours prétendu défendr
les droits légitimes des Moldo-Valaques contre la Turquie, — ni pa
la Porte elle-même, qui, en y dérogeant trop souvent, n'a jamai
pris son point d'appui que dans les nécessités réelles ou supposée
auxquelles elle était réduite, — et qu'enfin, dans les complication
européennes qui viennent d'avoir lieu et dans les conclusions d
paix qui se préparent, ces traités sont encore l'unique base su
laquelle on s'est fondé pour éclaircir et résoudre la question de
Principautés. A cet égard, toutes les pièces échangées entre le
gouvernements ne laissent aucun doute ; nous citerons seulemen
sur ce point la circulaire du ministre des affaires étrangères d
France [1] en réponse à celle de M. de Nesselrode. Nous croyon
prudent de glisser sur les premières questions que le ministr
français adresse à son adversaire, car s'il est vrai de dire que l
sultan n'a jamais « *songé* à revenir sur aucune des concessions d
son prédécesseur, » il serait moins facile d'établir que « les im
munités des Principautés du Danube « sont restées à l'abri d
toute atteinte de la part de la puissance suzeraine, même « depui
les dernières guerres » seulement. Mais ce que nous voulons con
stater, c'est que le ministre reconnaît que « le régime d'indépen
dance administrative des Principautés (voilà seulement un mo
qui nous paraît bien faible) n'était ni en Valachie ni en Moldavi
une conquête récente, mais le résultat d'*un accord librement conc
il y a des siècles*, et altéré seulement du jour où les hospodars on
commencé, pendant les guerres du XVIIIe siècle, à compter davan
tage avec la cour de Russie qu'avec la Sublime Porte. « C'est ainsi
ajoute le ministre, que la Moldavie a perdu la moitié du territoir
qui lui avait été *garanti par les sultans*, etc. »

Tous prétendus droits de la Russie, soit sur une portion d
territoire des Principautés, soit de s'ingérer dans leurs affaire
intérieures, sont nuls en effet, parce que ces prétendus droit
ont été concédés par la Porte à laquelle ils n'appartenaient pas
et n'ont point été consentis par les Moldo-Valaques eux-mêmes
qui n'ont jamais traité avec la Russie.

Voilà qui est bien établi. En partant ici des capitulations, nou

1. Cette circulaire, en date du 23 mai 1855, a paru dans le *Moniteur* du 26 mai

donc, non pas dans les termes captieux de la rédaction
minaires de Vienne, — nous avons montré tout ce qu'ils
nt de dangers possibles, — mais dans l'esprit des disposi-
tement avouées par les gouvernements alliés et si net-
ndiquées par le comte Walewski. Ajoutons seulement,
du manifeste que nous venons de citer, une réflexion
paraît nécessaire.
éclaration, qui établissait exactement la situation diplo-
des Principautés comme nation, dans le passé et dans le
ne préjugeait rien pour l'avenir contre l'opportunité
vait y avoir à les déclarer indépendantes; et elle ne sau-
aucun cas, être considérée comme un engagement des
uvernements alliés ou de l'un d'eux dans ce sens, —
le n'était faite qu'à l'encontre de la Russie, et en néga-
prétendus droits qu'elle aurait eus sur ces Principautés
de la Porte et par ses traités avec cette puissance. Mais
quait assurément le minimum de ce à quoi les Moldo-
pouvaient prétendre, — en posant la nullité de toutes
gations qui avaient été faites à l'esprit et à la lettre de
itulations avec la Porte, soit sous la pression de la Rus-
de toute autre manière. Car il implique contradiction de
que les stipulations qu'ils ont faites avec la Porte, et
pose à la Russie comme n'autorisant pas les concessions
dernière puissance a obtenues de l'autre à leur pré-
ne puissent et ne doivent être également opposées,
ur légitime intérêt, aux empiétements que la Porte a
elle-même à leur égard; ce qui reviendrait à dire que
és engagent tout le monde, excepté la Turquie, qui les

La Russie
la Porte
devant l
capitulatio

l est bien clair que la Porte, qui n'avait pas le droit de
les empiétements d'une autre puissance contre ces trai-
ait pas le droit non plus d'en accomplir elle-même; et
ce qui est établi aujourd'hui en contradiction avec ces
ar le fait et au profit de n'importe quelle puissance, doit
ulé. C'est bien assez que la Turquie n'ait pas rempli dans
et ne puisse remplir dans l'avenir, les engagements actifs
capitulations lui imposent; si malgré cela on veut les
r dans le présent et dans l'avenir, il faut au moins qu'on
la Porte à l'exécution de ses engagements négatifs, de ses
s d'abstention à l'égard des droits des Principautés, et

finalement qu'on leur rende tous les droits que ces stipulations garantissent.

Cela est non-seulement de logique et d'équité; mais c'est l'unique moyen de prévenir, autant qu'elles peuvent être prévenues sous la suzeraineté, toutes les complications futures. En effet, si les plénipotentiaires des trois puissances alliées se placent, pour l'avenir comme pour le passé, sur le terrain des anciens traités avec la Porte, c'est sans doute pour y trouver une base diplomatique plus forte, un argument rétrospectif plus inébranlable contre les actes accomplis en ce qui touche la Russie, c'est apparemment pour pouvoir lui dire : « Nous, qui protestons contre les dérogations que vous avez fait subir à ces traités, et qui venons annuler les avantages que vous avez perfidement tirés de leur violation, nous maintenons ces traités, et, dans le moment même où nous aurions le droit de remanier la carte de l'Orient et de prendre des garanties plus fortes contre vous, nous voulons vous prouver et notre modération et le respect excessif que nous avons pour les conventions établies, en nous en tenant rigoureusement aux termes de celles que nous vous opposons, et en les conservant même pour l'avenir. »

Mais, quoi! si en prétendant vous appuyer sur cette base unique, vous la dénaturez, la Russie, l'Autriche, ou toute autre puissance, intéressée un jour ou l'autre à ruiner votre édifice, ne sera-t-elle pas bien forte, lorsqu'elle dira : « J'ai dû céder un instant aux nécessités de la situation, mais la prétendue légalité dans laquelle on a affecté de se placer au jour des conférences n'est qu'un jeu; on a invoqué contre la Russie d'anciens traités, mais en même temps on a consacré leur violation au profit de la Porte et au détriment des populations que ces traités intéressaient, au détriment de la partie même qui avait contracté ces stipulations avec la Porte! »—Et comme, en leur refusant toute justice, vous vous serez aliéné ceux qui espèrent en vous, et comme il est bien impossible qu'un peuple réduit aux dernières extrémités de la souffrance et de l'abandon, n'accueille pas, de quelque main qu'il lui vienne, le secours même intéressé qu'on lui apporte, cette puissance aura beau jeu pour intervenir encore entre la Turquie et les Principautés et pour troubler tout l'Orient.

Cela lui sera d'autant plus facile, que, comme nous l'avons établi, si la suzeraineté de la Porte reste non définie, tous les prétendus changements qu'on prétend établir dans les Principautés sont

illusoires : ni les réformes intérieures que l'état désastreux de ce pays réclame ne s'accompliront, ni aucune force militaire ne s'y développera. Elles resteront livrées moralement et militairement, comme diplomatiquement, aux invasions étrangères.

Non, il est impossible que dans les conférences, les puissances occidentales établissent leur œuvre sur de pareilles contradictions. Si l'on veut reconstituer les Principautés sur la base de leurs anciens traités, il est nécessaire de rentrer rigoureusement dans l'esprit et dans la lettre de ces traités.

Réponse inexactitu rédacti du proto

Le résumé bien simple de ces actes, — il ne faut pas craindre ici de se répéter, — c'est que chacune des deux Principautés conserve tous ses droits d'indépendance et de souveraineté, tant à l'extérieur qu'à l'intérieur, sous la seule réserve qu'elle doit à la Porte un tribut annuel déterminé et un hommage moral, emprunté aux mœurs du moyen âge, lequel consiste en ce que le chef de son gouvernement est tenu, à son entrée au pouvoir, de réclamer l'investiture du sultan. Voilà toute la suzeraineté, voilà toute la vassalité, voilà toutes les capitulations. Or il est impossible qu'aucune subtilité de raisonnement, qu'aucune habileté de rédaction dans tel ou tel protocole prévaille contre le texte même qu'on prend pour point de départ de toute solution. Lors donc qu'un plénipotentiaire, intéressé à obscurcir les termes du débat, viendra équivoquer — sur ce premier passage des préliminaires de Vienne, où il est écrit seulement que « les Principautés *conserveront* leurs *priviléges* et *immunités* sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, » quand il devrait être dit qu'elles rentreront dans les droits souverains que leur garantissent les titres mêmes de cette suzeraineté, — puis sur le passage suivant où le rédacteur a glissé que « le sultan.... *accordera* à ces Principautés ou y confirmera » une nouvelle organisation intérieure, — et enfin sur cette autre expression captieuse, que, « *d'accord avec la puissance suzeraine*, les Principautés adopteront un système définitif permanent, etc., » — il suffira aux hommes de bonne foi de répondre : « Il est vrai, cela est dit, mais cela est mal dit et comme non avenu; car cela est contraire aux stipulations sur lesquelles seules nous pouvons nous appuyer : c'est une rédaction vicieuse, qui ne rend pas la pensée qu'on a voulu exprimer, ou qui exprime des arrière-pensées qu'on ne saurait avouer. »

Ces longues explications étaient nécessaires pour établir ce que peut être encore la Moldo-Valachie sous la suzeraineté, si on veut

ramener cette suzeraineté à ses termes simples et légitimes, et abolir tous les empiétements, de quelque part qu'ils viennent, qui ont entamé les droits de cette nation.

Mais il ne suffit pas que la Moldo-Valachie puisse être, il faut qu'elle soit, et ceci nous ramène à la question de l'union.

2. L'UNION DANS SON RAPPORT AVEC LA SUZERAINETÉ.

on est de d'après les raités.

Du côté du droit écrit dans les traités, c'est-à-dire du côté de la suzerainté de la Porte, la question de l'union se trouve d'avance éclaircie : le droit pour chaque Principauté de s'unir à l'autre, même indépendamment des volontés de la Porte, ne peut faire l'ombre d'un doute : chacun de ces deux États conserve, d'après les capitulations, le droit et l'entière liberté « de faire la paix et la guerre; » donc il conserve, surtout d'après les idées qui régnaient alors, la faculté de s'agrandir et de s'amoindrir comme il peut ou comme il veut. Pour ce qui regarde l'amoindrissement, comme il n'est pas supposable qu'il se produise suivant le bon vouloir de la nation intéressée, surtout quand elle est homogène comme la nation moldave ou valaque, ce serait à la Turquie, protectrice obligée, d'après son contrat, de chaque Principauté « contre tous ses ennemis » de l'empêcher; mais passons. Quant à l'agrandissement, ce serait d'abord aux nations voisines de voir s'il ne blesse pas leurs intérêts; et, dans nos idées modernes, ce serait, en dernier appel, au concert des puissances européennes de voir si cet agrandissement est juste et légitime. Mais, sous ce rapport, la moins compétente de toutes à l'égard des Principautés serait la Turquie, car elle a reconnu aux princes valaques « le droit de faire la paix ou la guerre, sans être soumis à aucune responsabilité envers la Sublime Porte; » et si l'on conserve d'une part certains usages surannés, il semblerait juste de conserver également les avantages de même nature qui les compensent. Mais plaçons la Turquie à cet égard dans le droit commun, ce qui est la plus belle part qu'on puisse lui faire sur le point qui nous occupe, considérons-la même, si l'on veut, non dans ses droits nuls ici, mais dans ses intérêts de suzeraine : quel argument légitime peut-elle invoquer contre la réunion de deux pays soumis aux mêmes conditions vis-à-vis d'elle, de deux fragments de peuple de même race destinés par la nature même des choses à ne faire qu'un, et qui, en s'agrandissant l'un par l'autre et au profit commun, ne changent rien à la délimitation

du territoire sur lequel s'exerce sa suzeraineté, non plus qu'à l'étendue de ses prérogatives de suzeraine. Si l'une des principautés aliénait elle-même une partie de son territoire, — éventualité prévue cependant comme n'entraînant aucune responsabilité de sa part vis-à-vis de la Porte; ou même, si elle s'adjoignait un élément étranger, hétérogène, hostile peut-être à la Porte, — autre éventualité prévue dans le même sens, — on comprendrait encore que la Turquie pût s'alarmer. Mais il ne s'agit en réalité que d'un agrandissement moral : hé quoi ! la suzeraine serait-elle l'ennemie de la prospérité du peuple qui a cru assurer cette prospérité, en se liant autrefois à elle par le tribut et l'hommage !

Nous ne voulons pas le supposer; nous voulons croire que la Turquie, mieux éclairée, n'opposera dans les conférences aucun obstacle au droit si incontestable que les Principautés ont de s'unir. Ce serait là, de sa part, non-seulement de l'équité, mais de la bonne politique; car les immenses avantages qui doivent résulter pour elle-même du développement de la nationalité moldo-valaque, sont doublés pour la Porte, si elle s'y associe. Les Moldo-Valaques, qui lui sont restés dévoués malgré tant d'injustices, lui tiendront compte de tout ce qu'elle fera pour eux, même dans la mesure de ce qu'elle ne pourrait légitimement leur refuser. Mais si elle fait obstacle à leurs demandes les plus modérées, à leurs besoins les plus légitimes, il est encore dans son intérêt, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, comme nous le répéterons plus explicitement tout à l'heure, que les puissances occidentales la forcent à des concessions que réclament le droit, la justice, et la paix du monde.

C'est pourquoi nous avons voulu établir le droit des Principautés à l'union, sous la suzeraineté comme dans l'indépendance : en établissant ce droit contre la Turquie, nous travaillons encore pour elle.

L'union p
dan
le Règle
organi

Il serait étrange au surplus que l'on contestât aujourd'hui aux Moldo-Valaques les droits qui leur étaient reconnus, les avantages qui leur étaient promis dans ce *Règlement organique* qu'ils détestent, entre autres raisons, parce qu'il leur a été apporté par les Russes, mais qui n'en a pas moins été pour la Turquie, comme pour les Principautés elles-mêmes, leur constitution et leur code officiels depuis 1832 jusqu'à la dernière évacuation des Russes, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à l'année passée, et qui, faute de législation nouvelle, garde encore aujourd'hui force de loi sur bien des

points. Nous regrettons de n'avoir point entre les mains la première édition, seule complète et authentique, de ce gros volume. Dans l'édition de Valachie, que le prince Bibesco a fait publier en 1852, et la seule que nous puissions consulter en ce moment, le préambule a disparu, et c'est dans ce préambule surtout que l'union était prévue comme un fait inévitable et plus ou moins prochain. Mais le texte même du règlement en dit encore assez à cet égard, pour que nous le citions. L'article 371 dont nous allons donner la traduction textuelle, commence la section V^e^ du chapitre VIII, section intitulée : « Commencement d'une union plus intime entre les deux Principautés. » Suit immédiatement l'article 371, que voici : « L'origine, la religion, les mœurs et la langue, qui sont les mêmes pour les habitants des deux Principautés; leurs besoins, qui sont les mêmes, forment autant d'éléments d'une union plus intime entre elles, laquelle n'a pu s'opérer jusqu'à présent et a été retardée par des circonstances étrangères. Les avantages qui découlent de l'union des deux peuples sont en dehors de toute contestation. Le commencement donc de cette union a été posé dans ce règlement, par la similitude des mêmes bases d'administration intérieure pour les deux Principautés. » Les articles qui suivent ont pour objet de faciliter les relations entre les habitants des deux pays.

Devant ce texte si concluant d'un code tout récent promulgué et tenu en vigueur pendant plus de vingt ans sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, la Turquie prétextera-t-elle de la pression des cent mille baïonnettes russes qui ont présidé à la rédaction du Règlement? Quoi! le sultan serait moins juste envers les Principautés que le czar! il semble que ce serait se trahir soi-même.

A ce propos, qu'il nous soit permis d'exprimer deux réflexions qui se présentent à chaque pas quand on entre dans l'histoire récente de la Moldo-Valachie.

rôle que la urquie à prendre.

Si les manœuvres de la Russie, favorisées par les abus de la suzeraineté turque, ont créé à la Porte bien des embarras, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître, que, le premier moment de surprise et de trouble passé, elles donnaient occasion à la suzeraine de prendre dans les Principautés un beau rôle, aussi habile que généreux. Elle n'avait qu'à lutter avec la Russie de sollicitude pour les deux pays tributaires : sur ce terrain, on peut en être assuré, la Russie aurait été bientôt battue. Au lieu de cela, que fait la Porte? plus le czar proteste de ses intentions bienveil-

lantes pour les Moldo-Valaques, plus il s'ingère dans leurs affaires intérieures, plus la Porte se montre récalcitrante à leurs plus justes réclamations, méfiante à leur égard, malveillante et quelquefois impitoyable, plus elle les sacrifie à leur ennemi qui est pourtant le sien par-dessus tout. Inutile de dire que, presque en toute occasion, les actes du czar démentent ses paroles ; mais c'est précisément ce qui donne au sultan beau jeu : il ne sait pas en profiter; il ne sait avoir de son côté ni les paroles ni les actes.

La fidélit Roumain récompe

Aussi est-on presque étonné de voir que les Moldo-Valaques aient fini par reconnaître nettement leur inévitable ennemi, entre ces deux rivaux dont ils étaient la proie disputée. Il y a fallu du temps. Depuis Demètre Cantimir (mort en Russie en 1723), le premier prince qui chercha un appui dans le czar, jusqu'à Théodore Vladimiresco, le dernier héros de la nationalité roumaine (tué vers 1821), les espérances du peuple si maltraité, flottèrent entre les influences opposées. Vladimiresco, enfin, voyant le pays sans direction et sans chefs au milieu des cabales de l'hétairie, releva le drapeau de l'indépendance sous la suzeraineté légitime. Inaugurer deux vérités à la fois, c'était trop; le peuple, que le mot d'indépendance avait touché, ne comprit pas l'autre. Les relations de Théodore avec la Porte le rendirent suspect à plusieurs ; trahi par quelques-uns de ses capitaines, — ceux-ci étaient des étrangers qui ne comprenaient guère que le pillage, — il fut surpris par des sicaires de l'hétairie, et le plus grand Roumain de l'histoire contemporaine scella de son sang la nouvelle alliance de sa nation avec le sultan. Une mort généreuse fait comprendre bien des choses : depuis ce temps-là, il n'est pas un paysan roumain pour qui le nom de Domnou Toudor[1], comme il l'appelle, ne soit un nom sacré. Il faut dire aussi que, depuis ce temps-là, le Moscovite s'est fait durement connaître dans les Principautés; pourquoi ne pouvons-nous pas ajouter que le sultan, de son côté, en ait fait autant dans le sens contraire? L'occasion était belle, elle fut manquée. A la mort de Vladimiresco, il y eut bien de la part de la Porte un moment de retour; « en reconnaissance de la fidélité des habitants des Principautés » (textuel), la Porte les délivra des princes fanariotes qu'elle leur avait imposés; mais ce fut tout :

1. *Tudor*, c'est Théodore; *domnu* est l'équivalent du latin *dominus*, et c'est le seul titre national du prince.

une calamité de moins, — une calamité venue d'elle, notez bien, et dont le pays porte encore le stigmate de longtemps ineffaçable, — et puis plus rien ; de bienfait actif, pas un seul !

En 1848 cependant, lorsque, en Valachie, ce peuple se leva comme un seul homme, pour proclamer qu'il était vivant, c'est sous l'égide de la Porte et sous l'invocation du respect dû à sa suzeraineté, qu'il se plaça ; c'est contre la Russie qu'il se manifesta, elle seule qu'il eut l'habile générosité de rendre responsable de tous ses maux. Comment en a-t-il été récompensé ? comment ont été traités les chefs qui l'avaient si bien conseillé ? jetés en prison, puis en exil ; et plusieurs y sont encore. Dans les Principautés, les défenseurs de la Turquie n'ont pas de bonheur : en 1848, les Turcs accueillis avec enthousiasme, comme des frères, enlèvent par surprise une vingtaine des meilleurs, l'élite morale et intelligente de la Valachie, pour les promener de prisons en prisons ; puis viennent et reviennent les Russes qui, pour couronner les calamités de leur dernière occupation, emmenèrent une trentaine de Moldaves et de Valaques, d'innocents jeunes gens, pour la plupart, coupables seulement d'avoir manifesté leur aversion pour les Russes, c'est-à-dire leur préférence pour la Turquie ; ils n'en sont pas moins enfermés dans les forteresses de la Russie méridionale où ils gémissent encore (nous prions les plénipotentiaires de l'humanité de ne pas oublier ce détail au moment de la conclusion de la paix). Un peu plus tôt les Turcs avaient reparu sur le Danube ; le pays croit le moment venu de se joindre à eux contre l'ennemi commun, on refuse son concours ; plusieurs proscrits viennent offrir leurs services, on les rejette en exil ; cinq cents soldats valaques se présentent aux Turcs devant Kalafat, avec armes et bagages : on les dépouille de leurs armes, et on les renvoie sans défense sur le sol occupé par l'ennemi. Enfin viennent les Autrichiens, dont les excès dans les Principautés dépassent ceux des Russes eux-mêmes ; mais bornons-nous à dire ici que des vingt proscrits que la Turquie avait faits en 1848, comme trop dévoués à sa cause, il en reste douze, et que c'est à l'Autriche qu'ils doivent de n'avoir pu rentrer encore dans leur pays.

Qu'on nous pardonne cette digression ; ne pouvant aborder ici les grands enseignements de l'histoire, nous avons cru utile de rassembler en passant quelques faits qui en donnent le sens affaibli, mais très-clair. Au moment de clore notre étude sur les conditions légitimes de la suzeraineté turque, il n'était peut-être pas

hors de propos de montrer, ne fût-ce que par le côté extérieur, ce que produit le régime de la suzeraineté abusive. Depuis 1848 seulement, cinq occupations étrangères; et pendant que le pays agonise, et tend les bras vers le suzerain, il ne trouve que défiance et abandon : voilà un aperçu de ce régime.

Mais revenons à l'union. Nous savons maintenant qu'elle est de droit sous la suzeraineté, nous savons même que le Règlement la consacre, ce qui revient à dire que la Russie elle-même la défendra peut-être, — elle le fera presque certainement si la Turquie s'y oppose; — mais il semble, n'est-ce pas? que la Turquie ne puisse avoir un instant cette pensée. Nous pourrions ajouter que, cette union, les puissances occidentales la désirent sans doute : la France l'a demandée l'an dernier aux conférences de Vienne; lord Redcliffe l'a proposée récemment à Constantinople, exactement telle que nous la concevons, — avec peu de succès à la vérité, mais il semble que ce ne soit là qu'un détail; il semble que l'union ne puisse faire un pli. Eh bien! nous ne sommes pas si rassuré, et c'est pourquoi nous allons continuer notre tâche.

On est convaincu par ce qui précède que l'union ne doit pas trouver d'obstacles extérieurs; mais il reste à savoir si elle est réellement souhaitable. Étant donné cet autre résultat de la première partie de notre travail, que le but à atteindre c'est la reconstitution de la Moldo-Valachie en une nation forte, — il s'agit surtout de voir si cette union doit concourir efficacement à l'objet qu'on se propose.

3. L'UNION EN ELLE-MÊME.

Le premier besoin, pour une nation qui n'est pas et qui veut être, c'est, lorsqu'elle se trouve divisée en deux tronçons, de se réunir en un seul corps. Voilà une vérité qui n'a pas besoin d'être démontrée. Toute la question est donc de savoir si, par leur désir de se réunir, les Moldo-Valaques prouvent réellement qu'ils veulent devenir une nation, et si la réalisation de ce vœu présente des difficultés intérieures.

La réunion des deux Principautés en un seul État est le vœu le plus ardent des Moldaves et des Valaques. On peut dire que c'est là chez eux une idée fixe : pour eux, presque tous leurs malheurs, dans le passé, viennent de la division; toute régénération dans l'avenir dépend de l'union. Ils ne comprennent pas l'indépendance

sans l'union ; mais l'union, même sans l'indépendance, est encore pour eux une immense promesse de prospérité.

Supposons, pour un moment, qu'ils s'exagèrent la portée de ce bienfait : ne serait-ce pas déjà beaucoup, de rendre à ce pays découragé la confiance en lui-même, de lui donner le signe par lequel il croit qu'il doit vaincre ? Quel plus beau mobile d'ailleurs que celui qui repose sur un sentiment de rapprochement fraternel, sur une louable émulation d'efforts mis en commun ! Ces deux fragments de peuples sont comme deux frères qui, longtemps séparés, toujours malheureux dans l'isolement, alanguis par la pensée qu'ils ne peuvent réussir à rien l'un sans l'autre, se retrouvent et se disent : « Maintenant l'avenir nous appartient ! »

Quand un peuple s'attache tellement à une idée, il est impossible que son instinct le trompe, il est impossible que cette idée ne soit pas féconde. Et en effet, il n'y a pas là seulement chez les Moldo-Valaques un sentiment de confiance aveugle. Cette confiance est parfaitement fondée en raison. S'il est vrai de dire, en général, que l'union est un bienfait incontestable pour toute nation morcelée, il faut ajouter qu'elle est ici réclamée plus impérieusement que partout ailleurs, par les conditions particulières dans lesquelles se trouve le peuple Moldo-Valaque.

Indiquons seulement ces raisons particulières, et sans rechercher les enseignements, pourtant très-significatifs, du passé, tenons-nous, dans ce court examen, à la situation présente.

nion, n et gage énération.

C'est une chose malheureusement trop certaine, et qu'il faut bien reconnaître, que, depuis que les influences étrangères se sont attachées à démoraliser la patrie roumaine, pour la diviser et l'affaiblir, et surtout depuis que, sous le patronage de ces influences comme à la faveur de leurs conflits, les Fanariotes se sont abattus sur ce pays comme des vautours, — la corruption y a poussé de fortes racines : c'est là la plaie intérieure des Principautés. Non-seulement les ressorts de la vie morale en sont affectés, mais toute prospérité matérielle est entravée par là. En effet, tandis que d'une part la richesse publique est dilapidée, pourquoi, de l'autre, le paysan travaillerait-il à améliorer sa position par l'épargne qui donne un si grand stimulant aux efforts quotidiens, lorsqu'il n'est pas même sûr de récolter ce qu'il a semé? Comment le commerce et l'industrie se développeraient-ils, lorsqu'il n'y a aucune sécurité pour les transactions, lorsque la vénalité est dans les tribunaux, lorsqu'à la première contestation qui

s'élèvera, — et le commerce, ainsi que l'industrie, sont exposés chaque jour à des procès, surtout sous un pareil régime, — on se verra ruiné par l'effet de cette vénalité? Comment, en un mot, les capitaux se produiraient-ils et chercheraient-ils un emploi, profitable aux masses comme aux individus, lorsque d'abord les sources de la richesse publique sont taries, lorsque, de plus, toutes les garanties font défaut, lorsque rien n'est stable ni dans l'état politique ni dans les conditions privées, lorsque enfin les esprits sont détournés, par mille causes et par cette instabilité même, de toutes les préoccupations d'art et de science qui seules peuvent féconder l'industrie?

Le besoin d'extirper ce mal est généralement senti, même de la plupart de ceux qui par faiblesse cèdent au courant démoralisateur. Pour y parvenir, il ne suffit pas d'un expédient, nous le savons; il faudra des réformes de toutes sortes, et parmi elles se place en première ligne la nécessité de la stabilité dans l'état politique; or cette stabilité ne peut venir qu'à la suite de l'union, comme nous l'expliquerons plus loin. Mais, pour nous en tenir ici aux effets directs que la réunion des deux pays en un seul corps doit avoir contre les principaux éléments de corruption, il est clair, que, dans cette classe, heureusement limitée, qui est le foyer des influences pernicieuses, ces influences perdent la plus grande part de leur puissance, du moment que le cercle de leur action s'élargit et que le terrain même sur lequel elles opèrent est changé. Chacune des deux Principautés séparées est la proie de quelques personnes et de quelques familles : aussitôt qu'elles sont réunies, ces influences locales s'annulent par leur opposition, par leur déplacement, elles s'annulent surtout devant la résurrection de l'esprit général, devant le sentiment rendu aux populations qu'une ère nouvelle va commencer. Pour les Moldo-Valaques, en effet, l'union doit être le signal, compris de tous, que l'heure de la régénération est venue: et cet instinct est juste; car l'union ne peut s'accomplir sans un remaniement général des hommes et des choses.

Il faut ajouter que l'union présenterait l'avantage d'une grande économie dans les services publics, économie qui a de l'importance pour un pays où l'industrie n'a pas encore prodigué ses richesses. Avec deux Principautés il y a deux cours princières, deux ministères, deux assemblées législatives, deux directions des postes, deux administrations des douanes, deux cours des

comptes, deux cours de cassation, deux universités, et ainsi du reste. En réunissant tous ces rouages, on obtiendrait une économie considérable, ou plutôt, avec les mêmes ressources accumulées, on aurait les moyens de donner une impulsion toute nouvelle à plusieurs des services publics, notamment à l'instruction primaire et supérieure et au développement des forces militaires.

Ainsi, pour approfondir les avantages particuliers de l'Union au point de vue de la prospérité intérieure des Principautés, il faudrait entrer dans l'étude des réformes de toute sorte que réclame leur état désastreux. C'est là, on le conçoit, un sujet que nous ne pouvons traiter incidemment; dans la dernière partie de notre travail, qui comporterait des développements dans ce sens, nous ne pourrons même indiquer que les quelques points capitaux, qui tombent plus directement sous l'action des puissances, au moment où elles reconstitueront les Principautés sur de nouvelles bases. Mais nous croyons en avoir assez dit pour faire comprendre que les réformes sérieuses ne peuvent venir qu'à la suite de l'union. Cette vérité peut se résumer en trois propositions :

1° l'union, en exigeant un remaniement général des hommes et des choses, et en détruisant les influences locales, sera à la fois l'occasion nécessaire et le moyen le plus puissant de pratiquer ces réformes. Si, par exemple, on veut réaliser le troisième point du programme que lord Redcliffe avait proposé à Constantinople, savoir, « l'abolition du servage, l'émancipation des paysans, la répartition proportionnelle des impôts sur toutes les classes, l'introduction de codes et de lois semblables à celles qui existent dans les pays civilisés; » la première condition, pour arriver à de pareils résultats, c'est de briser les vieux moules dans lesquels se sont pétrifiés les abus et les préjugés. — 2° Mais un pareil sacrifice des choses du passé ne peut s'accomplir qu'à la faveur d'un élan vers l'avenir, il y faut le concours de toutes les forces vives de la nation, et ce n'est pas mécaniquement, par l'emploi de moyens extérieurs, qu'un tel résultat peut être obtenu. Il est donc de toute nécessité que le sentiment de la vie nationale soit réveillé dans le corps social que l'on veut guérir de ses plaies; et l'action décisive qui doit déterminer ce réveil, comme le signe le plus manifeste pour cette nation que le moment des réformes sera venu, c'est le rapprochement de ses membres séparés. Ainsi, l'union n'est pas seulement le moyen matériel le plus efficace de transformer ce pays, c'est en même temps le moyen moral sans lequel le premier serait

nme nul. S'il était besoin de chercher dans l'histoire des con-
nations à ce que nous avançons, n'est-il pas évident que la
nversion de la France provinciale en départements a été pour
tre pays le plus grand instrument de progrès, et notamment
e le Code civil eût été impossible sans elle? Mais n'est-il pas
ident aussi que ce Code, et tous les progrès accomplis alors, et
fait même de la transformation de la France en départements,
se fussent jamais produits sans l'élan national qui accompagna
utes ces réformes, qui amena le sacrifice volontaire de tous les
éjugés locaux, et qui, de l'unité conquise, se fit un instrument
ur de nouvelles conquêtes morales. En tenant compte de la dif-
rence des temps et des lieux, en ramenant les choses à de beau-
up moindres proportions, l'analogie est sensible; il est même
latant que l'union des deux principautés est pour elles un fait
aucoup plus grand, que n'a été pour la France sa distribution
uvelle : imaginez ce que la France eût ressenti, si cet événe-
ent,—si solennel, et accompli avec tant d'enthousiasme, quand il
ait enfermé dans le cercle de son ancien territoire et dans la
hère encore inviolée de son indépendance, — eût en même temps
nné l'heure de la réunion en une même famille de deux mem-
res entièrement séparés depuis plusieurs siècles, et d'un agran-
issement légitime qui, en doublant son territoire, comme en dé-
uplant sa vie, eût pour la première fois créé une nation; — si
nfin cet événement avait été le signal de la délivrance des in-
uences étrangères, et le gage de l'affranchissement des in-
sions ! Eh bien, tout ce que la France eût ressenti alors de joie,
t d'espérance, et de vie nouvelle, se trouve contenu, pour les
oldo-Valaques, dans ce seul mot : *union*.

Union sous une suzeraineté nettement définie, nettement res-
reinte aux conditions stipulées par les anciens traités, cela va
ns dire; car, à défaut de l'indépendance, il n'y a qu'une telle
uzeraineté qui soit compatible avec une existence nationale. Mais
l n'y a aussi qu'une telle suzeraineté qui puisse s'accommoder de
'union; et ceci nous ramène au troisième point de notre thèse sur
es avantages de l'union au seul point de vue des réformes inté-
ieures. — 3° Si l'union est refusée en droit, empêchée en fait, les
Moldo-Valaques disent, et nous disons avec eux, que, non-seule-
ment le véritable instrument matériel et le vrai levier moral pour
accomplir des réformes manquent à la fois, mais que des réformes
sérieuses ne seront pas même tentées. En effet, l'union refusée

aux Principautés, c'est la consécration définitive d'une suzerai-neté abusive, c'est le régime turc porté à un degré d'autorité et d puissance qu'il n'avait jamais connu, puisque ce nouveau régime contraire aux traités, se trouve alors placé sous la garantie d toutes les puissances européennes. Or, comment attendre de c régime abusif qui a perdu les Principautés, aucun remède aux maux dont il a été la source ? — Quoi ! la suzeraineté que nous avions, diront les Moldo-Valaques, nous permettait hier encore de nous unir, le Règlement organique lui-même l'a reconnu : ce droit qu touche à tous nos autres droits, la Turquie maintenant nous le con-teste, et vous nous l'ôtez ; vous faites de nous en réalité des pro vinces turques ; et vous prétendez nous régénérer !

En vain direz-vous que la Porte manifeste des sentiments plus libéraux à leur égard, et que maintenant d'ailleurs toutes les puissances, au lieu d'une ou deux seulement, se sont déclarées intéressées à y veiller : mais, d'abord, il est bien étrange que l bienveillance de la Porte, et la vôtre même, aient pour premier effet de les priver du plus précieux de leurs droits, — et ce début est de nature à inspirer peu de confiance ; mais ensuite, quel moyen aurez-vous de réaliser le bien que vous leur promettez lorsque vous-mêmes vous abdiquez en faveur de la Turquie ? Ce n'est pas le tout de vous *déclarer* intéressées à leur prospérité ; sans avoir fait cette déclaration, vous y étiez intéressées dès longtemps et vous voyez cependant à quel état de désorganisation ils sont ré duits. — Quels moyens mettez-vous en œuvre maintenant pour as surer leur prospérité ? Voilà toute la question. Remarquez-le bien on ne *fait* pas la prospérité d'un peuple, on ne peut qu'aider ce peuple à la faire, en l'aidant à se placer dans des conditions favo rables au développement de cette prospérité. Or, en quoi aidez vous celui-ci ? L'action de la Turquie, combinée avec les influences étrangères ; l'entravait depuis un siècle : vous corroborez le régime abusif de la Turquie, en prétendant seulement mêler votre influence aux autres influences étrangères. Ainsi l'instrument qui a fait la ruine est conservé pour le salut : vous avez seu lement l'intention de mieux le diriger. Mais est-ce qu'on peut faire exécuter réellement et fructueusement les meilleurs desseins par un agent qui y répugne ? Il y répugnera certainement ; car, dès que le suzerain entre contre les Roumains dans la voie de la dé fiance et des empiétements, tout ce qui doit faire leur prospérité et leur force ne peut manquer de lui porter ombrage. Il y répu

cera certainement ; car dans le moment même où tout concourt lui montrer que les intérêts des Moldo-Valaques sont conformes aux siens, il s'obstine à le méconnaître ; dans le moment même où vous pesez sur lui de toute l'influence que vous donnent des circonstances extraordinaires, vous échouez devant sa force de négation ; que sera-ce donc, lorsque cette situation, essentiellement transitoire, aura cessé ? — Nous nous appuierons, direz-vous, sur le concours de toutes les puissances, pour le pousser dans la voie des améliorations de ce pays : mais c'est là une autre erreur. Outre que le concours même de toutes les puissances ne saurait faire opérer des réformes utiles par un intermédiaire bien décidé d'avance à en paralyser l'effet, ce concours n'est qu'une illusion ; c'est lutte patente ou secrète qu'il faudrait dire. Comment ne pas voir qu'en ce moment même, la Russie étant pour un instant mise hors d'influence, l'Autriche a déjà pris son rôle ? C'est l'Autriche qui, s'appuyant sur le vieux parti turc, revenu au pouvoir à la faveur de petits conflits d'influence entre l'ambassade anglaise et l'ambassade française, a persuadé à la Porte que l'indépendance ou même l'union des Principautés serait un malheur, et qui, ce premier résultat obtenu, se sert de la Turquie pour entraver vos projets bienveillants à l'égard de ces Principautés. Lorsqu'on voit dès maintenant si peu d'accord, lorsque aujourd'hui même l'action funeste de l'Autriche est si manifeste, qu'attendre pour l'avenir du concours dont on veut se faire un appui ?

Ce qui n'est pas douteux, au contraire, c'est que, si on laisse la Turquie arbitre nominale du sort des Principautés, avec le soi-disant correctif du concours de toutes les puissances, la Turquie opposera, d'une part, sa force d'inertie contre le bien, elle qui serait impuissante à le réaliser, le voulût-elle, et sera, d'autre part, entre les mains de la première puissance qui aura su la flatter ou la dominer, un instrument très-docile pour le mal. Celles des puissances qui sont dégagées de préoccupations perfides, qui sont intéressées seulement au salut de l'empire ottoman et à celui de la Moldo-Valachie, auront bien assez à faire de chercher à déjouer les intrigues dirigées en vue de tout obscurcir et de tout compromettre ; et plus éloignées du double théâtre de ces intrigues, comme moins rompues à de si misérables luttes, elles n'y réussiront même pas.

Mais quoi ! nous faisions entendre plus haut que les puissances occidentales seraient toutes-puissantes en Orient si elles le vou-

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laient? Oui certainement, — à la condition qu'elles ne commencent pas par se priver des moyens admirables qui sont en leurs mains, et par déplacer le champ même de leurs salutaires influences : ce n'est point à Constantinople, dans cette métropole des intrigues, que doit se décider, jour par jour, pendant un avenir indéfini, le sort des Principautés : là, sur ce terrain mouvant, nous prédisons aux diplomates de l'Occident qu'ils seront battus : c'est ici et aujourd'hui même, que la question doit être résolue, et c'est dans les Principautés mêmes, pour nous borner à ce point capital, que l'influence occidentale doit perpétuellement s'exercer. Faites quelque chose pour un peuple qui espère en vous, qui ne compte que sur vous, qui déjà ne voit que vous, lorsque jamais encore vous n'avez rien fait pour lui; et quand vous lui aurez rendu la vie qui lui manque et à laquelle il aspire, soyez tranquilles : ce ne sont pas les intrigues étrangères qui disposeront de ses destinées ni qui troubleront ses sentiments pour vous!

Mais la question n'est pas épuisée. Nous n'avons parlé encore de l'union, qu'au point de vue de la prospérité intérieure de la Moldo-Valachie, et ce n'est pas là, dans la sphère des *intérêts* européens où nous devons nous renfermer, ce qui touchera directement les arbitres de la solution. Ce côté de la question nous intéresse toutefois indirectement de la manière la plus étroite; car s'il est une vérité incontestée, c'est que la force extérieure d'un peuple ne peut s'appuyer que sur sa prospérité intérieure. Si donc on veut faire de la Moldo-Valachie une nation forte, une barrière aux invasions, nous n'avons pas fait fausse route, nous qui demandons l'union, en établissant que cette union peut seule leur assurer la prospérité, qui, seule aussi, peut leur donner la force. Il faut ajouter que cette vérité est ici doublement vraie, attendu qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de trouver dans la Moldo-Valachie un obstacle aux envahissements armés, mais aussi de soustraire ce pays aux envahissements moraux, aux intrusions étrangères qui ne se produisent qu'à la faveur de la désorganisation intérieure.

e militaire. Ce point établi, voyons si l'union ne doit pas aussi concourir directement à l'objet capital qu'on se propose, qui est de donner à ce pays les moyens de se défendre lui-même et de couvrir ainsi la Turquie. Ici les résultats immédiats sont si patents, qu'il suffit de les exprimer en quelques lignes. Outre que, sans l'union, nous sommes convaincu que chacune des deux Principautés, n'étant rien,

n'ayant ni esprit public, ni finances, n'aura conséquemment jamais d'armée, tout le monde sait que deux forces réunies font beaucoup plus que se doubler : l'*union fait la force*, et, par contre, *diviser pour vaincre*, aussi bien que *pour régner*, ce sont là des vérités banales à force d'être patentes. Ainsi la question est résolue en même temps que posée, et nous ne pouvons peut-être qu'affaiblir notre thèse en la développant.

Entrons pourtant dans quelques explications particulières et locales. Du côté de la Russie, pour envisager seulement le danger comme par le passé, c'est la Moldavie seule qui offre son flanc et son flanc le plus étendu à l'ennemi : il faut que cette longue ligne soit gardée, que, sur tout son parcours, des forteresses soient occupées, et il faut en outre qu'une force mobilisable dans le pays puisse se porter sur chaque point menacé, et faire face à l'ennemi, lorsqu'il aura forcé le passage. Est-ce la Moldavie toute seule, la moins forte des deux Principautés, qui pourra satisfaire à cette double nécessité? Évidemment non; ce que la Moldo-Valachie disposant d'un effectif plus que double, qui obéirait à une seule impulsion, eût pu faire facilement, la Moldavie seule y est forcément impuissante. Dira-t-on qu'en cas menaçant les deux Principautés peuvent réunir leurs forces? elles le peuvent, oui, si d'abord elles en ont, ce dont il est permis de douter sous le régime de la suzeraineté abusive inséparable de la non-union, si ensuite le temps leur en est laissé, si les deux princes ne sont pas en état de rivalité, si mille longueurs et mille entraves ne sont pas opposées, et par les intrigues étrangères, et par les Turcs eux-mêmes qui seraient intéressés à la défense commune; et enfin, tous ces *si* écartés, toutes ces difficultés résolues, il est encore manifeste que la force réunie des deux États séparés ne sera pas ce qu'elle eût pu être sous l'impulsion d'une seule autorité centrale et sous l'unité de commandement.

Mais, en réalité, comme, sous le régime de la suzeraineté non définie, les forces militaires de la Moldavie et de la Valachie ne pourront prendre aucun développement sérieux, ce seront sans doute des Turcs, peut-être des Autrichiens qui occuperont les forteresses (situation bien commode pour l'Autriche, si c'est elle qui veut entrer en campagne contre les Principautés et contre la Porte), et comme cette double occupation sera une autre cause de mécontentement et d'irritation extrême dans le pays, à joindre à toutes celles que la continuation du régime de

suzeraineté abusive aura apportées, les moments de crise en face de l'ennemi seront ceux où la Turquie redoutera le plus, à tort ou à raison, l'armement des Roumains : loin de faire alors appel à leurs sympathies, elle ne pensera qu'à étouffer leur réveil.

Nous avons voulu exposer sommairement et d'une manière générale ces considérations aussi simples qu'irréfutables, sans les embarrasser dans les explications qu'exige un autre point très-important de la question. Mais, quoiqu'il soit d'ailleurs bien tard pour aborder ce point avec quelque chance de succès, nous ne saurions le passer sous silence : il s'agit de la ligne de défense de la Moldavie du côté de la Russie, c'est-à-dire de la principale frontière de cette Moldo-Valachie, dont on veut faire un boulevard à la Turquie contre le czar.

Quand on parle de l'union en général des deux Principautés, comme lorsque l'on considère la Moldo-Valachie au point de vue de la force de résistance qu'elle peut offrir, il est impossible de ne pas songer à la Bessarabie (nous ne voulons pas faire mention de la Bukowine). En effet, il y a là un territoire et des habitants, également roumains, qui, enlevés sans aucun droit à la Moldavie, doivent lui revenir et apporter un élément de plus dans l'union; et il y a là, en outre, une frontière naturelle, doublement fortifiée par la nature et par l'art, qui doit contribuer puissamment à mettre la Moldo-Valachie à l'abri des atteintes de la Russie : cette frontière, c'est le Dniester, un des plus grands fleuves de l'Europe, qui, indépendamment de l'obstacle important qu'il constitue par lui-même, est garni sur la rive roumaine de forteresses considérables, élevées de longue date, Akerman, Bender, Chotym, etc. Depuis les temps anciens jusqu'à 1812, cette frontière si forte a été celle de la Moldavie du côté de la Russie; il est incontestable et incontesté que tout le territoire purement roumain qui se trouve au midi de ce fleuve, et qui forme la Bessarabie, a été injustement acquis par la Russie, que la Porte n'avait aucun droit de le céder, et que le czar n'avait aucun titre pour s'en emparer. C'est ce que confirme expressément la circulaire déjà citée de M. Walewski[1]. Un des premiers effets de la guerre

1. Après avoir montré l'ingérence fatale de la Russie dans les Principautés, le ministre ajoute : « C'est ainsi que la Moldavie a perdu la moitié du territoire qui lui avait été *garanti par les sultans.* »

ntreprise pour annuler les empiétements de la Russie en Orient, levait donc être de rendre aux Principautés cette province, égale n étendue à la Moldavie actuelle : comment se fait-il que la restiution stipulée par les propositions de Vienne ne porte que sur la moitié du larcin? Voici le texte; nous ne disputerons pas sur les termes qui ôtent à la restitution le caractère qu'elle devait avoir, ne voyons que le fond des choses : « En échange des places fortes et territoires occupés par les armées alliées, la Russie consent à une rectification de sa frontière avec la Turquie européenne. Cette frontière, ainsi rectifiée d'une manière conforme aux intérêts généraux, partirait des environs de Chotym, suivrait la ligne de montagnes qui s'étend dans la direction du sud-est, et aboutirait au lac Salzyk. Le tracé serait définitivement réglé par le traité de paix, et le territoire concédé retournerait aux Principautés et à la suzeraineté de la Porte. »

Lorsqu'il est bien évident que la Russie n'a pas plus de droits sur la moitié de ce territoire que sur sa totalité; lorsque, au lieu de se réserver les difficultés d'un tracé à faire contradictoirement, la ligne du Dniester était si simple, d'où vient donc qu'on a transigé? C'est donc que la Russie tenait beaucoup à cette transaction? Mais comment se fait-il qu'un si grand pays attache tant d'importance à une langue de terre qui ne contient pas plus de 500 000 habitants? La raison est bien claire : c'est que, par cet arrangement, les Principautés n'ont pas de frontières du côté de la Russie; elles en sont même plus dépourvues qu'auparavant; car, diminuées de la Bessarabie, elles avaient du moins le Pruth, qui n'est qu'une rivière peu importante, mais qui forme une ligne de défense bien nette, tandis que le chaînon de montagnes qui part des environs de Chotym et qui s'abaisse bien avant Lapoutchna, c'est-à-dire vers le tiers ou la moitié du parcours de la nouvelle frontière, ne présente plus, à partir de ce point, aucune ligne précise : là, ce chaînon se divise à droite et à gauche de la direction indiquée vers le lac Salzyk, et s'éparpille en plusieurs séries de collines de plus en plus basses, à mesure qu'on se rapproche de la mer. A la vérité, les terres qui s'étendent de ce côté sont sillonnées par divers cours d'eau, notamment par le Kogalnik ou Kouroundouk et la Sarata, qui, tous deux, se jettent dans le lac Salzyk, et dont le premier servira sans doute de ligne de démarcation entre les deux pays; car il suit la direction indiquée, et sa source rejoint à peu près le point où le chaînon de collines

perd toute élévation et toute précision[1]. Mais il faut savoir que ces rivières ne sont, dans la plus grande partie de leur cours, que des filets d'eau, et que même, aux approches de la mer, si nous en croyons des renseignements par malheur incomplets, elles sont à la fois sans escarpement et guéables sur presque tous les points. Quelle résistance peut présenter une pareille ligne, composée, à une extrémité, de montagnes peu élevées, dont on partage le sommet avec l'ennemi, et marqué seulement, sur tout le reste de son développement, par un ruisseau que l'ennemi peut franchir librement? Pour rendre cette ligne, qui a pour le moins de 60 à 80 lieues de longueur, capable de défense, il faudrait une série de travaux d'art impossibles. Outre que les dépenses fabuleuses qu'une telle série de travaux exigerait, la Russie sait bien, et l'Autriche aussi, que sous le régime de la suzeraineté abusive et de la non-union, ce ne sont ni les Roumains qui auront la liberté de tenter ce prodige, ni les Turcs qui auront les moyens de l'accomplir. Ainsi, les Principautés, si bien et si fortement limitées de tous les autres côtés, les Principautés qui, au nord-est, avaient sur le Pruth une frontière passable, et qui, en rentrant en possession de la Bessarabie entière, devaient y retrouver une frontière excellente, restent, en réalité, sans frontière du côté de la Russie. En d'autres termes, la Russie a la frontière roumaine chez elle, au lieu de l'avoir entre elle et les Principautés. On comprend maintenant, l'intérêt énorme que le czar attache à cette langue de terre qui paraissait insignifiante.

La ligne du Dniester était d'autant plus importante pour les Principautés qu'elle permettait aux puissances maritimes de se porter, dès la première alerte, sur Akerman, point capital, le

1. En suivant dans ces explications une carte déjà ancienne que je crois bonne, j'ai peut-être encore donné trop d'importance à ces montagnes, qui, dans tous les cas, n'en ont guère, puisqu'elles sont reléguées à la pointe supérieure du pays, loin des routes que les Russes ont toujours suivies. Voici ce que m'écrit un homme très-compétent : « La ligne désignée dans le protocole est la ligne de partage des eaux qui se rendent d'un côté vers le Pruth et de l'autre vers le Dniester : cette ligne a été sans doute prise pour une chaîne de montagnes, ainsi que cela résulte de la plupart des cartes de Bessarabie, qui sont toutes mauvaises ; mais il n'y a même pas l'ombre de montagnes en Bessarabie, et c'est à peine si cela peut s'appeler des collines. C'est un pays plat, parfaitement plat, et qui ne présente, sur ladite ligne de partage des eaux qui coulent à droite et à gauche, que quelques rides très-légères, et dont aucune ne s'élève au-dessus de 500 pieds de hauteur au-dessus du niveau de la mer Noire : ceci est positif, vous pouvez l'affirmer. Le Dniester est la seule ligne de défense possible pour les Principautés, etc. »

pouvant être facilement remonté jusque-là par les navires
rre. Avec Bender et Chotym, il était aisé, d'autre part, à de
s de terre peu nombreuses, de rendre le passage du Dnies-
s-difficile et très-périlleux pour une armée russe[1].
s l'insistance même que le czar apportait ici aurait dû ou-
es yeux aux puissances occidentales, et leur montrer que
ngement proposé vient à l'encontre du but qu'elles ont, et
t de donner une force de résistance considérable à la Moldo-
hie. Comment donc l'Autriche, qui connaissait si bien le fort
faible de tous ces points, a-t-elle induit ces puissances en
areille faute? C'est que, par le nouvel arrangement, l'Autri-
tout ce qu'elle veut, tout ce qui lui importe quant à présent,
oir, la liberté des bouches du Danube, ce qui équivaut, dans
nsée, à la faculté de convertir ce fleuve en fleuve tout à fait
and. Du moment, en effet, que les Russes n'occupent plus
nbouchures, qu'ils ont presque toutes obstruées à dessein, il
'abord évident que la suprématie de la navigation sur ce
fleuve est assurée à l'Autriche, et qu'il lui appartiendra,
u'à tous autres, de faire les grands travaux nécessaires pour en
er les passes. Ce n'est certes pas nous qui nous plaindrons
amélioration qui devrait aussi profiter à la Moldo-Valachie,
i touche aux intérêts du commerce et de la civilisation en
al. Mais les vues de l'Autriche ne s'arrêtent pas là; et la
ve qu'elle apporte ici des préoccupations toutes particulières,
te précisément de l'empressement qu'elle a mis à adopter un
gement qui compromet la sûreté des Principautés, et qui
de toute évidence qu'un compromis entre les intérêts tout
culiers du czar et les siens. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que
nense delta formé par les bouches du Danube constitue un
in neutre, qui doit rester tel en partie, d'après les traités, et
'est de fait entièrement puisqu'il est inhabité. Ce terrain
re, les Russes en ont accaparé peu à peu les points à leur con-
nce, et ils y ont fait des établissements. Maintenant il faut
s l'évacuent. Mais ce que les Russes ont fait, l'Autriche pourra
le faire à sa place, elle qui, au lieu d'obstruer les passes, se

[1] ertainement aussi la frontière du Dniester, en donnant à la Moldo-Valachie
ôte très-accidentée, fournissait à ce pays, qui est aujourd'hui séparé de la
ui ne va y toucher que par un point où il rencontre la Russie et l'Autriche,
lité de créer d'excellents ports. C'est une chose grave qui m'avait échappé
je n'ai plus le temps d'examiner.

donnera la mission de les dégager : ce sera là pour elle à la fois un point de domination commerciale très-important, un point stratégique non moins fort, et enfin un point d'appui très-solide pour les colonisations qu'elle médite dans les Principautés. Ainsi possédant le cours supérieur du fleuve, elle dominera encore la Moldo-Valachie par ses embouchures, exerçant sur elle une triple pression commerciale, stratégique et colonisatrice. Ce sera assez bien commencer, et l'on conçoit qu'en retour de pareils avantages, l'Autriche soit coulante avec la Russie sur la question de la frontière moldave.

Non-seulement cette dernière question ne touche pas directement l'Autriche, mais elle espère bien trouver son compte aussi à l'état de désordre et d'instabilité que l'incertitude de la frontière roumaine du côté de la Russie, et toutes les autres solutions de la question moldo-valaque, comme elle les entend, doivent entrainer. Sous le régime de la suzeraineté abusive et de la non-union, il est bien clair que la détestable frontière de la Moldavie du côté de la Russie ne saurait être gardée par la Moldavie seule : donc, presque certainement, on y mettra des Turcs, et on y laissera, pour un temps au moins, des Autrichiens ; voilà donc l'Autriche qui tient le pays, non-seulement par tous les côtés, mais par son beau milieu. Pauvre pays ! Nous avons dit ce qu'y seraient seulement les Turcs ; ceux qui sont un peu au courant de ce qui s'y passe aujourd'hui, savent ce qu'y sont les Autrichiens : eh bien ! l'une ou l'autre de ces calamités ne suffisait pas, il les aura toutes les deux.

Mais voilà, ce semble, qui ne fait guère les affaires de la Russie, et elle devrait bien au moins dévoiler de pareilles menées : Erreur ; peut-être cherchera-t-elle à les déjouer en quelque point dès maintenant ; mais comme, d'une part, elle a tout ce qu'elle pouvait obtenir quant à présent, et ce qu'elle ne pouvait obtenir que par la complicité de l'Autriche, à savoir la possession du Dniester ; comme, d'autre part, elle espère bien profiter à son heure du résultat des manœuvres de l'Autriche, elle ne les dévoilera pas. L'Autriche et la Russie comptent l'une sur l'autre, et à bien juste raison, pour se faire détester dans les Principautés, et elles comptent ensemble sur la Turquie pour y remplir, avec moins de clairvoyance, le même rôle ; elles savent bien que celle des deux qui occupe ce pays, si elle n'y reste pas, ouvre la route à l'autre. Chacune à son tour espère y assurer sa domination en l'occupant ; mais celle qui est évincée momentanément prévoit bien que son tour viendra. Eh ! qui oserait assurer aujourd'hui, si toutes choses

passent comme l'entend l'Autriche, que la meilleure chance ne it pas encore à la Russie? Les Autrichiens ont déjà réussi dans les rincipautés à faire presque regretter les Russes; qu'ils y amènent aintenant les Turcs à l'état de garnisons permanentes, que la si- ation désespérée de la Moldo-Valachie continue et s'aggrave; ue, par les dispositions du traité européen qui va se conclure, out espoir soit ôté aux Roumains du côté des puissances occiden- les; et que, le moment venu, la Russie se présente, — il lui est acile d'entrer, la frontière reste ouverte, — et dise : « Voilà donc beau résultat de la régénération promise! On a méconnu mes ntentions. Moldo-Valaques, n'ai-je pas toujours défendu vos droits vos priviléges? Souvenez-vous que c'est moi qui ai déjà chassé les urcs de vos forteresses; votre condition est bien pire aujourd'hui u'elle n'était alors. Venez à moi, je vous apporte la délivrance! » ans de si horribles conjonctures, on conçoit, non-seulement inertie bien certaine, mais l'égarement même d'une population ui ne se serait vue délivrée des Russes que pour retomber sous n double joug plus lourd encore; et, devant une situation si com- lexe, après un premier essai si coûteux et si infructueux de solu- ion, les puissances occidentales elles-mêmes pourraient bien ne avoir que dire et que faire.

Non, il n'est pas possible que les demi-mesures qui prépare- aient l'accomplissement de pareils desseins, prévaillent dans es conseils de l'Europe. Il est trop tard, nous le craignons, pour u'on puisse revenir sur la délimitation de la frontière mol- ave; mais si les Principautés se trouvent par là malheureusement affaiblies, c'est une raison de plus, si on veut qu'elles aient encore e la force, pour les unir. Plus il est évident que la Moldavie seule e peut suffire à la défense de son territoire ouvert, plus il est né- essaire de fondre la Valachie avec elle.

Ces deux pays séparés ne sont presque rien : réunis ils feraient ne nation de plus de cinq millions d'âmes, qui aussitôt que ses essources seront développées sous une bonne administration, eut entretenir en temps ordinaire une armée de quarante à oixante mille hommes suivant les besoins, et qui, dans les oments de grand danger, opposerait à l'invasion, s'il le fallait, lus de cent mille combattants.

On sait d'ailleurs combien les Roumains font de bons soldats, ans parler du temps où ils luttaient victorieusement contre les ations les plus guerrières et les plus redoutables de leur voisi-

nage, Hongrois, Polonais et autres; c'est parmi les Roumains de son empire que l'Autriche recrute ses meilleures troupes. Il est à remarquer encore que dans les guerres du commencement de ce siècle entre les Turcs et les Russes, alors que les Moldo-Valaques flottaient entre les deux influences contraires, c'est presque toujours du côté où s'étaient joints des détachements de troupes roumaines qu'inclinait la victoire.

Ainsi tout plaide en faveur de la cause que nous défendons; et nous cherchons en vain les obstacles. Pour tout épuiser, faut-il parler de la capitale qui devrait être adoptée pour une nouvelle Moldo-Valachie? On pourrait alléguer ou supposer quelque difficulté à cet égard, quelque rivalité entre Iassy et Bucharest. A cet égard nul malentendu entre les Moldaves et les Valaques. Les uns comme les autres reconnaissent que Bucharest a tous les titres; c'est une ville de plus de cent vingt mille âmes, beaucoup plus importante qu'Iassy, beaucoup plus vivante, plus centrale aussi, mieux placée, au point de vue commercial, à cause de sa proximité du Danube, auquel elle se relie par un petit fleuve susceptible de devenir très-navigable, aussi bien qu'au point de vue stratégique, surtout si la frontière du Dniester reste aux Russes : dans ces conditions en effet, Iassy, toute voisine du Pruth, serait à la merci du premier coup de main. Il faut ajouter que la Valachie, par sa configuration topographique, se prête bien mieux que la Moldavie à une résistance désespérée, en cas d'invasion; elle est tout coupée de montagnes et de cours d'eau, qui offrent de grandes ressources pour la guerre de partisans, pour la lutte suprême où chacun se fait soldat.

On avait bien parlé, afin d'éviter toute rivalité possible, de choisir pour capitale Fokschany qui se trouve sur la limite des deux pays. Mais cette ville, perdue dans les terres, n'a aucune importance, elle n'offre aucunes ressources naturelles pour la défense, elle ne présente aucun des avantages accumulés dans Bucharest. D'ailleurs, on n'improvise pas une capitale. Aussi devant le louable empressement des Moldaves à accepter Bucharest, cette idée paraît-elle abandonnée. Du reste, à part quelques intrigants intéressés à une séparation qui seule assure leur influence et leur permet d'aspirer au gouvernement de chacun des deux petits Etats, on peut dire qu'il n'est pas un Moldave ou un Valaque qui n'acceptât pour capitale un village quelconque, si, par absurde, l'union était à ce prix.

V.

RÉSUMÉ, CONSIDÉRATIONS GÉNÉRALES ET RÉPONSE AUX OBJECTIONS.

Résumons-nous. Par les efforts que les ennemis de la Turquie et de l'ordre européen poursuivent depuis un siècle, et continuent encore aujourd'hui, en vue d'affaiblir et d'absorber les Principautés, nous avons montré de quelle importance il est, pour les puissances occidentales qui veulent la paix du monde, de fortifier et de régénérer ce peuple moldo-valaque, qui doit servir de rempart à la Turquie et de barrière aux envahissements moraux et matériels de ses deux redoutables voisins. Après avoir établi cette vérité, qui n'est guère contestée, mais que nous avons cru nécessaire de montrer dans tout son jour, nous avons tâché de faire passer dans l'esprit de nos lecteurs la conviction profonde où nous sommes que, pour atteindre le but qu'on se propose, il faut, de toute nécessité et comme condition première, donner aux Principautés l'indépendance (qui aurait pour effet immédiat leur union), ou tout au moins l'union sous une suzeraineté conforme aux anciens traités.

Nous avons nettement séparé ces deux propositions connexes, de l'indépendance et de l'union, parce que, sans doute, les membres du Congrès les distingueront; et c'est dans la seconde que nous avons réuni nos développements et nos preuves, parce que c'est la plus modeste, celle qu'il paraît impossible de ne pas faire accepter. Il nous a semblé d'ailleurs que, dans cette cause, par extraordinaire, en prouvant le moins on était bien près de prouver le plus. Il n'aura échappé à personne, en effet, que le régime de vassalité, conforme aux capitulations et fortifié contre les empiétements du suzerain par l'union, approchait beaucoup de l'indépendance; et, d'autre part, il est bien clair que les avantages promis par l'union sont encore beaucoup mieux assurés par l'indépendance complète : d'où il résulte que, l'union admise, il y a encore de fortes raisons pour aller jusqu'à l'indépendance, et bien peu à faire pour y arriver. L'union cependant ne peut être refusée sans déni de justice et sans se mettre en contradiction avec la fin qu'on se propose : c'est ce que nous croyons avoir solidement établi.

Nous ne pouvions guère, d'ailleurs, prouver les avantages de

l'indépendance, abstraction faite de l'union. Car l'union est, bien entendu, la première conséquence de l'indépendance complète, comme c'est la première réclamation de l'indépendance sous la suzeraineté, telle qu'elle est définie par les capitulations. Ainsi, en discutant l'union, nous entrions seulement d'un degré de plus dans la réalité, et ce milieu nous était favorable pour mieux apprécier la nouvelle existence du peuple moldo-valaque.

Nous croyons avoir suffisamment indiqué tous les avantages, au point de vue des intérêts moldo-valaques comme au point de vue des intérêts européens, de la réunion des deux pays en un seul État. Du côté de la suzeraineté (si la suzeraineté est maintenue), en même temps que cette union est de droit, elle est de garantie nécessaire; car, en la refusant, on affaiblit à la fois les Principautés, et dans leur droit et dans leur faculté de résistance aux nouveaux empiétements sur le droit; on consacre en réalité leur servitude, on place, pour ainsi dire, l'anéantissement de cette nation sous la garantie de l'Europe. Sans l'union, point de prospérité intérieure, car elle est à la fois l'instrument matériel et le ressort moral de toute régénération. Sans l'union, point de force militaire, point de moyens de résistance contre les invasions, nulle barrière morale ni matérielle entre la Turquie d'un côté, l'Autriche et la Russie de l'autre. Sans l'union, enfin, aucune stabilité possible en Orient; le pays reste le champ ouvert à toutes les ambitions, à toutes les intrigues, à tous les envahissements; et, dans cette nation, qui devait être le plus ferme appui de la Turquie, tout ce qui reste encore de force se retourne contre elle : une population de cinq millions d'âmes de plus ou de moins pour soi ou contre soi, c'est quelque chose!

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Après une telle accumulation d'arguments européens, faut-il faire appel aux intérêts pour ainsi dire personnels de chaque nation? Après avoir montré aux peuples de l'Occident les énormes dangers qu'ils conjurent en adoptant une politique aussi sensée que généreuse, faut-il montrer les avantages positifs qu'ils doivent en retirer? Il est certain qu'il ne peut y avoir accroissement de prospérité légitime chez un membre de la grande famille humaine, sans que tous en ressentent les bienfaits. Les bienfaits seront d'autant plus grands ici, qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un affermissement graduel, mais d'une transformation nouvelle et presque subite. La Moldo-Valachie est un sol vierge et qui renferme toute sorte de richesses inexploitées, richesses agricole

out, si fécondes que, presque sans culture, elles approvi-
nt déjà les greniers de l'Europe, mais richesses indus-
aussi, telles que mines d'or et d'autres métaux précieux,
bois de construction, qui n'attendent que des capitaux et
ins expérimentées. Les nations industrielles et colonisa-
comme l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne elle-même, trouveront
débouchés nouveaux pour leurs produits et pour l'excédant
population; d'autres, comme la France et l'Italie, aux-
appartient surtout l'influence civilisatrice, rencontreront
e pays des sympathies d'autant plus vives qu'elles sont
s et fortifiées par des instincts de races : leur esprit, im-
sur ce sol nouveau, rayonnera alentour, sur tout l'Orient;
cette voie de satisfaction morale, elles aboutiront aussi, sans
r, aux avantages matériels. De tous les points de l'Europe,
taux seront appelés à féconder une civilisation naissante : il
ra beaucoup pour créer des routes, des canaux, des chemins
et ce sera pour les capitalistes de toutes les nations une
de grands profits, en même temps que pour la Moldo-Valachie
leur gage et le plus puissant instrument de sa prospérité.
chaque nation aussi, car il ne faut pas rapetisser la cause,
bénéfice de cette bonne pensée, qu'il y avait là un peuple
nt qui demandait la vie, — et auquel la vie a été rendue;
avait là près de cinq millions d'hommes qui ne sont pas
ement serfs, comme on le croit généralement, mais qui,
poids de tant d'invasions et sous l'action combinée de tant
mes oppressifs et désastreux, tous résumés dans le fameux
ient organique, étaient arrivés à une condition pire que
u servage, — et que ces cinq millions de malheureux devront
re nouveau les bienfaits de la liberté, de la sécurité, du
productif et moralisateur, c'est-à-dire, avec les joies de la
délivrée, celle de l'homme libre et de la famille affranchie.
i, l'Autriche et la Russie n'auront pas, il est vrai, les avan-
qu'elles réclament et qu'elles prétendent fonder sur la
de et la mort d'un peuple, (pour ne parler que de celui-ci);
e ce peuple libre et vivant sortiront des avantages bien plus
ux, qui profiteront à toutes les nations, et dont ces deux-là
elles-mêmes leur part. Et qui sait même si ce petit peuple,
abord comme barrière à leurs convoitises, comme instru-
le séparation entre des intérêts hostiles, ne sera pas un jour
t de ralliement et le conciliateur bienfaisant de tant de pas-

Centre d'alliance et d'ordre nouveau en Orient.

sions rivales ! Devant l'impossible, les mauvaises pensées s'évanouissent. Ne dit-on pas déjà que, pour occuper les loisirs que va lui faire, pour quelque temps au moins, la solution de la question d'Orient, le czar médite de grandes réformes dans son empire ! Faites que ces loisirs soient durables ; donnez-en de pareils à l'Autriche, s'il se peut, et à la Turquie elle-même : tout le monde y gagnera. Le moment viendra ensuite où, sur cette terre qui fut l'objet et le théâtre de leurs rivalités, ces nations se rencontreront, non plus comme en un champ clos, mais comme en un rendez-vous d'alliance.

Il ne faut pas perdre de vue, en effet, que de toutes les races du monde, la race latine, qui n'est partout qu'une greffe sur d'autres races, est la plus sympathique, la seule qui s'accommode plus ou moins du contact de toutes les autres. C'est une merveille et un bienfait providentiel qu'un membre de cette grande famille latine se trouve aujourd'hui placé aux confins de l'Orient, entre tant de peuples divers par leurs origines, opposés par leurs mœurs et leurs instincts. Quels que soient les démembrements et les dislocations qui puissent se produire dans l'Europe orientale, une Moldo-Valachie reconstituée sera comme l'arche de salut dans ce déluge.

Il est impossible, en effet, de s'en tenir indéfiniment dans la politique de l'Orient à un principe négatif comme celui de l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman : un principe, non de théorie mais de fait, qui est contredit par les faits. Il est tout simple que l'Autriche défende ce prétendu principe qu'elle sait mieux que personne vide de sens ; il est tout simple qu'elle essaye d'abuser avec ce mot les puissances occidentales, elle qui ne vit que de négations, qui ne grandit que par les chutes qu'elle prépare ; il est tout simple aussi qu'elle ait par là beaucoup de prise sur la Turquie, et principalement sur le vieux parti turc, qui, non-seulement ne doute pas que le présent ne soit bien assuré, mais qui rêve encore de conquêtes : elle est dans des conditions d'autant meilleures pour perdre la Turquie en la flattant, qu'elle peut identifier son principe avec le sien, et lui dire : « Moi aussi, je n'ai de droit et d'existence que par la conquête. » Elle n'ajoute pas qu'elle a encore la force de s'étendre, tandis que la Turquie n'a plus celle de se maintenir. Dans tous les cas, les puissances occidentales ne sauraient se laisser prendre ni à de tels mensonges ni à de telles illusions.

Nous aurions beaucoup à nous étendre sur ce sujet; le temps nous manque, et peut-être d'ailleurs notre objet précis ne comporte-t-il pas de tels développements. Un mot, cependant, pour rendre notre pensée générale. Entre le radicalisme intéressé du czar, qui prétend la Turquie déjà morte, afin de prendre son héritage, et le quiétisme non moins calculé de l'Autriche, qui veut l'endormir pour la dépouiller à petit bruit, n'est-il pas nécessaire d'adopter une politique à la fois conservatrice et prévoyante, qui, sans nier le mal comme sans l'exagérer, pourvoie en même temps aux nécessités du présent et aux éventualités de l'avenir, qui, en recueillant à propos, et en vivifiant chaque membre qui se détache fatalement et de lui-même, prévienne d'une part la dissolution de tout le corps engagé, et dépose de l'autre les germes féconds d'un ordre nouveau?

Mais pour sauver la cause que nous défendons, il n'est pas même nécessaire d'entrer résolûment dans cette politique aussi juste que salutaire. Si la Turquie et l'Autriche invoquent l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman contre l'union aussi bien que contre l'indépendance, disant que l'une équivaut presque à l'autre et peut y conduire, que tout ferment d'indépendance est dangereux dans cet empire ébranlé; il est facile de lui répondre: En principe il n'y a là aucune concession qui tire à conséquence; les deux Principautés ne sont pas des pays conquis faisant partie intégrante de l'empire ottoman; il n'y a entre elles et le sultan qu'un contrat qui liait les deux parties dans des circonstances données, et qu'il est avantageux pour les deux parties de rompre, ces circonstances ayant changé: au profit du sultan tout se réduisait finalement à un tribut qui n'a plus de cause et qui n'est pour le sultan lui-même qu'une source de grands embarras: il est donc tout simple qu'il y renonce. Voilà pour l'indépendance, si c'est à cette solution, de beaucoup la meilleure assurément, que l'on s'arrête. Quant à l'union, elle ne saurait être refusée; la faculté pour les deux Principautés de s'unir est en dehors du contrat: voilà pour la seconde solution. Dans l'un ou l'autre cas, il n'y a rien là qui puisse autoriser des exigences nouvelles de la part des populations voisines qui se trouvent placées dans de tout autres conditions. En principe donc la puissance du sultan ne reçoit aucune atteinte; mais en fait elle se trouve garantie et fortifiée doublement, 1° parce que la Moldo-Valachie unie et régénérée protége la Turquie contre ses ennemis du côté du Danube; 2° parce que le

sultan compte dans son empire cinq millions de mécontents d moins.

Les puissances intéressées à empêcher la formation d'un Éta nouveau sur le Danube, feront peut-être une autre objection tirée de leur prétendue connaissance de l'état des choses. Elle diront sans doute que le peuple moldo-valaque est un peupl corrompu et dégénéré, duquel il n'y a rien à attendre, et qui n répondra à aucun des avantages qu'on se promet en lui donnan l'indépendance ou quelque chose qui en approche. Ce sont là d ces allégations bien faciles à faire, mais également difficiles établir et à réfuter : car pour trancher complétement une pareill question, il n'y aurait qu'un moyen, ce serait d'y aller voir. En core faudrait-il y voir attentivement et ne pas s'arrêter à la sur face des choses; car en se renfermant dans une classe très restreinte, mais la seule qui s'offre à la fréquentation habituell du voyageur, on risquerait d'être gravement abusé. Pour nous nous dirons en toute sincérité ce que nous croyons fermement Non, le peuple moldo-valaque n'est pas un peuple corromp et dégénéré. Il est très-vrai que la classe supérieure a de grand vices; ces vices, nous ne les avons pas dissimulés; nous-mêm nous y insisterions peut-être encore une dernière fois, si nou n'avions la crainte de faire des blessures inutiles et de troubler le aspirations meilleures qui, dans ce moment même, se mani festent dans tous les rangs de cette nation rendue à l'espé rance. Mais ces vices, importés du Fanar, cette corruption cette vénalité, cet esprit d'intrigue, restent circonscrits dan une classe très-peu nombreuse et nettement distincte de tou le fond de la population. Et quand nous parlons de cette class si limitée, qu'on n'aille pas croire que nous l'offrons tout en tière en holocauste à l'opinion : il y a dans cette classe même assez d'exceptions généreuses non-seulement pour la racheter mais pour sauver la nation tout entière, si celle-ci était rendue son indépendance complète, extérieure et intérieure. C'est ic l'écrivain qui parle tout seul, il le peut et il le doit, quoiqu'o ne l'en ait pas prié; et il ose ajouter que cet écrit lui-même inspiré par l'immense majorité des Moldo-Valaques présents Paris, entièrement conforme à leurs vues et à leurs sentiments porte assez témoignage. Mais ce qu'on le presse de dire, parce que c'est là une vérité impersonnelle et capitale, c'est que le fo[illegible]de la nation (c'est-à-dire les cinq millions environ qui sub

sistent après déduction faite) est bon, intelligent, tout pénétré encore de la forte tradition des ancêtres et tout rempli déjà du sentiment de la régénération prochaine.

Mais dans cette question où les preuves sont si difficiles en l'un ou l'autre sens, j'aperçois même des preuves : — Un peuple abruti, dit-on : — lisez les ballades populaires de la Romanie. — — Un peuple énervé. Nous avons dit ses vertus guerrières, et nul ne peut les contester. — Un peuple brutal, inhumain :.... Oh! voilà ce qui n'entrera jamais dans la pensée, même de ses accusateurs : 1848 est là pour répondre.

Mais en vérité il y a une preuve plus étonnante de la puissance de vitalité que recèle cette nation. Depuis le Bosphore et l'Archipel, jusqu'à la Russie, jusqu'à la Prusse, jusqu'aux Alpes, il y avait bien douze ou quinze peuples : tous ont été conquis, soumis, incorporés à d'autres États; tous ont succombé, — et il y en avait de bien redoutables qui le sont même encore, — les uns absorbés par la Turquie alors si puissante, les autres par l'Autriche. Un seul, et le plus foulé par les invasions barbares des premiers siècles, le plus aventuré dans la mêlée du moyen âge, — car il se trouvait isolé entre tous les autres, et il avait tant d'ennemis à combattre qu'il ne savait de quel côté tourner ses coups, — un seul a échappé, a pu garder une ombre d'indépendance; et vous lui contestez le droit de vivre! Aujourd'hui il est brisé, nous ne le nions pas; pendant que les autres peuples étaient abrités du moins sous la servitude, ayant eu, lui, à supporter le choc des plus grandes ambitions des temps modernes, à subir, depuis la fin du dernier siècle, nous ne savons plus combien d'invasions armées, et dès avant cela l'invasion plus redoutable encore du Fanar, il a failli succomber ; mais quel autre à sa place fût resté debout? Depuis quelque temps, il est vrai, ce peuple est comme un navire désemparé qui flotte au gré des vents contraires; il n'a perdu toutefois ni sa boussole ni ses rameurs; et que disputons-nous sur les chances qu'il a de se sauver ou de périr, quand le voilà qui touche au port!

Une dernière réflexion pourtant. S'il est une chose certaine, c'est que ni la situation présente de ce pays ni l'état actuel des choses du côté du Danube ne peuvent être pires qu'ils ne sont. Doutât-on même du succès des tentatives dont nous croyons le résultat certain, il n'y aurait rien de mieux à faire que de les

mettre à l'épreuve. Seulement, qu'on nous permette de le répéter encore, pour régénérer un peuple, il ne faut pas de demi-mesures; et le moins qu'on puisse faire ici, c'est de donner aux Moldo-Valaques la véritable indépendance sous la suzeraineté, sinon l'indépendance entière, qui vaudrait beaucoup mieux encore. Tout ce qui serait essayé en deçà perdrait tout et ne prouverait rien.

VI.

BASES DU NOUVEL ÉTAT POLITIQUE.

Le sens général de tout ce qui précède, c'est que l'union, dans l'une des deux conditions d'indépendance que nous avons examinées, contient en germe toutes les conséquences nécessaires pour faire de la Moldo-Valachie une nation. Mais ces conséquences, nous n'avons pu les indiquer que d'une manière générale; et pour présenter un plan complet de régénération, il faudrait entrer dans le détail de toutes les réformes que réclament les Principautés. Ce serait là, en réalité, le sujet d'un Mémoire plus étendu que ne l'est déjà celui-ci, et ce nouveau sujet exigerait de grandes études. Nous n'avons pu avoir un instant la pensée de le traiter ici. Nous aurions voulu cependant aborder sommairement quelques points capitaux; mais plus nous avançons, plus le temps nous manque; nous sommes donc forcé de nous réduire à un seul de ces points, et de ne le toucher qu'en courant, sous la forme, pour ainsi dire, de *post-scriptum :* il se rattache trop étroitement à toutes les considérations précédentes pour que nous le passions tout à fait sous silence.

La première condition de l'indépendance, même sous la suzeraineté, c'est un gouvernement national, et ce gouvernement prend d'autant plus d'importance dans la réunion des deux pays en un seul État. Ce gouvernement, quel sera-t-il? Voilà la question que nous avons à résoudre en quelques mots.

N'oublions pas que nous voulons une nation forte; pour cela il faut un gouvernement fort, surtout quand cette nation forte n'existe pas encore et qu'il s'agit de la faire surgir.

Quiconque connaît un peu ce pays sait deux choses : premièrement, que le régime des princes électifs, soit à vie comme autrefois, et plus encore pour un temps déterminé comme aujourd'hui a été pour les Principautés, aussi bien que pour la Pologne, un

des principales causes de ruine; secondement, que dans l'état des mœurs politiques de ce pays, dans les conditions actuelles de l'élection qui est réservée aux boyards, on ne peut compter sur un bon choix; et qu'en tout cas un homme même très-heureusement choisi dans ces conditions détestables, ne saurait avoir l'autorité suffisante pour gouverner, non pas le peuple qui est très-facile à gouverner, mais ses égaux d'hier, ses rivaux d'hier et d'aujourd'hui.

Il faut donc que le principe de gouvernement soit radicalement changé dans les Principautés : dans quel sens, et comment?

Il n'y a que deux solutions possibles : ou un gouvernement positivement démocratique qui puise sa force dans l'élection la plus large possible, et qui s'appuierait sur le peuple; ou un gouvernement franchement monarchique.

Nous sommes loin de croire le premier de ces deux gouvernements impossible en Moldo-Valachie : ce que nous avons dit du peuple un peu plus haut nous donnerait confiance au contraire, — à la condition toutefois que la première élection fût préparée par un gouvernement intérimaire déjà issu d'un large suffrage, et qu'elle eût lieu à l'abri de toute influence étrangère, le pays conséquemment étant d'abord évacué par les troupes qui l'occupent. Mais, comme il n'est pas présumable que ce soit là la solution préférée dans le Congrès, nous avons plutôt à nous occuper de la seconde.

Une monarchie donc. Mais il est bien peu de boyards prêts à accepter l'un d'entre eux pour prince héréditaire et dynastique. Tout bien considéré, sa situation ne serait guère tenable, à moins, peut-être, qu'il ne dût son origine à une élection vraiment universelle, pratiquée dans les conditions que nous avons déjà mentionnées plus haut. Hors de là, son autorité serait compromise et son temps dépensé dans des luttes personnelles de chaque jour. Il ne reste donc plus qu'une seule alternative : un prince étranger, un prince appartenant de près ou de loin à quelqu'une des familles régnantes de l'Europe, choisi ou reconnu par toutes les puissances, et placé par là, en même temps que par sa seule qualité d'étranger, et, s'il se pouvait, par ses qualités personnelles, au-dessus ou en dehors des rivalités des boyards.

Mais ici plusieurs exclusions sont nécessaires. Il est clair que toutes les nations, que leurs prétentions ou leur seul voisinage désignent comme intéressées à se créer dans les Principautés des

influences exclusives, doivent être mises hors de concours; évidemment le prince héréditaire ne peut être ni turc ou grec, ni russe, ni autrichien, nous ajoutons ni même allemand, car tout Allemand deviendrait l'instrument de l'Autriche. Sans ces exclusions, tout serait perdu.

Puisqu'il faut aboutir à cette nécessité regrettable, mais bien certaine, d'un prince héréditaire étranger, remarquons tout de suite que l'union des deux Principautés en un seul État devient par là d'autant plus urgente, et, pour ainsi dire, inévitable; et qu'en même temps la question de l'investiture et de l'hommage se trouve presque certainement tranchée. Il est évident, en effet, qu'on ne peut avoir la pensée de mettre là deux princes étrangers, côte à côte en quelque sorte dans deux moitiés d'État. Il est évident aussi que l'hommage est réduit à rien, et probablement supprimé tout à fait, en raison de l'hérédité.

Un dernier mot, un dernier vœu, en terminant cette échappée rapide sur la question du prince : L'homme qui sera chargé de régner le premier sur la Moldo-Valachie aura une grande mission à remplir, la régénération d'un peuple! Il est bien souhaitable qu'il y apporte de grandes qualités personnelles. Dans tous les cas et quel qu'il soit, celui qui viendra, sous la garantie de l'Europe, prendre possession du nouvel État uni et affranchi, est sûr d'un bon accueil : qu'il compte sur cet accueil, qu'il s'entoure le moins possible de troupes étrangères; que tout ce qui peut rappeler de près ou de loin les hontes de l'invasion soit écarté : c'est assez qu'il ait été étranger lui-même; en franchissant le seuil du nouvel État, il doit cesser de l'être.

Il resterait à parler de l'assemblée représentative du pays. Nous disons l'assemblée, car il est absolument contraire aux traditions politiques du pays, comme il serait peu conforme à son état social actuel, d'en avoir deux. Mais le temps nous manque absolument pour aborder cette question.

FIN.

LE

PROTECTORAT DU CZAR

OU

LA ROUMANIE ET LA RUSSIE

NOUVEAUX DOCUMENTS SUR LA SITUATION EUROPÉENNE.

PAR J. * R.

Témoin oculaire des événements qui se sont passés en Valachie de 1828 à 1849.

PARIS

AU COMPTOIR DES IMPRIMEURS-UNIS.

COMON, ÉDITEUR,

15, QUAI MALAQUAIS.

1850

AVANT-PROPOS.

L'auteur de cette brochure est un Roumain émigré (1), témoin oculaire des faits contemporains qu'il retrace, impartial historien des annales de sa patrie trop peu connue parmi nous. Sa publication, en répandant un jour précieux sur elle, emprunte, comme son titre l'indique, un intérêt particulier aux événements dont l'Europe est le théâtre depuis deux années, événements dont elle complète en quelque sorte le tableau. La terrible lutte hongroise, transportée à son dénouement des rives de la Theiss aux rives du Danube, appelle l'attention générale sur la marche de cette puissance à double face, embrassant et menaçant deux moitiés d'hémisphères; elle a montré sous une physionomie neuve le long duel qui se poursuit, tantôt diplomatiquement, tantôt masqué, tantôt par les armes, entre la Turquie et la Russie, c'est-à-dire entre deux religions et deux races, duel épisodique lui-même dans le grand combat déchaîné entre les forces antagonistes du monde moderne.

On y a vu avec surprise le vieil empire Islamite, réputé naguère barbare, gardien auguste des droits de l'hospitalité sainte, et l'empire orthodoxe des successeurs de Pierre-le-Grand, l'empire septentrional dont nos poètes philosophes chantaient métaphoriquement la lumière naissante, abandonner lâchement ses prisonniers, devenus ses hôtes, aux potences autrichiennes, et réclamer pour les leur livrer encore l'extradition des chrétiens réfugiés sur les terres du Sultan. — C'est en effet un rayon de lumière jeté sur la situation, le critérium de la nouvelle phase des deux empires.

Le premier, après avoir passé par l'état barbare et fanatique, pénètre lentement dans la voie progressive; il s'humanise et s'illumine. Le second, au contraire, assis sur sa victime immortelle, la Pologne, se constitue le centre de l'absolutisme rétrograde, le Don-Quichotte des ténèbres et du passé; il recule aux confins de la barbarie.

Toute la politique européenne doit être envisagée à ce point de vue. On le comprendra mieux après avoir lu l'appréciation historique du *Protectorat du Czar* dans les principautés Danubiennes. L'on comprendra aussi comment, vis-à-vis un pareil protectorat, la politique vraiment conservatrice et nationale des Roumains se résume dans ces deux termes adoptés pour règle par les nationaux : l'autonomie du pays et la suzeraineté de la Porte; — La politique intelligente,

(1) *Le cachet national s'y empreint* dans son style, fidèlement conservé avec ses ures caractéristiques.

pour le monde civilisé, dans celui-ci : l'intégrité de l'empire Ottoman ; — et pour la France en particulier, suivant sa mission traditionnelle trop rarement accomplie, dans la haute protection libérale des tribus chrétiennes de l'Asie et des Slaves catholiques de l'Europe contre leurs oppresseurs, maintenant placés au pied des monts Ourals ; car le protectorat russe absorbe et dénationalise dans son cosmopolitisme délétère les éléments indigènes, que laissent vivre les traités existants avec la Turquie désormais instruite par les sévères leçons de l'expérience, et que de nouveaux traités favorables pourraient au besoin développer. La glorieuse tentative de résurrection roumaine, dont cet opuscule indique déjà les faits principaux et dont nous donnerons plus tard la narration complète, le prouve non moins suffisamment ; pour se régénérer, la nation valaque n'avait qu'à invoquer ses traités antiques avec la Porte et à se retremper dans ses sources primitives, altérées surtout par le génie moscovite.

Certes le cœur battra en voyant ces nobles tribus Daces, nos sœurs par la vieille Rome et le christianisme, aux prises avec un ennemi si redoutable et si astucieux, comme la colombe aux serres du vautour. On connaîtra sans voile les ressorts de ce gouvernement qui ne rougit pas de descendre jusqu'à falsifier par un acte de faussaire la constitution d'un peuple pour l'asservir, de ce gouvernement qui se pose en défenseur de la civilisation contre les anarchistes et qu'un éminent orateur (1) osait appeler *le seul gouvernement régulier en Europe*.

Et, comme français, je le dis avec les Valaques : Ouvrez les yeux, car cet ennemi, c'est le nôtre! Qu'on ne s'y trompe pas, en séparant comme toujours, par une étroite rhétorique, les choses indivisibles. Pour qui a suivi la marche des incorporations, transformations ou dénationalisations opérées depuis un demi-siècle, la question roumaine, c'est la question de la Bassarabie et des autres provinces russianisées ; c'est la question polonaise et la question romaine, demain peut-être la question helvétique. La question du protectorat du Czar en Roumanie et en Pologne, c'est la question de la suprématie du Czar sur l'Orient et sur l'Occident, la question sommairement prophétisée par ces paroles de l'illustre captif : républicaine ou cosaque!

En doutez-vous? — Pour mieux éclairer l'avenir, un diplomate russe publie dans une revue parisienne (2), au moment où j'écris, un article intitulé : *La Question romaine et la Papauté*. Cet article fournit un admirable corollaire à la présente brochure, ainsi qu'aux mani-

(1) Constatons, pour être justes, que cet orateur homme d'état, lorsqu'il était au *pouvoir, avait autrefois* compris plus libéralement la mission de la France en Roumanie.

(2) *La Revue des Deux-Mondes* du 1er janvier 1850. — Voir aussi la brochure de *L. Raudot intitulée : Décadence de la France* et nous prédisant, comme un dernier *fau, l'Attila Czar*.

estes de Sa Majesté Nicolas. Il révèle dans leur superbe fanatisme les mbitions de l'église grecque, se proclamant l'église orthodoxe, et les rojets occultes de son pontife, nouveau Charlemagne hyperboréen; r, voici ce qu'il annonce en périodes plus ou moins mystiques :

— Le catholicisme se meurt, le protestantisme se meurt, tués par leur ntinomie fatale, originelle. Le premier ne fut qu'une déviation schismatique, une coupable usurpation de huit siècles sur l'église véritable, et le second, son digne fils, le père de la révolution antisociale, antichrétienne. Tous deux ont achevé leur cercle néfaste. La guerre fratricide des peuples et des principes va se clore par un retour à l'unité rédemptrice, à l'église grecque, seule dépositaire des traditions orientales, à l'église grecque dont Pétersbourg est le centre, dont Rome va redevenir la métropole. Les Czars sont prédestinés pour régénérer la caduque Europe; ils doivent sauver l'Occident, le christianiser *à la cosaque*. —

« Qu'il me soit permis, s'écrie en finissant le biblique diplomate, prophète du Dieu-Czar, qu'il me soit permis de rappeler un incident qui se rattache à la visite que l'Empereur de Russie a faite à Rome en 1846. On s'y souviendra peut-être encore de l'émotion générale qui l'accueillit à son apparition dans l'église de Saint-Pierre. — L'apparition de l'Empereur orthodoxe revenu à Rome après plusieurs siècles! — et du mouvement électrique qui parcourut la foule, quand elle le vit aller prier au tombeau des apôtres. Cette émotion était légitime. L'Empereur prosterné ne priait pas seul : toute la Russie était prosternée avec lui. Espérons qu'elle n'aura pas prié en vain devant les saintes reliques. »

Je n'expliquerai point ici au croyant illuminé, pour ne pas troubler sa foi, l'espèce d'émotion qui saisit l'Europe en regardant Nicolas, le restaurateur *de l'ordre* à Varsovie, saluer le successeur du Christ et s'agenouiller sur le tombeau des apôtres. Mais qu'il me soit permis à mon tour de citer, comme appendice à ce corollaire et comme un échantillon des bienfaits du règne sauveur, l'Ukase tout récent dont l'Empereur orthodoxe et très-chrétien gratifie ses bienheureux sujets.

« Ordonnance impériale du 29 novembre 1849 (commission de l'instruction publique). A partir du 1er janvier 1850, ne seront plus admis aux classes supérieures, depuis la quatrième, que des élèves dont *la noblesse sera légitime*. Quant aux classes inférieures, S. M. daignera autoriser à y admettre les enfants des bourgeois, tels que les commerçants, et même ceux des Juifs. Seulement ceux-ci paieront une somme considérable qui sera fixée plus tard. »

Comme complément, est limité à 300 le nombre des élèves de chacune des huit universités, uniques foyers intellectuels de l'immense empire. Les scellés sont mis sur toutes les librairies des provi

de la Baltique, et pour contrôler *plus régulièrement* ce dangereu commerce, on se propose de fonder un entrepôt central où le sain office slavon timbrera de son cachet les ouvrages licites, et où tou l'empire devra s'approvisionner, comme cela se pratique chez nou pour la poudre et le tabac. — Quant à la noblesse privilégiée, se membres ne peuvent franchir, sans un permis impérial, le mur d'a rain élevé autour de la nation sainte. Leurs têtes et leurs biens ap partiennent au Dieu-Romanow.

Catholiques et bourgeois, mes concitoyens, vous êtes avertis : voil le dernier terme du système orthodoxe, du protectorat du Czar son but éternel, à travers tous les masques, l'apothéose de la Russ entre les nations, et de l'autocratisme sur la Russie. En un mot voudrait, Moloch Panslavite, usurper la moitié du globe pour agra dir ses mornes domaines, — voler à l'Asie Stamboul, l'ancienne mé tropole des Césars byzantins, — Rome à l'Italie, à la chrétienté, à monde, — la lumière, la patrie et la liberté aux peuples.

Comprenez-vous maintenant pourquoi le même pouvoir apparaît e Orient sous une autre face : ici expropriant et enchaînant à son ca price, là s'annonçant comme l'émancipateur des esclaves et le ga dien des propriétés, — hier patron occulte ou avoué, suivant les ca de l'hétérie grecque et de toutes les insurrections contre la puissan ottomane, aujourd'hui lançant l'anathème et ses armées contre l'hétéri hongroise et toutes les insurrections occidentales, — tantôt agita au bout d'une pique le bonnet révolutionnaire, tantôt tenant le glai et la balance de l'ordre conservateur. Ce que les Czars ont depu longtemps pris à la ville pontificale, c'est la clé du machiavélisme.

Dieu merci, leurs plans sont encore des rêves. Comme le dit avec d conclusions malignes l'auteur de l'article *sur la question romaine*, il a dans la vie morale de la France, des éléments, des principes qui sub sisteront aussi longtemps qu'il y aura une France. A chacun sa mission que l'empire moscovite remplisse la sienne chez les hordes sauvag en les courbant sous l'unité, passage nécessaire de leur initiation à grande vie humaine; pour nous... mais déjà le colosse est miné p la base. Le vent des steppes nous apporte l'écho de ses convulsio souterraines. On a beau se déifier sur son trône, enfermer la pens dans un cercle de bronze; Dieu vous brise avec votre échafaudage, la pensée, son ministre invincible, se change en lave pour dévorer s géôliers et sa prison. La jeunesse russe, noble et bourgeoise, conspi contre l'autocrate (1). Je lui répète avec des millions de voix : au li *de menacer, qu'il* tremble, car son jour approche !

Sébastien Rhéa...

(1) *Voyez le décret* inséré le 4 janvier 1850 dans le journal officiel de Pét *ff à la découverte d'une vaste conjuration contre l'empire et l'empereur*

LE

ROTECTORAT DU CZAR

OU

LA ROUMANIE ET LA RUSSIE.

PREMIÈRE PÉRIODE.

RIGINES ET INSTITUTIONS. — COUP-D'OEIL HISTORIQUE GÉNÉRAL.

I.

ncienne Dacie, après la dispersion de la race indigène qui suivit la iête romaine, et le repeuplement du sol à l'aide de colonies que Trajan ela du sein même de l'Italie et des autres parties de l'empire, reçut le de *Terra Romana*. Les descendants de ces premiers colons l'appellent e aujourd'hui *Terra Romanesca*. Les lettrés la nomment *Roumanie*. Roumanie ou Terre Romaine, autour de laquelle le Dniester, les monts thes, la Theiss, le Danube et la mer Noire forment une frontière na- le, comprenait les deux banats de Temeswar et de Crajova, la Transyl- , la Valachie actuelle et la Moldavie avec la Bassarabie et la Bucovine. ant au nom de *Valaques* employé par les géographes pour distinguer bitants de la Roumanie, il n'existe pas dans la langue de ces peuples; ne dénomination empruntée aux idiômes slaves; par un procédé d'as- tion qui leur est familier, ils traduisirent le mot *Romain*, ῥωμαῖος robuste), par Wlass, ou Vloky signifiant la même chose dans leur e, de la même manière qu'ils firent *Begoslovia* (discours sur Dieu) de gie, *Zembleopissania* (description de la terre) de géographie, *Rada* resse) de Lætitia ou Euphrosyne, *Bogdan* de Théodore, etc. De , ou Vlasy ou Vloky, *noms par lesquels* les peuples Slavons, Russes, *ais, Croates, Bohèmes désignent* indifféremment les anciens Romains

et les Italiens modernes, on a fait en français le mot *Valaques*, nom par restriction aux habitants des plus considérables contrées danubi

En l'absence même de preuves historiques, la langue seule des Rou suffirait à établir leur origine (1).

Nous allons, par une digression sur les institutions roumaines, d trer que les chefs du parti national en 1848, en réclamant les droits a joui la Moldo-Valachie jusqu'en 1828, n'étaient pas des novateurs révolutionnaires avec des tendances communistes, ainsi qu'on s'est pl représenter.

La Valachie fut constituée en *Domnie* (seigneurie) par Radu-Negru le commencement du XIIIe siècle, celui-ci partagea le sol en douze di à l'exemple des douze tribus d'Israël, pieux témoignage d'un peuple tué à mêler la Bible et l'Évangile aux traditions et aux institutio tionales.

Quelques années plus tard, Radu joignit à la Valachie le ba Crajova, lequel forma cinq autres districts sous le nom de Petite-Val

A peu près à la même époque, en 1310, la Moldavie fut également en domnie par Dragos.

Les chefs de ces deux États avaient le titre de *Domnu* (sieur), qu'il servent fidèlement dans l'idiôme du pays. Ils sont appelés aussi Voï Mais cette appellation slave s'introduisit dans ces contrées, lorsq Roumains, après la consommation du schisme, pour mieux marque séparation d'avec Rome, eurent adopté le slavon comme langue de l'E — Voïvode signifie généralissime.

Hospodar ou *Gospodar* est un nom exotique. Les étrangers seul servent, et il n'a pas la signification de *prince ;* c'est toujours du s équivalent au terme de *Domnu* (sieur).

Le mot *prince* est une traduction du mot turc *bey*, qualification q Phanariotes se décernaient d'eux-mêmes, et dont les Turcs sont asse digues, car ils la donnent à toute personne un peu sortable. Les étra seuls se servent du mot *prince*; les indigènes ne l'emploient que pou signer un fou, un bouffon.

(1) Voyez à la fin, dans les notes, les n^os^ correspondants.

Roi, dans l'idiôme du pays, signifie coquin, sans culotte, mauvais sujet scélérat (2).

Ces traits sommaires, cités entre mille, suffisent pour indiquer le caractère particulier d'une nation chez laquelle, malgré toutes les tentatives et toutes les traverses, le despotisme féodal ou monarchique n'a jamais pu prendre racine.

Leur position géographique et une même foi ont uni, comme deux sœurs, la Valachie et la Moldavie; nous ne parlerons ici que de la première, car leurs destinées et l'histoire de leurs droits ont toujours été si étroitement liées que parler de l'une, c'est raconter les annales de l'autre.

Jouissant, à l'origine, d'une indépendance absolue, la Valachie était dotée des institutions les plus libérales. Ainsi, le Domnu était électif, pris indifféremment parmi toutes les classes et professions, boyars, prêtres, paysans et le reste des citoyens. Dans notre histoire, nous avons un prêtre qui fut élu domnu, un autre qui par sa vaillance parvint au grade de général.

Le peuple, en temps de paix, cultivait la terre, s'occupait de ses intérêts généraux et surveillait l'ordre public. En cas de guerre, tout le monde était appelé aux armes. Le Roumain combattant sous les drapeaux se nommait *boyar*. Le mot *boïu* signifie *guerre* (bellum), et par conséquent, *boyar* ne veut dire que belligérant, guerrier, militaire. Ce titre, tant que la guerre durait, entraînait l'exemption de toutes contributions et charges.

Les grades auxquels on parvenait dans la hiérarchie militaire n'étaient que personnels. Le fils ne pouvait hériter du titre paternel. Et comme tout Roumain était militaire, si l'on servait dans l'administration ou dans la justice, en récompense on recevait un titre toujours militaire.

Par exemple, le maréchal du camp s'appelait *chatrar*, le chef de la cavalerie *grand pacarnik*, le chef de l'infanterie, *capitan de dorobans*, etc. Les mêmes titres pouvaient être décernés à un employé civil. Celui qui passait de l'armée dans l'administration ou dans la justice conservait le grade qu'il s'était acquis dans son service militaire. On voyait des chatrars, des pacarniks, des caminars civils, comme on aurait vu des capitaines, des majors, des colonels, remplir toute autre fonction qu'une fonction militaire

Partant, tout Roumain ayant un grade est un boyar, un
Son fils, s'il ne sert pas, s'il ne peut acquérir aucun grade, n
boyar, de même que le fils de l'officier n'est pas officier. Il est tout
ment ou tout naturellement fils de boyar, et il rentre dans la m
peuple. Puis, comme les carrières ont toujours été ouvertes et libre
Roumain, on a vu des paysans s'élever de grade en grade jusqu'
de grand bano, et la postérité de Mircea et d'autres chefs de l'État, l
rité de tant d'illustres boyars descendre dans les rangs des pay
grand-père des deux domni Stirbeiu et Bibesco a été gardien de c

C'est ainsi que le pays fut gouverné, depuis Radu-Négru (vers
nière décade du XIIIe siècle) jusqu'à Mircea (1390), libre, indépen
tenant tour à tour tête aux Hongrois, aux Polonais, aux Tatars,
Turcs. L'on conçoit sans peine comment les Valaques, unis aux Mo
ont pu résister à tant d'ennemis, former deux redoutables rempart
les débordements primitifs des hordes musulmanes et empêcher leu
sion en Europe. Les Turcs avaient conquis la Thrace, Byzance,
garie et la Serbie, et ne s'arrêtèrent que devant la résistance des Ro
D'où venait leur force principale? c'est que tout le peuple était bo
guerrier, tout le peuple était propriétaire.

Les paysans avaient leurs chefs qui les commandaient en temps de
et les inspectaient pendant la paix. Si le chef avait le titre de camin
les villages ou les paysans commandés par lui s'appelaient *Camina*
était clucear, ils s'appelaient Cluceareï, et ainsi toute la contrée se
en Vornicei, Cluceareï, Caminareï, Chatrareï, Pitareï, etc. selon le
chef qui les commandait. C'étaient des militaires non soldés cor
dant aux gardes nationales modernes.

Mircea organisa encore une armée permanente, la première qui a
en Europe à l'époque de la féodalité. Elle était composée d'une inf
de dorobans sous un général nommé *Capitan*, d'un corps de *fe*
(ferentarii) infanterie légère, d'une cavalerie commandée par le gra
carnik. On distinguait ensuite les *Rossiori*, *Verdissori*... qui étaient
quables par leurs uniformes rouges, verts... Le corps formant la
du chef de l'État était celui des Licteurs (fasciatori, fustatori, fustas
teurs de faisceaux.

Puis du mot turc *lufé* ou *léfa*, qui signifie *solde*, en idiôme
donna le nom de lefeci aux gendarmes mercenaires.

'ar conséquent, dans le XIVe siècle, la Valachie était, comme nous l'a- dit, un pays indépendant, avec un gouvernement électif représenta- possédant le suffrage universel, sa garde nationale, son armée perma- le, sa police civile, sans priviléges féodaux, sans noblesse héréditaire, ormant un peuple d'hommes libres, tous propriétaires et tous boyars ligérants).

II.

s Roumains soutinrent plusieurs guerres contre les Turcs, sans être uis, sans perdre leur indépendance. A l'époque de Bajazet, pour s'a- r contre ce torrent formidable qui menaçait l'Europe entière, et pour le temps de s'opposer à d'autres ennemis moins redoutables, Mircea lut avec ce sultan un traité signé à Nicopolis l'an 1393, traité par l il mit la Valachie sous la suzeraineté de la Porte, aux conditions ntes :

Le pays gardera son droit d'autonomie, avec son Domnu élu par ses ha- ts, son ministère et sa législation.

Il aura le droit de déclarer la guerre à ses ennemis et de conclure la .

Il conservera son droit de frapper la monnaie.

Pour demeurer en paix avec la Turquie, il offrira chaque année à la ime-Porte une somme de 3,000 piastres rouges, à titre de *présent.* »

ans l'espace de soixante années, des discussions touchant ces articles nt élevées, Ulad V renouvela le traité avec Mahomet II, et ses stipu- ns ne sont qu'un éclaircissement ou une extension du droit d'autono- dont la Valachie devait jouir. Dans ce nouveau traité, on ne tolérait pas mosquées sur le territoire roumain ; on ne permettait pas aux Turcs d'y érir des propriétés, ni de réclamer un Musulman qui aurait embrassé ligion chrétienne en s'y réfugiant, etc.

epuis lors, toutes les fois qu'il se formait des demandes ou se manifes- des intentions contraires aux droits et aux institutions moldo-valaques, Domni avec le Peuple entier les soutenaient le sabre à la main. L'his- *nous montre ainsi les guerres* de Radu-Tzepeş, de Radu-d'Afumati,

de Michel-le-Brave, etc. Jamais le pays n'a cessé d'être autonome, soi
le respect de la Porte envers les traités, soit par la défense héroïqu
Roumains.

La Valachie se maintint de la sorte pendant une longue suite de s
et dans des temps où les Turcs étaient l'épouvantail de l'Europe. Po
défendre avec une telle énergie, le Peuple devait avoir son intérêt; i
vait avoir une *Patrie*. Il avait cet intérêt, car, d'après son ordre na
tout le territoire était partagé aux paysans par terres communales, et à
chefs par terres particulières. Les villageois propriétaires s'appellaien
ou sieurs, vieillards, d'où le verbe roumain *mos'-tenire*, hériter, ten
pères. Plus d'un quart des villageois sont restés jusqu'à ce jour des
teni, propriétaires du sol communal, partagé entre les familles.

Les Roumains qui, pour leurs services ou leur courage, recevaie
récompense de la Patrie une terre, en recevaient aussi le surnom
exemple, le propriétaire de la terre Gradistea fut surnommé Gradist
celui de Balaciu, Balaceanu; et quelquefois plusieurs donnaient
noms de famille à la terre dont ils devenaient propriétaires. Un P
pesco a donné à sa terre le nom de Philippesci, un Rosetti donna d
rement à une terre qu'il reçut en dot le nom de Rosettesci.

Un nom propre ou une épithète, passé en héritage, recevait la fin
escu, ou en *eiu*, comme : de Nicolas, Nicolescu, de buza (lèvre), bu
de albu (blanc), albescu; de stirb (édenté), stirbeiu; de bestia,
leiu (3).

Des lieux, des choses, des circonstances qui faisaient époque
l'histoire, et qui rappelaient un acte éminent, un service rendu,
naient également un surnom au héros, ou à l'employé. Dans un
taille, Etienne-le-Grand de Moldavie perdit son cheval; un solda
était près de lui, en descendant du sien, lui dit : « Tiens, signorie,
fais taupinière sur la terre, monte sur moi, et enjambe mon che
Etienne, en montant, fut sauvé et gagna la bataille. Appelant c
le cavalier : « De Taupinière, lui dit-il, tu es devenu *Movila* (Tumu
De cette famille la Moldavie eut des Domni qui la gouvernèrent
descendants reçurent le surnom de Movili ou Movalesci (4).

Il n'y eut jamais, répétons-le, rien d'héréditaire, ni le domniat,
banat, ni le vorniciat, ni aucun titre, rien, excepté la propriété et
de famille. Les villageois propriétaires du sol communal, chacun de cette

se nomment *câneni*, comme les propriétaires de la terre particulière Gradistea, *Gradisteni* ; nulle trace des droits de naissance ou des prérogatives de noblesse. Le mot *noble* est même inconnu. Il y existe bien une dénomination distinctive de *neam* qui signifie *gens*, et par laquelle on récompense les paysans, les commerçants ou les hommes de métier. Mais il n'y a pas un notable qui la brigue. Si celui qui l'a mérité se trouve dans leur classe, il fait tout son possible pour en sortir et pour se débarrasser de cette dénomination ; l'on n'ambitionne qu'une chose, le titre de boyar, équivalent à celui d'officier : nom guerrier dans son origine, maintenant il appartient à tout Roumain qui par son service, ou par l'abus ou la faveur, s'acquiert un titre quelconque. Toutefois, nous l'avons expliqué, comme les grades de la hiérarchie, il est personnel, et ne peut se transmettre en héritage.

On rencontre aussi d'autres noms de famille, qui n'ont point les désinences roumaines ; ce ne sont pas des familles indigènes, mais des plantes parasites, restes du règne des Phanariotes ou des étrangers établis dans ces contrées.

Malheureusement, institutions ni peuples n'échappent à la double action délétère du temps et des influences environnantes ; les meilleurs principes, abandonnés à eux-mêmes sans sauvegarde et conduits à leurs conséquences extrêmes, enfantent des catastrophes. Placée entre deux vastes courants opposés dont la force colossale devait tour à tour peser sur elle, l'islamisme et le penslavisme russe, la Moldo-Valachie en fit la triste expérience. Son histoire le témoigne au fur et à mesure qu'elle s'éloigne de l'époque primitive, comme elle conserve toujours néanmoins des types distinctifs à travers ses phases diverses et les altérations successives imposées par les événements ou les hommes appelés à en diriger les ressorts ; pour bien l'apprécier, il faut maintenant avoir sans cesse présente cette observation fondamentale.

Donc l'esclavage de la glèbe et le droit de majorat ne furent également jamais connus dans les États roumains. Tout homme, boyar comme paysan, resta libre de vendre sa propriété, de la partager et de la laisser en héritage, ou de la léguer en donation. Les terres de tant de propriétaires ancieus sont *aujourd'hui propriétés* des monastères, et tant d'autre ter-

ent changé de possesseurs. De même que le boyar pouvait vendre son domaine, de même le villageois vendait sa parcelle. Des grands domaines ainsi morcelés successivement sont devenus terres communales, et de plusieurs morceaux des mosteni, en les achetant et en les réunissant, on a pu former des domaines particuliers. Puis de plusieurs donations des particuliers, boyars et non boyars, s'érigèrent de grands domaines de monastères qui possèdent presqu'un tiers du pays, — inféodation cléricale dont nous verrons par la suite les résultats désastreux.

Voilà l'origine des villageois sans propriété, c'est-à-dire non mosteni ou prolétaires, car au commencement tous avaient leurs terres.

Plus tard, durant les longues famines amenées par les guerres fréquentes et par l'état arriéré de l'agriculture, les prolétaires, réduits à la dernière détresse, finissaient par se vendre d'eux-mêmes comme esclaves pour quelques kilos de froment ou de maïs, afin de nourrir leurs familles. Cet usage de pouvoir se vendre provenait de quelques traditions romaines, ou d'une liberté absolue dont jouissait chacun jusqu'à l'abus : liberté d'attenter à sa liberté même. L'on possède des actes ou contrats d'une pareille condition.

En voici la teneur :

« N'ayant plus de quoi nourrir moi et ma famille, dans ce temps de ca-
» lamité et d'expiation de péchés, et trouvant le sieur tel, qui a bien voulu
» avoir la charité de me fournir tant en kilos..., en échange, je me suis
» donné à lui et à ses descendants, moi, ma femme et mes enfants et les
» enfants de mes enfants à perpétuité, esclaves, etc. »

III.

Dans la dernière décade du XVIe siècle, sous Michel-le-Brave, les villageois ou les paysans de la Valachie se divisaient en propriétaires, en prolétaires libres, et en esclaves qui s'étaient vendus de la manière que nous avons relatée, d'ailleurs encore en petit nombre. Ce Domnu, qui avait livré plus de vingt batailles contre les Turcs, les Tatars, les Battori de Transylvanie et les Arons de Moldavie, et toujours vainqueur, ce Domnu, dis-je, *après avoir réuni* sous sa domination la Valachie, la Transylvanie et la

oldavie par les bras et la vaillance d'un peuple libre, eut enfin l'idé
former une Roumanie grande, forte et indépendante, d'en créer u
yaume. Mais il oublia les anciennes et belles institutions de son pays, e
ulut imiter celles de la Hongrie et de la Pologne, en créant des magnat
en leur accordant des droits féodaux. Par un acte fatal, il soumit tou
paysans non mosteni aux devoirs des serfs, en les attachant à la terr
r laquelle ils se trouvaient, et en les confondant dans la catégorie d
ux qui s'étaient vendus par eux-mêmes. Un acte semblable porta un cou
rtel à l'esprit belliqueux des villageois. Deux tiers du peuple n'avaien
is à défendre ni liberté ni foyer. Les boyars, les chefs de l'armée n'avaien
is sous leur commandement des frères d'armes, combattants dévoué
x mêmes intérêts. Ils avaient des serfs ou des étrangers mercenaires.
Cette malheureuse idée vint à Michel après ses victoires, et l'acte maudi
promulgué un an avant sa mort.
Les Domni, ses successeurs, trouvant le pays dans cet état, ne puren
is soutenir ses droits. Si la Turquie n'opprima tout-à-fait la Valachie,
elle n'en fit pas un pachalik, ce fut un effet ou de la générosité des Sul
is et de leur respect pour les traités, ou de la faiblesse dans laquelle so
mpire commençait à tomber.
En attendant, des pachas rebelles et autres chefs de brigands turcs, qu
savaient pas reconnaître la foi des traités, franchissaient les frontières d
Roumanie et y commettaient des ravages dont ils rendaient victimes le
rcs eux-mêmes. Ils passaient le Danube, portaient partout le fer et l
mme, et enlevaient les enfants et les femmes, avec le bétail et les bien
s'ils rencontraient sur leur passage. Le pays n'avait plus de défenseurs; le
ldats étaient des serfs qui aimaient mieux déserter chez les Musulmans,
la vieille Terra Romana souffrait de plus en plus.
A cette époque, parut Pierre-le-Grand. Sa guerre avec la Turquie en
uragea les Valaques et les Moldaves. La religion et l'espérance d'être
nvés inspiraient des sympathies aux Roumains. Cantimir de Moldavie e
rancovano de Valachie firent cause commune avec le Czar contre l
roissant. L'histoire constate les traités de cette alliance (5).
Les Roumains, en effet, n'étaient plus en position de déclarer et de sou
enir la guerre; mais ils pouvaient recevoir en frères les Russes, offri
eurs villes comme magasin de provisions, procurer le nécessaire, suppor
r les charges et les dépenses de la lutte, former un corps auxiliaire de

ontaires destinés à remplir les fossés pour préparer la victoire, fai
eurs maisons les asiles et les hôpitaux d'une armée, de leur sol le
re des dévastations; et ce fut d'un grand secours dans toutes les
agnes de la Russie, au milieu de contrées ennemies et inconnues. S
ût donné à Napoléon une Moldo-Valachie, avec toutes ces condi
omme arrière-garde quand il entreprit sa croisade du Nord, Nap
n'aurait pas succombé, et Napoléon seul nous dirait quelle providen
toujours été les deux pays pour l'empire moscovite.

Les Roumains accordèrent au Czar ce qu'ils ne lui devaient pas
Czar, à la fin de la campagne, abandonna la famille de Brancovan
subit le martyre à Constantinople, emporta à Pétersbourg celle de Ca
et d'autres chefs, dépouilla la Valachie et la Moldavie de leurs doc
historiques et des hommes les plus capables, et ne conclut avec la
que des traités en sa faveur. Les Roumains n'en tirèrent aucun pr
non d'avoir dans le Czar un garant de leurs droits, puis un soi-disa
tecteur, puis un des plus cruels ennemis et usurpateurs. Mais ce
pas le Divan qui empiétait sur leurs droits, ce n'était pas le Divan
prédait leur territoire pour avoir besoin d'être garantis contre le
C'étaient les brigands et les rebelles turcs, contre lesquels le Czar ne
rien garantir et rien défendre.

IV.

Dans ses vues de conquêtes, la Russie, aspirant sans relâche au t
Constantinople, arracha d'abord la Crimée à la Turquie. Puis, pour
dans la Roumanie une influence qu'elle n'aurait pu avoir avec les
indigènes, par une finesse tout-à-fait moscovite, et par un sentim
reconnaissance plus que cosaque envers les Roumains, loin de l'en
elle poussa la Porte à leur enlever le droit d'élire leurs chefs parmi
à leur imposer des beys phanariotes... Voilà où aboutit le protect
Czar! Il engage Cantimir et Brancovano à se liguer avec lui, so
Moldavie et la Valachie, puis dévoue l'une et l'autre à la
Sultan, et au lieu de garantir le plus sacré de leurs

bute dans son rôle tutélaire par exciter la Porte à opprimer les Ro
mains et à faire le premier pas vers la perte de toute son influence s
eux.

La Turquie, dans sa simplicité primitive, crut qu'elle faisait un pas
plus vers l'extension de son pouvoir. Elle céda en effet la Crimée; mais,
suzeraine, elle se croyait déjà presque souveraine dans la Moldo-Valach
elle avait, nous l'avons dit, le droit de lui imposer des beys.

Cependant les hommes du Phanar, étrangers et précaires dans ces co
trées, ne pouvaient s'en considérer que comme les fermiers. Ils arrivai
pauvres et tâchaient de s'enrichir dans quelques années par toute sorte
spoliations et d'intrigues. Ils divisaient les boyars, s'associaient les u
persécutaient les autres, et propageaient parmi les employés leur doctr
corruptrice et servile en faisant de tous leurs instruments ou leurs co
plices. Mais, sachant que la Porte s'armait alors de la hache pour pu
jusqu'au soupçon d'injustice, ils se préparaient d'avance un refuge.
Russie le leur offrait toujours en cas de persécution de la part du Div
et les aidait même très-souvent à parvenir au trône des Hospoda
Aussi les Phanariotes n'étaient que les exécuteurs des plans de Péte
bourg.

Le premier bey nommé par la Porte, sous l'instigation moscovite,
Maurocordato. Celui-ci, pour affaiblir les Roumains et les mettre à la me
de toute oppression, effaça jusqu'à la dernière trace de milice nationale,
confia le service à des mercenaires Albanais, Serbes, et Bulgares. Le p
avait son droit d'autonomie; Maurocordato s'appliqua soigneusement à
extirper les racines; sous prétexte de soulager les paysans, il abolit
restes de garde civique subsistant sous le nom de Caminareï, Pitareï, e
Puis, à dessein d'apauvrir et de ruiner les chefs et notables de la nati
il proposa de délivrer tous les serfs attachés aux terres. Les boya
comme nous l'avons dit, n'étaient pas accoutumés à avoir des serfs, ca
servage légal ne datait que de Michel-le-Brave; par conséquent, loin de
combattre, ils applaudirent à cette proposition. Se réunissant avec le M
tropolitain, par un acte solennel, signé de tous, ils rendirent la liberté à
hommes primitivement libres, et prononcèrent l'anathème contre quico

oserait le violer. Ce document mémorable existe encore. Il se base sur la foi évangélique. C'est une des plus belles preuves du double sentiment de religion et de la liberté qui distingue la nation roumaine.

Le Phanariote avait cru, comme nous l'avons dit, affaiblir et ruiner les boyars par cet acte ; mais les descendants des Bassarabes, des pieux Négru et Mircea, les descendants de tous ces boyars fondateurs de nombreux monastères et soutiens du Saint-Sépulcre, de ceux qui ont toujours su mourir pauvres et déshériter leurs enfants pour ériger des asiles aux pauvres, à la veuve et aux orphelins, ces valeureux et libéraux boyars, ne voyant qu'un brillant avenir dans l'arrière-pensée du bey, s'empressèrent d'en profiter pour reconstituer une nation d'hommes libres. Ils firent plus, ils dotèrent chaque village d'une portion de terre, capable de nourrir la commune et son bétail. Le villageois ne fut plus redevable envers le propriétaire que de la dime des produits qu'il tirait du terrain situé hors de celui de la commune.

Ainsi se trouva providentiellement anéantie l'œuvre de servitude scellée par Michel-le-Brave, et le principal fondement de la nationalité rétabli par un de ses machiavéliques ennemis.

V.

De temps immémorial, il existe en Moldo-Valachie parmi les paysans une coutume charitable de secourir les pauvres, les nouveaux mariés, le chantre de l'église et le prêtre, tout homme qui n'a pas de bœufs ou de chevaux. Les jours de fête, tout le village, jeunes gens, filles, hommes, femmes et enfants se rassemblent avec leurs bœufs et leurs charrues pour labourer, ensemencer ou récolter la terre cédée aux hommes ou aux familles hors d'état de la cultiver. Ce travail pieux s'appelle *claca*, c'est-à-dire travail gratuit. Par son bienfait, les pauvres sont soulagés et parviennent à obtenir une récolte, à s'en nourrir et même à posséder progressivement une paire de bœufs, une vache, ce qui les met en état de commencer la vie agricole. Le chantre de l'église et le prêtre jouissent de la claca en faisant appel à la foi des paysans, les autres à leur charité.

A divers intervalles, le propriétaire venait visiter son domaine. Les paysans

se présentaient en masse pour le féliciter comme leur voisin et protecteur. Leur visite était accompagnée d'œufs, de beurre et même d'une poule, car le propriétaire faisait aussi des cadeaux aux enfants; sa femme était la bien-aimée pour les femmes et les filles du village : elle leur apportait des rubans, des boucles d'oreilles, des colliers; elle leur apprenait à se parer. Le propriétaire secourait les pauvres; sa femme enseignait à soigner les malades par une espèce de médecine domestique. Leur présence réjouissait les paysans, et le village était toujours disposé à célébrer pour le propriétaire la claca de deux ou trois jours. « Allons, mes enfants, disaient les vieillards, encore une claca pour le pauvre boyar : il n'a pas de bœufs, il n'est pas accoutumé à labourer la terre. » Et la jeunesse, garçons et filles, tout le monde se trouvait prêt; car la claca, c'est une fête. Les autres jours chacun travaille pour soi et en particulier, mais dans la claca tout le village travaille ensemble : l'amant près de sa belle, la fiancée à côté de son fiancé, les nouveaux mariés devant leurs parents réunis; les adolescents rendent le travail riant par leur concours folâtre; le maître musicien du village récite ses ballades, accompagné de son violon; la claca, c'est le travail en groupes tant rêvé par Fourier dans son Phalanstère. Puis, après la claca, on se réjouit, on chante, on danse.

Voici comment les domaines des propriétaires furent cultivés depuis Maurocordato jusqu'à Caragea (1815). Ce bey, en vertu de l'autonomie dont jouissait le pays, dota la Valachie d'un Code civil, qu'on nomma le *Code de Caragea*. Il fut discuté par l'assemblée générale, adopté par une *anaphora* et mis en exécution sans que la Russie eût le droit de s'en mêler.

Ce Code, entre autres obligations, impose la claca envers le propriétaire, comme un devoir de douze journées par an pour chaque paysan non mostean... Profaner la claca, abaisser un sentiment de charité en un devoir de servage, ce fut un scandale pour le paysan comme pour le propriétaire. De 1815 jusqu'à 1831, plusieurs villages ne voulurent pas s'y soumettre, plusieurs propriétaires ne purent s'arroger un droit contraire aux et usages nationaux et à la foi évangélique. Les vieux boyars, les véritables Roumains se refusèrent constamment à profiter de ce droit *maudit* selon leur expression.

Certains nouveaux propriétaires, des parvenus étrangers, comme des Souzo, des Villara, des Linge et des fermiers grecs s'appliquèrent seuls *à en tirer bénéfice. Puis vinrent* des jeunes gens, élevés hors de leur p

En 1821, le génie moscovite lance Hypsilanti dans les deux pays, et révolution éclate. Théodore Vladimiresco se met à la tête du mouvem valaque, proteste contre l'invasion et les excès d'une soldatesque recru à la manière des pirates, s'entend avec la Porte et devient victime de dévouement. C'était le sort de tous ceux qui avaient eu le malheur d'ê fidèles à la Turquie...

Puisse sa politique mieux s'inspirer à l'avenir !

Après la destruction du corps d'Hypsilanti, dont le but fut plutôt vol, le massacre et le sacrilége, que de se mesurer avec les Turcs, la Sublim Porte restitua enfin à la Valachie et à la Moldavie le droit d'avoir le Domni parmi les indigènes.

VII.

Grégoire Ghica fut nommé Domnu en Valachie, et Jean Stourza en M davie. Mais la Russie, suivant son rôle de protectrice garante, ne voulut reconnaître cette restitution des droits roumains ; car dans son vocabula les mots *chrétien*, *garantie* et *protection*, signifient tout autre chose de pratiquer la doctrine évangélique, garantir et protéger les droits de coreligionnaires. La Turquie se passa de cette non reconnaissance et rev à sa loyauté naturelle. Grégoire Ghica et Jean Stourza gouvernèrent le pays respectifs à l'ombre de toutes les intrigues et de la protection des co suls russes ; car, par leur absence d'alors à Bucaresci et à Jassi, ils ne po vaient entraver les affaires.

Grégoire Ghica élut un comité composé de cinq membres pour rédig un projet de réformes basées sur les anciens droits et usages, établit d écoles nationales, donna à la langue roumaine les moyens de se culti par l'enseignement de la philosophie, des mathématiques et des autr sciences universitaires, réintégra la Valachie dans la possession des mona stères fondés et enrichis par la piété de nos ancêtres, et usurpés pa pidité sacerdotale, forma un corps de pandours pour rétablir civique, et dota le pays de plusieurs autres institutions con *progrès matériel* et intellectuel.

Cependant, à la suite de l'insurrection d'Hypsilanti foment

et d'une conspiration perpétuelle de cette puissance contre l'empire Ottoman, à la suite de tant d'intrigues sans fin, le sultan Mahmoud, indigné, se vit obligé de lever l'étendard du Prophète et d'appeler aux armes tout Musulman. La Russie ne demandait pas mieux, car c'était une guerre qu'elle recherchait depuis une douzaine d'années, guerre que la Sainte Alliance ne lui permettait pas d'entreprendre. Dans ce moment, c'est le croissant de Stamboul qui provoque l'aigle du Nord : le Sultan arrache le masque au Czar, et le lui jette à la figure avec toute la dignité du droit.

L'honneur de la Russie est engagé, disait le cabinet moscovite; le Czar en s'adressant à ses alliés, ne songe qu'à venger son honneur; il déclare qu'il n'a aucun projet de conquête; mais, provoqué, il doit accepter le duel. — Quant à l'honneur, si l'on en a, on a le droit de se couper la gorge ou de se brûler la cervelle. — Suivant son désir, le cabinet impérial eut la permission d'entamer cette guerre, pourvu seulement qu'il la restreignit dans ses justes limites.

Les Janissaires étaient déjà exterminés, l'armée régulière de la Turquie peu nombreuse et nouvellement recrutée; néanmoins la Porte entreprit la lutte, car le sultan Mahmoud ne reculait pas. Il tira le sabre et attendit ferme l'approche du Ghiaour. Son fils, le sultan Abdul-Medjid, vient de prouver noblement, dans la question des réfugiés hongrois, qu'il savait montrer au besoin une égale énergie.

Tout le monde connaît la malheureuse campagne de la Russie en 1828. Sans la trahison, seule force du Czar, sans les secours que lui fournirent ces Roumains toujours trompés, la Russie aurait vu tomber son colosse aux pieds d'argile.

Cette campagne coûta à la Valachie plus de 200,000 hommes morts sur le champ de bataille, ou employés comme du bétail à transporter sur leur dos les provisions de guerre à travers les marais et pendant la rigueur du froid, décimés par la famine et contraints à se nourrir de l'écorce des arbres, tandis qu'ils cédaient leur froment et leur maïs à leurs oppresseurs. Cette campagne coûta encore à la Valachie plus de 100 millions en numéraire, sans compter les abus qui enrichirent tant de Russes et de vieux *cioc* pires que les Cosaques, sans compter les provisions fournies à toute l'armée pendant *cinq ans.*

2

Après l'apparition des troupes du Czar, G. Ghica ne pouvait plus r
et la haute cour protectrice y établit un gouvernement provisoire
la présidence du comte Palhen d'abord, puis de Zeltouhine, puis du f
et adroit prestidigitateur, le général Kisseleff.

DEUXIÈME PÉRIODE.

ANNALES CONTEMPORAINES. — INVASION DU POUVOIR RUSSE DANS LES ÉTATS ROUMAINS.

I.

En 1828, à l'entrée de l'armée russe dans la Valachie et la Moldav
la jeunesse roumaine, au sein de laquelle les écoles nationales établies p
G. Ghica et le mouvement de Vladmiresco avaient réveillé l'esprit patri
tique, cette jeunesse était encore adolescente et hors de tout emploi p
blic. Parmi les anciens boyars, les uns, vieillis dans les préjugés religieu
se montraient trop crédules et trop confiants en tout homme qui se pr
sentait sous le titre de chrétien du rite grec ; d'autres, élevés dans l'éc
phanariote, avaient pour maxime : tirer parti de toute circonstance. Ceu
ci savaient deviner et prévenir les intentions du Moskovite, et briguaie
l'honneur d'en devenir les instruments. Depuis longtemps la Russie av
les yeux fixés vers l'Orient, et y marquait comme son point de départ l
pays danubiens.

Après avoir fait le premier pas en arrachant la Bassarabie à la Moldav
et à l'intégrité de l'empire Ottoman, l'heure était arrivée pour elle d'e
rrer les serres sur la Moldavie et sur la Valachie, soit pour les ravir enti
rement à la Turquie, soit pour y étendre plus hardiment son influence.

Le deuxième parti convenait mieux à sa politique astucieuse, car e
pouvait le masquer aux yeux de l'Europe ; d'ailleurs, comment s'appr
prier sans prétexte des pays qui ne lui furent jamais hostiles et do
l'existence reposait sur des traités? La Turquie même n'avait nul pouv
de céder aux Czars ce qui ne lui appartenait point ; elle ne les avait p
conquis par le droit des armes. Les Roumains s'étaient librement soumi
la Porte, sous la garantie d'un contrat ; comment le droit de suzeraine
sans leur consentement, aurait-il passé à une autre puissance? Et si la Po
renonçait aux *bénéfices du contrat*, la Roumanie rentrait dans sa prem
condition indépendante. La Russie connaissait très-bien tout cela, ca

d'elle que les Roumains, dans leur simplicité, l'avaient appris. Lorsque ses agents s'efforcèrent de gagner les bons et crédules boyars pour obtenir leurs signatures, ils ne leur chantèrent que leurs *droits éclatants*, en vertu desquels ils avaient le libre arbitre de secouer le barbare joug turc, et de s'attacher au bienfaisant protectorat des Czars très-chrétiens et très-orthodoxes.

Le comité dont nous avons parlé, nommé par G. Ghica pour la rédaction du projet de réformes, fonctionnait déjà, et ses travaux avançaient dans un esprit national et légal : le réglement organique était presqu'achevé. Mais la cour moskovite, dans sa sollicitude toute particulière, demanda qu'un comité adjoint fût aussi élu par la Moldavie pour la représenter ; elle-même désigna les boyars appelés à le composer. Les deux comités devaient se réunir à Bucaresci sous les yeux du général Kisseleff, et, pour qu'ils ne s'égarassent pas hors de l'ornière tracée par le cabinet de Pétersbourg, sa sollicitude *toujours* paternelle leur fit donner pour président le consul russe, M. Mizzaki, homme nourri dans l'école phanariote et impériale, école dans laquelle se distinguent tous ces Greco-Italiens, proprement dits *tahouchans*, race bâtarde assouplie à la vieille corruption qui perdit Venise.

Le *bon* M. Mizzaki, d'accord avec Villara et Stirbeiu parmi les Valaques et avec M. Stouza et compagnie parmi les Moldaves, supprima du projet de réformes arrêté quelques articles et en ajouta d'autres, broda d'or les uniformes des officiers de la nouvelle milice et escamota au pays son droit d'autonomie, en soumettant le pouvoir législatif au contrôle de la Russie et de la *Turquie*, ce qui se résume au contrôle de la première ; car on y enlevait à la seconde toutes ses prérogatives, jusqu'au droit d'avoir son chargé d'affaires, son consul à Bucaresci, comme toutes les autres puissances. Le chargé d'affaires de la sublime Porte dans les principautés, par une concession inouïe, c'est le consul de Sa Majesté Nicolas. Enfin il se trouva que le prétendu restaurateur des États Moldo-Valaques n'avait fait que récrépir *et dorer l'édifice* dont il sapait les fondements.

L'armée impériale, en déployant sa bannière sur leur territoire, avai fait publier, selon sa coutume, un manifeste où elle promettait au Roumains, non-seulement le respect de leurs droits, mais des améliora tions et un brillant avenir. Pour préambule de ses promesses, d'après s fidèle tactique, elle commença par imposer un président russe aux deu comités qui allaient travailler à la destinée future de leurs patries respec tives. Puis le résultat de leurs travaux, ce projet de réglement organique devait être soumis à l'examen d'une assemblée générale *extraordinaire* d révision, car le pieux orthodoxe, dans sa loyauté cosaque, ne voulait rie entreprendre arbitrairement.

Depuis la fondation des deux domnies, le président légitime de l'As semblée générale avait toujours été le métropolitain; alors le métropoli tain était un de ces hommes primitifs qui ne sont pas rares dans ce terres héroïques. Roumain, et Roumain pur, il était élevé dans la vie l plus strictement monacale, loin de la corruption phanariote; à ses vertu nationales, il réunissait aussi ce courage familier à tous ceux qui ont ap pris à ne craindre que Dieu. Un tel chrétien ne convenait nullement l'espèce particulière de christianisme que professe l'empereur de toutes le Russies. Par conséquent, la cour czarienne s'était pourvue à l'avance, et l métropolitain Grégoire se trouvait déjà exilé en Bassarabie, comme coupa ble d'avoir refusé d'assujettir le clergé valaque à quitter l'autel pour alle transporter les munitions de guerre.

L'Assemblée générale extraordinaire fut convoquée; mais elle était veuve son légitime président gémissait dans l'exil. Le gouvernement russe n pouvait laisser une assemblée sans président, et il nomma le même M. Mi zaki, pour protéger les droits et les priviléges du pays, toujours à s mode. — Donc cette haute diète roumaine s'ouvrit sous l'influence de baïonnettes tutélaires de la Russie, et sous l'adroite direction du génér Kisseleff.

Quelques boyars, qui conservaient les sentiments traditionnels légu par leurs pères, avaient senti les artifices du protecteur insinués dans projet *du réglement organique*. Le plus jeune d'entre eux eut la hardi *de protester contre cette façon* d'Assemblée nationale qui n'avait pas,

la diriger, son président légal, le métropolitain. Ce boyar fut immédiatement livré à des juges militaires; pourtant, quoique selon la justice russe il dût être fusillé, ou au moins pendu, la clémence du général Kisseleff, pour n'en pas faire un cas trop sérieux, lui épargna un martyre nuisible à la politique czarienne. Le général, qui passait aussi pour un amateur des beaux-arts, traita le courageux boyar en poète, c'est-à-dire en fou, et le fit exiler de la capitale comme un sujet de scandale universel.

Les plus vieux boyars, associés à la protestation, comme le ban Brancovano, le ban Vacaresco, le ban Balaceano et le Vornic C. Campineano, par un de ces miracles qui viennent quelquefois très-à-propos, moururent tous dans le même semestre, avant la clôture de l'assemblée générale : ce n'est pas sans raison que l'empereur Nicolas proclame dans tous ses manifestes que Dieu est avec lui.

Ces boyars furent appelés, au dire des Russes, dans le sein d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob, et leurs restes mortels ensevelis avec grande pompe et parade ordonnées par le pieux gouvernement de Nicolas, car la religion et les morts sont très-révérés en Russie.

Les morts étaient morts, mais les vivants vivaient encore. Le réglement organique fut discuté et adopté dans l'Assemblée générale, pénétrée de respect pour la mémoire des vénérables défunts. Il restait un seul article qui plaçait le pouvoir législatif sous le contrôle du Czar, comme nous l'avons dit, article dont le sacrilége frappait les yeux. Les vivants pouvaient le comprendre, et par conséquent faire du bruit. On s'arrêta donc par ordre à la dernière page du réglement. — Les livres illustrés se terminent, comme chacun sait, de manière à n'avoir pas la dernière ligne au bas de la dernière page. L'avant-dernier article devait laisser, selon toutes les règles, le quart final de la page blanche; et, comme les 190 signatures des membres de l'Assemblée ne pouvaient entrer dans ce dernier quart, M. le président Mizzaki s'adressa aux représentants du pays et leur dit dans son mauvais grec *tahouchan* : « *Arcontés*, Messieurs, ayez la bonté d'apposer vos » signatures sur la page suivante, car, vous voyez bien qu'il n'y a pas de » place au bas de celle-ci. » C'était une raison très-naturelle, et les bons boyars, l'un après l'autre, apposèrent leurs signatures, suivant tous les droits de la hiérarchie, sur la page suivante.

L'Assemblée fut close, — le réglement, relié en argent et en or, déposé *dans les archives*; — mais la même main, qui avait si bien calligraphié

l'or, s'introduisit dans l'ombre des archives, et ajouta sur le dernier de la dernière page un *seul article*, très-petit, l'article qui ravit au le droit d'autonomie.

II.

on le traité d'Andrinople, on devait élire les chefs indigènes des gouments des deux États ; la Russie devait retirer ses armées de tout l'emOttoman. Mais alléchée par l'acte séparé du traité d'Andrinople et ous les articles qu'elle avait fait insérer dans le réglement orga-, elle se sentait une singulière paresse à rappeler ses troupes des prinés danubiennes. Quant à ces soi-disant princes de la Valachie et Moldavie, ils devaient être nommés en vertu des anciennes coutumes s, et même en vertu de ce réglement organique par l'élection des rentants du pays. Mais la cour impériale, pour le moment, dans sa se trouva mieux de les désigner elle-même, et de ne laisser à la Porte e soin de les confirmer.

conséquence, elle fixa son choix sur Alexandre Ghica et Michel za ; et d'abord ils furent tentés comme Christ par le Diable, qui lui ra le règne de ce monde : elle leur fit espérer ce règne, s'ils livraient âmes entières aux bonnes grâces et aux inspirations de l'Empereur. omme ni A. Ghica ni M. Stourza ne pouvaient être tout-à-fait des ds Christs pour dire : « *En arrière, Satanas!* » dans leur faiblesse ine et en pauvres pécheurs, ils se sentirent l'appétit de régner. Ils irent tout ; ils promirent même de demander, après leur installation, ques divisions de troupes protectrices, sous prétexte de maintenir l'ort la paix dans le pays, quand le pays n'avait aucune intention de trou-l'ordre et la paix.

utefois, à la suite de l'insistance vive des puissances européennes e culièrement de l'Angleterre, les principautés furent enfin évacuées par roupes russes. On nomma les Domni à la manière des beys, sans con-r l'opinion ni le choix légitime des deux peuples. Pour que la Russie nrât de tous leurs *mouvements, pour* qu'il ne restât aux Roumains au-*voie à s'entendre avec la Porte*, pour avoir l'œil et la main partout *nposa, comme chargés d'affaires* moldo-valaques à Constantinop

deux Phanariotes éprouvés, MM. Aristarchi pour la Valachie et Vogoridès pour la Moldavie; elle laissa un autre Phanariote, non moins éprouvé, parmi les Roumains, M. Mavros : il fut établi comme inspecteur général des quarantaines, par tout le littoral. Dans la milice valaque, elle imposa comme chefs Odobesco, Garbaski, Banow et autres officiers subalternes russes ou créatures russes; elle parsema dans les ministères des espions comme un certain Joanidès et autres ; auprès du Domnu valaque, elle intronisa aussi un M. Groumont, un juif renégat, Meyer, une espèce de médecin et passe-partout, et tant d'autres Argus et Minotaures du paganisme moscovite, sans compter les Valaques de l'école phanariote, et tant d'autres Phanariotes pur sang, qui ne se soutiennent dans le pays que par l'influence ouralienne.

Serré de la sorte, le Domnu, surveillé de près dans tous ses actes et discours, dans toutes ses relations, devint une machine du moscovisme, un exécuteur des ordres verbaux du consul impérial.

Le moment donc était arrivé où la Russie devait recevoir le premier service de la part d'Alexandre Ghica. Elle attendait que, d'accord avec l'assemblée générale, il demandât à la puissance protectrice deux divisions seulement de troupes, sous prétexte que les esprits des Roumains, non accoutumés aux nouvelles institutions réglementaires, menaçaient d'être agités et que ces baïonnettes salutaires les tiendraient en repos. Ghica, malgré ses promesses, fut assez intelligent pour voir que, s'il ne pouvait régner à côté d'un consul russe, à plus forte raison il ne serait rien en présence de 24 mille baïonnettes tutélaires. Il déclara que les esprits étaient assez calmes pour lui permettre de prendre sous sa responsabilité la paix intérieure, et avec le plus profond respect il repoussa la proposition bienveillante du paternel empereur Nicolas. Ce refus ne tarda point à être considéré par le cabinet moscovite comme un acte ingrat et traître à la *sainte* cause de la Russie (les causes du Czar ne sont ni plus ni moins que saintes). Dès ce moment, Ghica se mit de lui-même sur la pente de sa chute.

III.

Pour réaliser les plans dont il était l'exécu[illegible] consul russe, M. Ré[illegible]

mécontents. Le coryphée en fut M. J. Campineano. Lorsque l'opposition devint assez forte, Rükmann contraignit Ghica à introduire dans l'assemblée nationale la question de l'article intercalé dans le réglement organique. Cet article avait l'apparence de la légalité, mais personne ne le connaissait; il avait besoin d'une publicité solennelle, chose fort périlleuse dans une époque de non-occupation et de volonté libre. Rükmann excitait les passions, les ambitions, et lorsqu'il vit que la publicité de cet article irritait les esprits, il ne manqua point d'encourager le parti antagoniste soulevé directement contre la puissance protectrice. — On connaît la politique moscovite; elle pousse celui qu'elle veut frapper à se rendre l'aggresseur pour avoir le prétexte de l'atteindre dans son bon droit. — Le consul russe avait le dessein d'incriminer l'opposition formée par lui-même, et en inculpant à la fois A. Ghica pour sa connivence avec elle, de susciter une affaire grave à la suite de laquelle devait tomber le Domnu. Celui-ci ne tarda pas à juger sa difficile situation; il se trouvait entre Scylla et Carybde; il s'agissait ou de trahir son pays en s'unissant aux intentions du Czar, en opprimant l'Assemblée nationale par la violence et la corruption, pour lui faire adopter par toutes les formes le susmentionné article, ou de faire cause commune avec l'Assemblée nationale et conséquemment perdre le trône. Il eut le courage de mépriser une couronne flétrie, et sut échapper à la critique de l'histoire comme aux piéges de M. Rükmann.

Ce diplomate pourtant réussit à compromettre l'Assemblée, à l'incriminer et à obtenir le décret qui la dissolvait. Puis, pour démontrer que l'opposition, dont elle nourrissait le germe, ne fut pas provoquée par lui, il se rendit à Constantinople, et il rapporta un firman qui punissait de l'exil tous les chefs du parti opposant, même Campineano son ami, entraîné dans ses rangs par le consul intrigant et corrupteur. Car il avait eu l'art de pousser, selon ses vues, les hommes les plus patriotes pour les renverser, les dénigrer ensuite, et, à force de persécutions, les rendre les premiers champions de la Russie.

Ghica, connaissant toute l'intrigue, se garda de mettre en exécution le firman et personne ne fut exilé.

Les membres de ce parti, révoqués de leurs fonctions et charges sur la demande du consul, persécutés et ignorant les précédentes relations de Campineano avec *le perfide diplomate*, résolurent de poursuivre leur che-

connu à Pétersbourg ; car le cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg po
des yeux et des oreilles. Comme il revenait de sa mission, Ca
arrêté à Vienne par le gouvernement autrichien, — car le g
autrichien fut toujours complaisant pour ses alliés de la Ne
exécuter les ukases du Czar.

Campineano donc fut conduit par une escorte autrichien
frontières et rendu aux autorités de la Valachie. Puis, à la sui
du consul russe, il y fut arrêté dans un couvent et retenu en c

Cette persécution, contrainte de la part du Domnu, souleva l
triotiques ; et les amis de Campineano commencèrent à conspir
quement pour le délivrer et pour renverser Ghica. Le gouver
covite souriait à cette conspiration, car il voyait sa prophéti
le point de s'accomplir, et le consul disait toujours que le
jamais tranquille sans les baïonnettes protectrices.

En même temps, le vice consul russe de Gallatzi et d'Ibra
(1841) l'hétairie bulgare. Il l'organisait en Moldo-Valachie e
fils avec la conspiration qui se tramait à Bucaresci contre l
plan était que la révolution bulgare éclatât à Ibrilla, et par
une autre à Bucaresci. — La chute de Ghica, les désordr
la double révolution bulgare et valaque, ne pourraient qu'insp

volontairement à la suzeraineté ou domination entière de la Russie.
lan assez ingénieux et digne du cabinet de Pétersbourg ! Mais A. Ghica
ua ce plan et démasqua le complot : le procès-verbal des conspirateurs
expédié à Constantinople. Ghica reçut un sabre d'honneur de la part
Sultan. Cette récompense de la Porte fut regardée par l'autocrate
me une déclaration de guerre, un défi, et comme la Turquie n'avait pas
tention d'engager une lutte armée, par un firman elle ne tarda pas à
tituer Ghica pour donner une preuve éclatante de ses sentiments paci-
es envers l'illustre cour du Nord.

IV.

e successeur de Ghica était marqué d'avance par la Russie ; c'était Stir
a, qui l'avait servie avec zèle. Son frère Bibesco, en escamotant l
te, la surprit elle-même, quoiqu'elle connût ses qualités comme celle
premier.

Bibesco, s'étant fait élire par son adresse, fut confirmé Domnu. Le plan
scovite d'occuper les deux pays, découvert par A. Ghica, ne pouvait
s être mis en jeu. Les Machiavels ouraliens s'imaginèrent d'introduire
s colonies russes dans la Valachie. Ils envoyèrent des entrepreneurs
ur exploiter ses mines. Le réglement organique ne permet pas leur ex-
itation sans l'approbation de l'assemblée générale. Bibesco reçut avec
veillance M. Trandafiroff avec ses acolytes, et le recommanda spéciale
ent à son ministère. Celui-ci conclut avec l'exploiteur russe des con-
ats, ordonna aux administrateurs des districts de lui prêter aide et pro
ction, c'est-à-dire de forcer les propriétaires des montagnes à subir ses
nditions, tout-à-fait dans le sens du communisme cosaque : « Le tien es
e mien sans que le mien soit le tien. »

M. Trandafiroff, qui venait prendre possession de nos montagnes pour
erme illimité, avait en outre le plein pouvoir d'appeler de la Russie 4
travailleurs ; et si ces hommes étaient des soldats ou des sapeurs dé
s, tant mieux, disait-on, car ils seraient des hommes soumis et disci
s.

acte arbitraire de Bibesco, cet acte qui violait le réglement orga

A. Ghica. On lui accorde en conséquence une autorité absolu
trôle, sans assemblée générale, pendant trois années de souffra
pays. Ses parents et ses créatures, sous son ombre, purent i
vendre les fonctions publiques aux plus offrants, dépouiller
tères et trafiquer de leurs revenus, pour fournir à la pieuse or
prétexte de se constituer leur tutrice. Afin de mieux remplir sc
tructeur, Bibesco frappa la langue nationale dans les écoles, ma
le ridicule et la persécution les auteurs nationaux, de manière
s'aliénait l'affection de ses compatriotes, plus il acquérait la
Czar et le droit de gouverner par une main de fer.

Le cabinet de Pétersbourg se réjouissait à la vue de ce go
odieux et anti-national; car il ne veut que pousser les Do
mettre toute espèce d'abus et à mériter l'exécration des ind
que les hommes honnêtes se voient réduits à se jeter entre
l'Empereur : soldats nouveaux destinés à servir ses volontés
ambitions sans bornes, au besoin contre la Turquie, quand il j
elle son coup décisif.

TROISIÈME PÉRIODE.

ITUATION POLITIQUE ET MOUVEMENT DES PARTIS. — PRÉAMBULE A L'HISTOIRE DE LA RÉGÉNÉRATION ROUMAINE.

V.

pendant la jeunesse Moldo-Valaque mûrissait. La Presse, par inter- laissait jaillir quelques vérités. La nation commençait à s'éveiller et pinions à se former. Les mains faibles d'A. Ghica n'avaient pu empê- le peuple de maudire, en la souffrant, la tyrannie des Roumano-Pha- tes soutenus par les consuls russes, et dernièrement la main de fer ibesco courbait tous les fronts sous un joug insupportable, depuis le humble jusqu'au plus superbe. La domination de la Russie n'était plus roblème. Tout ce qui avait le sentiment patriotique se voyait persé- proscrit. Le Consul moscovite agissait en proconsul et le Domnu n'é- que son *aide-de-camp*, suivant l'expression du consul même.

lors éclate la Révolution de Février en France; elle produit celle de lin, de Vienne et de presque toute l'Europe. L'absolutisme chancelle. épidémies sont au moral comme au physique. Les événements se suc- ient; les journaux, à chaque poste, soulevaient une vive commotion s la capitale et les autres villes de la Valachie. La jeunesse, les négo- ts, les boyars mêmes, le peuple, apprenaient chaque jour des exemples reux et la souveraineté des peuples. Le système successif des précédents vernements, le joug accablant de Bibesco, avaient exaspéré les âmes; les ars et les notables n'ayant aucun moyen de faire parvenir leurs plaintes connaissance de la Porte, ne sachant plus où recourir, commencèrent endre foi dans leur force, devant les manifestations triomphantes des ns sœurs. Mais rien n'était encore organisé; pas le moindre symptôme conspiration. Seulement quelques échanges d'idées, quelques aspirations pathiques, de beaux rêves sans énergie et sans direction.

a chute *du Metternichisme à Vienne* fut un grand deuil pour le Czar;

il ne voyait que la perte de ses alliés dans toute l'Allemagne dé
tionnalisée. Il promit aide et assistance à l'Autriche pour la réi
son ancien régime. L'élément le plus redoutable pour les nation
minées par l'Autriche était celui des Magyars. C'est par là qu'i
de porter le premier coup aux libertés promises par l'empereur F
On arrêta le plan, et le pacte fut ténébreusement scellé entre les
gustes puissances.

Par une de ces fatalités remarquables dans l'histoire des pe
braves et généreux Magyars, s'exaltant dans leur premier élan d
sité, crurent qu'il était facile de magyariser toutes les nationalit
composait le royaume de la Hongrie. Les Croates, les Slavons,
et les Roumains s'irritèrent à ce symptôme de fanatisme. En
héros du Teiss appelaient tout citoyen au partage égal des dro
libertés; les autres nationalités se récriaient que pour être lib
exister d'abord, et le magyarisme s'efforce d'anéantir toutes les e
stences nationales pour les absorber dans la sienne. L'astucieux
se hâta de profiter de cette division. Son système, mis en relief
plomate de la Sainte-Alliance, l'avait depuis longtemps acco
dompter l'orgueil des puissants par les bras des faibles. On c
scènes sanglantes de la Gallicie; le cabinet de Vienne se proposa

pliquer un cercle assez fort, en s'approchant de ses frontières par
ie, la Bukovine, la Moldavie et la Valachie, jusqu'à Orsowa où ap-
élément slavon, et d'où Jellacici était prêt à donner le signal de
ie *monarchesque*.

VI.

sous quel prétexte occuper les principautés danubiennes? Le cabi-
érial le proposa à Michel Stourza, car il comptait sur la prompte
ce de Bibesco. Stourza hésita dès le premier mot. Assez riche, il s'é-
outumé pendant plusieurs années à gouverner en satrape. Il refusa.
germes de mécontentement couvaient depuis longtemps en Moldavie.
inet impérial fit ourdir par son consul à Jassi une conspiration
nds boyars, jaloux du trône et des portefeuilles. La jeunesse pa-
à son insu, en devint l'organe, entraînée par son zèle et par ses bon-
entions. Les coryphées conspiraient dans la maison du consul
t ce diplomate, pour intimider Stourza et le contraindre à demander
pes russes, lui déclamait ses grandes inquiétudes et ses soupçons :
rait qu'il se tramait une vaste conspiration, et tout en justifiant et
ant les conspirateurs, il les lui dénonçait. Le vieux renard dé-
tout et s'efforçait d'échapper au péril par ses propres moyens
courir aux baïonnettes protectrices. Enfin les conspirateurs fu-
ussés des deux côtés aux voies extrêmes. Stourza souhaitait les
dre en flagrant délit, et le consul tâchait de provoquer un éclat.
n appellerait un commissaire russe pour examiner l'affaire et la
quer de façon à réduire Stourza à réclamer l'entrée des troupes
ou à s'en créer un prétexte.
tersbourg, on savait prophétiquement le jour de l'explosion et on
d'avance le général Duhamel, afin qu'il pût se trouver à Jassi dans
nière fermentation des esprits.
mouvement médité contre Stourza eut lieu le 28 mars. Les *in-*
(comme Stourza les nommait) furent surpris, vaincus, dispersés,
rêtés, exilés, etc. Duhamel arriva à Jassi sans être attendu. Tout
le s'étonna de la vitesse de la poste russe..... Duhamel se mon-

que nous appelons Roumano-Phanariotes, comme les seuls f
Russie. Faisant un crime à Bibesco de vertus qu'il n'avait pas, elle
encourageant la jeunesse et flattant ses rêves d'une nationalité p
que, de l'existence des hommes fabuleux, et insinuait tant d'autre
qui fournirent de la matière au manifeste de Nesselrode du 19 j

Bibesco, pour démontrer que ses accusateurs étaient une m
trigante et jalouse, commence à caresser le parti national qui,
grande majorité, avait du crédit et de l'influence. En mêm
expédie à Jassi Villara, son ministre de l'intérieur, pour sond
seins de Duhamel. Celui-ci fit comprendre à Villara qu'il vi
à Bucaresci pour prêter main-forte au *prince* et le soutenir
mouvement attentatoire à la dignité du gouvernement, et qu'
tout murmure dans des circonstances aussi graves.

Dès que Bibesco reçut cette nouvelle, il se ranima et chan
gage avec le parti national. Il le taxa de turco-philisme e
tude envers la bienveillance de la Russie; il déclara que la
pouvait mettre les deux pays sur le chemin du bien-être et,
de l'indépendance. — Qui connaît *le langage de Stirbeiu, son*
son dernier voyage à Londres en 1848, *comprend de quelle sou*

rit de l'époque, par les besoins du pays, et conformes à ses devoirs de
al. Rien ne s'ourdissait dans l'ombre que les intrigues tortueuses du
i roumano-phanariote.

VII.

Telle était la situation à l'arrivée de Duhamel dans Bucaresci. Fidèle à
plan, il tint sa parole pour gagner tout entier Bibesco. Le métropoli-
n et le corps des boyars vinrent le visiter, et il les reçut en robe de
ambre et le cigare à la bouche. Il apostropha les uns, en leur disant qu'il
levait des murmures contre le gouvernement, qu'il les réprimera et prê-
a son appui au *prince*. Il ajouta que si la Russie est prête à secourir les
uvernements partout, à plus grande raison elle ne pourra souffrir aucun
mptôme agitateur dans les deux pays placés sous sa tutèle. Il annonça
fin qu'il voulait anéantir l'esprit révolutionnaire dans la Valachie.

Lorsque les habitants de la capitale entendirent ces paroles, personne ne
uvait comprendre de quel esprit de révolution parlait cet envoyé de Pé-
rsbourg. On ne soupçonnait que le parti roumano-phanariote, adversaire
Bibesco, et, en effet, ce parti se crut incriminé et pâlit. Bibesco triom-
hait.

Une protection si généreuse exigeait naturellement de Bibesco un té-
oignage de gratitude. Le pauvre diable était disposé à tout, à prévenir
ême, s'il était possible, les intentions et les désirs de Duhamel.

Dès le premier jour, l'envoyé russe demanda qu'on lui donnât une
dée exacte de la quantité des céréales qui se trouvaient sur le territoire, et
manifesta sa résolution d'attendre jusqu'à la nouvelle récolte pour en
pprécier le résultat. Puis il demanda à Bibesco qu'on lui donnât auss
connaissance de la quantité de produits nécessaires pour la consommation
u pays ; et, pour le surplus, il exigea que l'exportation en fût interdite.

Une semblable demande étonna Bibesco. Elle lui parut une mesure tout-
t contraire à la sollicitude et aux vues que professait le commissaire
rial pour imposer la tranquillité, quand elle était parfaite; cette me-
frappait en même temps *les intérêts* du propriétaire, du fermier, &
ant et du paysan. Conséquemment il osa exposer à son Excelle

qu'il n'avait pas le courage, dans de pareilles conjonctures, d'attaque
rectement et de si près les intérêts généraux. Duhamel le rassura, l'e
tant à ne rien craindre, lorsqu'il compterait sur les bonnes grâces et le
tien de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Bibesco eut la curiosité de savoir à quoi aboutirait cette mesure.

Duhamel lui certifia que la Russie, toujours bienveillante enver
principautés, veillait sur elles *comme la Providence*, et se préparai
introduire ses armées pour les sauver d'un mouvement qui pouvait é
dans le voisinage, par exemple en Transylvanie..., dans le Banat..
parmi les Hongrois. Il l'engagea donc à convoquer de suite l'assen
générale, récemment dissoute par une inspiration peut-être salutaire,
y reprendre opportunément son siége et réclamer l'entrée des armée
périales sur le territoire roumain.

Ces insinuations prophétiques n'avaient pas de sens possible alors, s
dans le langage de la diplomatie. Comment la Russie connaissait-elle d'
ce un mouvement insurrectionnel en Transylvanie et en Hongrie ? Le
net autrichien ne le connaissait pas, et ceux-même qui devaient conspir
le connaissaient pas davantage. — Non, c'est contre l'Autriche constitu
nelle que la Russie se prépare... Telles étaient les conjectures de Bibesc
première impression ; il augura néanmoins qu'il y avait là quelque ch

Cependant le Domnu, avec tout son zèle d'être utile à la puissance pr
trice, ne trouva pas si commode de gouverner à côté de tant de géné
russes; il n'y voyait que l'interruption du règne absolu auquel il s
accoutumé, se considérant comme un roi. Il promit tout; mais il resta
sieurs jours à réfléchir avant d'exécuter sa promesse.

Duhamel est un homme digne de son maître, sachant peser le poid
ton de chaque *oui* et de chaque *non*. Il commença à soupçonner Bib
Celui-ci cherchait les moyens d'éviter l'invasion moscovite, en se procu
des forces nationales pour défendre le pays au cas d'un mouvemen
l'autre côté des Carpathes. Augmenter l'armée par la création d'un c
de pandours fut sa première idée. Il fit appeler Maghiero, qui était
administrateur dans le district de Romanati en Petite-Valachie, homme
puté par sa bravoure. Il lui dit confidentiellement qu'on soupçonnait
vement dans la Transylvanie de la part de quelques agitateurs
l'intention de passer en Valachie, et, pour que le gouver
état de leur résister sans recourir au secours étranger, il

on de tous les dorobans ; il lui enjoignit d'aller s'informer auprès de
ne administration si leur nombre était complet, si leurs armes étaient
on état, s'ils étaient bien orgnaisés par *caporalies*. Puis il lui ma-
ta l'intention qu'il avait de lui confier ensuite la formation d'un
s de pandours.

VIII.

Duhamel, voyant l'hésitation de Bibesco à se prononcer décisivement,
lit redoubler ses soupçons, et résolut d'employer à son égard le même
ifice dont on avait usé avec Stourza. D'un côté, il chargea M. Mavros de
nter une conspiration systématique contre le Domnu. Mavros avait ses
és, ses amis, ses parents, et initia dans le secret quelques personnes dé-
uées. Elles reçurent la mission de faire la propagande sans nommer le
teur; d'un autre côté, il envoya des espions russes, comme Joannidès et
Ghica, aux hommes du parti roumano-phanariote pour les encourager.
s messagers insinuèrent à ceux-ci qu'il fallait aller visiter encore le com-
ssaire impérial. « Ne désespérons pas, disaient-ils, tâchons de lui appren-
e ce qui se passe dans le pays sous le gouvernement du *Fou*. » — Les Rou-
no-phanariotes appelaient ainsi Bibesco. — Ces boyars ne tardèrent pas
e rendre chez Duhamel. Le commissaire russe les accueillit très-poliment
tte fois, et leur expliqua que, dans les premiers jours, il n'avait pas voulu
la vérité recevoir des plaintes et des accusations contre Bibesco, mais
u'à la suite de son séjour, s'étant assuré que le *fou* avait dévié du chemin
églementaire, ces messieurs pouvaient très-bien exposer leurs griefs et
éclamations par la voie légale, en désignant tous les abus de son gouver-
ement. L'Empereur, ajoutait-il, leur rendrait sévèrement justice. Puis, en
ssant, il leur recommanda de s'entendre avec certaines personnes, pa-
ntes de M. Mavros, en les signalant comme très-douées des moyens pro-
es à manier la plume et les *affaires*.

La conspiration, formée dans la maison de Mavros, se propageait et acqué-
t des adeptes à divers degrés. Parmi les cercles des boyars, on avait déjà
mmencé à sentir *les mouvements* et le but de cette association organisé
us le consulat russe. Les chefs du parti roumano-phanariote, comme

Ghica (l'ex-ministre), C. Cantacuzène, C. Souzo entrevirent une
dans la recommandation que leur fit le commissaire impérial : ils
naient de conspiration les personnes recommandées, et, par conséq
furent presque convaincus que le complot était ourdi sous l'inspirat
covite. Ils connaissaient déjà celui d'Ibraïla dont nous avons par
tardèrent pas à montrer une magnanime audace. Comment, av
principes, seraient-ils restés en dehors d'un complot *privilégié* c
persécutions de la police?

Le parti russe et celui des Roumano-phanariotes se fondirent
leur nature dans un seul.

Les événements s'aggravaient au centre de l'Europe. Chaque p
portait des nouvelles importantes. Les programmes des consti
que les peuples proclamaient à l'envi, étaient une école pour l
roumain. Chaque camaraderie, chaque profession, chaque métier
corporation devenait une centralisation partielle d'individus qui
des améliorations dont ils sentaient de plus près le besoin. Les pro
les étudiants, les imprimeurs, les libraires, les relieurs même soul
voir abolir la censure arbitrairement établie, entrave si préjudiciab
industrie où tant d'individus, dont l'État avait la charge, pourraier
honnêtement le pain nourricier. Les commerçants éprouvaient depu
temps le besoin d'une banque nationale, tant de fois demandée et
par les diplomates czariens, et les barbaries commises par l
leur faisaient désirer la garantie de leurs personnes et de leur
devenus le jeu et la proie de chaque sbire. Les boyars, temoins et
de toutes les corruptions électorales, appelaient plus sérieusement
d'anéantir une influence aussi oppressive dans la nomination des dé
des fonctionnaires publics. Chaque centralisation, suivant ses be
sa méthode, se créait une projet de constitution, sans avoir la h
de le propager en dehors de son cercle. Les partis ne pouvaient
naître et ils ne connaissaient point ce qui se passait dans le consul
et dans la maison de Mavros.

Sur ces entrefaites arrivèrent quelques jeunes gens roumi
qui avaient été les témoins de la proclamation de la R

en février. Ils se pressèrent d'accourir à Bucaresci pour juger quels nt les éléments de la Valachie et quelles chances favorables s'y of- nt pour entreprendre un mouvement national vers une voie de progrès. jeunes gens, d'un côté enthousiasmés par ce qu'ils venaient d'admi- en France d'où les encourageaient des hommes assez influents, d'un e côté étrangers à toute ambition, sans famille, ne craignaient pas de ifester plus hautement leurs principes et leurs projets. Les conspira- s privilégiés par la Russie avaient aussi le même courage. Mavros et pagnie clamaient à haute voix leur grand patriotisme, leurs sentiments *ètes* et libéraux, leur haine contre les abus, et particulièrement leur pprobation *loyale* de tous les actes de Bibesco. Nous dirons plus tard u'est M. Mavros : mais à le voir, lui et ses adeptes, à les entendre, y avait nulle différence entre le parti russe et celui des jeunes gens vés de Paris, sinon que ces derniers, comme plusieurs du parti natio- , étaient assez souvent attaqués par la police, tandis que la police ait hasarder aucune observation aux amis de M. Mavros, de Kotzebue e Duhamel, ni même aux hommes initiés par les bons amis et parents Mavros.

ourtant quelquefois, lorsque la propagande et les déclamations se fai- nt trop ouvertement, M. Mavros ne manquait pas de recommander la dence.

es jeunes néophytes révolutionnaires, en proie à mille persécutions, ne assaient pas de tenter tous les moyens pour atteindre leur but. Dans s recherches, ils ne découvrirent personne de plus intrépide que ceux étaient mus par les leviers de la Russie. Le courage, ou mieux l'imper- nce de ceux-ci parut du patriotisme à la crédule jeunesse; trompée l'apparence, elle leur donna la main.

e commissaire russe recevait des rapports quotidiens; il était instruit tout ce qui se passait, et plus la conspiration grossissait par la réu- n des partis, plus il pressait Bibesco de réclamer l'entrée des troupes ses, attendu qu'il *sentait dans l'air une conspiration, une révolution.* 'en dénonçait pas les organes et ses complices ; mais il insistait pour ter, exiler et pendre même des hommes dont le crime n'était que d'é- étrangers au mouvement fomenté par ses propres ruses. Il exigea la pension du *Courrier Roumain (6)*, qui tenait un langage ferme, calme et *onal, s'efforçant d'éclairer les masses* pour qu'elles ne devinssent pa

la proie des intrigues étrangères, puis de l'anarchie, selon le cabinet russe; car, au cas où Bibesco ne consentirait pas à l'occ le cabinet protecteur rêvait le désordre, l'anarchie, pour avoi texte de venir *légalement* rétablir l'ordre.

En ce moment la conspiration touchait à son dernier term restait qu'à régler la marche du mouvement. Le parti russe n' nombreux. Il formait, pour ainsi dire, un état-major sans Puis son intention était, si Bibesco persistait dans son refus lever l'étendard que vers la fin du mois d'août, lorsqu'aurait mouvement commencé en Hongrie par Jellacici et par les popula vonnes et roumaines. La Russie en tirerait un motif doublement pour faire entrer ses troupes dans la Valachie, les y camper avan tervention des autres puissances, les hiverner et posséder ainsi printemps, au moment d'agir, le point stratégique du départ.

Les jeunes révolutionnaires s'accordaient pour l'emploi des moy mes; mais, impatients, ils voulaient engager sans délai la lutte, les villages, puis les arrondissements, puis les districts, puis le pa soulever les prolétaires contre les propriétaires, détrôner Bibesco dre les rênes du gouvernement. Les Russes souriaient; les Roumai riotes qu'on nomme aussi vieux *Ciocoi* n'avaient pas le courage senter armés dans les rues, et ils redoutaient encore, avec raison, ner les paysans; car ils ne savaient par quels moyens les calmer et l quand une fois ces masses aveugles mesureraient leur force. On s donc de tenter la milice. Le parti russe avait déjà initié le chef roumaine, Odobesco; celui-ci avait de même initié Salomon, qui dait le régiment en garnison dans la capitale. Leur mission était les soldats à ne pas tirer sur le peuple pour réduire Bibesco à i secours russe. C'était une mission secrète inconnue aux deux aut

s'il se mettait à la tête du mouvement pour sauver le pays d'immin malheurs.

IX.

Ces trames multiples se nouaient en Valachie, lorsque Tala'at-Efe le commissaire turc, se trouvait encore à Bucaresci. Il voulait connaître hommes et les choses ; mais, surveillé, espionné dans tous ses actes, pa sbires de Saint-Pétersbourg, il n'était approché que par le parti russe, celui des Roumano-phanariotes et par quelques-uns des hommes de Bibe Tout autre, qui aurait essayé de lui parler et de s'entendre avec lui serait vu infailliblement persécuté et arrêté. Personne n'osait se comp mettre vis-à-vis de Duhamel.

Enfin Héliade et les frères Golesci, membres influents du parti na nal (7), se décidèrent à tout risquer et à le voir. Mais alors il n'était en état de pénétrer ce qui se passait en Valachie ; même aujourd'hui, n sommes certains que beaucoup de choses lui sont restées inconnues, la Russie avait pris toutes les précautions pour ériger un mur de fer e la Moldo-Valachie et la Porte !

— Comment, demanda le commissaire turc, vous n'êtes pas cont de votre *Prince*, élu par vous ?

— Qui vous a dit cela, Excellence ?

— Tous les boyars qui sont venus me visiter. J'aperçois ici deux par les uns se déclarent contre le Prince ; les autres, ses parents et ses *ci* (créatures), s'en montrent très-satisfaits ; cela signifie que presque tou monde en est mécontent. Vous, de quel parti êtes-vous ?

— Nous ne sommes ni les parents du Prince, ni ses ciraks, ni ses ad saires ; nous ne sommes ni ses amis, ni ses ennemis. Nous sommes les a de l'ordre : peu nous importe à nous qui règne, Bibesco ou Ghica. N voulons l'ordre, le respect au pouvoir et aux lois.

— Mais... qui veut troubler l'ordre ? qui ne veut pas respecter le pou et les lois ?

— Les partisans de l'état actuel, où tous les principes sont bouleve

— *Je ne vous comprends pas ;* expliquez-vous mieux.

— Pour avoir l'ordre, il faut reconnaître un principe ou un chef. L'on ne peut servir deux maîtres rivaux. Nous avons un prince, et nous voyons un consul qui le paralyse sans aucun titre, sans être reconnu par aucun traité ni par aucune puissance. Nos pères ont souscrit à la suzeraineté de la Porte et à sa protection pour nos droits, et nous voyons la Russie qui prétend nous imposer sa souveraineté. Avons-nous cessé une seule fois de payer notre tribut à la Porte? pourquoi ferme-t-elle les yeux? — Est-elle, oui ou non, notre véritable protectrice sous la garantie de nos droits imprescriptibles? — Tout est confondu; jusqu'au dernier des employés du consulat, jusqu'au dernier des sujets russes, jusqu'au dernier des sbires et des espions moscovites veut passer pour plus que le Czar.

Or, nous avons nos traités, nos lois, et ceux qui sont nés et nourris dans la religion des lois et des traités sont les plus persécutés, les plus malheureux. Sommes-nous les vassaux du Sultan, ou les sujets du Czar? Quand ces deux questions seront éclaircies, nous aurons l'ordre. Aujourd'hui, c'est l'anarchie; nous en craignons les suites.

— Qu'est-ce que vous craignez? Est-ce qu'on est ici à la veille d'un mouvement?

— On prépare ce mouvement, et les hommes qui s'efforcent de l'empêcher sont persécutés.

— Mais vous, quelles intentions avez-vous? Je vous juge des hommes sans passions, soumis à la raison et doués de bon sens. Soyez tranquilles et calmes; ne vous mêlez de rien.

— Nous ne nous mêlons de rien; c'est justement pour cela que nous sommes persécutés. On nous oblige de prendre parti. Si nous sommes forcés d'agir, nous agirons, Excellence, pour renouveler nos anciennes et légitimes relations avec la Sublime Porte, relations paralysées par le réglement organique. Nous agirons pour défendre l'ordre et préserver le pays de nouveaux désastres. Le peuple connait les hommes qui l'ont toujours servi. L'anarchie moscovite sera repoussée ou vaincue.

— Mais qu'est-ce que vous entendez toujours par l'anarchie?

— Nous l'avons dit; l'ordre consiste à reconnaître un principe ou un chef légitime, et à respecter les lois. Or, pour bien vivre en Valachie, dans l'état actuel, il faut être l'ennemi du Sultan, notre chef par la foi d'un libre *trat, mépriser le* prince élu ou le contraindre à se servir du kr *ux pieds les lois*, se rendre l'esclave ou l'espion du consul russ

elle ordre, nous ne sommes pas d'accord. Nous l'appelons anarchie, et nous
aignons une anarchie plus terrible qu'on nous apprête dans l'ombre... »

Le commissaire turc resta longtemps pensif, comme pour donner un
tre cours à la conversation, puis il reprit :

« — Mais... vos opinions politiques, quelles sont-elles ? Etes-vous libé-
ux ou aristocrates ? êtes-vous monarchistes ou républicains ? car, voyez-
us, les idées qui fermentent maintenant dans l'Europe, ne sauraient
e tolérées dans les Etats du Sultan... non pas tant les idées, mais les for-
s sous lesquelles on les présente.

— Nous savons très-bien que le gouvernement de l'empire ottoman est
ogressiste, car l'Islamisme est basé sur la loi éternelle de l'égalité. Quant à
us, nous ne sommes pas aristocrates, car les Roumains n'ont jamais connu
e aristocratie, et si le pays avait eu des lois ou des traditions aristocra-
nes, le prince d'aujourd'hui ne serait pas le chef de l'Etat... Nous ne
mmes non plus des monarchistes, car vouloir un trône héréditaire en Va-
hie, serait conspirer contre nos lois, contre la suzeraineté de la Porte.
us ne nous proclamons pas davantage démocrates, car aucun Valaque ne
nnaît ce nom, et nous ne voulons pas chercher des mots, nous voulons
s faits. Nous sommes Roumains, et Roumains purs, tels que nos pères
t été, lorsqu'ils ont conclu les traités avec la Sublime Porte ; nous voulons
server nos droits reconnus et respectés par la Turquie, lorsqu'elle était
zénith de sa grandeur, reconnus par la Russie elle-même, leur sourde
structrice. Nous voulons conserver notre autonomie, notre droit électif,
s lois et coutumes anciennes. Nous sommes, Excellence, *conservateurs*,—
r il faut conserver ce qui est bon. — Nous voulons conserver, respecter
soutenir les droits de tous, de la Valachie en général et de chaque Rou-
ain en particulier. Notre point de départ, c'est l'autonomie du pays, et la
uzeraineté de la Porte.

— C'est bien ; mais je vous conseille d'être tranquilles et *prudents*.

— Nous ne demandons pas mieux ; mais on ne nous laisse pas tranquil-
s. Le prince nous persécute, et peut-être qu'il a néanmoins la conviction
e notre loyauté ; peut-être qu'il est contraint de nous persécuter....

— Je parlerai au prince.

— Nous vous en prions beaucoup, Excellence.... car il dépend du prince
maintenir la tranquillité... »

XI.

Trois jours après cette conversation, Tala'at-Efendi partit pour vie, et le lendemain de son départ, l'un des trois interlocuteurs e tu le que le prince était contraint par Duhamel à le faire exiler ; nacé même d'être envoyé aux travaux forcés des Salines. Ce fut al chefs du parti national se décidèrent à organiser un accord gé tous les patriotes, jusque là simples spectateurs et prêts à s'oppo tentative de mouvement anarchique. Ce fut alors qu'ils se déter opérer une surprise, à confondre et paralyser ce Méphistophélès (et massif que l'enfer du Nord avait vomi sur la Valachie, com rare du génie moscovite. — Admirable diplomate ! les Rouma voyant, s'étaient écriés : Voilà l'ours ! et les Tzigans le saluèr charivari, en faisant exécuter sous ses fenêtres la danse de l'our chantant la ballade du grotesque animal.

Mais le parti national, il faut le dire, n'était plus un parti, c'é tion entière. Les grands boyars, sauf les Roumano-phanariotes, de la seconde et troisième classe, les négociants, le clergé, les p les hommes de lettres, les artistes, la jeunesse, les paysans, tous mes désiraient des réformes salutaires par la voie légale, des amé et l'extirpation des abus ; mais, avant tout, ils désiraient l'ordre ; taient l'anarchie. Dès qu'ils sentirent que la Russie complot leur repos, ils ne firent qu'un seul corps, et leurs chefs, ou mieux présentants, se retirèrent dans la petite Valachie pour donner le la guerre contre le perturbateur, l'anarchiste moscovite, et pour

l'Occident, car les bases de cette proclamation sont les suivantes

« Respect à la propriété;

« Respect aux personnes;

« Avantages généraux sans dommages pour aucun citoyen;

« Il est injuste que la majorité soit la proie d'une minorité;

« Il est odieux que la minorité soit la proie de la majorité. »

Le mot d'ordre de tout le mouvement fut :

« Justice. — Fraternité. »

Toute la constitution (9) ne se base que sur les anciens droits et l
nciennes coutumes qui ont gouverné le pays jusqu'à l'an 1828. On vie
e parcourir l'histoire des droits de la Valachie, de son gouverneme
ormal, sans cesse dénaturé par les infâmes intrigues russes, et on ver
u'il n'y a rien de nouveau dans cette constitution. Si elle a paru tr
bérale aux yeux des monarchistes, la faute n'en est pas aux Roumai
aujourd'hui, mais à leurs ancêtres, à leurs pères qui se sont donné ces l
t se gouvernèrent par elles pendant tant de siècles; la faute en est à
Porte qui les a reconnues et respectées pendant tant de siècles; à
ussie, qui, depuis Pierre-le-Grand jusqu'à nos jours, les a elle-mèn
econnues officiellement, au lieu d'exterminer comme criminelle tou
ette race de Roumains devenus chrétiens d'après la lettre de l'Evangil
Les Roumains ne se sont appelés ni démocrates, ni socialistes, ni m
narchistes, ni aristocrates, car ils ignoraient ce que sont ces choses-là;
e sont levés pour défendre et conserver leurs biens généraux et par
uliers, soutenir l'ordre menacé, l'ordre établi sur leurs relations l
gitimes avec la Turquie. Voilà leur mouvement! voilà leur crime!

Bibesco, après avoir signé *librement* la constitution, — car le peup
ui la lui demandait était sans armes, — après avoir gouverné de
ours en véritable Domnu roumain, intimidé par Dubamel, abdiq
la couronne et la gloire d'être le sauveur, le régénérateur de sa natio

Le commissaire russe, déjoué dans ses vues anarchiques, et voya
ibesco revêtu d'une vigueur nouvelle acclamé et adoré par le peu

affranchi de ses vieilles entraves, comprit le danger ; car le Domn
rait soutenir désormais l'ordre par la seule force morale, et renou
liens primitifs avec la Porte, couper aux Russes tout espoir d'en
Valachie. Il employa donc son art à démoraliser ce pauvre potentat
et lui fit abandonner la terre roumaine pour se rendre en Transylva
l'illusion trompeuse que dans quelques jours il sera réinstallé.

X.

Duhamel se flattait qu'à la suite de cette abdication, il serait f
composer un gouvernement provisoire d'hommes vendus à la Ru
les amener à ses vues, c'est-à-dire à reclamer son intervention, so
texte qu'ils ne sont pas en état de maintenir l'ordre. Mais le peu
voyait très-clair et connaissait déjà ses intentions, se choisit pour
uants des hommes dévoués à sa cause et à la Turquie.

Duhamel passa incontinent en Moldavie, et les hommes qu'il avai
à Bucaresci essayèrent de renverser le gouvernement populaire ;
sième jour après leur installation, ses membres furent arrêtés pa
besco et Salomon ; en un quart d'heure ils furent délivrés par
ple, et à leur tour les deux malheureux traîtres, saisis, arrêtés
tinés à être jugés tant pour leur attentat contre le gouvernement q
avoir fait assassiner onze individus.

Dans les dix jours suivants, les hommes du parti russe ne se l
pas de tenter un nouveau coup. Ils répandirent dans la capitale
bruit que les Russes avaient franchi la frontière de la Valachie ; i
tendirent avec tous les Roumano-phanariotes, et avec un petit nom
réactionnaires, ou de jeunes gens trompés, les premiers répandus
milice, et les seconds, insinués au centre même du gouvernem
bruit découragea le peuple et enhardit la réaction. Le gouvern
pour éviter des scènes sanglantes, pour n'être pas obligé de sévir
ses ennemis, se décida à tranférer son siége dans Tourgoviste, l'a
capitale et résidence des Domni.

Les Roumano-phanariotes profitèrent de son absence, et

une soi-disant *caimacamie*, composée parmi eux. Elle ne put du-
vingt-quatre heures. Le peuple la chassa sans tirer d'autres repré-
es, et rappela son gouvernement qui sut rassurer les esprits et main-
r l'ordre, jusqu'à l'arrivée de Suleyman-Pacha.

e digne et véritable Turc, après s'être informé de l'état des choses, pour
lre patente la fidélité des Roumains, n'eut d'autre marche à proposer
de dissoudre le gouvernement provisoire et de procéder à l'élection
autre gouvernement, composé de trois membres pris parmi les mi-
res sous le nom de *lieutenants-princiaires*, et le peuple, pour donner
nouvelle preuve de sa loyauté, obéit ; la lieutenance fut élue, sans au-
mélange des hommes du parti russe. Le nouveau gouvernement fut
nnu au nom du Sultan, et, sur l'invitation de Suleyman-Pacha, tous
réprésentants des puissances étrangères entrèrent en relation avec lui.
armi le corps diplomatique, il ne manquait à Bucaresci que le con-
russe. La lieutenance adressa aussitôt une note à Suleyman-Pacha,
le priant d'intervenir pour faire rentrer le représentant de la Russie
ucaresci, et l'inviter à reprendre ses relations avec le gouvernement
main. Mais ce consul, d'accord avec Duhamel, avait d'autres affaires à
latzi, en Moldavie, et la sécurité publique de la Valachie lui importait
. Il y complotait dans l'ombre avec MM. Mavros, Georges Philipesco,
certain Souzi, pour agiter les esprits, préparer des massacres et com-
quer les affaires, comme un véritable représentant de la puissance pro-
trice et des sentiments paternels et cosaques de l'empereur Nicolas.

Par l'installation du nouveau gouvernement valaque, la Russie perdait
ute espérance d'y voir des hommes avec qui elle pourrait se concerter sui-
nt ses desseins, comme elle avait déjà vainement essayé de le faire avec le
uvernement provisoire, avant l'arrivée de Suleyman-Pacha (10). Epuisant
fin toutes ses ruses diplomatiques, elle s'appliqua d'un côté à se servir de
démagogie à Bucaresci pour provoquer la guerre civile et incriminer
lieutenance, et de l'autre à insister par toutes sortes de menaces au-
rès du divan pour rappeler Suleyman-Pacha et envoyer Fuad-Efendi
mme son remplaçant. Ce dernier, d'accord avec Duhamel et avec une
rmée turque de 16,000 hommes, devait rétablir l'ordre en Valachie.

Mais l'ordre légal, conservé par les Roumains, a lui seul tenu en respect
ndant trois mois les troupes russes, sans qu'elles tentassent d'y pénétrer.
Russie *en cherchait par tous* les moyens un prétexte, et la Valachie

le lui a pas fourni. Par une faute grave, selon nous, il fut réservé, Efendi de lui procurer ce prétexte par le déplorable conflit de de Spyro. Car, si la Porte avait gardé ses troupes sur le impériale n'aurait pas osé impunément violer en protectrice l des Roumains.

Ce conflit néfaste, qui mit aux prises les soldats turcs avec l valaque et nécessita leur entrée à Bucarest, autorisa en même général moscovite à exécuter la sienne, comme garant et consécu protectorat. — Premier acte décisif du plan czarien. Vainement Fuad-Efendi voulut protester. Une lettre, expédiée aussitôt par l à Lüders, le conjurait d'arriver en toute hâte : « Le moment est v sait-il, de posséder l'Orient et de menacer l'Occident. » L'admin du district de Buzeo, qui avait surpris cette lettre, fut condamné vaux forcés. — Et le vautour de l'Oural s'abattit, les serres étendu proie qu'il convoitait depuis si longtemps.

CONCLUSION.

Voilà le protectorat russe depuis 1828. Les représentants des puissances européennes en Valachie ont été les témoins oculaires de tous les faits que je viens de mettre en évidence. L'Autriche devait s'inquiéter davantage de contenir cette influence usurpatrice pour les Roumains, nuisible pour l'Europe, et fatale pour elle; car la vieille Terra roumana se trouve au centre de toutes les populations roumaines et slavones de la Turquie et de l'Autriche. Déjà, de longue date, elles sont travaillées par les popes en faveur du Czar, le calife du fanatisme moscovite. L'Autriche, avec raison, a toujours été soucieuse de ce soi-disant protectorat, et toujours elle a surveillé la marche de sa politique dans les Principautés danubiennes. Mais son dernier consul, M. Timoni, payé depuis vingt ans et décoré par l'autocrate, ne fut, dans cet espace de temps, que le valet sous toutes les formes du consul russe. Jamais le cabinet autrichien n'a eu des rapports exacts de ce qui se passait sur notre territoire.

En envoyant, comme consul général et agent à Bucaresci, M. A. Billecocq, homme qui avait rempli sa longue carrière diplomatique auprès des premières cours européennes, la France donna dernièrement une preuve qu'elle songeait à fixer son attention particulière sur ces contrées, ou plutôt sur la politique czarienne en Orient. Mais la France était dégénérée dans son gouvernement et affaiblie dans sa politique extérieure; en se mêlant plus sérieusement aux affaires de la Moldo-Valachie, elle ne fit qu'empirer son sort. Plus le consul français prétendait soutenir l'honneur et la dignité de sa nation, au nom de ses belles prérogatives en Orient, plus la Russie redoublait d'efforts et d'énergie pour démontrer qu'elle y est maîtresse absolue. En vain M. Billecocq appliquait son zèle et son intelligence à pénétrer toutes les cabales, tous les projets occultes du machiavélisme moscovite, et à en instruire son gouvernement. *M. Guizot faisait le sourd. Au lieu d'être* encouragé à défendre l'honneur

pavillon tricolore, M. Billecocq passait pour un homme à idées fixes voix se perdait comme celle de Cassandre. Mais l'ancienne divinatri voyait l'avenir et on pouvait douter de ses prédictions, tandis que l' menté consul français ne faisait qu'ouvrir les yeux, juger le présent p tirer des conséquences rationnelles. Si une des premières qualités d' plomate consiste à avoir le coup d'œil sagace, à se mettre dans le v point de vue, à voir clair et juste et à informer d'avance son cabin qualité de M. Billecocq fut considérée comme une extravagante pré de donner des choses hors de propos.

Le cabinet de Pétersbourg connut mieux les services que ce consu à la France par les préjudices qu'il portait à sa politique hypocrite e il voulut se débarrasser de lui, et le ministère de Louis-Philippe son ukase rendu par la bouche du consul russe à Bibesco, et par ce à M. Guizot. M. Billecocq, qui accomplit sa mission mieux que tou consul en Moldo-Valachie, fut rappelé, car il avait vu ce qu'il ne de voir, et il avait informé de ce dont il ne devait pas informer, selon litique du ministre doctrinaire. Tout ce que le consul général avait d ses rapports se réalise de jour en jour.

Nous avons relaté dans cet exposé succinct l'histoire des droits d mains, et de la politique russe en Orient depuis Pierre-le-Grand j 1828, et depuis cette année jusqu'à la présente. Nous finirons par u d'œil sur les événements qui viennent de s'accomplir en Hongrie chemin que le génie moscovite s'était préparé en Moldo-Valachie.

La Russie est si astucieuse, si prévoyante, et tellement assouplie que, par ses agents de tout genre, et par son or, on peut dire qu'el pare les événements. Si l'on affirmait que c'est elle qui travail puis longtemps les Hongrois, qui encourage leurs efforts pour reco leurs droits nationaux, qui les pousse à demander une nouvelle co tion ; que c'est elle qui a nourri le fanatisme des uns pour oppr irriter les autres nationalités de la Hongrie, qui a discrédité par l *fanatique* la clairvoyance et la justice du parti véritablement prog *des Magyars* ; que c'est elle qui a incité l'Autriche à se repentir, &

abarras, de ses beaux moments de libéralisme et à tromper les Magyars, —
i a entraîné ensuite ces derniers à se soulever en masse, qui a flatté e
courage par moments les Kossuth, qui s'est créé d'avance et s'est prépar
s Georgey pour contre-balancer et puis renverser les Kossuth, lorsque l
oment arriverait; — si l'on affirmait que la Russie a travaillé même le
ouges et les Blancs en France, ourdi les journées de Juin pour paralyse
démocratie, souri à l'intervention française en Italie et l'a poussée mêm
our avoir, elle aussi, le droit d'intervenir en Hongrie afin de dompter le
agyars et de faire sa propagande parmi les peuplades slavonnes et rou
aines; — si l'on affirmait qu'elle a ainsi agi pour forcer les Magyars à s
ter à ses pieds et solliciter sa protection, pour réduire l'Autriche à l'éta
e la Turquie et la Hongrie à celui de la Moldo-Valachie, pour coupe
ute ressource au cabinet de Vienne qui l'entravait dans ses démarches contr
Porte, et enfin pour se débarrasser d'un rival qui seul la surveillait d
is dans toutes ses évolutions d'intrigues en Orient; — si l'on affirmait tou
la, le cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg dirait : Cet homme nous connaît bien
est dangereux. Personne ne pourrait comprendre que cet homme dévoil
vérité, hors Dieu, le diable et les diplomates de Saint-Pétersbourg
ous les autres cabinets, oppresseurs et victimes, trompeurs et trompés, l
garderaient comme un visionnaire. Le temps lève bien des voiles... sou
nt, hélas ! trop tard.

En supposant pourtant que tout cela soit vrai, on serait tenté de croir
e la Russie est formidable, et que ses programmes ressemblent au livr
destin. Au contraire, c'est parce qu'elle a toujours été la plus faibl
'elle a toujours recours à la fourberie, aux intrigues et aux trahisons
ui a enfanté le *Metternichisme* ? La faiblesse morale, la position même d
Autriche. Pourquoi la femme est-elle plus rusée que l'homme ? pourqu
joue-t-elle et le domine-t-elle à son gré ? Parce qu'elle est esclave, plu
ible et plus ignorante. La Russie et l'Autriche n'ont rempli en Europ
e le rôle de deux prostituées rivales. Qui devait remporter la victoire
a plus jeune. Tôt ou tard l'autre devait céder la place, et conformémen
sa vie passée, vivre du métier des vieilles courtisanes, en secondant l
ce, et devenir témoin des actes détestables de sa jeune rivale

Les autres puissances européennes, éclairées, moralement et matériell
ent fortes, furent trop grandes pour descendre jusqu'aux moyens ex

ployés par ces deux puissances corrompues et corruptrices. Le fa
faible inventent des artifices et des piéges dédaignés par l'hon
honnête et vigoureux. Ces forces factices, appuyées sur l'hypo
mensonge, bien qu'elles semblent colossales, s'écroulent au mo
tonnement du monde.

NOTES.

I.

ORIGINES.

nain est la plus immédiate et la plus directe de toutes les langues de latine. On pourrait dire qu'il est, sous certains rapports, plus romain in même, du moins celui que nous connaissons : car il conserve un nbre de mots de l'ancien dorique, de cet idiome populaire qu'on ne par- lus à Rome, au temps de Virgile et de Cicéron, et qui est au latin clas- ue le celte est au français, le teutonique à l'allemand ; comme *alfare*' *drumu* (δρόμος), chemin ; *frica* (φρίκη), terreur ; *pandure* (δοῦρα, δούριος, , forêt, buis....

observant que *agnus*, c'est l'ἀμνός, en changeant *mn* en *gn*, on voit que n conserve toujours l'ancien type dans des mots comme : *semnu, lem- itate*, signum, lignum, dignitas.

é à l'italien, avec lequel il offre le plus d'analogie, le roumain se rappro- tage de la langue-mère. Ainsi, dans les dérivés qui forment à peu près les mes de la langue, il conserve entier le mot primitif. Là où l'italien met :

roumain écrit lacu.		Campidoglio, *le roumain écrit* capitoliu.	
— — locu.		Nazione,	— — natiŏ.
— — lupu.		Ragione,	— — ratiŏ.

nain dit *cugetú* pour la *pensée*, *dominu* ou *domnu* pour *seigneur* ou ; *intindere*, en roumain a le sens latin de *tendre*, et non de *compren- ndere brachia*. » De plus, le roumain décline les substantifs féminins, à du latin : *Roma*, *Romae*, *musa*, *musae*.

es citations mettront à même de comparer et d'apprécier les ressources ngue.

Italien.	*Français.*
gli abitator' dell' ombre éterne,	Lorsque du Créateur la parole féconde,
suon della tartarea tromba.	Dans une heure fatale, eut enfanté le monde
(*Tasso*).	Des germes du chaos. (*Lamartine.*)
Roumain.	*Roumain.*
locuitori eternelor umbre,	Quând vorba mundiferă c'ó urra creatore,
sunet *tartarei trombæ*	A dis' să fiă lumea intr'o fatale óre,
(*Trad.*)	D'in germen'i lui chaos. (*Trad.*)

ant une inversion littérale de la traduction roumaine, nous laisson tine juger *laquelle de ces deux* langues était la plus capable d'ex-

primer sa pensée lorsqu'il entonna le chant du désespoir. Voici le mot à mot :

« Lorsque le verbe mundifere, par une haine créatrice,
« Dans une heure fatale dit : Que le monde soit
» Des germes du chaos! »

Le roumain écrit en général comme il prononce, et il conserve l'ancienne prononciation latine. C'est l'oreille, et non la grammaire qui lui apprend à doubler les consonnes, à reconnaître les voyelles latines, longues et brèves. Il écrit sans crainte de se tromper *littera*, *mittere*, parce qu'il prononce *litera*, *mitere*, et là où on accentue l'antépénultième, il doit avoir deux consonnes. Il écrit de même les mots, comme : *battere*, *familtia*, *batallie*.

La voyelle *a* brève latine est à peine sensible dans le roumain, comme l'*e* muet français, *luna*, *Roma*.

L'*e* bref latin, en roumain devient *i*, car l'*i* se prononce avec la bouche plus fermée.

Tempus *devient* timpu.
Bene — bine, etc.

L'*i* long latin, en roumain devient *e*, car l'*e* se prononce avec la bouche plus ouverte.

Lignum, lemnu.
Signum, semnu.

L'*o* latin ne se prononce *o* en roumain, que lorsqu'il a un son intermédiaire entre la longue et la brève. Dès que l'*o* devient long en latin, le roumain ouvre la bouche et le prononce *oa ;* lorsqu'il est bref, le roumain ferme la bouche et le prononce à moitié *u*, ce que le français représente par une diphtongue *ou* plus ou moins longue.

Mŏrs, mŏrte *devient en roumain* moarte.
Mori, morire — — murire (mourir.)

Le roumain, qui a les infinitifs, comme en latin, en *are*, *ere*, *ire*, a tout de suite la clef des substantifs français en *ance* et *ence*, sans qu'il soit obligé de recourir au latin. Jamais il ne commettra la faute, comme un français est souvent tenté de le faire, d'écrire *stence* pour *stance*, *allience* pour *alliance*, *providance* pour *providence*, et s'il écrit *naissance* au lieu de *naiscence*, il n'ignore pas qu'il viole l'étymologie ; s'il écrit aussi *connaissance* au lieu de *connoiscence*, il a la même *connoiscence* et non la *con-naissance*, car il y a une grande différence entre *con-noître* et *con-naître*.

Les Roumains sachant que les syllabes *al*, *el* dans leur langue, suivies d'une consonne, répondent à *au* et *eau*, écrivent en français sans hésiter :

De alba, aube. Et de Pelle, peau.
Palma, paume. Agnellu agneau.

Cald,	chaud.	Castellu,	château.
Assalt,	assaut (1).	Vitellu,	veau.
Psalmu,	psaume.	Bâtellu,	bateau.
Balsamu,	baume.		
Baldovin,	Baudouin.		

De même pour des mots, comme *taureau*, *aurore*, dont la prononciation rou-
ine *taour*, *aourora*, lui enseigne la véritable orthographe.

(1) Remarquons en outre que la consonne finale dans *cald*, *assalt*, *pas*, etc., indique l'emploi
ment du *d*, *t*, *s*, dans les mots français correspondants.

GÉNIE DÉMOCRATIQUE DE LA LANGUE ROUMAINE.

ce que nous venons de dire est pour la matière de la langue. Mais si on ob-
ve sa forme et ses expressions, qui ne sont que le résultat de son éducation,
ne peut qu'admirer les populations roumaines ; car, seules parmi les nationali-
de la race latine, elles ont conservé les mœurs et les habitudes démocrati-
s jusque dans leur langage.

Dans la langue roumaine il n'est pas encore usité de s'adresser à la seconde
sonne par le pluriel, comme chez les Français, ni par la troisième personne, au
u de la seconde, comme chez les Italiens. Le roumain s'adresse à Dieu, au chef
l'Etat, à tout fonctionnaire public, comme au dernier des paysans ou de ses
mestiques, par la seconde personne du verbe au singulier : « *Tata quare, esci
ceruri*, — *Que faci Maria ta?* — *Vino frate.* — *Du te Ioanne*, etc. — Père
tre dans les cieux. — Comment te portes-tu, altesse ? — Viens, frère. — Va,
an.

Les titres d'*altesse*, *excellence*, ne se donnent qu'aux étrangers, ou en parlant
e autre langue. Parmi les indigènes et dans la langue roumaine, il n'existe
e le titre de ta *grandeur* (maria ta) pour le chef de l'Etat, et celui de ta *sei-
urie* (domnia ta) appliqué depuis le grand bano jusqu'au serviteur.

Le vocatif, *frate* (frère), s'adresse sans exception à tout individu, même dans
moments de colère : « *Mhei, frate, de que n'asculti? — Apoi, frate, credeam que
ine assà.* — Hé! frère, pourquoi n'obéis-tu ? — Mais, frère, je croyais que
tait bien comme ça.

Pour les autres titres de noblesse et de souveraineté, voyez la deuxième note.

II.

Les mots *coquin*, *spadassin* ou *mauvais sujet*, *scélérat*, n'existent pas dans la
ngue roumaine, et on remplace le premier par : *roi de la vieille cour* (craiu
e curtea vecchie); *le second par : un roi et demi*, un roi sans bornes (un craiu
jumetate, un craiu fără margini); et le dernier par : un roi à pendre (un cra

de spenduratu). De sorte que, si l'on s'exprimait en roumain par cette g
fanfaronnade démocratique d'une république qui détrône un roi pour le re
cer par 36 millions, si l'on s'exprimait, dis-je, par la dénomination b
de peuple de rois (popol de craï), ce serait la plus cruelle et sarcastiqu
jure. Car, *peuple de rois* en roumain ne signifie que peuple de déguenillé
anarchistes, des hommes sans lois et conscience; il faut aller en Roumani
apprendre la véritable signification du mot roi dans la démocratie antique
entendre ce dédaigneux *rex* des parents de la république romaine. La ré
pour ce mot y est poussée si loin, que dans la traduction de la Bible, on l'a re
par des équivalents. Le *Livre des rois* s'y appelle le *Livre des empereurs.*

Principu n'a jamais signifié, comme nous l'avons dit, que bouffon
Tout le monde connaît en Valachie les expressions : « *principul sampi*
classa'l *que è un principu*, etc. Depuis le réglement organique, on essaya de
au chef de l'Etat ce titre, et pour éviter le mot national *principu*, on fut ob
recourir au mot français *prince*, afin de masquer en quelque sorte l'insulte.

Marquis et comtesse signifie fournisseur ou fournisseuse de filles; le mot p
désigner ce métier n'existe pas non plus en roumain, et on emploie un mot tu
ne peut figurer dans un salon, comme leurs seigneuries les marquis et les com

III.

Les finales en *escu* sont des patronymiques qui marquent la descendance,
les *ides* grecs, les Pélopides, les Héraclides; ou le mémoire d'un haut fait,

ldavie, le 13 avril 1711, pour ce qui concerne l'indépendance et la sou-eté de ce peuple. « La Moldavie aura pour frontière le Nistre. — Elle ne ra aucun tribut. — Le titre de son chef sera : le prince sérénissime de la davie, *samoderjetz* (autocrate et collègue de la Russie). »

VI.

Courrier roumain, dirigé par J. Héliade, en face des trames machiavéliques s par l'envoyé russe, prit pour devise : *J'abborre la tyrannie et je crains l'a-ie*. Duhamel, en lisant ces deux phrases, comprit leur sens et dit au consul mme nous connait. Il demanda aussitôt la suppression du journal et la pro-ion du rédacteur.

VII.

is notre Histoire de la régénération roumaine, nous ferons connaître plus en ces citoyens qui y jouèrent un rôle important.

VIII.

Valaques désignaient l'envoyé moscovite par cette qualification caractéris-Nous la conservons fidèlement.

IX.

constitution nouvelle sera également donnée dans notre Histoire, en regard ncienne, avec tous les principaux documents nécessaires pour justifier nos ons et pour éclairer nettement une nationalité presqu'inconnue à l'Europe.

X.

dans l'Histoire de la régénération la lettre du consul russe envoyée au mé-tain par Th. Popesco, et le *refus* d'Héliade et de C. Philippesco.

APPENDICE.

DU RÉGLEMENT ORGANIQUE ET DU SYSTEME RUSSE.

réglement organique commencé par G. Ghica dans le sens national, achevé s Russes dans les vues du cabinet de Pétersbourg, ne pouvait que recon-la liberté du paysan; car il n'a jamais été attaché à la terre sur laquelle il uve. Il a toujours été libre de s'acheter une terre, s'il le pouvait, de s'éta-r sa propriété, ou d'aller habiter une autre terre à son choix.

principe de liberté a été respecté par Ghica et par les Russes même. Seule-le soi-disant *protectorat russe, en mettant* la main, comme nous l'avons relaté, *projet de réformes, ne fit que* tâcher de tirer profit de chaque article, et

d'abuser de tout bon principe. Il déclare le paysan libre ; il engage le propriét
à lui céder rigoureusement 9 pogones (à peu près 4 hectares) de terrain à cu
ver pour son propre compte ; il autorise le paysan à ne solder, pour cela, au pr
priétaire qu'un équivalent en travail montant au plus à 36 francs par année....
Mais dans quel but?

La Russie considérait déjà la Moldo-Valachie comme deux pays appelés à de
venir deux gouvernements russes; elle se croyait presqu'à la veille de réaliser c
projet par l'acte séparé et secret du traité d'Andrinople. Dans un pareil cas, pr
absorber et anéantir la nationalité roumaine, les paysans devaient être libres d
se transporter où bon leur semblerait ; c'est-à-dire qu'ils devaient se trouver, p
leur condition naturelle, prêts à être transplantés et disséminés dans les contré
vastes et presque désertes de la Russie ; puis par une sollicitude toute paterne
de l'empereur, ils n'eussent été divisés parmi les peuplades russes qu'au bout d
quelques années. Grâce à la coïncidence de la même religion, il ne serait re
aucune trace de cette nationalité engloutie par le nombre.

Alors, la Moldo-Valachie serait dépeuplée. — Non, la sollicitude toujours p
ternelle du Czar, dans l'intérêt des propriétaires moldo-valaques, aurait repeu
au fur et à mesure le pays par des colons russes qui, au dire du gouvernem
moscovite, *sauraient mieux cultiver la terre*. On ne peut pas nier cette extrê
bonté du Czar, car on en a des preuves évidentes et palpables en Bassarabie. Ce
portion de la Moldavie, arrachée par la puissance protectrice, fut dépeup

de cette manière, la Bassarabie est aujourd'hui peuplée de Cosaques ou de
daves cosaquisés ; c'est toujours de la même façon que la plupart des pro-
taires moldaves ont perdu leurs biens. Le même sort donc menaçait la Vala-
e et le reste de la Moldavie par le réglement organique. Voilà ce qu'on appelle
mmunisme czarien ou czaresque.

On a maintes preuves de cette bonne intention de la Russie ; entre autres, nous
erons ce qui dernièrement eut lieu en Valachie.

Sous le gouvernement d'Alexandre Ghica, un boyar, poussé par philanthropie
par pur intérêt, se proposa de morceler sa terre et de la vendre à des paysans.
es de 1500 familles vinrent en acheter et s'établir sur leur légitime propriété.
is le consul russe excita et encouragea quelques boyars parvenus à réclamer
s divers prétextes et sophismes contre cette nouvelle espèce de spéculation qui
ait ouvrir à plusieurs paysans le moyen de devenir propriétaires. Leur réclama-
n devint sérieuse, et le consul la soutenait secrètement. Ghica, dont le gouver-
ment se signala par plus de quarante actes officiels qui garantissent les droits
la liberté des paysans, ne put que protéger la liberté du vendeur boyar et des
heteurs paysans. La vente continua jusqu'à l'avénement de Bibesco ; celui-ci, in-
idé par le consul, s'empressa d'arrêter cette gangrène qui allait, comme une
le libératrice, s'étendre parmi tous ceux qui voulaient vendre leur terre, et
idre avec le temps tout le reste des paysans propriétaires.

On s'efforça donc d'expliquer la lettre du réglement organique par l'interpré-
ion suivante, qui nous laisse entrevoir clairement les vues de la Russie.

« Le paysan est libre ; il peut aller où bon lui semble ; mais il n'a pas le
roit de s'acheter un morceau de terre ou une maison, » c'est à-dire, il a le droit
tre toujours prolétaire et étranger sur la terre de ses ancêtres. Quel intérêt
le Czar de voir le paysan moldo-valaque libre à sa manière, c'est-à-dire
s propriété, sans un coin où reposer sa tête ? Pourquoi en Valachie, les Grecs,
Serbiens, les Bulgares peuvent-ils acheter des terres, tandis que le paysan va-
que est condamné à errer sur le sol de ses pères, sur ce sol jadis défendu par
ur glaive, arrosé par leur sang, fécondé par leurs sueurs, et par son propre tra-
il. Pourquoi ? — Pour se trouver prêts, selon la prédestination moscovite, à
ler peupler les déserts sibériens, et laisser la terre roumaine en pâture aux Co-
ques usurpateurs.

C'est de ce communisme que la constitution a voulu sauver la vieille *Terra-Ro-
nana* et les propriétés particulières. Mais les voleurs ont la coutume fréquente de
onner le nom de *brigands* à leurs victimes ; Sa Majesté cosaque ne manqua pas
l'appeler *communistes* les véritables conservateurs des propriétés publiques et pri-
ées en Valachie.

FRAGMENT HISTORIQUE SUR LA MOLDO-VALACHIE.

Nous extrayons, pour terminer, le passage suivant d'un beau travai Moldaves, dans leur exil, publièrent en Bucovine, l'année 1848.

« Les deux pays jouissaient d'une entière indépendance ; ils choisissa domni parmi les indigènes; leurs frontieres, leurs institutions et leurs c étaient religieusement respectées ; ils jouissaient enfin de tous les droit à deux États souverains, assez puissants pour que leur alliance fût bri les plus grands monarques de l'Europe ; l'empereur de l'Allemagne et le la Russie se disputaient l'amitié et la coopération de ces deux prin gouvernées alors par les domni Constantin Brancovano et Démétrius (

» C'est l'an 1711, que Pierre-le-Grand se détermina à mettre en exécutio jets d'abaisser la Turquie. La Moldavie, *heureuse* et *bien organisée*, suivant sion du réformateur même de la Russie (1), se sacrifia pour ses corel res, les Russes. Mais lorsque la paix fut conclue sur le Pruth, des de familles moldaves avec leur domni Cantemir, victimes de leur dév se virent forcées d'émigrer ; car les deux pays furent délaissés par I Grand, à la merci du malheur ; la S. Porte, pour châtier leurs sy envers un empire étranger, les livra (la Moldavie particulièrement) aux Tatars, foula aux pieds leurs anciens traités, cerna leurs fron forteresses turques construites sur le territoire roumain par l'

t également contraint d'abandonner ses ouailles et son pays ; la Moldavie fut ouveau vouée à la vengeance turque, sans aucun remords et souci de a sie ; Munich dans sa retraite, pour reconnaissance, livra Jassy à la déprédation es soldats, exigea de la ville une nouvelle somme d'argent, en la menaçant des mes, emporta pour cela les caïmacans du pays prisonniers aux fers jusqu'à in, et, lorsqu'il passa le Pruth, « envoya, disent les chroniques contempo- ines, ses soldats dans les districts de Hotin et de Cernovitz, pour enlever des illiers d'hommes à titre d'esclaves, lesquels furent partagés ou vendus comme les animaux ; les uns prenaient les maris, les autres les femmes, et les autres s enfants ; les Russes surpassaient en cruauté les féroces Tatars (1). »

Dans la troisième campagne, de 1760 à 1774, les Roumains donnèrent à la sie d'égales preuves de dévouement et de secours en armes, hommes, argent provisions. Leur zèle pour les Russes et leur concours contre la Turquie, furent que la S. Porte, en représailles et châtiments, par un *fetva* du grand mufti, a comme une double proie à ses armées la Valachie et la Moldavie, avec ne liberté de dépouiller, d'incendier et d'égorger.

L'impératrice Catherine, par son manifeste du 15 décembre 1769, six fois relu s les églises roumaines, avait promis que la Russie défendrait pour toujours principautés contre les Turcs. La paix de Caïnardjik fut conclue, et les domni Moldavie et de Valachie furent rendus à la Turquie, en reconnaissance de dévastation soufferte, et du sang versé par les deux peuples pour les czars. là, pour la troisième fois, des milliers de Roumains compromis, fuyant leur rie dévastée (à cause de la Russie, et malgré toute sa soi-disant protection), ouillée de tout reste de droits; puis, malgré les plaintes du métropolitain ec l'assemblée générale, et malgré tou'es les protestations du chef de l'État ica pour l'intégrité de la Moldavie, la Russie en arracha la Bucovine, et frit à son alliée l'Autriche, en abandonnant Ghica au martyre.

La Russie entreprit contre la Turquie une quatrième campagne, celle de 1787 à 91. Pendant que les plus notables boyars de la Moldo-Valachie, victimes de rs sympathies pour le cabinet de Pétersbourg, se trouvaient arrêtés et captifs r l'ordre du sultan dans les îles de l'Archipel, dans les monastères de la Bulgarie du Mont Athos, dans l'Albanie et dans les prisons de Constantinople(2), les eux contrées souffraient toutes les charges d'une guerre atroce, comme théâtres s luttes sanglantes entre les Austro-Russes et les Turcs. La paix de Jassi fut nclue encore sans amener pour notre patrie aucune des améliorations promises. e malheureux pays, désert et réduit en cendres, fut rendu à la Sublime-Porte

(1) Papiniou, *Histoire de la Dacie*, t. II, p. 360 et t. III, p. 370.
(2) Engels *Geschichte der Moldau*, p. 300, et les demandes du feld-maréchal Münich, dans Xenopol, D

sous l'auspice de quelques garanties qui n'ont jamais été observées ; car vie ainsi que la Valachie, à la suite de leurs témoignages de dévouemer Russie, ne cessèrent d'être traitées par la Turquie en pays infidèles e toujours prets à faire cause commune avec cet empire orthodoxe cont suzeraine.

» Une cinquieme campagne contre la Turquie fut entreprise par la R dura de 1806 a 1812. Nul n'ignore les traverses, les dévastations et le dont les deux principautés, et plus encore la Moldavie, furent victim le cours de six années. A la conclusion de la paix de Bucarest, pour r de tous les malheurs qu'ont soufferts les Roumains, la soi-disant paisi tectrice arrache à la Moldavie la moitié de son territoire, la Bassarabie fallut meme que les proprietaires de terrains moldaves ne se vissent privés qu'ils possedaient sur la partie gauche du Pruth. Il a fallu la bonté pers l'empereur Alexandre pour leur accorder cette consolation, en les réc de leurs maux cruels et de la perte de la moitié de leur territoire, par s envers leurs propriétés. L'incorporation de la Bassarabie à la Russie n la meilleure reponse a la depêche du 10 juillet (1818) qui nous chante par les suivantes : « Le passé répond du present : plus d'une fois dans » nous (la Russie) avons occupé le tout, ou une partie de ces principau » deles a notre parole, nous les avons évacuées, des que les conditions » notre retraite furent accomplies. »

CONSTITUTION ROUMAINE

EXPLIQUÉE D'APRÈS SES VRAIS PRINCIPES [1].

Nous croyons accomplir une œuvre nécessaire en donnant l'analyse et la justification des principes de cette Constitution, accusée d'idées nouvelles et d'imitation des principes qui ont agité dernièrement l'Europe.

Voici les 22 articles ou demandes des Roumains :

« 1° Indépendance administrative et législative, fondée sur les traités de « Mircea et de Vlad V, et non intervention des puissances étrangères dans les « affaires du pays. »

Cet article n'a besoin d'aucun commentaire. Les Roumains ont voulu conserver par lui ce qu'ils ont toujours eu jusqu'en 1828, et ce que le traité même d'Andrinople avait respecté.

« 2° Egalité de droits politiques et civils. »

L'égalité politique et civile a toujours existé de droit et de fait en Moldo-Valachie. Les carrières civiles, militaires et judiciaires ont toujours été ouvertes à tout Roumain, comme la carrière sacerdotale. Qui a poussé la plus grande partie des boyars d'aujourd'hui à monter sur les degrés de la hiérarchie, sinon cette égalité de droits? La plus grande partie parmi eux se compose ou de domestiques devenus boyars en vertu de droits publics, ou des étrangers. Si le pays n'avait pas été gouverné d'après l'égalité politique, Bibesco et Stirbein ne seraient pas parvenus aux plus hauts degrés de la hiérarchie, et tant d'étrangers comme Villara, Linges, Bello, et tant de Phanariotes ne seraient pas des grands boyars. Les Roumains n'ont rien inventé par cet article; ils ont seulement voulu consacrer un ancien droit, et par les articles qui suivent le rendre utile et salutaire en le dégageant de tous les abus qui l'avaient rendu préjudiciable et funeste même.

« 3° Contribution générale. »

C'est une conséquence de l'égalité politique et civile. On a vu que *boyar* signifie guerrier, officier, et puis fonctionnaire. Tout Roumain dans l'ancien temps était né soldat, et par conséquent guerrier (boyar). Lorsqu'on était en

(1) Voyez la brochure intitulée : *Le Protectorat du czar, ou la Roumanie et la Russie.*

fonction ou à la guerre, on était exempt de contribution. Ce n'est que sous le régime phanariote que les beys, en voulant donner un air de noblesse à leurs parents et aux autres aventuriers qui venaient avec eux, en leur accordant des titres, les rendaient exempts de contributions, puis, pour flatter et corrompre les boyars indigènes, accordaient le même privilége à ceux qui étaient revêtus d'un *caftan*. D'ailleurs, sous quel système de gouvernement ne paie-t-on pas d'impôt pour soutenir les frais de l'Etat?

« 4° Assemblée générale composée de représentants pris dans toutes les « classes de la société. »

Si l'on considère l'histoire de ces deux pays, si l'on voit dans les élections des domni se réunir les représentants de toutes les conditions, l'armée entière — et l'armée c'était le pays ; — si l'on examine l'acte de réformes du Maurocordato, qui a été discuté et adopté par l'Assemblée générale ; si l'on examine un acte semblable, promulgué pour la Moldavie en 1740, et si l'on jette un coup-d'œil sur les signatures apposées sur ces deux actes solennels preuves palpables de nos anciennes assemblées générales, on verra que l'Assemblée générale roumane a toujours été en effet composée de représentants pris dans toutes les classes de la société. Sa dénomination de *générale* indique sa nature. Les Roumains ne demandent pas à innover, mais à conserver.

« 5° Le chef de l'Etat responsable, élu pour cinq ans, et éligible dans toutes « les classes de la société. »

Les anciens domni, comme élus, ne pouvaient être que responsables envers les électeurs. Et plus tard, lorsque les beys du Phanar payaient à leur tête leurs actes arbitraires, ils n'étaient responsables envers la Porte et punis par elle que sur la plainte des boyars et du pays. Les Roumains

de la hiérarchie ses créatures et ses sbires ; car, par un article du règlement imposé par ses baïonnettes, elle monopolisa le domniat pour cette pépinière d'hommes les plus vils et corrompus qu'elle a recrutés comme les instruments de ses desseins.

Remontons encore aux anciens temps.

Le domnu Radu d'Affumati, avant d'être élu chef de l'Etat, n'était qu'un simple particulier, sans aucun titre, et d'une famille très-humble.

Lorsque l'opinion et le choix publics se portaient sur un prêtre, aucune loi n'empêchait ce choix ; aucune classe ou profession n'était exclue de l'élection.

Pierre Rareche, de Moldavie, simple pêcheur, quitta les filets et monta au trône à la voix de son pays, qui l'élut à l'unanimité.

Constantin Cantimir, lorsqu'il fut élu domnu, n'avait que le grade de sarclar (sous-lieutenant).

Quant à la durée du domniat, que cet article le fixe pour cinq années, c'est le résultat de l'expérience. Les Roumains ont vu qu'un domnu ne peut gouverner tranquillement et sans opposition orageuse que dans ses premières années. Pourquoi perpétuer un état de choses nuisible, qui nourrit les passions et amène des troubles dont la Russie profite pour exercer ses intrigues, en divisant les boyars et en encourageant ou en humiliant le domnu selon ses vues et les circonstances? Le Règlement organique fixe pour la vie le domniat. Mais le réglement n'est pas la loi du pays, c'est l'expression de la force. Puis, pourquoi la Russie n'a-t-elle laissé A. Ghica gouverner selon la lettre de ce Règlement? C'est le caractère de la force et de l'iniquité ; elles ne peuvent pas même reconnaître leurs propres lois.

La responsabilité du chef de l'Etat et son élection parmi toutes les classes de la société ne sont donc ni une imitation ni une tendance à des idées nouvelles, mais un droit très-ancien du pays. Et si on appelle cela de la démocratie, ce ne sont pas les Roumains qui le disent. Pilate demanda au Christ s'il était roi? — C'est toi qui le dis, répondit le Sauveur.

Les Roumains veulent conserver ; mais, hélas ! on ne leur accorde pas même le droit d'être conservateurs.

« 6° Diminution de la liste civile. Tout moyen de corruption enlevé. »

Le revenu de l'Etat valaque s'élève jusqu'à 17 millions de piastres (environ 6 millions de francs), et le Règlement organique accorde au domnu une liste qui monte en tout jusqu'à plus de 2 millions de piastres. Dans quel Etat trouve-t-on cette proportion? En outre, est-ce que la liste civile a jamais été fixée avant 1830, pour la respecter aujourd'hui, par la seule raison qu'elle a été imposée par des baïonnettes aussi protectrices que celles de la Russie? Pourquoi le cabinet moscovite a-t-il voulu diminuer les revenus de l'Etat et augmenter la liste civile? Pour tenir la Valachie toujours en arrière ; pour lui couper tout moyen de progrès matériel et intellectuel ; pour corrompre les boyars

par l'appât d'une liste civile et les entraîner à oublier tout devoir national et à n'aspirer qu'au trône par la bassesse et la trahison.

« 7° Responsabilité des ministres et de tous les fonctionnaires publics. »

Si le chef de l'Etat a toujours été responsable, les ministres et autres fonctionnaires l'ont été à plus forte raison. Dans les anciens temps, le peuple demandait la destitution ou la décapitation même des ministres. Ces temps sont passés ; les Roumains aujourd'hui demandent simplement la responsabilité des fonctionnaires publics devant l'assemblée générale.

« 8° Liberté absolue de la presse. »

Jamais en Moldo-Valachie n'a existé une loi contre la presse ni aucune censure. Le Règlement organique même n'a pas eu l'effronterie de violer cette liberté. On n'y voit aucun article, aucune allusion touchant la censure. Le général Kisseleff a demandé, en 1830, quelles sont les lois de la Moldavie sur la presse ? Et le divan exécutif lui a répondu que la presse n'a jamais eu aucune autre censure que l'opinion publique ; c'est elle qui ne souffre pas qu'on attaque la religion et la morale. Si le pays n'a jamais connu cette police de la pensée et de la parole qu'on appelle censure, si le Règlement organique même n'en fait aucune mention, les Roumains devaient-ils souffrir dernièrement une censure qui ne date que de quelques années, imposée arbitrairement par Kisseleff, et conservée par le domnu, sous la contrainte d'un ordre verbal du consul russe ?

« 9° Toute récompense dérivera de la patrie, par ses représentants, et non « du domnu. »

La Moldo-Valachie n'a jamais eu de décorations ou de titres héréditaires. Les récompenses, dans ces deux pays, ne peuvent se décerner qu'en numéraire ou en pension ; elles doivent être, comme elles ont toujours été, l'objet des décrets de l'Assemblée générale qui règle le budget.

« 10° Droit pour chaque département de choisir ses fonctionnaires ; droit « qui découle de celui que le peuple entier a de choisir le chef de l'Etat. »

Cet article s'explique de soi-même. Il a été en partie respecté par le Règlement organique, et on ne lui a donné plus d'extension que pour enlever toute la responsabilité qui pèse sur le domnu, et pour extirper les moyens de corruption greffés dans ce Règlement.

« 11° Garde nationale. »

Si l'on a traduit le mot de *pitarei*, *caminarei*, *clucearei*, etc., par *garde nationale*, ce n'est pas la faute des Roumains, mais de ceux qui n'ont point voulu connaître l'histoire de la Valachie. Nous ne nous sommes pas chargés de faire aussi l'éducation de ceux qui, se prétendant hommes d'Etat, se mêlent de critiquer la constitution valaque comme trop libérale, ni de convertir le diable, qui d'après ce qu'on dit, connaît mieux que tout autre la vérité et ne veut jamais la reconnaître. L'histoire à la main, nous nous adressons à la Porte. La *Russie*, inspirée par sa grande et cosaque amitié pour le gouvernement turc

a fait concevoir des soupçons et une injuste méfiance de cet article. Mais lorsque la Valachie avait ses *pitarei* et *caminarei*, la Turquie était plus puissante, et les sympathies qu'elle s'acquiert chaque jour de ses populations la rendront assez forte pour ne pas avoir des craintes touchant un droit des Roumains, qui ne le réclament que pour garantir les lois contre l'arbitraire intérieur.

« 12° Émancipation des monastères dédiés aux saints lieux. »

Cette clause n'est pas un article de constitution; c'est une affaire juridique. Nos pères ont fondé des monastères, des établissements publics pour être l'asile du pauvre, du vieillard, de l'orphelin; et pour leur assurer la sainteté ainsi que la pratique de ces sentiments et de leurs dernières volontés, les fondateurs et donateurs les ont mis sous le patronage des saints lieux. Mais la cupidité sacerdotale, oubliant de jour en jour le but de ces établissements, poussa leurs tuteurs à s'en rendre propriétaires. Puis ceux-ci, pour se les assurer, se mirent dernièrement sous la protection du Czar. Le consul russe est devenu un second ministre du culte et complice de toutes les spoliations et de tous les abus égouménaux.

« 13° Emancipation des paysans de la *claca* qui deviennent propriétaires » au moyen de l'indemnité. »

Nous avons donné l'explication de la *claca* (voy. p. 12). C'est un travail pieux et gratuit, c'est une espèce de secours. Nous avons dit comment et depuis quand elle fut imposée comme un devoir d'une vingtaine de journées par an. Mais ces journées, par l'esprit spéculateur et rapace des fermiers et des employés, montèrent au nombre de plus de soixante, et ceux-ci enlevaient au paysan les meilleures journées de chaque saison. ***Emancipation de la claca,*** c'est comme si l'on avait dit émancipation du secours. De quel droit le Règlement organique et le code de Caragea, qui reconnaissent la liberté du paysan, en ont-ils fait un devoir de servage, en imposant des lois à l'insu et au préjudice de ces hommes libres? Les mots ***serf, vassal, corvée***, n'ont jamais existé en Moldo-Valachie. Jamais ces mots n'ont été connus dans le vocabulaire des Moldo-Valaques. On a fait de *claca* comme on avait jadis fait en Moldavie de *vecinitate* (voisinage), un équivalent de servage. *Claca*, en Valachie, et *vecinitate*, en Moldavie, voilà les devoirs réciproques entre les pauvres et les riches, pour s'entr'aider, et voilà comment on essaya de les transformer en droit du plus fort, sans pouvoir pourtant rayer ces mots. Tant que *secours* et *voisin* n'auront pas la signification de *serf*, jamais *claca* et *vecinitate* ne signifieront servage.

Par cet article, les Roumains n'ont entendu rien imiter, mais rétablir le paysan dans ses droits, dont il a toujours joui jusqu'à Caragea, et jusqu'en 1830 même. On a accusé cet article de tendance au socialisme ou au communisme. Mais il se borne à rendre au paysan ce qu'il a toujours eu avant l'an 1815, une parcelle de terre : car le rayon du village a toujours été la propriété de la commune. Cette parcelle, usurpée par le code de Caragea et

par le Règlement organique, rendue au paysan, on en a voulu indemniser le propriétaire abusif, pour éviter toutes sortes de malinterprétations et rassurer les esprits. Par cet article, on a voulu plus : on a voulu assurer les grandes propriétés, menacées par le communisme moscovite qui se trouve caché dans le Règlement organique. Les actes du gouvernement provisoire pendant trois mois, les commissaires envoyés dans chaque arrondissement, la convocation d'une assemblée générale pour discuter les vingt-et-un articles, la nomination d'une commission composée de membres égaux représentant les propriétaires et les paysans, pour un travail préparatoire à cette question, tout atteste la loyauté du mouvement et la bonne foi de cet article. Le gouvernement provisoire fut composé d'hommes qui ont toujours professé des sentiments progressifs et équitables ; ce gouvernement fut, pour ainsi dire, l'âme du mouvement. Quel est donc l'acte, quelle est la démarche ou la parole qui ont pu trahir une seule pensée attentatoire à la propriété ? Quel fut le principal but des commissaires envoyés dans les villages et quelles furent les instructions que le gouvernement leur transmettait, sinon d'engager les paysans à l'ordre et au respect de la propriété, par l'explication de la proclamation constitutionnelle, et d'encourager les paysans à cultiver la terre ?

Il est vrai pourtant qu'on a entendu souvent des exaltés prononcer des mots incendiaires qui inquiétaient les propriétaires. Mais qui étaient ces exaltés ? quelles étaient et quelles sont encore leurs relations ? On les voit les amis des Russes, les créatures, les parents de Mavros, d'Odobesco. Il y en a parmi eux qui jouissent dans ce moment de leur liberté au milieu des cosaques ; il y en a même qui sont actuellement des fonctionnaires publics. Et qui sont les hommes proscrits ? Les fidèles à la Porte, les amis des Turcs et de l'ordre, les hommes qui ont tout sacrifié pour sauver le pays de l'anarchie.

« 14° L'abolition de l'esclavage des cigans par une indemnité. »

Voilà le seul article qui n'a jamais existé dans nos anciennes lois. Si c'est un crime de déclarer libres, dans le XIXe siècle, des hommes qui ont la même religion, des hommes qui ont reçu le même baptême et l'onction comme le prêtre et le roi biblique, nous effaçons cet article de notre Constitution ; nous sommes prêts à complaire à tous ceux qui, dans leur piété, ont la consolation de dire que le cigan doit être esclave, car ce fut par un cigan qu'ils ont été forgés les clous qui attachèrent Christ sur la croix. J'ignore si cet article, en vérité, sent le socialisme, car il sent le Christianisme et l'humanité en Valachie.

« 15° Un représentant de la nation à Constantinople, pris parmi les Rou-« mains. »

Par cet article les Roumains ont voulu renouer avec la Porte leurs véritables relations, et débarrasser le divan d'un espion russe.

« 16° Instruction égale, complète et gratuite pour tous les Roumains des « deux sexes. «

« 17° Abolition des titres sans fonction. »

Les anciennes fonctions abolies par les beys du Phanar, ils en ont c
servé les titres ou les noms, comme nous l'avons dit. Grégoire Ghica,
se proposant de faire des réformes, n'oublia pas cet abus absurde. Mai
règlement organique le conserva, car il ne conserva que ce qui était reste
ital de ce régime destructeur. Où a-t-on vu des absurdités pareilles aux
vantes?

Vous êtes chef de bureau, et on vous donne un titre de boulanger ou f
isseur de pain (pitar), fonction qui n'existe plus.

Vous êtes chef d'une section, et on vous donne un titre d'échanson (pach
k), fonction qui n'existe plus.

Vous êtes juge ou président d'un tribunal, et on vous donne souvent
tre militaire turc que les Turcs eux-mêmes ont oublié (sardar).

Vous êtes directeur d'un département, et on vous donne le titre de c
erge ou de geôlier (clucear), fonction qui n'existe plus.

Vous êtes ministre de l'intérieur, et on vous donne le nom de portier
huissier (dvornik), qui veille à la porte, fonction qui n'existe plus.

Vous êtes ministre des finances, et on vous donne le nom de garderob
vestiar), fonction qui n'existe plus.

Vous êtes ministre de l'instruction publique ou des cultes, et on vous do
uelquefois le titre convenable à un janissaire ou à un spahis (aga).

Vous êtes chef de l'armée, et on vous donne aussi parfois le titre de gr
uteur, grand compositeur de discours (logothète).

Enfin on est le laquais du domnu ou d'un grand boyar, on est le sous-c
issaire de police, ou le *capitan* d'une barrière, et on reçoit en récompe
e titre de professeur de style (concipiste).

Et toutes ces conséquences-là, la Valachie les doit aux messieurs Vil
et Stirbein; car le premier fut grand compositeur de discours (Logothète)
e second chef de l'instruction publique.

Est-il quelque chose de plus absurde au monde que ce galimatias de tou
es langues, qui n'atteste aucun droit, aucune noblesse, sinon un état de
mesticité des anciens domni, et encore plus des beys du Phanar? Qui ne
e gros bons sens de cet article 17? Est-ce que les fonctions actuelles
sont pas assez honorables? Est-ce que leurs noms de *ministres*, de *directe*
de *chefs*, de *présidents*, de *juges*, etc., déshonorent ceux qui remplissent
fonctions, pour en rechercher et en avoir d'autres qui les rangent au nom
des domestiques et des laquais d'un bey phanariote? Y a-t-il de l'aristocra
de la noblesse, de la boyarie même, dans les titres de concierge, de geôli
de boulanger, de portier, etc., et y a-t-il de la démocratie ou du socialis

dans les titres de directeur, de président, de ministre, de capitaine, de m
et de général ?

« 18° Abolition des peines corporelles et dégradantes. »

Sur la base de l'égalité politique, les beys du Phanar, à leur manière
velaient toutes les classes : ils faisaient appliquer les coups de verges s
dos du paysan comme sur celui du boyar le plus éminent; la phal
s'appliquait de préférence aux pieds du boyar. Un certain boyar,
premières familles, très-récemment, du temps de Grégoire Ghica, a
puni et flagellé à phalanga. Le règlement organique a aboli les peines co
relles et dégradantes pour les boyars ou officiers. La constitution, se ba
sur l'égalité politique, les a abolies aussi pour les paysans et les sold

« 19° Abolition de la peine de mort, en sentence comme elle l'est en fa

La loi condamne à la mort; mais depuis le temps de Grégoire Ghic
n'a pas pu trouver un bourreau; car le pays fut purifié de tous les étran
vagabonds et mercenaires. Depuis ce temps-là, on chercha en vain parm
indigènes des hommes qui consentissent à se charger d'exécuter la loi
mœurs adoucies ne peuvent plus souffrir ni exécutions ni bourreaux. La p
de mort est abolie de fait depuis vingt-huit années; la constitution l'a
aussi en sentence, pour l'honneur de la nation et des mœurs.

« 20° Etablissements pénitentiaires. »

« 21° Emancipation des Israélites et égalité politique pour tous les citoy
« de toutes les religions. »

Ces deux articles n'ont besoin d'aucune analyse, grâce à l'esprit progr
et fraternisateur du peuple roumain, qui adopta et soutint avec tant d'enth
siasme et tant d'ordre ces 21 articles. Pour ceux qui ont le courage e
mauvaise volonté de combattre ces deux derniers articles, nous leur lais
la gloire d'être vainqueurs. Ils seront bien récompensés par le Czar.

« 22° Convocation immédiate d'une assemblée générale constituante
« pour représenter toutes les classes de la société, et qui sera chargée de
« diger la constitution sur les bases de ces vingt-deux articles, décrétés
« le peuple roumain. »

On voit toute la loyauté et toute la bonne foi du mouvement dans ce der
article. Où en est l'arbitraire? Où en est le communisme? Où en sont
symptômes de désordre, quand on proclame des principes qui ont tou
régi le pays, et quand on les soumet à la discussion et à l'approbation
représentants de toutes les conditions et de tous les intérêts?

E. DE SOYE et Comp., imprimeurs, rue de Seine, 33, à Paris.

Die Revolution,

eine Zeitschrift in zwanglosen Heften.

Herausgegeben von

J. Weydemeyer.

Erstes Heft.

der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon

von

Karl Marx.

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☞ Briefe, welche die Expedition angehen, bitte ich zwar an meinen Namen, aber mit dem besondern Zusatze „Expedition der Revolution“ ꝛc. zu adressiren, damit das Nöthige auch in meiner Abwesenheit besorgt werden kann.

J. Weydemeyer.

Vorwort.

Die von mir redigirte Wochenschrift, „die Revolution," hat nur zwei Ausgaben erlebt. Mangel an Kapital — da die Aktienzeichnung nicht die erwarteten Früchte trug — zwang mich, das Unternehmen in dieser Form einstweilen wieder aufzugeben. Ich hoffe, mich zur Wiederaufnahme desselben bald in den Stand gesetzt zu sehen. Bis dahin aber werde ich das für die „Revolution" bestimmte Material in zwanglosen Heften zusammenfassen, von denen ich das erste hiermit dem Publikum übergebe. Von der Schnelligkeit des Absatzes desselben wird die Dauer des Zwischenraumes bis zum Erscheinen der folgenden abhängen. Für das zweite Heft liegt das Material schon theilweise bereit; es ist natürlich solches, das eben so wenig wie der im Folgenden mitgetheilte „18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon von Karl Marx" ein nur augenblickliches Interesse hat, welches durch die Verschiebung der Herausgabe verloren gehen würde.

In der "New-York Daily Tribune" hat Karl Marx unter dem Titel "Revolution and Contrerevolution" eine Reihe von Artikeln veröffentlicht, in denen er ein Bild von der revolutionären Entwickelung und jetzigen Lage Deutschlands entwirft. In ähnlicher Weise zeichnet er im „18ten Brumaire" die Lage Frankreichs. Je wichtiger und entscheidender die Rolle, welche Frankreich in den europäischen Revolutionen zugefallen ist, desto wichtiger ist eine richtige Schilderung seiner Verhältnisse. Nur durch diese kann den herzzerreißenden Jeremiaden, mit denen die durch den 2. Dezember 1851 in ihren Erwartungen getäuschten Führer der kleinbürgerlichen Demokratie sich ohne Aufhören vor dem Auslande prostituiren, der Boden entzogen werden. Frankreich ist und bleibt das Land der revolutionären Thatkraft, und so sehr Deutschland ihm an intellektueller und theoretischer Entwickelung den *Vorrang abgewonnen* hat, der Schwerpunkt der revolutionären Entwickelung.

Ein literarischer Wegelagerer, ein gewisser Herr Tellering, „Referendarius von Berlin und Wien," wie er sich neulich marktschreierisch annoncirte, früherer Wiener Korrespondent der von Karl Marx in Köln herausgegebenen „Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung," hat neulich die komische Unverschämtheit gehabt, die von Karl Marx in der "Tribune" veröffentlichten Artikel für Plagiat seiner früheren Briefe zu erklären. Nachdem er mit seinem Schimpfpamphlet vergeblich bei allen deutschen Zeitungen New-Yorks herumhausirt, hat er endlich bei Hrn. Karl Heinzen den gewünschten Zutritt erhalten. Daß Karl Marx sowohl durch die Originalität seiner Ansichten, das Resultat tiefer und umfassender Studien, als die Klassizität seiner Sprache dem großen Haufen der politischen Literaten weit voran steht, wird ihm selbst von seinen Gegnern nicht bestritten. Ich würde es daher sowohl unter seiner als unter meiner Würde halten, auf jene Erklärung auch nur mit einer Silbe zu erwidern. Daß es mir aber in diesen Blättern an Raum fehlt, die Thätigkeit des Herrn Heinzen, der, wie Fallstaff das Schlachtfeld, das Feld der prinzipiellen Debatte ängstlich vermeidet, wenn er mit seinen gewohnten Radomontaden und bramabarsirendem Gepolter den Gegner nicht niederzuwerfen vermag, und tapfer fortfährt, über Dinge zu schimpfen, die in sein beschränktes Gehirn nicht hineinpassen wollen — die Thätigkeit dieses großmäuligsten aller Journalisten etwas näher zu beleuchten, das bedaure ich recht herzlich. Ich werde mir diese Arbeit indessen für das nächste Heft vorbehalten. Herr Heinzen mißt mit seinem Maßstab die großen Männer seiner eignen Partei; der Journalist einer Partei aber gibt selbst wieder stets einen trefflichen Maßstab für diese Partei ab.

New-York, den 1. Mai 1852.

J. Weydemeyer.

Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte

von

Karl Marx.

I.

Hegel bemerkt irgendwo, daß alle großen weltgeschichtlichen Thatsachen und Personen sich so zu sagen zweimal ereignen. Er hat vergessen hinzuzufügen: das eine Mal als große Tragödie, das andre Mal als lumpige Farce. Caussidière für Danton, Louis Blanc für Robespierre, die Montagne von 1848–51 für die Montagne von 1793–95, und der Londoner Konstabler mit dem ersten besten Dutzend Schulden beladener Lieutenants für den kleinen Korporal mit seiner Tafelrunde von Marschällen! Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Idioten für den achtzehnten Brumaire des Genies! Und dieselbe Karrikatur in den Umständen, unter denen die zweite Auflage des achtzehnten Brumaire herausgegeben wird. Das erste Mal Frankreich am Rande des Bankerots, diesmal Bonaparte selbst am Rande des Schuldthurms; damals die Koalition der großen Mächte an den Grenzen, — diesmal die Koalition von Ruge-Darasz in England, von Kinkel-Brentano in Amerika; damals ein St. Bernhard zu übersteigen, diesmal eine Kompagnie Gensdarmen über den Jura zu schicken; damals mehr als ein Marengo zu gewinnen, diesmal das Großkreuz des St. Andre-Ordens zu verdienen und die Achtung der „Berliner National-Zeitung" zu verlieren.

Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus freien Stücken unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorhandenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen. Die Tradition aller todten Geschlechter lastet wie ein Alp auf dem Gehirne der Lebenden. Und wenn sie eben damit beschäftigt scheinen, sich und die Dinge umzuwälzen, noch nicht Dagewesenes zu schaffen, gerade in solchen Epochen revolutionärer Krise beschwören sie ängstlich die Geister der Vergangenheit zu ihrem Dienste herauf, entlehnen ihnen Namen, Schlachtparole, Kostüme, um in dieser altehrwürdigen Verkleidung und mit dieser geborgten Sprache die neue Weltgeschichtsszene aufzuführen. So maskirte sich Luther als Apostel Paulus, die Revolution von 1789–1814 drappirte sich abwechselnd als römische Republik und als römisches Kaiserthum, und die Revolution von 1848 wußte nichts Besseres zu thun, als hier 1789, dort die revolutionäre Ueberlieferung von 1793–95 zu parodiren. So übersetzt der Anfänger, der eine neue Sprache erlernt hat, sie immer zurück in seine Muttersprache, aber den Geist der neuen Sprache hat er sich nur angeeignet und frei in ihr zu produziren vermag er nur, sobald er sich ohne Rückerinnerung in ihr bewegt und die ihm angestammte Sprache in ihr vergißt.

Bei Betrachtung jener weltgeschichtlichen Todtenbeschwörungen zeigt sich sofort ein springender Unterschied. Camille Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, St. Just, Napoleon, die Heroen wie die Parteien und die Masse der alten französischen Revolution vollbrachten in dem römischen Kostüme und mit römischen Phrasen die

Aufgabe ihrer Zeit, die Entfesselung und Herstellung der modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Einen schlugen den feudalen Boden in Stücke und mähten die feudalen Köpfe ab, die darauf gewachsen waren. Der Andre schuf im Innern von Frankreich die Bedingungen, in denen erst die freie Konkurrenz entwickelt, das parzellirte Grundeigenthum ausgebeutet, die entfesselte industrielle Produktivkraft der Nation verwandt werden konnte, und jenseits der französischen Grenzen fegte er überall die feudalen Gestaltungen weg, so weit es nöthig war, um der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in Frankreich eine entsprechende, zeitgemäße Umgebung auf dem europäischen Kontinent zu verschaffen. Die neue Gesellschaftsformation einmal hergestellt, verschwanden die vorsündfluthlichen Kolosse und mit ihnen das wieder auferstandene Römerthum — die Brutusse, Grachusse, Publicola's, die Tribunen, die Senatoren und Cäsar selbst. Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft in ihrer nüchternen Wirklichkeit hatte sich ihre wahren Dollmetscher und Sprachführer erzeugt in den Say's, Cousin's, Royer-Collard's, Benjamin Constant's und Guizot's, ihre wirklichen Heerführer saßen hinter dem Comptoirtisch und der Speckkopf Ludwig XVIII. war ihr politisches Haupt. Ganz absorbirt in die Produktion des Reichthums und in den friedlichen Kampf der Konkurrenz begriff sie nicht mehr, daß die Gespenster der Römerzeit ihre Wiege gehütet hatten. Aber unheroisch, wie die bürgerliche Gesellschaft ist, hatte es jedoch des Heroismus bedurft, der Aufopferung, des Schreckens, des Bürgerkriegs und der Völkerschlachten, um sie auf die Welt zu setzen. Und ihre Gladiatoren fanden in den klassisch strengen Ueberlieferungen der römischen Republik die Ideale und die Kunstformen, die Selbsttäuschungen, deren sie bedurften, um den bürgerlich beschränkten Inhalt ihrer Kämpfe sich selbst zu verbergen und ihre Leidenschaft auf der Höhe der großen geschichtlichen Tragödie zu erhalten. So hatten auf einer andern Entwickelungsstufe, ein Jahrhundert früher, Cromwell und das englische Volk dem alten Testamente Sprache, Leidenschaften und Illusionen für ihre bürgerliche Revolution entlehnt. Als das wirkliche Ziel erreicht, als die bürgerliche Umgestaltung der englischen Gesellschaft vollbracht war, verdrängte Loke den Habakuk.

Die Todtenerweckung in jenen Revolutionen diente also dazu, die neuen Kämpfe zu verherrlichen, nicht die alten zu parodiren, die gegebene Aufgabe in der Phantasie zu übertreiben, nicht vor ihrer Lösung in der Wirklichkeit zurückzuflüchten, den Geist der Revolution wieder zu finden, nicht ihr Gespenst wieder umgehen zu machen.

1848–1851 ging nur das Gespenst der alten Revolution um, von Marrast dem Républicain en gants jaunes, der sich in den alten Bailly verkleidete, bis auf den Abentheurer, der seine trivial-widrigen Züge unter der eisernen Todtenlarve Napoleons versteckt. Ein ganzes Volk, das sich durch eine Revolution eine beschleunigte Bewegungskraft gegeben zu haben glaubt, findet sich plötzlich in eine verstorbene Epoche zurückversetzt, und damit keine Täuschung über den Rückfall möglich ist, stehn die alten Data wieder auf, die alte Zeitrechnung, die alten Namen, die alten Edikte, die längst der antiquarischen Gelehrsamkeit verfallen, und die alten Schergen, die längst verfault schienen. Die Nation kömmt sich vor, wie jener närrische Engländer in Bedlam, der zur Zeit der alten Pharaonen zu leben meint und täglich über die harten Dienste jammert, die er in den äthiopischen Bergwerken als Goldgräber verrichten muß, eingemauert in dies unterirdische Gefängniß, eine spärlich leuchtende Lampe auf dem eigenen Kopfe befestigt, hinter ihm der Sklavenaufseher mit langer Peitsche und an den Ausgängen ein Gewirr von barbarischen Kriegsknechten, die weder die Zwangsarbeiter in den Bergwerken, noch sich unter einander verstehen, weil sie keine gemeinsame Sprache reden. „Und dies Alles wird mir," — seufzt der närrische Engländer — „mir dem freigebornen Britten zugemuthet, um Gold für die alten Pharaonen zu machen." „Um die Schulden der Familie Bonaparte zu zahlen," — seufzt die französische Nation. Der Engländer, so lange er bei Verstande war, konnte die fixe Idee des Goldmachens nicht los werden. Die Franzosen, so lange sie revolutionirten, nicht die

napoleonische Erinnerung, wie die Wahl vom 10. Dezember bewies. Sie sehnten sich aus den Gefahren der Revolution zurück nach den Fleischtöpfen Aegyptens und der 2. Dezember 1851 war die Antwort. Sie haben nicht nur die Karrikatur des alten Napoleon, sie haben den alten Napoleon selbst karrikirt, wie er sich ausnehmen muß in der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.

Die soziale Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts kann ihre Poesie nicht aus der Vergangenheit schöpfen, sondern nur aus der Zukunft. Sie kann nicht mit sich selbst beginnen, bevor sie allen Aberglauben an die Vergangenheit abgestreift hat. Die früheren Revolutionen bedurften der weltgeschichtlichen Rückerinnerungen, um sich über ihren eigenen Inhalt zu betäuben. Die Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts muß die Todten ihre Todten begraben lassen, um bei ihrem eignen Inhalt anzukommen. Dort ging die Phrase über den Inhalt, hier geht der Inhalt über die Phrase hinaus.

Die Februar-Revolution war eine Ueberrumpelung, eine *Ueberraschung* der alten Gesellschaft, und das Volk proklamirte diesen unverhofften *Handstreich* als eine weltgeschichtliche That, womit die neue Epoche eröffnet sei. Am 2. Dezember wird die Februar-Revolution eskamotirt durch die Volte eines falschen Spielers, und was umgeworfen scheint, ist nicht mehr die Monarchie, es sind die liberalen Konzessionen, die ihr durch Jahrhundert lange Kämpfe abgetrotzt waren. Statt daß die *Gesellschaft* selbst sich einen neuen Inhalt erobert hätte, scheint nur der *Staat* in seiner ältesten Form zurückgekehrt, zur unverschämt einfachen Herrschaft von Säbel und von Kutte. So antwortet auf den coup de main vom Februar 1848 der coup de tête vom Dezember 1851. Wie gewonnen, so zerronnen. Unterdessen ist die Zwischenzeit nicht unbenutzt vorübergegangen. Die französische Gesellschaft hat während der Jahre 1848–1851 die Studien und Erfahrungen nachgeholt, und zwar in einer abkürzenden viel revolutionärern Methode, die bei regelmäßiger, so zu sagen schulgerechter Entwickelung der Februar-Revolution hätten vorhergehen müssen, sollte sie mehr als eine Erschütterung der Oberfläche sein. Die Gesellschaft scheint jetzt hinter ihren Ausgangspunkt zurückgetreten; in Wahrheit hatte sie sich erst den revolutionären Ausgangspunkt zu schaffen, die Situation, die Verhältnisse, die Bedingungen, unter denen allein die moderne Revolution ernsthaft wird.

Bürgerliche Revolutionen, wie die des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, stürmen rascher von Erfolg zu Erfolg, ihre dramatischen Effekte überbieten sich, Menschen und Dinge scheinen in Feuerbrillanten gefaßt, die Extase ist der Geist jedes Tages; aber sie sind kurzlebig, bald haben sie ihren Höhepunkt erreicht und ein langer Katzenjammer erfaßt die Gesellschaft, ehe sie die Resultate ihrer Drang- und Sturmperiode nüchtern sich anzueignen lernt. Proletarische Revolutionen dagegen, wie die des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, kritisiren beständig sich selbst, unterbrechen sich fortwährend in ihrem eignen Lauf, kommen auf das scheinbar Vollbrachte zurück, um es wieder von Neuem anzufangen, verhöhnen grausam-gründlich die Halbheiten, Schwächen und Erbärmlichkeiten ihrer ersten Versuche, scheinen ihren Gegner nur niederzuwerfen, damit er neue Kräfte aus der Erde sauge und sich riesenhaft ihnen gegenüber wieder aufrichte, schrecken stets von Neuem zurück vor der unbestimmten Ungeheuerlichkeit ihrer eignen Zwecke, bis die Situation geschaffen ist, die jede Umkehr unmöglich macht, und die Verhältnisse selbst rufen:

Hic Rhodus, hic salta!

Hier ist die Rose, hier tanze!

Jeder erträgliche Beobachter übrigens, selbst wenn er nicht Schritt vor Schritt dem Gang der französischen Entwicklung gefolgt war, mußte ahnen, daß der Revolution eine unerhörte Blamage bevorstehe. Es genügte das selbstgefällige Siegsgeläffe zu hören, womit die Herren Demokraten sich wechselweis zu den Gnadenwirkungen des 2. Mai 1852 *beglückwünschten*. Der 2. Mai 1852 war in ihren *Köpfen zur fixen Idee geworden, zum Dogma*, wie der Tag, an dem Christus wiederscheinen und das tausendjährige Reich beginnen sollte, in den Köpfen der

klasten. Die Schwäche hatte sich wie immer in den Wunderglauben gerettet, glaubte den Feind überwunden, wenn sie ihn in der Phantasie wegherte, und verlor alles Verständniß der Gegenwart über der thatlosen Verhimmelung der Zukunft, die ihr bevorstehe, und der Thaten, die sie in petto habe, aber nur noch nicht an den Mann bringen wolle. Jene Helden, die ihre bewiesene Unfähigkeit dadurch zu widerlegen suchen, daß sie sich wechselseitig ihr Mitleiden schenken und sich zu einem Haufen zusammenthun, hatten ihre Bündel geschnürt, strichen ihre Lorbeerkrone auf Vorschuß ein und waren eben damit beschäftigt, auf dem Wechselmarkt die Republiken in partibus diskontiren zu lassen, für die sie bereits in aller Stille ihres anspruchslosen Gemüths das Regierungspersonal vorsorglich organisirt hatten. Der 2. Dezember traf sie wie ein Blitzstrahl aus heiterm Himmel, und die Völker, die in Epochen kleinmüthiger Verstimmung sich gern ihre innere Angst von den lautesten Schreiern übertäuben lassen, werden sich vielleicht überzeugt halten, daß die Zeiten vorüber sind, wo das Geschnatter von Gänsen das Kapitol retten konnte.

Die Konstitution, die Nationalversammlung, die dynastischen Partheien, die blauen und die rothen Republikaner, die Helden von Afrika, der Donner der Tribüne, das Wetterleuchten der Tagespresse, die gesammte Literatur, die politischen Namen und die geistigen Renoméen, das bürgerliche Gesetz und das peinliche Recht, die liberté, egalité, fraternité und der 2. Mai 1852 — Alles ist verschwunden, wie eine Phantasmagorie vor der Bannformel eines Mannes, den seine Feinde selbst für keinen Hexenmeister ausgeben. Das allgemeine Wahlrecht scheint nur einen Augenblick überlebt zu haben, damit es eigenhändig vor den Augen aller Welt sein Testament mache und im Namen des Volkes selbst erkläre: Alles was besteht, ist werth, daß es zu Grunde geht.

Es genügt nicht zu sagen, wie die Franzosen thun, daß ihre Nation überrascht worden sei. Einer Nation und einer Frau wird die unbewachte Stunde nicht verziehen, worin der erste beste Abentheurer ihnen Gewalt anthun und sie sich aneignen konnte. Das Räthsel wird durch dergleichen Wendungen nicht gelöst, sondern nur anders formulirt. Es bliebe zu erklären, wie eine Nation von 36 Millionen durch drei vulgaire Industrieritter überrascht und widerstandslos in die Gefangenschaft abgeführt werden kann.

Recapituliren wir in allgemeinen Zügen die Phasen, die die französische Revolution vom 24. Februar 1848 bis zum Dezember 1851 durchlaufen hat.

Drei Hauptperioden sind unverkennbar: die Februarperiode, 4. Mai 1848 bis zum 29. Mai 1849, Periode der Konstituirung der Republik oder der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung, 29. Mai 1849 bis zum 2. Dezember 1851, Periode der konstitutionellen Republik oder der legislativen Nationalversammlung.

Die erste Periode vom 24. Februar oder dem Sturze Louis Philipp's bis zum 4. Mai 1848, dem Zusammentritt der konstituirenden Versammlung, die eigentliche Februarperiode, kann als der Prolog der Revolution bezeichnet werden. Ihr Charakter sprach sich offiziell darin aus, daß die von ihr improvisirte Regierung sich selbst für provisorisch erklärte, und wie die Regierung gab Alles, was in dieser Periode angeregt, versucht, ausgesprochen wurde, sich für nur provisorisch aus. Niemand und Nichts wagte das Recht des Bestehens und der wirklichen That für sich in Anspruch zu nehmen. Alle Elemente, die die Revolution vorbereitet oder bestimmt hatten, dynastische Opposition, republikanische Bourgeoisie, demokratisch-republikanisches Kleinbürgerthum, sozial-demokratisches Arbeiterthum fanden provisorisch ihren Platz in der Februar-Regierung.

Es konnte nicht anders sein. Die Februartage bezweckten ursprünglich eine Wahlreform, wodurch der Kreis der politisch Privilegirten unter der besitzenden *Klasse selbst* erweitert und die ausschließliche Herrschaft der Finanzaristokratie gestürzt werden sollte. Als es aber zum wirklichen Konflikt kam, das Volk auf die *Barrikaden stieg*, die Nationalgarde sich passiv verhielt, die Armee keinen ernstlichen *Widerstand leistete* und das Königthum davonlief, schien sich die Republik von selbst

zu verstehen. Jede Partei deutete sie in ihrem Sinn. Von dem Proletariat, die Waffen in der Hand ertrotzt, prägte es ihr seinen Stempel auf und proklamirte sie als soziale Republik. So wurde der allgemeine Inhalt der modernen Revolution angedeutet, der, wie es im Prologe des Drama's nicht anders sein kann, in sonderbarstem Widerspruche stand zu Allem, was mit dem vorliegenden Material, mit der erreichten Bildungsstufe der Masse, unter den gegebenen Umständen und Verhältnissen zunächst unmittelbar in's Werk gesetzt werden konnte. Andrerseits wurde der Anspruch aller übrigen Elemente, die zur Februarrevolution mitgewirkt hatten, anerkannt in dem Löwenantheil, den sie an der Regierung erhielten. In keiner Periode finden wir daher ein bunteres Gemisch von überfliegenden Phrasen und thatsächlicher Unsicherheit und Unbeholfenheit, von enthusiastischerem Neuerungsstreben und von gründlicherer Herrschaft der alten Routine, von mehr scheinbarer Harmonie der ganzen Gesellschaft und von tieferer Entfremdung der Elemente, woraus sie besteht. Während das Pariser Proletariat noch in dem Anblick der großen Perspektive, die sich ihm eröffnet hatte, schwelgte und sich in ernstgemeinte Diskussionen über die sozialen Probleme erging, hatten sich die alten Mächte der Gesellschaft gruppirt, gesammelt, besonnen und fanden eine unerwartete Stütze an der Masse der Nation, den Bauern und Kleinbürgern, die alle auf einmal auf die politische Bühne stürzten, nachdem die Barrieren der Julimonarchie gefallen waren.

Die zweite Periode vom 4. Mai 1848 bis Ende Mai 1849 ist die Periode der Konstituirung, der Begründung der bürgerlichen Republik. Unmittelbar nach den Februartagen war nicht nur die dynastische Opposition überrascht worden durch die Republikaner, die Republikaner durch die Sozialisten, sondern ganz Frankreich durch Paris. Die Nationalversammlung die am 4. Mai 1848 zusammentrat, aus den Wahlen der ganzen Nation hervorgegangen, repräsentirte die ganze Nation. Sie war ein lebendiger Protest gegen die Zumuthungen der Februartage und sollte die Resultate der Revolution auf den bürgerlichen Maßstab zurückführen. Vergebens versuchte das Pariser Proletariat, das den Charakter dieser Nationalversammlung sofort begriff, wenige Tage nach ihrem Zusammentritt, am 15. Mai, ihre Existenz gewaltsam wegzuläugnen, sie aufzulösen, die organische Gestalt, worin der reagirende Geist der Nation es bedrohte, wieder in ihre einzelnen Bestandtheile zu zerstreuen. Der 15. Mai hatte bekanntlich kein anderes Resultat, als Blanqui und Genossen, d. h. die wirklichen Führer der proletarischen Partei, die revolutionären Kommunisten, für die ganze Dauer des Cyklus, den wir betrachten, vom öffentlichen Schauplatz zu entfernen.

Auf die bürgerliche Monarchie Louis Philippe's kann nur die bürgerliche Republik folgen, d. h. wenn unter dem Namen des Königs ein beschränkter Theil der Bourgeoisie geherrscht hat, so wird jetzt im Namen des Volks die Gesammtheit der Bourgeoisie herrschen. Die Forderungen des Pariser Proletariats sind utopistische Flausen, womit geendet werden muß. Auf diese Erklärung der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung antwortete das Pariser Proletariat mit der Juni-Insurrektion, dem kolossalsten Ereigniß in der Geschichte der europäischen Bürgerkriege. Die bürgerliche Republik siegte. Auf ihrer Seite stand die Finanzaristokratie, die industrielle Bourgeoisie, der Mittelstand, die Kleinbürger, die Armee, das als Mobilgarde organisirte Lumpenproletariat, die geistlichen Kapacitäten, die Pfaffen und die Landbevölkerung. Auf der Seite des Pariser Proletariats stand Niemand als es selbst. Ueber 3000 Insurgenten wurden niedergemetzelt nach dem Siege, 15000 ohne Urtheil transportirt. Mit dieser Niederlage tritt das Proletariat in den Hintergrund der revolutionären Bühne. Es versucht sich jedesmal wieder vorzudrängen, sobald die Bewegung einen neuen Anlauf zu nehmen scheint, aber mit immer schwächerem Kraftaufwand und stets geringerem Resultat. Sobald eine der höher über ihm liegenden Gesellschaftsschichten in revolutionäre Gährung geräth, geht es eine Verbindung mit ihr ein und theilt so alle Niederlagen, die die verschiedenen Parteien nach einander erleiden. Aber diese nachträglichen Schläge schwächen sich immer mehr ab, je mehr sie sich auf die ge

Oberfläche der Gesellschaft vertheilen. Seine bedeutenderen Führer in der Versammlung und in der Presse fallen der Reihe nach den Gerichten als Opfer und immer zweideutigere Figuren treten an seine Spitze. Zum Theil wirft es sich auf doktrinäre Experimente, in Tauschbanken und Arbeiter-Assoziationen, also in eine Bewegung, worin es darauf verzichtet, die alte Welt mit ihren eigenen großen Gesammtmitteln umzuwälzen, vielmehr hinter dem Rücken der Gesellschaft, auf Privatweise, innerhalb seiner beschränkten Existenzbedingungen seine Erlösung zu vollbringen sucht, also nothwendig scheitert. Es scheint weder in sich selbst die revolutionäre Größe wiederfinden, noch aus den neu eingegangenen Verbindungen neue Energie gewinnen zu können, bis alle Klassen, womit es im Juni gekämpft, neben ihm selbst platt darniederliegen. Aber wenigstens erliegt es mit den Ehren des großen weltgeschichtlichen Kampfes; nicht nur Frankreich, ganz Europa zittert vor dem Junierdbeben, während die nachfolgenden Niederlagen der höhern Klassen so wohlfeil erkauft werden, daß sie der frechen Uebertreibung von Seiten der siegenden Partei bedürfen, um überhaupt als Ereignisse passiren zu können, und um so schmachvoller werden, je weiter die unterliegende Partei von der proletarischen entfernt ist.

Die Niederlage der Juniinsurgenten hatte nun allerdings das Terrain vorbereitet, geebnet, worauf die bürgerliche Republik begründet, aufgeführt werden konnte; aber sie hatte zugleich gezeigt, daß es sich in Europa um andre Fragen handelt, als „um Republik oder Monarchie." Sie hatte offenbart, daß bürgerliche Republik hier die uneingeschränkte Gesammtdespotie einer Klasse über andre Klassen bedeute. Sie hatte bewiesen, daß in altzivilisirten Ländern mit entwickelter Klassenbildung, mit modernen Produktionsbedingungen und mit einem geistigen Bewußtsein, worin alle überlieferten Ideen durch Jahrhunderte lange Arbeit aufgelöst sind, die Republik überhaupt nur die revolutionäre Zerstörungsform der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bedeutet und nicht ihre konservative Entwickelungsform, wie z. B. in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, wo zwar schon Klassen bestehen, aber sich noch nicht fixirt haben, sondern in beständigem Flusse fortwährend ihre Bestandtheile wechseln und an einander abtreten, wo die modernen Produktionsmittel, statt mit einer stagnanten Uebervölkerung zusammenzufallen, vielmehr den relativen Mangel an Köpfen und Händen ersetzen, und wo endlich die fieberhaft jugendliche Bewegung der materiellen Produktion, die eine neue Welt sich anzueignen hat, weder Zeit noch Gelegenheit ließ, die alte Geisterwelt abzuschaffen.

Alle Klassen und Parteien hatten sich während der Junitage zur Partei der Ordnung vereint gegenüber der proletarischen Klasse, als der Partei der Anarchie, des Sozialismus, des Kommunismus. Sie hatten die Gesellschaft „gerettet" gegen „die Feinde der Gesellschaft." Sie hatten die Stichworte der alten Gesellschaft, „Eigenthum, Familie, Religion, Ordnung," als Parole unter ihr Heer ausgetheilt und der kontrerevolutionären Kreuzfahrt zugerufen: „Unter diesem Zeichen wirst du siegen!" Von diesem Augenblick, sobald eine der zahlreichen Parteien, die sich unter diesem Zeichen gegen die Juniinsurgenten geschaart hatten, in ihrem eigenen Klasseninteresse den revolutionären Kampfplatz zu behaupten sucht, unterliegt sie vor dem Rufe: „Eigenthum, Familie, Religion, Ordnung." Die Gesellschaft wird eben so oft gerettet, als sich der Kreis ihrer Herrscher verengt, als ein exclusives Interesse dem weiteren gegenüber behauptet wird. Jede Forderung der einfachsten bürgerlichen Finanzreform, des ordinärsten Liberalismus, des formalsten Republikanerthums, der plattesten Demokratie, wird gleichzeitig als „Attentat auf die Gesellschaft" bestraft und als „Sozialismus" gebrandmarkt. Und schließlich werden die Hohenpriester der „Religion und Ordnung" selbst mit Fußtritten von ihren Polsterstühlen verjagt, in Nacht und Nebel aus ihren Betten geholt, in Zellenwagen gesteckt, in Kerkern oder in's Exil geschickt, ihr Tempel wird der Erde gleich gemacht,

wird versiegelt, ihre Feder zerbrochen, ihr Gesetz zerrissen, im Namen der Religion, des Eigenthums, der Familie, der Ordnung. Ordnungsfanatische Bourgeois auf ihren Balkonen werden von besoffenen Soldatenhaufen zusammengeschossen, ihr Familienheiligthum wird entweiht, ihre Häuser werden zum Zeitvertreib bombardirt — im Namen des Eigenthums, der Familie, der Religion und der Ordnung. Der Auswurf der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bildet schließlich die heilige Phalanx der Ordnung und Held Crapülinsky zieht in die Tuilerien ein als „Retter der Gesellschaft."

II.

Nehmen wir den Faden der Entwickelung wieder auf.

Die Geschichte der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung seit den Junitagen ist die Geschichte der Herrschaft und der Auflösung der republikanischen Bourgeois-Fraktion, jener Fraktion, die man unter dem Namen trikolore Republikaner, reine Republikaner, politische Republikaner, formalistische Republikaner u. s. w. kennt.

Sie hatten unter der bürgerlichen Monarchie Louis Philippe's die offizielle republikanische Opposition und daher einen anerkannten Bestandtheil der damaligen politischen Welt gebildet. Sie besaß ihre Vertreter in den Kammern und in der Presse einen bedeutenden Wirkungskreis. Ihr Pariser Organ, der "National," galt in seiner Weise für ebenso respektabel als das "Journal des Débats." Dieser Stellung unter der konstitutionellen Monarchie entsprach ihr Charakter. Es war dies keine durch große gemeinsame Interessen zusammengehaltene und durch eigenthümliche Produktionsbedingungen abgegrenzte Fraktion der Bourgeoisie. Es war eine Koterie von republikanisch gesinnten Bourgeois, Schriftstellern, Advokaten, Offizieren und Beamten, deren Einfluß auf den persönlichen Antipathien des Landes gegen Louis Philippe, auf Erinnerungen an die alte Republik, auf dem republikanischen Glauben einer Anzahl von Schwärmern, vor Allem aber auf dem französischen Nationalismus beruhte, dessen Haß gegen die Wiener Verträge und gegen die Allianz mit England sie fortwährend wach hielt. Einen großen Theil des Anhangs, den der "National" unter Louis Philippe besaß, schuldete er diesem versteckten Imperialismus, der ihm daher später unter der Republik als ein vernichtender Konkurrent in der Person Louis Bonaparte's gegenüber treten konnte. Die Finanzaristokratie bekämpfte er, wie die ganze übrige bürgerliche Opposition es that. Die Polemik gegen das Budget, die in Frankreich genau mit der Bekämpfung der Finanzaristokratie zusammenhängt, verschaffte eine zu wohlfeile Popularität und zu reichhaltigen Stoff zu puritanischen leading articles, um nicht ausgebeutet zu werden. Die industrielle Bourgeoisie war ihm dankbar für seine sklavische Vertheidigung des französischen Schutzzollsystems, die er indeß auf mehr nationale als national-ökonomische Gründe hin aufnahm, die Gesammtbourgeoisie für seine gehässigen Denunziationen des Kommunismus und Sozialismus. Im Uebrigen war die Partei des "National" rein republikanisch, d. h. sie verlangte eine republikanische statt einer monarchischen Form der Bourgeois-Herrschaft und vor Allem ihren Löwenantheil an dieser Herrschaft. Ueber die Bedingungen dieser Umwandlung war sie sich durchaus nicht klar. Was ihr dagegen sonnenklar war und auf den Reform-Banketten in der letzten Zeit Louis Philippe's öffentlich erklärt wurde, war ihre Unpopularität bei den demokratischen Kleinbürgern und insbesondere bei dem revolutionären Proletariat. Diese reinen Republikaner, wie reine Republikaner denn sind, standen auch schon auf dem Sprunge, sich zunächst mit einer Regentschaft der Herzogin von Orleans zu begnügen, als die Februarrevolution ausbrach und ihren bekanntesten Vertretern einen Platz in der provisorischen Regierung anwies. Sie besaßen natürlich von vornherein das Vertrauen der Bourgeoisie und die Majorität der konstitu-

renden Nationalversammlung. Aus der Exekutiv-Commission, welche diese Nationalversammlung bei ihrem Zusammentritt bildete, hatte sie sofort die sozialistischen Elemente der provisorischen Regierung ausgeschlossen und die Partei des "National" benutzte den Ausbruch der Juniinsurrektion, um auch die Exekutiv-Commission abzudanken und damit ihre nächsten Rivalen, die kleinbürgerlichen oder demokratischen Republikaner (Ledru-Rollin u. s. w.) los zu werden. Cavaignac, der General der bourgeois-republikanischen Partei, der die Junischlacht kommandirte, trat an die Stelle der Exekutiv-Kommission mit einer Art diktatorischer Gewalt. Marrast, ehemaliger Redakteur en chef des "National," wurde der perpetuirliche Präsident der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung und die Ministerien, wie sämmtliche übrigen bedeutenden Posten, fielen den reinen Republikanern anheim.

Die republikanische Bourgeois-Fraktion, die sich seit lange als legitime Erbin der Julimonarchie betrachtet hatte, fand sich so in ihrem Ideal übertroffen, aber sie gelangte zur Herrschaft, nicht wie sie unter Louis Philippe geträumt hatte, durch eine liberale Revolte der Bourgeoisie gegen den Thron, sondern durch eine niederkartätschte Emeute des Proletariats gegen das Kapital. Was sie als das revolutionärste Ereigniß sich vorgestellt hatte, trug sich in der Wirklichkeit zu als das kontrerevolutionärste. Die Frucht fiel ihr in den Schooß, aber sie fiel vom Baum der Erkenntniß, nicht vom Baum des Lebens.

Die ausschließliche Herrschaft der Bourgeois-Republikaner währte nur vom 24. Juni bis zum 10. Dezember 1848. Sie resumirt sich in der Abfassung einer republikanischen Konstitution und im Belagerungszustand von Paris.

Die neue Konstitution war im Grunde nur die republikanisirte Ausgabe der konstitutionellen Charte von 1830. Der enge Wahlcensus der Julimonarchie, der selbst einen großen Theil der Bourgeoisie von der politischen Herrschaft ausschloß, war unvereinbar mit der Existenz der bürgerlichen Republik. Die Februarrevolution hatte sofort an der Stelle dieses Census das direkte allgemeine Wahlrecht proklamirt. Die Bourgeois-Republikaner konnten dieses Ereigniß nicht ungeschehen machen. Sie mußten sich damit begnügen, die beschränkende Bestimmung eines sechsmonatlichen Domizils am Wahlorte hinzuzufügen. Die alte Organisation der Verwaltung, des Gemeindewesens, der Rechtspflege, der Armee u. s. w. blieb unversehrt bestehen, oder wo die Konstitution sie änderte, betraf die Aenderung das Inhaltsregister, nicht den Inhalt, den Namen, nicht die Sache.

Der unvermeidliche Generalstab der Freiheiten von 1848, persönliche Freiheit, Preß-, Rede-, Assoziations-, Versammlungs-, Lehr- und Religions-Freiheit u. s. w., erhielt eine konstitutionelle Uniform, die sie unverwundbar machte. Jede dieser Freiheiten wird nämlich als das unbedingte Recht des französischen Citoyens proklamirt, aber mit der beständigen Randglosse, daß sie schrankenlos seien, so weit sie nicht durch die „gleichen Rechte Anderer und die öffentliche Sicherheit" beschränkt werden, oder durch „Gesetze," die eben diese Harmonie der individuellen Freiheiten unter einander und mit der öffentlichen Sicherheit vermitteln sollen. Z. B.: „die Bürger haben das Recht sich zu assoziren, sich friedlich und unbewaffnet zu versammeln, zu petitioniren und ihre Meinungen durch die Presse oder wie sonst immer auszudrücken. Der Genuß dieser Rechte hat keine andere Schranke, als die gleichen Rechte Andrer und die öffentliche Sicherheit." (Kap. II. der franz. Konstitution, §. 8.) — „Der Unterricht ist frei. Die Freiheit des Unterrichts soll genossen werden unter den vom Gesetze fixirten Bedingungen und unter der Oberaufsicht des Staats." (A. a. O. §. 9.) — „Die Wohnung jedes Bürgers ist unverletzlich außer in der vom Gesetz vorgeschriebenen Formen." (Kap. I §. 3.) U. s. w., u. s. w. — *Die Constitution* weis't daher beständig auf zukünftige organische Gesetze hin, *die jene Randglossen ausführen und den Genuß dieser unbeschränkten Freiheit regeliren sollen, daß sie weder unter einander, noch mit der öffentlichen Sic-*

ien. Und später sind diese organischen Gesetze von den Ordnungsfreunden
leben gerufen und alle jene Freiheiten so regulirt worden, daß die Bourgeoisie
en Genuß an den gleichen Rechten der andern Klassen keinen Anstoß findet.
ie „den Andern" diese Freiheiten ganz untersagt oder ihren Genuß unter Be-
ngen erlaubt, die eben so viele Polizei-Fallstricke sind, geschah dies immer nur
nteresse der „öffentlichen Sicherheit," d. h. der Sicherheit der
geoisie, wie die Konstitution vorschreibt. Beide Seiten berufen sich daher in
olge mit vollem Recht auf die Konstitution, sowohl die Ordnungsfreunde, die
ne Freiheiten aufhoben, wie die Demokraten, die sie alle heraus verlangten.
Paragraph der Konstitution enthält nämlich seine eigne Antithese, sein eignes
und Unterhaus in sich, nämlich in der allgemeinen Phrase die Freiheit, in
andglosse die Aufhebung der Freiheit. So lange also der Name der Freiheit
irt und nur die wirkliche Ausführung derselben verhindert wurde, auf gesetz-
Wege versteht sich, blieb das konstitutionelle Dasein der Freiheit unversehrt,
zetastet, mochte ihr gemeines Dasein noch so sehr todtgeschlagen sein.
iese auf so sinnige Weise unverletzlich gemachte Konstitution war indeß wie
es an einem Punkte verwundbar, nicht an der Ferse, aber am Kopfe oder viel-
an den zwei Köpfen, worin sie sich verlief, — gesetzgebende Ver-
mlung einerseits, Präsident andrerseits. Man durchfliege die Konsti-
, und man wird finden, daß die Paragraphen, worin das Verhältniß des
euten zur gesetzgebenden Versammlung bestimmt wird, die einzig absoluten,
en, widerspruchslosen, unverdrehbaren sind, die sie enthält. Hier galt es näm-
r die Bourgeois-Republikaner, sich selbst sicher zu stellen. §§. 45–70 der Kon-
on sind so abgefaßt, daß die Nationalversammlung den Präsidenten konstitu-
, der Präsident die Nationalversammlung nur inkonstitutionel beseitigen kann,
ndem er die Konstitution selbst beseitigt. Hier fordert sie also ihre gewaltsame
chtung heraus. Sie heiligt nicht nur wie die Charte von 1830 die Theilung
ewalten, sie erweitert sie bis zum unerträglichen Widerspruch. Das Spiel
konstitutionellen Gewalten, wie Guizot den parlamentarischen
hl zwischen gesetzgebender und vollziehender Gewalt nannte, spielt in der
tution von 1848 beständig va banque. Auf der einen Seite 750 durch allge-
Stimmrecht gewählte und wieder wählbare Volksrepräsentanten, die eine un-
llirbare, unauflösbare, untheilbare Nationalversammlung bilden, eine Natio-
sammlung, welche gesetzgeberische Allmacht genießt, Krieg, Frieden und Han-
rträge in letzter Instanz entscheidet, allein das Recht der Amnestie besitzt und
ihre Permanenz unaufhörlich den Vordergrund der Bühne behauptet. Andrer-
er Präsident, mit allen Attributen der königlichen Gewalt, noch dadurch ver-
, daß er seine Minister unabhängig von der Nationalversammlung ein- und
, mit allen Mitteln der exekutiven Gewalt in seinen Händen, alle Stellen ver-
und d. h. in Frankreich wenigstens über 1½ Millionen Existenzen entscheiden,
o viel hängen an den 500,000 Beamten und an den Offizieren aller Grade, —
ze bewaffnete Macht hinter sich, mit dem Privilegium begabt einzelne Verbre-
begnadigen, Nationalgarden zu suspendiren, die von den Bürgern ernann-
wählten General-, Kantonal- und Gemeinderäthe im Einverständniß mit dem
srath abzusetzen, Initiative und Leitung aller Verträge mit dem Ausland ihm
alten, nicht wie die Versammlung beständig auf den Brettern und dem kritisch
en Tageslicht fortwährend ausgesetzt, sondern ein verborgnes Leben führend
elyseischen Gefilden und mit alledem Artikel 45 der Constitution vor Augen
n Herzen, der ihm täglich zuruft: "frère, il faut mourir." „Deine Macht hört
n zweiten Sonntag des schönen Monats Mai im vierten Jahr deiner Wahl!
ist die Herrlichkeit am Ende, das Stück spielt nicht zweimal, und wenn du
den hast, siehe bei Zeiten zu, daß du sie mit den dir von der Konstitution aus-
fenen 600,000 Franken *abbezahlst*, ziehst du nicht etwa vor, am zweiten Mon-
schönen Monats Mai nach Clichy zu wandern!" — Wenn die Konstitution
Präsidenten alle faktischen Gewalten beilegt, sucht sie der Nationalversamm-

lung die moralische Macht zu sichern. Abgesehen davon, daß es unmöglich ist, durch Gesetzesparagraphen eine moralische Macht zu schaffen, hebt die Konstitution sich hierin wieder selbst auf, indem sie den Präsidenten von allen Franzosen durch direktes Stimmrecht wählen läßt. Während die Stimmen Frankreichs sich auf die 700 Mitglieder der Nationalversammlung zersplittern, konzentriren sie sich dagegen hier auf das eine Individuum. Während jeder einzelne Volksrepräsentant nur diese oder jene Partei, diese oder jene Stadt, diesen oder jenen Brückenkopf oder auch nur die Nothwendigkeit vertritt, einen beliebigen Sieben hundert und fünfzigsten zu wählen, bei dem man sich weder der Sache noch den Mann so genau ansieht, ist Er der Erwählte, der Nation und der Akt seiner Wahl ist der große Trumpf, den das souveräne Volk alle 4 Jahre einmal ausspielt. Die erwählte Nationalversammlung steht in einem metaphysischen, aber der erwählte Präsident in einem persönlichen Verhältniß zur Revolution. Die Nationalversammlung stellt wohl in ihren einzelnen Repräsentanten die mannigfaltigen Seiten des Nationalgeistes dar, aber in dem Präsidenten inkarnirt er sich. Er besitzt ihr gegenüber eine Art von göttlichem Recht, er ist von Volksgnaden.

Thetis, die Meergöttin, hatte dem Achilles prophezeit, daß er in der Blüthe der Jugend sterben werde. Die Konstitution, die ihren faulen Fleck hat, wie Achilles, hatte auch ihre Ahnung, wie Achilles, daß sie eines frühen Todes abgehen müsse. Es genügte den konstituirenden reinen Republikanern, einen Blick aus dem Wolkenhimmel ihrer idealen Republik auf die profane Welt zu werfen, um zu erkennen, wie der Uebermuth der Royalisten, der Bonapartisten, der Demokraten, der Kommunisten und ihr eigner Mißkredit täglich stieg, in demselben Maaße, als sie sich der Vollendung ihres großen gesetzgeberischen Kunstwerks näherte, ohne daß Thetis deshalb das Meer zu verlassen und ihnen das Geheimniß mitzutheilen brauchte. Sie suchten das Verhältniß konstitutionell-pfiffig zu überlisten durch §. 111 der Konstitution, wonach jeder Vorschlag zur Revision der Verfassung in drei successiven Debatten, zwischen denen immer ein ganzer Monat zu liegen hat, von wenigstens ¾ der Stimmen votirt werden muß, vorausgesetzt noch, daß nicht weniger als 500 Mitglieder an der Nationalversammlung Theil nehmen. Sie machten damit nur den ohnmächtigen Versuch, noch als parlamentarische Minorität, als welche sie sich schon prophetisch im Geiste erblickten, eine Macht auszuüben, die in diesem Augenblicke, wo sie über die parlamentarische Majorität verfügten und über alle Mittel der Regierungsgewalt, täglich mehr ihren schwachen Händen entschlüpfte.

Endlich vertraut die Konstitution, in einem melodramatischen Paragraphen, sich selbst „der Wachsamkeit und dem Patriotismus des ganzen französischen Volkes wie jedes einzelnen Franzosen" an, nachdem sie vorher schon in einem andern Paragraphen die „Wachsamen" und „Patriotischen" der zarten, hochnothpeinlichen Aufmerksamkeit des eigens von ihr erfundenen Hochgerichts "haute cour," anvertraut hatte.

Das war die Konstitution von 1848, die am 2. Dezember 1851 nicht von einem Kopfe umgeworfen wurde, sondern vor der Berührung mit einem bloßen Hute umfiel; allerdings war dieser Hut ein dreieckiger Napoleonshut.

Während die Bourgeois-Republikaner in der Versammlung damit beschäftigt waren, diese Konstitution auszuspintisiren, zu diskutiren und zu votiren, hielt Cavaignac außerhalb der Versammlung den Belagerungszustand von Paris aufrecht. Der Belagerungszustand von Paris war der Geburtshelfer der Konstituante bei ihren republikanischen Schöpfungswehen. Wenn die Konstitution später durch Bajonette aus der Welt geschafft wird, so darf man nicht vergessen, daß sie ebenfalls durch Bajonette, und zwar gegen das Volk gekehrte, schon im Mutterleibe beschützt und durch Bajonette auf die Welt gesetzt werden mußte. Die Vorfahren der „honetten Republikaner" hatten ihr Symbol, die Trikolore, die Tour durch Europa machen lassen. Sie ihrerseits machten auch eine Erfindung, die selbst den Weg über den ganzen Kontinent fand, aber mit immer erneuter nach Frankreich zurückkehrte, bis sie jetzt in der Hälfte seiner Departements

erworben hat — den Belagerungszustand. Treffliche Erfindung, pe-
sch angewandt in jeder nachfolgenden Krise im Laufe der französischen Revolu-
Aber Kaserne und Bivuak, die man so der französischen Gesellschaft periodisch
en Kopf legte, um ihr das Hirn zusammenzupressen und sie zum stillen Mann
achen; Säbel und Muskete, die man periodisch richten und verwalten, bevor-
den und censiren, Polizei üben und Nachtwächterdienst verrichten ließ; Schnur-
und Kommißrock, die man periodisch als höchste Weisheit der Gesellschaft und
Rektor der Gesellschaft anposaunte; — mußten Kaserne und Bivuak, Säbel
Muskete, Schnurbart und Kommißrock nicht schließlich auf den Einfall kom-
lieber ein für allemal die Gesellschaft zu retten, indem sie ihr eignes regime
as oberste ausriefen und die bürgerliche Gesellschaft ganz von der Sorge be-
n, sich selbst zu regieren? Kaserne und Bivuak, Säbel und Muskete, Schnur-
und Kommißrock mußten um so mehr auf diesen Einfall kommen, als sie dann
beßre baare Zahlung für ihr erhöhtes Verdienst erwarten konnten, während
em blos periodischen Belagerungszustand und den vorübergehenden Gesell-
srettungen im Geheiß dieser oder jener Bourgeois-Fraktion wenig Solides ab-
außer einigen Todten und Verwundeten und einigen freundlichen Bürgergri-
en. Sollte das Militär nicht endlich auch einmal in seinem eignen Interesse
für sein eignes Interesse Belagerungszustand spielen und zugleich die bürger-
n Börsen belagern. Man vergesse übrigens nicht, im Vorbeigehn sei es be-
t, daß Oberst Bernard, derselbe Militärkommissions-Präsident, der unter
ignac 15,000 Insurgenten zur Deportation ohne Urtheil verhalf, sich in die-
Augenblick wieder an der Spitze der in Paris thätigen Militärkommissionen
gt.

Wenn die honetten, die reinen Republikaner mit dem Belagerungszustand in
s die Pflanzschule anlegten, worin die Prätorianer des 2. Dezember 1851
wachsen sollten, verdienen sie dagegen das Lob, daß sie, statt wie unter Louis
ippe das Nationalgefühl zu übertreiben, jetzt, wo sie über die nationale Macht
ebieten hatten, vielmehr darauf verzichteten und statt Italien für sich zu erobern
on Oesterreichern und Neapolitanern wiedererobern ließen. Louis Bona-
e's Wahl zum Präsidenten am 10. Dezember 1848 machte der Diktatur Ca-
naac's und der Konstituante ein Ende.

In §. 44 der Konstitution heißt es: „der Präsident der französischen Republik
nie seine Eigenschaft als französischer Bürger verloren haben." Der erste
sident der französischen Republik, L. N. Bonaparte, hatte nicht allein seine Ei-
haft als französischer Bürger verloren, war nicht nur englischer Spezial-Kon-
er gewesen, er war sogar ein naturalisirter Schweizer.

Ich habe an einem andern Orte die Bedeutung der Wahl vom 10. Dezember
ickelt. Ich komme hier nicht darauf zurück. Es genügt hier zu bemerken,
sie eine Reaktion der Bauern, die die Kosten der Februarrevolution
n zahlen müssen, gegen die übrigen Klassen der Nation, eine Reaktion des
des gegen die Stadt war. Sie fand großen Anklang in der Armee,
ie Republikaner des "National" keinen Ruhm verschafft hatten, noch Zulage,
r der großen Bourgeoisie, die Bonaparte als Brücke zur Monarchie, unter den
etariern und Kleinbürgern, die ihn als Geißel für Cavaignac begrüßten. Ich
e später Gelegenheit finden, auf das Verhältniß der Bauern zur französischen
olution näher einzugehen.

Die Epoche vom 20. Dezember 1848 bis zur Auflösung der Konstituante im
1849 umfaßt die Geschichte des Untergangs der Bourgeois-Republikaner.
dem sie eine Republik für die Bourgeoisie gegründet, das revolutionäre Proletariat
dem Terrain vertrieben und das demokratische Kleinbürgerthum einstweilen zum
weigen gebracht haben, werden sie selbst von der Masse der Bourgeoisie bei Seite
oben, die diese Republik mit Recht als ihr Eigenthum mit Beschlag be-
Diese große Bourgeoisie war aber royalistisch. Ein Theil derselben, die

großen Grundeigenthümer, hatten unter der Restauration geherrscht und war daher legitimistisch. Der andre, die Finanzaristokraten und großen Industriellen hatten unter der Julimonarchie geherrscht und waren daher orleanistisch. Die Großwürdenträger der Armee, der Universität, der Kirche, des Barreau's, der Akademie und der Presse vertheilten sich auf beide Seiten, wenn auch in verschiedener Proportion. Hier in der bürgerlichen Republik, die weder den Namen Bourbon noch den Namen Orléans trug, sondern den Namen Kapital, hatten sie die Staatsform gefunden, worunter sie gemeinsam herrschen konnten. Schon die Juniinsurrektion hatte sie zur „Partei der Ordnung" vereinigt. Jetzt galt es zunächst, die Koterie der Bourgeois-Republikaner zu beseitigen, die noch die Sitze der Nationalversammlung inne hielt. Eben so brutal, wie diese reinen Republikaner dem Volke gegenüber die physische Gewalt geltend gemacht hatten, ebenso feig, kleinlaut, muthlos, gebrochen, kampfunfähig wichen sie jetzt zurück, wo es galt, der exekutiven Gewalt und den Royalisten gegenüber ihr Republikanerthum und ihr gesetzgeberisches Recht zu behaupten. Ich habe hier nicht die schmähliche Geschichte ihrer Auflösung zu erzählen. Es war ein Vergehen, kein Untergehen. Ihre Geschichte hat für immer ausgespielt und in der folgenden Periode figuriren sie, sei es innerhalb, sei es außerhalb der Versammlung, nur noch als Erinnerungen, Erinnerungen, die wieder lebendig zu werden scheinen, sobald es sich wieder um den bloßen Namen Republik handelt und so oft der revolutionäre Konflikt auf das niedrigste Niveau herabzusinken droht. Ich bemerke im Vorbeigehn, daß das Journal, welches dieser Partei ihren Namen gab, der "National," sich in der folgenden Periode zum Sozialismus bekehrt.

Die Periode der Konstituirung oder Begründung der französischen Republik zerfiel also in drei Epochen: 4. Mai bis 24. Juni 1848, Kampf sämmtlicher im Februar vereinigter Klassen und Klassenzubehöre unter Anführung der Bourgeois-Republikaner gegen das Proletariat, furchtbare Niederlage des Proletariats; 25. Juni 1848 bis 10. Dezember 1848, Herrschaft der Bourgeois-Republikaner, Abfassung der Konstitution, Belagerungszustand von Paris, Diktatur Cavaignac's; 20. Dezember 1848 bis Ende Mai 1849, Kampf Bonaparte's und der Ordnungspartei mit der republikanischen Konstituante, Niederlage derselben, Untergang der Bourgeois-Republikaner.

Ehe wir mit dieser Periode abschließen, müssen wir noch einen Rückblick auf die beiden Mächte werfen, von denen die eine die andre am 2. Dezember 1851 vernichtet und die vom 20. Dezember 1848 bis zum Abtritte der Konstituante in ehelichem Verhältnisse lebten. Wir meinen Louis Bonaparte einerseits und die Partei der koalisirten Royalisten, der Ordnung, der großen Bourgeoisie andrerseits. Beim Antritt seiner Präsidentschaft bildete Bonaparte sofort ein Ministerium der Partei der Ordnung, an dessen Spitze er Odilon Barrot stellte, nota bene den alten Führer der liberalsten Fraktion der parlamentarischen Bourgeoisie. Herr Barrot hatte endlich das Ministerium erjagt, dessen Gespenst ihn seit 1830 verfolgte, und noch mehr, die Präsidentschaft in diesem Ministerium; aber nicht, wie er sich unter Louis Philippe eingebildet hatte, als der avancirteste Chef der parlamentarischen Opposition, sondern mit der Aufgabe ein Parlament todt zu machen, und als Verbündeter mit allen seinen Erzfeinden, Jesuiten und Legitimisten. Er führte endlich die Braut heim, aber erst nachdem sie prostituirt war. Bonaparte selbst ellipsirte sich scheinbar vollständig. Jene Partei handelte für ihn.

Gleich im ersten Ministerkonseil wurde die Expedition nach Rom beschlossen, die man hinter dem Rücken der Nationalversammlung auszuführen und wofür man ihr die Mittel unter falschem Vorwande zu entreißen übereinkam. So wurde begonnen mit einer Prellerei der Nationalversammlung und mit einer heimlichen *Konspiration* mit den absoluten Mächten des Auslandes gegen die revolutionäre *römische Republik*. Bonaparte bereitete auf dieselbe Weise und durch dieselben *Manöver* seinen Coup vom 2. Dezember gegen die royalistische Legislative und ihre *konstitutionelle* Republik vor. Vergessen wir nicht, daß dieselbe Partei, die w

20. Dezember 1848 Bonaparte's Ministerium, am 2. Dezember 1851 die Majorität der legislativen Nationalversammlung bildete.

Die Konstituante hat im August beschlossen, sich nicht aufzulösen, bevor sie nicht eine ganze Reihe organischer Gesetze, die die Konstitution ergänzen sollten, ausgearbeitet und promulgirt habe. Die Ordnungspartei ließ ihr durch den Repräsentanten Rateau am 6. Januar 1849 vorschlagen, die organischen Gesetze laufen zu lassen und vielmehr ihre eigene Auflösung zu beschließen. Nicht nur das Ministerium, Herrn Odilon Barrot an der Spitze, sämmtliche royalistische Mitglieder der Nationalversammlung herrschten ihr in diesem Augenblicke zu, ihre Auflösung sei nothwendig zur Herstellung des Kredits, zur Konsolidirung der Ordnung, um dem unbestimmten Provisorium ein Ende zu machen und einen definitiven Zustand zu gründen, sie hindre die Produktivität der neuen Regierung und suche ihr Dasein blos aus Rancune zu fristen, das Land sei ihrer müde. Bonaparte merkte sich alle diese Invektiven gegen die gesetzgebende Gewalt, lernte sie auswendig und bewies den parlamentarischen Royalisten am 2. Dezember 1851, daß er von ihnen gelernt habe. Er wiederholte ihre eignen Stichworte gegen sie.

Das Ministerium Barrot und die Ordnungspartei gingen weiter. Sie riefen Petitionen an die Nationalversammlung in ganz Frankreich hervor, worin diese freundlichst gebeten wurde, sich aufzulösen, zu verschwinden. So führten sie gegen die Nationalversammlung, den konstitutionell organisirten Ausdruck des Volkes, seine unorganischen Massen in's Feuer. Sie lehrten Bonaparte von den parlamentarischen Versammlungen an das Volk appelliren. Endlich am 29. Januar 1849 war der Tag gekommen, an dem die Konstituante über ihre eigne Auflösung beschließen sollte. Die Nationalversammlung fand ihr Sitzungsgebäude militärisch besetzt; Changarnier, der General der Ordnungspartei, in dessen Händen der Oberbefehl über Nationalgarde und Linientruppen vereinigt war, hielt große Truppenschau in Paris, als wenn eine Schlacht bevorstehe, und die koalisirten Royalisten erklärten der Konstituante drohend, daß man Gewalt anwenden werde, wenn sie nicht willig sei. Sie war willig und marktete sich nur noch eine ganz kurze Lebensfrist aus. Was war der 29. Januar anders, als der Coup d'état vom 2. Dezember 1851, nur mit Bonaparte von den Royalisten gegen die republikanische Nationalversammlung ausgeführt. Die Herren bemerkten nicht oder wollten nicht bemerken, daß Bonaparte schon den 29. Januar 1849 benutzte, um einen Theil der Truppen vor den Tuilerien an sich vorbeidefiliren zu lassen und gerade dies erste öffentliche Aufgebot der Militärmacht gegen die parlamentarische Macht begierig aufgriff, um den Caligula anzudeuten. Sie sahen allerdings nur ihren Changarnier.

Ein Motiv, das die Partei der Ordnung noch insbesondere bewog, die Lebensdauer der Konstituante gewaltsam abzukürzen, waren die organischen, die Konstitution ergänzenden Gesetze, wie das Unterrichtsgesetz, Kultusgesetz u. s. w., den koalisirten Royalisten lag Alles daran, diese Gesetze selbst zu machen und nicht von den mißtrauisch gewordenen Republikanern machen zu lassen. Unter diesen organischen Gesetzen befand sich indeß auch ein Gesetz über die Verantwortlichkeit des Präsidenten der Republik. 1851 war die legislative Versammtung eben mit Abfassung eines solchen Gesetzes beschäftigt, als Bonaparte diesem Coup durch den Coup vom 2. Dezember zuvorkam. Was hätten die koalisirten Royalisten in ihrem parlamentarischen Winterfeldzug von 1849 darum gegeben, wenn sie das Verantwortlichkeitsgesetz fertig vorgefunden und zwar verfaßt von einer mißtrauischen, gehässigen, republikanischen Versammlung.

Nachdem am 29. Januar 1849 die Konstituante ihre letzte Waffe selbst zerbrochen hatte, hetzten das Ministerium Barrot und die Ordnungsfreunde sie zu Tode, ließen nichts ungeschehen, was sie demüthigen konnte, und trotzten ihrer an sich selbst verzweifelnden Schwäche Gesetze ab, die sie den letzten Rest von Achtung v dem Publikum verlieren ließ. Bonaparte mit seiner fixen napoleonischen Idee beschäftigt, war leicht genug, diese Herabwürdigung der parlamentarischen M

öffentlich zu exploitiren. Als nämlich die Nationalversammlung am 8. Mai 1849 dem Ministerium ein Tadelsvotum wegen der Besetzung Civita-Vecchia's durch Oudinot ertheilte und die römische Expedition zu ihrem angeblichen Zweck zurückzuführen befahl, publizirte Bonaparte denselben Abend im Moniteur einen Brief an Oudinot, worin er ihm zu seinen Heldenthaten Glück wünscht und sich schon im Gegensatz zu den federfuchsenden Parlamentären als den großmüthigen Protecteur der Armee geberdet. Die Royalisten lächelten dazu. Sie hielten ihn einfach für ihren Dupe. Endlich als Marrast, der Präsident der Konstituante, einen Augenblick die Sicherheit der Nationalversammlung gefährdet glaubte und auf die Konstitution gestützt einen Oberst mit seinem Regimente requirirte, weigerte sich der Oberst, bezog sich auf die Disziplin und verwies Marrast an Changarnier, der ihn höhnisch abwies mit der Bemerkung, er liebe nicht die bayonettes intelligentes. November 1851, als die koalisirten Royalisten den entscheidenden Kampf mit Bonaparte beginnen wollten, suchten sie in ihrer berüchtigten Quästorenbill das Prinzip der direkten Requisition der Truppen durch den Präsidenten der Nationalversammlung durchzusetzen und selbst zu übertreiben. Einer ihrer Generale, Leflô, hatte den Gesetzvorschlag unterzeichnet. Vergebens stimmte Changarnier für den Vorschlag und huldigte Thiers der umsichtigen Weisheit der ehemaligen Konstituante. Der Kriegsminister St. Arnaud antwortete ihm, wie dem Marrast Changarnier geantwortet hatte, und — unter dem Beifallsruf der Montagne.

So hatte die Partei der Ordnung selbst, als sie noch nicht Nationalversammlung, als sie nur noch Ministerium war, das parlamentarische Regime gebrandmarkt. Und sie schreit auf, als der 2. Dezember 1851 es aus Frankreich verbannt!

Wir wünschen ihm glückliche Reise.

III.

Am 29. Mai 1849 trat die gesetzgebende Nationalversammlung zusammen. Am 2. Dezember 1851 ward sie gesprengt. Diese Periode umfaßt die Lebensdauer der konstitutionellen oder parlamentarischen Republik. Sie zerfällt in drei Hauptepochen: 29. Mai 1849 bis 13. Juni 1849, Kampf der Demokratie und der Bourgeoisie, Niederlage der kleinbürgerlichen oder demokratischen Partei; — 13. Juni 1849 bis 31. Mai 1850, parlamentarische Diktatur der Bourgeoisie, d. h. der koalisirten Orleanisten und Legitimisten oder der Partei der Ordnung, Diktatur, die sich durch die Abschaffung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts vollendet; — 31. Mai 1850 bis zum 2. Dezember 1851, Kampf der Bourgeoisie und Bonaparte's, Sturz der Bourgeois-Herrschaft, Untergang der kostitutionellen oder parlamentarischen Republik.

In der ersten französischen Revolution folgt auf die Herrschaft der Konstitutionellen die Herrschaft der Girondin's und auf die Herrschaft der Girondin's die Herrschaft der Jakobiner. Jede dieser Parteien stützt sich auf die fortgeschrittenere. Sobald sie die Revolution weit genug geführt hat, um ihr nicht mehr zu folgen, noch weniger ihr vorangehen zu können, wird sie von dem kühnern Verbündeten, der hinter ihr steht, bei Seite geschoben und auf die Guillotine geschickt. Die Revolution bewegt sich so in aufsteigender Linie.

Umgekehrt die Revolution von 1848. Die proletarische Partei erscheint als *Anhang* der kleinbürgerlich-demokratischen. Sie wird von ihr verrathen und fallen *gelassen am 16.* April, am 15. Mai und in den Junitagen. Die demokratische *Partei ihrerseits* lehnt sich auf die Schultern der bourgeois-republikanischen. Die

Bourgeois-Republikaner glauben kaum festzustehen, als sie den lästigen Kameraden abschütteln und sich selbst auf die Schultern der Ordnungspartei stützen. Die Ordnungspartei zieht ihre Schultern ein, läßt die Bourgeois-Republikaner purzeln und wirft sich selbst auf die Schultern der bewaffneten Gewalt. Sie glaubt noch auf ihren Schultern zu sitzen, als sie an einem schönen Morgen bemerkt, daß sich die Schultern in Bajonette verwandelt haben. Jede Partei schlägt von hinten auf nach der weiterdrängenden, und lehnt sich von vorn über auf die zurückdringende. Kein Wunder, daß sie in dieser lächerlichen Positur das Gleichgewicht verliert, und nachdem sie die unvermeidlichen Grimassen geschnitten, unter seltsamen Kapriolen zusammenstürzt. Die Revolution bewegt sich so in absteigender Linie, und sie findet sich in dieser rückgängigen Bewegung, ehe die letzte Februar-Barrikade weggeräumt und die erste Revolutionsbehörde constituirt ist.

Die Periode, die wir vor uns haben, umfaßt das bunteste Gemisch schreiender Widersprüche: Konstitutionelle, die offen gegen die Konstitution konspiriren, Revolutionärs, die eingestandenermaßen konstitutionell sind, eine Nationalversammlung, die allmächtig sein will und stets parlamentarisch bleibt; eine Montagne, die in Dulden ihren Ruf findet und durch die Prophezeiung künftiger Siege ihre gegenwärtigen Niederlagen parirt; Royalisten, die die patres conscripti der Republik bilden, und durch die Situation gezwungen werden, die feindlichen Königshäuser, denen sie anhängen, im Auslande, und die Republik, die sie hassen, in Frankreich zu halten, eine Exekutivgewalt, die in ihrer Schwäche selbst ihre Kraft und in der Verachtung, die sie einflößt, ihre Respektabilität findet, eine Republik, die nichts anders ist, als die zusammengesetzte Infamie zweier Monarchien, der Restauration und der Julimonarchie, mit einer imperialistischen Etiquette, — Verbindungen deren erste Klausel die Trennung, Kämpfe, deren erstes Gesetz die Entscheidungslosigkeit ist, im Namen der Ruhe wüste, inhaltslose Agitation, im Namen der Revolution feierliches Predigen der Ruhe, Leidenschaften ohne Wahrheit, Wahrheiten ohne Leidenschaft, Helden ohne Heldenthaten, Geschichte ohne Ereignisse, Entwickelung, deren einzige Triebkraft der Kalender scheint, durch beständige Wiederholung derselben Spannungen und Abspannungen ermüdend, Gegensätze, die sich selbst periodisch nur auf die Höhe zu treiben scheinen, um sich abzustumpfen und zusammenzufallen, ohne sich auflösen zu können, pretentiös zur Schau getragene Anstrengungen und bürgerliche Schrecken vor der Gefahr des Weltuntergangs und von den Weltrettern gleichzeitig die kleinlichsten Intriguen und Hofkomödien gespielt, die in ihrem Laisser aller weniger an den jüngsten Tag als an die Zeiten der Fronde erinnern, — das offizielle Gesammtgenie Frankreichs von der pfiffigen Dummheit eines einzelnen Individuums zu Schanden gemacht, der Gesammtwille der Nation, so oft er in allgemeinen Wahlrecht spricht, in den verjährten Feinden der Masseninteressen seinen entsprechenden Ausdruck suchend, bis er ihn endlich in dem Eigenwillen eines Flibustiers findet. Wenn irgend ein Geschichtsausschnitt grau in grau gemalt ist, so ist es dieser. Menschen und Ereignisse erscheinen als umgekehrte Schlemihls als Schatten, denen der Körper abhanden gekommen ist. Die Revolution selbst paralysirt ihre eigenen Träger und stattet nur ihre Gegner mit leidenschaftlicher Gewaltsamkeit aus. Wenn das „rothe Gespenst" von den Kontrerevolutionären beständig geweckt, heraufbeschworen und gebannt, endlich erscheint, so erscheint es nicht mit anarchischer Phrygiermütze auf dem Kopfe, sondern in der Uniform der Ordnung, in rothen Plumphosen.

Wir haben gesehen: das Ministerium, das Bonaparte am 20. Dezember 1848 am Tage seiner Himmelfahrt installirte, war ein Ministerium der Ordnungspartei, der legitimistischen und orleanistischen Koalition. Dies Ministerium Barrot-Fallou hatte die republikanische Konstituante, deren Lebensdauer es mehr oder minder gewaltsam abkürzte, überwintert und befand sich noch am Ruder. Changarnier, der General der verbündeten Royalisten, vereinigte fortwährend in seiner Person das Generalkommando der ersten Militärdivision und der Pariser Nationalgarden. Die allgemeinen Wahlen endlich hatten der Ordnungspartei die große Majorität

Oberfläche der Gesellschaft vertheilen. Seine bedeutenderen Führer in der Versammlung und in der Presse fallen der Reihe nach den Gerichten als Opfer und immer zweideutigere Figuren treten an seine Spitze. Zum Theil wirft es sich auf doktrinäre Experimente, in Tauschbanken und Arbeiter-Assoziationen, also in eine Bewegung, worin es darauf verzichtet, die alte Welt mit ihren eigenen großen Gesammtmitteln umzuwälzen, vielmehr hinter dem Rücken der Gesellschaft, auf Privatweise, innerhalb seiner beschränkten Existenzbedingungen seine Erlösung zu vollbringen sucht, also nothwendig scheitert. Es scheint weder in sich selbst die revolutionäre Größe wiederfinden, noch aus den neu eingegangenen Verbindungen neue Energie gewinnen zu können, bis alle Klassen, womit es im Juni gekämpft, neben ihm selbst platt darniederliegen. Aber wenigstens erliegt es mit den Ehren des großen weltgeschichtlichen Kampfes; nicht nur Frankreich, ganz Europa zittert vor dem Junierdbeben, während die nachfolgenden Niederlagen der höhern Klassen so wohlfeil erkauft werden, daß sie der frechen Uebertreibung von Seiten der siegenden Partei bedürfen, um überhaupt als Ereignisse passiren zu können, und um so schmachvoller werden, je weiter die unterliegende Partei von der proletarischen entfernt ist.

Die Niederlage der Juniinsurgenten hatte nun allerdings das Terrain vorbereitet, geebnet, worauf die bürgerliche Republik begründet, aufgeführt werden konnte; aber sie hatte zugleich gezeigt, daß es sich in Europa um andre Fragen handelt, als „um Republik oder Monarchie." Sie hatte offenbart, daß bürgerliche Republik hier die uneingeschränkte Gesammtdespotie einer Klasse über andre Klassen bedeute. Sie hatte bewiesen, daß in altzivilisirten Ländern mit entwickelter Klassenbildung, mit modernen Produktionsbedingungen und mit einem geistigen Bewußtsein, worin alle überlieferten Ideen durch Jahrhunderte lange Arbeit aufgelöst sind, die Republik überhaupt nur die revolutionäre Zerstörungsform der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft bedeutet und nicht ihre konservative Entwickelungsform, wie z. B. in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, wo zwar schon Klassen bestehen, aber sich noch nicht fixirt haben, sondern in beständigem Flusse fortwährend ihre Bestandtheile wechseln und an einander abtreten, wo die modernen Produktionsmittel, statt mit einer stagnanten Uebervölkerung zusammenzufallen, vielmehr den relativen Mangel an Köpfen und Händen ersetzen, und wo endlich die fieberhaft jugendliche Bewegung der materiellen Produktion, die eine neue Welt sich anzueignen hat, weder Zeit noch Gelegenheit ließ, die alte Geisterwelt abzuschaffen.

Alle Klassen und Parteien hatten sich während der Junitage zur Partei der Ordnung vereint gegenüber der proletarischen Klasse, als der Partei der Anarchie, des Sozialismus, des Kommunismus. Sie hatten die Gesellschaft „gerettet" gegen „die Feinde der Gesellschaft." Sie hatten die Stichworte der alten Gesellschaft, „Eigenthum, Familie, Religion, Ordnung," als Parole unter ihr Heer ausgetheilt und der kontrerevolutionären Kreuzfahrt zugerufen: „Unter diesem Zeichen wirst du siegen!" Von diesem Augenblick, sobald eine der zahlreichen Parteien, die sich unter diesem Zeichen gegen die Juniinsurgenten geschaart hatten, in ihrem eigenen Klasseninteresse den revolutionären Kampfplatz zu behaupten sucht, unterliegt sie vor dem Rufe: „Eigenthum, Familie, Religion, Ordnung." Die Gesellschaft wird eben so oft gerettet, als sich der Kreis ihrer Herrscher verengt, als ein exclusives Interesse dem weiteren gegenüber behauptet wird. Jede Forderung der einfachsten bürgerlichen Finanzreform, des ordinärsten Liberalismus, des formalsten Republikanerthums, der plattesten Demokratie, wird gleichzeitig als „Attentat auf die Gesellschaft" bestraft und als „Sozialismus" gebrandmarkt. Und schließlich werden die Hohenpriester der „Religion und Ordnung" selbst mit Fußtritten von ihren Phythiastühlen verjagt, bei Nacht und Nebel aus ihren Betten geholt, in Zellenwagen gesteckt, in Kerker geworfen oder in's Exil geschickt, ihr Tempel wird dem Erdboden gleich gemacht, ihr Mund

t m p f und die eigenthümliche Physiognomie dieser Periode verschleiert und sie einer schatzhaltigen Mine für kannegießernde Politiker und republikanische Gesinnungsmänner macht.

gitimisten und Orleanisten bildeten, wie gesagt, die zwei großen Fraktionen rdnungspartei. Was diese Fraktionen an ihren Prätendenten festhielt, und chselseitig auseinander hielt, war es nichts Andres, als Lilie und Trikolore, Bourbon und Haus Orléans, verschiedene Schattirungen des Royalismus, s überhaupt das Glaubensbekenntniß des Royalismus? Unter den Bourbo- hatte das große Grundeigenthum regiert mit seinen Pfaffen und en, unter den Orléans die hohe Finanz, die große Industrie, der große Han- d. h. das Kapital mit seinem Gefolge von Advokaten, Professoren und nrednern. Das legitime Königthum war blos der politische Ausdruck für die stammte Herrschaft der Herren von Grund und Boden, wie die Julimonarchie der politische Ausdruck für die usurpirte Herrschaft der bürgerlichen Parvenues. also diese Fraktionen auseinander hielt, es waren keine sogenannten Prinzi- es waren ihre materiellen Existenzbedingungen, zwei verschiedene Arten des nthums, es war der alte Gegensatz von Stadt und Land, die Rivalität zwischen tal und Grundeigenthum. Daß gleichzeitig alte Erinnerungen, persönliche dschaften, Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen, Vorurtheile und Illusionen, Sym- en und Antipathien, Ueberzeugungen, Glaubensartikel und Prinzipien sie an ine oder das andre Königshaus band, wer leugnet es? Auf den verschiedenen en des Eigenthums, der sozialen Existenzbedingung, erhebt sich ein ganzer bau verschiedener und eigenthümlich gestalteter Empfindungen, Illusionen, eisen und Lebensanschauungen. Die ganze Klasse schafft und gestaltet sie ren materiellen Grundlagen heraus und aus den gesellschaftlichen Verhält- die ihnen entsprechen. Das einzelne Individuum, dem sie durch Tradition rziehung zufließen, kann sich einbilden, daß sie die eigentlichen Bestimmungs- und den Ausgangspunkt seines Handelns bilden. Wie Orleanisten, Legiti- Jede Fraktion sich selbst und der andern vorzureden suchte, daß die Anhäng- an ihre zwei Königshäuser sie trennte, so bewies später die Thatsache, daß hr ihr gespaltenes Interesse die Vereinigung der zwei Königshäuser verbot. e man ein Privatleben unterscheidet zwischen dem, was ein Mensch von sich und sagt, und dem, was er wirklich ist und thut, so muß man noch mehr in tlichen Kämpfen die Phrasen und Einbildungen der Parteien von ihrer en Organisation und ihren wirklichen Interessen, ihre Vorstellung von ihrer t unterscheiden. Orleanisten und Legitimisten fanden sich in der Republik nander mit gleichen Ansprüchen. Wenn jede Seite gegen die andre die ration ihres eignen Königshauses durchsetzen wollte, so hieß das ndres, als daß die zwei großen Interessen, worin die Bour- sich spaltet — Grundeigenthum und Kapital — jedes seine eigne Supre- und die Unterordnung der andern zu restauriren suchte. Wir sprechen von teressen der Bourgeoisie, denn das große Grundeigenthum, trotz seiner feu- Lotterie und seines Racenstolzes war durch die Entwicklung der modernen ast vollständig verbürgerlicht. So haben die Tories in England sich lange et, daß sie für das Königthum, die Kirche und die Schönheiten der alteng- Verfassung schwärmten, bis der Tag der Gefahr ihnen das Geständniß ent- sie nur für die Grundrente schwärmten.

koalisirten Royalisten spielten ihre Intrigue gegen einander in der Presse, in Claremont außerhalb des Parlaments. Hinter den Coulissen zogen sie n orleanistischen und legitimistischen Livréen wieder an und führten ihre urniere wieder auf. Aber auf der öffentlichen Bühne, in ihren Haupt- und ctionen, als große parlamentarische Partei, fertigten sie ihre respektiven Kö- ser mit bloßen Reverenzen ab, vertagten die Restauration der Monarchie tum *und verrichteten ihr wirkliches Geschäft als* Partei der Ordnung, ter einem gesellschaftlichen nicht unter einem politischen Titel,

renden Nationalversammlung. Aus der Exekutiv-Commission, welche diese Nationalversammlung bei ihrem Zusammentritt bildete, hatte sie sofort die sozialistischen Elemente der provisorischen Regierung ausgeschlossen und die Partei des "National" benutzte den Ausbruch der Juniinsurrektion, um auch die Executiv-Commission abzudanken und damit ihre nächsten Rivalen, die kleinbürgerlichen oder demokratischen Republikaner (Ledru-Rollin u. s. w.) los zu werden. Cavaignac, der General der bourgeois-republikanischen Partei, der die Junischlacht kommandirte, trat an die Stelle der Exekutiv-Kommission mit einer Art diktatorischer Gewalt. Marrast, ehemaliger Redakteur en chef des "National," wurde der perpetuirliche Präsident der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung und die Ministerien, wie sämmtliche übrigen bedeutenden Posten, fielen den reinen Republikanern anheim.

Die republikanische Bourgeois-Fraktion, die sich seit lange als legitime Erbin der Julimonarchie betrachtet hatte, fand sich so in ihrem Ideal übertroffen, aber sie gelangte zur Herrschaft, nicht wie sie unter Louis Philippe geträumt hatte, durch eine liberale Revolte der Bourgeoisie gegen den Thron, sondern durch eine niederkartätschte Emeute des Proletariats gegen das Kapital. Was sie als das revolutionärste Ereigniß sich vorgestellt hatte, trug sich in der Wirklichkeit zu als das kontrerevolutionärste. Die Frucht fiel ihr in den Schooß, aber sie fiel vom Baum der Erkenntniß, nicht vom Baum des Lebens.

Die ausschließliche Herrschaft der Bourgeois-Republikaner währte nur vom 24. Juni bis zum 10. Dezember 1848. Sie resumirt sich in der Abfassung einer republikanischen Konstitution und im Belagerungszustand von Paris.

Die neue Konstitution war im Grunde nur die republikanisirte Ausgabe der konstitutionellen Charte von 1830. Der enge Wahlcensus der Julimonarchie, der selbst einen großen Theil der Bourgeoisie von der politischen Herrschaft ausschloß, war unvereinbar mit der Existenz der bürgerlichen Republik. Die Februarrevolution hatte sofort an der Stelle dieses Census das direkte allgemeine Wahlrecht proklamirt. Die Bourgeois-Republikaner konnten dieses Ereigniß nicht ungeschehen machen. Sie mußten sich damit begnügen, die beschränkende Bestimmung eines sechsmonatlichen Domizils am Wahlorte hinzuzufügen. Die alte Organisation der Verwaltung, des Gemeindewesens, der Rechtspflege, der Armee u. s. w. blieb unversehrt bestehen, oder wo die Konstitution sie änderte, betraf die Aenderung das Inhaltsregister, nicht den Inhalt, den Namen, nicht die Sache.

Der unvermeidliche Generalstab der Freiheiten von 1848, persönliche Freiheit, Preß-, Rede-, Assoziations-, Versammlungs-, Lehr- und Religions-Freiheit u. s. w., erhielt eine konstitutionelle Uniform, die sie unverwundbar machte. Jede dieser Freiheiten wird nämlich als das unbedingte Recht des französischen Citoyens proklamirt, aber mit der beständigen Randglosse, daß sie schrankenlos seien, so weit sie nicht durch die „gleichen Rechte Anderer und die öffentliche Sicherheit" beschränkt werden, oder durch „Gesetze," die eben diese Harmonie der individuellen Freiheiten unter einander und mit der öffentlichen Sicherheit vermitteln sollen. Z. B.: „die Bürger haben das Recht sich zu assoziren, sich friedlich und unbewaffnet zu versammeln, zu petitioniren und ihre Meinungen durch die Presse oder wie sonst immer auszudrücken. Der Genuß dieser Rechte hat keine andere Schranke, als die gleichen Rechte Andrer und die öffentliche Sicherheit." (Kap. II. der franz. Konstitution, §. 8.) — „Der Unterricht ist frei. Die Freiheit des Unterrichts soll genossen werden unter den vom Gesetze fixirten Bedingungen und unter der Oberaufsicht des Staats." (A. a. O. §. 9.) — „Die Wohnung jedes Bürgers ist unverletzlich außer in der vom Gesetz vorgeschriebenen Formen." (Kap. I. §. 3.) U. s. w., u. s. w. — Die Constitution weis't daher beständig auf zukünftige organische Gesetze hin, *die jene* Randglossen ausführen und den Genuß dieser unbeschränkten Freiheiten so *reguliren sollen*, daß sie weder unter einander, noch mit der öffentlichen Sicherheit

anstoßen. Und später sind diese organischen Gesetze von den Ordnungsfreunden in's Leben gerufen und alle jene Freiheiten so regulirt worden, daß die Bourgeoisie in deren Genuß an den gleichen Rechten der andern Klassen keinen Anstoß findet. Wo sie „den Andern" diese Freiheiten ganz untersagt oder ihren Genuß unter Bedingungen erlaubt, die eben so viele Polizei-Fallstricke sind, geschah dies immer nur im Interesse der „öffentlichen Sicherheit," d. h. der Sicherheit der Bourgeoisie, wie die Konstitution vorschreibt. Beide Seiten berufen sich daher in der Folge mit vollem Recht auf die Konstitution, sowohl die Ordnungsfreunde, die alle jene Freiheiten aufhoben, wie die Demokraten, die sie alle heraus verlangten. Jeder Paragraph der Konstitution enthält nämlich seine eigne Antithese, sein eignes Ober- und Unterhaus in sich, nämlich in der allgemeinen Phrase die Freiheit, in der Randglosse die Aufhebung der Freiheit. So lange also der Name der Freiheit respektirt und nur die wirkliche Ausführung derselben verhindert wurde, auf gesetzlichem Wege versteht sich, blieb das konstitutionelle Dasein der Freiheit unversehrt, unangetastet, mochte ihr gemeines Dasein noch so sehr todtgeschlagen sein.

Diese auf so sinnige Weise unverletzlich gemachte Konstitution war indeß wie Achilles an einem Punkte verwundbar, nicht an der Ferse, aber am Kopfe oder vielmehr an den zwei Köpfen, worin sie sich verlief, — gesetzgebende Versammlung einerseits, Präsident andrerseits. Man durchfliege die Konstitution, und man wird finden, daß die Paragraphen, worin das Verhältniß des Präsidenten zur gesetzgebenden Versammlung bestimmt wird, die einzig absoluten, positiven, widerspruchslosen, unverdrehbaren sind, die sie enthält. Hier galt es nämlich für die Bourgeois-Republikaner, sich selbst sicher zu stellen. §§. 45–70 der Konstitution sind so abgefaßt, daß die Nationalversammlung den Präsidenten konstitutionel, der Präsident die Nationalversammlung nur inkonstitutionel beseitigen kann, nur indem er die Konstitution selbst beseitigt. Hier fordert sie also ihre gewaltsame Vernichtung heraus. Sie heiligt nicht nur wie die Charte von 1830 die Theilung der Gewalten, sie erweitert sie bis zum unerträglichen Widerspruch. Das Spiel der konstitutionellen Gewalten, wie Guizot den parlamentarischen Krakehl zwischen gesetzgebender und vollziehender Gewalt nannte, spielt in der Konstitution von 1848 beständig va banque. Auf der einen Seite 750 durch allgemeines Stimmrecht gewählte und wieder wählbare Volksrepräsentanten, die eine unkontrollirbare, unauflösbare, untheilbare Nationalversammlung bilden, eine Nationalversammlung, welche gesetzgeberische Allmacht genießt, Krieg, Frieden und Handelsverträge in letzter Instanz entscheidet, allein das Recht der Amnestie besitzt und durch ihre Permanenz unaufhörlich den Vordergrund der Bühne behauptet. Andrerseits der Präsident, mit allen Attributen der königlichen Gewalt, noch dadurch vermehrt, daß er seine Minister unabhängig von der Nationalversammlung ein- und absetzt, mit allen Mitteln der exekutiven Gewalt in seinen Händen, alle Stellen vergebend und d. h. in Frankreich wenigstens über 1½ Millionen Existenzen entscheiden, denn so viel hängen an den 500,000 Beamten und an den Offizieren aller Grade, — die ganze bewaffnete Macht hinter sich, mit dem Privilegium begabt einzelne Verbrecher zu begnadigen, Nationalgarden zu suspendiren, die von den Bürgern ernannten, erwählten General-, Kantonal- und Gemeinderäthe im Einverständniß mit dem Staatsrath abzusetzen, Initiative und Leitung aller Verträge mit dem Ausland ihm vorbehalten, nicht wie die Versammlung beständig auf den Brettern und dem kritisch gemeinen Tageslicht fortwährend ausgesetzt, sondern ein verborgnes Leben führend in den elyseischen Gefilden und mit alledem Artikel 45 der Constitution vor Augen und im Herzen, der ihm täglich zuruft: "frère, il faut mourir." „Deine Macht hört auf am zweiten Sonntag des schönen Monats Mai im vierten Jahr deiner Wahl! Dann ist die Herrlichkeit am Ende, das Stück spielt nicht zweimal, und wenn du Schulden hast, siehe bei Zeiten zu, daß du sie mit den dir von der Konstitution ausgeworfenen 600,000 Franken abbezahlst, ziehst du nicht etwa vor, am zweiten Montag des schönen Monats Mai nach Clichy zu wandern!" — Wenn die Konstitution so dem Präsidenten alle faktischen Gewalten beilegt, sucht sie der Nationalversam-

Das Gros der Montagne hatte seine Avantgarde im Stiche gelassen, indem es ihrer Proklamation die Unterschriften verweigerte. Die Presse war desertirt, indem nur zwei Journale das Pronunziamento zu veröffentlichen wagten. Die Kleinbürger verriethen ihre Repräsentanten indem die Nationalgarden ausblieben oder wo sie erschienen, den Barrikadenbau verhinderten. Die Repräsentanten hatten die Kleinbürger dupirt, indem die angeblichen Affiliirten von der Armee nirgends zu erblicken waren. Endlich, statt von ihm Kraftzuschuß zu gewinnen, hatte die demokratische Partei das Proletariat mit ihrer eignen Schwäche angesteckt, und, wie gewöhnlich bei demokratischen Hochthaten, hatten die Führer die Genugthuung, ihr „Volk" der Desertion und das Volk die Genugthuung, seine Führer der Prellerei beschuldigen zu können.

Selten war eine Aktion mit größerem Geräusch verkündet worden, als der bevorstehende Feldzug der Montagne, selten ein Ereigniß mit mehr Sicherheit und länger vorher austrompetet, als der unvermeidliche Sieg der Demokratie. Ganz gewiß: die Demokraten glauben an die Posaunen, vor deren Stößen die Mauern Jericho's einstürzten. Und so oft sie den Wällen des Despotismus gegenüberstehen, suchen sie das Wunder nachzumachen. Wenn die Montagne im Parlamente siegen wollte, durfte sie nicht zu den Waffen rufen. Wenn sie im Parlamente zu den Waffen rief, durfte sie sich auf der Straße nicht parlamentarisch verhalten. Wenn die friedliche Demonstration ernst gemeint war, so war es albern, nicht vorherzusehen, daß sie kriegerisch empfangen werden würde. Wenn es auf den wirklichen Kampf abgesehen war, so war es originell, die Waffen abzulegen, mit denen er geführt werden mußte. Aber die revolutionären Drohungen der Kleinbürger und ihrer demokratischen Vertreter sind bloße Einschüchterungsversuche des Gegners. Und wenn sie sich in eine Sackgasse verrannt, wenn sie sich hinlänglich kompromittirt haben, um zur Ausführung ihrer Drohungen gezwungen zu sein, so geschieht es in einer zweideutigen Weise, die nichts mehr vermeidet als die Mittel zum Zwecke und nach Vorwänden zum Unterliegen hascht. Die schmetternde Ouverture, die den Kampf verkündete, verliert sich in ein kleinlautes Knurren, sobald er beginnen soll, die Schauspieler hören auf sich au sérieux zu nehmen und die Handlung fällt platt zusammen, wie ein luftgefüllter Ballon, den man mit einer Nadel pickt.

Keine Partei übertreibt sich mehr ihre Mittel, als die demokratische, keine täuscht sich leichtsinniger über die Situation. Wenn ein Theil der Armee für sie gestimmt hatte, war die Montagne nun auch überzeugt, daß die Armee für sie revoltiren werde. Und bei welchem Anlasse? Bei einem Anlasse, der vom Standpunkte der Truppen keinen andern Sinn hatte, als daß die Revolutionäre für die römischen Soldaten gegen die französischen Soldaten Partei ergriffen. Von den Arbeitern mußte die Montagne wissen, daß die Erinnerungen an den Juni 1848 noch zu frisch waren, als daß nicht eine tiefe Abneigung des Proletariats gegen die Nationalgarde und ein durchgreifendes Mißtrauen der Chefs der geheimen Gesellschaften gegen die demokratischen Chefs existiren mußte. Um diese Differenzen auszugleichen, dazu bedurfte es großer gemeinschaftlicher Interessen, die auf dem Spiele standen. Die Verletzung eines abstrakten Verfassungsparagraphen konnte das Interesse nicht bieten. War die Verfassung nicht schon wiederholt verletzt worden nach der Versicherung der Demokraten selbst? Hatten die populärsten Journale sie nicht als ein kontrerevolutionäres Machwerk gebrandmarkt? Aber der Demokrat, weil er das Kleinbürgerthum vertritt, also eine Uebergangsklasse, worin die Interessen zweier Klassen sich zugleich abstumpfen, dünkt sich über den Klassengegensatz überhaupt erhaben. Die Demokraten geben zu, daß eine privilegirte Klasse ihnen gegenübersteht, aber sie mit der ganzen übrigen Umgebung der Nation bilden das Volk. Was sie vertreten, ist das Volksrecht; was sie interessirt, ist das Volksinteresse. Sie brauchen daher bei einem bevorstehenden Kampfe die Interessen und Stellungen der verschiedenen Klassen nicht zu prüfen. Sie brauchen ihre eignen Mittel nicht allzu bedenklich abzuwägen. Sie haben eben nur das Signal zu geben, damit das Volk mit allen seinen unerschöpflichen Reserven ins

die Dränger herfalle. Stellen sich nun in der Ausführung ihre Interessen als uninteressant und ihre Macht als Ohnmacht heraus, so liegt das entweder an verderblichen Sophisten, die das untheilbare Volk in verschiedene feindliche Lager spalten, oder die Armee war zu verthiert und zu verblendet, um die reinen Zwecke der Demokratie als ihr eignes Beste zu begreifen, oder an einem Detail der Ausführung ist das Ganze gescheitert, oder aber ein unvorhergesehener Zufall hat für diesmal die Partie vereitelt. Jedenfalls geht der Demokrat eben so makellos aus der schmählichsten Niederlage heraus, wie er unschuldig in sie hineingegangen ist, mit der neugewonnenen Ueberzeugung, daß er siegen muß, nicht daß er selbst und seine Partei den alten Standpunkt aufzugeben, sondern umgekehrt, daß die Verhältnisse ihm entgegenzureifen haben.

Man muß sich daher die dezimirte, gebrochene und durch das neue parlamentarische Reglement gedemüthigte Montagne nicht gar zu unglücklich vorstellen. Die Diäten und die offizielle Stellung waren für viele derselben ein täglich neuer Quell des Trostes. Wenn der 13. Juni ihre Chefs beseitigt hatte, so machte er andrerseits ihren Platz untergeordneteren Kapazitäten zugänglich, denen diese neue Stellung schmeichelte. Wenn ihre Machtlosigkeit im Parlamente nicht mehr bezweifelt werden konnte, so waren sie nun auch berechtigt, ihre That auf Ausbrüche sittlicher Entrüstung und polternder Deklamationen zu beschränken. Wenn die Ordnungspartei in ihnen als den letzten offiziellen Repräsentanten der Revolution alle Schrecken der Anarchie verkörpert zu sehen vorgab, so konnten sie in der Wirklichkeit desto platter und bescheidener sein. Ueber den 13. Juni aber vertrösteten sie sich mit der tiefen Wendung: Aber wenn man das allgemeine Wahlrecht anzugreifen wagt, aber dann! Dann werden wir zeigen, wer wir sind. Nous verons.

Was die in's Ausland geflüchteten Montagnards betrifft, so genügt es hier zu bemerken, daß Ledru-Rollin, weil es ihm gelungen war, in kaum zwei Wochen die mächtige Partei, an deren Spitze er stand, rettungslos zu ruiniren, sich nun berufen fand, eine französische Regierung in partibus zu bilden, daß seine Figur, in der Form, vom Boden der Aktion weggehoben, im Maßstab als das Niveau der Revolution sank und die offiziellen Größen des offiziellen Frankreichs zwerghafter wurden, an Größe zu wachsen schien, daß er als republikanischer Prätendent für 1852 figuriren konnte, daß er periodische Rundschreiben an die Wallachen und andere Völker erließ, worin den Despoten des Kontinents mit seinen und seiner Verbündeten Thaten gedroht wird. Hatte Proudhon ganz Unrecht, wenn er diesen Herren zurief: "Vous n'êtes que de blangueurs?"

Die Ordnungspartei hatte am 13. Juni nicht nur die Montagne gebrochen, sie hatte die Unterordnung der Konstitution unter die Majoritätsbeschlüsse der Nationalversammlung durchgesetzt. Und so verstand sie die Republik. Daß die Bourgeoisie hier in parlamentarischen Formen herrsche, ohne wie in der Monarchie an dem Veto der Exekutivgewalt oder an der Auflösbarkeit des Parlaments eine Schranke zu finden. Das war die parlamentarische Republik, wie Thiers sie nannte. Aber wenn die Bourgeoisie am 13. Juni ihre Allmacht innerhalb des Parlamentsgebäudes sicherte, schlug sie nicht das Parlament selbst der Exekutivgewalt und dem Volke gegenüber mit unheilbarer Schwäche, indem sie den populärsten Theil desselben ausstieß? Indem sie zahlreiche Deputirte ohne weitere Ceremonien den Requisitionen der Parkette preisgab, hob sie ihre eigne parlamentarische Unverletzlichkeit auf. Das demüthigende Reglement, dem sie die Montagne unterwarf, erhöhte in demselben Maße den Präsidenten der Republik, als es den einzelnen Repräsentanten des Volks herabdrückte. Indem sie die Insurrektion zur Behauptung der konstitutionellen Verfassung als anarchische auf den Umsturz der Gesellschaft abzweckende That verdammte, verbot sie sich selbst den Appell an die Insurrektion, sobald die Exekutivgewalt ihr gegenüber die Verfassung verletzen würde. Die Ironie der Geschichte wollte, daß der General, der im Auftrag

Bonaparte's Rom bombardirt, und so den unmittelbaren Anlaß zu der konstitutionellen Emeute vom 13. Juni gegeben hatte, daß Oudinot am 2. Dezember 1851 dem Volke von der Ordnungspartei flehentlich und vergeblich als General der Konstitution gegen Bonaparte angeboten werden mußte. Ein andrer Held des 13. Juni, Vieyra, der von der Tribüne der Nationalversammlung Lob einärndtete für die Brutalitäten, die er in demokratischen Zeitungslokalen an der Spitze einer der hohen Finanz angehörigen Rotte verübt hatte, dieser selbe Vieyra war in die Verschwörung Bonaparte's eingeweiht und trug wesentlich dazu bei, in ihrer Todesstunde der Nationalversammlung jeden Schutz von Seiten der Nationalgarde abzuschneiden.

Der 13. Juni hatte noch einen andern Sinn. Die Montagne hatte Bonaparte's Versetzung in Anklagezustand ertrotzen wollen. Ihre Niederlage war also ein direkter Sieg Bonaparte's, sein persönlicher Triumph über seine demokratischen Feinde. Die Partei der Ordnung erfocht den Sieg, Bonaparte hatte ihn nur einzukassiren. Er that es. Am 14. Juni war eine Proklamation an den Mauern von Paris zu lesen, worin der Präsident, gleichsam ohne sein Zuthun, widerstrebend, durch die bloße Macht der Ereignisse gezwungen aus seiner klösterlichen Abgeschiedenheit hervortritt, als verkannte Tugend über die Verläumdungen seiner Widersacher klagt und während er seine Person mit der Sache der Ordnung zu identifiziren scheint, vielmehr die Sache der Ordnung mit seiner Person identifizirt. Zudem hatte die Nationalversammlung die Expedition gegen Rom zwar nachträglich gebilligt, aber Bonaparte hatte die Initiative dazu ergriffen. Nachdem er den Hohepriester Salomon in den Vatikan wieder eingeführt, konnte er hoffen, als König David wieder die Tuilerien zu beziehen. Er hatte die Pfaffen gewonnen.

Die Emeute vom 13. Juni beschränkte sich, wie wir gesehen, auf eine friedliche Straßenprozession. Es waren also keine kriegerischen Lorbeeren gegen sie zu gewinnen. Nichts desto weniger, in dieser Helden- und Ereigniß- armen Zeit verwandelte die Ordnungspartei diese Schlacht ohne Blutvergießen in ein zweites Austerlitz. Tribune und Presse priesen die Armee als die Macht der Ordnung gegenüber den Volksmassen als der Ohnmacht der Anarchie und den Changarnier als das „Bollwerk der Gesellschaft." Mystifikation, an die er schließlich selbst glaubte. Unter der Hand aber wurden die Korps, die zweideutig schienen, aus Paris verlegt, die Regimenter, deren Waffen am demokratischsten ausgefallen waren, aus Frankreich nach Algier verbannt, die unruhigen Köpfe unter den Truppen in Strafabtheilungen verwiesen, endlich die Absperrung der Presse von der Kaserne und der Kaserne von der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft systematisch durchgeführt.

Wir sind hier bei dem entscheidenden Wendepunkte in der Geschichte der französischen Nationalgarde angelangt. 1830 hatte sie den Sturz der Restauration entschieden. Unter Louis Philippe mißglückte jede Emeute, worin die Nationalgarde auf Seite der Truppen stand. Als sie in den Februartagen 1848 sich passiv gegen den Aufstand und zweideutig gegen Louis Philippe zeigte, gab er sich verloren und war er verloren. So hatte die Ueberzeugung Wurzel geschlagen, daß die Revolution nicht ohne, und die Armee nicht gegen die Nationalgarde siegen könne. Es war dies der Aberglaube der Armee an die bürgerliche Allmacht. Die Junitage 1848, wo die gesammte Nationalgarde mit den Linientruppen die Insurrektion niederwarf, hatten den Aberglauben befestigt. Nach Bonaparte's Regierungsantritt sank die Stellung der Nationalgarde einigermaßen durch die konstitutionswidrige Vereinigung ihres Kommandos mit dem Kommando der ersten Militärdivision in der Person Changarnier's.

Wie das Kommando über sie hier als ein Attribut des militärischen Oberbefehlshabers erschien, so sie selbst nur noch als Anhang der Linientruppen. Am 13. Juni endlich wurde sie gebrochen: Nicht nur durch die theilweise Auflösung der Nationalgarde, die sich seit dieser Zeit periodisch an allen Punkten Frankreichs wiederholte und nur Trümmer von ihr zurückließ. Die Demokratie

unt war vor Allem eine Demonstration der demokratischen National-
Sie hatten zwar nicht ihre Waffen, wohl aber ihre Uniformen der
enübergeführt, aber gerade in dieser Uniform saß der Talisman. Die
rzeugte sich, daß diese Uniform ein wollener Lappen wie ein andrer
Zauber ging verloren. In den Junitagen 1848 waren Bourgeoisie
bürgerthum als Nationalgarde mit der Armee gegen das Proletariat
im 13. Juni 1849 ließ die Bourgeoisie die kleinbürgerliche National-
der Armee auseinander sprengen, am 2. Dezember 1851 war die Na-
der Bourgeoisie selbst verschwunden und Bonaparte konstatirte nur
m, als er nachträglich ihr Auflösungsdekret unterschrieb. So hatte
oisie selbst ihre letzte Waffe gegen die Armee zerbrochen, aber sie mußte
en von dem Augenblicke, wo das Kleinbürgerthum nicht mehr als Vasall
sondern als Rebell vor ihr stand, wie sie überhaupt alle ihre Ver-
smittel gegen den Absolutismus mit eigner Hand zerstören mußte, sobald
solut geworden war.

rdnungspartei feierte unterdeß in der Nationalversammlung die Wie-
ng einer Macht, die 1848 nur verloren schien, um 1849 von ihren
befreit wiedergefunden zu werden, durch Invektiven gegen die Republik
nstitution, durch Verfluchung aller zukünftigen, gegenwärtigen und ver-
Revolutionen, die eingerechnet, welche ihre eignen Führer gemacht hat-
n Gesetzen, wodurch die Presse geknebelt, die Assoziation vernichtet und
rungszustand als organisches Institut regulirt wurde. Die National-
ng vertagte sich dann von Mitte August bis Mitte Oktober, nachdem sie
menzkommission für die Zeit ihrer Abwesenheit ernannt hatte. Wäh-
Ferien intriguirten die Legitimisten mit Ems, die Orleanisten mit
Bonaparte durch prinzliche Rundreisen und die Departementalräthe
ngen über die Revision der Verfassung, — Vorfälle, die in den periodi-
n der Nationalversammlung regelmäßig wiederkehren und auf die ich
n will, sobald sie zu Ereignissen werden. Hier sei nur noch bemerkt,
tionalversammlung unpolitisch handelte, als sie für längere Intervalle
ihre verschwand und auf der Spitze der Republik nur noch Eine, wenn
che Gestalt erblicken ließ, die Louis Bonaparte's, während die Partei
ng zum Skandale des Publikums in ihre royalistischen Bestandtheile
r und ihren sich widerstreitenden Restaurationsgelüsten nachging. So
d diesen Ferien der verwirrende Lärm des Parlaments verstummte
körper sich in die Nation auflöste, zeigte sich unverkennbar, daß nur
fehle, um die wahre Gestalt dieser Republik zu vollenden: Seine
nanent machen und ihre Aufschrift: Liberté, égalité, fraternité, er-
die unzweideutigen Worte: Infanterie, Cavallerie, Artillerie!

IV.

Oktober 1849 war die Nationalversammlung zusammengetreten. Am
er überraschte Bonaparte sie mit einer Botschaft, worin er die Entlas-
kinisteriums Barrot-Fallour und die Bildung eines neuen Ministeriums
Man hat Lakaien nie mit weniger Ceremonien aus dem Dienste gejagt,
irte seine Minister. Die Fußtritte, die der Nationalversammlung be-
en, erhielt vorläufig hier Barrot u. Comp.

Ministerium Barrot war, wie wir gesehen haben, aus Legitimisten und
zusammengesetzt, ein Ministerium der Ordnungspartei. Bonaparte
en bedurft, um die republikanische Konstituante aufzulösen, die Expedi-
Rom zu bewerkstelligen und die demokratische Partei zu brechen. Hinter
isterium hatte er sich scheinbar ekliptisirt, die Regierungsgewalt in die

Hände der Ordnungspartei abgetreten und die bescheidene Charaktermaske angelegt, die zu Paris die verantwortlichen Garanten der Zeitungspresse tragen, die Maske des homme de paille. Jetzt warf er eine Larve weg, die nicht mehr der leichte Vorhang war, worunter er seine Physiognomie verstecken konnte, sondern die eiserne Maske, die ihn verhinderte, eine eigne Physiognomie zu zeigen. Er hatte das Ministerium Barrot eingesetzt, um im Namen der Ordnungspartei die republikanische Nationalversammlung zu sprengen; er entließ es, um seinen eignen Namen von der Nationalversammlung der Ordnungspartei unabhängig zu erklären.

An plausiblen Vorwänden zu dieser Entlassung fehlte es nicht. Das Ministerium Barrot vernachlässigte selbst die Anstandsformen, die den Präsidenten der Republik als eine Macht neben der Nationalversammlung hätten erscheinen lassen. Während der Ferien der Nationalversammlung veröffentlichte Bonaparte einen Brief an Edgar Ney, worin er das illiberale Auftreten des Pabstes zu mißbilligen schien, wie er im Gegensatz zur Konstituante einen Brief veröffentlicht hatte, worin er Oudinot für den Angriff auf die römische Republik belobte. Als nun die Nationalversammlung das Budget für die römische Expedition votirte, brachte Victor Hugo aus liberalem Interesse jenen Brief zur Sprache. Die Ordnungspartei erstickte den Einfall, als ob Bonaparte's Einfälle irgend ein politisches Gewicht haben könnten, unter verächtlich ungläubigen Ausrufungen. Keiner der Minister nahm den Handschuh für ihn auf. Bei einer andern Gelegenheit ließ Barrot mit seinem bekannten hohlen Pathos Worte der Entrüstung von der Rednerbühne auf die „abominablen Umtriebe" fallen, die nach seiner Aussage in der nächsten Umgebung des Präsidenten vorgingen. Endlich weigerte sich das Ministerium, während es der Herzogin von Orleans einen Witwengehalt von der Nationalversammlung erwirkte, die Erhöhung der präsidentiellen Civilliste zu beantragen. Und in Bonaparte war der kaiserliche Prätendent so innig verschmolzen mit dem heruntergekommenen Glücksritter, daß die Eine große Idee, er sei berufen, das Kaiserthum zu restauriren, stets von der andern ergänzt ward, das französische Volk sei berufen, seine Schulden zu bezahlen.

Das Ministerium Barrot-Fallour war das erste und letzte *parlamentarische Ministerium*, das Bonaparte in's Leben rief. Die Entlassung desselben bildet daher einen entscheidenden Wendepunkt. Mit ihm verlor die Ordnungspartei, um ihn nie wieder zu erobern, einen unentbehrlichen Posten für die Behauptung des parlamentarischen Regimes, die Handhabe der Exekutivgewalt. Man begreift sogleich, daß in einem Lande wie Frankreich, wo die Exekutivgewalt über ein Beamtenheer von mehr als einer halben Million von Individuen verfügt, also eine ungeheure Masse von Interessen und Existenzen beständig in der unbedingtesten Abhängigkeit erhält, wo der Staat die bürgerliche Gesellschaft von ihren umfassendsten Lebensäußerungen bis zu ihren unbedeutendsten Regungen hinab, von ihren allgemeinsten Daseinsweisen bis zur Privatexistenz der Individuen umstrickt, kontrollirt, maßregelt, überwacht und bevormundet, wo dieser Parasitenkörper durch die außerordentlichste Centralisation eine Allgegenwart, Allwissenheit, eine beschleunigte Bewegungsfähigkeit und Schnellkraft gewinnt, die nur in der hülflosen Selbstständigkeit, in der zerfahrenen Unförmlichkeit des wirklichen Gesellschaftskörpers ein Analogon finden, daß in einem solchen Lande die Nationalversammlung mit der Verfügung über die Ministerstellen jeden wirklichen Einfluß verloren gab, wenn sie nicht gleichzeitig die Staatsverwaltung vereinfachte, das Beamtenheer möglichst verringerte, endlich die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und die öffentliche Meinung zu eignen von der Regierungsgewalt unabhängigen Organe erschaffen ließ. Dagegen das *materielle Interesse* der französischen Bourgeoisie ist gerade aufs Innigste mit der Erhaltung jener breiten und vielverzweigten Staatsmaschine verwebt. Hier bringt sie ihre überschüssige Bevölkerung unter und ergänzt in Form von Staatsgehalten, was sie nicht in der Form von Profiten, Zinsen, und Honoraren einstecken kann. Andrerseits zwang ihr *politisches* Interesse, die Regression, also die Mittel und das Personal der Staatsgewalt zu

vermehren, während sie gleichzeitig einen ununterbrochenen Krieg gegen die öffe
liche Meinung führen und die selbstständigen Bewegungsorgane der Gesellsch
mißtrauisch verfolgen, verstümmeln, lähmen mußte, wo es ihr nicht gelang
gänzlich zu amputiren. So war die französische Bourgeoisie durch ihre Klassenst
lung gezwungen, einerseits die Lebensbedingungen einer jeden, also auch ihrer e
nen parlamentarischen Gewalt zu vernichten, andrerseits die ihr feindliche Exekut
gewalt unwiderstehlich zu machen.

Das neue Ministerium hieß das Ministerium d'Hautpoul. Nicht als hä
General d'Hautpoul den Rang eines Ministerpräsidenten erhalten. Mit Bar
schaffte Bonaparte vielmehr zugleich diese Würde ab, die den Präsidenten der R
publik allerdings zur legalen Nichtigkeit eines konstitutionellen Königs verdamm
über eines konstitutionellen Königs ohne Thron und ohne Krone, ohne Scep
und ohne Schwert, ohne Unverantwortlichkeit, ohne den unverjährbaren Besitz
höchsten Staatswürde, und was das fatalste war, ohne Civilliste. Das Minis
terium d'Hautpoul besaß nur einen Mann von parlamentarischem Rufe, den Jud
Fould, eins der berüchtigsten Glieder der hohen Finanz. Ihm fiel das Finan
Ministerium anheim. Man schlage die Pariser Börsennotationen nach und m
wird finden, daß vom 1. November 1849 an die französischen Fonds steigen u
fallen mit dem Fallen und Steigen der bonapartistischen Aktien. Während Bon
parte so seinen Affiliirten in der Börse gefunden hatte, bemächtigte er sich zugle
der Polizei, indem er Carlier zum Polizeipräfekten von Paris ernannte.

Indeß konnten sich die Folgen des Ministerwechsels erst im Laufe der Entwic
lung herausstellen. Zunächst hatte Bonaparte nur einen Schritt vorwärts getha
um desto augenfälliger rückwärts getrieben zu werden. Seiner barschen Vorsch
folgte die servilste Unterthänigkeitserklärung an die Nationalversammlung. So
die Minister den schüchternen Versuch wagten, seine persönlichen Marotten a
Gesetzesvorschläge einzubringen, schienen sie selbst nur widerwillig und durch ih
Stellung gezwungen die komischen Aufträge zu erfüllen, von deren Erfolglosigk
sie im voraus überzeugt waren. So oft Bonaparte im Rücken der Minister sei
Absichten ausplauderte und mit seinen "idées napoléoniennes" spielte, desavouirt
ihn die eigenen Minister von der Tribüne der Nationalversammlung herab. Sei
Usurpationsgelüste schienen nur laut zu werden, damit das schadenfrohe Gelächt
der Gegner nicht verstumme. Er gebärdete sich als ein verkanntes Genie, das a
Welt für einen Simpel ausgibt. Nie genoß er in vollerem Maße die Verachtun
aller Klassen, als während dieser Periode. Nie herrschte die Bourgeoisie unbedin
ter, nie trug sie prahlerischer die Insignien der Herrschaft zur Schau.

Ich habe hier nicht die Geschichte ihrer gesetzgeberischen Thätigkeit zu schreibe
die sich während dieser Periode in zwei Gesetzen resumirt: in dem Gesetze, das d
Weinsteuer wiederherstellt, in dem Unterrichtsgesetze, das den Ungla
ben abschafft. Wenn den Franzosen das Weintrinken erschwert, ward ihnen des
reichlicher vom Wasser des wahren Lebens geschenkt. Wenn die Bourgeoisie in de
Gesetze über die Weinsteuer das alte gehässige französische Steuersystem für unan
tastbar erklärt, sucht sie durch das Unterrichtsgesetz den alten Gemüthszustand d
Massen zu sichern, der es ertragen ließ. Man ist erstaunt, die Orleanisten, d
liberalen Bourgeois, diese alten Apostel des Voltairianismus und der eklectisch
Philosophie, ihren Stammfeinden, den Jesuiten, die Verwaltung des französisch
Geistes anvertrauen zu sehen. Aber Orleanisten und Legitimisten konnten in B
dung auf den Kronprätendenten auseinandergehen, sie begriffen, daß ihre ve
te Herrschaft die Unterdrückungsmittel zweier Epochen zu vereinigen gebot, d
Unterdrückungsmittel der Julimonarchie durch die Unterdrückungsmittel d
tauration ergänzt und verstärkt werden mußten.

Die Bauern, in allen ihren Hoffnungen getäuscht, durch den niedrigen Sta
Getreidepreise einerseits, durch die wachsende Steuerlast und Hypothekenschu
erseits mehr als je erdrückt, begannen sich in den Departements zu re
antwortete ihnen durch die Hetzjagd auf die Schulmeister, die den Geistl

der Nationalversammlung gesichert. Hier trafen die Deputirten und Pairs Louis Philipp's zusammen, mit einer heiligen Schaar von Legitimisten, die aus ihrem Versteck hervortraten, nachdem zahlreiche Wahlzettel der Nation sich für sie in Eintrittskarten auf die politische Bühne verwandelt hatte. Die bonapartistischen Volksrepräsentanten waren zu dünne gesäet, um eine selbstständige parlamentarische Partei bilden zu können. Sie waren hinreichend vorhanden, um bei einer allgemeinen Musterung gegen die republikanischen Streitkräfte als Ziffern zu zählen. Sie erschienen nur als mauvaise queue der Ordnungspartei. So war die Ordnungspartei im Besitz der Regierungsgewalt, der Armee und des gesetzgebenden Körpers, kurz: der Gesammtmacht des Staats, moralisch gekräftigt durch die allgemeinen Wahlen, die ihre Herrschaft als den Willen des Volkes erscheinen ließen, und durch den gleichzeitigen Sieg der Kontrerevolution auf dem gesammten europäischen Kontinent.

Nie eröffnete eine Partei mit größern Mitteln und unter günstigern Auspicien ihren Feldzug.

Die schiffbrüchigen reinen Republikaner fanden sich in der gesetzgebenden Nationalversammlung auf eine Klique von ungefähr 50 Mann zusammengeschmolzen, an ihrer Spitze die afrikanischen Generale Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Bedeau. Die große Oppositionspartei aber wurde gebildet durch die Montagne. Diesen parlamentarischen Taufnamen hatte sich die sozial-demokratische Partei gegeben. Sie verfügte über mehr als 200 Stimmen von den 750 Stimmen der Nationalversammlung und war daher wenigstens eben so mächtig als irgend eine der drei Fraktionen der Ordnungspartei für sich genommen. Ihre relative Minorität gegen die eine gesammte royalistische Koalition schien durch besondere Umstände aufgewogen. Nicht nur zeigten die Departementswahlen, daß sie einen bedeutenden Anhang unter der Landbevölkerung gewonnen hatten. Sie zählten beinahe alle Deputirten von Paris unter sich, die Armee hatte durch die Wahl von drei Unteroffizieren ein demokratisches Glaubensbekenntniß abgelegt und der Chef der Montagne, Ledru-Rollin, war im Unterschiede von allen Repräsentanten der Ordnungspartei in den parlamentarischen Adelstand erhoben durch fünf Departements, die ihre Stimmen auf ihn vereinigt hatten. Die Montagne schien also am 29. Mai 1849, bei den unvermeidlichen Kollisionen der Royalisten unter sich und der gesammten Ordnungspartei mit Bonaparte, alle Elemente des Erfolgs vor sich zu haben. Vierzehn Tage später hatten sie alles verloren, die Ehre eingerechnet.

Ehe wir der parlamentarischen Geschichte weiter folgen, sind einige Bemerkungen nöthig, um gewöhnliche Täuschungen über den ganzen Charakter der Epoche, die uns vorliegt, zu vermeiden. In der demokratischen Manier zu sehen, handelt es sich während der Periode der gesetzgebenden Nationalversammlung, um was es sich in der Periode der konstituirenden handelte, um den einfachen Kampf zwischen Republikanern und Royalisten. Die Bewegung selbst aber fassen sie in ein Stichwort zusammen: „Reaktion," Nacht, worin alle Katzen grau sind und die ihnen erlaubt, ihre nachtwächterlichen Gemeinplätze abzuleiern. Und allerdings, auf den ersten Blick zeigt die Ordnungspartei einen Knäuel von verschiedenen royalistischen Fraktionen, die nicht nur gegen einander intriguiren, um jede ihren eigenen Prätendenten auf den Thron zu erheben und den Prätendenten der Gegenpartei auszuschließen, sondern, die sich alle vereinigen in gemeinschaftlichem Haß und gemeinschaftlichen Angriffen gegen die „Republik." Die Montagne ihrerseits erscheint im Gegensatze zu dieser royalistischen Konspiration als Vertreterin der „Republik." Die Ordnungspartei erscheint beständig beschäftigt mit einer „Reaktion," die sie nicht mehr nicht minder wie in Oesterreich gegen Presse, Assoziation u. dgl. richtet und in brutalen Polizeieinmischungen der Bureaukratie, der Gensdarmerie und der *Parkette* sich vollstreckt wie in Oesterreich. Die „Montagne" ihrerseits wieder ist ebenso fortwährend beschäftigt, diese Angriffe abzuwehren und so die „ewigen Menschenrechte" zu vertheidigen, wie jede sogenannte Volkspartei mehr oder minder seit anderthalb Jahrhunderten gethan hat. Vor einer nähern Betrachtung der Thätigkeit der Parteien verschwindet indeß dieser oberflächliche Schein, der den Blick

senkampf und die eigenthümliche Physiognomie dieser Periode verschleiert und sie so zu einer schatzhaltigen Mine für kannegießernde Politiker und republikanische Gesinnungsmänner macht.

Legitimisten und Orleanisten bildeten, wie gesagt, die zwei großen Fraktionen der Ordnungspartei. Was diese Fraktionen an ihren Prätendenten festhielt, und sie wechselseitig auseinander hielt, war es nichts Andres, als Lilie und Trikolore, Haus Bourbon und Haus Orléans, verschiedene Schattirungen des Royalismus, war es überhaupt das Glaubensbekenntniß des Royalismus? Unter den Bourbonen hatte das große Grundeigenthum regiert mit seinen Pfaffen und Lakaien, unter den Orléans die hohe Finanz, die große Industrie, der große Handel, d. h. das Kapital mit seinem Gefolge von Advokaten, Professoren und Schönrednern. Das legitime Königthum war blos der politische Ausdruck für die angestammte Herrschaft der Herren von Grund und Boden, wie die Julimonarchie nur der politische Ausdruck für die usurpirte Herrschaft der bürgerlichen Parvenues. Was also diese Fraktionen auseinander hielt, es waren keine sogenannten Prinzipien, es waren ihre materiellen Existenzbedingungen, zwei verschiedene Arten, des Eigenthums, es war der alte Gegensatz von Stadt und Land, die Rivalität zwischen Kapital und Grundeigenthum. Daß gleichzeitig alte Erinnerungen, persönliche Feindschaften, Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen, Vorurtheile und Illusionen, Sympathien und Antipathien, Ueberzeugungen, Glaubensartikel und Prinzipien sie an das eine oder das andre Königshaus band, wer leugnet es? Auf den verschiedenen Formen des Eigenthums, der sozialen Existenzbedingung, erhebt sich ein ganzer Ueberbau verschiedener und eigenthümlich gestalteter Empfindungen, Illusionen, Denkweisen und Lebensanschauungen. Die ganze Klasse schafft und gestaltet sie aus ihren materiellen Grundlagen heraus und aus den gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, die ihnen entsprechen. Das einzelne Individuum, dem sie durch Tradition und Erziehung zufließen, kann sich einbilden, daß sie die eigentlichen Bestimmungsgründe und den Ausgangspunkt seines Handelns bilden. Wie Orleanisten, Legitimisten jede Fraktion sich selbst und der andern vorzureden suchte, daß die Anhänglichkeit an ihre zwei Königshäuser sie trennte, so bewies später die Thatsache, daß vielmehr ihr gespaltenes Interesse die Vereinigung der zwei Königshäuser verbot. Und wie man ein Privatleben unterscheidet zwischen dem, was ein Mensch von sich meint und sagt, und dem, was er wirklich ist und thut, so muß man noch mehr in geschichtlichen Kämpfen die Phrasen und Einbildungen der Parteien von ihrer wirklichen Organisation und ihren wirklichen Interessen, ihre Vorstellung von ihrer Realität unterscheiden. Orleanisten und Legitimisten fanden sich in der Republik neben einander mit gleichen Ansprüchen. Wenn jede Seite gegen die andre die Restauration ihres eignen Königshauses durchsetzen wollte, so hieß das nichts Andres, als daß die zwei großen Interessen, worin die Bourgeoisie sich spaltet — Grundeigenthum und Kapital — jedes seine eigne Suprematie und die Unterordnung der andern zu restauriren suchte. Wir sprechen von zwei Interessen der Bourgeoisie, denn das große Grundeigenthum, trotz seiner feudalen Kotterie und seines Racenstolzes war durch die Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft vollständig verbürgerlicht. So haben die Tories in England sich lange eingebildet, daß sie für das Königthum, die Kirche und die Schönheiten der altenglischen Verfassung schwärmten, bis der Tag der Gefahr ihnen das Geständniß entriß, daß sie nur für die Grundrente schwärmten.

Die koalisirten Royalisten spielten ihre Intrigue gegen einander in der Presse, in Ems, in Claremont außerhalb des Parlaments. Hinter den Coulissen zogen sie ihre alten orleanistischen und legitimistischen Livréen wieder an und führten ihre alten Turniere wieder auf. Aber auf der öffentlichen Bühne, in ihren Haupt- und Staatsaktionen, als große parlamentarische Partei, fertigten sie ihre respektiven Königshäuser mit bloßen Reverenzen ab, vertagten die Restauration der Monarchie in infinitum *und verrichteten ihr wirkliches* Geschäft als Partei der Ordnung, d. h. *unter einem gesellschaftlichen* nicht unter einem politischen Titel.

als Vertreter der bürgerlichen Weltordnung, nicht als Ritter fahrender Prinzessinnen, als Bourgeoisklasse gegenüber andern Klassen, nicht als Royalisten gegenüber den Republikanern. Und als Partei der Ordnung haben sie eine unumschränktere und härtere Herrschaft über die andern Klassen der Gesellschaft ausgeübt, als sie je weder unter der Restauration noch unter der Julimonarchie vermochten, wie sie überhaupt nur unter der Form der parlamentarischen Republik möglich war, denn nur unter dieser Form konnten die zwei großen Abtheilungen der französischen Bourgeoisie sich vereinigen und die Herrschaft ihrer Klasse statt des Regimes einer privilegirten Fraktion derselben auf die Tagesordnung setzen. Wenn sie trotzdem auch als Partei der Ordnung die Republik insultiren und ihren Widerwillen gegen sie aussprechen, so geschieht es nicht nur aus royalistischer Erinnerung, sondern aus dem Instinkt, daß die republikanische Form zwar ihre politische Herrschaft vollendet und ihr allen fremden Schein abstreift, aber zugleich deren gesellschaftliche Grundlage unterwühlt, indem sie nun ohne Vermittlung, ohne den Versteck der Krone, ohne das nationale Interesse durch ihre unterordneten Kämpfe unter einander und mit dem Königthum ableiten zu können, den unterjochten Klassen gegenüberstehen und mit ihnen ringen müssen. Es geschieht aus Schwäche, die sie vor den reinen Bedingungen ihrer eignen Klassenherrschaft zurückbeben und sich nach den unvollständigern, unentwickelteren und eben darum gefahrloseren Formen derselben zurücksehnen läßt. So oft die koalisirten Royalisten dagegen in Konflikt mit dem Prätendenten gerathen, der ihnen gegenübersteht, mit Bonaparte, so oft sie ihre parlamentarische Allmacht von der Exekutivgewalt gefährdet glauben, so oft sie also den politischen Titel ihrer Herrschaft auskehren müssen, treten sie als Republikaner auf und nicht als Royalisten, von dem Orleanisten Thiers, der der Nationalversammlung zuruft, daß die Republik sie am wenigsten trenne, bis auf den Legitimisten Berryer, der am 2. Dezember 1851 die dreifarbige Schärpe umgewunden, das vor dem Mairiegebäude des zehnten Arrondissements versammelte Volk als Tribun im Namen der Republik haranguirt. Allerdings ruft ihm das Echo spottend zurück: Henri V.! Henri V.!

Der koalisirten Bourgeoisie gegenüber hatte sich eine Koalition zwischen Kleinbürgern und Arbeitern gebildet, die sogenannte sozial-demokratische Partei. Die Kleinbürger sahen sich nach den Junitagen 1848 schlecht belohnt, ihre materiellen Interessen gefährdet und die demokratischen Garantien, die ihnen die Geltendmachung dieser Interessen sichern sollten, von der Kontrerevolution in Frage gestellt. Sie näherten sich daher den Arbeitern. Ihre parlamentarische Repräsentation andrerseits, die Montagne, während der Diktatur der Bourgeois-Republikaner bei Seite geschoben, hatte in der letzten Lebenshälfte der Konstituante durch den Kampf mit Bonaparte und den royalistischen Ministern ihre verlorne Popularität wiedererobert. Sie hatte mit den sozialistischen Führern eine Allianz geschlossen. Februar 1849 waren Versöhnungs-Banquette gefeiert. Ein gemeinschaftliches Programm wurde entworfen, gemeinschaftliche Wahlkomités wurden gestiftet und gemeinschaftliche Kandidaten aufgestellt. Den sozialen Forderungen des Proletariats wurde die revolutionäre Pointe abgebrochen und eine demokratische Wendung gegeben, den demokratischen Ansprüchen des Kleinbürgerthums wurde die blos politische Form abgestreift und ihre sozialistische Pointe herausgekehrt. So entstand die Sozial-Demokratie. Die neue Montagne, das Ergebniß dieser Kombination, enthielt, einige Figuranten aus der Arbeiterklasse und einige sozialistische Sektirer abgerechnet, dieselben Elemente wie die alte Montagne, nur numerisch stärker. Aber im Laufe der Entwickelung hatte sie sich verändert mit der Klasse, die sie vertrat. Der eigenthümliche Charakter der Sozial-Demokratie faßt sich dahin zusammen, daß demokratisch-republikanische Institutionen als Mittel verlangt werden, nicht um zwei Extreme, Kapital und Lohnarbeit, beide aufzuheben, sondern um ihren Gegensatz abzuschwächen und in Harmonie zu verwandeln. Wie *verschiedene Maßregeln* zur Erreichung dieses Zweckes vorgeschlagen werden mögen, *wie sehr er mit mehr* oder minder revolutionären Vorstellungen sich verbrämen mag,

er Inhalt bleibt derselbe. Dieser Inhalt ist die Umänderung der Gesellschaft auf emokratischem Wege, aber eine Umänderung innerhalb der Grenzen des Kleinbürerthums. Man muß sich nur nicht die bornirte Vorstellung machen, als wenn das kleinbürgerthum prinzipiell ein egoistisches Klasseninteresse durchsetzen wolle. Es laubt vielmehr, daß die besondern Bedingungen seiner Befreiung die allgemeinen Bedingungen sind, innerhalb deren allein die moderne Gesellschaft gerettet und der Klassenkampf vermieden werden kann. Man muß sich ebensowenig vorstellen, daß ie demokratischen Repräsentanten nun alle shopkeepers sind oder für dieselben chwärmen. Sie können ihrer Bildung und ihrer individuellen Lage nach himmelweit von ihnen getrennt sein. Was sie zu Vertretern des Kleinbürgers macht, ist, aß sie im Kopfe nicht über die Schranken hinauskommen, worüber jener nicht im Leben hinauskommt, daß sie daher zu denselben Aufgaben und Lösungen theoretisch etrieben werden, wohin jene das materielle Interesse und die gesellschaftliche Lage raktisch treiben. Dies ist überhaupt das Verhältniß der politischen und iterarischen Vertreter einer Klasse zu der Klasse, die sie vertreten.

Nach der gegebenen Auseinandersetzung versteht sich von selbst, daß, wenn die Montagne mit der Ordnungspartei fortwährend um die Republik und die sogenannten Menschenrechte ringt, weder die Republik noch die Menschenrechte ihr letzter Zweck sind, so wenig wie eine Armee, die man ihrer Waffen berauben will und die ich zur Wehr setzt, auf den Kampfplatz getreten ist, um sich den Besitz ihrer eignen Waffen zu sichern.

Die Partei der Ordnung provozirte gleich beim Zusammentritte der Nationalversammlung die Montagne. Die Bourgeoisie fühlte jetzt die Nothwendigkeit, mit en demokratischen Kleinbürgern fertig zu werden, wie sie ein Jahr vorher die Nothwendigkeit begriffen hatte, mit dem revolutionären Proletariat zu enden. Nur war ie Situation des Gegners eine verschiedene. Die Stärke der proletarischen Partei ar auf der Straße, die der Kleinbürger in der Nationalversammlung selbst. Es alt also, sie aus der Nationalversammlung auf die Straße zu locken und sie selbst re parlamentarische Macht zerbrechen zu lassen, ehe Zeit und Gelegenheit sie konolidiren konnte. Die Montagne sprengt mit verhängtem Zügel in die Falle.

Das Bombardement Rom's durch die französischen Truppen war der Köder, er ihnen hingeworfen wurde. Es verletzte Art. V der Konstitution, der der franzöischen Republik untersagt, ihre Streitkräfte gegen die Freiheiten eines andern olks zu verwenden. Zudem verbot auch Art. IV jede Kriegserklärung von Seien der Exekutivgewalt ohne Zustimmung der Nationalversammlung, und die Konituante hatte durch ihren Beschluß vom 8. Mai die römische Expedition gemißbilligt. uf diese Gründe hin deponirte Ledru-Rollin am 11. Juni 1849 einen Anklageakt egen Bonaparte und seine Minister und, durch die Wespenstiche von Thiers aufereizt, ließ er sich zu der Drohung fortreißen, die Konstitution mit allen Mitteln ertheidigen zu wollen, selbst mit den Waffen in der Hand. Die Montagne erhob ch wie Ein Mann und wiederholte diesen Waffenruf. Am 12. Juni verwarf die Nationalversammlung den Anklageakt und die Montagne verließ das Parlament. Die Ereignisse des 13. Juni sind bekannt: die Proklamation eines Theils der Montagne, wodurch Bonaparte und seine Minister „außerhalb der Konstitution erklärt wurden; die Straßenprozession der demokratischen Nationalgarden, die waffenlos, wie sie waren, bei dem Zusammentreffen mit den Truppen Changarnier's auseinander stoben u. s. w. u. s. w. Ein Theil der Montagne flüchtete in's Ausland, ein anderer wurde dem Hochgerichte in Bourges überwiesen, und ein parlamentarisches Reglement unterwarf den Rest der schulmeisterlichen Aufsicht des Präsidenten der Nationalversammlung. Paris wurde wieder in Belagerungszustand versetzt und der demokratische Theil seiner Nationalgarde aufgelöst. So war der Einfluß der Montagne im Parlamente und die Macht der Kleinbürger in Paris gebrochen.

Lyon, wo der 13. Juni das Signal zu einem blutigen Arbeiteraufstande gegeben hatte, wurde mit den fünf umliegenden Departements ebenfalls in Belagerungszustand erklärt, ein Zustand, der bis auf diesen Augenblick fortdauert.

Das Gros der Montagne hatte seine Avantgarde im Stiche gelassen, indem es ihrer Proklamation die Unterschriften verweigerte. Die Presse war desertirt, indem nur zwei Journale das Pronunziamento zu veröffentlichen wagten. Die Kleinbürger verriethen ihre Repräsentanten indem die Nationalgarden ausblieben oder wo sie erschienen, den Barrikadenbau verhinderten. Die Repräsentanten hatten die Kleinbürger dupirt, indem die angeblichen Affiliirten von der Armee nirgends zu erblicken waren. Endlich, statt von ihm Kraftzuschuß zu gewinnen, hatte die demokratische Partei das Proletariat mit ihrer eignen Schwäche angesteckt, und, wie gewöhnlich bei demokratischen Hochthaten, hatten die Führer die Genugthuung, ihr „Volk" der Desertion und das Volk die Genugthuung, seine Führer der Prellerei beschuldigen zu können.

Selten war eine Aktion mit größerem Geräusch verkündet worden, als der bevorstehende Feldzug der Montagne, selten ein Ereigniß mit mehr Sicherheit und länger vorher austrompetet, als der unvermeidliche Sieg der Demokratie. Ganz gewiß: die Demokraten glauben an die Posaunen, vor deren Stößen die Mauern Jericho's einstürzten. Und so oft sie den Wällen des Despotismus gegenüberstehen, suchen sie das Wunder nachzumachen. Wenn die Montagne im Parlamente siegen wollte, durfte sie nicht zu den Waffen rufen. Wenn sie im Parlamente zu den Waffen rief, durfte sie sich auf der Straße nicht parlamentarisch verhalten. Wenn die friedliche Demonstration ernst gemeint war, so war es albern, nicht vorherzusehen, daß sie kriegerisch empfangen werden würde. Wenn es auf den wirklichen Kampf abgesehen war, so war es originell, die Waffen abzulegen, mit denen er geführt werden mußte. Aber die revolutionären Drohungen der Kleinbürger und ihrer demokratischen Vertreter sind bloße Einschüchterungsversuche des Gegners. Und wenn sie sich in eine Sackgasse verrannt, wenn sie sich hinlänglich kompromittirt haben, um zur Ausführung ihrer Drohungen gezwungen zu sein, so geschieht es in einer zweideutigen Weise, die nichts mehr vermeidet als die Mittel zum Zwecke und nach Vorwänden zum Unterliegen hascht. Die schmetternde Ouverture, die den Kampf verkündete, verliert sich in ein kleinlautes Knurren, sobald er beginnen soll, die Schauspieler hören auf sich au sérieux zu nehmen und die Handlung fällt platt zusammen, wie ein luftgefüllter Ballon, den man mit einer Nadel pickt.

Keine Partei übertreibt sich mehr ihre Mittel, als die demokratische, keine täuscht sich leichtsinniger über die Situation. Wenn ein Theil der Armee für sie gestimmt hatte, war die Montagne nun auch überzeugt, daß die Armee für sie revoltiren werde. Und bei welchem Anlasse? Bei einem Anlasse, der vom Standpunkte der Truppen keinen andern Sinn hatte, als daß die Revolutionäre für die römischen Soldaten gegen die französischen Soldaten Partei ergriffen. Von den Arbeitern mußte die Montagne wissen, daß die Erinnerungen an den Juni 1848 noch zu frisch waren, als daß nicht eine tiefe Abneigung des Proletariats gegen die Nationalgarde und ein durchgreifendes Mißtrauen der Chefs der geheimen Gesellschaften gegen die demokratischen Chefs existiren mußte. Um diese Differenzen auszugleichen, dazu bedurfte es großer gemeinschaftlicher Interessen, die auf dem Spiele standen. Die Verletzung eines abstrakten Verfassungsparagraphen konnte das Interesse nicht bieten. War die Verfassung nicht schon wiederholt verletzt worden nach der Versicherung der Demokraten selbst? Hatten die populärsten Journale sie nicht als ein kontrerevolutionäres Machwerk gebrandmarkt? Aber der Demokrat, weil er das Kleinbürgerthum vertritt, also eine Uebergangsklasse, worin die Interessen zweier Klassen sich zugleich abstumpfen, dünkt sich über den Klassengegensatz überhaupt erhaben. Die Demokraten geben zu, daß eine privilegirte Klasse ihnen gegenübersteht, aber sie mit der ganzen übrigen Umgebung der Nation bilden das Volk. Was sie vertreten, ist das Volksrecht; was sie interessirt, ist das Volksinteresse. Sie brauchen daher bei einem bevorstehenden Kampfe die Interessen und Stellungen der verschiedenen Klassen nicht zu prüfen. Sie brauchen *ihre eignen* Mittel nicht allzu bedenklich abzuwägen. Sie haben eben nur das Signal zu geben, damit das Volk mit allen seinen unerschöpflichen Resourcen über

die Dränger herfalle. Stellen sich nun in der Ausführung ihre Interessen als uninteressant und ihre Macht als Ohnmacht heraus, so liegt das entweder an verderblichen Sophisten, die das untheilbare Volk in verschiedene feindliche Lager spalten, oder die Armee war zu verthiert und zu verblendet, um die reinen Zwecke der Demokratie als ihr eignes Beste zu begreifen, oder an einem Detail der Ausführung ist das Ganze gescheitert, oder aber ein unvorhergesehener Zufall hat für diesmal die Partie vereitelt. Jedenfalls geht der Demokrat eben so makellos aus der schmählichsten Niederlage heraus, wie er unschuldig in sie hineingegangen ist, mit der neugewonnenen Ueberzeugung, daß er siegen muß, nicht daß er selbst und seine Partei den alten Standpunkt aufzugeben, sondern umgekehrt, daß die Verhältnisse ihm entgegenzureifen haben.

Man muß sich daher die dezimirte, gebrochene und durch das neue parlamentarische Reglement gedemüthigte Montagne nicht gar zu unglücklich vorstellen. Die Diäten und die offizielle Stellung waren für viele derselben ein täglich neuer Quell des Trostes. Wenn der 13. Juni ihre Chefs beseitigt hatte, so machte er andrerseits ihren Platz untergeordneteren Kapazitäten zugänglich, denen diese neue Stellung schmeichelte. Wenn ihre Machtlosigkeit im Parlamente nicht mehr bezweifelt werden konnte, so waren sie nun auch berechtigt, ihre That auf Ausbrüche sittlicher Entrüstung und polternder Deklamationen zu beschränken. Wenn die Ordnungspartei in ihnen als den letzten offiziellen Repräsentanten der Revolution alle Schrecken der Anarchie verkörpert zu sehen vorgab, so konnten sie in der Wirklichkeit desto platter und bescheidener sein. Ueber den 13. Juni aber vertrösteten sie sich mit der tiefen Wendung: Aber wenn man das allgemeine Wahlrecht anzugreifen wagt, aber dann! Dann werden wir zeigen, wer wir sind. Nous verons.

Was die in's Ausland geflüchteten Montagnards betrifft, so genügt es hier zu bemerken, daß Ledru-Rollin, weil es ihm gelungen war, in kaum zwei Wochen die mächtige Partei, an deren Spitze er stand, rettungslos zu ruiniren, sich nun berufen fand, eine französische Regierung in partibus zu bilden, daß seine Figur, in der Form, vom Boden der Aktion weggehoben, im Maßstab als das Niveau der Revolution sank und die offiziellen Größen des offiziellen Frankreichs zwerghafter wurden, an Größe zu wachsen schien, daß er als republikanischer Prätendent für 1852 figuriren konnte, daß er periodische Rundschreiben an die Wallachen und andere Völker erließ, worin den Despoten des Kontinents mit seinen und seiner Verbündeten Thaten gedroht wird. Hatte Proudhon ganz Unrecht, wenn er diesen Herren zurief: "Vous n'êtes que de blangueurs?"

Die Ordnungspartei hatte am 13. Juni nicht nur die Montagne gebrochen, sie hatte die Unterordnung der Konstitution unter die Majoritätsbeschlüsse der Nationalversammlung durchgesetzt. Und so verstand sie die Republik. Daß die Bourgeoisie hier in parlamentarischen Formen herrsche, ohne wie in der Monarchie an dem Veto der Exekutivgewalt oder an der Auflösbarkeit des Parlaments eine Schranke zu finden. Das war die parlamentarische Republik, wie Thiers sie nannte. Aber wenn die Bourgeoisie am 13. Juni ihre Allmacht innerhalb des Parlamentsgebäudes sicherte, schlug sie nicht das Parlament selbst der Exekutivgewalt und dem Volke gegenüber mit unheilbarer Schwäche, indem sie den populärsten Theil desselben ausstieß? Indem sie zahlreiche Deputirte ohne weitere Ceremonien den Requisitionen der Parkette preisgab, hob sie ihre eigne parlamentarische Unverletzlichkeit auf. Das demüthigende Reglement, dem sie die Montagne unterwarf, erhöhte in demselben Maße den Präsidenten der Republik, als es den einzelnen Repräsentanten des Volks herabdrückte. Indem sie die Insurrektion zur Behauptung der konstitutionellen Verfassung als anarchische auf den Umsturz der Gesellschaft abzweckende That verdammte, verbot sie sich selbst den Appell an die Insurrektion, sobald die Exekutivgewalt ihr gegenüber die Verfassung verletzen würde. *Die Ironie der Geschichte* wollte, daß der General, der im Auftra

Bonaparte's Rom bombardirt, und so den unmittelbaren Anlaß zu der konstitutionellen Emeute vom 13. Juni gegeben hatte, daß Oudinot am 2. Dezember 1851 dem Volke von der Ordnungspartei flehentlich und vergeblich als General der Konstitution gegen Bonaparte angeboten werden mußte. Ein anderer Held des 13. Juni, Vieyra, der von der Tribüne der Nationalversammlung Lob einärndtete für die Brutalitäten, die er in demokratischen Zeitungslokalen an der Spitze einer der hohen Finanz angehörigen Rotte verübt hatte, dieser selbe Vieyra war in die Verschwörung Bonaparte's eingeweiht und trug wesentlich dazu bei, in ihrer Todesstunde der Nationalversammlung jeden Schutz von Seiten der Nationalgarde abzuschneiden.

Der 13. Juni hatte noch einen andern Sinn. Die Montagne hatte Bonaparte's Versetzung in Anklagezustand ertrotzen wollen. Ihre Niederlage war also ein direkter Sieg Bonaparte's, sein persönlicher Triumph über seine demokratischen Feinde. Die Partei der Ordnung erfocht den Sieg, Bonaparte hatte ihn nur einzukassiren. Er that es. Am 14. Juni war eine Proklamation an den Mauern von Paris zu lesen, worin der Präsident, gleichsam ohne sein Zuthun, widerstrebend, durch die bloße Macht der Ereignisse gezwungen aus seiner klösterlichen Abgeschiedenheit hervortritt, als verkannte Tugend über die Verläumdungen seiner Widersacher klagt und während er seine Person mit der Sache der Ordnung zu identifiziren scheint, vielmehr die Sache der Ordnung mit seiner Person identifizirt. Zudem hatte die Nationalversammlung die Expedition gegen Rom zwar nachträglich gebilligt, aber Bonaparte hatte die Initiative dazu ergriffen. Nachdem er den Hoheprieſter Salomon in den Vatikan wieder eingeführt, konnte er hoffen, als König David wieder die Tuilerien zu beziehen. Er hatte die Pfaffen gewonnen.

Die Emeute vom 13. Juni beschränkte sich, wie wir gesehen, auf eine friedliche Straßenprozession. Es waren also keine kriegerischen Lorbeeren gegen sie zu gewinnen. Nichts desto weniger, in dieser Helden- und Ereigniß- armen Zeit verwandelte die Ordnungspartei diese Schlacht ohne Blutvergießen in ein zweites Austerlitz. Tribune und Presse priesen die Armee als die Macht der Ordnung gegenüber den Volksmassen als der Ohnmacht der Anarchie und den Changarnier als das „Bollwerk der Gesellschaft." Mystifikation, an die er schließlich selbst glaubte. Unter der Hand aber wurden die Korps, die zweideutig schienen, aus Paris verlegt, die Regimenter, deren Waffen am demokratischsten ausgefallen waren, aus Frankreich nach Algier verbannt, die unruhigen Köpfe unter den Truppen in Strafabtheilungen verwiesen, endlich die Absperrung der Presse von der Kaserne und der Kaserne von der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft systematisch durchgeführt.

Wir sind hier bei dem entscheidenden Wendepunkte in der Geschichte der französischen Nationalgarde angelangt. 1830 hatte sie den Sturz der Restauration entschieden. Unter Louis Philippe mißglückte jede Emeute, worin die Nationalgarde auf Seite der Truppen stand. Als sie in den Februartagen 1848 sich passiv gegen den Aufstand und zweideutig gegen Louis Philippe zeigte, gab er sich verloren und war er verloren. So hatte die Ueberzeugung Wurzel geschlagen, daß die Revolution nicht ohne, und die Armee nicht gegen die Nationalgarde siegen könne. Es war dies der Aberglaube der Armee an die bürgerliche Allmacht. Die Junitage 1848, wo die gesammte Nationalgarde mit den Linientruppen die Insurrektion niederwarf, hatten den Aberglauben befestigt. Nach Bonaparte's Regierungsantritt sank die Stellung der Nationalgarde einigermaßen durch die konstitutionswidrige Vereinigung ihres Kommandos mit dem Kommando der ersten Militärdivision in der Person Changarnier's.

Wie das Kommando über sie hier als ein Attribut des militärischen Oberbefehlshabers erschien, so sie selbst nur noch als Anhang der Linientruppen. Am 13. Juni endlich wurde sie gebrochen: Nicht nur durch die theilweise Auflösung der Nationalgarde, die sich seit dieser Zeit periodisch an allen Punkten Frankreichs wiederholte und nur Trümmer von ihr zurückließ. Die Demonstration

des 13. Juni war vor Allem eine Demonstration der demokratischen Nationalgarden. Sie hatten zwar nicht ihre Waffen, wohl aber ihre Uniformen der Armee gegenübergeführt, aber gerade in dieser Uniform saß der Talisman. Die Armee überzeugte sich, daß diese Uniform ein wollener Lappen wie ein andrer war. Der Zauber ging verloren. In den Junitagen 1848 waren Bourgeoisie und Kleinbürgerthum als Nationalgarde mit der Armee gegen das Proletariat vereinigt, am 13. Juni 1849 ließ die Bourgeoisie die kleinbürgerliche Nationalgarde von der Armee auseinander sprengen, am 2. Dezember 1851 war die Nationalgarde der Bourgeoisie selbst verschwunden und Bonaparte konstatirte nur dies Faktum, als er nachträglich ihr Auflösungsdekret unterschrieb. So hatte die Bourgeoisie selbst ihre letzte Waffe gegen die Armee zerbrochen, aber sie mußte sie zerbrechen von dem Augenblicke, wo das Kleinbürgerthum nicht mehr als Vasall hinter ihr, sondern als Rebell vor ihr stand, wie sie überhaupt alle ihre Vertheidigungsmittel gegen den Absolutismus mit eigner Hand zerstören mußte, sobald sie selbst absolut geworden war.

Die Ordnungspartei feierte unterdeß in der Nationalversammlung die Wiedereroberung einer Macht, die 1848 nur verloren schien, um 1849 von ihren Schranken befreit wiedergefunden zu werden, durch Invektiven gegen die Republik und die Konstitution, durch Verfluchung aller zukünftigen, gegenwärtigen und vergangenen Revolutionen, die eingerechnet, welche ihre eignen Führer gemacht hatten, und in Gesetzen, wodurch die Presse geknebelt, die Assoziation vernichtet und der Belagerungszustand als organisches Institut regulirt wurde. Die Nationalversammlung vertagte sich dann von Mitte August bis Mitte Oktober, nachdem sie eine Permanenzkommission für die Zeit ihrer Abwesenheit ernannt hatte. Während dieser Ferien intriguirten die Legitimisten mit Ems, die Orleanisten mit Claremont, Bonaparte durch prinzliche Rundreisen und die Departementalräthe in Berathungen über die Revision der Verfassung, — Vorfälle, die in den periodischen Ferien der Nationalversammlung regelmäßig wiederkehren und auf die ich erst eingehen will, sobald sie zu Ereignissen werden. Hier sei nur noch bemerkt, daß die Nationalversammlung unpolitisch handelte, als sie für längere Intervalle von der Bühne verschwand und auf der Spitze der Republik nur noch Eine, wenn auch klägliche Gestalt erblicken ließ, die Louis Bonaparte's, während die Partei der Ordnung zum Skandale des Publikums in ihre royalistischen Bestandtheile auseinander und ihren sich widerstreitenden Restaurationsgelüsten nachging. So oft während diesen Ferien der verwirrende Lärm des Parlaments verstummte und sein Körper sich in die Nation auflöste, zeigte sich unverkennbar, daß nur noch Eins fehle, um die wahre Gestalt dieser Republik zu vollenden: Seine Ferien permanent machen und ihre Aufschrift: Liberté, égalité, fraternité, ersetzen durch die unzweideutigen Worte: Infanterie, Cavallerie, Artillerie!

IV.

Mitte Oktober 1849 war die Nationalversammlung zusammengetreten. Am 1. November überraschte Bonaparte sie mit einer Botschaft, worin er die Entlassung des Ministeriums Barrot-Fallour und die Bildung eines neuen Ministeriums anzeigte. Man hat Lakaien nie mit weniger Ceremonien aus dem Dienste gejagt, als Bonaparte seine Minister. Die Fußtritte, die der Nationalversammlung bestimmt waren, erhielt vorläufig hier Barrot u. Comp.

Das Ministerium Barrot war, wie wir gesehen haben, aus Legitimisten und Orleanisten zusammengesetzt, ein Ministerium der Ordnungspartei. Bonaparte hatte desselben bedurft, um die republikanische Konstituante aufzulösen, die Expedition gegen Rom zu bewerkstelligen und die demokratische Partei zu brechen. Hinter diesem *Ministerium hatte er sich* scheinbar ekliptisirt, die Regierungsgewalt in die

Hände der Ordnungspartei abgetreten und die bescheidene Charaktermaske angelegt, die zu Paris die verantwortlichen Garanten der Zeitungspresse tragen, die Maske des homme de paille. Jetzt warf er eine Larve weg, die nicht mehr der leichte Vorhang war, worunter er seine Physiognomie verstecken konnte, sondern die eiserne Maske, die ihn verhinderte, eine eigne Physiognomie zu zeigen. Er hatte das Ministerium Barrot eingesetzt, um im Namen der Ordnungspartei die republikanische Nationalversammlung zu sprengen; er entließ es, um seinen eignen Namen von der Nationalversammlung der Ordnungspartei unabhängig zu erklären.

An plausiblen Vorwänden zu dieser Entlassung fehlte es nicht. Das Ministerium Barrot vernachlässigte selbst die Anstandsformen, die den Präsidenten der Republik als eine Macht neben der Nationalversammlung hätten erscheinen lassen. Während der Ferien der Nationalversammlung veröffentlichte Bonaparte einen Brief an Edgar Ney, worin er das illiberale Auftreten des Pabstes zu mißbilligen schien, wie er im Gegensatz zur Konstituante einen Brief veröffentlicht hatte, worin er Oudinot für den Angriff auf die römische Republik belobte. Als nun die Nationalversammlung das Budget für die römische Expedition votirte, brachte Victor Hugo aus liberalem Interesse jenen Brief zur Sprache. Die Ordnungspartei erstickte den Einfall, als ob Bonaparte's Einfälle irgend ein politisches Gewicht haben könnten, unter verächtlich ungläubigen Ausrufungen. Keiner der Minister nahm den Handschuh für ihn auf. Bei einer andern Gelegenheit ließ Barrot mit seinem bekannten hohlen Pathos Worte der Entrüstung von der Rednerbühne auf die „abominablen Umtriebe" fallen, die nach seiner Aussage in der nächsten Umgebung des Präsidenten vorgingen. Endlich weigerte sich das Ministerium, während es der Herzogin von Orleans einen Witwengehalt von der Nationalversammlung erwirkte, die Erhöhung der präsidentiellen Civilliste zu beantragen. Und in Bonaparte war der kaiserliche Prätendent so innig verschmolzen mit dem heruntergekommenen Glücksritter, daß die Eine große Idee, er sei berufen, das Kaiserthum zu restauriren, stets von der andern ergänzt ward, das französische Volk sei berufen, seine Schulden zu bezahlen.

Das Ministerium Barrot-Fallour war das erste und letzte *parlamentarische Ministerium*, das Bonaparte in's Leben rief. Die Entlassung desselben bildet daher einen entscheidenden Wendepunkt. Mit ihm verlor die Ordnungspartei, um ihn nie wieder zu erobern, einen unentbehrlichen Posten für die Behauptung des parlamentarischen Regimes, die Handhabe der Exekutivgewalt. Man begreift sogleich, daß in einem Lande wie Frankreich, wo die Exekutivgewalt über ein Beamtenheer von mehr als einer halben Million von Individuen verfügt, also eine ungeheure Masse von Interessen und Existenzen beständig in der unbedingtesten Abhängigkeit erhält, wo der Staat die bürgerliche Gesellschaft von ihren umfassendsten Lebensäußerungen bis zu ihren unbedeutendsten Regungen hinab, von ihren allgemeinsten Daseinsweisen bis zur Privatexistenz der Individuen umstrickt, kontrollirt, maßregelt, überwacht und bevormundet, wo dieser Parasitenkörper durch die außerordentlichste Centralisation eine Allgegenwart, Allwissenheit, eine beschleunigte Bewegungsfähigkeit und Schnellkraft gewinnt, die nur in der hülflosen Unselbstständigkeit, in der zerfahrenen Unförmlichkeit des wirklichen Gesellschaftskörpers ein Analogon finden, daß in einem solchen Lande die Nationalversammlung mit der Verfügung über die Ministerstellen jeden wirklichen Einfluß verloren gab, wenn sie nicht gleichzeitig die Staatsverwaltung vereinfachte, das Beamtenheer möglichst verringerte, endlich die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und die öffentliche Meinung ihre eignen von der Regierungsgewalt unabhängigen Organe erschaffen ließ. Aber das *materielle Interesse* der französischen Bourgeoisie ist gerade auf das Innigste mit der Erhaltung jener breiten und vielverzweigten Staatsmaschine verwebt. Hier bringt sie ihre überschüssige Bevölkerung unter und ergänzt in der Form von Staatsgehalten, was sie nicht in der Form von Profiten, Zinsen, Renten und Honoraren einstecken kann. Andrerseits zwang ihr *politisches Interesse* sie, die Regression, also die Mittel und das Personal der Staatsgewalt täglich zu

ermehren, während sie gleichzeitig einen ununterbrochenen Krieg gegen die öffent-
che Meinung führen und die selbstständigen Bewegungsorgane der Gesellschaft
ißtrauisch verfolgen, verstümmeln, lähmen mußte, wo es ihr nicht gelang sie
änzlich zu amputiren. So war die französische Bourgeoisie durch ihre Klassenstel-
ung gezwungen, einerseits die Lebensbedingungen einer jeden, also auch ihrer eig-
en parlamentarischen Gewalt zu vernichten, andrerseits die ihr feindliche Exekutiv-
ewalt unwiderstehlich zu machen.

Das neue Ministerium hieß das Ministerium d'Hautpoul. Nicht als hätte
eneral d'Hautpoul den Rang eines Ministerpräsidenten erhalten. Mit Barrot
hasste Bonaparte vielmehr zugleich diese Würde ab, die den Präsidenten der Re-
ublik allerdings zur legalen Nichtigkeit eines konstitutionellen Königs verdammte,
der eines konstitutionellen Königs ohne Thron und ohne Krone, ohne Scepter
nd ohne Schwert, ohne Unverantwortlichkeit, ohne den unverjährbaren Besitz der
öchsten Staatswürde, und was das fatalste war, ohne Civilliste. Das Ministe-
um d'Hautpoul besaß nur einen Mann von parlamentarischem Rufe, den Juden
ould, eins der berüchtigsten Glieder der hohen Finanz. Ihm fiel das Finanz-
inisterium anheim. Man schlage die Pariser Börsennotationen nach und man
ird finden, daß vom 1. November 1849 an die französischen Fonds steigen und
llen mit dem Fallen und Steigen der bonapartistischen Aktien. Während Bona-
arte so seinen Affiliirten in der Börse gefunden hatte, bemächtigte er sich zugleich
r Polizei, indem er Carlier zum Polizeipräfekten von Paris ernannte.

Indeß konnten sich die Folgen des Ministerwechsels erst im Laufe der Entwicke-
ng herausstellen. Zunächst hatte Bonaparte nur einen Schritt vorwärts gethan,
n desto augenfälliger rückwärts getrieben zu werden. Seiner barschen Botschaft
lgte die servilste Unterthänigkeitserklärung an die Nationalversammlung. So oft
e Minister den schüchternen Versuch wagten, seine persönlichen Marotten als
esetzesvorschläge einzubringen, schienen sie selbst nur widerwillig und durch ihre
tellung gezwungen die komischen Aufträge zu erfüllen, von deren Erfolglosigkeit
im voraus überzeugt waren. So oft Bonaparte im Rücken der Minister seine
bsichten ausplauderte und mit seinen "idées napoléoniennes" spielte, desavouirten
n die eignen Minister von der Tribüne der Nationalversammlung herab. Seine
urvationsgelüste schienen nur laut zu werden, damit das schadenfrohe Gelächter
r Gegner nicht verstumme. Er gebärdete sich als ein verkanntes Genie, das alle
elt für einen Simpel ausgibt. Nie genoß er in vollerem Maße die Verachtung
ler Klassen, als während dieser Periode. Nie herrschte die Bourgeoisie unbeding-
, nie trug sie prahlerischer die Insignien der Herrschaft zur Schau.

Ich habe hier nicht die Geschichte ihrer gesetzgeberischen Thätigkeit zu schreiben,
e sich während dieser Periode in zwei Gesetzen resumirt: in dem Gesetze, das die
Weinsteuer wiederherstellt, in dem Unterrichtsgesetze, das den Unglau-
n abschafft. Wenn den Franzosen das Weintrinken erschwert, ward ihnen desto
ichlicher vom Wasser des wahren Lebens geschenkt. Wenn die Bourgeoisie in dem
esetze über die Weinsteuer das alte gehässige französische Steuersystem für unan-
stbar erklärt, sucht sie durch das Unterrichtsgesetz den alten Gemüthszustand der
lassen zu sichern, der es ertragen ließ. Man ist erstaunt, die Orleanisten, die
eralen Bourgeois, diese alten Apostel des Voltairianismus und der eklectischen
hilosophie, ihren Stammfeinden, den Jesuiten, die Verwaltung des französischen
eistes anvertrauen zu sehen. Aber Orleanisten und Legitimisten konnten in Be-
hung auf den Kronprätendenten auseinandergehen, sie begriffen, daß ihre ver-
nte Herrschaft die Unterdrückungsmittel zweier Epochen zu vereinigen gebot, daß
e Unterdrückungsmittel der Julimonarchie durch die Unterdrückungsmittel der
estauration ergänzt und verstärkt werden mußten.

Die Bauern, in allen ihren Hoffnungen getäuscht, durch den niedrigen Stand
r Getreidepreise einerseits, durch die wachsende Steuerlast und Hypothekenschuld
nderseits mehr als je erdrückt, begannen sich in den Departements zu regen.
n antwortete ihnen durch die Hetzjagd auf die Schulmeister, die den Geistlichen

durch die Hetzjagd auf die Maires, die dem Präfekten, und durch ein System der Spionage, dem Alle unterworfen wurden. In Paris und den großen Städten trägt die Reaktion selbst die Physiognomie ihrer Epoche und fordert mehr heraus, als sie niederschlägt. Auf dem Lande wird sie platt, gemein, kleinlich, ermüdend, plackend, mit einem Worte Gensdarm. Man begreift, wie drei Jahre vom Régime des Gensdarmen, eingeseguet durch das Régime des Pfaffen unreife Massen demoralisiren mußten.

Welche Summe von Leidenschaft und Deklamation die Ordnungspartei von der Tribune der Nationalversammlung herab gegen die Minorität aufwenden mochte, ihre Rede blieb einsylbig, wie die des Christen, dessen Worte sein sollen: Ja, ja, nein, nein! Einsylbig von der Tribune herab, wie in der Presse. Fad wie ein Räthsel, dessen Lösung im voraus bekannt ist. Handelte es sich um Petitionsrecht oder um Weinsteuer, um Preßfreiheit oder um Freihandel, um Klubs oder um Munizipalverfassung, um Schutz der persönlichen Freiheit oder um Regelung des Staatshaushaltes, das Losungswort kehrt immer wieder, das Thema bleibt immer dasselbe, der Urtheilsspruch ist immer fertig und lautet unveränderlich: „Sozialismus"! Für sozialistisch wird selbst der bürgerliche Liberalismus erklärt, für sozialistisch die bürgerliche Aufklärung, für sozialistisch die bürgerliche Finanzreform. Es war sozialistisch, eine Eisenbahn zu bauen, wo schon ein Kanal vorhanden war, und es war sozialistisch, sich mit dem Stocke zu vertheidigen, wenn man mit dem Degen angegriffen wurde.

Es war dies nicht bloße Redeform, Mode, Parteitaktik. Die Bourgeoisie hatte die richtige Einsicht, daß alle Waffen, die gegen den Feudalismus geschmiedet, ihre Spitze gegen sie selbst kehrten, daß alle Bildungsmittel, die sie erzeugt, gegen ihre eigne Civilisation rebellirten, daß alle Götter, die sie geschaffen, von ihr abgefallen waren. Sie begriff, daß alle sogenannten bürgerlichen Freiheiten und Fortschrittsorgane ihre Klassenherrschaft zugleich an der gesellschaftlichen Grundlage und an der politischen Spitze angriffen und bedrohten, also „sozialistisch" geworden waren. In dieser Drohung und in diesem Angriffe fand sie mit Recht das Geheimniß des Sozialismus, dessen Sinn und Tendenz sie richtiger beurtheilt, als der sogenannte Sozialismus sich selbst zu beurtheilen weiß, der daher nicht begreifen kann, wie die Bourgeoisie sich verstockt gegen ihn verschließt, mag er nun sentimental über die Leiden der Menschheit winseln, oder christlich das tausendjährige Reich und die allgemeine Bruderliebe verkünden, oder humanistisch von Geist, Bildung, Freiheit faseln, oder doktrinär ein System der Vermittlung und der Wohlfahrt aller Klassen ausbecken. Was sie aber nicht begriff, war die Konsequenz, daß ihr eignes parlamentarisches Régime, daß ihre politische Herrschaft überhaupt nun auch als sozialistisch dem allgemeinen Verdammungsurtheil verfallen mußte. So lange die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisklasse sich nicht vollständig organisirt, nicht ihren reinen politischen Ausdruck gewonnen hatte, konnte auch der Gegensatz der andern Klassen nicht rein hervortreten, und wo er hervortrat, nicht die gefährliche Wendung nehmen, die sofort das Eigenthum, die Religion, die Familie, die Ordnung in Frage stellte, jeden Kampf gegen die Staatsgewalt in einen Kampf gegen das Kapital verwandelt. Wenn sie in jeder Lebensregung der Gesellschaft die „Ruhe" gefährdet sah, wie konnte sie an der Spitze der Gesellschaft das Régime der Unruhe, ihr eignes Régime, das parlamentarische Régime behaupten wollen, dieses Régime, das nach dem Ausdrucke eines ihrer Redner im Kampfe und durch den Kampf lebt? Das parlamentarische Régime lebt von der Diskussion, wie soll es die Diskussion verbieten? Jedes Interesse, jede gesellschaftliche Einrichtung wird hier in allgemeine Gedanken verwandelt, als Gedanken verhandelt, wie soll irgend ein Interesse, irgend eine Einrichtung sich über dem Denken behaupten und als Glaubensartikel imponiren? Der Rednerkampf auf der Tribune ruft den Kampf der Preßbengel hervor, der debattirende Klub im Parlament ergänzt sich nothwendig durch debattirende Klubs in den Salons und in den Kneipen, die Repräsentanten, die beständig an die Volks-

meinung appelliren, berechtigen die Volksmeinung in Petitionen ihre wirkliche Meinung zu sagen. Das parlamentarische Régime überläßt Alles der Entscheidung der Majoritäten, wie sollen die großen Majoritäten jenseits des Parlaments nicht entscheiden wollen? Wenn ihr auf dem Gipfel des Staates die Geige streicht, was Andres erwarten, als daß die drunten tanzen?

Indem also die Bourgeoisie, was sie früher als „liberal" gefeiert, jetzt als „sozialistisch" verketzert, gesteht sie ein, daß ihr eignes Interesse gebiete, sie der Gefahr des Selbstregierens zu überheben, daß um die Ruhe im Lande herzustellen, vor Allem das Bourgeois-Parlament zur Ruhe gebracht, um ihre gesellschaftliche Macht unversehrt zu erhalten, ihre politische Macht gebrochen werden müsse, daß die Privatbourgeois nur fortfahren könnten, die andern Klassen zu exploitiren und sich ungetrübt des Eigenthums, der Familie, der Religion und der Ordnung zu erfreuen, unter der Bedingung, daß ihre Klasse neben den andern Klassen zu gleicher politischer Nichtigkeit verdammt werde, daß um ihren Beutel zu retten, die Krone ihr abgeschlagen und das Schwert, das sie beschützen solle, zugleich als Damoklesschwert über ihr eignes Haupt gehängt werden müsse.

In dem Bereiche der allgemeinen bürgerlichen Interessen zeigte sich die Nationalversammlung so unproduktiv, daß z. B. die Verhandlungen über die Paris-Avignoner Eisenbahn, die im Winter 1850 begannen, am 2. Dezember 1851 noch nicht zum Schluß reif waren. Wo sie nicht unterdrückte, reagirte, war sie mit unheilbarer Unfruchtbarkeit geschlagen.

Während Bonaparte's Ministerium theils die Initiative zu Gesetzen im Geiste der Ordnungspartei ergriff, theils ihre Härte in der Ausführung und Handhabung derselben noch übertrieb, suchte er andererseits durch kindisch alberne Vorschläge Popularität zu erobern, seinen Gegensatz zur Nationalversammlung zu konstatiren und auf einen geheimen Hinterhalt hinzudeuten, der nur durch die Verhältnisse einstweilen verhindert werde, dem französischen Volke seine verborgenen Schätze zu spenden. So der Vorschlag, den Unteroffizieren eine tägliche Zulage von vier Sous zu dekretiren. So der Vorschlag einer Ehrenleihbank für die Arbeiter. Geld geschenkt und Geld gepumpt zu erhalten, das war die Perspektive, womit er die Massen zu ködern hoffte. Schenken und Pumpen, darauf beschränkt sich die Finanzwissenschaft des Lumpenproletariats, des vornehmen und des gemeinen. Darauf beschränkten sich die Springfedern, die Bonaparte in Bewegung zu setzen wußte. Nie hat ein Prätendent platter auf die Plattheit der Massen spekulirt.

Die Nationalversammlung brauste wiederholt auf bei diesen unverkennbaren Versuchen auf ihre Kosten Popularität zu erwerben, bei der wachsenden Gefahr, daß dieser Abenteurer, den die Schulden voranpeitschten, und kein erworbener Ruf zurückhielt, einen verzweifelten Streich wagen werde. Die Verstimmung zwischen der Ordnungspartei und dem Präsidenten hatte einen drohenden Charakter angenommen, als ein unerwartetes Ereigniß ihn reuig in ihre Arme zurückwarf. Wir meinen die Nachwahlen vom 10. März 1850. Diese Wahlen fanden statt, um die Repräsentantenstellen, die nach dem 13. Juni durch das Gefängniß oder das Exil erledigt worden waren, wieder zu besetzen. Paris wählte nur sozialdemokratische Kandidaten. Es vereinte sogar die meisten Stimmen auf einen Insurgenten des Juni 1848, auf Deflotte. So rächte sich das mit dem Proletariat alliirte Pariser Kleinbürgerthum für seine Niederlage am 13. Juni 1849. Es schien im Augenblick der Gefahr nur vom Kampfplatz verschwunden zu sein, um ihn bei günstiger Gelegenheit mit massenhafteren Streitkräften und mit einer kühnern Kampfparole wieder einzunehmen. Ein Umstand schien die Gefahr dieses Wahlsieges zu erhöhen. Die Armee stimmte in Paris für den Juniinsurgenten gegen Labitte, einen Minister Bonaparte's, und in den Departements zum großen Theil für die Montagnards, die auch hier, zwar nicht so entschieden wie in Paris, das Uebergewicht über ihre Gegner behaupteten.

Bonaparte sah sich plötzlich wieder die Revolution gegenüber erstehen. W
am 29. Januar 1849, wie am 13. Juni 1849, verschwand er am 10. März 1

hinter der Partei der Ordnung. Er beugte sich, er that kleinmüthig Abbitte, er erbot sich auf Befehl der parlamentarischen Majorität jedes beliebige Ministerium zu ernennen, er flehte sogar die orleanistischen und legitimistischen Parteiführer, die Thiers, die Berryer, die Broglio, die Molé, kurz die sogenannten Burggrafen an, das Staatsruder in eigner Person zu ergreifen. Die Partei der Ordnung wußte diesen unwiederbringlichen Augenblick nicht zu benutzen. Statt sich kühn der angebotenen Gewalt zu bemächtigen, zwangen sie Bonaparte nicht einmal, das am 1. November entlassene Ministerium wieder einzusetzen; sie begnügten sich, ihn durch die Verzeihung zu demüthigen und dem Ministerium d'Hautpoul Herrn Baroche beizugesellen. Herr Baroche hatte als öffentlicher Ankläger, das eine Mal gegen die Revolutionäre vom 15. Mai, das andre Mal gegen die Demokraten des 13. Juni vor dem Hochgerichte zu Bourges gewüthet, beide Male wegen Attentat auf die Nationalversammlung. Keiner der Minister Bonaparte's trug später mehr dazu bei, die Nationalversammlung herabzuwürdigen, und nach dem 2. Dezember 1851 finden wir ihn wieder als wohlbestallten und theuer bezahlten Vizepräsidenten des Senats. Er hatte den Revolutionären in die Suppe gespuckt, damit Bonaparte sie aufesse.

Die sozial-demokratische Partei ihrerseits schien nur nach Vorwänden zu haschen, um ihren eignen Sieg wieder in Frage zu stellen und ihm die Pointe abzubrechen. Vidal, einer der neu erwählten Pariser Repräsentanten war gleichzeitig in Straßburg gewählt worden. Man bewog ihn, die Wahl für Paris abzulehnen und die für Straßburg anzunehmen. Statt also ihrem Siege auf dem Wahlplatze einen definitiven Charakter zu geben und dadurch die Ordnungspartei zu zwingen, ihn sofort im Parlamente streitig zu machen, statt so den Gegner im Augenblick des Volksenthusiasmus und der günstigen Stimmung der Armee zum Kampfe zu treiben, ermüdete die demokratische Partei Paris während der Monate März und April mit einer neuen Wahlagitation, ließ die aufgeregten Volkseigenschaften in diesem abermaligen prytanischen Stimmenspiele sich aufreiben, die revolutionäre Thatkraft in konstitutionellen Erfolgen sich sättigen, in kleinen Intrigen, hohlen Deklamationen und Scheinbewegungen verpuffen, die Bourgeoisie sich sammeln und ihre Vorkehrungen treffen, endlich die Bedeutung der Märzwahlen in der nachträglichen Aprilwahl, in der Wahl Eugen Sue's einen sentimental abschwächenden Kommentar finden. Mit einem Worte, sie schickte den 10. März in den April.

Die parlamentarische Majorität begriff die Schwäche ihres Gegners. Ihre siebzehn Burggrafen, denn Bonaparte hatte ihr die Leitung und die Verantwortlichkeit des Angriffs überlassen, arbeiteten ein neues Wahlgesetz aus, dessen Vorlage dem Minister Faucher, der sich diese Ehre ausbat, anvertraut wurde. Am 8. Mai brachte er das Gesetz ein, wodurch das allgemeine Wahlrecht abgeschafft, ein dreijähriges Domizil an dem Orte der Wahl den Wählern als Bedingung auferlegt, endlich der Nachweis dieses Domizils für die Arbeiter von dem Zeugnisse ihrer Arbeitgeber abhängig gemacht wurde.

Wie revolutionär die Demokraten während des konstitutionellen Wahlkampfes aufgeregt und getobt hatten, so konstitutionell predigten sie jetzt, wo es galt, mit den Waffen in der Hand den Ernst jener Wahlsiege zu beweisen, Ordnung, majestätische Ruhe (calme majestueux), gesetzliche Haltung d. h. blinde Unterwerfung unter den Willen der Kontrerevolution, der sich als Gesetz breit machte. Während der Debatte beschämte der Berg die Partei der Ordnung, indem er ihrer revolutionären Leidenschaftlichkeit gegenüber die leidenschaftslose Haltung des Biedermanns geltend machte, der den Rechtsboden behauptet, und indem er sie mit dem furchtbaren Vorwurfe zu Boden schlug, daß sie revolutionär verfahre. Selbst die neugewählten Deputirten bemühten sich durch anständiges und besonnenes Auftreten zu beweisen, welche Verkennung es war, sie als Anarchisten zu verschreien und ihre Wahl als einen Sieg der Revolution auszulegen. Am 31. Mai ging das neue *Wahlgesetz* durch. Die Montagne begnügte sich damit, dem Präsidenten einen *Protest in die Tasche* zu schmuggeln. Dem Wahlgesetz folgte ein neues Preßgesetz,

wodurch die revolutionäre Zeitungspresse vollständig biseitigt wurde. Sie hatte ihr Schicksal verdient. "National" und "la Presse," zwei bürgerliche Organe, blieben nach dieser Sündfluth als äußerste Vorposten der Revolution zurück.

Wir haben gesehen, wie die demokratischen Führer während März und April Alles gethan hatten, um das Volk von Paris in einen Scheinkampf zu verwickeln, wie sie nach dem 8. Mai Alles thaten, um es vom wirklichen Kampfe abzuhalten. Wir dürfen zudem nicht vergessen, daß das Jahr 1850 eines der glänzendsten Jahre industrieller und kommerzieller Prosperität, also das Pariser Proletariat vollständig beschäftigt war. Allein das Wahlgesetz vom 31. Mai 1850 schloß es von aller Theilnahme an der politischen Gewalt aus. Es schnitt ihm das Kampfterrain selbst ab. Es warf die Arbeiter in die Pariastellung zurück, die sie vor der Februarrevolution eingenommen hatten. Indem sie einem solchen Ereignisse gegenüber sich von den Demokraten lenken lassen und das revolutionäre Interesse ihrer Klasse über einem augenblicklichen Wohlbehagen vergessen konnten, verzichteten sie auf die Ehre eine erobernde Macht zu sein, unterwarfen sich ihrem Schicksale, bewiesen daß die Niederlage vom Juni 1848 sie für Jahre kampfunfähig gemacht hatte und daß der geschichtliche Prozeß zunächst wieder über ihren Köpfen vor sich gehen müsse. Was die kleinbürgerliche Demokratie betrifft, die am 13. Juni geschrien hatte, „aber wenn erst das allgemeine Wahlrecht angetastet wird, aber dann!" — so tröstete sie sich jetzt damit, daß der kontrerevolutionäre Schlag, der sie getroffen, kein Schlag und das Gesetz vom 31. Mai kein Gesetz sei. Am 2. Mai 1852 erscheint jeder Franzose auf dem Wahlplatze, in der einen Hand den Stimmzettel, in der andern das Schwert. Mit dieser Prophezeihung that sie sich selbst Genüge. Die Armee endlich wurde, wie für die Wahlen am 29. Mai 1849, so für die vom März und April 1850 von ihren Vorgesetzten gezüchtigt. Diesmal sagte sie sich aber entschieden: „die Revolution prellt uns nicht zum dritten Mal."

Das Gesetz vom 31. Mai 1850 war der coup d'état der Bourgeoisie. Alle ihre bisherigen Eroberungen über die Revolution hatten einen nur provisorischen Charakter. Sie waren in Frage gestellt, sobald die jetzige Nationalversammlung von der Bühne abtrat. Sie hingen von dem Zufall einer neuen allgemeinen Wahl ab und die Geschichte der Wahlen seit 1848 bewies unwiderleglich, daß in demselben Maße wie die faktische Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie sich entwickelte, ihre moralische Herrschaft über die Volksmassen verloren ging. Das allgemeine Wahlrecht erklärte sich am 10. März direkt gegen die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie, die Bourgeoisie antwortete mit der Achtung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts. Das Gesetz vom 31. Mai war also eine der Nothwendigkeiten des Klassenkampfes. Andrerseits erheischte die Konstitution, damit die Wahl des Präsidenten der Republik gültig sei, ein Minimum von zwei Millionen Stimmen. Erhielt keiner der Präsidentschaftskandidaten das Minimum, so sollte die Nationalversammlung unter den drei Kandidaten, denen die meisten Stimmen zufallen würden, den Präsidenten wählen. Zur Zeit, wo die Konstituante dies Gesetz machte, waren zehn Millionen Wähler auf den Stimmlisten eingeschrieben. In ihrem Sinne reichte also ein Fünftel der Wahlberechtigten hin, um die Präsidentschaftswahl gültig zu machen. Das Gesetz vom 31. Mai strich wenigstens drei Millionen Stimmen von den Wahllisten, reduzirte die Zahl der Wahlberechtigten auf sieben Millionen und behielt nichts desto weniger das gesetzliche Minimum von zwei Millionen für die Präsidentschaftswahl bei. Es erhöhte also das gesetzliche Minimum von ein Fünftel auf beinahe ein Drittel der wahlfähigen Stimmen, d. h. es that Alles, um die Präsidentenwahl aus den Händen des Volkes in die Hände der Nationalversammlung hinüberzuschmuggeln. So schien die Partei der Ordnung durch das Wahlgesetz vom 31. Mai ihre Herrschaft doppelt befestigt zu haben, indem sie die Wahl der Nationalversammlung und des Präsidenten der Republik dem stationären Theil der Gesellschaft anheimgab.

V.

Der Kampf brach sofort wieder aus zwischen der Nationalversammlung und Bonaparte, sobald die revolutionäre Krise überdauert nnd das allgemeine Wahlrecht abgeschafft war.

Die Konstitution hatte das Gehalt Bonaparte's auf 600,000 Francs festgesetzt. Kaum ein halbes Jahr nach seiner Installirung gelang es ihm, diese Summe auf das Doppelte zu erhöhen. Odilon Barrot ertrotzte nämlich von der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung einen jährlichen Zuschuß von 600,000 Francs für sogenannte Repräsentationsgelder. Nach dem 13. Juni hatte Bonaparte ähnliche Anliegen verlauten lassen, ohne diesmal bei Barrot Gehör zu finden. Jetzt nach dem 31. Mai benutzte er sofort den günstigen Augenblick und ließ seine Minister eine Civilliste von drei Millionen in der Nationalversammlung beantragen. Ein langes abentheuerndes Vagabundenleben hatte ihn mit den entwickeltsten Fühlhörnern begabt, um die schwachen Momente herauszutasten, wo er seinem Bourgeois Geld abpressen durfte. Er trieb förmliche Chantage. Die Nationalversammlung hatte die Volkssouveränität mit seiner Mithülfe und seinem Mitwissen geschändet. Er drohte ihr Verbrechen dem Volksgerichte zu denunziren, falls sie nicht den Beutel ziehe und sein Stillschweigen mit drei Millionen jährlich erkaufe. Sie hatte drei Millionen Franzosen ihres Stimmrechts beraubt. Er verlangte für jeden außer Cours gesetzten Franzosen einen Cours habenden Franken, genau drei Millionen Francs. Er, der Erwählte von sechs Millionen fordert Schadenersatz für die Stimmen, um die man ihn nachträglich geprellt hatte. Die Kommission der Nationalversammlung wies den Zudringlichen ab. Die bonapartistische Presse drohte. Konnte die Nationalversammlung mit dem Präsidenten der Republik brechen in einem Augenblicke, wo sie prinzipiell und definitiv mit der Masse der Nation gebrochen hatte? Sie verwarf zwar die jährliche Civilliste, aber sie bewilligte einen einmaligen Zuschuß von 2,160,000 Francs. Sie machte sich so der doppelten Schwäche schuldig, das Geld zu bewilligen und zugleich durch ihren Aerger zu zeigen, daß sie es nur widerwillig bewilligt. Wir werden später sehen, wozu Bonaparte das Geld brauchte. Nach diesem ärgerlichen Nachspiel, das der Abschaffung des allgemeinen Stimmrechts auf dem Fuße folgte, und worin Bonaparte seine demüthige Haltung während der Krise des März und April mit herausfordernder Unverschämtheit gegen das usurpatorische Parlament vertauschte, vertagte sich die Nationalversammlung für zwei Monate, vom 11. August bis 11. November. Sie ließ an ihrer Stelle eine Permanenzkommission von 18 Mitgliedern zurück, die keinen Bonapartisten enthielt, wohl aber einige gemäßigte Republikaner. Die Permanenzkommission vom Jahre 1849 hatte nur Männer der Ordnung und Bonapartisten gezählt. Aber damals erklärte sich die Partei der Ordnung in Permanenz gegen die Revolution. Diesmal erklärte sich die parlamentarische Republik in Permanenz gegen den Präsidenten. Nach dem Gesetze vom 31. Mai stand der Partei der Ordnung nur noch dieser Rival gegenüber.

Als die Nationalversammlung im November 1850 wieder zusammentrat, schien statt ihrer bisherigen kleinlichen Plänkeleien mit dem Präsidenten ein großer rücksichtsloser Kampf, ein Kampf der beiden Gewalten auf Leben und Tod unvermeidlich geworden zu sein.

Wie im Jahre 1849 war die Partei der Ordnung während der diesjährigen Parlamentsferien in ihre einzelnen Fraktionen aus einander gegangen, jede mit ihren eignen Restaurationsintriguen beschäftigt, die durch den Tod Louis Philippe's neue Nahrung erhalten hatten. Der Legitimistenkönig Heinrich V. hatte sogar ein förmliches Ministerium ernannt, das zu Paris residirte und Mitglieder der Permanenzkommission unter sich zählte. Bonaparte war also berechtigt, seinerseits *Rundreisen* durch die französischen Departements zu machen und je nach der *Stimmung der Stadt*, die er mit seiner Gegenwart beglückte, bald versteckter, bald offener *seine eignen Restaurationspläne* auszuplaudern und Stimmen für sich zu werben.

sen Zügen, die der große offizielle Moniteur und die kleinen Privatmoniteure
rte's natürlich als Triumphzüge feiern mußten, war er fortwährend begleitet
llirten der Gesellschaft des 10. Dezember. Diese Gesellschaft datirt noch
hre 1849. Unter dem Vorwande eine Wohlthätigkeitsgesellschaft zu stiften,
s Pariser Lumpenproletariat in geheime Sektionen organisirt worden, jede
von bonapartistischen Agenten geleitet, an der Spitze des Ganzen ein bona-
cher General. Neben zerrütteten Roués der Aristokratie mit zweideutigen
nzmitteln und von zweideutiger Herkunft, neben verkommenen und aben-
den Ablegern der Bourgeoisie Vagabunden, entlassene Soldaten, entlassene
usträflinge, entlaufene Galeerensklaven, Gauner, Gaukler, Lazzaronis,
diebe, Taschenspieler, Spieler, Maquereaus, Bordellhalter, Lastträger,
ner, Orgeldreher, Lumpensammler, Scheerenschleifer, Kesselflicker, Bettler,
ganze unbestimmte, aufgelöf'te, hin und hergeworfene Masse, die die Fran-
Bohème nennen, mit diesem ihm verwandten Elemente bildete Bonaparte
ck der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember. „Wohlthätigkeitsgesellschaft" — in
lle Mitglieder wie Bonaparte das Bedürfniß fühlten, sich auf Kosten der
den Nation wohlzuthun. Dieser Bonaparte, der sich als Chef des Lum-
tariats konstituirt, der hier allein in massenhafter Form die Interessen wie-
t, die er persönlich verfolgt, der in diesem Auswurfe, Abfall, Abhub aller
die einzige Klasse erkennt, auf die er sich unbedingt stützen kann, er ist der
Bonaparte, der Bonaparte sans phrase, unverkennbar selbst dann noch,
r später allmächtig neben den Revolutionären einem Theile seiner alten
chwörer die Schuld dadurch abträgt, daß er sie nach Cayenne transportirt.
rchtriebener Roué faßt er das geschichtliche Leben der Völker und die Haupt-
aatsaktionen derselben als Komödie im ordinärsten Sinne, als eine Mas-
wo die großen Kostüme, Worte und Posituren nur der kleinlichsten Lumperei
ke dienen. So bei seinem Zuge nach Straßburg, wo ein eingeschulter
er Geier den napoleonischen Adler vorstellte. Für seinen Einfall in Bou-
eckt er einige Londoner Lakaien in französische Uniformen. Sie stellen die
vor. In seiner Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember sammelt er 10,000 Lumpen-
le das Volk vorstellen müssen, wie Klaus Zettel den Löwen. In einem
licke, wo die Bourgeoisie selbst die vollständigste Komödie spielte, aber in der
testen Weise von der Welt, ohne irgend eine der pedantischen Bedingungen der
schen dramatischen Etiquette zu verletzen, und selbst halb geprellt, halb über-
on der Feierlichkeit ihrer eignen Haupt- und Staatsaktionen, mußte der
urer siegen, der die Komödie platt als Komödie nahm. Erst wenn er seinen
en Gegner beseitigt hat, wenn er nun selbst seine kaiserliche Rolle im Ernste
und mit der napoleonischen Maske den wirklichen Napoleon vorzustellen
wird er das Opfer seiner eignen Weltanschauung, der ernsthafte Hanswurst,
t mehr die Weltgeschichte als eine Komödie, sondern seine Komödie als Welt-
e nimmt. Was für die sozialistischen Arbeiter die Nationalateliers, was für
rgeois-Republikaner die Gardes mobiles, das war für Bonaparte die Ge-
t vom 10. Dezember, die ihm eigenthümliche Parteistreitkraft. Auf seinen
mußten die auf der Eisenbahn verpackten Abtheilungen derselben ihm ein
m improvisiren, den öffentlichen Enthusiasmus aufführen, vive l'Empereur
die Republikaner insultiren und durchprügeln, natürlich unter dem Schutze
lizei. Auf seinen Rückfahrten nach Paris mußten sie die Avantgarde bilden,
emonstrationen zuvorkommen oder sie auseinanderjagen. Die Gesellschaft
. Dezember gehörte ihm, sie war **sein** Werk, sein eigenster Gedanke. Was
sonst aneignet, gibt ihm die Macht der Verhältnisse anheim, was er sonst
m die Verhältnisse für ihn oder begnügt er sich von den Thaten Andrer zu
; aber er, mit den offiziellen Redensarten der Ordnung, der Religion, der
, des Eigenthums *öffentlich* vor den Bürgern, hinter sich die geheime Ge-
der Schufterles und der Spiegelberge, die Gesellschaft der Unordnung,
titution und des Diebstahls, das ist Bonaparte selbst als Originalautor

und die Geschichte der Gesellschaft des 10. Dezember ist seine eigne Geschichte. Es hatte sich nun ereignet, daß ausnahmsweise der Ordnungspartei angehörige Volksrepräsentanten unter die Stöcke der Dezembristen geriethen. Noch mehr. Der der Nationalversammlung zugewiesene, mit der Bewachung ihrer Sicherheit beauftragte Polizeikommissär Yon hatte auf die Aussage eines gewissen Alais hin der Permanenzkommission angezeigt, daß eine Sektion der Dezembristen die Ermordung des Generals Changarnier und Dupin's, des Präsidenten der Nationalversammlung, beschlossen und zu deren Vollstreckung schon die Individuen bestimmt habe. Man begreift den Zorn des Herrn Dupin. Eine parlamentarische Enquete über die Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember, d. h. die Profanirung der bonaparte'schen Geheimwelt, schien unvermeidlich. Grade vor dem Zusammentritt der Nationalversammlung löste Bonaparte vorsorglich seine Gesellschaft auf, natürlich nur auf dem Papiere, denn noch Ende 1851 suchte der Polizeipräfekt Carlier in einem ausführlichen Memoire ihn vergeblich zur wirklichen Auseinanderjagung der Dezembristen zu bewegen.

Die Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember sollte so lange die Privatarmee Bonaparte's bleiben, bis es ihm gelang, die öffentliche Armee in eine Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember zu verwandeln. Bonaparte machte hierzu den ersten Versuch kurz nach Vertagung der Nationalversammlung, und zwar mit dem eben ihr abgetrotzten Gelde. Als Fatalist lebt er der Ueberzeugung, daß es gewisse höhere Mächte gibt, denen der Mensch und insbesondere der Soldat nicht widerstehen kann. Unter diese Mächte zählt er in erster Linie Cigarre und Champagner, mit kaltem Geflügel und Knoblauchswurst. Er traktirt daher in den Gemächern des Elysée zuerst Offiziere und Unteroffiziere mit Cigarre und Champagner, mit kaltem Geflügel und Knoblauchswurst. Am 3. Oktober wiederholt er dieses Manöver mit den Truppenmassen bei der Revue von St. Maur und am 10. Oktober dasselbe Manöver auf noch größerer Stufenleiter bei der Armeeschau von Satory. Der Onkel erinnerte sich der Feldzüge Alexander's in Asien, der Neffe der Eroberungszüge des Bachus in demselben Lande. Alexander war allerdings ein Halbgott, aber Bachus war ein Gott und dazu der Schutzgott der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember.

Nach der Revue vom 3. Oktober lud die Permanenzkommission den Kriegsminister d'Hautpoul vor sich. Er versprach, jene Disziplinarwidrigkeiten sollten sich nicht wiederholen. Man weiß, wie Bonaparte am 10. Oktober d'Hautpoul's Wort hielt. In beiden Revuen hatte Changarnier kommandirt als Oberbefehlshaber der Armee von Paris. Er, zugleich Mitglied der Permanenzkommission, Chef der Nationalgarde, „Retter" vom 29. Januar und 13. Juni, „Bollwerk der Gesellschaft," Candidat der Ordnungspartei für die Präsidentenwürde, der gehaßte Monk zweier Monarchien, hatte bisher nie seine Unterordnung unter den Kriegsminister anerkannt, die republikanische Konstitution stets offen verhöhnt, Bonaparte mit einer zweideutig vornehmen Protektion verfolgt. Jetzt eiferte er für die Disziplin gegen den Kriegsminister und für die Konstitution gegen Bonaparte. Während am 10. Oktober ein Theil der Kavallerie den Ruf "vive Napoleon! vive les saucissons!" ertönen ließ, veranstaltete Changarnier, daß wenigstens die unter dem Kommando seines Freundes Neumeyer vorbeidefilirende Infanterie ein eisiges Stillschweigen beobachtete. Zur Strafe entsetzte der Kriegsminister auf Bonaparte's Antrieb den General Neumeyer seines Postens in Paris, unter dem Vorwand, ihn als Obergeneral der 14. und 15. Militärdivision zu bestellen. Neumeyer schlug dieses Stellenwechsel aus und mußte so seine Entlassung nehmen. Changarnier seinerseits veröffentlichte am 2. November eine Tagesordnung, worin er den Truppen verbot, politische Ausrufungen und Demonstrationen irgend einer Art sich unter den Waffen zu erlauben. Die elyseischen Blätter griffen Changarnier an, die *Blätter* der Ordnungspartei Bonaparte, die Permanenzkommission wiederholte *geheime* Sitzungen, worin wiederholt beantragt wurde, das Vaterland in Gefahr *zu erklären*, die Armee schien in zwei feindliche Lager getheilt mit zwei feindlichen *Generalstäben*, der eine im Elysée, wo Bonaparte, der andere in den Tuilerien

nier hauste. Es schien nur des Zusammentritts der Nationalversamm-
dürfen, damit das Signal zum Kampfe erschalle. Das französische
eurtheilte diese Reibungen zwischen Bonaparte und Changarnier wie
e Journalist, der sie mit folgenden Worten charakterisirt hat: „Die
ausmägde Frankreichs kehren die glühende Lava der Revolution mit
weg, und keifen sich aus, während sie ihre Arbeit verrichten."
beeilte sich Bonaparte, den Kriegsminister d'Hautpoul zu entsetzen,
er Kopf nach Algier zu spediren und an seine Stelle General Schramm
inister zu ernennen. Am 12. November sandte er der Nationalver-
ine Botschaft von amerikanischer Weitläufigkeit, überladen mit Details,
stend, versöhnungslüstern, konstitutionell-resignirt, von Allem und
elnd, nur nicht von den questions brûlantes des Augenblickes. Wie
hen ließ er die Worte fallen, daß den ausdrücklichen Bestimmungen der
gemäß der Präsident allein über die Armee verfüge. Die Botschaft
lgenden hochbetheuernden Worten:
kreich verlangt vor allem Andern Ruhe.... Allein
en Eid gebunden, werde ich mich innerhalb der engen
halten, die er mir gezogen hat.... Was mich betrifft,
erwählt, und ihm allein meine Macht schuldend, ich werde mich stets
lich ausgedrückten Willen fügen. Beschließt Ihr in dieser Sitzung die
r Konstitution, so wird eine konstituirende Versammlung die Stellung
gewalt regeln. Wo nicht, so wird das Volk 1852 feierlich seinen Ent-
nden. Was aber immer die Lösungen der Zukunft sein mögen, laßt
em Verständniß kommen, damit niemals Leidenschaft, Ueberraschung
über das Schicksal einer großen Nation entscheide..... Was vor
Aufmerksamkeit in Anspruch nimmt, ist nicht, zu wissen, wer 1852
eich regieren wird, sondern die Zeit, die zu meiner Verfügung steht, so
n, daß die Uebergangszeit ohne Agitation und Störung vorübergehe.
t Aufrichtigkeit mein Herz vor Euch eröffnet, Ihr werdet meiner Offen-
em Vertrauen antworten, meinen guten Strebungen durch Eure Mit-
und Gott wird das Uebrige thun."
ette, heuchlerisch gemäßigte, tugendhaft gemeinplätzliche Sprache der
offenbart ihren tiefsten Sinn im Munde des Selbstherrschers der Ge-
n 10. Dezember und des Piknikhelden von St. Maur und Satory.
ggrafen der Ordnungspartei täuschten sich keinen Augenblick über das
das diese Herzenseröffnung verdiene. Ueber Eide waren sie längst bla-
ten Veteranen, Virtuosen des politischen Meineids in ihrer Mitte, Sie
Stelle über die Armee nicht überhört. Sie bemerkten mit Unwillen,
schaft in der weitschweifigen Aufzählung der jüngst erlassenen Gesetze
te Gesetz, das Wahlgesetz, mit affektirtem Stillschweigen überging und
Falle der Nichtrevision der Verfassung die Wahl des Präsidenten für
Volke anheimstellte. Das Wahlgesetz war die Bleikugel an den Füßen
gspartei, die sie am Gehen verhinderte und nun gar am Stürmen!
e Bonaparte durch die amtliche Auflösung der Gesellschaft vom 10. De-
die Entlassung des Kriegsministers d'Hautpoul die Sündenböcke mit
d auf dem Altare des Vaterlandes geopfert. Er hatte der erwarteten
Spitze abgebrochen. Endlich suchte die Ordnungspartei selbst ängstlich
ldenden Conflikt mit der Exekutivgewalt zu umgehen, abzuschwächen,
n. Aus Furcht, die Eroberungen über die Revolution zu verlieren,
hren Rivalen die Früchte derselben gewinnen. „Frankreich verlangt
ndern Ruhe." So rief die Ordnungspartei der Revolution seit Februar
Bonaparte's Botschaft der Ordnungspartei zu. „Frankreich verlangt vor
e." Bonaparte beging Handlungen, die auf Usurpation hinzielten,
dnungspartei beging die „Unruhe," wenn sie Lärm über diese Hand-
g und sie hypochondrisch auslegte. Die Würste von Satory waren

mausstill, wenn Niemand von ihnen sprach. „Frankreich verlangt vor Allem Ruhe.“ Also verlangte Bonaparte, daß man ihn ruhig gewähren lasse, und die parlamentarische Partei war von doppelter Furcht gelähmt, von der Furcht die revolutionäre Unruhe wieder heraufzubeschwören, von der Furcht selbst als der Unruhstifter in den Augen ihrer eignen Klasse, in den Augen der Bourgeoisie zu erscheinen. Da Frankreich also vor allem Andern Ruhe verlangte, wagte die Ordnungspartei nicht, nachdem Bonaparte in seiner Botschaft „Frieden“ gesprochen hatte, „Krieg“ zu antworten. Das Publikum, das sich mit großen Skandalscenen bei Eröffnung der Nationalversammlung geschmeichelt hatte, wurde in seinen Erwartungen geprellt. Die Oppositionsdeputirten, die Vorlage der Protokolle der Permanenzkommission über die Oktoberereignisse verlangten, wurden von der Majorität überstimmt. Man floh prinzipiell alle Debatten, die aufregen konnten. Die Arbeiten der Nationalversammlung während November und Dezember waren ohne Interesse.

Endlich gegen Ende Dezember begann der Guerillakrieg um einzelne Prärogative des Parlaments. In kleinlichen Chikanen um die Prärogative der beiden Gewalten versumpfte die Bewegung, seitdem die Bourgeoisie mit der Abschaffung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts den Klassenkampf zunächst abgemacht hatte.

Gegen Mauguin, einen der Volksrepräsentanten, war Schulden halber ein gerichtliches Urtheil erwirkt worden. Auf Anfrage des Gerichtspräsidenten erklärte der Justizminister Rouher, es sei ohne weitere Umstände ein Verhaftsbefehl gegen den Schuldner auszufertigen. Mauguin wurde also in den Schuldthurm geworfen. Die Nationalversammlung brauste auf, als sie das Attentat erfuhr. Sie verordnete nicht nur Seine sofortige Freilassung, sondern ließ ihn auch noch denselben Abend von ihrem Greffier gewaltsam aus Clichy herausholen. Um jedoch ihren Glauben an die Heiligkeit des Privateigenthums zu bewähren, und mit dem Hintergedanken, im Nothfall ein Asyl für lästig gewordene Montagnards zu eröffnen, erklärte sie die Schuldhaft von Volksrepräsentanten nach vorheriger Einholung ihrer Erlaubniß für zulässig. Sie vergaß zu dekretiren, daß auch der Präsident Schulden halber eingesperrt werden könne. Sie vernichtete den letzten Schein von Unverletzlichkeit, der die Glieder ihres eigenen Körpers umgab.

Man erinnert sich, daß der Polizeikommissär Yon eine Sektion der Dezembristen auf Aussage eines gewissen Alais hin wegen Mordplans auf Dupin und Changarnier denunzirt hatte. Gleich in der ersten Sitzung machten die Quästoren mit Bezug hierauf den Vorschlag, eine eigne parlamentarische Polizei zu bilden, besoldet aus dem Privatbudget der Nationalversammlung und durchaus unabhängig von dem Polizeipräfekten. Der Minister des Innern, Baroche, hatte gegen diesen Eingriff in sein Ressort protestirt. Man schloß darauf einen elenden Kompromiß, wonach der Polizeikommissär der Versammlung zwar aus ihrem Privatbudget besoldet und von ihren Quästoren ein- und abgesetzt werden solle, aber nach vorheriger Verständigung mit dem Minister des Innern. Unterdessen war Alais gerichtlich von der Regierung verfolgt worden und hier war es leicht, seine Aussager als eine Mystifikation darzustellen und durch den Mund des öffentlichen Anklägers einen lächerlichen Schein auf Dupin, Changarnier, Yon und die ganze Nationalversammlung zu werfen. Jetzt am 29. Dezember schreibt der Minister Baroche einen Brief an Dupin, worin er die Entlassung Yon's verlangt. Das Bureau der Nationalversammlung beschließt Yon in seiner Stelle zu erhalten, aber die Nationalversammlung, über ihre Gewaltsamkeit in Mauguin's Angelegenheit erschreckt, und gewohnt, wenn sie einen Schlag gegen die Exekutivgewalt gewagt hat, zwei Schläge von ihr in Austausch zurückzuerhalten, sanktionirt diesen Beschluß nicht. Sie entläßt Yon zur Belohnung seines Diensteifers und beraubt sich einer parlamentarischen Prärogative, unerläßlich gegen einen Menschen, der nicht in der Nacht beschließt, um bei Tage auszuführen, sondern bei Tage beschließt und in der Nacht ausführt.

Wir haben gesehen, wie die Nationalversammlung während der Monate November und Dezember bei den großen schlagenden Veranlassungen den Kampf mit der Exekutivgewalt umging, niederschlug. Jetzt sehen wir sie gezwungen, ihn bei den

kleinlichsten Anlässen aufzunehmen. In der Angelegenheit Mauguin's bestätigt sie dem Prinzipe nach die Schuldhaft der Volksrepräsentanten, behält sich aber vor, es nur auf ihr mißliebige Repräsentanten anwenden zu lassen, und um dieses infame Privilegium hadert sie mit dem Justizminister. Statt den angeblichen Mordplan zu benutzen, um eine Enquête über die Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember zu verhängen und Bonaparte in seiner wahren Gestalt als das Haupt des Pariser Lumpenproletariats vor Frankreich und Europa rettungslos bloszustellen, läßt sie die Kollision auf einen Punkt herabsinken, wo es sich zwischen ihr und dem Minister des Innern nur noch darum handelt, zu wessen Kompetenz die Ein- und Absetzung eines Polizeikommissärs gehört. So sehen wir die Partei der Ordnung während dieser ganzen Periode durch ihre zweideutige Stellung gezwungen, ihren Kampf mit der Exekutivgewalt in kleinliche Kompetenzzwiste, Chikanen, Rabulistereien, Grenzstreitigkeiten mit den Ministern zu verpuffen, zu verbröckeln und die abgeschmacktesten Formfragen zum Inhalt ihrer Thätigkeit zu machen. Sie wagt die Kollision nicht aufzunehmen in demselben Augenblicke, wo sie eine prinzipielle Bedeutung hat, wo die Exekutivgewalt sich wirklich blosgestellt hat und die Sache der Nationalversammlung die nationale Sache wäre. Sie würde dadurch der Nation eine Marschordre ausstellen und sie fürchtet nichts mehr, als daß sich die Nation bewege. Bei solchen Gelegenheiten weist sie daher die Anträge der Montagne zurück und geht zur Tagesordnung über. Nachdem die Streitfrage so in ihren großen Dimensionen aufgegeben ist, wartet die Exekutivgewalt ruhig den Zeitpunkt ab, wo sie dieselbe bei kleinlich unbedeutenden Anlässen wieder aufnehmen kann, wo sie so zu sagen nur noch ein parlamentarisches Lokalinteresse bietet. Dann bricht die verhaltene Wuth der Ordnungspartei aus, dann reißt sie den Vorhang von den Coulissen, dann denunzirt sie den Präsidenten, dann erklärt sie die Republik in Gefahr, aber dann erscheint auch ihr Pathos abgeschmackt und der Anlaß des Kampfes als heuchlerischer Vorwand oder überhaupt des Kampfes nicht werth. Der parlamentarische Sturm wird zu einem Sturm in einem Glase Wasser, der Kampf zur Intrigue, die Kollision zum Skandal. Während die Schadenfreude der revolutionären Klassen sich an der Demüthigung der Nationalversammlung weidet, denn sie schwärmen eben so sehr für die parlamentarischen Prärogative derselben, wie jene Versammlung für die öffentlichen Freiheiten, begreift die Bourgeoisie außerhalb des Parlaments nicht, wie die Bourgeoisie innerhalb des Parlaments ihre Zeit mit so kleinlichen Zänkereien vergeuden und die Ruhe durch so elende Rivalitäten mit dem Präsidenten blosstellen kann. Sie wird verwirrt, verwildert über eine Strategie, die in dem Augenblicke Frieden schließt, wo alle Welt Schlachten erwartet, und in dem Augenblicke angreift, wo alle Welt den Frieden geschlossen glaubt.

Am 20. Dezember interpellirte Pascal Duprat den Minister des Innern über die Goldbarren-Lotterie. Diese Lotterie war eine „Tochter aus Elysium," Bonaparte hatte sie mit seinen Getreuen auf die Welt gesetzt und der Polizeipräfekt Carlier sie unter seine offizielle Protektion gestellt, obgleich das französische Gesetz alle Lotterien mit Ausnahme zur Verloosung zu wohlthätigen Zwecken untersagt. Sieben Millionen Loose, Stück für Stück ein Frank, der Gewinn angeblich bestimmt zur Verschiffung Pariser Vagabunden nach Kalifornien. Einerseits sollten goldene Träume die sozialistischen Träume des Pariser Proletariats verdrängen, die verführerische Aussicht auf das große Loos das doktrinäre Recht auf Arbeit. Die Pariser Arbeiter erkannten natürlich in dem Glanze der kalifornischen Goldbarren die unscheinbaren Franken nicht wieder, die man ihnen aus der Tasche lockte. In der Hauptsache aber handelte es sich um eine direkte Prellerei. Die Vagabunden, die kalifornische Goldminen eröffnen sollten, ohne sich aus Paris wegzubemühen, waren Bonaparte selbst und seine schuldenzerrüttete Tafelrunde. Die von der Nationalversammlung bewilligten drei Millionen waren verjubelt, die Kasse mußte auf eine oder die andre Weise wieder gefüllt werden. Vergebens hatte Bonaparte zur Errichtung von *sogenannten cités ouvrières* eine Nationalsubscription eröffnet, an *deren Spitze er sich selbst mit einer bedeutenden* Summe voranstellte. Die hartherz-

zigen Bourgeois warteten mißtrauisch die Einzahlung seiner Aktie ab, und da diese natürlich nicht erfolgte, fiel die Spekulation auf die sozialistischen Luftschlösser platt zu Boden. Die Goldbarren zogen besser. Bonaparte und Genossen begnügten sich nicht damit, den Ueberschuß der sieben Millionen über die auszuspielenden Barren theilweise in die Tasche zu stecken, sie fabrizirten falsche Loose, sie gaben auf dieselbe Nummer 10, funfzehn bis zwanzig Loose aus, Finanzoperation im Geiste der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember. Hier hatte die Nationalversammlung nicht den fiktiven Präsidenten der Republik sich gegenüber, sondern den Bonaparte in Fleisch und Blut. Hier konnte sie ihn auf der That ertappen im Konflikte nicht mit der Konstitution, sondern mit dem Code pénal. Wenn sie auf Duprat's Interpellation zur Tagesordnung überging, geschah es nicht nur, weil Girardin's Antrag sich für "satisfait" zu erklären, der Ordnungspartei ihre systematische Korruption in's Gedächtniß rief. Der Bourgeois, und vor Allem der zum Staatsmann aufgeblähte Bourgeois ergänzt seine praktische Gemeinheit durch eine theoretische Ueberschwenglichkeit. Als Staatsmann wird er und die Staatsgewalt, die ihm gegenübersteht, ein höheres Wesen, das nur in höherer, geweihter Weise bekämpft werden kann.

Bonaparte, der eben als Bohemien, als prinzlicher Lumpenproletarier den Vorzug vor dem schuftigen Burgeois hatte, daß er den Kampf gemein führen konnte, sah nun, nachdem die Versammlung selbst ihn über den schlüpfrigen Boden der Militärbanquets, der Revuen, der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember und endlich des Code pénal mit eigner Hand hinübergeleitet hatte, den Augenblick gekommen, wo er aus der scheinbaren Defensive in die Offensive übergehen konnte. Wenig genirten ihn die mitten durch spielenden kleinen Niederlagen des Justizministers, des Kriegsministers, des Marineministers, des Finanzministers, wodurch die Nationalversammlung ihr knurriges Mißvergnügen kundgab. Er verhinderte nicht nur die Minister abzutreten und so die Unterwerfung der Exekutivgewalt unter das Parlament anzuerkennen. Er konnte nun vollbringen, womit er während der Ferien der Nationalversammlung begonnen hatte, die Losreißung der Militärgewalt vom Parlamente, die Absetzung Changarnier's.

Ein elyseisches Blatt veröffentlichte einen Tagesbefehl, während des Monats Mai, angeblich an die erste Militärdivision gerichtet, also von Changarnier ausgehend, worin den Offizieren empfohlen wurde, im Falle einer Empörung den Verräthern in ihren eignen Reihen kein Quartier zu geben, sie sofort zu erschießen und der Nationalversammlung die Truppen zu verweigern, wenn sie dieselben requiriren sollte. Am 3. Januar 1851 wurde das Kabinet über diesen Tagesbefehl interpellirt. Es verlangt zur Prüfung dieser Angelegenheit erst drei Monate, dann eine Woche, endlich nur vier und zwanzig Stunden Bedenkzeit. Die Versammlung besteht auf sofortigem Aufschlusse. Changarnier erhebt sich und erklärt, daß dieser Tagesbefehl nie existirt habe. Er fügt hinzu, daß er sich stets beeilen werde, den Aufforderungen der Nationalversammlung nachzukommen, und daß sie in einem Kollisionsfalle auf ihn rechnen könnte. Sie empfängt seine Erklärung mit unaussprechlichem Applaus und dekretirt ihm ein Vertrauensvotum. Sie dankt ab, sie dekretirt ihre eigne Machtlosigkeit und die Allmacht der Armee, indem sie sich unter die Privatprotektion eines Generals begibt, aber der General täuscht sich, indem er ihr gegen Bonaparte eine Macht zu Gebote stellt, die er nur als Lehen von demselben Bonaparte hält, wenn er seinerseits Schutz von diesem Parlamente, von seinem schutzbedürftigen Schützlinge erwartet. Aber Changarnier glaubt an die mysteriöse Macht, womit ihn die Bourgeoisie seit dem 29. Januar 1849 ausgestattet. Er hält sich für die dritte Gewalt neben den beiden übrigen Staatsgewalten. Er theilt das Schicksal der übrigen Helden oder vielmehr Heiligen dieser Epoche, deren Größe eben in der interessirten großen Meinung besteht, die ihre Partei von ihnen aufbringt, und die in Alltagsfiguren zusammenfallen, sobald die Verhältnisse sie einladen, [illegible]

der zu verrichten. Der Unglaube ist überhaupt der tödtliche Feind dieser vermeinten Helden und wirklichen Heiligen. Daher ihre würdevoll-sittliche Entrüstung über die enthusiasmusarmen Witzlinge und Spötter.

An demselben Abende wurden die Minister nach dem Elisée beschieden, Bonaparte dringt auf die Absetzung Changarnier's, fünf Minister weigern sich sie zu zeichnen, der Moniteur kündigt eine Ministerkrise an und die Ordnungspresse droht mit der Bildung einer parlamentarischen Armee unter dem Kommando Changarnier's. Die Partei der Ordnung hatte die konstitutionelle Befugniß zu diesem Schritte. Sie brauchte blos Changarnier zum Präsidenten der Nationalversammlung zu ernennen und eine beliebige Truppenmasse zu ihrer Sicherheit zu requiriren. Sie konnte es um so sicherer, als Changarnier noch wirklich an der Spitze der Armee und der Pariser Nationalgarde stand, und nur darauf lauerte, mit sammt der Armee requirirt zu werden. Die bonapartistische Presse wagte noch nicht einmal das Recht der Nationalversammlung zu direkter Requisition der Truppen in Frage zu stellen, ein juristischer Skrupel, der unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen keinen Erfolg versprach. Daß die Armee dem Befehle der Nationalversammlung gehorcht hätte, ist wahrscheinlich, wenn man erwägt, daß Bonaparte acht Tage in ganz Paris suchen mußte, um endlich zwei Generale zu finden — Baraguay d'Hilliers und St. Jean d'Angely —, die sich bereit erklärten, die Absetzung Changarnier's zu kontrasigniren. Daß die Ordnungspartei in ihren eignen Reihen und im Parlamente die zu einem solchen Beschlusse nöthige Stimmenzahl gefunden hätte, ist mehr als zweifelhaft, wenn man bedenkt, daß acht Tage später 286 Stimmen sich von ihr trennten, und daß die Montagne einen ähnlichen Vorschlag noch im Dezember 1851 in der letzten Stunde der Entscheidung verwarf. Indessen wäre es vielleicht den Burggrafen jetzt noch gelungen, die Masse ihrer Partei zu einem Heroismus hinzureißen, der darin bestand, sich hinter einem Walde von Bajonetten sicher zu fühlen und den Dienst einer Armee anzunehmen, die in ihr Lager desertirt war. Statt dessen begaben sich die Herren Burggrafen am Abende des 6. Januar in's Elysée, um durch staatskluge Wendungen und Bedenken Bonaparte von der Absetzung Changarnier's abstehen zu machen. Wen man zu überreden sucht, den erkennt man als den Meister der Situation an. Bonaparte, durch diesen Schritt sicher gemacht, ernennt am 12. Januar ein neues Ministerium, worin die Führer des alten, Fould und Baroche, verbleiben. St. Jean d'Angely wird Kriegsminister, der Moniteur bringt das Absetzungsdekret Changarniers, sein Kommando wird getheilt unter Baraguay d'Hilliers, der die erste Militärdivision, und Perrot, der die Nationalgarde erhält. Das Bollwerk der Gesellschaft ist abgedankt, und wenn kein Stein darüber vom Dache fällt, steigen dagegen die Börsenkurse.

Indem sie die Armee, die sich ihr in Changarnier's Person zur Verfügung stellt, zurückstößt und so unwiderruflich dem Präsidenten überantwortet, erklärt die Ordnungspartei, daß die Bourgeoisie den Beruf zum Herrschen verloren hat. Es existirte kein parlamentarisches Ministerium mehr. Indem sie nun noch die Handhabe der Armee und Nationalgarde verlor, welches Gewaltmittel blieb ihr, um gleichzeitig die usurpirte Gewalt des Parlaments über das Volk und seine konstitutionelle Gewalt gegen den Präsidenten zu behaupten? Keins. Es blieb ihr nur noch der Appell an gewaltlose Prinzipien, die sie selbst stets nur als allgemeine Regeln ausgelegt hatte, die man Dritten vorschreibt, um sich selbst desto freier bewegen zu können. Mit der Absetzung Changarnier's, mit dem Anheimfallen der Militärgewalt an Bonaparte, schließt der erste Abschnitt der Periode, die wir betrachten, die Periode des Kampfes zwischen der Ordnungspartei und der Exekutivgewalt. Der Krieg zwischen den beiden Gewalten ist jetzt offen erklärt, wird offen geführt, aber erst nachdem die Ordnungspartei Waffen und Soldaten verloren hat. Ohne Ministerium, ohne Armee, ohne Volk, ohne öffentliche Meinung, *seit ihrem Wahlgesetz vom 31. Mai* nicht mehr die Repräsentantin der souveränen Nation, *ohn' Aug', ohn' Ohr*, ohn' Zahn, ohn' Alles hatte sich die Nati

nalversammlung allgemach in ein altfranzösisches Parlament verwandelt, das die Aktion der Regierung überlassen und sich selbst mit knurrenden Remonstrationen post festum begnügen muß.

Die Ordnungspartei empfängt das neue Ministerium mit einem Sturme der Entrüstung. General Bédeau ruft die Milde der Permanenzkommission während der Ferien in's Gedächtniß zurück und die übergroße Rücksicht, womit sie auf die Veröffentlichung ihrer Protokolle verzichtet habe. Der Minister des Innern besteht nun selbst auf Veröffentlichung dieser Protokolle, die jetzt natürlich schaal wie abgestandenes Wasser geworden sind, keine neue Thatsache enthüllen und ohne die geringste Wirkung in das blasirte Publikum fallen. Auf Remusat's Vorschlag zieht sich die Nationalversammlung in ihre Bureaux zurück und ernennt ein „Komité außerordentlicher Maßregeln." Paris tritt um so weniger aus dem Geleise seiner alltäglichen Ordnung, als der Handel in diesem Augenblicke prosperirt, die Manufakturen beschäftigt sind, die Getreidepreise niedrig stehen, die Lebensmittel überfließen, die Sparkassen täglich neue Depositen erhalten. Die „außerordentlichen Maßregeln," die das Parlament so geräuschvoll angekündigt hat, verpuffen am 18. Januar in ein Mißtrauensvotum gegen die Minister, ohne daß General Changarnier auch nur erwähnt wurde. Die Ordnungspartei war zu dieser Fassung ihres Votums gezwungen, um sich die Stimmen der Republikaner zu sichern, da diese von allen Maßregeln des Ministeriums gerade nur die Absetzung Changarnier's billigen, während die Ordnungspartei in der That die übrigen ministeriellen Akte nicht tadeln kann, die sie selbst diktirt hatte.

Für das Mißtrauensvotum vom 18. Januar entschieden 415 gegen 286 Stimmen. Es wurde also nur durchgesetzt durch eine Koalition der entschiedenen Legitimisten und Orleanisten mit den reinen Republikanern und der Montagne. Es bewies also, daß die Partei der Ordnung nicht nur das Ministerium, nicht nur die Armee, sondern in Konflikten mit Bonaparte auch ihre selbstständige parlamentarische Majorität verloren hatte, daß ein Trupp von Repräsentanten aus ihrem Lager desertirt war, aus Vermittlungsfanatismus, aus Furcht vor dem Kampfe, aus Abspannung, aus Familienrücksicht für blutverwandte Staatsgehalte, auf Spekulation für frei werdende Ministerposten (Odilon Barrot), aus dem platten Egoismus, womit der gewöhnliche Bourgeois ste s geneigt ist, das Gesammtinteresse seiner Klasse diesem oder jenem Privatmotive zu opfern. Die bonapartistischen Repräsentanten gehörten von vornherein der Ordnungspartei nur im Kampfe gegen die Revolution. Der Chef der katholischen Partei, Montalembert, warf seinen Einfluß schon damals in die Wagschale Bonaparte's, da er an der Lebensfähigkeit der parlamentarischen Partei verzweifelte. Die Führer dieser Partei endlich, Thiers und Berryer, der Orleanist und Legitimist, waren gezwungen, sich offen als Republikaner zu proklamiren, zu bekennen, daß ihr Herz königlich, aber ihr Kopf republikanisch gesinnt, daß die parlamentarische Republik die einzig mögliche Form für die Herrschaft der Gesammtbourgeoisie sei. Sie waren so gezwungen, die Restaurationspläne, die sie unverdrossen hinter dem Rücken des Parlaments weiter verfolgten, vor den Augen der Bourgeoisklasse selbst als eine eben so gefahrvolle wie kopflose Intrigue zu brandmarken.

Das Mißtrauensvotum vom 18. Januar traf die Minister und nicht den Präsidenten. Aber der Präsident hatte Changarnier abgesetzt und nicht die Minister. Sollte die Ordnungspartei Bonaparte selbst in Anklagezustand versetzen? Wegen seiner Restaurationsgelüste? Sie ergänzten nur ihre eignen. Wegen seiner Konspiration in den Militärrevuen und der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember? Sie hatten diese Themata längst unter einfachen Tagesordnungen begraben. Wegen der Absetzung des Helden vom 29. Januar und vom 13. Juni, des Mannes, der *Mai 1850* im Falle einer Emeute Paris an allen vier Ecken in Brand zu stecken *drohte?* Ihre Alliirten von der Montagne und Cavaignac erlaubten ihnen nicht *einmal*, das gefallene Bollwerk der Gesellschaft durch eine offizielle Vollsdebezeugung aufzurichten. Sie selbst konnten dem Präsidenten die loyalitätsvolle Be-

fugniß einen General abzusetzen nicht bestreiten. Sie tobten nur, weil er von seinem konstitutionellen Rechte einen unparlamentarischen Gebrauch machte. Hatten sie von ihrer parlamentarischen Prärogative nicht fortwährend einen inkonstitutionellen Gebrauch gemacht und namentlich bei der Abschaffung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts? Sie waren also darauf angewiesen, sich genau innerhalb der parlamentarischen Schranken zu bewegen. Und es gehörte jene eigenthümliche Krankheit dazu, die seit 1848 auf dem ganzen Kontinente grassirte, der parlamentarische Kretenismus, der die Angesteckten in eine eingebildete Welt festbannt und ihnen allen Sinn, alle Erinnerung, alles Verständniß für die rauhe Außenwelt raubt, dieser parlamentarische Kretenismus gehörte dazu, wenn sie, die alle Bedingungen der parlamentarischen Macht mit eignen Händen zerstört hatten und in ihrem Kampfe mit den andern Klassen zerstören mußten, ihre parlamentarischen Siege noch für Siege hielten und den Präsidenten zu treffen glaubten, indem sie auch seine Minister schlugen. Sie gaben ihm nur Gelegenheit, die Nationalversammlung von Neuem in den Augen der Nation zu demüthigen. Am 20. Januar meldete der Moniteur, daß die Entlassung des Gesammtministeriums angenommen sei. Unter dem Vorwande, daß keine parlamentarische Partei mehr die Majorität besitze, wie das Votum vom 18. Januar, diese Frucht der Koalition zwischen Montagne und Royalisten beweise, und um die Neubildung einer Majorität abzuwarten, ernannte Bonaparte ein sogenanntes Uebergangsministerium, wovon kein Mitglied dem Parlamente angehörte, lauter durchaus unbekannte und bedeutungslose Individuen, ein Ministerium von bloßen Kommis und Schreibern. Die Ordnungspartei konnte sich jetzt im Spiele mit diesen Marionetten abarbeiten, die Exekutivgewalt hielt es nicht mehr der Mühe werth, ernsthaft in der Nationalversammlung vertreten zu sein. Bonaparte konzentrirte um so sichtbarer die ganze Exekutivgewalt in seiner Person, er hatte um so freiern Spielraum, sie zu seinen Zwecken auszubeuten, je mehr seine Minister reine Statisten waren.

Die mit der Montagne koalisirte Ordnungspartei rächte sich, indem sie die präsidentielle Dotation von 1,800,000 Frcs. verwarf, zu deren Vorlage das Haupt der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember seine ministeriellen Kommis gezwungen hatte. Diesmal entschied eine Majorität von nur 102 Stimmen, es waren also seit dem 28. Januar neuerdings 27 Stimmen abgefallen, die Auflösung der Ordnungspartei ging voran. Damit man sich keinen Augenblick über den Sinn ihrer Koalition mit der Montagne täusche, verschmähte sie gleichzeitig einen von 189 Mitgliedern der Montagne unterzeichneten Antrag auf allgemeine Amnestie der politischen Verbrecher auch nur in Betracht zu ziehen. Es genügt, daß der Minister des Innern, ein gewisser Baisse erklärt, die Ruhe sei nur scheinbar, im Geheimen herrsche große Agitation, im Geheimen organisirten sich allgegewärtige Gesellschaften, die demokratischen Blätter machten Anstalten um wieder zu erscheinen, die Berichte aus den Departements lauteten ungünstig, die Flüchtlinge von Genf leiteten eine Verschwörung über Lyon durch ganz Südfrankreich, Frankreich stehe am Rande einer industriellen und kommerziellen Krise, die Fabrikanten von Rubaix hätten die Arbeitszeit vermindert, die Gefangenen von Belle Isle sich empört — es genügte, daß selbst nur ein Baisse das rothe Gespenst heraufbeschwor, damit die Partei der Ordnung ohne Diskussion einen Antrag verwarf, der der Nationalversammlung eine ungeheure Popularität erobern und Bonaparte in ihre Arme zurückwerfen mußte. Statt sich von der Exekutivgewalt durch die Perspektive neuer Unruhen einschüchtern zu lassen, hätte sie vielmehr dem Klassenkampf einen kleinen Spielraum gewähren müssen, um die Exekutive von sich abhängig zu erhalten. Aber sie fühlte sich nicht der Aufgabe gewachsen, mit dem Feuer zu spielen.

Unterdessen vegetirte das sogenannte Uebergangsministerium bis Mitte April fort. Bonaparte ermüdete, foppte die Nationalversammlung mit beständig neuen Ministerkombinationen. Bald schien er ein republikanisches Ministerium bilden zu wollen mit Lamartine und Billaut, bald ein parlamentarisches mit dem unvermeidlichen Odilon Barrot, dessen Name nie fehlen darf, wenn ein Dupe nothwendig

ist, bald ein legitimistisches mit Vatismenil und Benoist d'Azy, bald ein orleanistisches mit Malleville. Während er so die verschiedenen Fraktionen der Ordnungspartei in Spannung gegen einander erhält und sie insgesammt mit der Aussicht auf ein republikanisches Ministerium und die dann unvermeidlich gewordene Herstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts ängstet, bringt er gleichzeitig bei der Bourgeoisie die Ueberzeugung hervor, daß seine aufrichtigen Bemühungen um ein parlamentarisches Ministerium an der Unversöhnlichkeit der royalistischen Fraktionen scheitern. Die Bourgeoisie schrie aber nur so lauter nach einer „starken Regierung," sie fand es um so unverzeihlicher, Frankreich „ohne Administration zu lassen, jemehr eine allgemeine Handelskrise nun im Anmarsche schien und in den Städten für den Sozialismus warb, wie der ruinirend niedrige Preis des Getreides auf dem Lande. Der Handel wurde täglich flauer, die unbeschäftigten Hände vermehrten sich zusehends, in Paris waren wenigstens 10,000 Arbeiter brodlos, in Rouen, Mühlhausen, Lyon, Raubaix, Courcoing, St. Etienne, Elbeuf u. s. w. standen zahllose Fabriken still. Unter diesen Umständen konnte Bonaparte es wagen, am 11. April das Ministerium vom 18. Januar zu restauriren. Die Herren Rouher, Fould, Baroche ꝛc. verstärkt durch Herrn Léon Faucher, der während der letzten Tage der Konstituante die Versammlung einstimmig mit Ausnahme von fünf Ministerstimmen wegen Verbreitung falscher telegraphischer Depeschen mit einem Mißtrauensvotum gebrandmarkt hatte. Die Nationalversammlung hatte also am 18. Januar einen Sieg über das Ministerium davongetragen, sie hatte während drei Monaten mit Bonaparte gekämpft, damit am 11. April Fould und Baroche den Puritaner Faucher als Dritten in ihrem ministeriellen Bunde aufnehmen konnten.

November 1849 hatte sich Bonaparte mit einem unparlamentarischen Ministerium begnügt, Januar 1851 mit einem außerparlamentarischen, am 11. April fühlte er sich stark genug, ein antiparlamentarisches Ministerium zu bilden, das die Mißtrauensvota beider Versammlungen, der Konstituante und der Legislativen, der republikanischen und royalistischen harmonisch in sich vereinigte. Diese Stufenleiter von Ministerien war der Termometer, woran das Parlament die Abnahme der eignen Lebenswärmen messen konnte. Diese vor Ende April tief genug gesunken, daß Persigny den Changarnier in einer persönlichen Zusammenkunft auffordern konnte, in das Lager des Präsidenten überzugehen. Bonaparte, versicherte er ihm, betrachte den Einfluß der Nationalversammlung als vollständig vernichtet und schon liege die Proklamation bereit, die nach dem beständig beabsichtigten, aber zufällig wieder aufgehobenen coup d'état veröffentlicht werden solle. Changarnier theilte den Führern der Ordnungspartei die Todesanzeige mit, aber wer glaubt, daß der Biß von Wanzen tödtete? Und das Parlament, so geschlagen, so aufgelöst, so sterbefaul es war, konnte sich nicht überwinden, in dem Duelle mit dem grotesken Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember etwas Andres zu sehen, als das Duell mit einer Wanze. Aber Bonaparte antwortete der Partei der Ordnung wie Agesilaus dem Könige Agis: „Ich scheine die Ameise aber ich werde einmal Löwe sein."

VI.

Die Koalition mit der Montagne und den reinen Republikanern, wozu die Ornungspartei in ihren vergeblichen Anstrengungen den Besitz der Militärgewalt zu behaupten und die oberste Leitung der Exekutivgewalt wieder zu erobern, sich verurtheilt sah, bewies unwidersprechlich, daß sie die selbstständige parlamentarische Majorität eingebüßt hatte. Die bloße Macht des Kalenders, der *Stundenzeiger* gab am 29. Mai das Signal ihrer völligen Auflösung. Mit dem *29. Mai begann* das letzte Lebensjahr der Nationalversammlung. Sie wußte sich

nun entscheiden für unveränderte Fortdauer oder für Revision der Verfassung. Aber Revision der Verfassung das hieß nicht nur Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie oder kleinbürgerlichen Demokratie, Demokratie oder proletarische Anarchie, parlamentarische Republik oder Bonaparte, das hieß zugleich Orleans oder Bourbon! So fiel mitten in das Parlament der Erisapfel, an dem sich der Widerstreit der Interessen, die die Ordnungspartei in feindliche Fraktionen sonderten, offen entzünden mußte. Die Ordnungspartei war eine Verbindung von heterogenen gesellschaftlichen Substanzen. Die Revisionsfrage erzeugte eine politische Temperatur, worin das Produkt wieder in seine ursprünglichen Bestandtheile zerfallen mußte.

Das Interesse der Bonapartisten an der Revision war einfach. Für sie handelte es sich vor Allem um Abschaffung des Art. 45, der Bonaparte's Wiederwahl untersagte und die Prorogation seiner Gewalt. Nicht minder einfach schien die Stellung der Republikaner. Sie verwarfen unbedingt jede Revision, sie sahen in ihr eine allseitige Verschwörung gegen die Republik. Da sie über mehr als drei Viertel der Stimmen in der Nationalversammlung verfügten, und verfassungsmäßig diese Stimmenzahl zum rechtgültigen Beschlusse der Revision und zur Einberufung einer revidirenden Versammlung erfordert war, brauchten sie nur ihre Stimmen zu zählen, um des Sieges sicher zu sein. Und sie waren des Sieges sicher.

Diesen klaren Stellungen gegenüber befand sich die Partei der Ordnung in unentwirrbaren Widersprüchen. Verwarf sie die Revision, so gefährdete sie den Statusquo, indem sie Bonaparte nur noch einen Ausweg übrig ließ, den der Gewalt, indem sie Frankreich am 2. Mai 1852, im Augenblick der Entscheidung der revolutionären Anarchie preisgab, mit einem Präsidenten, der seine Autorität verlor, mit einem Parlamente, das sie längst nicht mehr besaß, und mit einem Volke, das sie wieder zu erobern dachte. Stimmte sie für die verfassungsmäßige Revision, so wußte sie, daß sie umsonst stimmte und am Veto der Republikaner verfassungsmäßig scheitern müsse. Erklärte sie verfassungswidrig die einfache Stimmenmajorität für bindend, so konnte sie die Revolution nur zu beherrschen hoffen, wenn sie sich unbedingt der Botmäßigkeit der Exekutivgewalt unterwarf, so machte sie Bonaparte zum Meister über die Verfassung, über die Revision und über sich selbst. Eine nur theilweise Revision, die die Gewalt des Präsidenten verlängerte, bahnte der imperialistischen Usurpation den Weg. Eine allgemeine Revision die die Existenz der Republik abkürzte, brachte die dynastischen Ansprüche in unvermeidlichen Konflikt, denn die Bedingungen für eine bourbonische und die Bedingungen für eine orleanistische Restauration waren nicht nur verschieden, sie schlossen sich wechselseitig aus.

Die parlamentarische Republik war mehr als das neutrale Gebiet, worin die zwei Fraktionen der französischen Bourgeoisie, Legitimisten und Orleanisten, großes Grundeigenthum und Industrie gleichberechtigt nebeneinander hausen konnten. Sie war die unumgängliche Bedingung ihrer gemeinsamen Herrschaft, die einzige Staatsform, worin ihr allgemeines Klasseninteresse sich zugleich die Ansprüche ihrer besondern Fraktionen wie alle übrigen Klassen der Gesellschaft unterwarf. Als Royalisten fielen sie in ihren alten Gegensatz zurück, in den Kampf um die Suprematie des Grundeigenthums oder des Geldes, und der höchste Ausdruck dieses Gegensatzes, die Personifikation desselben, waren ihre Könige selbst, ihre Dynastien. Daher das Sträuben der Ordnungspartei gegen die Rückberufung der Bourbonen.

Der Orleanist und Volksrepräsentant Creton hatte 1849, 1850 und 1851 periodisch den Antrag gestellt, das Verbannungsdekret gegen die königlichen Familien aufzuheben. Das Parlament bot eben so periodisch das Schauspiel einer Versammlung von Royalisten, die ihren verbannten Königen hartnäckig die Thore verschließt, durch die sie heimkehren könnten. Richard III. hatte Heinrich IV. ermordet mit dem Bemerken, daß er zu gut für diese Welt sei und in den Himmel gehöre. Sie erklärten Frankreich für zu schlecht, seine Könige wieder zu besitzen. Durch die Macht der Verhältnisse gezwungen waren sie zu Republikanern geworden

und sanktionirten wiederholt den Volksbeschluß, der ihre Könige aus Frankreich verjagte.

Die Revision der Verfassung — und sie in Betracht zu ziehen zwangen die Umstände — stellte mit der Republik zugleich die gemeinsame Herrschaft der beiden Bourgeois-Fraktionen in Frage und rief mit der Möglichkeit der Monarchie, die Rivalität der Interessen, die sie abwechselnd vorzugsweise vertreten hatte, in's Leben zurück, den Kampf um die Suprematie der einen Fraktion über die andre. Die Diplomaten der Ordnungspartei glaubten den Kampf schlichten zu können durch eine Verschmelzung beider Dynastien, durch eine sogenannte Fusion der royalistischen Parteien und ihrer Königshäuser. Die wirkliche Fusion der Restauration und der Julimonarchie war die parlamentarische Republik, worin orleanistisch und legitimistische Farben ausgelöscht wurden und die Bourgeois-Arten in dem Bourgeois schlechtweg, in der Bourgeois-Gattung verschwanden. Jetzt aber sollte der Orleanist Legitimist, der Legitimist Orleanist werden. Das Königthum, worin sich ihr Gegensatz personifizirte, sollte ihre Einheit verkörpern, der Ausdruck ihrer ausschließlichen Fraktionsinteressen zum Ausdruck ihres gemeinsamen Klasseninteresses werden, die Monarchie das leisten, was nur die Aufhebung zweier Monarchien, die Republik leisten konnte und geleistet hatte. Es war dies der Stein des Weisen, an dessen Herstellung sich die Doktoren der Ordnungspartei die Köpfe zerbrachen. Als könnte die legitime Monarchie jemals die Monarchie der industriellen Bourgeois oder das Bürgerkönigthum jemals das Königthum der angestammten Grundaristokratie werden. Als könnten Grundeigenthum und Industrie sich unter einer Krone verbrüdern, wo die Krone nur auf ein Haupt fallen konnte, auf das Haupt des ältern Bruders oder des jüngern. Als könnte die Industrie sich überhaupt mit dem Grundeigenthum ausgleichen, so lange das Grundeigenthum sich nicht entschließt, selbst industriell zu werden. Wenn Henri V. morgen stürbe, der Graf von Paris würde darum nicht der König der Legitimisten, es sei denn, daß er aufhörte, der König der Orleanisten zu sein. Die Philosophen der Fusion jedoch, die sich in dem Maße breit machten, als die Revisionsfrage in den Vordergrund trat, die sich in der "Assemblée nationale" ein offizielles Tagesorgan geschaffen hatten, die sogar in diesem Augenblicke (Februar 1852) wieder im Werke sind, erklärten sich die ganze Schwierigkeit aus dem Widerstreben und der Rivalität der beiden Dynastien. Die Versuche, die Familie Orleans mit Heinrich V. zu versöhnen, seit dem Tode Louis Philippe's begonnen, aber wie die dynastischen Intriguen überhaupt nur während der Ferien der Nationalversammlung, in den Zwischenakten, hinter den Coulissen gespielt, mehr sentimentale Koquetterie mit dem alten Aberglauben, als ernstgemeintes Geschäft, wurden nun zu Haupt- und Staatsaktionen und von der Ordnungspartei auf der öffentlichen Bühne aufgeführt, statt wie bisher auf dem Liebhabertheater. Die Kuriere flogen von Paris nach Venedig, von Venedig nach Claremont, von Claremont nach Paris. Der Graf v. Chambord erläßt ein Manifest, worin er „mit Hülfe aller Glieder seiner Familie" nicht seine, sondern die „nationale" Restauration anzeigt. Der Orleanist Salvandy wirft sich Heinrich V. zu Füßen. Die Legitimistenchefs Berryer, Benoit d'Azy, St. Priest, wandern nach Claremont, um die Orleans zu überreden, aber vergeblich. Die Fusionisten gewahren zu spät, daß die Interessen der beiden Bourgeois-Fraktionen weder an Ausschließlichkeit verlieren, noch an Nachgiebigkeit gewinnen, wo sie in der Form von Familieninteressen, von Interessen zweier Königshäuser sich zuspitzen. Wenn Heinrich V. den Grafen von Paris als Nachfolger anerkannte — der einzige Erfolg, den die Fusion im besten Fall erzielen konnte —, so gewann das Haus Orleans keinen Anspruch, den ihm die Kinderlosigkeit Heinrich V. nicht schon gesichert hätte, aber es verlor alle Ansprüche, die es durch die Julirevolution erobert hatte. Es verzichtete auf seine Originalansprüche, auf alle Titel die es in einem mehr als hundertjährigen Kampfe dem ältern Zweige der Bourbonen abgerungen, es tauschte seine historischen Prärogative, die Prärogative des modernen Königthums, gegen die Prärogative

Stammbaums aus. Die Fusion war also nichts, als eine freiwillige Abdankung des Hauses Orleans, die legitimistische Resignation desselben, der reuige Rücktritt aus der protestantischen Staatskirche in die katholische. Ein Rücktritt, der es dazu nicht einmal auf den Thron, den es verloren hatte, sondern auf die Stufe des Throns brachte, auf der es geboren war. Die alten orleanistischen Minister Guizot, Duchatel ꝛc., die ebenfalls nach Claremont eilten, um die Fusion zu bevorworten, vertraten in der That nur den Katzenjammer über die Julirevolution, die Verzweiflung am Bürgerkönigthum und am Königthum der Bürger, den Aberglauben an die Legitimität als das letzte Amulet gegen die Anarchie. In ihrer Einbildung Vermittler zwischen Orleans und Bourbon waren sie in der Wirklichkeit nur noch abgefallne Orleanisten, und als solche empfing sie der Prinz v. Joinville. Der lebensfähige, kriegerische Theil der Orleanisten dagegen, Thiers, Baze u. s. w., überzeugten die Familie Louis Philippe's um so leichter, daß wenn jede unmittelbar monarchische Restauration die Fusion der beiden Dynastien, jede solche Fusion aber die Abdankung des Hauses Orleans voraussetze, es dagegen ganz der Tradition ihrer Vorfahren entspreche, vorläufig die Republik anzuerkennen und abzuwarten, bis die Ereignisse erlaubten, den Stuhl in einen Thron zu verwandeln. Joinville's Kandidatur wurde gerüchtsweise ausgesprengt, die öffentliche Neugier in der Schwebe erhalten, und einige Monate später, nach Verwerfung der Revision, im September öffentlich proklamirt.

Der Versuch einer royalistischen Fusion zwischen Orleanisten und Legitimisten war so nicht nur gescheitert, er hatte ihre parlamentarische Fusion, ihre republikanische Gemeinform gebrochen und die Ordnungspartei wieder in ihre ursprünglichen Bestandtheile zersetzt; aber je mehr die Entfremdung zwischen Claremont und Venedig wuchs, ihre Ausgleichung sich zerschlug, die Joinville-Agitation um sich griff, desto eifriger, ernster wurden die Verhandlungen zwischen Faucher, dem Minister Bonaparte's und den Legitimisten.

Die Auflösung der Ordnungspartei blieb nicht bei ihren ursprünglichen Elementen stehen. Jede der beiden großen Fraktionen zersetzte sich ihrerseits von Neuem. Es war, als wenn alle die alten Nuanzen, die sich früher innerhalb jedes der beiden Kreise, sei es des legitimen, sei es des orleanistischen, bekämpft und gedrängt hatten, wieder aufgethaut wären, wie vertrocknete Infusorien bei Berührung mit Wasser, als wenn sie von Neuem Lebenskraft genug gewonnen hätten, um eigne Gruppen und selbstständige Gegenstände zu bilden. Die Legitimisten träumten sich zurück in die Streitfragen zwischen den Tuilerien und dem Pavillon Marsan, zwischen Villele und Polignac. Die Orleanisten durchlebten von Neuem die goldene Zeit der Turniere zwischen Guizot, Molé, Broglio, Thiers und Odilon Barrot.

Der revisionslustige, aber über die Grenzen der Revision wieder uneinige Theil der Ordnungspartei, zusammengesetzt aus den Legitimisten unter Berryer und Fallour einerseits, unter Larochejaquelin andrerseits, und den kampfmüden Orleanisten unter Molé, Broglio, Montalembert und Odilon Barrot, vereinbarte sich mit den bonapartistischen Repräsentanten zu folgendem unbestimmten und weitgefaßten Antrage: „Die unterzeichneten Repräsentanten, mit dem Zwecke, der Nation die volle Ausübung ihrer Souveränität wiederzugeben, stellen die Motion, daß die Verfassung revidirt werde.“ Gleichzeitig aber erklären sie einstimmig durch ihren Berichterstatter Toqueville, die Nationalversammlung habe nicht das Recht, die Abschaffung der Republik zu beantragen, dies Recht stehe nur der Revisionskammer zu. Uebrigens könne die Verfassung nur auf „legale“ Weise revidirt werden, also nur, wenn das verfassungsmäßig vorgeschriebene Dreiviertel der Stimmenzahl für Revision entscheide. Nach sechstägigen stürmischen Debatten, am 19. Juli, wurde die Revision, wie vorherzusehen, verworfen. Es stimmten 446 dafür, aber 278 dagegen. Die entschiedenen Orleanisten Thiers, Changarnier ꝛc. stimmten mit den Republikanern und der Montagne.

Die Majorität des Parlaments erklärte sich so gegen die Verfassung, aber diese Verfassung selbst erklärte sich für die Minorität und ihren Beschluß für bindend. Hatte aber die Ordnungspartei nicht am 31. Mai 1850, nicht am 13. Juni 1849 die Verfassung der parlamentarischen Majorität untergeordnet? Beruhte ihre ganze bisherige Politik nicht auf der Unterordnung der Verfassungsparagraphen unter die parlamentarischen Majoritätsbeschlüsse? Hatte sie den alttestamentarischen Aberglauben an den Buchstaben des Gesetzes nicht den Demokraten überlassen und an den Demokraten gezüchtigt? In diesem Augenblicke aber hieß Revision der Verfassung nichts Andres, als Fortdauer der präsidentiellen Gewalt, wie Fortdauer der Verfassung nichts Andres hieß, als Absetzung Bonaparte's. Das Parlament hatte sich für ihn erklärt, aber die Verfassung erklärte sich gegen das Parlament. Er handelte also im Sinne des Parlaments, wenn er die Verfassung zerriß, und er handelte im Sinne der Verfassung, wenn er das Parlament auseinanderjagte.

Das Parlament hatte die Verfassung und mit ihr seine eigne Herrschaft „außerhalb der Majorität" erklärt, es hatte durch seinen Beschluß die Verfassung aufgehoben und die präsidentielle Gewalt verlängert und zugleich erklärt, daß weder die eine sterben noch die andre leben könne, so lange es selbst fortbestehe. Die Füße derer, die es begraben sollten, standen vor der Thüre. Während es die Revision debattirte, entfernte Bonaparte den General Baraguay d'Hilliers, der sich unschlüssig zeigte, von dem Kommando der ersten Militärdivision und ernannte an seine Stelle den General Magnan, den Sieger von Lyon, den Helden der Dezembertage, eine seiner Kreaturen, der sich schon unter Louis Philippe bei Gelegenheit der Expedition von Boulogne mehr oder minder für ihn kompromittirt hatte.

Die Ordnungspartei bewies durch ihren Beschluß über die Revision, daß sie weder zu herrschen noch zu dienen, weder zu leben noch zu sterben, weder die Republik zu ertragen noch sie umzustürzen, weder die Verfassung aufrecht zu erhalten noch sie über den Haufen zu werfen, weder mit dem Präsidenten zusammenzuwirken noch mit ihm zu brechen verstand. Von wem erwartete sie denn die Lösung aller Widersprüche? Von dem Kalender, von dem Gang der Ereignisse. Sie hörte auf, sich die Gewalt über die Ereignisse anzumaßen. Sie forderte also die Ereignisse heraus, ihr Gewalt anzuthun, und damit die Macht, an die sie im Kampfe mit dem Volke ein Attribut nach dem andern abgetreten hatte, bis sie selbst ihr gewaltlos gegenüberstand, damit der Chef der Exekutivgewalt desto ungestörter den Kampfplan gegen sie entwerfen, seine Angriffsmittel verstärken, seine Werkzeuge auswählen, seine Positionen befestigen könne, beschloß sie mitten in diesem kritischen Augenblicke von der Bühne abzutreten und sich auf drei Monate zu vertagen, vom 10. August bis 4. November.

Die parlamentarische Partei war nicht nur in ihre zwei großen Fraktionen, jede dieser Fraktionen war nicht nur innerhalb ihrer selbst aufgelöst, sondern die Ordnungspartei im Parlamente war mit der Ordnungspartei außerhalb des Parlaments zerfallen. Die Wortführer und die Schriftgelehrten der Bourgeoisie, ihre Tribüne und ihre Presse, kurz die Ideologen der Bourgeoisie und die Bourgeoisie selbst, die Repräsentanten und die Repräsentirten, standen sich entfremdet gegenüber und verstanden sich nicht mehr.

Die Legitimisten in den Provinzen mit ihrem beschränkten Horizont und ihrem unbeschränkten Enthusiasmus bezüchtigten ihre parlamentarischen Führer, Berryer und Fallour, der Desertion in's bonapartistische Lager und des Abfalls von Heinrich V. Ihr Lilienverstand glaubte an den Sündenfall, aber nicht an die Diplomatie.

Ungleich verhängnißvoller und entscheidender war der Bruch der kommerziellen Bourgeoisie mit ihren Politikern. Sie warf ihnen vor, nicht wie die Legitimisten den ihren, von dem Prinzip abgefallen zu sein, sondern umgekehrt, an unnütz gewordenen Prinzipien festzuhalten.

Ich habe schon früher angedeutet, daß seit dem Eintritt Fould's in's Ministe
rium der Theil der kommerziellen Bourgeoisie, der den Löwenantheil an Louis Phi
lippe's Herrschaft besessen hatte, daß die Finanzaristokratie bonapartistisc
geworden war. Fould vertrat nicht nur Bonaparte's Interesse an der Börse,
vertrat zugleich das Interesse der Börse bei Bonaparte. Die Stellung der Fi
nanzaristokratie schildert am schlagendsten ein Citat aus ihrem europäischen Orga
dem Londoner Oekonomist. In seiner Nummer vom 1. Februar 1851 läßt er sic
aus Paris schreiben: „Nun haben wir es konstatirt von allen Seiten her, da
Frankreich vor Allem nach Ruhe verlangt. Der Präsident erklärt es in seine
Message an die legislative Versammlung, es tönt als Echo zurück von der natio
nalen Rednertribune, es wird betheuert von den Zeitungen, es wird verkündet vo
der Kanzel, es wird bewiesen durch die Empfindlichkeit de
Staatspapiere bei der geringsten Aussicht auf Störung
durch ihre Festigkeit, so oft die Exekutivgewalt siegt."

In seiner Nummer vom 29. November 1851 erklärt der Oekonomist in seine
eignen Namen: „Auf allen Börsen von Europa ist der Präsi
dent nun als die Schildwache der Ordnung anerkannt." D
Finanzaristokratie verdammte also den parlamentarischen Kampf der Ordnungspar
tei mit der Exekutivgewalt als eine Störung der Ordnung, und feier
jeden Sieg des Präsidenten über ihre angeblichen Repräsentanten als einen Sie
der Ordnung. Man muß hier unter der Finanzaristokratie nicht nur d
großen Staatsgläubiger und Spekulanten in Staatspapieren verstehen, von dene
es sich sofort begreift, daß ihr Interesse mit dem Interesse der Staatsgewalt zu
sammenfällt. Das ganze moderne Geldgeschäft, die ganze Bankwirthschaft ist au
das Innigste mit dem öffentlichen Kredit verwebt. Ein Theil ihres Geschäftska
pitals wird nothwendig in schnell konvertiblen Staatspapieren angelegt und ver
zins't. Ihre Depositen, das ihnen zur Verfügung gestellte und von ihnen unte
Kaufleute und Industrielle vertheilte Kapital strömt größtentheils aus den Div
denden der Staatsrentner her. Der ganze Geldmarkt und die Priester dieses Geld
markts, wenn so zu jeder Epoche die Stabilität der Staatsgewalt Moses und d
Propheten für sie bedeutet; wie nicht erst heute, wo jede Sündfluth mit den alte
Staaten die alten Staatsschulden wegzuschwemmen droht?

Auch die industrielle Bourgeoisie ärgerte sich in ihrem Ordnungsfa
natismus über die Zänkereien der parlamentarischen Ordnungspartei mit der Ex
kutivgewalt. Thiers, Angles, Saint Beuve u. s. w. erhielten nach ihren Votu
vom 18. Januar, bei Gelegenheit der Absetzung Changarnier's, öffentliche Zurech
weisungen von ihren Mandatgebern gerade aus den industriellen Bezirken, wori
namentlich ihre Koalition mit der Montagne als Hochverrath an der Ordnun
gegeißelt wurde. Wenn wir gesehen haben, daß die prahlerischen Neckereien, d
kleinlichen Intriguen, worin sich der Kampf der Ordnungspartei mit dem Präsiden
ten kundgab, keine bessere Aufnahme verdiente, so war andrerseits diese Bourgeoi
partei, die von ihren Vertretern verlangt, die Militärgewalt aus den Händen ihr
eignen Parlaments widerstandslos in die eines abentheuernden Prätendenten übe
gehen zu lassen, nicht einmal der Intriguen werth, die in ihrem Interesse ver
schwendet wurden. Sie bewies, daß der Kampf um die Behauptung ihres öffent
lichen Interesses, ihres eignen Klasseninteresses, ihrer politische
Macht sie als Störung des Privatgeschäfts nur belästige und verstimme.

Die bürgerlichen Honoratioren der Departementalstädte, die Magistrate, Han
delsrichter u. s. w. empfingen mit kaum einer Ausnahme Bonaparte überall a
seinen Rundreisen in der servilsten Weise, selbst wenn er wie in Dijon die Nationa
versammlung und speziell die Ordnungspartei rückhaltlos angriff.

Wenn der Handel gut ging, wie noch Anfang 1851, tobte die kommerziel
Bourgeoisie gegen jeden parlamentarischen Kampf, damit dem Handel ja nicht
Humor *ausgehe. Wenn der Handel* schlecht ging, wie fortdauernd seit
Februar 1851, klagte sie die parlamentarischen Kämpfe als Ursache der Sto

an und schrie nach ihrem Verstummen, damit der Handel wieder laut werde. Die Revisionsdebatten fielen gerade in diese schlechte Zeit. Da es sich hier um Sein oder Nichtsein der bestehenden Staatsform handelte, fühlte sich die Bourgeoisie um so berechtigter von ihren Repräsentanten das Ende dieses folternden Provisoriums und zugleich die Erhaltung des Statusquo zu verlangen. Es war dies kein Widerspruch. Unter dem Ende des Provisoriums verstand sie gerade seine Fortdauer, das Hinausschieben des Augenblicks, wo es zu einer Entscheidung kommen mußte, in eine blaue Ferne. Der Statusquo konnte nur auf zwei Wegen erhalten werden, Verlängerung der Gewalt Bonaparte's oder verfassungsmäßiger Abtritt desselben und Wahl Cavaignac's. Ein Theil der Bourgeoisie wünschte die letztre Lösung und wußte seinen Repräsentanten keinen bessern Rath zu geben, als zu schweigen, den brennenden Punkt unberührt zu lassen. Wenn ihre Repräsentanten nicht sprächen, meinten sie, werde Bonaparte nicht handeln. Sie wünschten sich ein Straußenparlament, das seinen Kopf verstecke, um ungesehen zu bleiben. Ein andrer Theil der Bourgeoisie wünschte Bonaparte, weil er einmal auf dem Präsidentenstuhl saß, auf dem Präsidentenstuhl sitzen zu lassen, damit Alles im alten Geleise bleibe. Es empörte sie, daß ihr Parlament nicht offen die Konstitution brach und ohne Umstände abdankte.

Die Generalräthe der Departements, diese Provinzialvertretungen der großen Bourgeoisie, die während der Ferien der Nationalversammlung vom 25. August an tagten, erklärten sich fast einstimmig für die Revision, also gegen das Parlament und für Bonaparte.

Noch unzweideutiger als der Zerfall mit ihren *parlamentarischen Repräsentanten*, legte die Bourgeoisie ihre Wuth über ihre literarischen Vertreter, über ihre eigne Presse an den Tag. Die Verurtheilungen zu unerschwinglichen Geldsummen und zu schamlosen Gefängnißstrafen durch die Bourgeois-Juris für jeden Angriff der Bourgeois-Journalisten auf die Usurpationsgelüste Bonaparte's, für jeden Versuch der Presse, die politischen Rechte der Bourgeoisie gegen die Exekutivgewalt zu vertheidigen, setzten nicht nur Frankreich, sondern ganz Europa in Erstaunen.

Wenn die parlamentarische Ordnungspartei, wie ich gezeigt habe, durch ihr Schreien nach Ruhe sich selbst zur Ruhe verwies, wenn sie die politische Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie für unverträglich mit der Sicherheit und dem Bestand der Bourgeoisie erklärte, indem sie im Kampfe gegen die andern Klassen der Gesellschaft alle Bedingungen ihres eignen Régimes, des parlamentarischen Régimes mit eigner Hand vernichtete, so forderte dagegen die *außerparlamentarische Masse der Bourgeoisie* durch ihre Servilität gegen den Präsidenten, durch ihre Schmähungen gegen das Parlament, durch die brutale Mißhandlung der eignen Presse Bonaparte auf, ihren sprechenden und schreibenden Theil, ihre Politiker und ihre Literaten, ihre Rednertribune und ihre Presse zu unterdrücken, zu vernichten, damit sie nun vertrauensvoll unter dem Schutze einer starken und uneingeschränkten Regierung ihren Privatgeschäften nachgehen könne. Sie erklärte unzweideutig, daß sie ihre eigne politische Herrschaft loszuwerden schmachte, um die Mühen und Gefahren der Herrschaft loszuwerden.

Und die Elende, die Feige, die sich schon gegen den blos parlamentarischen und literarischen Kampf für die Herrschaft ihrer eignen Klasse empört und die Führer dieses Kampfes verrathen hatte, sie wagt jetzt nachträglich das Proletariat anzuklagen, daß es nicht zum blutigen Kampfe, zum Kampfe auf Leben und Tod für sie aufgestanden sei! Sie, die jeden Augenblick ihr allgemeines Klasseninteresse, d. h. ihr politisches Interesse dem bornirtesten, schmutzigsten Privatinteresse aufopferte und an ihre Vertreter die Zumuthung eines ähnlichen Opfers stellte, sie jammert jetzt: *das Proletariat* habe seinen materiellen Interessen ihre idealen politischen Interessen *geopfert*. Sie gebahrt sich als schöne Seele, die von dem durch Sozialisten irregeleiteten und egoistisch gewordenen Proletariat verkannt und im entscheidenden Augenblicke verlassen worden sei. Und sie findet ein allgemeines Echo in der ganzen

lichen Welt. Ich spreche natürlich hier nicht von deutschen Winkelpolitikern und Gesinnungslümmeln. Ich verweise z. B. auf denselben Oekonomist, der noch am 29. November 1851, also vier Tage vor dem Staatsstreich, Bonaparte für die „Schildwache der Ordnung", die Thiers und Berryer aber für „Anarchisten" erklärte und schon am 27. Dezember 1851, nachdem Bonaparte jene Anarchisten zur Ruhe gebracht hat, über den Verrath schreit, den „ignorante, unerzogne, stupide Proletariermassen an dem Geschick, der Kenntniß, der Disziplin, dem geistigen Einfluß, den intellektuellen Hülfsquellen und dem moralischen Gewicht der mittleren und höheren Gesellschaftsränge" verübt hätten. Die stupide, ignorante und gemeine Masse war Niemand anders, als die Bourgeoismasse selbst.

Frankreich hatte allerdings im Jahre 1851 eine Art von kleiner Handelskrisis erlebt. Ende Februar zeigte sich Verminderung des Exports gegen 1850, im März litt der Handel und schlossen sich die Fabriken, im April schien der Stand der industriellen Departements so verzweifelt wie nach den Februartagen, im Mai war das Geschäft noch nicht wieder aufgelebt, noch am 28. Juni zeigte das Portefeuille der Bank von Frankreich durch ein ungeheures Wachsen der Depositen und eine eben so große Abnahme der Vorschüsse auf Wechsel den Stillstand der Produktion, und erst Mitte Oktober trat wieder eine progressive Besserung des Geschäfts ein. Die französische Bourgeoisie erklärte sich diese Handelsstockung aus rein politischen Gründen, aus dem Kampfe zwischen dem Parlamente und der Exekutivgewalt, aus der Unsicherheit einer nur provisorischen Staatsform, aus der Schreckensaussicht auf den 2. Mai 1852. Ich will nicht läugnen, daß alle diese Umstände einige Industriezweige in Paris und in den Departements herabdrückten. Jedenfalls war aber diese Einwirkung der politischen Verhältnisse nur lokal und unerheblich. Bedarf es eines andern Beweises, als daß die Besserung des Handels gerade in dem Augenblicke eintrat, wo sich der politische Zustand verschlechterte, der politische Horizont verdunkelte und jeden Augenblick ein Blitzstrahl aus dem Elysium erwartet wurde, gegen Mitte Oktober? Der französische Bourgeois, dessen „Geschick, Kenntniß, geistige Einsicht und intellektuelle Hülfsquellen" nicht weiter reichen als seine Nase, konnte übrigens während der ganzen Dauer der Industrieausstellung in London mit der Nase auf die Ursache seiner Handelsmisére stoßen. Während in Frankreich die Fabriken geschlossen wurden, brachen in England kommerzielle Bankerutte aus. Während der industrielle Panic im April und Mai einen Höhepunkt in Frankreich erreichte, erreichte der kommerzielle Panic April und Mai einen Höhepunkt in England. Wie die französische litt die englische Wollindustrie, wie die französische die englische Seidenmanufaktur: Wenn die englischen Baumwollfabriken weiter arbeiteten, geschah es nicht mehr mit demselben Profit, wie 1849 und 1850. Der Unterschied war nur der, daß die Krise in Frankreich industriell, in England kommerziell, daß während in Frankreich die Fabriken stillsitzten, sie sich in England ausdehnten, aber unter ungünstigeren Bedingungen wie in den vorhergehenden Jahren, daß in Frankreich der Export, in England der Import die Hauptschläge erhielt. Die gemeinsame Ursache, die natürlich nicht innerhalb der Grenzen des französisch-politischen Horizonts zu suchen ist, war augenscheinlich. 1849 und 1850 waren Jahre der größten materiellen Prosperität und einer Uebergangsproduktion, die erst 1851 als solche hervortrat. Sie wurde im Anfang dieses Jahres durch die Aussicht auf die Industrieausstellung noch besonders befördert. Als eigenthümliche Umstände kamen hinzu: erst der Mißwachs der Baumwollenerndte von 1850 und 1851, dann die Sicherheit einer größern Baumwollenerndte als erwartet war, erst das Steigen, dann das plötzliche Fallen, kurz die Schwankungen der Baumwollenpreise. Die Rohseidenerndte war wenigstens in Frankreich noch unter dem Durchschnittsertrage ausgefallen. Die Wollenmanufaktur endlich hatte sich seit 1848 so sehr ausgedehnt, daß die Wollproduktion ihr nicht nachfolgen konnte und der Preis der Rohwolle in einem großen Mißverhältnisse zu dem Preise der Wollfabrikate stieg. Hier haben wir also in dem Rohmaterial von drei Weltmarktsindustrien *schon dreifaches Material zu einer* Handelsstockung. Von diesen besondern U

ständen abgesehen war die scheinbare Krise des Jahres 1851 nichts Anders als der Halt, den Ueberproduktion und Ueberspekulation jedes Mal in der Beschreibung des industriellen Kreislaufes macht, bevor sie ihre letzten Kraftanstrengungen zusammenrafft, um fieberhaft den letzten Kreisabschnitt zu durchjagen und bei ihrem Ausgangspunkt, der allgemeinen Handelskrise, wieder anzulangen. In solchen Intervallen der Handelsgeschichte brechen in England kommerzielle Bankerutte aus, während in Frankreich die Industrie selbst stillgesetzt wird, theils durch die gerade dann unerträglich werdende Konkurrenz der Engländer auf allen Märkten zum Rückzug gezwungen, theils als Luxusindustrie vorzugsweise von jeder Geschäftsstockung angegriffen. So macht Frankreich außer den allgemeinen Krisen seine eignen nationalen Handelskrisen durch, die jedoch weit mehr durch den allgemeinen Stand des Weltmarkts als durch französische Lokaleinflüsse bestimmt und bedingt werden. Es wird nicht ohne Interesse sein, dem Vorurtheil des französischen Bourgeois das Urtheil des englischen Bourgeois gegenüber zu stellen. Eins der größten Liverpooler Häuser schreibt in seinem Jahres-Handelsberichte für 1851: „Wenige Jahre haben die bei ihrem Beginnen gehegten Anticipationen mehr getäuscht, als das eben abgelaufene; statt der großen Prosperität der man einstimmig entgegensah, bewies es sich als eins der entmuthigendsten Jahre seit einem Vierteljahrhundert. Es gilt dies natürlich nur von den merkantilen, nicht von den industriellen Klassen. Und doch waren sicherlich Gründe vorhanden beim Beginne des Jahres auf das Gegentheil zu schließen, die Produktenvorräthe waren spärlich, Kapital überflüssig, Nahrungsmittel wohlfeil, ein reicher Herbst war gesichert; ungebrochner Friede auf dem Kontinent und keine politischen oder finanziellen Störungen zu Hause; in der That, die Flügel des Handels waren nie fesselloser .... Wem dies ungünstige Resultat zuschreiben? Wir glauben dem Ueberhandel sowohl in Importen als Exporten. Wenn unsere Kaufleute nicht selbst ihrer Thätigkeit engere Grenzen ziehen, kann uns Nichts im Gleise halten, als alle drei Jahr ein panic."

Man stelle sich nun den französischen Bourgeois vor, wie mitten in diesem Geschäftspanic sein handelskrankes Gehirn gefoltert, umschwirrt, betäubt wird von Gerüchten über Staatsstreiche und Herstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts, von dem Kampfe zwischen Parlament und Exekutivgewalt, von dem Frondekrieg der Orleanisten und Legitimisten, von kommunistischen Konspirationen in Südfrankreich, von angeblichen Jacquerien in den Nièvre- und Cher-Departements, von den Reklamen der verschiedenen Präsidentschaftskandidaten, von den marktschreierischen Lösungen der Journale, von den Drohungen der Republikaner, mit den Waffen in der Hand die Konstitution und das allgemeine Stimmrecht behaupten zu wollen, von den Evangelien der emigrirten Helden in partibus, die den Weltuntergang für den 2. Mai 1852 anzeigten, und man begreift, daß der Bourgeois in dieser unsäglichen, geräuschvollen Konfusion von Fusion, Revision, Prorogation, Konstitution, Konspiration, Realition, Emigration, Usurpation und Revolution seiner parlamentarischen Republik toll zuschnaubt: „Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken, als ein Schrecken ohn' Ende!"

Bonaparte verstand diesen Schrei. Sein Begriffsvermögen wurde geschärft durch den wachsenden Ungestüm von Gläubigern, die mit jedem Sonnenuntergang, der den Verfalltag, den 2. Mai 1852 näher rückte, einen Protest der Gestirnbewegungen gegen ihre irdischen Wechsel erblickten. Sie waren zu wahren Astrologen geworden. Die Nationalversammlung hatte Bonaparte die Hoffnung auf konstitutionelle Prorogation seiner Gewalt abgeschnitten, die Kandidatur des Prinzen von Joinville gestattete kein längeres Schwanken.

Wenn je ein Ereigniß lange vor seinem Eintritt seinen Schatten vor sich geworfen hat, so war es Bonaparte's Staatsstreich. Schon am 29. Januar kaum einen Monat nach seiner Wahl, hatte er den Vorschlag dazu Ch gemacht. Sein eigner Premierminister Odilon Barrot hatte im Ta verhüllt, Thiers im Winter 1850 offen die Politik der Staatsstreic

Persigny hatte im Mai 1851 Changarnier noch einmal für den Coup zu gewinnen gesucht, der "Messager de l'Assemblée" hatte diese Unterhandlung veröffentlicht. die bonapartistischen Journale drohten bei jedem parlamentarischen Sturme mit einem Staatsstreiche, und je näher die Krise rückte, desto lauter wurde ihr Ton. In den Orgien, die Bonaparte jede Nacht mit männlichem und weiblichem swell mob feierte, so oft die Mitternachtsstunde heranrückte und reichliche Cibationen die Zungen gelöf't und die Phantasieen erhitzt hatten, wurde der Staatsstreich für den folgenden Morgen beschlossen. Die Schwerter wurden gezogen, die Gläser erklirrten, die Repäsentanten flogen zum Fenster hinaus, der Kaisermantel fiel auf die Schultern Bonaparte's, bis der nächste Morgen wieder den Spuck vertrieb und das erstaunte Paris von wenig verflossenen Vestalinnen und indiskreten Paladinen die Gefahr erfuhr, der es noch einmal entwischt war. In den Monaten September und Oktober überstürzten sich die Gerüchte von einem Coup d'état. Der Schatten nahm zugleich Farbe an, wie ein buntes Daguerreotypbild. Man schlage die Monatsgänge für September und Oktober in den Organen der europäischen Tagespresse nach und man wird wörtlich Andeutungen wie folgende finden: Staatsstreich-Gerüchte erfüllen Paris. Die Hauptstadt soll während der Nacht mit Truppen gefüllt werden und der andre Morgen Dekrete bringen, die die Nationalversammlung auflösen, das Departement der Seine in Belagerungszustand versetzen, das allgemeine Wahlrecht wiederherstellen, an's Volk appelliren. Bonaparte soll Minister für die Ausführung dieser illegalen Dekrete suchen. Die Korrespondenzen, die diese Nachrichten bringen, enden stets mit dem einsilbigen „aufgeschoben." Der Staatsstreich war stets die fixe Idee Bonaparte's. Mit dieser Idee hatte er den französischen Boden wiederbetreten. Sie besaß ihn so sehr, daß er sie fortwährend verrieth und ausplauderte. Er war so schwach, daß er sie ebenso fortwährend wieder aufgab. Der Schatten des Staatsstreiches war den Parisern als Gespennst so familiär geworden, daß sie nicht an ihn glauben konnten, als er endlich in Fleisch und Blut erschien. Es war also weder die verschlossene Zurückhaltung des Chefs der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember, noch eine ungeahnte Ueberrumpelung von Seiten der Nationalversammlung, was den Staatsstreich gelingen ließ. Wenn er gelang, gelang er trotz seiner Indiskretion und mit ihrem Vorwissen, ein nothwendiges, unvermeidliches Resultat der vorhergegangenen Entwickelung.

Am 10. Oktober kündete Bonaparte seinen Ministern den Entschluß an, das allgemeine Wahlrecht wieder herstellen zu wollen, am 16. gaben sie ihre Entlassung, am 26. erfuhr Paris die Bildung des Ministeriums Thorigny. Der Polizeipräfekt Carlier wurde gleichzeitig durch Maupas ersetzt, der Chef der ersten Militärdivision, Magnan, zog die zuverlässigsten Regimenter der Hauptstadt zusammen. Am 4. November eröffnete die Nationalversammlung wieder ihr Sitzungen. Sie hatte nichts mehr zu thun, als in einem kurzen bündigen Repetitorium den Cursus, den sie durchgemacht hatte, zu wiederholen und zu beweisen, daß sie erst begraben würde, nachdem sie gestorben war.

Der erste Posten, den sie im Kampfe mit der Exekutivgewalt eingebüßt hatte, war das Ministerium. Sie mußte diesen Verlust freilich eingestehn, indem sie das Ministerium Thorigny, ein bloßes Scheinministerium, als voll hinnahm. Die Permanenzkommission hatte Herrn Giraud mit Lachen empfangen, als er sich im Namen der neuen Minister vorstellte. Ein so schwaches Ministerium für so starke Maßregeln, wie die Wiederherstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts! Aber es handelte sich eben darum, Nichts im Parlamente, Alles gegen das Parlament durchzusetzen.

Gleich am ersten Tage ihrer Wiedereröffnung erhielt die Nationalversammlung die Message Bonaparte's, worin er Wiederherstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts und Abschaffung des Gesetzes vom 31. Mai 1850 verlangte. Seine Minister brachten an demselben Tage ein Dekret in diesem Sinne ein. Die Versammlung verwarf sofort den Dringlichkeitsantrag der Minister und das Gesetz selbst am 13. *November mit 355 gegen 348 Stimmen.* Sie zerriß so noch einmal ihr Mandat.

sie bestätigte noch einmal daß sie sich aus der freigewählten Repräsentation des Volkes in das usurpatorische Parlamet einer Klasse verwandelt, sie bekannte noch einmal, daß sie selbst die Muskeln entzweigeschnitten hatte, die den parlamentarischen Kopf mit dem Körper der Nation verbanden.

Wenn die Exekutivgewalt durch ihren Antrag auf Wiederherstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts von der Nationalversammlung an das Volk, appellirte die gesetzgebende Gewalt durch ihre Quästorenbill von dem Volke an die Armee. Diese Quästorenbill sollte ihr Recht auf unmittelbare Requisition der Truppen, auf Bildung einer parlamentarischen Armee festsetzen. Wenn sie so die Armee zum Schiedsrichter zwischen sich und dem Volke, zwischen sich und Bonaparte nannte, wenn sie die Armee als die höchste Staatsgewalt anerkannte, mußte sie andrerseits bestätigen, daß sie längst den Anspruch auf Herrschaft über dieselbe aufgegeben habe. Indem sie, statt sofort Truppen zu requiriren, das Recht der Requisition debattirte, verrieth sie den Zweifel an ihrer eignen Macht. Indem sie die Quästorenbill verwarf, gestand sie offen ihre Ohnmacht. Diese Bill fiel durch mit einer Minorität von 108 Stimmen, die Montagne hatte so den Ausschlag gegeben. Sie befand sich in der Lage von Buridan's Esel, zwar nicht zwischen zwei Säcken Heu, um zu entscheiden, welcher der anziehendere, wohl aber zwischen zwei Trachten Prügel, um zu entscheiden, welche die härtere sei. Auf der einen Seite die Furcht vor Changarnier, auf der andern die Furcht vor Bonaparte. Man muß gestehen, daß die Lage keine heroische war.

Am 18. November wurde von dem von der Ordnungspartei selbst eingebrachten Gesetze über die Kommunalwahlen das Amendement gestellt, daß statt drei Jahren ein Jahr domizil für die Kommunalwähler genügen solle. Das Amendement fiel mit einer einzigen Stimme durch, aber diese eine Stimme stellte sich sofort als ein Irrthum heraus. Die Ordnungspartei hatte durch Zersplitterung in ihre feindlichen Fraktionen längst ihre selbstständig-parlamentarische Majorität eingebüßt. Sie zeigte jetzt, daß überhaupt keine Majorität im Parlament mehr vorhanden war. Die Nationalversammlung war beschlußunfähig geworden. Ihre atomistischen Bestandtheile hingen durch keine Kohäsionskraft mehr zusammen, sie hatte ihren letzten Lebensathem verbraucht, sie war todt.

Die außerparlamentarische Masse der Bourgeoisie endlich sollte ihren Bruch mit der Bourgeoisie im Parlamente noch einmal einige Tage vor der Katastrophe feierlich bestätigen. Thiers, als parlamentarischer Held vorzugsweise von der unheilbaren Krankheit des parlamentarischen Kretenismus angesteckt, hatte nach dem Tode des Parlaments eine neue parlamentarische Intrigue mit dem Staatsrathe ausgeheckt, ein Verantwortlichkeitsgesetz, das den Präsidenten in die Schranken der Verfassung festbannen sollte. Wie Bonaparte am 15. September bei Grundlegung zu den neuen Markthallen von Paris die dames des halles, die Fischweiber als zweiter Masaniello bezaubert hatte — allerdings wog ein Fischweib an realer Gewalt 17 Burggrafen auf —, wie er nach Vorlegung der Quästorenbill die in dem Elysée traktirten, Lieutenants begeisterte, so riß er jetzt am 25. November die industrielle Bourgeoisie mit sich fort, die im Circus versammelt war, um aus seiner Hand Preismedaillen für die Londoner Industrieausstellung entgegenzunehmen. Ich gebe den bezeichnenden Theil seiner Rede nach dem "Journal des débats:" „Mit solch' unverhofften Erfolgen bin ich berechtigt zu wiederholen, wie groß die französische Republik sein würde, wenn es ihr gestattet wäre, ihre realen Interessen zu verfolgen und ihre Institutionen zu reformiren, statt beständig gestört zu werden einerseits durch die Demagogen, andrerseits durch die monarchischen Hallucinationen. (Lauter, stürmischer und wiederholter Applaus von jedem Theile des Amphitheaters.) Die monarchischen Hallucinationen verhindern allen Fortschritt und alle ernsten Industriezweige. Statt des Fortschritts nur Kampf. Man sieht Männer, die früher die eifrigsten Stützen der königlichen Autorität und Prärogativen waren, Parteigänger eines Konvents werden, blos um die Autorität zu schwächen, die aus dem allgemeinen Stimmrecht entsprungen ist. (Lauter und wiederholter Applaus.)

Wir sehen Männer, die am meisten von der Revolution gelitten und sie am meisten bejammert hatten, eine neue provoziren, und nur um den Willen der Nation zu fesseln ..... Ich verspreche Euch Ruhe für die Zukunft ꝛc. ꝛc. (Bravo, bravo, stürmisches Bravo.) — So klatscht die industrielle Bourgeoisie dem Staatsstreiche vom 2. Dezember, der Vernichtung des Parlaments, dem Untergang ihrer eignen Herrschaft, der Diktatur Bonaparte's ihr serviles Bravo zu. Der Beifallsdonner vom 25. November erhielt seine Antwort in dem Kanonendonner vom 3. bis zum 6. Dezember, und das Haus des Herrn Sallantrouze, der die meisten Bravos geklatscht hatte, wurde von den meisten Bomben zerklatscht.

Cromwell, als er das lange Parlament auflöst'te, begab sich allein in die Mitte desselben, zog seine Uhr heraus, damit es keine Minute über die von ihm festgesetzte Frist forteristire und verjagte jedes einzelne Parlamentsglied mit heiter humoristischen Schmähungen. Napoleon, kleiner als sein Vorbild, begab sich am 18. Brumaire wenigstens in den gesetzgebenden Körper und verlas ihm, wenn auch mit beklommener Stimme, sein Todesurtheil. Der zweite Bonaparte, der sich übrigens im vorhandenen Besitz einer ganz andern Exekutivgewalt befand, als Cromwell und Napoleon, suchte sein Vorbild nicht in den Annalen der Weltgeschichte, sondern in den Annalen der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember, in den Annalen der Kriminalgerichtsbarkeit. Er bestiehlt die Bank von Frankreich um 25 Millionen Francs, kauft den General Magnan mit einer Million, die Soldaten Stück für Stück mit 15 Francs und mit Schnaps, findet sich wie ein Dieb in der Nacht mit seinen Spießgesellen heimlich zusammen, läßt in die Häuser der gefährlichsten Parlamentsführer einbrechen und Cavaignac, Lamoricière, Leflô, Changarnier, Charras, Thiers, Baze ꝛc. aus ihren Betten entführen, die Hauptplätze von Paris sowie das Parlamentsgebäude mit Truppen besetzen und früh am Morgen marktschreierische Plakate an allen Mauern anschlagen, worin die Auflösung der Nationalversammlung und des Staatsraths, die Wiederherstellung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts und die Versetzung des Seinedepartements in Belagerungszustand verkündet wird. So rückt er kurz nachher ein falsches Dokument in den Moniteur ein, wonach einflußreiche parlamentarische Namen sich in einer Staatsconsulta um ihn gruppirt hätten.

Das im Mairiegebäude des 10. Arondissements versammelte Rumpfparlament, hauptsächlich aus Legitimisten und Orleanisten bestehend, beschließt unter dem wiederholten Rufe, „es lebe die Republik," die Absetzung Bonaparte's, haranguirt umsonst die vor dem Gebäude gaffende Masse und wird endlich unter dem Geleite afrikanischer Scharfschützen erst in die Kaserne d'Orsey geschleppt, später in Zellenwagen verpackt und nach den Gefängnissen von Mazas, Ham und Vincennes transportirt. So endete die Ordnungspartei, die legislative Versammlung und die Februarrevolution. Ehe wir zum Schluß eilen, kurz das Schema ihrer Geschichte:

I. Erste Periode. Vom 24. Februar bis 4. Mai 1848. Februarperiode. Prolog. Allgemeiner Verbrüderungsschwindel.

II. Zweite Periode. Periode der Konstituirung der Republik und der konstituirenden Nationalversammlung.

1) 4. Mai bis 25. Juni 1848. Kampf sämmtlicher Klassen gegen das Proletariat. Niederlage des Proletariats in den Junitagen.

2) 25. Juni bis 10. Dezember 1848. Diktatur der reinen Bourgeois-Republikaner. Entwerfung der Konstitution. Verhängung des Belagerungszustandes über Paris. Die Bourgeois-Diktatur am 10. Dezember beseitigt durch die Wahl Bonaparte's zum Präsidenten.

3) 20. Dezember 1848 bis 29. Mai 1849. Kampf der Konstituante mit Bonaparte und der mit ihm vereinigten Ordnungspartei. Untergang der Konstituante. Fall der republikanischen Bourgeoisie.

III. Dritte Periode. Periode der konstitutionellen Republik und der legislativen Nationalversammlung.

1) *29. Mai 1849 bis 13. Juni 1849.* Kampf der Kleinbürger mit der Bourgeoisie *und mit Bonaparte.* Niederlage der kleinbürgerlichen Demokratie

2) 13. Juni 1849 bis 31. Mai 1850. Parlamentarische Diktatur der Ordnungspartei. Vollendet ihre Herrschaft durch Abschaffung des allgemeinen Wahlrechts, verliert aber das parlamentarische Ministerium.
3) 31. Mai 1850 bis 2. Dezember 1852. Kampf zwischen der parlamentarischen Bourgeoisie und Bonaparte.
   a) 31. Mai 1850 bis 12. Januar 1851. Das Parlament verliert den Oberbefehl über die Armee.
   b) 12. Januar bis 11. April 1851. Es unterliegt in den Versuchen sich der Administrativgewalt wieder zu bemächtigen. Die Ordnungspartei verliert die selbstständige parlamentarische Majorität. Koalition mit den Republikanern und der Montagne.
   c) 11. April 1851 bis 9. Oktober 1851. Revisions-, Fusions-, Prorogations-Versuche. Die Ordnungspartei löst sich in ihre einzelnen Bestandtheile auf. Der Bruch des Bourgeoisparlaments und der Bourgeoispresse mit der Bourgeoismasse konsolidirt sich.
   d) 9. Oktober bis 2. Dezember 1852. Offener Bruch zwischen dem Parlament und der Exekutivgewalt. Es vollzieht seinen Sterbeakt und unterliegt, von seiner eignen Klasse, von der Armee, von allen übrigen Klassen im Stiche gelassen. Untergang des parlamentarischen Régime's und der Bourgeoisherrschaft. Sieg Bonaparte's. Imperialistische Restaurationsparodie.

VII.

Die soziale Republik erschien als Phrase, als Prophezeiung an der Schwelle der Februarrevolution. In den Junitagen 1848 wurde sie im Blute des Pariser Proletariats erstickt, aber sie geht in den folgenden Akten des Dramas als Gespenst um. Die demokratische Republik kündigte sich an. Sie verpufft am 13. Juni 1849 mit ihren davongelaufenen Kleinbürgern, aber im Fliehen wirft sie doppelt renomirende Reklamen hinter sich. Die parlamentarische Republik mit der Bourgeoisie bemächtigt sich der ganzen Bühne, sie lebt sich aus in der vollen Breite ihrer Existenz, aber der 2. Dezember 1851 begräbt sie unter dem Angstschrei der koalisirten Royalisten: „Es lebe die Republik!"

Die soziale und die demokratische Republik haben Niederlagen erlebt, aber die parlamentarische Republik, die Republik der royalistischen Bourgeoisie ist untergegangen, wie die reine Republik, die Republik der Bourgeois-Republikaner, untergegangen ist.

Die französische Bourgeoisie bäumte sich gegen die Herrschaft des arbeitenden Proletariats, sie hat das Lumpenproletariat zur Herrschaft gebracht, an der Spitze den Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember. Die Bourgeoisie hielt Frankreich in athemloser Furcht vor dem zukünftigen Schrecken der rothen Anarchie; Bonaparte escomptirte ihr diese Zukunft, als er am 3. und 4. Dezember die vornehmen Bürger des Boulevard Montmartre und des Boulevard des Italiens durch die schnapsbegeisterte Armee der Ordnung von ihren Fenstern herabschießen ließ. Sie apotheosirte den Säbel; der Säbel beherrscht sie. Sie vernichteten die revolutionäre Presse; ihre eigne Presse ist vernichtet. Sie stellte die Volksversammlung unter Polizeiaufsicht; ihre Salons stehen unter der Aufsicht der Polizei. Sie lösten die demokratischen Nationalgarden auf; ihre eigne Nationalgarde ist aufgelöst. Sie verhingen den Belagerungszustand; der Belagerungszustand ist über sie verhängt. Sie verdrängten die Jurys durch Militärkommissionen; ihre Jurys sind durch Militärkommissionen verdrängt. Sie unterwarfen den Volksunterricht den Pfaffen unterwarfen sie ihrem eignen Unterricht. Sie transportirte ohne Urtheil; sie werden ohne Urtheil transportirt. Sie unterdrückten [illegible]

Gesellschaft durch die Staatsmacht; jede Regung ihrer Gesellschaft wird durch die Staatsmacht erdrückt. Sie rebellirten aus Begeisterung für ihre Geldbeutel, gegen ihre eignen Politiker und Literaten; ihre Politiker und Literaten sind beseitigt, aber ihr Geldbeutel wird geplündert, nachdem sein Mund geknebelt und seine Feder zerbrochen ist. Die Bourgeoisie rief der Revolution unermüdlich zu, wie der heilige Arsenius den Christen: "Fuge, Tace, Quiesce! Fliehe, Schweige, Ruhe!" Bonaparte ruft der Bourgeoisie zu: "Fuge, Tace, Quiesce! Fliehe, Schweige, Ruhe!"

Die französische Bourgeoisie hatte längst das Dilemma Napoleon's gelöst: "Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque." Sie hatte es gelöst in der "république cosaque." Keine Circe hat das Kunstwerk der bürgerlichen Republik durch bösen Zauber in eine Ungestalt verzerrt. Jene Republik hat nichts verloren, als ihre rhetorischen Arabesken, die Anstandsformen, mit einem Wort den Schein der Respektabilität. Das jetzige Frankreich war fertig in der parlamentarischen Republik enthalten. Es bedurfte nur eines Bajonetstichs, damit die Blase platze und das Ungeheuer in die Augen springe.

Der nächste Zweck der Februarrevolution war, die Dynastie Orleans und den Theil der Bourgeoisie, der unter ihr herrschte, zu stürzen. Erst am 2. Dezember 1851 ist dieser Zweck erreicht worden. Nun wurden die ungeheuern Besitzungen des Hauses Orleans, die reale Grundlage seines Einflusses, konfiszirt, und was man nach der Februarrevolution erwartet hatte, trat nach dem Dezember ein, Gefängniß, Flucht, Absetzung, Verbannung, Entwaffnung, Verhöhnung der Männer, die seit 1830 Frankreich mit ihrem Rufe ermüdet hatten. Aber unter Louis Philippe herrschte nur ein Theil der kommerziellen Bourgeoisie. Die andern Fraktionen derselben bildeten eine dynastische und eine republikanische Opposition, oder standen ganz außerhalb des sogenannten legalen Landes. Erst die parlamentarische Republik nahm alle Fraktionen der kommerziellen Bourgeoisie in ihren Staatskreis auf. Unter Louis Philippe schloß zudem die kommerzielle Bourgeoisie die landbesitzende aus. Erst die parlamentarische Republik stellte sie gleichberechtigt neben einander, vermählte die Julimonarchie mit der legitimen Monarchie und verschmolz zwei Epochen der Herrschaft des Eigenthums in Eine. Unter Louis Philippe verbarg der bevorzugte Theil der Bourgeoisie seine Herrschaft unter der Krone; in der parlamentarischen Republik zeigte die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisie, nachdem sie alle ihre Elemente vereint und ihr Reich zum Reiche ihrer Klasse erweitert hatte, nackt ihr Haupt. So mußte die Revolution selbst erst die Form schaffen, worin die Herrschaft der Bourgeoisklasse ihren weitesten, allgemeinsten und letzten Ausdruck gewinnen, also nun auch gestürzt werden konnte, ohne wieder aufstehn zu können.

Erst jetzt wurde das im Februar erlassene Urtheil an der orleanistischen Bourgeoisie, d. h. an der lebensfähigsten Fraktion der französischen Bourgeoisie vollstreckt. Jetzt wurde sie geschlagen an ihrem Parlamente, ihrem Advokatenbureau, ihren Handelsgerichten, ihren Provinzialvertretungen, ihrem Notariat, ihrer Universität, ihrer Tribune und ihren Tribunalen, ihrer Presse und ihrer Literatur, ihren Administrationseinkünften und ihren Gerichtssporteln, ihren Armengehalten und ihren Staatsrenten, an ihrem Geist und an ihrem Körper. Blanqui hatte die Auflösung der Bourgeoisgarden als erste Forderung an die Revolution gestellt, und die Bourgeoisgarden, die im Februar der Revolution die Hand reichten, um sie am Gehen zu hindern, sind im Dezember von der Bühne verschwunden. Das Pantheon selbst verwandelt sich wieder in eine ordinäre Kirche. Mit der letzten Form des Bourgeoisregimes ist auch der Zauber gebrochen, der seine Initiatoren vom achtzehnten Jahrhundert in Heilige verklärt hatte. Als Guizot das Gelingen des Staatsstreichs am 2. Dezember erfuhr, rief er daher aus: C'est le triomphe complet et definitif du Socialismo! Das ist der vollständige und definitive Triumph des Sozialismus! Das heißt: das ist der definitive und vollständige Sturz der Bourgeoisherrschaft.

Warum hat das Proletariat nicht die Bourgeoisie gerettet? Darin löst sich

Frage auf: Warum hat sich das Pariser Proletariat nicht nach dem 2. Dezember erhoben?

Noch war der Sturz der Bourgeoisie erst dekretirt, das Dekret war nicht vollzogen. Jede wirklich revolutionäre Erhebung des Proletariats hätte sie sofort neu belebt, mit der Armee ausgesöhnt und den Arbeitern eine zweite Juniniederlage gesichert.

Am 4. Dezember wurde das Proletariat von Bourgeois und Epiciers zum Kampfe aufgestachelt. Am Abende dieses Tages versprachen mehrere Legionen der Nationalgarde bewaffnet und uniformirt auf dem Kampfplatze zu erscheinen. Bourgeois und Epicier waren nämlich dahinter gekommen, daß Bonaparte in einem seiner Dekrete vom 2. Dezember das geheime Votum abschaffte und ihnen anbefahl, in den offiziellen Registern hinter ihren Namen ihr Ja oder Nein einzutragen. Der blutige Widerstand vom 4. Dezember schüchterte Bonaparte ein. Während der Nacht ließ er an allen Straßenecken von Paris Plakate anschlagen, die die Wiederherstellung des geheimen Votums verkündeten. Bourgeois und Epicier glaubten ihren Zweck erreicht zu haben. Wer nicht am andern Morgen erschien, waren Epicier und Bourgeois.

Das Pariser Proletariat, zudem durch einen Handstreich Bonaparte's während der Nacht vom 1. auf den 2. Dezember seiner Führer, der Barrikadenchefs beraubt, eine Armee ohne Offiziere, durch seine Erinnerungen vom Juni 1848 und 1849 und vom Mai 1850 zu aufgeklärt, um unter dem Banner der Montagnards zu kämpfen, handelte also mit richtiger Würdigung seiner eignen Kräfte und der allgemeinen Situation, wenn es seiner Avantgarde, den geheimen Gesellschaften überließ, die insurrektionelle Ehre von Paris zu retten, die von den Bourgeois so widerstandslos der Soldateska preisgegeben wurde, daß Bonaparte später die Nationalgarde mit der höhnischen Motive entwaffnen konnte: nicht weil er fürchte, sie mißbrauchten seine Waffen gegen ihn, sondern die Anarchisten mißbrauchten diese Waffen gegen sie selbst.

"C'est le triomphe complet et definitif du Socialisme!" So charakterisirte Guizot den 2. Dezember. Aber wenn der Sturz der parlamentarischen Republik dem Keime nach den Triumph der proletarischen Revolution in sich enthält, so war ihr nächstes handgreifliches Resultat der Sieg Bonaparte's über das Parlament, der Exekutivgewalt über die Legislativgewalt, der Gewalt ohne Phrase über die Gewalt der Phrase. Die eine Gewalt des alten Staats ist so zunächst nur von ihrer Schranke befreit, zur unumschränkten, absoluten Gewalt geworden. In dem Parlamente erhob die Nation ihren allgemeinen Willen zum Gesetze, d. h. das Gesetz der herrschenden Klasse zu ihrem allgemeinen Willen. Vor der Exekutivgewalt dankt sie jeden eignen Willen ab und unterwirft sich dem Machtgebot des Fremden, der Autorität. Die Exekutivgewalt im Gegensatz zur legislativen drückt die Heteronomie der Nation im Gegensatz zu ihrer Autonomie aus. Frankreich scheint also nur der Despotie einer Klasse entlaufen, um unter die Despotie eines Individuums zurückzufallen und zwar unter die Autorität eines Individuums ohne Autorität. Der Kampf scheint so geschlichtet, daß alle Klassen gleich machtlos und gleich lautlos vor dem Kolben niederknien.

Aber die Revolution ist gründlich. Sie ist noch auf der Reise durch das Fegefeuer begriffen. Sie vollbringt ihr Geschäft mit Methode. Bis zum 2. Dezember 1851 hatte sie die eine Hälfte ihrer Vorbereitung absolvirt, sie absolvirt jetzt die andre. Sie vollendete erst die parlamentarische Gewalt, um sie stürzen zu können. Jetzt, wo sie dies erreicht, vollendet sie die Exekutivgewalt, reduzirt sie auf ihren reinsten Ausdruck, isolirt sie, stellt sie als einzigen Vorwurf gegenüber, um alle ihre Kräfte der Zerstörung gegen sie zu konzentriren. Und wenn sie diese zweite Hälfte ihrer Vorarbeit vollbracht hat, wird ganz Europa von seinem Sitz aufspringen und jubeln: Brav gewühlt, alter Maulwurf!

Diese Exekutivgewalt mit ihrer ungeheuren bureaukratischen und mili-

Organisation, mit ihrer weitschichtigen und künstlichen Staatsmaschinerie, ein Beamtenheer von einer halben Million neben einer Armee von einer andern halben Million, dieser fürchterliche Parasitenkörper, der sich wie eine Netzhaut um den Leib der französischen Gesellschaft schlingt und ihr alle Poren verstopft, entstand in der Zeit der absoluten Monarchie, beim Verfall des Feudalwesens, den er beschleunigen half. Die herrschaftlichen Privilegien der Grundeigenthümer und Städte verwandelten sich in eben so viele Attribute der Staatsgewalt, die feudalen Würdenträger in bezahlte Beamte und die bunte Mustercharte der widerstreitenden mittelalterlichen Machtvollkommenheiten in den geregelten Plan einer Staatsmacht, deren Arbeit fabrikmäßig getheilt und zentralisirt ist. Die erste französische Revolution mit ihrer Aufgabe, alle lokalen, territorialen, städtischen und provinziellen Sondergewalten zu brechen, um die bürgerliche Einheit der Nation zu schaffen, mußte entwickeln, was die absolute Monarchie begonnen hatte, die Centralisation, aber zugleich den Umfang, die Attribute und die Handlanger der Regierungsgewalt. Napoleon vollendete diese Staatsmaschinerie. Die legitime und die Juli-Monarchie fügten nichts hinzu, als eine größere Theilung der Arbeit, in demselben Maaße wachsend, als die Theilung der Arbeit innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft neue Gruppen von Interessen schuf, also neues Material für die Staatsverwaltung. Jedes gemeinsame Interesse wurde sofort von der Gesellschaft losgelöst, als höheres, allgemeines Interesse ihr gegenübergestellt, der Selbstthätigkeit der Gesellschaftsglieder entrissen und zum Gegenstand der Regierungs-Thätigkeit gemacht, von der Brücke, dem Schulhaus und dem Kommunalvermögen einer Dorfgemeinde bis zu den Eisenbahnen, dem Nationalvermögen und der Landesuniversität Frankreichs. Die parlamentarische Republik endlich sah sich in ihrem Kampfe mit der Revolution gezwungen, mit den Repressivmaßregeln die Mittel und die Centralisation der Regierungsgewalt zu verstärken. Alle Umwälzungen vervollkommneten diese Maschine statt sie zu brechen. Die Parteien, die abwechselnd um die Herrschaft rangen, betrachteten die Besitznahme dieses ungeheuren Staatsgebäudes als die Hauptbeute des Siegers.

Aber unter der absoluten Monarchie, während der ersten Revolution, unter Napoleon, war die Bureaukratie nur das Mittel, die Klassenherrschaft der Bourgeoisie vorzubereiten. Unter der Restauration, unter Louis Philippe, unter der parlamentarischen Republik war sie das Instrument der herrschenden Klasse, so sehr sie auch nach Eigenmacht strebte.

Erst unter dem zweiten Bonaparte scheint sich der Staat der Gesellschaft gegenüber verselbstständigt und sie unterjocht zu haben. Die Selbstständigkeit der Exekutivgewalt tritt offen hervor, wo ihr Chef nicht mehr des Genie's, ihre Armee nicht mehr des Ruhms und ihre Bureaukratie nicht mehr der moralischen Autorität bedarf, um sich zu rechtfertigen. Die Staatsmaschine hat sich der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft gegenüber so befestigt, daß an ihrer Spitze der Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember genügt, ein aus der Fremde herbeigelaufener Glücksritter, auf das Schild gehoben von einer trunkenen Soldateska, die er durch Schnaps und Würste erkauft hat, nach der er stets von Neuem mit Wurst werfen muß. Daher die kleinlaute Verzweiflung, das Gefühl der ungeheuersten Demüthigung, Herabwürdigung, das die Brust Frankreichs beklemmt und seinen Athem stocken macht. Es fühlt sich wie entehrt. Wie Napoleon ihm kaum mehr einen Vorwand für die Freiheit, läßt ihm der zweite Bonaparte keinen Vorwand mehr für die Knechtschaft.

Und dennoch schwebt die Staatsgewalt nicht in der Luft. Bonaparte vertritt eine Klasse und zwar die zahlreichste Klasse der französischen Gesellschaft, die Parzellenbauern.

Wie die Bourbons die Dynastie des großen Grundeigenthums, wie die Orleans die Dynastie des Geldes, so sind die Bonaparte's die Dynastie der Bauern, d. h. der französischen Volksmassen. Nicht der Bonaparte, der sich dem Bourgeoisparlamente unterwarf, sondern der Bonaparte, der das Bourgeoisparlament auseinanderjagte, ist der Auserwählte der Bauern. Drei Jahre war es den Städ

gelungen, den Sinn der Wahl vom 10. Dezember zu verfälschen und die Bauern um die Wiederherstellung des Kaiserreichs zu prellen. Die Wahl vom 10. Dezember 1848 ist erst erfüllt worden durch den coup d'état vom 2. Dezember 1851.

Die Parzellenbauern bilden eine ungeheure Maße, deren Glieder in gleicher Situation leben, aber ohne in mannichfache Beziehung zu einander zu treten. Ihre Produktionsweise isolirt sie von einander, statt sie in wechselseitigen Verkehr zu bringen. Die Isolirung wird gefördert durch die schlechten französischen Kommunikationsmittel und die Armuth der Bauern. Ihr Produktionsfeld, die Parzelle, läßt in ihrer Kultur keine Theilung der Arbeit zu, keine Anwendung der Wissenschaft, also keine Mannichfaltigkeit der Entwickelung, keine Verschiedenheit der Talente, keinen Reichthum der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. Jede einzelne Bauernfamilie genügt beinahe sich selbst, produzirt unmittelbar selbst den größten Theil ihres Konsums und gewinnt so ihr Lebensmaterial mehr im brutalen Austausche mit der Natur, als im Verkehr mit der Gesellschaft. Die Parzelle, der Bauer und die Familie; daneben eine andre Parzelle, ein andrer Bauer und eine andre Familie. Ein Schock davon macht ein Dorf und ein Schock von Dörfern macht ein Departement. So wird die große Masse der französischen Nation gebildet durch einfache Addition gleichnamiger Größen, wie etwa ein Sack von Kartoffeln einen Kartoffelsack bildet. Insofern Millionen von Familien unter ökonomischen Existenzbedingungen leben, die ihre Lebensweise, ihre Interessen und ihre Bildung von denen der andern Klassen trennen und ihnen feindlich gegenüberstellen, bilden sie eine Klasse. Insofern ein nur lokaler Zusammenhang unter den Parzellenbauern besteht, die Dieselbigkeit ihrer Interessen keine Gemeinsamkeit, keine nationale Verbindung und keine politische Organisation unter ihnen erzeugt, bilden sie keine Klasse. Sie sind daher unfähig ihr Klasseninteresse im eigenen Namen, sei es durch ein Parlament, sei es durch einen Konvent geltend zu machen. Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen vertreten werden. Ihr Vertreter muß zugleich als ihr Herr, als eine Autorität über ihnen erscheinen, als eine unumschränkte Regierungsgewalt, die sie vor den andern Klassen beschützt und ihnen von oben Regen und Sonnenschein schickt. Der politische Einfluß der Parzellenbauern findet also darin seinen letzten Ausdruck, daß die Exekutivgewalt sich das Parlament, der Staat sich die Gesellschaft unterordnet.

Durch die geschichtliche Tradition ist der Wunderglaube der französischen Bauern entstanden, daß ein Mann Namens Napoleon ihnen alle Herrlichkeit wiederbringen werde. Und es fand sich ein Individuum, das sich für diesen Mann ausgibt, weil es den Namen Napoleon trägt, in Folge des Code Napoléon, der anbefiehlt: "Moute recherche de la paternité est interdite." Nach zwanzigjähriger Vagabundage und eine Reihe von grotesken Abentheuern erfüllt sich die Sage und der Mann wird Kaiser der Franzosen. Die fixe Idee des Neffen verwirklichte sich, weil sie mit der fixen Idee der zahlreichsten Klasse der Franzosen zusammenfiel.

Aber, wird man mir vorwerfen, die Bauernaufstände in halb Frankreich, die Treibjagden der Armee auf die Bauern, die massenhafte Einkerkerung und Transportation der Bauern?

Seit Ludwig XIV. hat Frankreich keine ähnliche Verfolgung der Bauern „wegen demagogischer Umtriebe" erlebt.

Aber man verstehe wohl. Die Dynastie Bonaparte repräsentirt nicht revolutionären, sondern den konservativen Bauer, nicht den Bauer, der über seine soziale Existenzbedingung, die Parzelle hinausdringt, sondern der sie vielmehr befestigen will, nicht das Landvolk, das durch eigne Energie im Anschlusse an die Städte die alte Ordnung umstürzen, sondern umgekehrt dumpf verschlossen dieser alten Ordnung sich mit sammt seinen Parzellen von dem Gespenst des Imperatorthums gerettet und bevorzugt sehen will. Sie repräsentirt nicht die Aufklärung, sondern den Aberglauben des Bauern, nicht sein Urtheil, sondern sein

nicht seine Zukunft, sondern seine Vergangenheit, nicht seine modernen Cevennen, sondern seine moderne Vendée.

Die dreijährige harte Herrschaft der parlamentarischen Republik hatte einen Theil der französischen Bauern von der napoleonischen Illusion befreit und wenn auch nur noch oberflächlich revolutionirt, aber die Bourgeoisie warf sie gewaltsam zurück, so oft sie sich in Bewegung setzten. Unter der parlamentarischen Republik rang das moderne mit dem traditionellen Bewußtsein der französischen Bauern. Der Prozeß ging vor sich in der Form eines unaufhörlichen Kampfes zwischen den Schulmeistern und den Pfaffen. Die Bourgeoisie schlug die Schulmeister nieder. Die Bauern machten zum ersten Mal Anstrengungen, der Regierungsthätigkeit gegenüber sich selbstständig zu verhalten. Es erschien dies in dem fortgesetzten Konflikte der Maires mit den Präfekten. Die Bourgeoisie setzte die Maires ab. Endlich erhoben sich die Bauern verschiedener Orte Frankreichs während der Periode der parlamentarischen Republik gegen ihre eigne Ausgeburt, die Armee. Die Bourgeoisie bestrafte sie mit Belagerungszuständen und Exekutionen. Und dieselbe Bourgeoisie schreit jetzt über die Stupidität der Massen der vile multitude, die sie an Bonaparte verrathen hat. Sie selbst hat den Imperialismus der Bauernklasse gewaltsam befestigt, sie hielt die Zustände fest, die die Geburtsstätte dieser Bauernreligion bilden. Allerdings muß die Bourgeoisie die Dummheit der Massen fürchten, so lange sie konservativ bleiben, und die Einsicht der Massen, sobald sie revolutionär werden.

In den Aufständen nach dem coup d'état protestirte ein Theil der französischen Bauern mit den Waffen in der Hand gegen sein eignes Votum vom 10. Dezember 1848. Die Schule seit 1848 hatte sie gewitzigt. Allein sie hatten sich der geschichtlichen Unterwelt verschrieben, die Geschichte hielt sie beim Worte und noch war die Mehrzahl so befangen, daß gerade in den rothesten Departements die Bauernbevölkerung öffentlich für Bonaparte stimmte. Die Nationalversammlung hatte ihn nach ihrer Ansicht am Gehen verhindert. Er hatte jetzt nur die Fessel gebrochen, die die Städte dem Willen des Landes angelegt. Sie trugen sich stellenweise sogar mit der grotesken Vorstellung: neben einem Napoleon ein Konvent.

Nachdem die erste Revolution die halbhörigen Bauern in freie Grundeigenthümer verwandelt hatte, befestigte und regelte Napoleon die Bedingungen, worin sie ungestört den eben erst ihnen anheim gefallenen Boden Frankreichs ausbeuten und die jugendliche Lust am Eigenthum büßen konnten. Aber woran der französische Bauer jetzt untergeht, es ist seine Parzelle selbst, die Theilung des Grund und Bodens, die Eigenthumsform, die Napoleon in Frankreich konsolidirte. Es sind eben die materiellen Bedingungen, die den französischen Feudalbauern zum Parzellenbauer und Napoleon zum Kaiser machten. Zwei Generationen haben hingereicht, um ihr unvermeidliches Resultat zu erzeugen: progressive Verschlechterung des Ackerbaues, progressive Verschuldung des Ackerbauers. Die „Napoleonische" Eigenthumsform, die im Anfange des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts die Bedingung für die Befreiung und die Bereicherung des französischen Landvolkes war, hat sich im Laufe dieses Jahrhunderts als das Gesetz ihrer Sklaverei und ihres Pauperismus entwickelt. Und eben dies Gesetz ist die erste der "idées napoléoniennes," die der zweite Bonaparte zu behaupten hat. Wenn er mit den Bauern noch die Illusion theilt, nicht im Parzelleneigenthum selbst, sondern außerhalb im Einflusse sekundärer Umstände die Ursache ihres Ruins zu suchen, so werden seine Experimente wie Seifenblasen an den Produktionsverhältnissen zerschellen, jener Illusion den letzten Schlupfwinkel abschneiden und im besten Falle die Krankheit acuter machen.

Die ökonomische Entwickelung des Parzelleneigenthums hat das Verhältniß der Bauern zu den übrigen Gesellschaftsklassen von Grund aus verkehrt. Unter Napoleon *ergänzte die Parzellirung* des Grund und Bodens auf dem Land *die freie Konkurrenz und die beginnende* große Industrie in den Städten. Sel

die Bevorzugung der Bauernklasse lag im Interesse der neuen bürgerlichen Ordnung. Diese neugeschaffene Klasse war die allseitige Verlängerung des bürgerlichen Régimes über die Thore der Städte hinaus, seine Ausführung in nationalem Maßstab. Diese Klasse war der allgegenwärtige Protest gegen die eben erst gestürzte Grundaristokratie. Wurde sie vor allen bevorzugt, so bot sie aber auch vor allen den Angriffspunkt für die Restauration der Feudalen. Die Wurzeln, die das Parzelleneigenthum in dem französischen Grund und Boden schlug, entzogen dem Feudalismus jeden Nahrungsstoff. Seine Grenzpfähle bildeten das natürliche Befestigungswerk der Bourgeoisie gegen jeden Handstreich ihrer alten Oberherren. Aber im Laufe des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts trat an die Stelle des feudalen der städtische Wucherer, an die Stelle der Feudalpflichtigkeit des Bodens die Hypotheke, an die Stelle des aristokratischen Grundeigenthums das bürgerliche Kapital. Die Parzelle des Bauern ist nur noch der Vorwand, der dem Kapitalisten erlaubt, Profit, Zinsen und Rente von dem Acker zu ziehen und den Ackerbauer selbst zusehen zu lassen, wie er seinen Arbeitslohn herausschlägt. Die auf dem französischen Boden lastende Hypothekarschuld legt der französischen Bauernschaft einen Zins auf, so groß wie der Jahreszins der gesammten britannischen Nationalschuld. Das Parzelleneigenthum in dieser Sklaverei vom Kapital, wozu seine Entwickelung unvermeidlich hindrängt, hat die Masse der französischen Nation in eine Nation von Troglodyten verwandelt. Sechszehn Millionen Bauern (Frauen und Kinder eingerechnet) hausen in Höhlen, wovon ein großer Theil nur Eine Oeffnung, der andre nur zwei, und der bevorzugteste nur drei Oeffnungen hat. Die Fenster sind an einem Haus, was die fünf Sinne für den Kopf sind. Die bürgerliche Ordnung, die im Anfange des Jahrhunderts den Staat als Schildwache vor die neu entstandene Parzelle stellte und sie mit Lorbeeren düngte, ist zum Vampyr geworden, der ihr Herzblut und Hirnmark aussaugt und sie in den Alchymistenkessel des Kapitals wirft. Der Code Napoléon ist nur noch der Code der Exekution, der Subhastation und der Zwangsversteigerung. Zu den vier Millionen (Kinder u. s. w. eingerechnet) offizieller Paupers, Vagabunden, Verbrecher und Prostituirten, die Frankreich zählt, kommen fünf Millionen hinzu, die an dem Abgrunde der Existenz schweben und entweder auf dem Lande selbst hausen oder beständig mit ihren Lumpen und ihren Kindern von dem Lande in die Städte und von den Städten auf das Land desertiren. Das Interesse der Bauern befindet sich also nicht mehr, wie unter Napoleon, im Einklange, sondern im tödtlichsten Gegensatze mit den Interessen der Bourgeoisie, mit dem Kapital. Sie finden also ihren natürlichen Verbündeten und Führer in dem städtischen Proletariat, dessen Aufgabe der Umsturz der bürgerlichen Ordnung ist. Aber die starke und unumschränkte Regierung, — und dies ist die zweite "idée napoléonienne," die der zweite Napoleon auszuführen hat, ist zur gewaltsamen Vertheidigung dieser „materiellen" Ordnung berufen. Auch giebt dieser "ordre matériel" in allen Proklamationen Bonaparte's gegen die aufrührerischen Bauern das Stichwort ab.

Neben der Hypotheke, die das Kapital ihr auferlegt, lastet auf der Parzelle die Steuer. Die Steuer ist die Lebensquelle der Bureaukratie, der Armee, der Pfaffen und des Hofes, kurz des ganzen Apparats der Exekutivgewalt. Starke Regierung und starke Steuer sind identisch. Das Parzelleneigenthum eignet sich seiner Natur nach, die Grundlage einer allgewaltigen und zahllosen Bureaukratie abzugeben. Es schafft ein gleichmäßiges Niveau der Verhältnisse und der Personen über der ganzen Oberfläche des Landes. Es erlaubt also auch die gleichm[illegible] Einwirkung nach allen Punkten dieser gleichmäßigen Masse von einem ob[illegible] Centrum aus. Es vernichtet die aristokratischen Mittelstufen zwischen d[illegible] masse und der Staatsgewalt. Es ruft also von allen Seiten das direkt[illegible] fen dieser Staatsgewalt und das Zwischenschieben ihrer unmittelbar[illegible] hervor. Es erzeugt endlich eine unbeschäftigte Ueberbevölkerung, [illegible] dem Lande noch in den Städten Platz findet und daher nach den S[illegible]

einer Art von respektablen Almosen greift und die Schöpfung von Staatsämtern provozirt. Unter Napoleon war dieses zahlreiche Regierungspersonal nicht nur unmittelbar produktiv, indem es unter der Form von Staatsbauten u. s. w. mit den Zwangsmitteln des Staats für die neu entstandene Bauernschaft ausführte, was die Bourgeoisie im Wege der Privatindustrie noch nicht leisten konnte. Die Staatssteuer war ein nothwendiges Zwangsmittel, um den Austausch zwischen Stadt und Land zu erhalten. Der Parzellenbesitzer würde sonst, wie in Norwegen, wie in einem Theile der Schweiz, in bäurischer Selbstgenügsamkeit den Zusammenhang mit den Städten abgebrochen haben. Und Napoleon gab in den neuen Märkten, die er mit dem Bajonette eröffnete, in der Plünderung des Kontinents, die Zwangssteuer mit Zinsen zurück. Sie war ein Stachel für die Industrie des Bauern, während sie jetzt seine Industrie der letzten Hülfsquellen beraubt, seine Widerstandslosigkeit gegen den Pauperismus vollendet. Und eine enorme Bureaukratie, wohlgalonirt und wohlgenährt, ist die "idée napoléonienne," die dem zweiten Bonaparte von allen am meisten zusagt. Wie sollte sie nicht, da er gezwungen ist, neben den wirklichen Klassen der Gesellschaft eine künstliche Kaste zu schaffen, für welche die Erhaltung seines Régimes zur Messer- und Gabelfrage wird. Eine seiner ersten Finanzoperationen war daher auch die Wiedererhöhung der Beamtengehalte auf ihren alten Betrag mit Schöpfung neuer Sinekuren.

Eine andre "idée napoléonienne" ist die Herrschaft der Pfaffen als ein Regierungsmittel. Aber wenn die neu entstandene Parzelle in ihrem Einklang mit der Gesellschaft, in ihrer Abhängigkeit von den Naturgewalten und ihrer Unterwerfung unter die Autorität, die sie von oben beschützte, natürlich religiös war, wird die schuldzerrüttete, mit der Gesellschaft und der Autorität zerfallene, über ihre eigne Beschränktheit hinausgetriebene Parzelle natürlich irreligiös. Der Himmel war eine ganz schöne Zugabe zu dem eben gewonnenen schmalen Erdstrich, zumal da er das Wetter macht; er wird zum Insult, sobald er als Ersatz für die Parzelle aufgedrängt wird. Der Pfaffe erscheint dann nur noch als der gesalbte Spürhund der irdischen Polizei, — eine andre "idée napoléonienne" — die unter dem zweiten Bonaparte nicht wie unter Napoleon den Beruf hat, die Feinde des Bauernregimes in den Städten, sondern die Feinde Bonaparte's auf dem Lande zu überwachen. Die Expedition gegen Rom wird das nächste Mal in Frankreich selbst stattfinden, aber im umgekehrten Sinne des Herrn v. Montalembert.

Der Kulminirpunkt der "idées napoléonniennes" endlich ist das Uebergewicht der Armee. Die Armee war der point d'honneur der Parzellenbauern, sie selbst in Heroen verwandelt, nach außen hin den neuen Besitz vertheidigend, ihre eben erst errungene Nationalität verherrlichend, die Welt plündernd und revolutionirend. Die glänzende Uniform war ihr eignes Staatskostüm, der Krieg ihre Poesie, die in der Phantasie verlängerte und abgerundete Parzelle das Vaterland und der Patriotismus die ideale Form des Eigenthumssinnes. Aber die Feinde, wogegen der französische Bauer jetzt sein Eigenthum zu vertheidigen hat, es sind nicht die Kosacken, es sind die Huissiers und Steuerexekutoren. Die Parzelle liegt nicht mehr im sogenannten Vaterland, sondern im Hypothekenbuch. Die Armee selbst ist nicht mehr die Blüthe der Bauernjugend, sie ist die Sumpfblume des bäuerlichen Lumpenproletariats. Sie besteht großentheils aus Remplacants, aus Ersatzmännern, wie der zweite Bonaparte selbst nur Remplacant, der Ersatzmann für Napoleon ist. Ihre Heldenthaten verrichtet sie jetzt in den Gems- und Treibjagden auf die Bauern, ein Gensdarmendienst, und wenn die innern Widersprüche seines Systems den Chef der Gesellschaft des 10. Dezember über die französische Grenze jagen, wird sie nach einigen Banditenstreichen keine Lorbeeren, sondern Prügel erndten.

Man sieht: Alle "idées napoléonniennes" sind Ideen der unentwickelten, jugendfrischen Parzelle, sie sind ein Widersinn für die überlebte Parzelle. Sie sind nur die Hallucinationen ihres Todeskampfes, Worte in Phrasen, Geister, die in Gespenster, sinnige Trachten, die in abgeschma

Theaterkostüme verwandelt sind. Aber die Parodie des Imperialismus war nothwendig, um die Masse der französischen Nation von der Wucht der Tradition zu befreien und den Gegensatz der Staatsgewalt zur Gesellschaft rein herauszuarbeiten. Die Zertrümmerung der Staatsmaschine wird die Centralisation nicht gefährden. Die Bureaukratie ist nur die niedrige und brutale Form einer Centralisation, die noch mit ihrem Gegensatze, dem Feudalismus behaftet ist. Mit der Verzweiflung der napoleonischen Restauration scheidet der französische Bauer von dem Glauben an seine Parzelle, stürzt das ganze auf dieser Parzelle aufgeführte Staatsgebäude zusammen, und erhält die proletarische Revolution das Chor, ohne das ihr Sologesang in allen Bauernnationen zum Sterbelied wird.

Die französischen Bauernverhältnisse enthüllen uns das Räthsel der allgemeinen Wahlen vom 20. und 21. Dezember, die den zweiten Bonaparte auf den Berg Sinai führten, nicht um Gesetze zu erhalten, sondern um sie zugleich zu geben und auszuführen. Allerdings beging die französische Nation in jenen verhängnißvollen Tagen eine Todsünde gegen die Demokratie, die auf den Knieen liegt und täglich betet: Heiliges allgemeines Wahlrecht, bitt' für uns! Die Gläubigen an das allgemeine Wahlrecht wollen natürlich nicht auf eine Wunderkraft verzichten, die so große Dinge an ihnen selbst vollbracht, die einen Bonaparte II. in einen Napoleon, einen Saulus in einen Paulus und einen Simon in einen Petrus verwandelt hat. Der Volksgeist spricht zu ihnen durch die Wahlurne, wie der Gott des Propheten Ezechiel zu den marklosen Knochen: "Haec dicit dominus deus ossibus sens: Ecce, ego intromittam in vos Spiritum et viretis." „So sprach der Herr Gott zu seinen Knochen: Siehe, ich werde Euch Geist einblasen und Ihr werdet leben!"

Die Bourgeoisie hatte offenbar keine andere Wahl, als Bonaparte zu wählen. Despotie oder Anarchie. Sie stimmte natürlich für die Despotie. Als die Puritaner auf dem Konzile von Konstanz über das lasterhafte Leben der Päpste klagten und über die Nothwendigkeit der Sittenreform jammerten, donnerte der Kardinal Pierre d'Ailly ihnen zu: „Nur noch der Teufel in eigner Person kann die katholische Kirche retten und Ihr verlangt Engel." So rief die französische Bourgeoisie nach dem coup d'état: Nur noch der Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember kann die bürgerliche Gesellschaft retten! Nur noch der Diebstahl das Eigenthum, der Meineid die Religion, das Bastardthum die Familie, die Unordnung die Ordnung!

Bonaparte als die verselbstständigte Macht der Exekutivgewalt fühlt seinen Beruf, die „bürgerliche Ordnung" sicher zu stellen. Aber die Stärke dieser bürgerlichen Ordnung ist die Mittelklasse. Er weiß sich daher als Repräsentant der Mittelklasse und erläßt Dekrete in diesem Sinne. Er ist jedoch nur dadurch etwas, daß er die politische Macht dieser Mittelklasse gebrochen hat und täglich von Neuem bricht. Er weiß sich daher als Gegner der politischen und literarischen Macht der Mittelklasse. Aber indem er ihre materielle Macht beschützt, erzeugt er von Neuem ihre öffentliche, ihre politische Macht. Die Ursache muß daher am Leben erhalten, aber die Wirkung, wo sie sich zeigt, aus der Welt geschafft werden. Aber ohne kleine Verwechselungen von Ursache und Wirkung kann dies nicht abgehen, da beide in der Wechselwirkung ihre Unterscheidungsmerkmale verlieren. Neue Dekrete, die die Grenzlinie verwischen. Bonaparte weiß sich zugleich gegen die Bourgeoisie als Vertreter der Bauern und des Volkes überhaupt, der innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft die untern Volksklassen beglücken will. Neue Dekrete, die die „wahren Sozialisten" im Voraus ihre Regierungsweisheit prellen. Aber Bonaparte weiß sich vor Allem Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember, als Repräsentanten des Lumpenproletariats, dem er selbst, seine entourage, seine Regierung und seine Armee angehören, und für das es sich vor Allem darum handelt, sich aus der Staatskasse kalifornische Loose aus dem Staatsschatze zu ziehen. Und er

Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember mit Dekreten, ohne Dekrete und tr
der Dekrete.

Diese widerspruchsvolle Aufgabe des Mannes erklärt die Widersprüche sein
Regierung, das unklare Hin- und Hertappen, das bald diese, bald jene Klasse ba
zu gewinnen, bald zu demüthigen sucht und alle gleichmäßig gegen sich aufbring
dessen praktische Unsicherheit einen hochkomischen Kontrast bildet zu dem gebieter
schen, kategorischen Style der Regierungsakte, der dem Onkel folgsam nachkopi
wird. So soll die Hast und das Ueberstürzen dieser Widersprüche die allseiti
Thätigkeit und Schlagfertigkeit des Kaisers nachäffen.

Industrie und Handel, also die Geschäfte der Mittelklasse sollen unter der sta
ken Regierung treibhausmäßig aufblühen. Verleihen einer Unzahl von Eisenbah
konzessionen. Aber das bonapartistische Lumpenproletariat soll sich bereichern. Tr
potage mit den Eisenbahnkonzessionen auf der Börse von den vorher Eingeweihte
Aber es zeigt sich kein Kapital für die Eisenbahnen. Verpflichtung der Bank, a
Eisenbahnaktien vorzuschießen. Aber die Bank soll zugleich persönlich exploitirt u
daher cajolirt werden. Entbindung der Bank von der Pflicht ihren Bericht w
chentlich zu veröffentlichen. Leoninischer Vertrag der Bank mit der Regierun
Das Volk soll beschäftigt werden. Anordnungen von Staatsbauten. Aber d
Staatsbauten erhöhen die Steuerpflichten des Volkes. Also Herabsetzung d
Steuern durch Angriff auf die Rentiers durch Konvertirung der fünfprozentig
Renten in 4½prozentige. Aber der Mittelstand muß wieder ein Douceur erhalte
Also Verdoppelung der Weinsteuer für das Volk, das ihn en detail käuft und He
absetzung um die Hälfte für den Mittelstand, der ihn en gros trinkt. Auflösu
der wirklichen Arbeiterassoziationen, aber Verheißung von künftigen Assoziation
wundern. Den Bauern soll geholfen werden. Hypothekenbanken, die ihre Ve
schuldung und die Conzentration des Eigenthums beschleunigen. Aber diese Ba
ken sollen benutzt werden, um persönlich Geld aus den konfiszirten Gütern d
Hauses Orléans herauszuschlagen. Kein Kapitalist will sich zu dieser Bedingu
verstehen, die nicht in dem Dekrete steht, und die Hypothekenbank bleibt ein bloß
Dekret, u. s. w. u. s. w.

Bonaparte möchte als der patriarchalische Wohlthäter aller Klassen erscheine
Aber er kann keiner geben, ohne der andern zu nehmen. Wie man zur Zeit d
Fronde vom Herzog von Guise sagte, daß er der obligeanteste Mann von Frankrei
sei, weil er alle seine Güter in Obligationen seiner Partisanen gegen ihn verwa
delt habe, so möchte Bonaparte der obligeanteste Mann von Frankreich sein u
alles Eigenthum, alle Arbeit Frankreichs in eine persönliche Obligation gegen si
verwandeln. Er möchte ganz Frankreich stehlen, um es an Frankreich verschenke
oder vielmehr um Frankreich mit französischem Gelde wiederkaufen zu können, de
als Chef der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember muß er kaufen, was ihm gehören so
Und zu dem Institute des Kaufens werden alle Staatsinstitute, der Senat, d
Staatsrath, der gesetzgebende Körper, die Ehrenlegion, die Soldatenmedaille, d
Waschhäuser, die Staatsbauten, die Eisenbahnen, der état major der Nationa
garde ohne Gemeine, die konfiszirten Güter des Hauses Orléans. Zum Kau
mittel wird jeder Platz in der Armee und der Regierungsmaschine. Das Wichtig
aber bei diesem Prozesse, wo Frankreich genommen wird, um ihm zu geben, sind d
Prozente, die während des Umsatzes für das Haupt und die Glieder der Gesellsch
vom 10. Dezember abfallen. Das Witzwort, womit die Gräfin L., die Maitre
des Herrn de Morny, die Konfiskation der orléans'schen Güter charakterisirt
"C'est le premier vol de l'aigle,"* paßt auf jeden Flug dieses Adlers, der me
Rabe ist. Er selbst und seine Anhänger rufen sich täglich zu, wie jener itali
nische Karthäuser dem Geizhals, der prunkend die Güter aufzählte, an denen
noch für Jahre zu zehren habe: "In sai conto sopra i beni Bisogna prima far

* *Vol heißt Flug und Diebstahl.*

conto sopra gli anni." * Um sich in den Jahren nicht zu verrechnen, zählen sie nach Minuten. An den Hof, in die Ministerien, an die Spitze der Verwaltung und der Armee drängt sich ein Haufe von Kerlen, von deren Bestem zu sagen ist, daß man nicht weiß, von wannen er kommt, eine geräuschvolle, anrüchige, plauderungslustige Bohème, die mit derselben grotesken Würde in gallonirte Röcke kriecht, wie Soulouque's Großwürdenträger. Man kann diese höhere Schichte der Gesellschaft vom 10. Dezember sich anschaulich machen, wenn man erwägt, daß Véron-Crevel† ihr Sittenprediger ist und Granier de Cassaignac ihr Denker. Als Guizot zur Zeit seines Ministeriums diesen Granier in einem Winkelblatte gegen die dynastische Opposition verwandte, pflegte er ihn mit der Wendung zu rühmen: "C'est le roi des droles," „das ist der Narrenkönig." Man hätte Unrecht, bei dem Hofe und der Sippe Louis Bonaparte's an die Regentschaft oder Ludwig XV. zu erinnern. Denn „oft schon hat Frankreich eine Maitressenregierung erlebt, aber noch nie eine Regierung von hommes entretenus." ‡ Und Cato, der sich den Tod gab, um in den elyseischen Gefilden mit Heroen umzugehen! Armer Cato!

Durch die widersprechenden Forderungen seiner Situation gejagt, zugleich wie ein Taschenspieler in der Nothwendigkeit, durch beständige Ueberraschung die Augen des Publikums auf sich als den Ersatzmann Napoleons gerichtet zu halten, also jeden Tag einen Staatsstreich en miniature zu verrichten, bringt Bonaparte die ganze bürgerliche Wirthschaft in Wirrwarr, tastet Alles an, was der Revolution von 1848 unantastbar schien, macht die Einen revolutionsgeduldig, die Andern revolutionslustig und erzeugt die Anarchie selbst im Namen der Ordnung, während er zugleich der ganzen Staatsmaschine den Heiligenschein abstreift, sie profanirt, sie zugleich ekelhaft und lächerlich macht. Den Kultus des heiligen Rocks zu Trier wiederholt er zu Paris im Kultus des napoleonischen Kaisermantels. Aber wenn der Kaisermantel endlich auf die Schultern des Louis Bonaparte fällt, wird das eherne Standbild Napoleons von der Höhe der Vendômesäule herabstürzen.

* Du berechnest deine Güter, du solltest vorher deine Jahre berechnen.

† Balzac in der Cousine Bette stellt in Crevel, den er nach Dr. Véron, den Eigenthümer des Constitutionnel kopirt, den grundliderlichen Pariser Philister dar.

‡ Worte der Frau von Girardin.

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Der

democratische Gedanke.

Der

democratiſche Gedanke.

Ein Volksbuch der chriſtlichen Moral.

I

Wer für ſeine Minute arbeitet, arbeitet für die Ewigkeit.

London:
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1853.

Dem ewigwahren, liebenden, befreienden **Gotte weiht dieß Büch**lein sein Kind, und widmet es seinen **Brüdern und Schwestern, den** Menschen der Wahrheit, der **Freiheit und der Liebe.**

Der democratiſche Gedanke.

Dieſes Buch, ſo glaube ich, zieht von Aſien nach Europa als ein Buch unſerer Zeit, der Geſittung und Wahrheit, als ein Zeichen des Verſtändniſſes und höherer Geltung. Ich hoffe, daß kein Aufgeklärter mir einen Vorwurf darüber machen wird. Möge es denn geöffnet werden mit Liebe.

*

Es iſt ein Korn der großen Saat, welche die Menſchheit bald ſchneiden und in Garben legen wird, um im jubelnden Bunde das Ernteſeſt des Friedens zu feiern auf der Erde, die ſie in Beſitz nimmt; um endlich frei, dem ewigen Gotte der Liebe zu opfern— ihn preiſend in Umarmung und Bruderkuß, nach ſeinem innigſten Wohlgefallen.

*

Ich habe die Ueberzeugung gut zu handeln nach dem Maaß meiner Kräfte, indem ich dieſe Schrift verbreite. Und dieß genügt mir, denn ich bin Democrat.

*

Sie iſt ein David's Harfenton aus dem alten Judenlande, aus dem Lande des Evangeliums.

*

Der Wind der herüberſtreicht über den grauen Libanon, bringt die merkwürdige Kunde, daß die Völker Europa's angelangt ſeien an der Gränzmarke des Leidens—daß ein großer Zeitabſchnitt zu Ende geht, und ein größerer anbricht, daß die Zeit wunderbar ſchwanger geht mit Geburten und Toden; daß Großes, Unerhörtes bevorſteht.

*

So wäre ſie denn angelangt, die zuwartende Menſchheit an der Pforte des verheißenen Landes; am Beginne der Erlöſung und Entgeltungszeit. Wie übers Meer hin vorm Sturme, ſo zieht ſich hin ein langer Ton über Europa und America und murmelt Befrei-

ung!—der Weltgeist hört es und fragt: 1852? Wie viele Gefühle birgt und erweckt dieser Laut? Wie viel Muth und wie viel Zagen! wie viel Hoffen und wie viel Zittern—wie viel Strafe und Lohn! Er durchläuft alle Reihen des heiligen Heeres vor der großen Minute der Entscheidung, die den Waffenstillstand aufkündigt der bestehenden unheiligen Gewalt.

*

Also naht er heran der Tag, der entscheiden wird zwischen Monarchie und Republik, zwischen ewigem Krieg und ewigem Frieden; zwischen lebendigem Leben und hinsterbendem Tod; zwischen Menschenrecht und Dynastien Gewalt. Ob es ein Tag wird der Wahl-Urne oder der Wahlstatt?—Uns gleich! wir sind bereit und entschlossen. Es soll entschieden werden.

*

Denn wir haben begriffen, daß es anders und besser sein könne auf dieser Erde Gottes! daß die Völker neben einander wohnen können und handeln und wandeln in Frieden; daß Ihr es aber seid, die den ewigen Krieg wollt und seiner bedürftig seid —die Menschheit, die Ihr Unterhanen nennt, hinopfert Eurem düstern Wahnsinn und Herrschdurst, oder sie bluten und verbluten laßt im Spiele Eurer Blutlaunen—Ihr Menschen der angestammten Herrschgewalt! Ihr Häupter der blutiger Kronen!

*

Ihr seid es, wir haben es begriffen, die jeden Aufschwung

Das ist die Macht die Gott zusammengefügt hat durch Prüfung und Leidensfluthen in seiner zärtlichsten Liebes-Stunde, damit sie sein Reich begründe unter den Sterblichen, und das Heft der Gewalt entwinde den Händen des Hasses—liebend ordne und regle die ruhigen Schicksale der Welt, und alle Völker verbinde zu einem einzigen Volk, weithin sich ausbreitend über die ganze Erde, verbunden durch rege Liebe, im Gesetz und in den Herzen.

*

Das ist die Aufgabe unseres Bundes! Das sein hohes praktisches Ziel; das die heilige Mission der Democratie! Die allgemeine Verständigung aber ist das Bedürfniß in der Vorstunde der Handlung.

*

Denn die Nothwendigkeit des innigen Bündnisses und der thätigen Liebe, das wissen nun Alle—spricht sich überall aus. Im großen wie im kleinen Haushalt. Vom Weltverbande der Staaten bis zum Seelenbund der Familie. Ist nicht Freiheit—ist nicht eine ganze neue Welt, ein unvergleichliches Dasein der Fülle und Größe zu erringen im Flügelschritt mit zwei kleinen begriffenen Worten? und hervorzubringen ungeahnete Production, Nahrung und Wohlstand.

*

Die Natur spricht zum Menschen: Gieb mir Liebe und Bund, und ich gebe dafür Dir alles; Fülle und Reichthum entquillt meinem Schooße, und Dir gehör' ich zu eigen; darf ja nichts Dir versagen; Du besitzest mich sobald du mich umfängst.

*

Das Gesetz der Erwiederung ist klar und bethätigt vom Menschen an bis in die Blumenstaubfäden der Moose. Die Natur arbeitet ja, nimmer müde, und bringt hervor mit Gotteshänden in ihrer ewigen Werkstatt, der Mensch säet nur das Korn um zu genießen den vollen Fruchtkorb der Ernte. Er giebt die kleine Liebe der Aussaat: ihm bringt die Natur vollendet und reif die große Liebe der Fechsung.

*

Menge, verbinde ein Samenkorn mit Erde und begieße es mit der Liebe des Wassers, und die Naturliebe des Sonnenstrahls strömt unaufhaltsam hinzu und erzeugt im Verein mit deinem Liebesfleiß aus den Stoffen schon ein organisch Gewächs; bringt Blumen, den Schmuck der Natur und der Frauen, und süße saftige Frucht, oder Körner zu heiligem Brod, welches die Menschheit ernährt, die Gott anbetet.

*

Wenn aber der Mensch vorerst selbst verbündet, verbinden wird, nicht nur Samenkorn und Erde, wie der schlichte einfache Bauer, sondern Kraft mit Kraft, Wissenschaft mit Wissenschaften, Elemente

mit Elementen, ja Welttheile mit Welttheilen, und Alles mit Gott, dann wird er ſich eine Welt ſchaffen groß und großartig wie eine Götterwohnung, wunderbar wie ein himmliſchen Traum.

*

Seit wann haben zwei einzige Wiſſenſchaften, Geſchichte und Philoſophie geſchloſſen ein Verſtändniß-Bündniß? Und ſchon in den wenig Jahren haben ſie erzeugt und nahe gebracht der Vollendung und Reife, die herrliche Errungenſchaft der Menſchenfreiheit—und der Staatsweisheit des Friedens. Chemie und Technik, Mechanik und Phyſik, reißen die Welt hin in Dampf-Fluge, mit der Blitz-Schnelle des elektriſchen Funkens—vom Wunder zu Wunder, zu höherer Beſitz-Ergreifung der Natur. Zur abſoluten Herrſchaft über die Elemente—Forsan scintillula latet?—patet.

*

Denn allgegenwärtig und allbereit ſich zum Menſchen zu neigen, waltet ſie überall ſichtbar, die Himmelskönigin, ſo weit ſich ausdehnt der Raum. Und kömmt ihr entgegen die irdiſche Herrſcherinn, die Menſchenliebe, das Bieten des Guten, das Ringen nach Freiheit, in Gedanke, Gefühl und That—da ſchüttet ſie aus ihre ganze Gnade, und krönet den ſiegreichen Bund.

*

Aber im engeren Haushalt der Menſchen, im gewöhnlichen Leben, ſagt da nicht Jeder: Dieſe Arbeit iſt gut, vortrefflich, mann ſieht

[redacted]

hohes England! und deiner edlen Regierung! Das hat sie gethan, während die Regierungen des Festlandes wüthen und schwelgen im Marke der Völker—zurückkehren möchten zur wilden Barbarei des Mittelalters und die Blätter der Geschichte besudeln mit Blut und Koth.

* * *

Fraternité! Großes Wort. Herdeglocke in Gotteshand. Testament des neuen Menschenbundes. Politik der Zukunft. Heil dir, du alleinseligmachender Glaube! Sie gegrüßt Verständniß des Vaters, des Sohnes, und des Heiligen Geistes! Begriff und Satzung der herangereiften Zeit. Heil dir ewiger Christ! Heil dir Rousseau! Heil euch Allen, Edle! Heilige! die früher und später zu den Menschen sagtet: liebet euch! verbündet euch!! Heil euch Märtyrern, die dafür gelitten und gestorben. Heil eurem Wirken!—Vitam impendere vero. Aufstrebende Söhne des Lichts und der Wahrheit! Menschen der Natur und der Wahrheit! Euch Gottgeweihten den Gruß der Menschheit!

*

Heil dir vier-und-zwanzigster Februar! An deinem Tage erst hat die Geschichte den dunkeln Band des Mittelalters geschlossen. An deinem Tage brach er heran der Welt-Tag der Menschheit! Ewige Glorie Dir Paris! daß du das Wort: „Brüderlichkeit" ausgesprochen hast. Freiheit und Gleichheit, die Götter, sie irrten stablos in der Dämmerung des Fortschritts. Die Völker fühlten, daß dem neuen Bunde sein Abendmahl fehle. Da schriebst du Paris! an jenem Tage, bei Blitz und Sturm, die Fraternität, an der Seite der Freiheit und Gleichheit, in die Gesetze der Welt. So ward, dreieinig ein Ganzes; ein Wahres. Ein Gott. Aus Göttern ein Gott.

*

So war die Leere gefüllt. So bekam die große Menschheit ein Herz; die Welt einen lebendigen Heiland. Der Glaube verjüngt sich und lebt in unseren Häusern, und aus allen Wohnungen der Sterblichen zieht der Rauch des Heerdes, zieht der Rauch der wärmenden Flamme sich zusammen aufwärts gen Himmel: daß die große Abel-Opfer-Rauchsäule des Friedens aufsteige zum Vater. Wie die Schrift es versprochen.

*

Er ist die Liebe! Liebe und Hilfe sein Nahme! Sein Reich ist beglückend und ewig! Schon beten die Geschöpfe ihn an:—vollführen auf Erden seinen heiligen Willen: daß der Mensch mit dem Menschen und Volk mit Volk und der Welttheil mit Welttheilen sich verbinde, vereinige; Eins werde, in des Gedankens innigster Ein-

heit; in der Einheit der That, und immer fortwirke in ihnen, ewig, bis die versöhnten Welten im Aether-Ocean sich begreifen und verbinden werden. Bis die Magnete sich nicht mehr abstossen, nur anziehen werden; bis sie uneingedenk des Hasses gelernt haben werden sich doppelt zu lieben.

*

Mächtiger weht sein Hauch daher zu dem jungen Geschlecht der Bewohner der Erde. Es naht wie Sturm. Millionen Gläubige ziehen heran mit der grünen Fahne, und stimmen an die Völker-Hymne aus einer einzigen Brust! Wie klingt sie prächtig daher zwischen Blitz und Donner und dem Glocken-Geläute.

*

Der Kain hat den Abel erschlagen. Aber es ward von den Profeten versprochen: daß der Tod auferstehen werde aus den Gräbern zum Leben, und wandeln werde lebendig mit Fleisch und Blut. Das war Profeten-Wort! Der Tod ist auferstanden! Leben webt in den Millionen Geistern und Herzen. Jugend- und Riesen-Kraft in dem Arm der Democratie.

*

Der Jesuiten-Orden ist ein alter Orden. Seit eine Schlange zischelte im Paradiese, lebt er, und zischelt und kriecht um Alles, was mächtig ist und reich. Wiegelt auf die Menschen gegen Gott und gegen einander, und führt mit Meineid und Lüge, mit Gift und Dolch, mit Hunger und Schwert und den Fallen des Beichtstuhles seinen ewigen Krieg gegen alles Lebendige.

*

Jesuiten heißen sie seit sie Jesu am Berge versucht haben. Einer der heiligen Patres war es, der hintrat zum Menschensohne, als er hungrig war, und ihm Brod zeigte; Anbethung und Unterwerfung; der ihm zeigte das reiche Land zu seinen Füssen und die Antonia-Burg am Saume mit der römischen Macht. Und zu ihm sagte: Sieh' da hinab, Alles soll dein sein—wolle nur! und wir bethen dich an, legen den goldnen Reif um deine Stirne und krönen dich zum König von Israel!

*

Aber der Erlöser sprach: heb' dich Satan hinweg! ich bin nicht gekommen um zu herrschen. Soll die Welt tauschen ewig Purpurstuhl um Purpurstuhl—Blut um Blut—mein Reich ist ein anderes! Ich bin ein Liebender. Ich bin Republicaner; ausgesendet vom Vater zu lehren und einzusegnen die brüderliche Universal-Republik des ewigen Friedens.

*

Die Könige und die hohen Priester fürchten sich; denn sie haben viel verbrochen am Menschen Geschlecht; und das wissen sie. Seit

drei Jahren haben sie die Gräuel gehäuft. Entsetzliches begangen. Alle heraufbeschworen die gebändigten Ungeheuer der Vorzeit. Sie haben geschwelgt im Blut der Gewürgten. Das Maaß ist voll. Der Meineid und der Raub des Waisengutes; das viele Elend hat an den Himmel geschrieen. Und fordert Sühnung. Der Himmel hat geantwortet: Das Gewissen des Zeitgeistes ist erwacht.

*

Die glücklicheren Völker der Erde glaubten lange nicht an unsere schreckliche Noth. Sie hörten unsere Klage und sahen unser Leid, aber sie sahen es nicht mit Augen: das rauchende Land, die öden Stätten, das bleichende Gebein auf allen Feldern; die Galgen unserer Helden und die Striemen auf den Rücken unserer Frauen; sie sahen nicht die Gräben voll mit unserem Blute, die Vesten und Verliesse mit unsern besten Jünglingen und Männern; sie hörten nicht das Weinen und Schluchzen der Wittwen und Verlassenen in den verwüsteten, verödeten Provinzen. Sie wollten ermessen mit Menschen-maaß das Unmenschliche; den Vernichtungskrieg des Unrechts gegen das Recht begreifen nach ihrem Rechtsbegriff.

*

Aber die Thräne der schmerzensreichen—der Hilfruf der erdrückten Menschheit, hat viele Herzen erweckt. Große Apostel der Liebe, der Verbrüderung und des Erbarmens haben ihre Finger selbst hineingelegt in die Wunden-Male der Nationen.—Ihre Erzählungen haben erschüttert über die ganze Erde den alten Frohnglauben an die Heiligkeit der Gewalt; sie haben es erwiesen, daß: Religion, Menschthum und Bürgerthum heute unter dem Nomaden-Zelte, unter dem Sklavendache der Democratie wohnen, verdrängt durch die Henker und Inquisitoren vom Throne der Könige.

*

Und die großen, freien Nationen, die Vorbilder, verlassen den Irrweg traditioneller Diplomatie, und kommen zu uns, uns beizustehen mit der Weihe der Sanction, der Aufmunterung und des Beistandes; —denn neben dem dürren Blutacker des Absolutismus sehen sie erblühen den grünen Fruchtgarten der freien, verbündeten Menschheit, und auf den Zweigen die schweren, reifenden Goldfrüchte des Menschenglücks.

* * *

Nicolaus, glaube mir: dein großer Ahne war kein Profet. Er irrte, du irrst, Euer De Maistre irret; Ihr irret Nicolaiten, wenn Ihr die Croyants um Euch versammelt und ausruft: Authorität! Ukas! Auto-da-fé! Knutenhieb! Welt-Unterjochung! Also Unfehlbarkeit, Gott im Einzigen.

*

Aber zeigt mir nur ein kleines Gottes-mal und ich werde ſchweigen und mich richten laſſen von Euch. Mich Euch unterwerfen. Keine Jury verlangen für Gut oder Böſe, aus Meinesgleichen, damit ſie mit dem Gewiſſen, der menſchlichen einzigen Wage—erkennen möge, ob ich recht oder unrecht gehandelt, und ſodann das Geſetz, nicht der Menſch, aufſtehe zu belohnen oder zu ſtrafen.

*

Ja, zeigt mir ein einziges kleines Mal, ein Gotteszeichen auf Eurem Leibe,—eine einzige Tugendkraft, die überſtrahle die Tugenden der Menſchen:—und der Thomas wird glauben an Euch.

*

Er wird auch glauben an Euch, wenn Ihr ihm eine einzige Teufelskralle weiſet, die der Menſch nicht abſchneiden könnte, wenn er die Scheere in die Hand nimmt. Dann will ich glauben an Euch. Will glauben an einen unverſöhnlichen blutigen Gott. An das Prinzip des Böſen in der Natur. An die Alleinherrſchaft des Haſſes. An den Untergang des Menſchengeſchlechts und aller Welten; das Erlöſchen der Sonnen und—an Gottes Ende.

*

Aber wir haben auch verſammelt die Croyants um unſere Fahne, und wenn Eure Heere heranziehen werden, dann werden die guten Prieſter vor der Fronte des Menſchen-Heeres das Crucifix gegen Euch erheben und ſagen: Stille! wir ſprechen hier im Nahmen Gottes; wir fragen dich: „wohin ziehſt du junger Soldat? Warum

bändigen und zähmen die Geier. Das Reich des Friedens bricht an. Wenn Ihr aber nicht rufet: „wir haben gesündiget" so lange es Zeit ist, abtretet und Euch davonschleicht: kommt das vernichtende Gewitter über Euch. Die Donner der democratischen Petarde, die zur selben Stunde in jeder Stadt, in jedem Dorfe, in jeder Negerhütte der Sklaven-Staaten platzen wird: sie wird Eure Thore aufsprengen; niederwerfen und zerschmettern alle Eure Pfeiler und Pfahle: die Throne und Galgen; damit sie spurlos verschwinden mögen von der Erde, und der Mensch nimmer tödte den Menschen.

*

Der Blitz geschleudert von der Hand des Richters, der über den Wolken thront, wird Eure Kanonen schmelzen und Eure Macht. Sein himmlisches Commando-Wort wird eure Armeen zum Siege des Jahrhunderts führen;—sie haben ja tapfer und genug gewüthet im eigenen Blute und im Bruderblut; es wird sie erleuchten: daß sie mit Männerernste es einsehen werden, wo heute die Soldaten-Ehre ihr Feldzeichen aufstecke; wo der Treuschwur sei, und wo das allerdurchlauchtigste Erzhaus. Sie werden hören die Trompeten-Zeichen der Völker—begrüßen an der jungen, wehenden Omnicolore des Bundes, den rothen Bandstreifen der Legion d'honneur.

* *

Aber die hohen Priester und Könige verstanden nie zu deuten, zu befolgen das gegebene Gesetz. Sah man sie einmal es heiligen? Einmal bekräftigen mit der That des Gehorsams das Wort der Lippen?

*

Ob das Gesetz ein Profet gegraben in Steintafeln für alle Geschlechter, und sie schon darüber gebrütet vierthalb Jahrtausende. —Oder ob sie es selber gemacht, auf Papier im hohen Rathe, auf Vorlage des Burgpfaffen und der Minister, ein Duzend auf die Stunde, nach jedem schlimmen Courier-Tage: einerlei! Empörung, Empörung immer! Auflehnung gegen Gott und Gesetz.

Steht es nicht geschrieben auf der Ur-Platte des alten und neuen Testamentes? „Du sollst nicht tödten." Aber sie glauben, Gott schreibe die Grundsäze des Menschthums auf heiligen Stein, in ewige Bücher: für Wölfe und Tiger, für den Räuber im Wald, den Meuchelmörder; für den lauschenden Rächer am Kreuzwege—aber nicht für den Staat, die Gesellschaft, den gesammelten Menschen und seinen Hort: das bürgerliche Gesetzbuch.

*

Was soll ihnen Gott, Buch, Gesetz und Bürger beisammen. Das braucht es nicht. Verfolgung, Vertilgung, Tod, Ihr sagt es täglich und bethätigt es: das sind die Götter auf Euren Altären;

Meineid, Krieg, Verwüstung, Brandfackel, Scheiterhaufe, Folter und Blutgerüst, Raub und Confiscation, die Stützen Euer Altäre und Throne! Die großen Elemente Eurer Staatskunst.

*

Zu ihrem blutigen Opferstocke betet euer Unherz in der Stunde des Uebermuths und der Schrecken. Warum das Geheul und dieses letzte Prassen? Fühlt ihr herannahen das Ende, die Stunde der Rechnung? Hört ihr das Glockengeläute der Ewigkeiten und ihre Posaunen? Erstehen die Erschlagenen, die Gehängten und Fusillirten aus den Gräbern? Vernehmt Ihr plötzlich das Weinen der Wittwen und Waisen und den Donnermarsch der nahenden Vergeltung? Das ist die Marseillaise der Democratie.

* *

Ihr aber seid Heiden, denn Ihr habt Menschen, Christen und Brüder geröstet und gebraten, unter Anrufung Eures Gottes und seiner Gesetze, bei angezündeten Kerzen und dem festlichen Dom-Geläute.

*

Wir aber tragen das wahre Zeichen des Kreutzes auf unserer Stirne. Unser Bund geht aus Leiden hervor; aus den eigenen und den unserer Nächsten. Wir folgen in Demuth dem Beispiele des Lehrers, das uns lehrt zu leiden und zu erwarten. Vor Allem aber uns zu vereinigen. Unsere Helden und Führer starben auf dem Galgen, den ewiggeheiligten! Ihre Leichen füllen alle Stadtgräben und alle Ackerfurchten—die Democraten, alle Gessler-Schlösser von Europa; und auf fremder Erde sammeln sich ihre Heere.

*

O sie leiden viel diese edlen Christ-Menschen, geben Alles hin für Nächstenliebe und Bruderthum; sie leiden und entbehren und kämpfen und sterben, damit Freiheit und Friede werde in all den schönen Ländern, die da seufzen unter dem Fluche Eurer Regierung.

*

Rufen der Bathyany, der Blum, der Messenhauser, an der Spitze der Hunderttausend Erwürgten, meuchlings Ermordeten, nicht laut genug. Jesus Christus! sind die hunderttausend Martyrer der letzten Jahre nicht gestorben in dem Geiste seines göttlichen Todes? Habt ihr nicht die Menschheit verspottet, angespieen, geschlagen und gekrönt mit der blutigen Dornenkrone, in dem Geiste wie sie es thaten mit dem Jesus—den Ihr Gotteslängner ewig eitel nennt.

* *

Bei diesem Jesus habe ich angefragt, von Wort zu Wort, von Lehre zu Lehre, ob wir ihn verstanden? Ob der neue Bund der

zur That wird und heran erstarkt die schmachvollen alten Heiden-Götter von Altar und Thron zu jagen mit ihren blutigen Priestern; ob der grüne Friedensbund der Liebe, ihm und seinem Vater im Himmel wohlgefällig sei? ob was er göttlich, gedacht, gefühlt und gestiftet, fortdenke und fortfühle,—ob die Stiftung seines Todes lebendig sei in der Religion der Democraten.

*

Mein Herz fragte, aber ohne Bangen, so sehr es auch schlug: Da sah es den heiligen Geist der innigsten, verstandensten Christus-Lehre herabschweben mit Taubenschwingen auf die Häupter der Menschen. Der Sohn wandte sein Angesicht im Schmerze ab von Rom, und zeigte dem Vater im Himmel, auflächelnd, sein liebes erwachendes Kind, die Menschheit, die liebende Menschheit. Et verbum caro factum est.

*

Darum blicke ich auf zum Gott, zum Ewigwahren, und rufe ihn an, daß er mich strafen möge an meinem Theuersten auf Erden: an meinem democratischen Glauben, und vernichten möge die Hoffnung und die Liebe, wenn ich nicht wahr spreche: Die democratische Lehre ist die wahre Gotteslehre. Sie ist der Inbegriff der Satzungen des neuen Bundes. Sie ist Gotteshonig für Menschen-Mund. Sie lehrt Menschenliebe und Menschenglück. Sie lehrt Gott in seinen Geschöpfen zu lieben.

*

Der Gedanke ist die Andacht des Democraten. Aber sein Glaube lebt im Herzen. Er glaubt an eine Liebe, eine allumschlingende Liebe in der Schöpfung. An Mutter-Brüste der Natur. Er glaubt daß Segen und Fülle aufquelle, Maaß für Maaß, überall wo Leben erschaffen wird, aufquillt. Denn Gott hält mit gerechter Hand die Wage: das wußten schon die alten Seher der Zeit.—

*

Sie wusten aber auch daß sich böse Menschen hinein stellen zwischen Gott und den Menschen, zwischen den Menschen und sein Stück Brod, zwischen der Menschheit lächelnde rothe Lippen und die lachenden, reifen, goldnen Früchte der Natur

*

Denn der Mensch ist das Werkzeug in Gotteshand, mit der Freiheit des Willens zu bauen oder zu zerstören, zu lieben oder zu hassen; mit der Gabe und freien Wahl zu vernichten oder zu schaffen, zu wirken und arbeiten, zu ebnen und zu flächen, hinwegzuräumen; daß die Einigung des Bundes immer und immer sich ausbreite über die ganze Menschheit, auf den geebneten Plan, wie

ein Athemzug des Frühlings—und endlich eine Lebensader schlage durch den Gliederbau der ganzen Schöpfung!

* *

Dir mein Jahrhundert gebührt die ewige Krone: verstanden zu haben. Was soll die Gottes-Weisheit in den Köpfen der Menschen? Unfruchtbare Verschwendung! Glauben, hoffen und lieben kann nur das Herz. Du mein Jahrhundert nimmst auf die Liebe in die Gesetze der Staaten und schreibst deinen Codex amoris populi, fraternitatis populorum; und weil Liebe, überschwengliche Liebe das Gesetz der Welt ist im Gottesverbande, gründest du einen Staat der bald die ganze Welt umschlingen wird. Einen Körper bilden wird für die verheißene, weltumschlingende Gottes-Umarmung.

*

Aber der Mensch wird mild und liebend, der heilige Kampf und die heiligen Leiden sie haben seine Seele geadelt. Rosenknospen brechen aus den blutigen Enden der Dornenkrone. Der Strahl Gottes, die Civilisation mit der Freiheits-und Friedensbotschaft dringt zum Menschen in die entferntesten Hütten, und bringt ihm die Bedeutung des Wortes:

*

Gott und Natur, Liebe und Friede, Gesetz, Erkenntniß, Bund und Einigung, Association und Wahl, Arbeit und Erwerb und ewig zunehmender Wohlstand, das ist der Inhalt der Bundeslade der heutigen Democratie; ihre großen Stifter haben es vorgepredigt in allen göttlichen Sendungen und Congressen des Friedens: diesen democratischen Concilien der Völker-Liebe. Dort sagen sie es täglich: wer dem heiligen Schreine nicht folgt, sich nicht schmückt mit dem grünen Reise des Friedens, der gehört nicht zu uns. Der schleiche sich aus dem Bunde hinweg.

* *

*

In der alten Burg, im verfallenem Haushalt ist das Heroldsamt herabgegangen auf den Schürer des Holzstoßes und den Mönchs-Bruder, der schönen Zeit letzte Getreue. Und diese Stimme töne entgegen dem Sturmesheer, dem Weltmeerbrausen der heranwogenden Menschheit?—Alles erschöpft, mißbraucht, verbraucht. Aufgezehrt ist der ganze Vorrath für Herrschaft und Willkühr in der langen Blut-Geschichte.

*

Ist es Drucker-Schwärze oder geronnen Blut aus einer ihrer Lachen? Kommt das Blatt aus einer Christenstadt oder aus einem Lande der Antropophagen?—Es kommt über Paris aus Rom.

*

Nicht das Tigerhafte an diesem Menschen entsetzt mich, und sein blutschnaubendes Marat-Maul. Mich überwältigt sein Unverstand. So weit kann die Menschen-Natur entarten unter dem unmittelbaren Einfluß des bösen Prinzips. So tief entsittlichen, entmenschen kann sie nur dogmatische Entzweiung der Religion und des Herzens. Luther stand auf weil Huß verbrant wurde und nicht weil er nicht verbrannt wurde; das weiß er nicht:—und hätte irgend ein frommer Fürst, mit Eurer Weihe, den Luther verbrannt, wahrlich, die Reformation des Christenthums hätte nicht 300 Jahre gebraucht um Euch zu verdrängen. Nicht erst nach 300 Jahren, wie Ihr sagt, wiederbeginnen müssen ihr heiliges Vollendungs-Werk.

*

Man lieſ't in der Presse:—

"L'Univers publiait hier les lignes suivantes: 'L'héresiarque, examiné et convaincu par l'Eglise, était livré au bras séculier et puni de mort. Rien ne m'a jamais semblé plus naturel et plus nécéssaire.' Plus de cent mille hommes perirent par suite de l'hérésie de Wiclef, celle de Jean Huss en fit perir plus encore; on ne peut mesurer ce que l'hérésie de Luther a fait couler de sang et ce n'est pas fini. Après trois siècles nous sommes à la veille d'un recommencement. La prompte repression des disciples de Luther et une croisade contre le protestantisme auraient épargné à l'Europe trois siécles de discordes et de catastrophes où la France et la civilisation peuvent perir.

"C'est dans cet ordre d'idées que j'ai écrit la phrase qui soulève la réprobation vertueuse des journaux rouges; la voici, telle qu'ils l'impriment:—

"'Pour moi, ce que je *regrette*, je l'avoue franchement, c'est qu'on n'ait pas *brulé Jean Huss plutòt*, et qu'on n'ait pas *également brulé Luther;* c'est qu'il ne se soit pas trouvé quelque prince *assez pieux* et assez politique pour mouvoir une croisade contre les protestants.' Litterairement, cette phrase pourrait être mieux tournée; mais comme j'ai le bonheur de n'être pas de ceux qui tiennent à la façon de leurs phrases, je ne la rénie point. Je la prends, puisqu'on me la rejette et je ne suis pas insensible au plaisir de me trouver fidele à mes opinions. Ce que j'écrivais en 1838 je le pense encore.

"Que les philantropes rouges impriment cette déclaration en tels caractéres et autant de fois que bon leur semblera; qu'ils y ajoutent leurs comentaires et qu'ils joignent le tout à mon dossier. Le jour ou je voudrai la déchirer, il pourront avoir de moi l'opinion que j'ai d'eux.

"Louis Veuillot."

*

Solche Declarationen braucht der Vatican. Durch solche muß er fallen; mehr noch als durch Mazzini's Römer-Arbeit, den Herzschlag der italischen Völker, das Weltbedürfniß der Zeit, Barot's Lügen und de Falloux's Bomben.

*

Ihr, die Ihr am nächsten steht dem heiligen Stuhle, mit ihm am innigsten verbunden seid, und Eure Blätter mit dem Zeichen der Tiare schmückt, Ihr lechzt, im Grunde des Herzens, noch Heute nach dem Geruche gebratenen Menschenfleisches, was selbst der Karaibe aufgegeben hat. Wo einer der Eurigen auftaucht über die Andern, das kann nur ein Blut-Mensch sein. Seht das Auge Antonelli's an; ich sah es; es ist ein Hyänen-Auge, nur im Ausdruck thierischer, niedriger. Gerade Ihr seid es, Ihr letzten Stützen des heiligen römischen Reiches, die Heute am Wenigsten versteht vom Gange der Dinge, von Gott und seinem Buche, vom Menschen und Menschenthum. Die kein Band der Liebe verbindet mit dem Mit-Geschöpf; und unter allen Lebenden, den Botokuden nicht ausgenommen, seid Ihr die dümmsten, schlechtesten, entartetsten Menschen auf der ganzen Erde. Euren moralischen Standpunkt könnte man Herzens-Crétinismus nennen. Das ist dafür der Beweis; daß das Böse sich selber verderbe und endlich vernichte. Jegliches. Im verkehrten Maaßstab des Guten. Es vernichtet am Tiefsten dasjenige Böse, welches sich ihm am Nächsten gestellt hat. Ein lebender Beweis: die Cardinäle und das kirchliche Hauptblatt: L'Univers.

*

Ging ich aber ein, Veuillot! ohne Dich zu fragen, wer jene blutigen Kriege und Metzeleien angestiftet hat, ging ich ganz ein in Deine Ordnung der Ideen; dann müßte Jesus, mit dem Kreuze, auch noch verbrannt werden, und noch einmal sterben, ohne Widerrede! in der strengsten Logik der Gedanken, denn er war auch ein Héresiarque des alten eingesetzten Glaubens.

*

Aber seine himmlische Heresie, das göttliche Evangelium, lebt— Luther's befruchtendes, verjüngendes Liebeskorn grünt auf in Millionen christlicher Herzen, und verbreitet sich mit der Giganten-Fluth der democratischen Liebes-Welle, und blühen wird die freie Glaubens-Gemeinde: nicht weil Jesus nicht gekreuzigt, sondern weil er gekreuzigt wurde, weil Luther und Lutheraner verfolgt und verbrannt wurden auf Holzstößen, und weil endlich das Wahre und Gute siegen muß. O, Veuillot! ich möchte nicht sein wie Du.

*

Wenn man es hört mit Schaudern und Entsetzen, daß wilde Neger im Innern der Westküste noch Menschen-Opfer bringen ihren blutigen Götzen, was ist dies Anderes als daß unter jene Arme,

Ein Bluttropfe hingespritzt ist von dem Blutbade der großen europäisch-christlichen Menschen-Schlachtopfer-Hekatombe des Catholicismus.

*

Merkt Ihr es denn nicht, Ihr an Rom gläubige Christen, daß Eure Fürsten und Priester noch heute, mitten unter Euch, blutige Menschen-Opferer sind? Wirkliche Götzendiener der grausamsten Art. Eine latente Fetisch-Sekte von Canibalen. Tugg's. Besonders wenn sie Alle gleichen den Blutthieren des Hapsburger Hauses. Dem Neapolitaner. Den Cardinälen in Rom und den Redactoren des Univers: diesen heiligen Gottes Vertretern. Zertretern.

* * *

In hohen Zeiten, in Geburts-Crisen, an großen Fest-Epochen der Menschheit sendet Gott Einzelne, in welche Alle Vertrauen erlangen, weil diese ihr leibhafter Ausdruck, die lebendige Gestalt und Einheit des Bundes sind. Mit solchen Männern hat die Zeit uns Alle beschenkt, die glorreiche, die den endlichen Sieg will.

*

Kossuth, Mazzini, und ihre Freunde, die Freunde Aller, die Lenker, sie stehen an der Spitze des Völkerheils! Ihr Wort ist Gottes-Wort! Ihr Befehl, Befehl in der Zeit des großen Wandels. Wer in der Zeit nicht gehorchen wird Jenen, die Gott sich auserlesen und bezeichnet hat mit dem Zeichen der Tugend und Volksliebe; der ist keiner der Unsrigen, der stehle sich aus dem Bunde hinweg.

* *

Denn die ewigen Feinde des Menschen-Geschlechts haben auch einen Bund geschlossen. Sie haben ihre Macht und den Rest ihrer Würde abgelegt in die Hand des berühmten nordischen Hetmanns. Der hält nun in Einer Faust die Gewalt—und exercirt die Bürschchen wie seine Pagen und Regimenter; und sie kriechen und fürchten sich vor ihm wie vor einem Götzen, und glauben am Ende wirklich, Er sei der Missionär, den die majorennen Völker Europa's erwarten.

*

Völkerglück und Glauben niedertreten mit Pferdehufen, die weißen Hütten einer Nation schwärzen mit Pulverdampf, hunderttausend Patrioten todt und zu Krüppeln schießen; hunderttausend Wittwen, und hunderttausende von Waisen zu machen, hunderttausend Beute-Wagen mit gestohlenem Gut zurückführen über die Karpathen, Verrath einleiten und üben, und endlich das gegebene Kaiser- und Feldmarschalls-Wort *schamlos* und *blutig* brechen, das ist wirklich eine heilige Vocation. Nein.—Autocrator! nicht so. Jenes berühmte Manifest wird die Geschichte ein Berüchtigtes nennen—oder

mitleidiger ein unschuldiges. Sie ist dies sich selber und dem kleinen Stamme der Magyaren schuldig.

*

Nicolaus dürfte sich vielleicht zurückziehen bei Zeiten, aus der heiligen Alliance; denn er ist ein großer Kaiser der Russen, bei Sinnen ziemlich, und hat seine Agenten überall. Die werden ihm berichtet haben, wie die Sachen ringsherum stehen, wie sich der Welt-Cours gestaltet. Wer Augen hat muß es ja sehen. Soll er um Buben zu helfen noch mehr erbittern den gerechten und furchtbaren Zorn der Democratie? Soll er sich selber opfern für eine verlorene Sache—für ein krankes, hinsiechendes, ausröchelndes Haus, und erschüttern die Säulen seines eigenen Reiches?

*

Weit hinter den Gränzen des heiligen Polenlandes, im Norden von Asien, wohnen noch einige unglückliche Völker, unaufgeklärte, barbarische, die eine Hand brauchen wie die seinige. Dort ist sein Reich. Dort stifte er Gutes; democratisire! Locke die Völker aus dem Walde heraus zum Bienenkorb der Civilisation, führe sie allmählig heran zur Reife damit auch sie, nach der Zeit der Prüfung, eingehen mögen einst in die allgemeine Völkerversammlung.

*

Vexilla regis prodeunt. Des großen Peter's Testament liegt zertreten im Staube. Diese Lapidar-Inschrift am Palaste der Czaren, die kühnste und gewaltigste, die je ein politisches Talent geschrieben auf Steintafeln, ist verwischt; der Stein selber war Sand. Der democratische Gedanke schlägt ihn in Trümmer.

*

Peter rief: Die Völker Europa's sind alt! und wollte bauen auf diesen Schutt sein Reich. Wir aber rufen: Wir sind jung! Verjüngtes Leben braust durch alle Herz-Adern der Nationen. 1848 hat es gesäet und geschrieben in Blut, die nächste Zeit wird es besiegeln, und schneiden die Ernte—wenn Gott will in Frieden, oder aber im Kampf;—im Kampfe der heiligen Vertheidigung, den einzigen, den der Himmel nicht wehren kann, den die Engel beschirmen.

*

Aber in furchtbarem Kampfe! Zur selben Stunde, mit gleichem Muth, in allen Ländern, nach einem einzigen Wink, mit Eiden verbunden. Daß das neue Dogma der Bruderliebe schnell und auf immer verwische die Züge und Striemen des russischen Pergaments. Und die Herrschaft verschwinde.

*

Weil Peter schon zu seiner Zeit den römischen Götzen sinken sah, so glaubte er, es wäre kein Gott um die Völker zu retten. Horcht

Romanoffs dem Tone in den Lüften! Es brauf't daher wie ein Gewitterſturm,—wie Frühlingslüfte: Das iſt der demo-cratiſche Gedanke, der die Welt verjüngt.

* * *

Dieſe Blätter meines Herzens, dieſes Büchlein der Liebe, habe ich unter Türken gefühlt und geſchrieben. Unter Heiden, wie man ſie nennt—unter Mohamedanern. Ich mußte aufzeichnen allein, und während der Nacht; daß der Strahl mich nicht blende. Mein Zimmer aber iſt heraußen im Selamlik, dem Ort des Grußes. Wo die Diener wohnen und Adjutanten; alle Türken. Denn die Sitte erlaubt es nicht, daß im Harem des Paſcha's, im innern Hofe, ein zweiter Mann wohne, ohne Unterſchied. Selbſt wenn der Paſcha ein Chriſt iſt.

*

Dort wandelt Richard Guyon, der Horſchid Paſcha, in ſeinem Harem, und denket nach über den Krieg und den Frieden. Begießt die Blumen und lockert die Erde auf. Raucht die Pfeife und zu-weilen ein Nargile. Lieſet Zeitungen. Und danket Gott. Küßt ſeine Frau und die lieben Kinder. Füttert auch mit Brodkrumen die rothen Fiſche im Marmor-Baſſin, in der Mitte des Hofes, zur ſelben Stunde, jedesmal; denn er iſt Soldat und pünktlich in Allem.

*

Dort wandelt er, wenn ihn nicht abruft die Pflicht. Wenn es aber an der Zeit iſt, dann ſitzt er auf, auf den prächtigen Araber-Schimmel mit dem Tigerfell; und reitet aus;—zu beſichtigen ein ſchönes Regiment des Sultans. Hinter ihm her der ganze orien-taliſche Troß. Denn ſo will es die Würde, und Guyon iſt heute Ferik-Paſcha.

*

O daß ich es ausſprechen könnte wie ich dich liebe und bewundere, du herrlicher Held! Du Fels! Du Mann des Beiſpiels und aller Tugenden. Werden Viele im Bunde auferſtehen wie dieſer, dann wird der Kampf furchtbar ſein und ſchnell beendigt. Der Friede aber mild und heiter: wie der Himmel des Orients: wie dein blaues Auge. Zürne nicht, zürne nicht, du Beſcheidener! daß ich dich nenne. Ich weiß es ja, daß ich deſſen nicht würdig bin, ich armer ſündenvoller Vagabund.

*

Aber Gott hat dich geſegnet. Aus hundert Schlachten heraus-geführt geſund und ſiegreich. Er gab dir Alles was den Menſchen glückſelig macht. Ein großes Herz. Die Liebe und Bewunderung einer Nation. Die Achtung der Welt. Einen ſtrahlenden Namen. Eine Ruhmes-Vergangenheit und eine Ruhmes-Zukunft. Ein ruhig

Gewiſſen und das Bewußtſein erfüllter Pflicht. Er gab dir ein liebendes Weib, drei ſüße Kinder, worunter ein Edgar. Und alle im Wohlſtand.

*

Oder daß der Serasker ihn erſuchen ließ, zu erſcheinen im Rathe. Denn es plündern immer die Beduinen, die Aneſis, und verwüſten das Land. Der Horſchid Paſcha aber verſteht den Krieg gegen Könige und Räuber. Er hat es bewieſen.

*

Die Wüſte erzieht Räuber und Hirten. Starke und Schwache. Den Wolf und das Lamm. Das Saatenfeld aber und der Weinſtock, der Blumengarten und die rieſelnde Wieſen-Quelle erziehen die Menſchen; führen ſie ein in das Heiligthum des Beſitzes. Alle gleich ſtark durch's Geſetz. Gegen daſſelbe Alle gleich ſchwach.

*

Die Völker des Libanon's können ſich auch noch nicht finden in die neue Geſtaltung der Dinge. Sie haben noch nicht begriffen, daß in Stambul ein edler Wille lebe. Ein Herz. Daß dort ein hoher Thron erbauet ſei, für den großen Sultan, Allah's ergebenen Diener, den mächtigen democratiſchen Sultan: Abdul Medſchid. Abdul Medſchid iſt ein ewiger, ein heiliger Name! Denn er hat die Liebes-Charte geſchrieben des Tanſimats. Und das geheiligte Gaſtrecht geübt mehr als Gott es befiehlt.

*

Dort ſitzt er unter ſeinem Volke, der Nachfolger des Proſeten,

ehrungswürdige, dann wird die dankbare Democratie aufstellen eure Bilder, in der Reihe der Vorbilder, und die Namen: Abdul Medschid, Reschid und Stradford, neben einander einschreiben ins goldene Buch der erhabenen Menschenfreunde. Die ungarischen Enkel aber werden wallfahrten kommen zum Grabe eurer heiligen Ruhe.

*

Steht er nicht da, dieser christliche edle Fürst wie ein Gottes-Exempel; mit seinem Finger zu bezeichnen, die heidnischen, blutigen, volksmörderischen Fürsten von Europa?

*

Wohl bald werde ich aus dieser Umgebung des Friedens scheiden müssen. Le flot monte! monte! gare! Die Martyrer sind Proseten. „Sturmvögel ziehen durch die Luft und die Zeit steht auf Gewitter"—schrieb man schon vor sieben Wochen aus Rom.

*

Dich also verlassen, blauer Himmel! warme Luft! dich einfaches, gutes, philosophisches Gottesvolk!—O! du mein Herz-Vers:

Im Orient, im Orient!
Wo ewig blau das Firmament!
Dort möcht' ich wohl ein Hindu sein!
Wie die Natur so fromm und rein.

*

Du mein Sándor! mein Geliebter, du hörst mich—und erfassest das Wort; du hast getrunken am Liebesquell! und weißt es, daß dem Bunde der Jugend und Freundschaft die Liebe Wort hält.

*

Wenn die Gesittung des Abendlands menschlich vollendet sein wird, wenn der Liebe Hand statt der Faust des Haßes die Verträge entwerfen wird — werden die Morgenstrahlen der Civilisation kosen kommen mit den Schatten des Palmen-Landes, beleuchten und erwecken sein kühl schlummerndes Volk. Wenn einst Osten und Westen sich ausgleichen werden, kommt ein neuer Liebeston: Harmonie, in die Lebens-Saiten der Menschen. Ein ergänzender Austausch. Der Accord zwischen dem Ursprung von Gott und vom Menschen — zwischen dem Anrecht an Zeit und Ewigkeit, zwischen dem Drang der Geister- und Sinnenwelt. Ein Accord zwischen Ruhe und Arbeit. Zwischen. Blume und Frucht. Zwischen Streben und Leben: die himmlische Mitte.

* *

Im schönen Caukasus wohnt ein prächtiger Democrat. Ein wilder Freiheits-Kämpfer. Der Shamyl Bey. Der Russen Vertilger. Er hütet dort die sauren Trauben und den rechten Flügel unserer Armee, damit sie nicht umgangen werde. Haben die Leiter des Bundes ihm gesendet einen Brudergruß wegen der gehörigen

Züchtigung des Magog-Chaus: des Räubers in allen Welttheilen? Er soll es auch wissen; und weiß es; daß das kommende Jahr die Botschaft der Sühnung bringen wird in alle Welttheile.

* * *

Stehet der Glaube an den Sieg des Geschlechts, an das endliche Werden, an die Überwindung der Menschheit, fest in deiner Brust, dann bist du ein Gläubiger, ein Sohn der gewordenen Zeit. Sei gegrüßt in seinem Reiche das zu uns kommet. Verbreite unter den Sterblichen das Gesetz des Bundes; du kennst es: Eines zu werden durch Liebe.

*

Daher sucht den Trost für Fehltritt, und Geschick von Oben, der Democrat im Gebet der verdoppelten Liebe: im regeren democratischen Eifer. Das ist der Hilferuf; das Gebet, das Gott erhört und die Menschen; das ist die wohlgefälligste Buße: denn für jede Liebe ersteht eine Andere im Welt-All, sobald die Eine geboren. Die sich anziehen und im Bunde umarmen, und in ewiger unsterblicher Jugend, forterzeugen die unendliche Enkelreihe des Guten und Besseren in Quadraten und Cubiken. . . . und dieses Princip, dieser Segen, dieser Liebesdrang waltet durch die ganze Natur.

*

Aber könnte man sagen:—

Die Natur ist voll Gifte die sie tödten, die Menschen voll Schmerzen und Krankheiten die sie untergraben und aufreiben. Die Schöpfung selbst scheint nur eine Geburt des Grabes zu sein. Ein Leichentuch für den einzig wahren Tod. Die Hoffnung, die Bestimmung zum Besseren, ist nur ein Kindermährchen oder ein Narrentraum; denn das Princip des Bösen ist das Siegreiche in der Natur. Es ist ewiger, mächtiger als das Princip der Liebe.

*

Wenn der ewige Hahnemann, der gläubige Forscher, nachdenkt über das Wunder der Vaccine: die Zähmung der Blatter durch Blatterngift; über die China-Rinde, die Fieber heilt und erzeugt; und so entdeckt und ausspricht das große Gesetz der Natur, das überall waltende: die verbindsame Liebe;—dann hat er das Böse niedergeworfen, entwaffnet.

*

Simila Similibus curantur. Wo sich Ähnliches zum Ähnlichen innig gesellt in Liebe, dort entsteht ein harmonischer Bund, ein siegreicher: dort Gesundheit, Kraft, Auferstehung vom

Krankenbett und Leben. Aber Wirkung und Rückwirkung, gleich den Schwingungen des Pendels, ist der Proceß der Natur, bis die Genesung, das Gleichgewicht, der Friede hergestellt ist im ganzen Körper. Wie das Meer geschüttelt von der Drehung der Erd-Achse so lange ebbet und fluthet bis es sein Niveau gefunden hat.

*

Das sind der Religion practische, allfaßliche Formeln, vor welchen wegkrächzt der Rabe: Unheil, mitsammt der jungen Brut. Das ist die Art, welche aushackt den wilden Baum mitsammt der Wurzel, aus dem Urwaldsdunkel des Silvanischen Zellen-System's für wilde Thiere, um darauf Gottes Pflanzungen anzulegen: den heitern Menschengarten: Socialismus—Associalismus.

*

Nimm ihn mit Liebe in die Hand den Arsenic, Menschenfreund! mit Wissenschaft, nach seiner Natur. Begreife seine Wahrheit, seine Kraft und seine Gabe: und du wirst heilen mit dem Arsenic die Krankheiten alle, die ihm ähnlich sind an Symptomen der Wirkung.—Also viele und schreckliche. Mit wenig Gift viele Leiden; die seiner Liebe harren um im Bunde der Ähnlichkeiten aufleben zu können: vom Schlimmen zum Guten, von der Krankheit zur Gesundheit, von Haß zur Liebe, von der Sclaverei zur Freiheit, vom monarchischen Princip zum republicanischen, vom Rückgang zum Fortschritt, vom Absolutismus zum Universalismus. Das wissen die Homäopathen.

*

Mit jedem Schritte der Wissenschaft, der Entdeckung der Wahrheit, ein Heilmittel mehr, eine Krankheit weniger. Ein Gift umgewandelt in Balsam. Das ist Siegesmarsch! Gang zur Vollendung; und gewisser Sieg!—So führet zum Heile das Wort: die himmlische Forschung in irdischen Stoffen, am Wege der Liebe.

*

Aber könnte man einwenden:—

Der Arsenic ist nicht immer in der Hand der Liebe. Vorsatz und Zufall können ihn reichen in Haß. Das beweisen in erster Linie die Borgias in Rom. Teste Papa!—und so ist das Princip des Bösen hergestellt. Ich aber sage: daß der Bund des Bösen, in Haß, nichts vermag gegen den Bund der Liebespflicht, das ist eben der Beweis für die Übergewalt und den Endsieg der Liebe. Denn:

*

Hätten die Päbste, wie Hahnemann, den Arsenic gereicht in

Liebe, in Wiſſenſchaft und Barmherzigkeit, mit Chriſtus-Händen; ſie hätten, übend die Liebe, einen dauernden Bund geſchloſſen, einen ewigen. Aber ſie gaben ihre Gaben, im Bündniß mit den Übermüthigen, wie Giftmiſcher: als Diſſolvens, Meineid, Abſolutismus. Staaten- und Glaubenszwang, Impenetranz, Heimlichkeit, Intoleranz, Verbrennung, Verdummung, und Verdammung. Anſtatt mit den Schwachen im Bunde, nach Jeſus Beiſpiele allen ein Heil zu bereiten im Geiſte der Wahrheit und Milde; durch Verbrüderung, Republik, Staaten-Freiheit und Freiheit der Forſchung, durch Öffentlichkeit, Toleranz,—durch Aufklärung und Erlöſung,—dieſer Geſammt-Summe und Endzweck der Civiliſation. Dieſem Weltfels der Liebe des Chriſtenthums.

*

Mit einem Worte; ſie gaben die Hoſtie der Menſchheit mit Gift und tranken aus dem Kelche ihr Blut, und thaten das Gegentheil von dem, was der Welt-Erlöſer gethan hat ſeinen Freunden und Jüngern, den Menſchen, beim ewigen Abendmal; denn er gab ihnen von ſeinem Blute, von der Mühe ſeines göttlichen Lebens und dem Schweiß ſeines menſchlichen Todes—von der Geburt an bis er auferſtand in der Allmacht des Geiſtes vollendet—und Ewig und Ewig. Darum verläßt Euch Heute und immer das Volk der Chriſtenheit, und hebt ſich in Erkenntniß und echtem Chriſtenſinn, nach dem großen Winke der Zeit. Erhebt in rechter Hand den



aber gewaltig geworden durch gewaltigen Bund;—durch Gottes-Weihe, durch Einigung, Lieb' und Erkenntniß, und furchtbare Rüstung, durch Sehnsucht nach Freiheit und Verlangen nach Frieden—durch göttlichen Willen und menschliche That und übt also Gutes, vollendend den Anfang: denn sie entwurzelt des Haßes eisern Princip, das Reich der Entzweiung, und befreit dadurch die Welt, vom Pabstthum, der Dissolvenz, den Meineid, von Absolutismus Staaten- und Glaubenszwang, Heimlichkeit, Intoleranz, Verbrennung, Verdummung und Verdammung.

*

Das hat die heilige Pius-Idee gethan, der Aufsprung der Liebe, in wenigen Jahren. Verwischend in kurzer Frist die Blutspuren des tausendjährigen Grimmes. Hat nicht der Heiland mit dem Sünder zur Rechten, einen Leidensbund geschlossen in der Sterbestunde? und sie wandelten im Paradiese zusammen denselben Abend.

*

So erhebt sich eine Idee, eine barmherzige, von den Lippen eines liebenden Priesters und Predigers ausgerufen, wenn er mit dem Herzen des Volks sich verbindet. So göttlich, allbezwingend und unbesiegbar ist der Liebe Gesetz. Ein unendlicher Kreislauf. Sie lenkt Alles, das von Gott ausgegangen zu Gott zurück: so den Menschen, so das Pabstthum und die Monarchie.

* *

Aber könnte man sagen:— Englands Volk schreitet vorwärts mit Männerschritt in Allem Großen. Ist, von Philantropie durchglüht, ein wahres Gottesvolk; und doch wird es durch das Princip des Bösen regiert: durch die Monarchie.

*

Aber England wird schon lange regiert durch das Princip der Republiken: durchWarheit, Liebe und Einklang, volksthümlich Gesetz, und humanistische Führung. Ein edles Geschlecht, das sich mit dem Volke verbunden im Gedanken der Wohlfahrt—steht obenan, befolgt die Verfassung und übt Gastfreundschaft. Macht die Ehre des prächtigen Fahrzeuges: dieses Dreimasters der Freiheit. Dort sitzt sie vor, dem kräftigen Volksmal, die liebende Königinn, die Mutter der Kinder, mit dem Diadem-Schmucke, während die erfahrenen Räthe mit Liebe lenken die Schicksale des Volks und der Völker, nach der Stimme von Oben, und nach der Stimme die die Erwählten aussprechen.

*

Denn sie wissen sich für ihre Macht auf Erden, Gott verantwortlich und den Menschen. Sie wollen ruhig leben und sterben, und bleiben im Gedächtniß der dankbaren Welt. Sie wollen voranschreiten der Menschheit in Allem Großen und Nützlichen, und

vor Allem in der Lehre des Friedens. Sie wollen die Schranken öffnen die Bosheit und Unverstand zwischen die Menschen hingestellt.

Großer Palmerston! Du übst wahrlich das Wort deines großen Lehrers und Vorgängers Canning: politische und religiöse Freiheit allen Menschen! Frieden der Welt!

* *

Der Zufall aber ist Schickung von Oben, und der Mensch findet Trost, und mildert sein Wirken durch Verdoppelung der wachenden Liebe; durch Wachsamkeit auf die wirklichen Gifte, deren Wesen er immer deutlicher wahrnimmt; deren Zahl daher immer verschwindet: —und so wie die Vorzeit das Göttliche, den Gedanken, den aufstrebenden Freiheitsmenschen, den Gottmenschen in Ketten schmiedet, einzeln und zu zweien, wie es Gladstone geseh'n und wir alle: so wird die Neuzeit, die regierende Democratie, binden und bändigen das Üble, das dem Menschen schadet und seine Hoheit erniedrigt; es bald umwandeln in so viele Hilfsquellen der Entfaltung.

*

O! Ihr sollt es sehen, das wird eine Epoche der Wunder und Wunder werden; so hell und glänzend wie der Sonne heiliges Licht, wie ein lauterer Strom des lebendigen Wassers; daß selbst die Verstocktesten sich bekehren werden zur Menschenliebe und der Anbetung Gottes. O! wir alle die wir leben und lebten, wir werden mitfeiern dieses große Menschheits-Fest.

* *

Unter deinen Schutz begeb' ich mich gastfreies England! Gottes wachendes, blaues Liebesauge in der Blutnacht der Tyrannei! Starkes, freies, glücklicheres Volk! Vorbestimmt vor Anderen zu glauben und zu wirken; und zu retten das erschöpfte, geknechtete Menschengeschlecht. Ahner des Himmelreiches, humane Protestanten, Gottes-Segen ruht sichtbar auf Euch.

*

Ich begebe mich unter euren Schutz; denn ich bin ein Gehenkter, und bin Katholik, und Proscribirter der Monarchie. Bin heimatlos und werde verfolgt bis auf den Tod, so lange sie walten auf Erden.

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Würde ich hinkönnen, wo mein Geist mich hinführt, wo er so oft weilet,—nach der lieben Heimat—den Thälern der Jugend— ich würde eilen zu küssen in heißen Thränen die Mutter, und Bruder und Schwestern; würde halten in meinen Händen die heiligen Hände die noch die Ringmarken tragen von den Ketten am Preßburger Schloßberge.

Hapsburger! Das ist Eure größte Schmach und Euer Verderben, daß Ihr die Frauen, edle Frauen in Eisen schlugt—oder peitschen ließt mit Ruthen am nackten Leibe, wie man es in barbarischen Zeiten mit Dirnen that. Dachtet Ihr nicht daß die Welt sagen wird: mit der Hapsburg steht es schlimm, sie fürchtet sich schon vor Weibern.

*

Und dann würde ich eilen Schutt und Bomben-Spuren vorbei, und grüßend die Freunde—in die heilige Synagoge der Juden, Gott zu danken und diesem braven, patriotischen, aufopfernden Stamm; weil er treu gehalten am Lande und am Volk—weil er Gut und Leben gegeben für den heiligen Preis. Mit edler, unverwischlicher Bürger- und Heldenschrift hat sich der ungarische Jude eingeschrieben in die ehernen Geschichts-Tafeln meines geprüften Volkes. Heil ihm! die nahe Freiheit er empfängt sie als verdienten Lohn!—

*

O wie viel Blut tränkt doch diese Segens-Fluren! seit Jahrhunderten welch ein Erntefeld für die Vernichtung! welch ein Fest des Todes! weil ein Volk da lebt, welches frei will sein und so glücklich als möglich.

*

Dort haben die Russen gemordet und gebrannt, dort die Oesterreicher, die Heere der alliirten Monarchen; dort die Croaten, dort die Serben, dort Wallachen und Raizen,—der Kirkise mußte aus der Steppe heraus, auch noch seinen Pfeil abzuschießen auf die verblutende Ungar-Brust;—damit ein verkommenes Geschlecht noch einige Monate schwelge in Blut und in Herrschaft, und durchführe bis zu Ende das Werk des tiefangelegten, blutigen, selbstmörderischen Meineids.

*

Also lieber war's dir, o Oesterreich! nach der Hand zu greifen des Erzfeindes der Throne und Völker, des Feindes der Welt—des Czaren Füße zu lecken süßer, als ihn annehmen zum Freunde, den treuen Freund in jeder alten Noth, den Retter der Theresia, den Retter des Franz, den ewigen Retter der Hapsburger, den edlen, ultra-loyalen, aber nunmehr ex-loyalen Magyaren-Stamm. Oesterreich, Oesterreich, hast du dies wohl bedacht? ich glaube nicht. Ich glaube daß Herrschsucht, Völkerhaß, und blutiger Wahnsinn deine Sinne umdämmert hat.

*

Zittere Oesterreich! Ungarns Tricolore flattert gerettet—stolzer als in Corvinus Tagen auf deiner Kaiserburg, nun in England und America! Dort hält sie hoch empor Kossuth's heilige Hand!

Die Hand deines unversöhnlichsten Feindes! und deines Vernichters! dieses geliebten Oberhauptes und Führers der ungarischen Nation! Dort stehen um die geweihte Fahne zwei democratische Brudervölker, die ersten, die größten, die freiesten der Welt, mit Titanen-Kraft und Tauben-Herzen—wie christliche Völker sind. Die befühlen an ihr das geronnene Blut—und Entsetzen, Mitleid und Brüderlichkeit regen auf ihrer Seele Tiefen. Und wenn Kossuth den Frühling ankündigen wird des Wiederbeginnes, und aufkündigen die Waffenruhe, werdet Ihr, Hapsburger! dahin schmelzen wie Schnee. Ungarns Volk aber wird versöhnt lieben und prosperiren mit Nachbar-Völkern, und voranschreiten Vielen—in der goldenen Völker-Krone nicht das letzte, unedelste Juwel.

*

Und Kossuth's Name wird mit Franklin's und Washington's Namen prangen, wie ein hoher Herold einer bessern Welt, wenn mit dem Eurigen Namen schlimme Kinder schrecken werden.

* * *

Diese Blätter in deutscher Sprache müssen nach England wandern, damit sie gedruckt werden. Guttenberg's göttliches Handwerk ist unter seinem Volke ein Sklave. Der freidenkende Mensch darf zwischen deutschen Menschen nicht mehr denken und beten. Der Gedanke muß ablegen jedes Kleid der Civilisation, verläugnen sein Jahrhundert und seinen göttlichen Ursprung, muß sich einhüllen in

schen beglücken und fördern können. Und die Völker wird sie beklagen, wegen ihrer Blindheit und Schwäche—die Euch so lange geduldet.

*

Ihr aber, gesteht es nur, Ihr würdet wenn Ihr könntet, den Menschen gerne herdenweise in Wildgärten sperren und ihn legen auf Eichelkost.

* *

*

Glück auf! Petin! Segler der Lüfte! Steige kühn auf zur Sonne, Democrat! Furche die blaue Bahn über den Thürmen und Burgen der Erde; über dem Mautschranken; über das völkertrennende Joch der Alpen, und der Flüsse veraltete Länderscheide. Glück auf!

*

Ermüde nimmer Petin! Vorwärs, aufwärts! Schiffer der Zukunft! Säge und hämmere fort und fort, und befestige das Steuer-Ruder an's Götterschiff: daß der Erdball hinziehen sehe zu Tausenden, die lustigen Barken mit hohen Reisenden; daß die Wolken sich nimmer drängen mögen zwischen ihn und das Firmament der Sonnen. Daß der freie Handel, mit dem neuen Telegrafen für Körper und Lasten, schnell und richtig vertheile unter die Völker, die Güter und Waaren; daß der Mensch ausrufen möge: die Erde ist erorbert, die Zeit beherrscht, losgerungen vom Staube die Menschheit.

*

Vollende! Vollende Heute—Morgen wir bitten dich! denn dein Schiff ist ein Glaubensstern der jungen Menschheit. Läge noch finstre Nacht auf ihr, der Ballon, der Beherrscher der Lüfte, er würde sie erleuchten; und Licht bringen und Freiheit;—O laß den Muth nicht sinken—Frankreich nicht; Frankreich's Schmach vertreibt dich, Columbus der Luft-Meere. Trage deinen großen und stolzen Gedanken fort mit dir—und vollende,—wie wir—auf fremder Erde. —Der Äther strömt und fluthet ja überall, eine ewige, endlose Heimat für die Kinder des Genie's—darum beschiffe ihn—und kannst du nicht: gelingt's nicht auf den ersten Flug—O Petin!—so ermüde nimmer! tausend Jünger beginnen dein Werk—wo du es lassen wirst—und werden's vollenden.—Metempsicose ist kein eitler Wahn. —Es war kein Fabler Pythagoras.

* *

*

Komm Volk der Welt und setze dich an den Tisch des Males. Eine Schule ist errichtet, die Denker deiner jungen Generation besuchen sie, und fundiren die Wissenschaft, die dich nähren, kleiden und

herbergen wird. Darüber wie Allen zu helfen, haben sie viel gedacht, geschwärmt, geirrt und gelitten. Sie haben gelitten, damit Allen werde menschliche Speise und ein menschliches Haus! Damit der Mensch, vor Nothdurft gesichert nach Höherem ringe, und im Wohlstand und Reichthum erkenne die Güte des Schöpfers und ihn als den Geber verehre. Solche Schulen errichtet die Democratie.

*

Erwerben ist menschlich. Rauben und Nehmen ist thierisch, monarchisch. O Mensch! Könntest du noch denken an Raub und Gewaltthat? An die Stirnröthe des Almosens, das den Geber allein erfreut? Weißt du nicht daß die Democratie keine stehenden Heere hält? Daß sie den Schweiß der Steuern abtrocknet von der Stirn des Volkes? Daß sie schnell und bleibend erwirbt, für Alle? Weißt du nicht, daß der freie Verein allmählig lüftet den Alpdruck des Capitals und der Zinsen? Daß der Tisch mit dem weißen Tischtuche, und das Huhn im Topfe, und das Hüpfen der Kinderbrut um die Honigkuchen der Stolz und die Aufgabe des democratischen Staates sind? Daß der ungehemmte Fortschritt deines Wohlstandes, o Mensch! o Gottesliebling! ein himmlisches Lächeln erzeugt um die Lippen des Vaters? Oben—und eine Freudenthräne die herabfällt befruchtend und segensreich, wie lauter Regen.— Republikaner! neuer Bürger einer neuen Welt! vergesse den alten monarchischen Proletarier.

*

Vielleicht werden sie sagen: Dieser Utopist streicht das Gift des Zeitgeistes mit Honig versüßt um die Lippen des hungernden Volkes. Das ist ein gefährlicher Mensch. Aber ich antworte Euch: Ihr seid Utopisten. Utopisten der Vergangenheit und des Bösen. Ihr sagt, die Creatur sei geboren zum Leiden, zum Entbehren. Ihr Leiden sei der Vorsatz Gottes und sein Bedürfniß; die wohlgefällige Genugthuung seiner Gerechtigkeit. O! das ist Entweihung! O das ist ein entsetzlicher Fluch gegen Gottes unendliche Liebe!

*

Also dem Vater wäre des Kindes Schmerz nothwendig? Die bittere Thräne der Welt wär' eine süße für's Welten-Herz? Das ist Lüge! Das ist eine der alten Lügen und Erfindungen von Euch, unbarmherzige Gottesleugner! Dränger der Menschheit!— Erfunden und unter's Volk gebracht: Gott aufzubürden all das Elend das Ihr herab octroyrt auf die Häupter der Sterblichen, seit uralten Zeiten.

*

Alle Eure Doctrinen sind Gift, tödtlich für den Wohlstand des Menschen und der Nationen. Ihr Ursprung ist das Böse. Sie

führen, und haben schon geführt zu Hunger und Verarmung. Macht geltend, unbeschränkt, Euer System der Heere, des Zwanges, der Knechtung und principiellen Entzweiung in Paradiesen, und Ihr werdet sie aushungern und entvölkern, daß kein Vogel in den Zweigen singen, kein Käfer im Grase summen wird; wie ihr aushungern und entvölkern möchtet mein theures Vaterland, das schöne Ungarn und alle die schönen Provinzen, wenn man Euch dazu Zeit ließe. Faciam Hungariam captivam, postea mendicam, deinda catholicam.

*

Unsere Lehre aber, die democratische Gotteslehre des Bundes, der Verbrüderung, der gegenseitigen Hülfe und Verständigung, die Doctrin der Lieb' und des Reichthums: sie ist die Saat der Wohlfahrt, sie ist Gottes-Honig für Menschenmund. Durch sie wird Ungarn, und die Welt,—frei, reich und nicht katholisch, trotz des väterlichen und geschichtlichen Wahlspruchs der Hapsburger.

*

Armee und Spionage! gerüsteter ewiger Krieg nach Innen und nach Außen: Polizei!—Dort schüttet Ihr es schmählich hin, tonnenweise, das saure Geld der Volksarbeit; das Geld, das bestimmt war mit Salz zu bestreuen das Kleienbrod des Armen. Dort zerschmilzt das Budget der Milliarden! Dort verblutet der Wohlstand der Nation. Dort schwindet ihr Mark und ihr Leben dahin in Siechthum. Der Schweiß kann nicht hinüber rollen die Wucht der Arbeit über diesen Wolkenberg des systematischen Staaten-Hasses; dieser massenhaften Deperdition der Volkskraft, diesen sanctionirten Diebstahl an dem Einlags-Capital der Generationen.

*

Noch greift Ihr in die Kisten, aus welchen die Beutel kommen mit den dreißig Silberlingen—und die sechs Kreuzer täglich, um den gedungenen Leibwächter zu bezahlen, und seine Hunderttausend mordenden Bajonette. Aber Eure Finger greifen nicht mehr wie sonst vollauf—sie finden am Boden der Lade kaum mehr ein blankes rollendes Goldstück; sie finden Papier.—Schlechtes Papier. Sie greifen und erstarren, und sehen sich schon stehen vor den leeren Kisten der großen Fallite. So lange haben sie das Gold legirt mit Menschenhaß und Seelenkauf, und gerollt in bösen Fingern, bis Papier daraus wurde, und obendrein nicht sehr beliebtes. Mit dem Finanzplan der praktischen Liebe werden wir Gold machen aus Papier. Das sollst du bald erfahren, Oesterreich!

*

Das Zeichen aber, das hereingekommen in die Welt, mit dem heiligen Oelzweige, wird die Völker lehren den anderen Steuer-Gulden in die Bundes-Casse zu legen, um ihre Armen anzusiedeln

und ihnen zu geben eine Hütte und ein Stück Feld, zum Saamen des Wohlstandes, ſtatt zu nähren die Armeen und Spione der Könige.

* * *

Wäre der Nazarener nicht Gott, nicht wandernder Rabbi geweſen; hätte der heilige Lehrer der Einſamkeiten ein Weib nehmen können im Drange ſeines Amtes und Schmerzes: wahrlich die Prieſterkaſte in der Welt, die die Menſchwerdung Gottes immer am wenigſten erkannt, oder dann am meiſten gefürchtet und verfolgt hat: ſie hätte nimmer bei Seite zu ſchaffen vermocht den heiligen Geiſt des Evangeliums; nimmer aufzurichten vermocht den heidniſchen Obelisken in Rom, auf der Stelle des Kreuzes, dem Kerkerloch und dem Grabe des himmliſchen Chriſts—des Redemptor's: auf das ſie den ſchweren Stein gewälzt: ehe ihn die Gemeinde begriffen.

*

Denn von Bund zu Bund fließt der raſche Quell der Verſtändigung—der Erguß der Wahrheit und Liebe; und das Gotteswort wird am richtigſten verſtanden, und lebendig geübt in der Familie. Zwiſchen Mann und Weib und dem blühenden Himmelsſegen der Kinder. Tres faciunt collegium.

*

Dort iſt ein Bund. Dort iſt Gottes erſtes, einfachſtes Bündniß. Dort der erſte Herzſchlag, der innigſte, der großen Welt-Democratie. Dort das heiligſte Heiligthum der Civiliſation. Die Scheidewand zwiſchen

ein Friedensherz. Nur an des Weibes Busen gelehnt, strömt Ruhe herüber und Lebensglück in die stürmende Männerbrust.

*

Aber wartet noch! wartet noch! Mütter! Weiber! Geliebte und Bräute! und Ihr, trauernde Frauen, Wittwen der Erschlagenen, wartet! demoeratisirt nicht zu schnell. Bis wir den Kampf ausgekämpft; und das Friedensreich hergestellt ist auf Erden; bis die Blutspur abgewaschen von der heiligen Schwelle des Tempels.

*

Dann civilisirt, Ihr schönen himmlischen Wesen! Haltet den Mann zurück vom Blute. Zwingt ihn zum Frieden: durch Anmuth und Liebkosung, durch die süßen Zeiten im Hause, und viele Kinder. Macht, o Frauen! das Männerherz dann mild, hülfreich und liebend, macht es engelgleicher: Euch ähnlicher!

* * *

Von Anfang her war waltend die Liebe, und die Liebe die war bei Gott, denn er ist ja selber die Liebe. Das Ur-ding, des Weltherzens Schlag, der geheiligte Trieb zum Erbarmen, zum Guten und Besseren, allwaltend im All, verband sich also, durch die That des Sohnes, herabfließend vom Vater, mit der werdenden Menschheit, und faßte Wurzeln auf Erden. Und der Gedanke reifte heran, in langer Prüfungs-Saat, mit der That sich verbindend durch Liebe: Um Wahrheit zu werden: Gesetz.

*

Denn Alles was entsteht und besteht, die ganze Ordnung der Schöpfung, fließt aus diesem liebenden Urquell. Aus dem zärtlichen großen Mutterherzen: Natur. Darum ist ihr auch am ähnlichsten, am verwandtsten auf Erden das göttlich-menschliche Herz. Darum der Zug der Herzen unwiderstehlich zu Gott und zur Liebe; —zum innigen, herzinnigen Verband.

*

Darum ist das Herz am frühesten gereift zur Freiheit, und vor dem Freiheitsgedanken lebte der Freiheits-Instinkt. Aufrufend den Knecht zum heiligen Widerstand; ihm lehrend die Lehre. Darum hat das Herz am längsten widerstanden der allgemeinen Entsittlichung und Degradation, welche die seculäre Erziehung des düstern Hasses, das eingeweihte Blut, Lügen- und Marter-System des Absolutismus, hereingebracht hat über alles Menschlich-Irdische: Alles was dem Gift-Odem des Fluches erreichbar war.

*

Das Herz aber ist göttlich, purgöttlich, engverbunden mit Gott—unfehlbar, rein, und unverwüstlich wie er, und jeder Ursprung. Es ist im Menschen das Gottes-Auge, des Gottes Anfang.

*

Durch das lange, wüste Regiment des Bösen, durch die Herrschaft der Könige und Priester, durch heidnische Verketzerung des Religion-Begriffs, Hinstellung von Götzenbildern vor das Weltlicht des ewigen Naturgottes; durch die lange blutige Praxis der Entzweiung, durch Anbetung des Goldes und Geldes, war der Mensch herabgesunken, tief, schauderhaft tief. Sein Glaube war erloschen oder verheidet, seine Würde erniedrigt, sein Sinn verthiert und blutig, und sein Endzweck war—der Besitz—der Gedanke, also verirrt, war unklar, nach Chimären greifend, und, was schlimmer ist: zweifelnd.—So fand den Menschen unserer Zeit, in großer Ueberzahl, der erste democratische Pistolen-Schuß in Paris.

*

Da grünte der gerettete göttliche Keim der Herzen schnell auf. Durch Millionen zuckte telegraphisch der Funken der himmlischen Sympathie; und die Aehnlich-Gesinnten, und Aehnlich-Unterdrückten, die Aehnlich-Blutenden von Europa:—Aehnlich-Verletzten an schwererrungenen Rechten, standen auf im Gefühl des allregen Freiheitstriebes; aber dem gefühlten Entschlusse fehlte der Bund der That:—der That die Vereinigung—damit die heilige democratische Trias zu bilden: Liebe, Verständniß und Vollführung—Herz, Kopf und Arm,—zur Einheit verschmolzen.

*

So wurden wir momentan besiegt und wie man weiß: geschlachtet. Wir haben einzeln geliebt und einzeln gekämpft: das war unsere Sünde. Wir haben nur die Freiheit geliebt, nur unsere—und der Mensch soll Alles lieben und wie sich selber die Andern. Hat nicht Ungarn unkundig und neu und gedrängt, Armeen votirt gegen Italien?—und einen gewissen Herrsch-Gedanken nicht aufgegeben—dazumal—über die Nebenländer. Deutschland meinte sogar, es könne nicht frei bestehen ohne der Schmach und Knechtschaft Italiens, sich nicht begründen ohne den Schirm eines kaiserlichen Reichsverwesers. Armes Deutschland!—England, dieses evangelische Reich, hatte das Evangelium gänzlich vergessen—vergessen, daß du deinen Nebenmenschen lieben sollst wie dich selbst, und ihm beistehen in der Noth. America schlief. Aber diese Völker schienen nicht zu wissen. Ihr Gewissen war nicht formirt und ihr Geist nicht erleuchtet.

*

Und von Paris, wo das Licht ausgegangen—sollte auch ausgehen der Brand. Die große Blutmakel von 48, die undemocratischen Juni-Tage leuchteten blutig empor an den kaum entwölkten Sternenhimmel. An die That des Hasses knüpft sich ihr nächster Bruder: der Gedanke des Zweifels: der stürzte Millionen hinüber in's Lager unserer Feinde; und diese jubelten und sagten: „seht wie gut wir den Proletarier uns erzogen haben."—Der hoffende Mensch aber erbleichte und fragte sich: ob er wirlich ein Blutthier?

*

Auf dieser Staffel stieg die Willkühr schnell wieder zur Macht empor. Diese Tage waren die ersten verlorenen Tage der Liebe, also die erste verlorne Schlacht der Democratie. Verloren schon als der Kampf hat begonnen. Und das Böse wurde wieder so mächtig, daß von Paris der Wille ausging, die verendete babylonische Hure zu retten. Und man sandte aus gegen die verjüngten Römer die jungen Soldaten der socialen Republik. So bestraft sich jede böse That.

*

Sociale? Ihr mögt Euch weigern Faucher's, und protestiren gegen die Sociale, Aber so lange der 24. Februar als Fait accomplit in der Geschichte prangen wird, so lange wird Frankreich eine Sociale sein:—vorerst im Geiste und es endlich werden in der That. Solche Dinge stoßen Leute Eures Gleichen nicht um. Das sind Begründungen: Welt-Phasen. Und Ihr wollt mit kleinen Gesetzen eingreifen? Eure kleinen Figuren entgegen stämmen dem Hereinströmen eines Natur-Gesetzes? Gebt auf solch' thöricht Wagen. C'est peine perdue.—Oleum et operam. Wagt es nach Vorne zu schauen, und lernet Gott und die Menschheit begreifen. Der Zweifel ist ja eben der Ursprung des Bösen.

*

So haben sie uns im Verlaufe besiegt und geschlachtet—die Blutwirthschaft der Fürsten und Cardinäle restaurirt; und auf ödem Moderschutt der Völker und Gauen wimpelte wieder blutroth die Monarchie. Der Fürst der Finsterniß aber bezog wieder sein Quartier im Vatican—und sann nach—bei stiller Weile—wie er's nunmehr besser anfinge—um doch endlich zu vernichten die Menschheit.

*

„Die Völker werden frei und mächtig—so sann er—durch den Glauben an Gott und die Liebe zum Lande; darum müssen alle Künste herbei, alle Mittel wirken, zu ersticken in ihrer Brust, den thörichten Glauben an Gott und die sündhafte Vaterlandsliebe."—Und er lächelte wohlgefällig, als er die Doctrine ersonnen hatte—

und freute ſich über ſich ſelber. Und begab ſich an's Werk. Sag' mal, Fallour! kennen wir nicht des Pudel's Kern? und den Grundſatz der Lehre?

*

Sie nahmen uns dann Alles und Alles: die Heimath, die Familie, die Freiheit, das Gut, das Geld und das Leben; aber nicht das Herz, das unantaſtbare ewige Herz. Dorthin zog ſich zurück ſinnend und trauernd der democratiſche Gedanke.

*

Und lebte zurückgezogen im Wittwen-Herzen, im Vater- und Mutterherzen, in des Kindes Waiſen und des Jünglings Heldenherzen—im rächenden Männerherzen—in jedem getrennten, jedem betrübten, jedem empörten Herzen, und ſtiftete im Schmerze den großen ſympathetiſchen Welt-Bund der Erlöſung über die ganze Erde.

*

Und aus den Herzen und ihrem Verband erſteht nun der rächende Richter; jene vernichtend, die Herzen getrennt und ſich an Gott gewagt haben mit teufliſchen Händen; denn ſein Gebot iſt; nicht zu trennen, ſondern zu vereinigen:—und es beſtraft ſich ſtets die böſe That.

*

So viele Herzen haben ſich nun vereinigt zu einem nämlichen Ziele, als damals Herzen gequält und getrennt wurden: alſo Millionen. Aber die Herzen ſind magnetiſch, ziehen an, und reißen mit ſich hin. Gott aber, der große Magnet der Alles anziehet

Da aber Poerio's Herz verbunden war mit allen den Zehntausend Paar Herzen, die der Burbone-Caligula zusammen geschmiedet hat mit sieben-und-zwanzig-pfündigen Galeeren-Ringen, zog das Poerio-Herz das Gladstone-Herz mit sich fort in seinen ganzen Verband, und gab so einen Beweis für die allanziehende Liebe.

*

So verfuhr auch das Gladstone-Herz, wechselseitig, mit dem Herzen-Poerio, und zog es in seinen mächtigen Kreis. Durch das Herz Aberdeen. Durch Artikel der Times und des Morning Herald, und den Flug aller Weltblätter wurde die Sache bekannt, und viele Tausende, ja Millionen, rührte das Schicksal Poerio's, und manche Thräne ist seitdem seinen Leiden geflossen. Viele Geister wurden erhellt, viele Herzen dem Gott der leidenden Liebe, viele Bajonette dem rächenden Gotte errungen. So belohnt sich stets die edle That.—Das war ein harter Schlag auf die alte, moderduftige Bastille.

*

So hat der erste öffentliche Bund, den Größe und Macht mit dem Elend geschlossen, schon die Welt heilig befruchtet, vorwärts getrieben das rollende Rad am Siegeswagen der Rettung; ist der Vorläufer geworden einer großen allgemeinen Erlösung.

*

O! erlaube mir, Gladstone, daß ich mich hinwerfe zu deinen Füßen und sie umfasse! und mich anklammere an dich, du großer Christ, Bruder des Jesu; du edler Conservativer! Du Vorbild irdischer Menschengröße. Du heiliger, liebender Mensch!

*

Man war nur gewohnt das Geheul und Wimmern zu hören aus der Hütte; den Nothschrei der Nackten; das Winseln der Elenden und Verfolgten;—nicht aber die Anklage des Mächtigen. Gladstone aber trat hin vor die Schranken der Menschheit: vor Gott, und sagte: „Seht, das hat ein einziger begangen gegen das ganze Geschlecht;—ich sah es mit meinen Augen, und verlange Hülfe und Gerechtigkeit."

*

Und ein anderer großer Philantrop trat zu ihm und sagte: „Gladstone! ich segne dich! so sollten alle Menschen handeln." Und dies geschah nicht in der einsammen Wüste am Jordan; sondern auf der Welt-Tribüne des englischen Parlaments. Welcher Fortschritt in der Oeffentlichkeit! und wer sprach die Worte? Wen rührten von dem versammelten englischen Volke die Leiden des Galeeren-Sträflings von Nisida?

*

Er war es, der Minister der Königinn Victoria; der mächtige Staats-Secretair des brittischen Reichs; der Staatsmann, der in die Geschicke aller Welttheile eingreift; den man stürzen wollte und nicht konnte; dem man Noten schrieb—diplomatische, im Geiste der äsopischen Kröte. Es war der bekannte, gott- und weltbekannte Lord Palmerston, dieses Musterbild eines democratischen Ministers und Gentleman.

*

Und der Poerio-Gladstone-Palmerston-Bund hat schon durchglüht den Begriff und das Herz des ganzen englischen Volkes. Kein engländer würde mehr heute vertheidigen den Neapolitaner, oder ein Penny-Stück hergeben zur Rettung seines fluchwürdigen Thrones. So bestraft sich stets die böse That—so belohnt sich die gute.

*

Die Ueberzeugten alle aber kommen herüber zu uns, wie eine griechische Phalanx, verbinden sich mit dem democratischen Gedanken, und stiften also das Welt-Reich der Liebe: den Frieden. Das hat der einfache, natürliche Bund zweier ähnlicher Herzen hervorgebracht. Was wird die Welt sein? was wird die Menschheit hervorbringen, wenn sich alle Herzen werden verbunden haben?

*

Würde sich doch ein Herz wieder zurückfinden zum Bunde! Ein verirrtes Lamm herbeigerufen werden durch die Glocke des himmlischen Hirten! Ein Sünder, reuig umkehren! O würde der democratische Pulsschlag der durch das Pius-Herz geflossen, auf seinem Erlösungs-Gange zuletzt wieder einfließen ins Pius-Herz! o, möchte göttliche Liebe und Einsicht es verbinden mit dem Gladstone-Bund!

*

Dann würde der letzte römische Pabst ein großes Christen-Beispiel geben, hintretend vor die Christenheit und sagend: „Ich habe Gottes Stimme vernommen, aber ich bin ihr nicht gefolgt: sie haben meine Sinne umdämmert mit Zuflüsterung, mich verführt durch Verführung—ich kehrte zu den Abgöttern der Gewalt zurück, und verließ, ein Zweifler, das Freiheits-Panier, und die heilige Communion der Liebe. Ich verließ meine Heerde. Nimm wieder auf, o du Gott der Verzeihung, deinen reumüthigen Sohn."

* *

Darum, o Freunde! laßt uns beten! Beten wir also:—

Allmächtiger Gott der Welt—sieh herab auf deine schöne Erde, in deiner regeren Liebes-Sorge! Die verbündete Menschheit liegt

auf den Knieen vor dir, im Staube, und betet in Fassung und Thränen. Sie dächte es wäre genug des Krieg's und des rothen Blutes auf Erden geflossen, sie sehnt sich nach Frieden, wünscht Ordnung und Ruhe. Darum betet sie in Fassung und Schmerz zu dir, du Vater! und stimmet an, weithin hallend, einstimmig, ein Veni-Creator, wie keines gesungen wurde bis jetzt von menschlichen Stimmen.

*

Also lautet der Psalm:—

Aus den Tiefen der Brust, steige unser Lied auf zu dir, Vater im Himmel! Wir Alle sind bekehrt zur Religion der Menschheit, zum Glauben des ewigen Friedens; wir sind Friedensleute, und wollen genau befolgen fürder deiner Liebe allerheiligst Gesetz: wir wollen uns lieben. Darum, eh' wir das Schwert erheben wie Männer, wollen wir versuchen, wie Frauen, die Kraft und die Wundergabe des Oelzweig's.

*

Hilf uns, Herr! sende ein Wunderzeichen herein in dein gläubiges, hülfebedürftiges Volk, das zu dir aufruft; denn die Heerde sucht nach einem Hirtenstern, da sie der Hirt und die Hirten verlassen. Aber nicht am Firmamente, nicht an Sonne und Mond laß deine Wunder geschehen: die sind ja vollendet, schön und glänzend. Wir bitten um einen Sonnenstrahl Barmherzigkeit, in die Seele eines unserer Brüder.

*

Laß sie fühlen und durchfühlen o Herr! alle unsere Leiden, unsere Marter und Tode, und sehen das Licht der Wahrheit; aber in deiner Gnade, Herr! nicht im Schmerze, daß sie nicht zu viel ausstehen möchte; nicht leiden, nur erkennen durch deine göttliche Offenbarung.

*

Er war es, der das Kreuz erhoben hatte, und sich gestellt an die Spitze der Menschheit, vorzuwandeln—eine leuchtende Wolke: und wir folgten erstaunt aber gläubig dem Rufe des Gottbemächtigten. Als sie aber herankamen die Schaaren der Knechte, da beschlich ihn die Angst, oder was schlimmer: der Zweifel, der alte Verführer, und er verläugnete Jesu in der Stunde der Gefahr; und ließ uns allein in der grausamen Noth mit unsern Feinden ringen und unserem blutigen Schicksale—als wir seiner am meisten bedurften; doch o verzeih' ihm Herr! es war ja nur Petrus-Schwäche, es war nicht Judas-Kuß:

*

Als er sich aus dem Bunde davonschlich und mit unheiliger

Hand, die Weihe, die er den Fahnen des Christen-Heeres spendete —wieder hintrug zu den Anbetern des goldenen Kalbes und den Priestern des blutigen Altars.

*

Erleuchte darum Langmüthiger! Du, der du dich zu den Reuigen kehrest—erleuchte noch einmal das reuige Pius-Herz in Liebe und Geist. Führe, o führe es heraus aus den Verließen seiner Kerkermeister und Feinde: damit es in lichter Himmelsbläue anlangen sähe die drei weißen Tauben des Gladstone-Bundes, und hinziehe mit ihnen, weit weg von Rom.

*

Der Friede würde sich dann herabsenken auf die Erde wie ein Frühlings-Morgen, ohne Volkserschütterung und Weltbeben; und der befreite hohe Gottes-Priester also sprechen zur ganzen versammelten Menge.

*

„Menschen der Erde! Gott hat zu mir gesprochen, darum seid stille und horchet. Er hat gezeichnet in die Natur die Stufen-Grade der Alter, so wie für die Einzelnen, so auch für's ganze Geschlecht. Braucht der Knabe die Hand des Vaters, und der Jüngling den Rath, so will der Erwachsene frei sein und folgen seiner eigenen Wahl. Die Pflichten des Vaters sind erfüllt, die Zeit kam zur Reife—ich gebe die Anvertrauten zurück sich selbst, ihrer eigenen Sorge, der Natur und dem Gotte. Der Welt."

*

„Aber sind sie auch erwachsen die Völker? Sind sie gewillt frei und selbstständig zu steh'n, sich loszutrennen von der bisherigen Führung? Einzutreten in den unabhängigen Bund, in die freie Gemeinde? Wer zeigt mir die Mehrzahl? wie soll ich unterscheiden die Reifen? Wie werd' ich sie zählen?"

*

Wir wollen darum feiern Heuer über die ganze Christen-Erde ein großes, heiliges Weihnachten. Ernst und gesammelt begehen die Geburt des Herrn. Die beginnende Minute der himmlischen Menschen-Erlösung.

*

Wenn es um die heilige Mitternacht, überall sich regen wird in den bewohnten Orten, alle Glocken läuten und alle Menschenherzen schlagen werden; dann werde ich Gott anflehen daß er mein Urtheil erleuchte: und ich werde sie alle zählen im Geiste.

*

Und wenn die Democraten sich geschmückt haben werden mit den

grünen Friedenszweigen und heranziehen werden mit ihren Fahnen, lobsingend dem Herrn, dann werde ich zählen in der Stunde der letzten Prüfung, die herüben und drüben; und erkennen nach dem geheiligten Rechte der Mehrzahl:

*

Zwischen friedlichen und blutigen, reifen und unreifen; zwischen liebenden und hassenden Menschen. Zwischen den Menschen der werdenden Zeit und der ablebenden Vorzeit—zwischen den Sternen des Völkermorgens und den Phantomen der ewigen Nacht—zwischen Hohen und Niedrigen—zwischen den Söldnern der gerichteten Könige und den stolzen Kriegern, mit dem christlich geschmückten, gesenkten Gewehr. Zwischen Knechten, Junkern und Fußleckern, und den freien Bündnern der großen, ewigen, democratischen Universal-Republik.

*

Dann werden wir sie Alle zählen, im vierherzigen Bundesrath, und nach Wahrnehmung und Gewissen aussprechen unser Urtheil, und es verkündigen, damit die neue Ordnung beginne. So feiert die große Christenheit das heilige Jubiläum des Erlösungs-Jahres; und die Geburt des Herrn.

*

In jener Stunde aber werden die Bösen und Uebermüthigen zittern in allen Tiefen der Brust. Sie werden sehen, daß Alles von ihnen abgefallen; daß die Menschheit sie verlassen hat—ausstößt; daß sie in jener Stunde jeden Blutflecken zählen wird an ihren Händen—und hinhalten wird vor ihre Augen die Leichen-Hemden der gemordeten, hingeschlachteten Brüder. Und die fünf- und zwanzig Rubinen-Tropfen am erzherzoglichen Braceletten-Geschenke.

*

Fünf und zwanzig Rubinen zum Geschenk für ein einziges Tigerweib! Fünf und zwanzig Heldenleben zu begütigen den Durst der blutigen Sophie! Hast du geschlürft die Schale der Labung? Geschwelgt, gepraßt in hohem Hapsburgischen Genuß? Magyarenblut! o wie süß muß dieses schmecken? Herzblut von diesem stolzen, unbändigen Stamm!

*

Aber dieser stolze, ungebändigte Stamm, ist ein Rächer-Stamm geworden, und er hütete die Blutsaat, aus welcher nunmehr aufersteht der Ultor ex ossibus. Von Pesth und Arad und den Pußten ziehn sie heran in den langen, weißen, blutigen Soldaten- und Arrestanten-Mänteln—die ermordeten Patrioten;—die Gehängten und Füsillirten; und sie kommen in jener Nacht an ihre Thüre

um zu klopfen und sie zu mahnen. Sie aber wird keinen Trost und keine Rettung finden in den Trostgründen und der Zusprache des Ligurianers.

* * *

Thekakisqui, Häuptling der Irokesen, führte zuerst seine Wilden in's Land der Spanier, wurde dann ein Parteigänger der Engländer in ihrem Kriege gegen die verbündeten Staaten. Kehrte Alles um in Feuer und Blut in der Carolina—und vertilgte gänzlich den District von Ninety-Six. Zu Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts wurde ein Vertrag geschlossen in Philadelphia: seit jener Zeit wurde sein Volk, das nur verstand zu leben vom Krieg und der Jagd ein ackerbauendes und glückliches, in Folge des Friedens. Das ist die Philosophie der Geschichte des Bundes.

*

Alle Philosophien und Philosopheme steuern zusamm', zum Mittelpunkt; die große democratische Idee auszusprechen; sie ist ausgesprochen im Jahrhundert, und rollt die unendliche Woge der Zeit. Ich denk' es immer und immer, und glaub' es, und fühl' es, und sag' es: Democratie ist Weltvereinigung im Gotteshaus der Liebe.

*

Der Mensch mit dem democratischen Gedanken im Herzen ist kein Irrender mehr auf Erden; sondern ein Wesen des Begriffs, der Wahl und der Wahrheit. Seine Religion ist positiv wie seine Liebe, und sie leuchtet ihm vor zur democratischen That, der gottgefälligen, in jedem Falle.

*

Mohabbet, die Liebe, das Herz, les entrailles wie es nennt der Franzose, das lebendige Fühlen und liebreiche Wirken im Staat und im Hause, das ist der Hirtenstern, die Weltlampe seiner Messiade, welche die göttliche Offenbarung des Begriffes der Liebe, aufgezogen hat am Sternenhimmel der Democratie.

*

Aber Alles ist Werden im Leben; Natur, Menschheit, Gedank und so auch das Buch. Ewig unwandelbar steht nur die Ewigkeit, Gott und die Liebe, und sie reichen die Milchbrüste dem Säugling: Natur; damit sie werde und ewig werde. Damit der Begriff sich entwickle und fester begründe, damit die Menschheit begreife. Sich nähre mit Gottesnahrung, mit Wahrheit, und so verwandter werde ewig sich selbst, der Natur und der Liebe. Sich verbinde mit Gott.

*

So ist das Werden, ein Samenkorn ew'ger Erzeugung, hingesäet von Gott in den unendlichen Aether. Dort athmet, liebet und wird die ewige Wesen-Reihe, in steter Veredlung: die Gliederung eines einzigen, liebend-anschwellenden Ganzen.

*

Wie die Bewohner des Wassertropfens den Menschen, so ahnet der Mensch kaum noch die Weltkörper. Er sieht sie nur, und fühlet daß sie sich ewig verbinden mit Weltkörpern durch Lichtstrahlen und Wärme: und so erzeugen in der Umarmung der Jahrtausende —einer Minute der Zeit;—junge Welten.

* *

Aber alle die Körper und Welten bewohnt die unsterbliche Seele; ziehend von hellem zu hellerem Licht; ewig in schönerer Form und seliger im Lieben. Mit sich führend den Strahl und die Schatten: den Reflex der Huld und des Schmerzes—wie Gott: Mächtiger stets im Lieben und schwächer im Haß.

*

Wie auf dem langen Weltgange die Geschlechter in der Form sich verbinden und veredeln, bis zur göttlichen Form, in unendlich mannigfaltiger Zahl, in Kraft und in Schönheit: so entfaltet die Seele, das Wesen, mit Seelen verschlungen, sich in sich selbst, auf ihrem Sonnenfluge, in Vergöttlichung der eigenen Liebe.

*

Zur Zeit des großen Wandels, auf den Höhenpunkten des Lebens, in der Sterbestunde, dieser neuen Minute des Werdens, dieser jüngsten Erlösung; Uebergang zu schönerer Form und höherer Liebe, löset sie auf, die Seele, das Band, das sie knüpfte an's Irdische durch Menschenliebe, bindet es wieder an, durch Engelliebe an bessere Welten.

*

Ob ein helleres Erdenleben? Ob schon Sternenleben? Wohl vielleicht gar Sonnenleben? Wer kann das wissen?—Wer enträthseln, ob der Mensch alsbald in Engel- oder in Gottähnlichkeit eintritt. Aber geschrieben steht es im Buche der Wahrheit, daß der Mensch nach dem Bilde des Schöpfers geformt sei, daß des Vaters Leben und Kraft innwohne dem Sohne; daß Gott seiner warte.

Syrien, im September, 1851.


Bund
Leben-Anbetung
des Guten
Menschen-Haus
Sublime
Licht-Liebe
Begriffene Natur
Wissenschaft-Gott
Democratie
Welt-Glück und Wohlstand
Der Gott der Wahrheit und Fülle
Glaube
Brachische Liebe
Jugend Christenthum
Free Trade
wachsen-
Ascension
Veredlung
Production
Geschlechtheit
durch die
cratie
Menschen
Phasen
Geburt
Fraternität
Unbegränzte Freiheit
Democratenthum
Herz und Natur
Welt
positif

LETTRE

AU

PEUPLE.

Londres : Imprimé chez Joseph Thomas, 8, White Hart-street, Dr

A NOS CONCITOYENS DE FRANCE ET D'EXIL.

FRÈRES,

Nous ne sommes point des directeurs d'opinion, des chefs d'école, des hommes d'état et de système, des donneurs d'ordres et des faiseurs de lois. Nous ne sommes pas au sommet du mont Sinaï, ni au balcon de l'Hôtel-de-Ville. Nous n'avons pas la prétention suprême de publier des programmes, de promulguer des chartes, de tenir les éclairs et d'imposer la vérité. Nous n'apportons ni les douze tables, ni les sept commandements, ni les quatre évangiles, ni les cinq codes, rassurez-vous! Nous ne sommes ni dictateurs, ni révélateurs; ni dieux, ni prophètes; ni Jésus, ni César. Nous ne voulons point constituer, point gouverner. Nous n'en avons pas plus le droit que la volonté. Nul n'en a le droit que le peuple. Le peuple seul est souverain.

Ni nous, ni d'autres, nous n'avons rien à dicter à la patrie, à la France, au peuple souverain. Le peuple saura mieux que nous ce qu'il devra faire; il voudra et pourra plus que nous; il sera plus éclairé, plus révolutionnaire et plus fort qu'aucun de nous. Tout le monde a plus d'esprit que Voltaire. Le peuple a toujours dépassé ses prétendus chefs. C'est avec lui que ce mot du Christ est absolument vrai: Les premiers sont les derniers; les derniers sont les premiers. En effet, les gouvernés devancent toujours les gouvernans. Ainsi le peuple du 10 Août voulait la République, quand ses gouvernans voulaient encore la royauté. Ainsi le peuple du 24 Février a voulu la République, quand ses gouvernans voulaient la régence. Ainsi le peuple du 15 Mai a protesté contre la réaction intérieure et extérieure de son gouvernement, contre le Manifeste Lamartine, et les 45 centimes. Ainsi le peuple de demain se lèvera encore à son heure et à son gré contre le gouvernement de Décembre et passera par dessus tous les nains qui voudront lui crier: halte ou marche! Comme Gul-

liver, il paraît lié, garotté à présent par les Lilliputiens qui l'ont surpris dans sa nuit, dans le sommeil dont il dort depuis ses rudes journées de Juin: mais il brisera, comme lui, tous leurs fers, tous leurs fils, d'un seul mouvement de son réveil. Quelle main peut retenir le géant? Quelle voix peut dire: monte ou baisse à l'Océan?

Nous, proscrits, nous, gouttes d'eau sorties de l'océan populaire, nous y avons à peine laissé un vide que le flot a comblé. Les jeunes entrent dans la carrière, quand les aînés n'y sont plus. L'arbre ne perd pas les feuilles qu'il remplace. Il n'y a que les rois qui disent: L'Etat c'est moi! Nous ne croyons pas comme les anciens émigrés représenter la France qui ne peut être représentée que par elle. Dieu nous garde d'un pareil sacrilège! Nous n'avons pas l'orgueil ridicule et impie d'avoir emporté la patrie à la semelle de nos souliers. Nous ne reviendrons jamais sous un autre drapeau que celui du peuple, avec une autre charte que sa souveraineté. Membres séparés du corps, parties imperceptibles du tout, éloignées, oubliées peut-être, humbles expatriés que nous sommes, nous ne représentons rien que nous-mêmes; nous ne

se féliciter de l'exil et bénéficier de la proscription, puisque la voix des bannis est la seule libre à cette heure, qu'elle parle donc ! Qu'elle dise tout haut ce que chacun pense tout bas ! Qu'elle proteste au nom du droit public, qu'elle proclame les principes communs, qu'elle profère les aspirations collectives, qu'elle serve enfin à nous rallier, à nous fortifier mutuellement par un échange que ni douaniers, ni gendarmes n'empêcheront, nous en parlant votre pensée, vous en pensant notre parole ! Qu'elle soit ainsi l'organe général des vœux et des besoins, des intérêts et des idées de tous ! Qu'elle crie et recrie par dessus les frontières, qu'elle hâte, s'il se peut, le réveil du peuple, de tous les peuples, qu'elle fasse entendre à tous les républicains démocrates-socialistes de la France et de l'Europe ce grand mot, ce mot de ralliement universel : Révolution !

I.

DES PRINCIPES DE LA RÉVOLUTION.

LIBERTÉ, ÉGALITÉ, FRATERNITÉ.

Les principes de la révolution sont connus. Ils sont dans tous les cœurs ; ils ont été sur toutes les lèvres, comme sur tous les murs : Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. On peut les enlever un instant de nos codes, de nos drapeaux et de nos monumens ; on ne les effacera jamais des consciences où ils sont gravés de la main de Dieu même, comme la plus haute formule des lois humaines.

Est-il besoin de les définir longuement ? Faut-il discuter ce qui est le sentiment de tous ? L'évidence se démontre-t-elle ? Les soleils se voient et ne se prouvent pas.

LIBERTÉ.

La Liberté de l'homme a son titre dans la conscience et sa sanction dans la responsabilité. Ce qui distingue l'homme de la brute, ce qui le fait un être libre, c'est la connaissance de soi-même, alliée à la notion du bien et du mal. Sa conscience fait son droit. Ainsi la liberté constitutive de l'homme, immanente et permanente en lui, reconnue du temps même de Moïse et consacrée par la Bible dans la vieille fable d'Adam fait libre et responsable, la liberté que nos pères qui s'y entendaient ont mise justement en tête de la for-

mule républicaine, la liberté est le droit originel, aîné, premier, principal, antérieur et supérieur, sans lequel il n'y a rien, ni égalité, ni fraternité, ni citoyen, ni peuple, pas même l'homme. La liberté est la vie même.

La liberté est le droit naturel de développer ses facultés et de satisfaire ses besoins. L'homme libre, c'est-à-dire maître de lui-même, disposant de ses forces, pouvant, disons-nous, développer toutes ses facultés, satisfaire tous ses besoins, exercer tous ses droits, en un mot, accomplir sa destinée ; l'homme vraiment libre, qui ne dépend ni de l'espace, ni du temps, ni du besoin, ni de l'erreur, de rien ni de personne, qui ne dépend que de sa propre volonté ; l'homme libre ainsi, l'homme souverain est forcément l'égal de chacun et sera le frère de tous. La liberté entière entraîne nécessairement l'égalité et la fraternité.

De la liberté principe, découlent toutes les libertés conséquences, libertés religieuses, civiles, politiques, commerciales, etc. ; liberté de conscience, liberté de pensée, de publication, d'enseignement, de discussion, quel qu'en soit le sujet et le mode, presse, tribune, club, chaire, théâtre, etc. ; liberté de réunion, d'association, liberté de vote et d'action, travail, industrie, échange, etc. ; toutes solidaires, essentielles, intégrales, absolues, toutes à la fois but et moyen, toutes inviolables, à ce point qu'un seul fait préventif contre une d'elles provoque l'insurrection comme le plus saint des

avec raison le second rang dans la formule. Elle vient après et par la liberté, comme la société ne vient qu'après et par l'individu. Les hommes sont égaux non-seulement parce qu'ils sont semblables, comme on l'a dit tant de fois, mais surtout parce qu'ils sont différents. Les hommes sont différents, parce qu'ils sont solidaires, solidaires parce qu'ils sont sociables, sociables parce qu'ils sont hommes, c'est-à-dire êtres relatifs, membres d'un corps, instruments d'un concert, parties d'un tout ; parce qu'ils ont besoin les uns des autres ; parce qu'au lieu de se limiter, de s'amoindrir et de s'annuller, ils s'engrènent, se complètent et se perfectionnent réciproquement ; parce qu'*il se faut entr'aider*, c'est la loi de nature et d'humanité : ils sont uns, parce qu'ils sont divers.

L'égalité n'est point la parité : on n'a jamais dit, on ne dira jamais une paire d'hommes, comme on dit une paire de bœufs. Les animaux sont pareils, les hommes sont égaux. Les animaux peuvent se passer de leurs pairs ; ils peuvent vivre isolément, insolidairement, indifféremment, parce qu'ils ont les mêmes besoins, les mêmes instincts invariables, imperfectibles. Les plus élevés n'arrivent qu'au troupeau. L'homme seul fait société ; et la société, dit Milton, n'a lieu qu'entre égaux ; et il le dit à propos de l'homme et de la femme, les deux égaux les plus différents. Physiologiquement, les contraires s'unissent et les semblables se repousseut. L'harmonie vient de la différence, l'unité de la variété. Les cinq doigts de la main, quoique différents, concourent également à l'action, et le plus petit n'est pas le moins utile. La basse est aussi nécessaire à l'orchestre que le violon. Si l'architecte est indispensable au maçon pour le plan, le maçon lui est indispensable pour l'exécution. Il y a égalité de compensation parce qu'il y a nécessité de concours. L'harmonie sociale, ou l'unité, ou l'égalité résulte donc de la différence des besoins, des facultés et des œuvres individuelles. Or les besoins, les facultés et les œuvres sont adéquats ; les œuvres sont proportionnelles aux facultés et les facultés aux besoins. Donc, pour qu'il y ait justice distributive, ordre équitable, équilibre vrai, égalité rationnelle, scientifique, parfaite entre les hommes, il faut qu'il y ait égalité et non parité de fonction, égalité et non parité de satisfaction. L'égalité par la diversité.

FRATERNITÉ.

La Fraternité vient la dernière dans la formule, suivant son vrai rang d'ordre dans la réalité. On ne peut être frère, si l'on n'est

égal et libre. Soyez donc frère de votre maître ! Notre ennemi c'est notre maître, a dit Lafontaine, en bon français. Le sentiment d'amitié fraternelle ne peut naître dans la contrainte ou l'infériorité. La fraternité est donc le sommet du triangle dont la liberté et l'égalité sont les bases. Elle est la conclusion des deux prémisses ; elle est la clef de voûte du monument, la couronne de l'œuvre ; elle est la flamme du phare ; elle est la fleur, elle est le fruit de l'arbre de vie, de l'arbre immortel dont les racines sont au ciel et les branches sur la terre, de l'arbre de liberté.

Ainsi, Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité, voilà les trois principes suprêmes de la Révolution ! Voilà la formule sublime que le peuple, ce maître faiseur d'abstractions, a exprimée comme la plus pure essence du génie humain ! Cette formule supérieure qui l'a trouvée ? Personne..... Tout le monde. Elle est sortie entière du creuset de 93. Elle est le grand œuvre du grand alchimiste, du peuple, c'est à-dire de Dieu. Cette formule française, à laquelle chaque peuple a concouru, est la règle universelle, la jauge commune à tous ; c'est le mètre infaillible, immuable, éternel ; c'est la mesure divine de toute loi terrestre. Tout ce qui s'en rapproche est vrai ; tout ce qui s'en écarte est faux. Mesurons donc de notre mieux les conséquences aux principes ; marchons donc au plus droit vers l'étoile fixe qui indique le but de la Révolution.

difiable, et nommant ses agents toujours révocables, quand et comment il lui plait. Jusqu'à ce qu'il n'y ait plus de gouvernement du tout, jusqu'à ce que la majorité, qui tend à devenir de plus en plus grande, atteigne *l'idéal* et devienne l'unanimité, la loi sera donc faite pour tous, par la volonté du plus grand nombre, et non du plus petit. La loi sera l'expression, non plus de la minorité, comme aujourd'hui, mais de la majorité. La loi sera, comme il convient, l'œuvre du peuple enfin. Et soyez sûrs qu'en fait deloi et de droit, le peuple se trompera moins que les gouvernements. Soyez certains surtout qu'il se trompera moins sur les principes que sur les hommes, toujours moins clairs que les principes. Le peuple aurait-il voté le décret des 45 centimes et le Manifeste du 5 Mars, ces deux fautes capitales du Gouvernement provisoire? Et pourtant il a choisi M. Garnier-Pagès et M. Lamartine qui les ont commises. D'ailleurs s'il se trompe comme ses gouvernants se sont trompés et l'ont toujours trompé, du moins il ne s'en prendra qu'à lui-même de ses fautes et pourra toujours les réparer. Il faut l'intéresser au gouvernement dont le système représentatif le dégoute et l'éloigne; il faut tuer l'industrie politique. Enfin, si la souveraineté n'est pas un mot, si le peuple est souverain, il doit l'être de fait comme de nom; il doit l'être sans cesse et sans bornes, absolument, dans la mesure bien entendu, du droit et de la science. Être souverain c'est être maître; être maître c'est faire la loi; faire la loi, c'est constater le droit. Or, le peuple subit toujours la loi, la loi injuste, *la loi faite partiellement*, partialement, faite hors du droit par un ou quelques-uns, par d'autres que par lui. Qu'est ce qu'un souverain qui reçoit la loi au lieu de la donner? Qu'est-ce qu'un Souverain qui obéit au lieu d'ordonner? C'est un sujet. Le peuple doit être son propre législateur, ou il n'est pas souverain.

Ainsi, plus de président, plus de représentants. Un conseil national élu par le peuple chaque année et révocable par lui en tout temps, chargé de présenter au peuple les lois et décrets à voter et les fonctionnaires à élire. Le peuple souverain n'a plus ni représentants, ni délégués, ni mandataires d'aucune sorte dans aucun des trois pouvoirs de la souveraineté. Le peuple n'a plus que des conseillers, des ministres, des commis, des serviteurs, spéciaux, temporaires, élus, révocables, responsables, qui préparent, qui soumettent le travail à sa volonté et font exécuter ses décisions. Le conseil propose et le Souverain dispose; le Con-

seil conseille et le Souverain décide : le Conseil projette et la Souverain vote. Législation, impôt, administration, justice, guerre et paix, tout passe sous l'œil du maître. Le peuple fait toutes ses affaires lui-même. Il délibère en assemblées primaires réunies par communes sérieusement constituées. La division départementale n'existe plus. Il n'y a plus que la nation, la commune et le citoyen. Souveraineté individuelle, souveraineté communale, souveraineté nationale. Voilà pour nous la loi et les prophètes! Tous les rouages intermédiaires supprimés, tout l'attirail administratif réformé, tout le personnel fonctionnaire si nombreux, si couteux, si stérile, si nuisible, manivelle de ruine et de gêne à la fois, tous les agents du pouvoir au nombre de cinq cent mille hommes et du poids et du prix de cinq cents millions, toute cette bureaucratie, barbouillée de noir, hérissée de plumes, toute cette féodalité du grattoir qui enterre la liberté sous les paperasses et fait sortir la tyrannie de la bouteille à l'encre, tous ces sales et rogues seigneurs de l'émargement, simplifiés, congédiés, balayés, nettoyés : économie de ressorts, de temps, de fonctions et d'argent ; diminution du budget, augmentation de liberté.

Le département, un mot là-dessus, n'est plus l'unité politique rationelle. Ce remède révolutionnaire à l'esprit provincial et féodal de la vieille France, cette institution vieillie elle-même, qu'inventa l'abbé Sieyès jadis, qui fut d'abord pour la Révolution le moyen de fusionner, d'unifier la patrie, qui depuis n'a été pour l'Empire qu'un mode de centralisation et d'absorption despotiques, le département aujourd'hui a fait plus que son temps. Dieu merci! tout homme de France se dit citoyen français à cette heure. Nul ne se dit plus Picard, ni Limousin. Nul n'admet non plus à cette heure le despotisme impérial. L'oncle nous en avait déjà dégoûté sans le neveu.

Robespierre lui-même disait déjà de son temps : " Fuyez la manie ancienne de vouloir trop gouverneur. Laissez aux individus, aux familles, aux communes, le droit de régler leurs affaires ; en un mot, rendez à la liberté individuelle ce qui lui a été illégitimement ôté."

En principe, le chef-lieu ne doit pas plus absorber la commune que la commune ne doit absorber le citoyen. Ce qui est vrai de l'individu, doit l'être de la collectivité, quel que soit le groupe. Le droit du citoyen est le droit de la commune, comme de la nation entière. Or, dans le système départemental, la souveraineté com-

munale n'est pas. Les Communes n'ont ni liberté, ni égalité, ni fraternité. Elles n'existent pas politiquement. Elles n'ont ni âme, ni corps, ni lumière, ni bien-être, ni vouloir, ni pouvoir. Le chef-lieu les domine spirituellement et matériellement. Le chef-lieu seul a tout, administration, tribunaux, banques, hospices, halle, presse; le reste rien. 86 communes en absorbent 37 mille autres pour être absorbées à leur tour par une seule, Paris. Il en résulte ce que nous avons vu en décembre, que toutes les communes de France, quand une seule ne le veut pas, ne peuvent ni conquérir, ni garder le droit, ni défendre, ni maintenir la liberté. 36 mille sur 37 mille n'ont pas 4,000 âmes de population; 16,000 n'ont pas plus de 900 habitants; 11,000 n'ont pas 900 fr. de revenu, point de reverbères, à peine un chemin. La plupart végètent, languissent, croupissent loin du centre, esclaves du préfet, du grand propriétaire et du curé, dans l'ignorance, la misère et l'isolement, sous le triple joug de l'autorité, de l'usure et de la superstitution. Il y a donc atrophie, paralysie, atonie, servitude d'un côté; engorgement, pléthore, excès, tyrannie de l'autre. Il faut donc les refondre, les reconstituer toutes, de façon qu'elles aient chacune leur part, comme elles ont leur droit au mouvement général; de façon qu'elles aient toutes une volonté propre, une autonomie sérieuse, une indépendance réelle, une existence véritable. Il faut donc les recomposer en groupes assez compacts pour être puissants, pour avoir vie et force, pour être capables de pensée et d'action. Il faut les réorganiser enfin d'après un mode conforme au principe d'égalité et pouvant seul leur assurer liberté et souveraineté.

III.

BUT DE LA RÉVOLUTION. — CONSÉQUENCES DES PRINCIPES.—RÉPUBLIQUE UNIVERSELLE.

Partant du principe de liberté ou souveraineté de l'homme, nous sommes arrivés d'abord à la liberté ou souveraineté du peuple, en passant par la liberté ou souveraineté de la commune; nous arrivons donc maintenant à la liberté ou souveraineté de tous les peuples. Le droit de l'individu, de la commune, de la nation, est celui de toutes les nations. Qui dit souveraineté du peuple, dit souveraineté de tous les peuples. Qui dit République, dit République universelle. L'humanité est une comme le droit, comme Dieu même dont elle est la fille et l'image, c'est-à-dire l'incarnation. Unité de Dieu, unité de droit, unité de l'homme. Tous les hommes,

tous les peuples ont donc le même droit de souveraineté, c'est-à-dire de liberté, d'égalité et fraternité, c'est-à-dire de République. Les Républiques sont donc des gouvernements de droit, les royautés, des gouvernements de fait ; or, le droit doit dominer le fait et non le fait le droit. Tous les peuples doivent donc être républicains, souverains au même titre, parcequ'ils sont tous, disons-nous, uns et solidaires, parce qu'aucun n'a ni le droit, ni le moyen d'être libre au milieu d'esclaves, heureux au milieu de misérables, parcequ'ils s'aident ou se nuisent tous réciproquement, parce qu'ils sont enfants d'une même famille, compatriotes d'une même patrie, concitoyens d'une même cité, de la même grande République une et indivisible, l'Humanité.

La République universelle est donc le corollaire de la Révolution. C'est la dernière et la plus grande idée qui soit sortie du peuple. C'est la vérité nouvelle qu'il a produite le 15 Mai, qu'il a fallu confesser le 13 Juin, parce qu'elle avait été méconnue le 5 Mars ; c'est le dogme démocratique et social de l'unité humaine. Ce qui a distingué 48 de 93, la jeune République de l'ancienne, c'est qu'elle a nettement posé ce grand dogme, au dedans, par l'association des citoyens, au dehors, par la solidarité des peuples. 93, en brisant la vieille forme catholico-féodale, avait proclamé l'unité de l'homme avec lui-même et avec ses semblables de la patrie ; 48 a fait un pas de plus et ce sera sa gloire : il a proclamé l'unité de l'homme avec toute l'humanité.

IV.

MOYENS DE LA RÉVOLUTION.

Mais il ne suffit pas de proclamer les principes, il faut savoir les réaliser, les appliquer, les pratiquer. Depuis dix-huit cents ans, l'Évangile a dit aux hommes : Aimez-vous les uns les autres, et l'homme combat encore l'homme. Depuis plus de cinquante ans nos pères ont proclamé liberté, égalité, fraternité, et l'homme est encore esclave de l'homme. Depuis plus de cinquante ans, la souveraineté du peuple est promulguée et le peuple est encore sujet d'un homme au nom même de sa propre souveraineté. Les principes seuls sont donc insuffisants, puisqu'on peut les tourner contre eux-mêmes et qu'on les trahit en les invoquant. Il faut donc l'union du principe avec le fait, comme celle de l'âme et du corps. Qu'est-ce que le principe sans le fait, pour l'homme qui n'est pas un pur esprit, qui est à la fois corps et âme ? La logique

de la pensée à l'action est le caractère général de l'homme et particulier du peuple français. La tête qui pense et le bras qui agit, c'est la France. A l'œuvre donc et pour nous et pour tous ! Car notre unité politique, fille de notre logique naturelle, notre unité fait notre force, et force oblige. Il faut agir ; il faut faire ce qu'il y a de possible à présent. Sans plus nous attarder, sans plus nous perdre dans les profondeurs de l'idéal, à la recherche de l'absolu, du bien *philosophal* que nul ne trouvera, il faut entrer immédiatement, résolument sur le terrain de l'action. Le champ des principes est vaste, immense, incommensurable ; mais il se réduit à notre portée par la pratique qu'aggrandit la science. Or, il y a déjà assez d'idées communes à tous, acquises et acceptées pour les appliquer à l'instant. Ceux qui veulent temporiser, attendre toujours le perfectionnement des systèmes, oublient que l'action perfectionne l'idée, que l'idée ne sera jamais parfaite, que l'idéal n'est pas terrestre, que l'absolu n'est pas humain. Etres finis et contingents, nous ne pouvons qu'approcher de plus en plus du principe sans l'atteindre. Il n'est donné à aucun homme, à aucun peuple, à aucune époque d'avoir la vérité intégrale, infinie, éternelle. La partie ne peut être le tout. L'ensemble seul des générations, des temps et des mondes peut incarner Dieu tout entier. Notre droit, notre devoir est de faire notre part pour notre temps, dans la limite de nos besoins et de nos forces, selon notre pouvoir et notre savoir. D'autres feront le reste.

Voyons donc ce qu'il y a de réalisable, de faisable par nous pour la Révolution. Eh bien, la contre-révolution nous l'enseigne elle-même. Elle se vante d'avoir pour appui l'Armée, le Clergé, la Magistrature, la Banque. Elle nous montre ainsi notre tâche, moyens et but. Avec quatre bons décrets, c'est autant qu'il en faut, le peuple révolutionnaire démolira ces quatre piliers de l'autre, et le monstre restera écrasé sous les débris.

V.

ARMÉE.

Jusqu'à présent la société n'a su organiser sa puissance que pour la destruction. L'homme, destiné à la paix et au travail, a commencé par la guerre et la conquête. Avant d'avoir la science, il s'est servi de la force ; avant de savoir qu'il devait, pour vivre, combattre la nature et conquérir la matière, il s'est mis à combattre et à conquérir ses semblables. Mais le temps des Hercules et des

Césars est passé, quoi qu'on fasse. La civilisation par les armes n'est plus possible. L'aggrégation des peuples par la victoire est finie ; la contrainte doit faire place à la Liberté.

L'armée permanente de France qui a été l'instrument perfectionné de la guerre, qui est donc aujourd'hui le mal par excellence, a porté ses derniers fruits, la servitude et la misère. Elle coûte cinq cents millions par an ; elle empêche le travail de cinq cents mille hommes en pleine force. Elle est composée d'un quart de mercenaires qui ont vendu leur âme comme leur corps ; d'une moitié d'ilotes que l'indigence oblige à payer l'impôt du sang en nature, et que l'ignorance réduit au mécanisme de soldats de plomb. C'est une machine infernale de cinq cents mille fusils pouvant tirer cinq fois à la minute dans la main d'un seul homme. Elle est contraire aux trois principes, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. Avec sa vie de caserne, son engoûment des chefs, son obéissance passive, son code barbare et sa discipline inhumaine, elle n'est qu'un engin de tyrannie, fait pour servir et asservir ; elle ruine et opprime, sous prétexte de défendre, corps d'esclaves armés pour contenir des esclaves sans armes.

L'armée permanente de France qui est la meilleure armée de conquête, est et sera toujours la meilleure armée d'oppression ; car la conquête est injuste, anormale, contradictoire avec le principe de la liberté humaine : c'est l'oppression au dehors, sœur de la tyrannie au dedans. Voyez si ces généraux d'Afrique n'ont pas traité les Français comme les Arabes ! Cette armée permanente, instrument suranné de violence intérieure et extérieure ne peut donc plus exister désormais. Elle est irrémissiblement condamnée. Elle n'eût pas dû survivre au 24 Février ; elle s'est tuée le 2 Décembre. Le meurtre qu'elle a commis a été son suicide. Sans le 2 Décembre, on l'eût peut-être conservée encore, comme on l'avait rappelée dans Paris après le 24 Février. On eut reparlé peut-être encore de l'honneur des armes, de la gloire du drapeau, des services rendus, des têtes blanchies sous le harnais, des vieux crachats, des vieux habits, des vieux galons. Tout est dit ; elle s'est noyée à jamais dans le sang de Décembre ; elle doit être dissoute, ses drapeaux doivent être brûlés, ses principaux chefs dégradés ; il faut un exemple. Il faut qu'elle comprenne l'énormité de son crime par la solennité du châtiment. Mais afin que cette grande leçon nationale soit morale et profitable, il faut, à côté de la peine pour les coupables, la récompense pour les méritants ; il

faut décerner l'ovation populaire aux soldats républicains d'Afrique, à ces sous-officiers démocrates expatriés, envoyés au désert pour cause de socialisme ; il faut leur rendre les honneurs civiques que la première Révolution rendit aux soldats de Château-Vieux condamnés aux galères du roi ; il faut en refaire cette pépinière de héros patriotes, de généraux invaincus qui s'appelaient Kléber, Hoche et Marceau !

Mais, dira-on, licencier l'armée, c'est désarmer la Révolution en face de la tyrannie. Et la défense de la patrie donc, et la délivrance de l'Europe ? La France doit donner la République universelle ou subir la royauté universelle. Donc, une armée. D'accord, mais une armée républicaine. Donc l'armée actuelle doit être dissoute, retrempée dans la nation entière pour y perdre à jamais cet esprit de corps prétorien, cette ambition soldatesque, ce métier impérial et royal de tueurs d'hommes, impuissant toujours à défendre le pays, et finalement vaincu par deux invasions. La grande armée est tombée à Leipsick ; la vieille garde à Waterloo. L'armée doit se fondre dans une levée en masse pour y reprendre ce sentiment général, généreux, désintéressé, invincible du salut commun, qui au contraire, a chassé par deux fois l'ennemi du sol de la République, avec les volontaires de Fleurus et de Valmy.

Sans doute, en principe, la vie étant divine et la guerre inhumaine, tout régime militaire, quel qu'il soit, est et sera toujours anti-naturel, anti-démocratique. Mais tant que les royautés seront debout et menaçantes pour le droit, tant que la République universelle n'aura pas fait de tous les peuples un seul peuple, il faut que la France qui a la force, la conserve et l'emploie contre l'ennemi commun. C'est un remède au mal ; il faut choisir le moins mauvais ; le meilleur n'existe pas. Il faut réduire l'armée à la défense de la patrie et de la liberté par le moyen même de la liberté et de l'égalité.

Ainsi l'élection rétablie ; la conscription et le remplacement abolis ; l'impôt du sang, payé aujourd'hui comme les autres impôts par les pauvres seuls, dû par tous, payé par tous ; l'armée permanente transformée en milice nationale ; tout soldat refait citoyen, tout citoyen fait soldat. Comme le quirite romain mesurait et défendait son champ avec sa lance, chaque citoyen français défend avec son fusil sa patrie et sa liberté. Il a le droit et la force, le vote et l'arme ; il ne peut pas plus déléguer son arme que son vote, sa force que son droit. Il est son propre soldat, comme il est son

propre législateur. Il se compromet autant en confiant sa défense qu'en confiant sa souveraineté. Il ne peut pas remettre à d'autres le soin de le protéger qui devient toujours celui de l'opprimer. La fonction militaire est un droit qui n'admet pas de représentans, comme c'est un devoir qui n'admet pas de remplaçans. Donc, plus d'armée permanente sortie et séparée de la nation, mais la nation entière en armes, nommant ses chefs, classée par bans suivant l'âge, exercée militairement en temps de paix, dans ses propres communes, par ses officiers instructeurs, ne quittant le foyer qu'en temps de guerre, et ne faisant plus qu'une guerre possible, la dernière, la guerre du principe contre le fait, du droit contre la force, de la liberté contre la tyrannie, des peuples contre les rois.

VI.

RELIGION.

Religion veut dire lien. L'homme est un être à la fois spirituel et matériel, individuel et social. Il est un avec lui-même, avec ses semblables, avec Dieu. La conscience de cette unité indivisible est religion. Ces vérités sont déjà banales. Toute religion qui ne comprend pas tout l'homme et tous les hommes, l'humanité entière, matérielle et spirituelle, individuelle et sociale, est fausse et incomplète ; en un mot, elle n'est pas religion. Le paganisme qui ne

matériel et payen à son tour. Ce qui était protestation devint donc oppression ; ce qui était croyance devint puissance, tantôt complice, tantôt rivale des autres pouvoirs temporels, traître à son origine, infidèle à sa mission, quittant la crèche pour le dôme, l'esprit pour le corps, le ciel pour la terre, Dieu pour le diable, Jésus pour César ; maudissant l'infortune, réprouvant la vertu, bénissant le crime, huilant le parjure, sacrant et consacrant le vol et le meurtre, toute violence et toute fraude ; abusant, dépravant la conscience, éteignant la raison, entretenant la crédulité, exploitant la faiblesse, alliant enfin avec un art infernal la ruse à la force, la croix à l'épée, le goupillon à la torche, et le tout à juste prix ; plus avare cent fois que les marchands du temple, plus hypocrite que les pharisiens, plus cruelle qu'Hérode, plus déloyale que Judas ; bref, vendant, livrant, crucifiant et mangeant le Christ tous les jours : voilà l'Église catholique depuis les anciens empereurs jusqu'aux nouveaux, depuis Constantin jusqu'à Bonaparte !

Dieu soit loué ! elle est morte ! elle s'est enterrée au 2 décembre. Ce n'est pas un *Te Deum* qu'elle a chanté pour le vainqueur ; c'est un *De profundis* qu'elle a chanté sur elle et un *Libera* pour nous ! Elle s'est tuée avec l'armée. Le prêtre séparé de la cité comme les soldats ; ayant comme eux, plus qu'eux, des mœurs, des règles, des chefs, une patrie à part ; ayant comme eux l'esprit de corps et moins qu'eux la famille, comme eux le métier, le mot d'ordre et la discipline ; improductif, onéreux, oppressif comme eux, comprimant l'âme, comme les soldats compriment le corps, le prêtre a commis le même parricide sur la mère commune, il mérite la même peine.

C'en est donc fait du prêtre comme du soldat, du clergé comme de l'armée, de l'église comme de la guerre. Le peuple doit être son propre prêtre, comme il est son propre soldat et son propre législateur. La conscience ne se délègue pas plus que la souveraineté et la force. Plus d'intermédiaire obligé entre l'homme et Dieu ! libre examen en tout et pour tous. La science a remplacé la foi. On ne croit plus, on sait. Et jusqu'à ce que la science ait prouvé à tous la vérité du lien qui unit l'homme à lui-même, à ses semblables et à Dieu, la vérité de la vraie religion qui comprend le corps et l'âme, l'individu et la société, tout l'homme, toute l'humanité et tout Dieu, la vérité, en un mot, du principe de solidarité et d'unité, de vie universelle, il ne peut plus y avoir de religion commune, publique, officielle. L'Église catholique ou autre est com-

plètement séparée de l'Etat. Le budget direct et indirect des cultes est supprimé. 813 millions d'économie. Liberté de conscience, égalité de foi, fraternité de dogmes. Chacun pratique comme il veut. Qui veut un prêtre le paye ; qui use l'autel l'entretient. Le temple n'est plus à tel ou tel culte dominant, mais à ceux qui le louent à la commune. Le prêtre, le ministre, le rabbin sont des citoyens ordinaires, n'ayant ni monopole, ni privilèges, ni exemptions d'aucune sorte vis-à-vis de l'Etat ; n'ayant ni plus, ni moins de droits et de devoirs que les autres citoyens ; jouissant des mêmes avantages, mais soumis aux mêmes charges que tout le monde. Pas plus de clergé constitué que d'armée permanente. Ni autel, ni trône, ni sacristie, ni caserne, ni pape, ni empereur, ni jésuite, ni gendarme, ni croix, ni sabre, ni casque, ni calotte, liberté entière de l'âme comme du corps, ainsi soit-il !

VII.

MAGISTRATURE.

Même lessive ! La robe est aussi sale que la soutane et l'uniforme. La magistrature a forfait comme l'armée et le clergé. Elle appartient à la mort comme ces institutions caduques. Elle s'en ira bras dessus bras dessous avec elles dans le même tombeau. Elle a frappé avec la même haine ; elle a servi avec la même honte ;

principe du jugement par le peuple et par le peuple partiel, est déjà reconnu et pratiqué dans l'institution du jury criminel. Le jury doit s'étendre à toute justice. Tout citoyen doit être juré. Le jury, c'est-à-dire le peuple souverain, décide de toutes les causes criminelles et civiles. Le jury décide en dernier ressort. Les juges chargés seulement d'instruire la cause et de prononcer l'arrêt sur la décision du jury, sont nommés, comme le sont déjà les juges de commerce et les prud'hommes, par des élections spéciales.

Donc, plus de magistrature assise sur son gros tas de codes, inamovible, corporative, disciplinée, hiérarchisée ne relevant que d'elle-même, disposant de la fortune, de l'honneur, de la liberté, de la vie des citoyens ; abrogation des vieilles formes comme des vieilles lois ; plus de juridictions à divers degrés, restes de l'âge féodal, avec toutes leurs conséquences de procédure, de chicane, de grimoire et de frais, qui dévorent toujours l'huitre, comme au temps d'Esope. Si le premier tribunal est bon, pourquoi un second ? S'il est mauvais, pourquoi est-il ? Un jury de cassation seulement pour régulariser les arrêts. Economie d'avocats, d'avoués d'huissiers, de toute la séquelle judiciaire, c'est-à-dire d'environ 300 millions. Justice prompte, justice équitable, justice gratuite et surtout plus de justice d'exception, état de siége, haute cour, conseil de guerre ; plus de justice politique, plus d'inquisition, d'espionnage, de surveillance occulte, arbitraire, discrétionnaire, plus d'œil invisible ouvert sur toutes les consciences, jetant le soupçon, la défiance, la terreur dans toutes les âmes ! Plus rien de ces institutions monarchiques qui supposent toujours le mal, le provoquent souvent et ne le préviennent jamais, véritables virus de la moralité publique, qui empoisonnent la société au lieu de la guérir ; mais une police communale, spéciale, populaire comme la justice, et dont chaque citoyen, au besoin, sera le sergent pour empêcher le mal, comme il sera juge pour le réprimer.

VIII.

CAPITAL.

C'est la grosse question, la question qui brûle, irrite et passionne, comme la question de noblesse en 93. C'est la question difficile que nous aborderons avec notre franchise ordinaire, disant tout ce que nous pensons, ni plus, ni moins ; c'est la question essentielle pour la solution de laquelle, il n'y a pas trop du savoir et de l'attention de tous, qui demande plus qu'aucune autre le concours

de toutes les intelligences, qui prouve plus que jamais la nécessité du gouvernement direct, et que le peuple entier peut seul délier ou traneher. C'est le nœud même de la révolution.

Si, comme nous l'avons dit, l'homme est à la fois esprit et matière, individu et société ; ses besoins, ses droits, ses facultés, sa vie sont doubles comme sa nature. Ils sont à la fois matériels et spirituels, individuels et collectifs. L'homme donc a droit, a besoin de vivre matériellement et spirituellement, individuellement et collectivement. Toute société doit satisfaire ce double besoin, ce double droit pour être bien faite, pour être conforme à la nature de l'homme. Or le droit implique le moyen. Le moyen de vivre matériellement d'abord, c'est de produire, c'est de travailler. Le droit de vivre emporte donc le droit de travailler. Le peuple qui a l'instinct de toute grande vérité l'a bien compris. De là cette simple formule des ouvriers de Lyon : Vivre en travaillant ou mourir en combattant ! et cette autre formule plus simple encore du peuple de Paris, au 24 Juin : Du pain ou du plomb ! De là enfin cette formule scientifique de la Révolution de Février : Droit au travail ! Car si la vie est un droit, et nul ne le conteste en principe, excepté Malthus, le travail qui est le moyen légitime de vivre, ne saurait être ni une peine, comme disent les catholiques, ni un frein, comme disent les protestants ; mais comme

rendre son bien, le droit au travail, le droit à la vie, le capital. Comment donc ? Le capital est presque tout entier aux mains de l'ennemi, de la contre-révolution, de la réaction, des amis de la propriété comme ils s'appellent. Il faut donc d'abord au nom de la justice, à titre de dommages-intérêts, de par le droit de réparation et de restitution, que la réaction rende au peuple ce qui lui appartient, ce qu'elle lui doit, ce qu'elle lui a pris. Qui casse les verres les paie, dit le proverbe. Or, la réaction a violé, brisé la Constitution au 13 Juin par la guerre de Rome, au 31 Mai par la mutilation du suffrage universel, au 2 Décembre par l'usurpation du pouvoir. La réaction a voté ainsi malgré la loi et le droit, quatre budgets de 1,500 millions ; la réaction a versé l'argent et le sang de la France sous les murs de Rome et dans les rues de Paris ; la réaction a tué, volé à main armée, confisqué, séquestré, emprisonné, déporté ; la réaction doit payer ; la réaction doit restituer ; la réaction doit réparer. Elle n'aura pas trop de tout son butin pour cela. Qui pourra évaluer jamais le dommage qu'elle a fait, le tort qu'elle a causé, le mal qu'elle a commis ? Qui pourra évaluer l'indemnité qu'elle doit pour tous ses crimes, pour l'Europe asservie, la France déshonorée, pour la fortune, la liberté, la vie de nos concitoyens arrêtés, dépouillés, exilés, fusillés, guillotinés ? Qui pourra évaluer le sang et les larmes des victimes en France, en Italie, en Hongrie, en Allemagne, dans le monde entier ?

Ce n'est donc pas révolutionnairement, arbitrairement, c'est au nom de la loi ordinaire, au nom de ce principe de droit vulgaire et de bon sens naturel, le droit et le sens commun, qui veulent que l'auteur du mal le répare, c'est au nom de la simple justice, de l'équité et de la morale éternelle que le peuple doit enfin faire le compte de la réaction. La révolution ne sera qu'une revendication. Donc tous ceux qui ont mené et exploité la contre-révolution, président, représentants, fonctionnaires de tout grade et de tout genre, ministres et bourreaux, tout complice civil, militaire et religieux, tout ce qui a ordonné, signé, jugé, exécuté, imposé, touché, émargé, tout ce qui a eu part doit rendre. Assez de révolutions platoniques ? Il faut en finir une bonne fois avec la réaction. Il faut la punir par où elle a péché, et comme elle a péché, solidairement ; il faut la frapper à la place du cœur, à la poche, comme 93 l'a frappée à la tête. C'est l'argent qu'il faut exécuter. Si la vie est inviolable, si la vie est sacrée pour nous qui avons

abolir la peine de mort, si la vie est à l'individu et à Dieu qui la donne, la fortune est à la société. On ne tue qu'à son corps défendant ; on épargne l'ennemi qu'on désarme : or la société a un moyen de défense plus sûr que la mort. L'argent est le nerf de la guerre : l'ennemi sera désarmé. 93 a créé les biens nationaux. C'est ainsi que la première révolution s'est consolidée, en saisissant les deux tiers du sol, en faisant des droits nouveaux, des intérêts nouveaux avec les vieux monopoles, les vieux privilèges, en faisant monte monnaie des grosses pièces, en multipliant les intéressés, les ayant-droit, les possesseurs et les défenseurs de la terre, en transformant les prolétaires en propriétaires, prêts à défendre une patrie où ils avaient part. Ferons-nous de même ?

Ici nous sommes en présence de deux écoles ou systèmes dans le parti, toutes deux exclusives. L'une dit : tout par l'individu ; l'autre dit : tout par la société ; l'une nie la collectivité, l'autre la personnalité. Ni l'une ni l'autre ne sont dans la vérité. La vérité est quelque chose par l'individu et quelque chose par la société. Ce n'est pas là du juste-milieu, de l'éclectisme ; ou, si nous sommes éclectiques, nous le sommes comme la nature. C'est suivre les conséquences des deux principes qui constituent l'homme, des deux éléments essentiels de sa nature qui est, répétons-le encore une fois, personnelle et sociale, individuelle et collective, particulière et gé-

propriété personnelle. L'ouvrier des villes et des champs n'est guère révolutionnaire que pour être propriétaire. Dans le sentiment de justice étroit, si l'on veut, mais profond, mais intense, que l'homme doit jouir du fruit de son travail, et qu'il n'en peut jouir s'il n'est propriétaire ou maître, le peuple n'a pas encore conclu qu'il pouvait être associé ; il a conclu seulement qu'il ne devait pas être salarié. Il a vu jusqu'ici que le propriétaire était libre et souverain, qu'il avait bien-être et lumière, qu'il était quitte de la misère et de l'ignorance et il veut être propriétaire. Celui qui a la propriété veut l'augmenter ; celui qui ne l'a pas veut l'acquérir. Certes, l'association serait préférable ; c'est l'idéal, le dernier *donc* de la société, c'est le seul et vrai moyen, combiné avec l'attraction, d'augmenter le produit, par conséquent d'établir l'harmonie, fille de l'abondance et de la justice. Certes, l'individu tend de plus en plus vers le système salutaire et suprême de l'association, mais il y tend graduellement. Il faut l'y conduire et non l'y pousser. La masse n'y est pas encore. Si on décrétait l'association forcée, si on ordonnait la propriété collective, on rendrait immédiatement la masse contre-révolutionnaire. Il faut passer par la propriété personnelle avant d'arriver à la propriété collective. Il faut approprier l'individu avant d'approprier la commune. Il faut laisser l'individu libre de s'associer ou non. Il faut avoir pleine confiance dans la vertu du principe qui prévaudra, s'il est bon, dès qu'il sera pratiqué.

Donc tous les biens appartenant aux complices de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, aux agents de son gouvernement de vol et de meurtre, doivent-être hypothèqués par la Révolution à partir du 2 Décembre, déclarés nationaux et saisis entre les mains des détenteurs ou de leurs prête-noms. Ils seront divisés, suivant les besoins, par lots communaux et distribués d'après le vote du peuple souverain aux citoyens prolétaires ; la terre aux travailleurs des champs, les valeurs industrielles aux ouvriers des villes. Chacun sera libre d'exploiter isolément ou en commun. Les systèmes, les écoles opéreront comme ils l'entendront. Les fouriéristes feront la phalange, les communistes la communauté, les mutuellistes la banque d'échange, librement, volontairement, sans contrainte et sans entraves, sans violence et sans obstacle. Le peuple les verra tous à l'œuvre, fonctionner, expérimenter et se décidera au moins en connaissance de cause. Il pourra prendre le bon et rejeter le mauvais. La théorie s'enseignera par la meilleure méthode, la

pratique, et se prouvera par la meilleure raison, le succès. Elle gagnera ainsi les plus incrédules les premiers. Oui, les plus sceptiques, les plus individuels, les plus égoïstes, seront les premiers pris à l'association par l'éloquence du fait. Quand ils verront produire plus et dépenser moins, ils seront les premiers à vouloir profiter du bénéfice. Autant donc l'association par force serait tyrannie, autant l'association sans l'attraction serait duperie, autant elle serait stérile, autant elle provoquerait une répulsion, une réaction immense, composée de tout ce qui possède ou veut posséder individuellement ; autant l'association libre, volontaire, spontanée et consentie, mode infaillible de richesse, de bonheur, de paix et d'unité, mode harmonieux de faire vivre chacun pour tous et tous pour chacun, assurerait à jamais le triomphe de la Révolution.

Les biens nationaux seraient accordés emphytéotiquement, c'est-à-dire possédés aux conditions ordinaires, mais pour un temps déterminé. A la mort du propriétaire, la plus-value restant à l'héritier direct, ils feraient retour à l'Etat, comme en Angleterre les biens de cette nature font retour, après un certain temps, au lord ou seigneur. Notre seul lord ou seigneur c'est le peuple qui les répartirait de nouveau à d'autres ayant-droit aux mêmes conditions, qui par une sorte de roulement perpétuel compenserait sans cesse le malheur et détruirait ainsi le prolétariat. Dès lors plus

qu'il n'y aurait plus de pauvreté, il n'y aurait plus de vol. Resteraient les autres fléaux, les autres sinistres, inondation, incendie, naufrage, grêle, maladie, chômage, faillite, etc., et les frais généraux que l'impôt couvrirait à un prix aussi faible et aussi juste que possible. Donc, plus de budget de 1,500 millions, plus d'impôt multiple et indirect sur les objets de consommation les plus nécessaires à la vie ; plus d'octrois, de douanes, de droits de toutes sortes sur le vin, la viande, l'air, le jour ; aucune de ces taxes injustes qui frappent la lucarne du pauvre plus que la fenêtre du riche, la piquette du pauvre plus que la liqueur du riche, le bouilli du pauvre plus que le rôti du riche ; bref, qui font payer le pauvre quatorze ou quinze fois plus que le riche ; mais l'impôt unique établi sur le capital, l'impôt rationel, équitable, progressif, non plus en sens de la misère, mais en sens de la richesse, l'impôt, régulateur, modérateur, pondérateur, températeur, fait pour équilibrer les fortunes et niveler les conditions.

X.

CRÉDIT.

L'impôt qui coûte aujourd'hui 170 millions pour sa seule perception, serait recueilli presque sans frais par les banques communales.

Ces banques instituées dans chaque commune, garanties par la masse des biens emphytéotiques et par les autres domaines de l'État, par l'impôt voté qu'elles seraient chargées de percevoir, gérées par le conseil communal, distribuant le crédit à ceux qui en manquent, remplissant dans la commune la fonction du cœur dans l'homme, faisant circuler la richesse comme il fait circuler le sang, du centre aux extrémités et des extrémités au centre, commanditant, escomptant à bas prix, celui des frais et sans monopole, bien entendu, laissant, en vertu du principe de liberté, à tous citoyens le droit d'être banquiers, mais les forçant par la concurrence à baisser de plus en plus l'intérêt, à ne plus arrêter l'argent comme les varices retiennent le sang, à ne plus s'engorger comme des artères infidèles au moindre péril ou au moindre frisson, à répandre au contraire l'argent partout et au meilleur marché possible, sous peine de stérilité et de diminution, à ne bénéficier enfin qu'à force de service, voilà quelles seraient les banques communales dans toute l'étendue de la République !

Le crédit est l'œuvre du peuple, il doit être son bien. Il émane

du peuple, il doit lui revenir. Le travail fait le produit, le capital et le crédit. Les travailleurs, les producteurs sont donc les véritables capitalistes, les véritables créditeurs. Les banques de privilége et de monopole, comme la Banque de France sont donc des établissements d'exaction et d'accaparement, d'usure brévetée à 16 0[0. Elles doivent être remplacées par les banques communales à intérêt gratuit.

Avec la banque communale, un bazar-entrepôt où chaque citoyen, chaque association, ayant exercé son droit au travail, pourrait déposer ou consigner son produit à sa marque, recevoir avant la vente partie du prix qui lui serait complété après. Ce qui lui permettrait de recommencer, de reproduire sans cesse en attendant. La banque et le bazar seraient ainsi des institutions de crédit réel et personnel, assurant à tout homme le droit démocratique et social de vivre en travaillant. Et quand nous disons l'homme, nous disons l'être humain, par conséquent la femme comme l'homme. Sans doute, tant que la force et la guerre auront à faire en ce monde, le droit politique de la femme sera nécessairement restreint. Mais il doit aller au moins jusqu'au droit de la vie, jusqu'au droit du travail, jusqu'au droit de la pudeur. La pauvreté fait la prostitution ; les mariages d'argent font les monstres. Si vous voulez avoir des enfants libres, n'ayez pas de mères esclaves. La vraie famille ne peut être constituée que par la liberté, la volonté. Or, pour que la femme ait liberté, il faut qu'elle puisse avoir aussi propriété. Le mariage actuel, ce régime absolu tempéré par l'adultère et l'arsenic, le mariage qui admet comme soupape de sûreté la séparation de corps ici, le divorce là-bas, le mariage sera beaucoup plus indissoluble quand il sera passionné et non intéressé, quand il sera volontaire et non forcé ; et alors la famille ne sera plus un privilége, ni un mensonge, mais un droit et une vérité.

La garantie contre l'abus du droit de crédit reconnu à tout citoyen, sera sanctionnée ainsi : celui qui malversera par sa faute duement constatée, sera condamné à la perte de ce droit, et deviendra, à défaut d'autres ressources, salarié de la commune, employé aux travaux d'utilité publique, s'il est valide, admis à l'assistance, s'il est infirme : car la société doit secours à ceux qui ne peuvent travailler, comme elle doit de l'ouvrage et un minimum de salaire à ceux qui le peuvent gagner. Voilà pour le droit au travail et le droit au repos ! voilà pour la vie matérielle de l'homme en société !

XI.

INSTRUCTION.

Mais l'homme a droit à la vie spirituelle comme à la vie matérielle, par conséquent à l'enseignement comme au travail, à l'instruction comme au crédit, à la nourriture de l'esprit comme à celle du corps, à la lumière comme au bien-être. Il doit être affranchi de l'ignorance comme de la misère, de l'erreur comme du besoin. Il doit être libre et souverain spirituellement et matériellement. Qu'est ce qu'un souverain qui ne sait pas lire? La science et l'art doivent être mis à la portée de tous, comme la propriété et la souveraineté. Savoir, avoir et pouvoir, ces trois mots sont frères dans la logique de la langue française. Celui qui a la richesse et la science, a la puissance.

L'enseignement doit être gratuit comme le crédit. Il doit être général et spécial, professionnel et militaire. Il faut que chacun apprenne en même temps son métier de citoyen et de soldat. L'instruction est un devoir autant qu'un droit; car si l'ignorant se fait à tort à lui-même comme individu, il fait tort aux autres comme membre de la société.

L'enseignement doit donc aussi être obligatoire, mais obligatoire par le meilleur moyen, par la force de l'intérêt. La royauté vend l'instruction; la République, qui est le contraire de la royauté, la donne. La royauté fait payer les riches pour apprendre, la République paie les pauvres. A cette heure, l'enfant du pauvre est le domestique de la famille, il est utile à ses parents. Condamnerez-vous le père à la prison parce qu'il envoie l'enfant aux champs et non à l'école? Que la République rachète, indemnise l'enfant du pauvre. Cette mesure ne sera que temporaire, car la pauvreté, fille de la royauté, disparaîtra avec elle. Que la République ait aussi pour un temps des instituteurs d'hommes, enseignant les pères comme les enfants, car la royauté nous a laissé l'ignorance avec la pauvreté. Le lendemain de la révolution, donnons des primes de toute sorte aux maîtres et aux élèves, faisons tous les sacrifices possibles pour la lumière; et ce sera de l'argent bien placé! Le mal vient à l'ombre comme les orties. Répandons l'instruction, sauvons la révolution. Lakanal disait: Tant qu'on n'aura pas organisé l'instruction publique, la Révolution ne sera pas sauvée, et il avait raison. La Convention, cette assemblée de

barbares, sur un budget de 600 millions, votait 59 millions pour l'instruction publique ; et nos honnêtes modérés, sur un budget de 1500 millions, en votent 17, tout au plus ! Nous sommes les fils de la Convention, imitons-la ! grossissons le budget de l'instruction de tout le budget de la destruction ! Moins d'argent pour tuer les hommes, plus d'argent pour former des citoyens ! Elever des hommes, la majesté du mot dit assez l'importance du fait. Que chaque commune ait donc son académie, comme elle a sa banque, son tribunal, sa milice et son assemblée primaire ; et que tout citoyen ait la science, comme il a le droit et le pouvoir !

Dans la question de l'enseignement, il y a trois intérêts à concilier, celui de l'enfant, celui de la famille, celui de la société.

L'enfant, appartient au père, sous la surveillance du peuple, jusqu'à ce qu'il ait âge de raison, jusqu'à ce qu'il puisse s'appartenir. De même que l'enfant vit du sang de sa mère, tant qu'il n'a pas d'existence propre, de même il vit de la conscience de son père, tant qu'il n'a pas de volonté. Il y a une sorte d'allaitement moral, comme un allaitement physique. La nature qui sait bien ce qu'elle fait, a fait de l'amour paternel, le meilleur gardien de l'enfant. La loi doit suivre la nature. Donc plus d'internat, plus d'éloignement, de la famille ; plus de ces claustrations qui démoralisent et flétrissent l'élève, nuisibles et pénibles pour les enfants et les parens,

liberté de choisir, mais il aura aussi la responsabilité. Certes, il aimera toujours mieux avoir pour son fils la bonne instruction gratis que d'acheter la mauvaise. Mais enfin, si, par exception, il se trompait, s'il laissait son fils dans l'ignorance, alors il perdra le droit dont il aura abusé. L'instruction de l'enfant lui sera retirée, comme la personne même de l'enfant est retirée au père dénaturé qui le maltraite physiquement. Règle générale, le père a la tutelle du corps de l'enfant ; il doit avoir la tutelle de l'esprit, sous la surveillance du peuple. Son amour fait son droit, mais sa faute ferait sa peine. De même, le citoyen libre d'enseigner serait responsable et perdrait le droit dont il abuserait. En tout et toujours, liberté et responsabilité.

CONCLUSION.

En résumé, droit à l'instruction et droit au travail, la vie complète, matérielle et spirituelle, individuelle et collective pour tous les citoyens ; la vie entière à bon marché, le pain quotidien de l'âme et du corps, bref, le règne du peuple : le peuple, au lieu d'être gouverné, possédé, hébété, affamé, le peuple s'enrichissant, s'instruisant, s'appartenant, s'administrant lui-même, le peuple régnant et gouvernant. Pour que ce règne arrive, il faut que le peuple reprenne et garde sa souveraineté ; pour qu'il reprenne sa souveraineté, il faut qu'il fasse la Révolution !

Donc à tous ceux qui veulent la Révolution et ses principes : Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité ; et toutes les conséquences : Association des citoyens, Solidarité des peuples, République démocratique et sociale, universelle ; à ceux qui sans esprit de système, d'orgueil, d'ambition et d'égoïsme, ne reconnaissent qu'un souverain, le Peuple ; à ceux qui regardent comme usurpation et vol tout autre pouvoir pris ou gardé ; à ceux mêmes qui n'ont souci que de l'honneur du nom français et de l'intérêt strict de la patrie, à tous ceux qui haïssent l'Empire, c'est-à-dire la servitude et l'invasion, nous crions de l'exil : assez de principes, assez d'idées, assez de paroles ! de l'action, de l'action de l'action ! Au fait ! à l'œuvre ! en avant ! insurrection et révolution ! Nous en savons assez, dès que nous ne voulons plus de tyran. L'insurrection est le plus saint des devoirs. L'insurrection est de droit depuis le 13 Juin ; elle est de devoir depuis le 31 Mai ; elle est de droit et de devoir depuis le 2 Décembre ! Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera ; l'union fait la force ; ni résignation, ni désespoir ; l'initiative à chacun et l'exemple pour tous ! Bour-

geois, ouvriers, paysans, rallions-nous tous contre l'ennemi ! Vous, bourgeois, dont les lumières le troublent ; vous, ouvriers, dont le dévouement l'effraie ; vous, paysans, que vos votes n'ont pas sauvés, nous tous confondus par la même persécution qui a mêlé notre sang et uni notre cause, associons nos forces contre le même ennemi ! Que le peuple entier de France se lève comme un seul homme ! Que chaque citoyen n'ait pas d'autre ennemi que l'ennemi commun, l'ennemi public, le parjure parricide, le traître assassin de ses frères, l'escroc insolvable qui a volé la République dans l'ombre, le vil rebut des prostituées de Londres devenu le souteneur de la famille, de la religion et de la propriété, l'insurgé, l'échappé de Ham défenseur de l'ordre, l'ami des forçats, le restaurateur de la guillotine et de la loterie ; sphynx immonde sorti d'une urne fausse, du fond des lupanars, des tripots et des charniers, véritable harpie qui salit en frappant comme le venin souille et tue, homme-fléau, l'opprobre, le scandale et l'effroi de la conscience, destiné à montrer jusqu'où peut aller le mal, qui en a reculé les bornes, qui a déshonoré même le crime par l'hypocrisie, qui l'a mêlé à tous les vices comme il a mêlé l'agiot à l'empire, le sang à la boue et le champagne à l'eau bénite ; ogrillon de Corse, croisé de prince, de prêtre et de grec, d'histrion, de ribaud et de bourreau, sorte de métis de Bonaparte et de Macaire, de Machiavel et de Mandrin, de marquis de

nace à nos sûretés. Nous sommes dans le cas de légitime défense ; et puisqu'il se proclame obstacle, puisqu'il se pose en travers du chemin, puisqu'il barre le passage à tous avec le trône et l'échafaud, que la France fasse comme la fille de Tarquin, qu'elle lui passe sur le corps plutôt que de reculer ! Qu'il serve encore à prouver, celui-là comme les autres, que le châtiment atteint le crime. Le trône le met hors la loi ; l'échafaud hors l'humanité. Que l'horreur qu'il inspire le presse donc de toutes parts ! que la terre elle-même le combatte ! que les pavés se soulèvent sous ses pieds ! que les tuiles le frappent à la tête, comme Pyrrhus ! que les outils deviennent des armes ; qu'on les trempe dans le sang et les larmes des victimes ! Ce n'est plus seulement avec du coton et du sucre qu'il faut faire de la poudre, oui, c'est avec les larmes, avec le sang, avec tout ce que peuvent fournir de plus explosif les cœurs exaspérés. Que tout soit dans la main de tous, arme de guerre, moyen de combat ! Point de César sans Brutus ! A bas le tyran !

Au nom des veuves et des orphelins, au nom des tombes pleines et des foyers vides, au nom des exilés qui couvrent les monts et les mers, des prisonniers qui remplissent les geôles, des morts qui remplissent les fosses, de par toutes ces voix gémissantes qui crient vengeance du fond de la terre et des quatre coins du ciel, au nom du droit, au nom de l'honneur, pour le salut de la France et du monde entier, frères, armons-nous, délivrons-nous et délivrons les autres ! Que le Peuple français reprenne enfin son beau titre de peuple libre, et le titre encore plus beau de peuple libérateur ! Qu'il se souvienne en recouvrant sa liberté, qu'il se souvienne comment il l'a perdue ! Pour n'avoir pas délivré l'Italie, il l'a enchaînée et il s'est enchaîné lui-même. Le 5 Mars a fait le 13 Juin ; le 13 Juin, le 31 Mai ; le 31 Mai, le 2 Décembre. Liberté oblige ou servitude suit. Qu'il fasse donc la révolution pour tous, s'il la veut garder pour lui ! Qu'il fasse la dernière guerre, la guerre sainte, la guerre du droit, la guerre de Dieu, la guerre que Dieu veut, que le Peuple peut, la croisade du dix-neuvième siècle, non plus pour la délivrance d'un tombeau, d'un Christ mort, mais pour le salut des peuples vivants, pour la délivrance de l'humanité ! Qu'il se lève en masse, qu'il refasse ses quatorze armées, qu'il retrouve ses volontaires, sa *Marseillaise*, son audace, sa furie de 93, tous ses miracles d'autrefois augmentés, s'il se peut, de la plus-value de la cause ; qu'il se retrouve tout entier, cœur et bras, foi et force, effréné, indomptable, invincible ; qu'il s'enrôle, qu'il marche encore s'il le

faut sans culotte et pieds nus, non plus seulement au secours de la patrie en danger, mais pour la liberté du monde ; qu'il mette sa blouse au bout de sa pique en signe d'affranchissement des peuples ; qu'il repète, en l'agrandissant encore, ce grand cri de la Convention nationale : Jusqu'à ce que la France... jusqu'à ce que le monde soit libre, le Peuple français debout contre les tyrans... debout pour la République démocratique et sociale, universelle !

Salut et fraternité !

Les Républicains démocrates-socialistes, membres de la Société la *Commune Révolutionnaire.*

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Monsieur Monsieur Kossuth, Ex-Gouv
Hongrie à Southampton (Angleterre)
Hg de l'Auteur

LA

FRANCE SAUVÉE,

PAR

AUGUSTE FABIUS.

PARIS,

CHEZ GUILLAUMIN, 14, RUE RICHELIEU,

ET CHEZ LES PRINCIPAUX LIBRAIRES.

LYON,

A LA LIBRAIRIE SCIENTIFIQUE,

14, place Louis-le-Grand (Bellecour);

A LA LIBRAIRIE GÉNÉRALE,

30, quai des Célestins.

1851.

LA FRANCE SAUVÉE.

LA

FRANCE SAUVÉE,

PAR

AUGUSTE FABIUS.

LYON.

IMPRIMERIE TYPOGRAPHIQUE ET LITHOGRAPHIQUE

DE LOUIS PERRIN,

Rue d'Amboise, 6, quartier des Célestins.

—

1851.



LA

FRANCE SAUVÉE,

PAR

AUGUSTE FABIUS.

Cinq partis se disputent le droit de gouverner la France : les Légitimistes, les Orléanistes, les Napoléonistes, les Républicains et les Communistes-Socialistes.

Les Légitimistes prétendent au droit de gouverner la France, parce que les Bourbons de la branche aînée ont régné sur le Pays pendant plusieurs siècles. Nos prétentions, disent-ils, sont légitimes ; à nous seuls le Pays, à nous seuls, et exclusivement à tous autres, d'en prendre possession, à nous la Couronne, en vertu du droit de la légitimité !...

Ce parti ignore-t-il donc qu'il existe un droit antérieur à leur droit? un principe antérieur à leur principe? Ce droit, ce principe antique, universel, éternel, proclame que :

Chaque génération a ses droits inaliénables.

Donc, *une génération ne peut aliéner les droits de la génération qui lui succède.*

Les droits des peuples datent de leur existence comme peuples. Lorsque dans l'antiquité le Peuple a conféré ses droits à un de ses membres avec le titre de Chef, de Prince, de Roi, et que dans la suite des temps ces chefs, ces princes, ces rois ont fait circonscrire dans la limite de leurs familles, de leur postérité, cette autorité suprême sans le consentement du Peuple, dès-lors ces chefs ont commis un crime, violenté la nation. Et si cela s'est opéré avec l'assentiment du peuple assoupi, nos pères n'avaient le droit de le faire que pour eux personnellement, ils n'avaient pas celui de disposer ainsi des libertés de leurs fils, et ce, en vertu du droit éternel que *chaque génération a ses droits inaliénables.*

Nos pères n'ont pu aliéner les droits de leurs descendants; et s'ils l'ont fait, ils ont manqué à leur devoir, à la justice; ils ont porté atteinte aux libertés de leurs enfants, qui peuvent et doivent les revendiquer.

L'homme, dès son entrée dans la société, contracte de fait l'engagement sacré d'observer les lois de haute morale, lois éternelles et universelles sans lesquelles la société ne pourrait avoir d'existence. Hors de là, les Peuples ne peuvent être tenus d'observer les autres lois de ceux qui les ont précédés que lorsque ces lois ont reçu leur adhésion, qu'ils acceptent quand elles sont justes, dictées par l'esprit d'une sage liberté, convenables à leurs mœurs, à leur tranquillité, à leur bonheur.

La légitimité, la seule, la véritable, la plus efficace, c'est celle qui est acceptée, acclamée par le Peuple, par tous ceux de ses membres qui n'ont pas perdu leurs droits civils et politiques, par tous ceux qui ont intérêt à soutenir l'ordre qui fait la prospérité du Pays.

Tout gouvernement établi, que le Peuple a acclamé et devant les lois duquel il s'incline, est un gouvernement légitime.

Ainsi, la branche aînée des Bourbons, bien qu'elle ait eu le bonheur de régner pendant des siècles, n'est pas plus légitime que les branches des Napoléons, des d'Orléans, qui n'ont régné que quelques années; et ces trois gouvernements ensemble n'ont, certes, aucun titre de légitimité supérieur à celui d'un gouvernement choisi par la nation elle-même, qui a appelé librement tous ses enfants, sans exception, au droit de voter, en n'excluant que ceux qui par leur coupable conduite ont perdu l'exercice de leurs droits.

Je le répète, ou les droits de nos pères leur ont été violemment arrachés, ou bien ils les ont conférés volontairement à une dynastie. Dans le premier cas, ceux qui s'en sont emparés si injustement ne peuvent se plaindre de ce qu'ils s'en trouvent dépossédés. Dans le second cas, nos pères n'ont pu ni dû octroyer ces droits, ni les étendre au-delà de leur génération. Ils n'avaient aucun droit d'engager leur postérité, d'enchaîner leurs descendants, d'asservir les générations futures, de disposer de leur vie physique et politique. Pouvaient-ils connaître d'avance tous nos besoins? Or, aucune génération n'a le droit de disposer des générations qui lui succèdent, de leur prescrire, de leur ordonner ou de les forcer à accepter pour toute la postérité le chef qu'elle s'est choisi : donc la Légitimité, comme on veut

l'interpréter vulgairement et l'imposer violemment au Pays, ce prétendu titre donné par une génération, ne peut être invoquée comme un droit pour les générations futures.

Il ne s'agit point de faire triompher tel parti sur tel autre : n'importe lequel, des Bourbons, des Napoléons, des d'Orléans, des Républicains, des Communistes-Socialistes.

Il s'agit de voir par quelle forme de gouvernement la France peut vivre, vivre tranquille, libre, grande, admirée, heureuse!...

Pendant des siècles la France a été monarchique, et vers la fin du dernier elle a rejeté cette forme de gouvernement; elle s'est tour à tour constituée en république, laquelle ne fut qu'un essai malheureux; transformée en empire qu'elle ne soutenait point, et enfin en royauté imposée et réimposée par l'étranger, que la France remplaça librement par une autre royauté plus populaire : tout cela a échoué. Chacune de ces formes de gouvernement a duré à peine dix ou quinze ans : ces gouvernements, ceux mêmes entés nouvellement, n'ont pu vieillir dans le Pays, et au moindre ouragan ces troncs princiers, même avec leurs racines séculaires, n'ont pu tenir bon, ils sont tombés!...

De la chute des anciennes dynasties des Bourbons, des Napoléons, des d'Orléans, on est forcé de conclure que les racines qu'elles avaient jetées dans le Pays se sont toutes desséchées. Le Pays s'est retiré d'elles, il n'a plus voulu vivre sous leur empire; il en fut de même de la première République qui, avant d'avoir su s'orienter, marchait à tâtons, et tombait de malheur en malheur.

Aujourd'hui, par le rétablissement d'aucun de ces gouvernements la France n'acquerra le calme, le repos, le

bonheur, l'ordre durable et indispensable à sa prospérité; ce serait courir d'agitations en agitations, de troubles en troubles, de bouleversements en bouleversements.

Qu'on n'égare donc pas davantage le Pays en lui criant chaque matin ces utopies, le *Communisme-Socialisme*. Il connaît toutes ces coupables tentatives qui mènent droit au malheur, au désordre, à la mort de la Patrie! Oui, le Pays se soulève indigné à la seule pensée de ces quelques-uns de ses enfants égarés par ces misérables utopies de Communisme-Socialisme, dont le drapeau n'est que le désordre, la mort. Un tel gouvernement serait la honte et l'ignominie du genre humain, si jamais il pouvait exister. Mais la France a trop de dignité, trop de grandeur, trop de sagesse pour se perdre ainsi et appeler sur elle ces terribles et effroyables calamités. Et quel est celui qui, sans être criminel, pourrait désirer une telle forme de gouvernement, le plus détestable, le plus méchant, le plus impur, le plus malheureux de tous les gouvernements du Monde?

Au Communisme en particulier je dirai: Supposons que votre idée chimérique puisse se réaliser, qu'un partage égal de la fortune publique soit possible entre tous les hommes. Eh bien! dès le lendemain du jour qu'il aurait été effectué, l'égalité des richesses aurait disparu; car il est impossible de détruire à fond toutes les mauvaises passions de l'homme: l'un, intelligent, actif, économe, homme d'ordre, saura conserver, accumuler; l'autre, sot, paresseux, prodigue, livré au désordre, aura dès le lendemain même rompu l'équilibre entre sa fortune et celle de son voisin. Vous n'auriez fait qu'éveiller, qu'exciter les penchants exécrables, les crimes dans le monde impur, pour ne pas être plus avancés que vous ne l'êtes aujourd'hui.

L'ordre, n'est-ce donc pas la vie? Le désordre, n'est-ce donc pas la mort? Non, sur cette terre de France il ne se trouvera pas assez d'impuretés pour former un gouvernement monstrueux tel que celui-là; ses promoteurs eux-mêmes en seraient les premières victimes. Où donc a-t-on jamais vu ou entendu dire qu'un gouvernement ait pu se fonder par le désordre, prendre racine et vivre? — Nulle part.

Pour rendre plus sensible ma pensée et la mettre en évidence, afin qu'elle frappe l'esprit le plus distrait, admettons un instant, ce que je crois impossible, que par égarement, par surprise, une nation quelconque se laisse imposer un gouvernement communiste-socialiste; admettons même (je veux vous faire la part énorme à vous, communistes-socialistes) que la moitié d'une nation en vertige, étouffant en elle tout sentiment de droiture, de justice, d'honneur, se rue sur l'autre moitié et s'empare de ses maisons, de ses terres, de ses biens, enfin de tout ce qui serait palpable sous sa main, à sa vue. Richesses, argent, valeurs, tout aurait disparu du pays; oui, avant même que ces violences se soient manifestées, les quatre-vingt-dix-neuf centièmes de toutes ces richesses, enfouies, sinon exportées, quelle que fût la vigilance exercée sur elles, auraient fui comme par enchantement.

Mieux encore, supposons même que l'argent, les valeurs, que tout enfin tombe entre vos mains, que la moitié du Pays, les pauvres et les soi-disant pauvres prennent enfin la place des riches, des possesseurs, des propriétaires; vous, communistes-socialistes, vous vous mettriez donc au lieu et place des riches; vous en auriez les jouissances; vous deviendriez, vous, les riches!... et, à leur tour, les premiers possesseurs deviendraient, eux, les pauvres!... Eh bien! le lendemain de cette violente et criminelle dé-

possession, les premiers, ex-possesseurs, acquerraient le droit dont vous vous seriez prévalus et feraient une agression contre vous-mêmes. Ils la feraient d'autant mieux qu'ils auraient pour eux le sentiment de justice, le droit, et que l'esprit de vengeance serait excusable en eux contre vous qui seriez venus les dépouiller; ils se serviraient contre vous des mêmes droits dont vous vous seriez servis contre eux. Donc, guerre et massacre du commencement jusqu'à la fin, et cela tour à tour et toujours. Dites-moi combien vivrait de jours un pouvoir exécrable de cette espece? Il n'est pas besoin de faire remarquer qu'on ne se laisserait pas dépouiller si facilement, sans opposition, sans combats, sans que l'agresseur trouvât le plus souvent la mort, là où il comptait ne trouver que des jouissances; que riches et pauvres se traîneraient en haillons, et que le Pays, mourant ainsi de consomption, deviendrait une terre de malédiction!...

Non, Dieu merci, il n'y a sur la terre ni assez de stupidité, ni assez d'impuretés, ni assez de crimes, pour la formation d'un gouvernement Communiste-Socialiste, *chaos inextricable!...*

Donc, le Communisme-Socialisme serait non-seulement le crime, mais il serait encore une impossibilité, une chimère qui ne peut exister que dans des cerveaux creux, imaginaires, ou dans des cœurs corrompus. Et ne serait-ce pas faire injure au Pays, que de supposer que la moitié de sa population pourrait désirer le Communisme-Socialisme? Ce ne sont assurément pas ceux qui possèdent quelque fortune qui appelleraient cette situation; et même les neuf dixièmes de ceux qui ne possèdent rien le repousseraient par droiture, par justice, parce qu'ils ont trop de dignité pour cher-

cher à s'approprier la moindre richesse par l'injustice, la violence, le crime, l'assassinat ; ils préféreraient plutôt souffrir, et souffrir toujours !... Cette forme de gouvernement est donc mise hors de cause. Pourquoi donc chercher à alarmer le Pays, à l'effrayer sans cesse, en lui faisant accroire la possibilité d'une chose impossible, la possibilité d'un gouvernement-chaos?...

Voici les saintes paroles à jamais mémorables du plus grand homme que la terre ait jamais su produire ; mieux que personne, il connaissait le cœur de l'homme ; Moïse, l'homme par excellence, devant qui, après Dieu, je m'incline avec la plus profonde vénération ; Moïse, dont les livres antiques, inappréciables, sont négligés, oubliés, même des savants de nos jours. Moïse, tout en félicitant le Peuple qu'il dirigeait dans la voie du bien, tout en lui ouvrant son cœur paternel et en travaillant à son bonheur réel, dit : « En suivant les voies parfaites « de la haute morale, les lois de Dieu, vous serez heu- « reux. »

אפס כי לא יהיה־בך אביון כי־ברך יברכך יהוה בארץ אשר יהוה אלהיך נתן־לך נחלה לרשתה :

« Puisse-t-il jamais n'y avoir parmi toi de nécessi- « teux !... Que l'Eternel te bénisse tellement sur la terre « que l'Eternel ton Dieu te donne en possession hérédi- « taire !... » (*Deut.* xv, 4.)

Puisse-t-il jamais n'y avoir parmi toi de nécessiteux !.... C'est là le souhait de cœur de cet homme divin.

Puis, recommandant fortement au peuple la charité, cette vertu céleste, il dit :

כי לא־יחדל אביון מקרב הארץ על־כן אנכי מצוך לאמר פתח תפתח את־ידך לאחיך לעניך ולאבינך בארצך :

« Car le nécessiteux ne manquera pas dans le pays ; « c'est pourquoi je te l'ordonne expressément : ouvre

« ta main à ton frère, à tes pauvres et à tes nécessiteux « dans ton pays ! » (*Deut.* xv, 11.)

Quelque heureux que vous soyez, il y aura toujours des nécessiteux, la nature de l'homme est ainsi faite; tous n'auront pu ni su vaincre leurs passions: l'un saura accumuler ses épargnes et acquérir par le travail honnête de quoi vivre content, l'autre ne saura jamais se sortir de sa déplorable position.

Je ne parle point de ces hommes qui, par un concours de circonstances malheureuses, ont perdu leur fortune, leur avenir, et dont la vie brisée de douleurs en a brisé aussi tous les ressorts de l'âme, et qui, par désespoir, faute de secours, ne peuvent se relever de leur chute, ou qui, par ce je ne sais quoi qu'on ne peut expliquer, succombent sous le poids de leur infortune!... Pour eux retentit du Ciel ce cri : RESPECT AU MALHEUR!...

« *Puisse-t-il ne plus y avoir de misère dans le pays !* »

C'est là, tracé en divins caractères, le souhait de l'homme de Dieu.

Voici la réalité, l'état, la nature de l'homme telle qu'elle est : « *Mais le nécessiteux ne manquera pas « dans le pays !...* »

Que sont-ils donc ceux qui, non pas pour le bonheur du Pays, mais pour satisfaire leurs désirs, leurs passions particulières, cherchent telle ou telle forme de gouvernement objet de leurs prédilections, et se récrient contre la République sage, gouvernement de liberté et non de licence, d'ordre et non de désordre, et qui avec dessein et calcul la confondent avec cette autre forme dite *Communisme-Socialisme*, dont pas un seul homme au cœur noble et honnête ne voudrait au prix même de sa vie ?

Quel vertige les saisit donc tous? il n'est donc plus de

cœurs qui battent pour la Patrie? Ils s'offrent en holocauste à leurs dieux, leurs intérêts, leurs passions, auxquels ils se sont voués corps et âme. Périsse le Pays, que leur importe, pourvu qu'ils sortent triomphants avec leur idole à eux, dussent-ils s'asseoir sur les ruines fumantes de la terre qui les a vus naître! Ils jettent dans le Pays les troubles qu'ils disent vouloir éteindre.

Non, le Pays n'est avec aucun d'eux!...

Non, la France n'est ni ne sera jamais ni avec les valets de la féodalité, ni avec les valets du désordre!...

La France à qui donc? — La France à elle-même!...

Comment donc, si le seul gouvernement qui puisse donner au Pays la stabilité, l'ordre, la sage liberté, la dignité, la prospérité, est le gouvernement républicain, serait-on assez insensé pour en désirer un autre et travailler au rétablissement de ces gouvernements qui ont vécu en France?...

Il est avéré que toute autre forme de gouvernement ne pourrait jeter de profondes racines sur cette terre de France; elle durerait quelques années peut-être, elle serait encore renversée.

אל־תבטחו בנדיבים בבן־אדם שאין לו תשועה׃

« Ne vous fiez pas aux Princes, au fils de la terre, car « son secours est néant!... » (*Psaumes*, CXLVI, 3.)

Aussi longtemps que la France cherchera son point d'appui dans la poussière, dans un fils de l'homme, aussi longtemps elle ne recueillera que d'amers regrets. Prenons notre point d'appui plus haut, prenons-le au ciel. Que la justice absolue, que la souveraine vérité soient les liens qui attachent la terre au ciel d'une manière permanente! Alors le Pays aura compris que les hommes qu'il doit investir de l'honneur de le représenter ne doi-

vent pas être ceux qui crient le plus fort : Vivent les Bourbons ! Vivent les d'Orléans ! Vivent les Napoléons ! Vive la République ! Vive le Socialisme ! Vive le Communisme !... mais qu'ils doivent être les plus capables, les plus spéciaux, les plus dignes dans la Guerre, la Marine, la Justice, les Cultes, les Finances, l'Agriculture, le Commerce, l'Industrie, les Sciences et les Arts. Alors chaque représentant ne portera la parole que sur les matières dont il aura une connaissance intime. Alors les bureaux et les commissions de l'Assemblée ne seront composés que d'hommes qui auront fait des études spéciales et approfondies sur les matières dont ils seront chargés de connaître. Alors seulement plus de discussions oiseuses, et les sessions seront utilement employées à la chose publique, à la prospérité du Pays !...

Qu'on n'infère pas de là qu'il faille s'évertuer à prendre en haine les familles princières ou royales qui furent jadis et naguère encore à la tête de la nation. Parce qu'un gouvernement autre que le gouvernement monarchique a surgi de par le temps, faut-il maudire les gouvernements précédents? Ce serait une trop grande injustice, un acte trop peu noble de notre Pays. Non, payons de respect les rejetons de ces familles antiques ou modernes, dont les chefs ont porté, ne fût ce que peu de temps même, le fardeau du gouvernement de l'Etat ; accueillons-les tous avec bienveillance sur cette terre de France, *qui ne leur appartient pas.* Chacun de leurs membres doit jouir des mêmes droits que tous les autres enfants de la Patrie; ne doivent être repoussés de cette terre que ceux d'entre eux qui refuseraient ces droits, que ceux qui nourriraient la coupable pensée d'ourdir des trames, de semer des troubles, qui croiraient que la France est à eux, et qui compteraient en disposer comme de leur propriété !...

Mais aussi la République doit être grande, noble, vraie, et toutes ses tendances doivent être consacrées à perfectionner l'état social et à rendre la France heureuse.

Un bon gouvernement doit apporter amélioration sur amélioration en tout; rendre l'agriculture et le commerce florissants; faire progresser de plus en plus l'industrie; porter à un point éminent la justice, les sciences et les arts; doter le pays de tout le bien-être humainement possible, y faire participer avec équité tous les membres de la grande famille, en commençant par ceux dont l'existence nous paraît la plus menacée, la plus malheureuse; soutenir ces existences, calmer leurs douleurs, et leur donner le moyen d'en sortir peu à peu par le travail (1).

Que demande le Pays? — L'ordre, la stabilité, une sage liberté, la dignité, la prospérité, fondés sur *la vérité*, *la justice et la paix*, *ces trois colonnes du Monde!...*

« Dieu a jeté sur la terre une étincelle de vie, *la raison;*
« vous avez beau vous armer contre elle: cette raison,
« par cela qu'elle est innée dans l'homme, percera à
« travers tout; elle vous fera trembler, vous, rois, sur
« vos trônes, et vous, peuples, sur votre terre, jusqu'au
« grand jour où vous tous vous aurez reconnu *l'unité*
« *de Dieu*, *la vérité*, *la justice* et *la vertu*.

« Ainsi, ce jour-là, Rois et Peuples, à chacun son
« devoir. Vous, Rois, guides des nations, vous travail-
« lerez sincèrement au bonheur de vos peuples, et votre
« récompense sera l'AFFECTION, la VÉNÉRATION de vos

(1) Voir ma brochure intitulée : *Le Repos du Monde*, ou *Plan sur l'amélioration du sort des ouvriers en général*, 1851.

« sujets, et vous n'aurez plus à craindre pour vos trônes.
« Vous, Peuples, inspirés par la justice, vous ne bran-
« direz plus, suivant l'expression d'Isaïe, les armes l'un
« contre l'autre; vous aurez appris à connaître le respect
« dû à votre roi, à votre élu, à vos chefs, à vous-mêmes;
« votre récompense sera la PAIX et le BONHEUR.

« *Unité de Dieu*, *vérité*, *justice*, *vertu!* voilà la de-
« vise sacrée; arborez-la, et alors, mais alors seulement,
« *le Monde sera sauvé!...* (1) »

Examinons donc quelle forme de gouvernement pourrait lui donner tout le bien-être. Serait-ce la branche aînée des Bourbons, ce que vulgairement on appelle *la Légitimité?* dénomination impropre, injuste, en ne l'appliquant qu'aux Bourbons seuls; car légitime est tout gouvernement élu par le Peuple. Ainsi la branche aînée, si elle a eu, dans les temps anciens, le bonheur d'avoir été l'élue de la nation pour la gouverner, elle n'est pas plus légitime que ne l'était la République, fondée plus tard sur ses ruines par le Peuple; celle-ci n'était pas plus légitime que l'Empire qui lui succéda, que le gouvernement de Juillet après lui, et que ne l'est aujourd'hui le gouvernement Républicain.

Il est incontestable qu'avec l'esprit du Pays, dont le naturel est porté à la nouveauté et qui marche à grands pas, avec les siècles qu'il devance, vers l'amélioration de son état physique et moral, le gouvernement républicain seul peut lui convenir, un gouvernement républicain où règne l'ordre, où tous les efforts et du gouvernement et de chaque individu tendent au bien, à la prospérité, en facilitant à chacun les moyens d'arriver, par le travail,

(1) Extrait de ma brochure intitulée : *Offrande au Dieu de l'Univers*, page 33; 1842.

à gagner de quoi vivre dans une certaine aisance, et à se créer ainsi, par ses sages économies, une position assurée pour l'avenir.

Et toi, Peuple Français, tu te laisserais égarer ainsi jusqu'à aliéner tes droits au profit de telle ou telle dynastie!... De peuple libre tu deviendrais peuple esclave!... Alors t'assailleraient les souffrances, et tu chercherais en vain à t'en affranchir; tu courrais au-devant de nouveaux malheurs toujours renaissants; tu riverais, pour longtemps encore, les fers de ton esclavage!...

Ne dépose donc pas ta puissance, ne te dessaisis pas du pouvoir; qu'à tes élus seuls soit déférée ta puissance gouvernementale! Que l'Assemblée nationale, elle seule, soit ton chef! Qu'elle nomme ses Ministres parmi les Représentants, et que son Président, nommé par elle, soit lui-même aussi le Président de la République! C'est ainsi qu'on évitera désormais ces scandaleux conflits de pouvoir à pouvoir.

Affligeant spectacle que celui d'un grand Peuple qui, ayant reconquis ses droits, ne sait pas quel usage en faire! Stupéfait de sa victoire, ce Peuple cherche encore, ou ses prétendus amis s'évertuent à lui faire trouver la manière de régner, de gouverner! A peine a-t-il conquis le Pouvoir qu'on l'en dirait déjà fatigué, accablé, parce qu'il se sert pour gouverner des mêmes moyens dont se servaient les gouvernements qui l'ont précédé; et c'est là son erreur, son mal. Comment! à peine a-t-il fait le premier usage de ses droits, de son pouvoir, nommé ses Représentants directs, l'Assemblée nationale, qu'il crée, sous une forme plébéienne, un autre pouvoir à côté du sien, pouvoir qui l'entrave, le contrecarre et s'efforce peu à peu de l'annihiler, un Président de la République!...

Sous le régime monarchique des derniers temps, pour

pondérer le pouvoir royal personnifié dans le ministère, la création de deux chambres devenait nécessaire. L'une devait défendre, garantir les droits du Peuple et empêcher le Pouvoir royal d'absorber en plein, dans sa fougue, les droits de la Nation; l'autre avait pour mission de s'opposer aux empiétements réciproques de ces pouvoirs qui se heurtaient sans cesse l'un l'autre, et de rétablir l'accord entre eux.

Mais aujourd'hui qu'il n'y a plus de roi, comment a-t-on pu créer, à part, un Président de la République qui représente, à peu de chose près, un monarque des derniers temps; qui, par les nominations qu'il fait directement, par la distribution des honneurs, des grades, des emplois, se crée des partisans aux dépens du Pays?... *Le cœur de l'homme n'est-il donc pas ainsi fait qu'il a de la reconnaissance pour celui qui lui a fait du bien?* Quoique ces honneurs viennent du Peuple, c'est le Président qui les donne, les distribue en son propre nom, se créant ainsi naturellement autant de partisans et aux dépens du Peuple, qui ne se doute même pas que c'est lui qui lui en a fourni les moyens.

Ne serait-il pas plus simple, et dans l'intérêt du Pays, que le Président de l'Assemblée nationale et le premier Vice-Président fussent, eux aussi, les Président et Vice-Président de la République nommés par l'Assemblée nationale ou au besoin par le Peuple?

Tous les hauts emplois, grades et honneurs seraient déférés au nom du Peuple par l'Assemblée nationale. Alors seulement ne s'offriraient plus à nos yeux ces tristes luttes de deux pouvoirs l'un contre l'autre. Tout émanerait du Peuple, tout serait fait au nom du Peuple. Il n'y aurait plus de *partis*. Tous seraient voués au Pays, et non à un individu; on ne compterait plus de sujets

d'un tel, mais uniquement des sujets de la Patrie, de la Loi!

Les nominations aux emplois ne seraient plus que des nominations d'excellent choix, faites par l'Assemblée elle-même; ce serait le mérite seul qui les aurait obtenues, et non les faveurs, ni les intrigues; et la reconnaissance de ceux qui en seraient honorés ne serait plus que pour la Patrie seule et pour nul autre.

Ne tombons plus dans les anciens errements. Il n'est plus besoin de pondérer les pouvoirs, puisqu'il n'existe qu'un seul pouvoir, le Peuple, dont la puissance émane de Dieu; partant, plus de luttes, plus de scandaleux conflits; tout sera rassuré, tout sera stable enfin. Et, si le Président venait à mourir, ou si ses pouvoirs arrivaient à terme, s'il y avait pour l'élection de son successeur un laps de temps plus ou moins long, le Pays n'en serait en rien ni ébranlé ni inquiété; parce que le Peuple est là, avec sa loi. Il ne meurt pas, lui!... Et le Pays, toujours représenté, poursuivrait calme, sans contrariété, sans entraves, sans interruption, les améliorations sociales. Plus de secousses, plus de troubles, plus de craintes. Ainsi rassuré, le Peuple travaillerait tranquille et vivrait heureux. C'est ainsi que la France prospérerait en tout et partout; c'est ainsi qu'elle marcherait à la tête des nations du Monde, qu'elle aurait réchauffées de son feu sacré, qu'elle aurait éclairées de son soleil!...

La révision de la Constitution sur de telles bases serait bien. Le délai de quatre ans, fixé pour la présidence, était sage. Où en serait-on aujourd'hui, si, par malheur, ce terme eût été fixé à dix ans? Le Pays n'a-t-il pas été déjà fort attristé et énervé par les luttes continuelles du Président contre l'Assemblée, par le bruit qui a couru de

ses tendances ou velléités à s'arroger de nouveaux titres, de nouveaux pouvoirs? Comment! le temps qui n'aurait dû être donné que pour raffermir la République, rassurer le Pays, faire prospérer la France, n'a été consumé qu'à défendre les droits de la Patrie contre les attaques imprudentes des favoris de celui qui n'eût jamais dû donner prise à cette accusation!...

Il serait à désirer qu'il pût y avoir quatre réélections successives du même individu; car, si le Pays a été satisfait de celui qui a eu l'immense honneur d'être à la tête du gouvernement, ne serait-ce pas folie de s'interdire le droit de le réélire? Ce sera là justement un motif pour que celui qui aura été revêtu de ce grand titre se sacrifie corps et âme pour le bien de la Patrie, ne fût-ce que dans l'espoir, pour ces hommes qui sont amorcés par le prestige des honneurs souverains quand une fois ils en ont goûté, de prolonger leurs pouvoirs par la réélection, à titre de reconnaissance de la part du Pays. Mais une telle réélection ne devrait jamais se reproduire plus de quatre fois; car un homme quel qu'il fût serait, après seize ans de règne, entièrement usé. Il est bon que le Pays se retrempe en portant à la direction des affaires de l'Etat un homme nouveau; et les changements survenus par ces nominations seraient-elles décennales, quinquennales, ou même annuelles, qu'elles ne jetteraient plus aucune inquiétude dans le Pays, pas plus qu'elles n'en jettent aujourd'hui quand il s'agit de renouveler mensuellement la Présidence de l'Assemblée nationale et ses bureaux. On n'escomptera plus les temps, les époques, les échéances de tel ou tel Pouvoir. Le Pays sera calme, tranquille, travaillera, vivra à l'ombre des lois, de la vérité, de la justice, et vivra heureux! Ce sera là le véritable gouvernement du Peuple, la vraie République, que nous envieront tous les Peuples de l'Univers!...

L'Assemblée nationale seule, représentant le Peuple, formera le Gouvernement.

Le Président et les Vice-Présidents de l'Assemblée nationale, tous, responsables, seront élus à la majorité par elle et parmi ses membres.

Le Président de l'Assemblée nationale et le premier Vice-Président seront les Président et Vice-Président de la République.

L'Assemblée nationale nommera et révoquera les Ministres, qu'elle choisira parmi ses membres.

Le Ministère élira lui-même dans son sein son Président.

Le Président de la République présidera de droit le Conseil des Ministres, et le convoquera toutes les fois qu'il le jugera convenable.

L'Assemblée nationale nommera et révoquera tous les fonctionnaires, qu'elle choisira parmi ses membres ou en dehors d'elle :

Aux Affaires étrangères, les Agents diplomatiques, les Consuls généraux et les Gouverneurs.

A la Guerre, depuis le grade de Lieutenant jusques et y compris celui de Maréchal de France.

A la Marine, depuis le grade de Lieutenant jusques et y compris celui d'Amiral.

A la Justice, les Conseillers, Juges, Substituts, Procureurs et Présidents de tous les tribunaux.

Aux Cultes, les Vicaires, Curés, Evêques, Archevêques, Cardinaux, et les Ministres des autres cultes.

A l'Instruction publique, les Professeurs, Censeurs, Proviseurs, Inspecteurs et Recteurs.

A l'Intérieur, les Sous-préfets, les Secrétaires généraux, les Préfets, le Conseil d'Etat ; les Maires et Adjoints sur la présentation des Conseils municipaux élus par chaque commune.

Aux Finances, les Receveurs particuliers, les Receveurs généraux; les Directeurs, Sous-Directeurs, Contrôleurs, Inspecteurs de l'Enregistrement et des Domaines; la Cour des comptes.

A l'Agriculture, les Comices agricoles, les Chambres d'agriculture, le Conseil général d'agriculture.

Au Commerce, les Consuls, les Missions commerciales et les Chambres de commerce.

Aux Travaux publics, les Architectes, Ingénieurs en chef et Ingénieurs des mines, etc.

Pour les nominations à ces fonctions, grades et honneurs, il sera procédé ainsi :

L'Assemblée nationale nommera dans son sein autant de Commissions spéciales (de dix membres chacune) qu'il y aura de Ministres; Commissions dont les membres ne pourront être pris que parmi les Représentants qui auront fait des études approfondies sur ce dont ils pourront être appelés à connaître. Chaque Commission sera présidée par le Ministre dans les attributions respectives de son département.

Le Ministre présentera à la Commission spéciale un rapport motivé sur les promotions à faire, les grades et les honneurs à distribuer. Ce rapport mentionnera les services, la capacité, le mérite des personnes proposées. La Commission prononcera à la majorité absolue, et sur ce le Ministre présentera un rapport conforme à cette décision à l'Assemblée nationale, laquelle acceptera ou rejettera à la majorité relative.

Toute nomination, tout grade, tout titre, tout signe d'honneur distinctif, sera décrété par l'Assemblée nationale au nom du Peuple.

Pour les révocations il sera procédé ainsi :

L'Assemblée nationale révoquera tout fonctionnaire,

ou par sa propre initiative, ou sur le rapport motivé du Ministre en conseil de la Commission spéciale.

Tout mandataire, Représentant du Peuple ou non, Président, Ministre, Ambassadeur, Gouverneur, Consul, Général, Amiral, Préfet, Maire, tout fonctionnaire, sera personnellement responsable de son mandat.

Parmi les partisans des Bourbons, des d'Orléans, des Napoléons, parmi tous ceux qui font briller aux yeux du Peuple ce drapeau qu'ils appellent le Parti de l'ordre, et qui, pour le bonheur du Pays, disent-ils, veulent faire passer leurs idoles en se posant comme les amis et les guides du Peuple, qui voyons-nous? Nous ne voyons que ceux qui, par l'une de ces dynasties, ont acquis des honneurs, des titres, des grades, des emplois, des pensions, etc., etc., Ministres ou autres. Ce sont tous, sans doute, des hommes très honorables et qui témoignent leur gratitude envers ceux qui leur ont donné des emplois, des pensions, et les ont comblés de richesses, de titres et d'honneurs. Ils montrent ainsi qu'ils portent en eux le sentiment de la reconnaissance envers leurs bienfaiteurs, Rois ou Princes, qui, dans leur conviction, représentaient le Pays! Ils croient par là servir leur Patrie; mais point, ils servent des individualités; ils sont les sujets de telle ou telle dynastie. Et puisque la France avait, dans un temps, concentré toute sa puissance, tous ses droits en tel ou tel roi, en telle ou telle dynastie, ne serait-ce pas une injustice d'imputer à crime l'attachement de ces fidèles serviteurs à leurs maîtres?...

Où sont les véritables défenseurs du Pays? — Ne les cherchez point parmi les courtisans des rois et des princes. Il faut aujourd'hui pour le bonheur du Pays que la France rentre dans ses droits, qu'elle ne les transmette plus qu'à ses élus, à l'Assemblée nationale. Elle seule

représentera fidèlement le Pays; ses membres seront les dignes et vrais représentants d'un Peuple libre, qui vivra prospère, avec ce bonheur que Dieu ne réserve qu'aux Peuples justes. C'est ainsi qu'on aura brisé à jamais et éteint pour toujours ce qu'on appelle *les partis*. Il n'y aura réellement plus *qu'un parti*, celui du Peuple, du Pays entier. Tout dévouement, tout sentiment de reconnaissance ne sera que pour la Patrie, pour la France seule, représentée avec vérité par elle-même sous le nom de République.

Aux fusionnistes je dirai : Vous cherchez à fusionner quoi? — Prince avec Prince, Roi avec Roi, Dynastie avec Dynastie ; puis vous prenez votre œuvre et l'imposez au Pays, sans le consulter même : vous excluez le Peuple, vous excluez le Pays.

Moi, je veux une fusion autre que la vôtre : je veux fusionner Princes, Rois, Dynasties avec le Peuple. Ce sera là une fusion fortement cimentée; au lieu que la vôtre, si elle se réalisait, ne serait que comme la paille devant le feu.

Si, parmi les Princes, se trouve un homme d'un haut mérite, d'un génie supérieur, il pourra, lui, aussi bien que tout autre, devenir Représentant, Ministre ou Président, mais sous les mêmes conditions que tout autre citoyen.

Dans le système dynastique, supposons qu'un Bourbon, un Napoléon ou un d'Orléans réunisse en lui seul les qualités, les vertus de toute sa lignée, s'il pouvait s'en rencontrer un aussi bien doté, et qu'avec lui la France puisse vivre heureuse; mais ce prince n'est qu'un homme, et ne vivra pas toujours! ses vertus, son génie, seront-ils inoculés à son successeur? à tous ses descendants?... Et si son successeur ne possède pas ces vertus,

ce génie, le bonheur pour le Peuple sera de nouveau perdu!... La mort d'un chef de dynastie entraîne toujours tant de changements, que le Pays tôt ou tard se trouve bouleversé. Et si ses descendants ne répondent point aux vœux du Pays, on arrivera encore à de nouvelles révolutions, toujours tristes et terribles!...

Avec la République ainsi constituée, tous ces inconvénients n'existeront plus.

L'Assemblée nationale nommera le plus digne du Pays, prince ou plébéien, celui qu'elle aura jugé capable de mener à bien le vaisseau de l'Etat dirigé par elle seule. Si elle se trompait dans son choix, elle reviendrait de son erreur sans secousse en donnant le Pouvoir à un autre. Si un tel malheur arrivait au bout d'un temps plus ou moins long, le Pays n'en serait point troublé; parce que le Gouvernement, qui est l'Assemblée nationale, serait toujours là; elle serait le pilote expérimenté représentant la force, la Volonté nationale, le Pouvoir, l'Unité, comme le *Dieu-un* devant qui l'Univers s'incline!... Et la France serait sauvée!...

En effaçant les droits de la nation, et en mettant à leur place les droits d'une dynastie quelconque, a-t-on bien pesé les désordres, les bouleversements, les ruines qu'on aura soulevés, et le gouffre de malheurs sans fin qu'on aura creusé sur le sol de la Patrie?...

Un Pays sera toujours sûr de trouver un chef digne de le gouverner quand il le choisira parmi trente-six millions d'âmes, pouvant le révoquer en tout temps s'il ne remplissait pas sa mission, révocation qui se ferait sans secousse. Mais un Pays ne sera jamais sûr de trouver un digne chef lorsqu'il se bornera à circonscrire son choix dans une seule famille quelconque, souvent réduite à un seul individu qui ne possède parfois aucune

des vertus de ses pères, et qui pourrait, au contraire, n'étaler aux yeux du Peuple que les vices des rois fainéants, stupides, fous ou criminels.

Le Peuple qui, pour son gouvernement, adopte le principe de l'hérédité dans une famille, branche ou dynastie, n'est plus un Peuple libre.

Le parti des Bourbons aimerait-il ainsi son Pays pour sacrifier la France entière à sa gloire, à sa satisfaction personnelle d'avoir Henri pour roi? pour roi, pendant quelques années seulement; car cette dynastie s'éteint avec lui, elle ne laisse point de postérité, dût-il, lui, vivre même toute la vie d'un homme. Et après, qui lui succédera?... Et si ce prince mourait avant son temps, il y aurait encore de nouveaux bouleversements. Et c'est pour encenser votre idole, pour satisfaire votre orgueil, que le repos de la France serait sacrifié à jamais!... Et vous dites que vous aimez la France, que vous aimez votre Patrie!...

Le parti des d'Orléans est nombreux. Les d'Orléans ont laissé dans le Pays des souvenirs de leur charité, de leurs vertus de famille. Le Pays leur tient compte aussi de leur noble résignation, de s'être tenus, aux jours de leurs grands malheurs, loin de toute intrigue, de toute trame contre la France.

Le parti des Napoléons remémorie le génie de l'empereur Napoléon, et la gloire qu'il a léguée à la France!..

A vous tous, les portes de la France seront ouvertes; elle vous accueillera comme de dignes enfants, au même titre que tout bon Français; vous aurez les mêmes droits que tout citoyen, rien de plus. Par vos talents, votre génie et vos vertus seules, vous pouvez espérer d'être appelés par le vœu de la nation à la tête de la République.

Un grand Peuple ne doit avoir pour Chef que le plus

digne du Pays, élu par chaque génération. Ce Peuple sera alors le Peuple-Roi.

עיני בנאמני־ארץ לשבת עמדי הלך בדרך ר־מים הוא ישרתני :

« J'ai (dit l'Esprit-Saint) les yeux (fixés) sur les hom-
« mes fidèles à leur Pays; je les ferai asseoir à mes
« côtés. Celui qui marche dans une voie parfaite sera
« mon serviteur!... » (*Psaumes*, CI, 6.)

Le parti des Républicains, ce parti qui veut la liberté et non la licence, l'ordre et non le désordre, la vérité et non le mensonge, le bien et non le mal; ce parti qui laisse à chaque membre honorable de la grande famille son droit, au Peuple son pouvoir, oui, la République ralliera tous ses enfants sous son drapeau, parce qu'elle est le seul gouvernement de vérité.

Alors son étendard flottera d'un bout de l'Univers à l'autre, et portera aux Peuples ce signe :

יהוה עמנו·

DIEU EST AVEC NOUS !...

LES FRANÇAIS

ET

LES ANGLAIS.

LONDRES:
DE L'IMPRIMERIE DE J. WERTHEIMER ET CIE.,
CIRCUS PLACE, FINSBURY CIRCUS.

1856.

Le 24 Mars, 1856.

CHER AMI,

En réponse à vos observations sur la France et l'Angleterre j'ai déjà jeté quelques pensées à la hâte, dans ma lettre précédente.

Vous connaissez ma doctrine trinitaire, résultat de l'union ou du mariage des deux principes co-existant, sympathiques et corrélatifs? L'Actif, le Passif, et le Résultat:

Esprit,	Matière,	Univers.
Ame,	Corps,	Homme.
Epoux,	Epouse,	Famille.
Ouvriers,	Matériaux,	Edifice.
etc.	etc.	etc.

Il est donc inutile de m'étendre davantage sur ce sujet qui fait la matière de tout un volume et qui sert de préliminaires à mon histoire universelle.

Afin d'être plus clair, dans ce que je voulais vous dire dans ma 1ere lettre, je dois remonter, l'histoire à la main, à l'origine des nations françaises et anglaises.

Les anciennes républiques ne se formèrent que dans l'état barbare ou nomade de la société, le plus voisin de l'état sauvage.

Je ne vous dis rien de nouveau au début de cet exposé; je ne fais que répéter (mais d'après ma méthode) ce qu'on a déjà dit depuis longtems et tant de fois.

L'homme sauvage, de même que tout autre animal, n'a paru

sur la terre qu'avec son *Droit*; le *Devoir* était inconnu dans l'état primitif.

Mais qu'est ce que le Droit dans le sens primordial et pur de ce mot?

C'est une émanation de la loi naturelle, c'est une prérogative, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, dans la succession des êtres, relativement au *Postérieur* sur *l'Antérieur*.

L'herbe, c'est-à-dire les plantes en général, étant postérieures à la terre ont un droit sur cette dernière. Elles germent, se nourrissent, se parent et se développent dans leurs beautés aux dépens de la terre.—Voilà les premières nymphes.

Les animaux herbivores comme postérieurs ont un droit sur la terre et les plantes leurs antérieures. Ce sont les premiers Seigneurs et possesseurs des plaines, des forêts et des montagnes.

Les animaux carnivores comme postérieurs encore, ont un droit, sur la terre, les forêts et les animaux qui se nourrissent d'herbes.

L'homme comme la dernière des œuvres de la création a un droit sur les trois règnes de la nature: le minéral, le végétal, et l'animal.—C'est le premier roi.

Partant à présent du premier homme: l'enfant a des droits sur ses parens, il se nourrit du sang de sa mère; il dispose des veilles de celle-ci, il jouit du fruit du travail de son père.

Il posséde à son insu deux défenseurs sincères et tendres; il hérite de leurs biens; il est doté en naissant de deux serviteurs constants et dévoués toujours prêts à se sacrifier pour lui.

Donc, la génération qui suit hérite nécessairement de la génération qui précéde: tous les biens matériels, toutes les idées, toutes les inventions des générations précédentes nous reviennent par conséquent de droit.

Et ainsi de suite....

Mais ce qui est un droit pour l'un devient inévitablement un devoir pour l'autre.

Le droit de l'eau devient un devoir pour la terre.

Le droit de l'herbe devient un devoir pour l'eau et la terre.

Le droit des animaux devient un devoir pour l'herbe, l'eau et la terre.

Le droit de l'homme devient un devoir pour tous les produits des trois règnes.

Les droits de l'enfant deviennent des devoirs pour ses parens.

Les droits des générations futures deviennent des devoirs pour la génération actuelle.

Et plus le devoir est naturel, plus il est facile, agréable, doux et salutaire. . . . . car le plaisir matériel de *recevoir* ne saurait se comparer au plaisir intellectuel et moral de *donner*.

Voilà le principe ou l'origine de la vraie morale.

Les premières sociétés sortirent de l'état sauvage. Les hommes n'y apportèrent du Devoir que le germe ou une espèce d'instinct presqu'égal à celui que les autres animaux ont de nourrir et de défendre leurs petits; tandisque le Droit se trouvait chez eux, développé dans toute sa force primitive et brutale.

Le Droit sans le Devoir est presque le synonyme de l'Egoïsme ou de la Liberté exclusive.

Le Devoir sans le Droit est aussi le synonyme de l'Abnégation exclusive ou de la servitude.

L'homme n'a pour point de départ que l'ἐγώ (le moi) d'où dérive le mot Egoïsme.

Et l'Egoïsme comme premier sentiment conservateur de l'homme, comme soin primordial de son *moi*, comme pourvoyeur exclusif, d'abord pour son propre être, puis pour les siens, fut par conséquent le premier stimulant des sociétés primitives.

L'instinct de défendre et d'assurer sa vie de propager son espéce, poussa l'homme qui se trouvait au gré du hasard et à la merci du plus fort à s'associer à un autre homme, à former les premières bandes d'où sortirent les premières familles, les premières tribus ou communautés qui furent les élémens des premières sociétés.

Plus ces dernières devinrent nombreuses, plus le germe du Devoir se développa et plus le Droit exclusif devait tôt ou tard être réprouvé, condamné même.

Les intelligences du premier ordre, les premiers philosophes et moralistes, loin d'être partisans ou apôtres du Droit, ne firent au contraire que le combattre à outrance, en lui opposant comme principe moralisateur le Devoir.

Après une longue et continuelle lutte, le Devoir finit par

être reconnu comme une émanation de l'Esprit du Bien et le Droit fut réprouvé comme le fruit de l'esprit du Mal ! On substitua l'Abnégation à l'Egoïsme.

Lorsqu'on lutte contre la nature, on fait la guerre aux lois même du Créateur et la nature doit triompher.

L'Egoïsme combattu à outrance par toutes les doctrines ne se révolta qu'avec plus de violence . . . et il se forma bientôt deux camps: Celui du Droit ou de l'Egoïsme et celui du Devoir ou de l'Abnégation.

Le premier comme plus vigoureux et plus violent fut toujours vainqueur; le second comme doux et inoffensif fut vaincu.

La société fut ainsi composée d'une minorité de privilegiés qui devaient jouir du Droit et d'une infinie majorité qui ne devait connaître que le Devoir.

Dans les anciennes républiques, la morale, c'était le devoir, la religion le devoir, la politique le devoir.

Et comme ces républiques ou démocraties ne furent enfantées que par des révolutions, on y renversa l'ordre des choses établies dans les Etats théocratiques et monarchiques. Le Droit devint la prérogative de la société entière et le Devoir ne fut imposé qu'à l'individu.

L'esclave d'un despote ou d'une caste, devint l'esclave de la Cité, du Peuple, de la nation entière. Le Droit n'appartenait plus qu'à l'homme collectif et le Devoir qu'à l'homme individuel.

Et comme l'homme collectif n'existe qu'en imagination, l'homme réel dut de nouveau courber la tête sous le joug du Devoir. Il dut reconnaître et servir des milliers de tyrans au lieu d'un.

On décora cette espèce de gouvernement du nom de *Démocratie* ou souveraineté du Peuple.

Telles furent les républiques de la Grèce.

Là, un Aristide devait subir, sans murmurer, la condamnation de l'ostracisme pour le seul crime d'avoir été *juste*.

Socrate devait boire la cigüe pour le crime de lése-vice et pour avoir donné l'exemple de la vertu pratique . . . .

Telle fut ensuite la république de Rome, où les capacités, les talens, les vertus par *excellence* devaient être frappées de l'exil comme dangereuses pour l'égalité générale des citoyens. Toute tête excédant le niveau commun devait être nivelée par la hache du bourreau.

Tel fut aussi l'état de la Judée. On s'y faisait un devoir, au nom de la religion et de la morale publique, de persécuter jusqu'à la mort tous les prophètes, pour le seul crime d'être les plus éclairés, les plus justes et les plus vertueux membres d'une société pervertie et corrompue.

Sur les types qu'on vient de citer, ou pour mieux dire—et en partant spontanément du même principe—pour combattre l'Egoïsme en combattant le Droit, et pour moraliser l'homme par le Devoir et l'Abnégation, on forma aussi les républiques de la vieille Gaule.

Une abnégation absolue du *moi*, le sacrifice de ses biens au bien public, l'holocauste de soi-même sur l'autel du devoir et toujours le devoir, constituaient selon la doctrine druidique le véritable citoyen.

Cet abus du Devoir comme nous venons de le dire, fit tomber l'humanité sous le joug du despotisme soit individuel, soit collectif.

Voilà, dans les sociétés de l'ancien monde, la forme gouvernementale sous laquelle les hommes avaient été façonnés ou pervertis depuis plus de deux mille ans.

Servitude individuelle, servitude collective, servitude corporelle, servitude spirituelle.

Les premiers qui osèrent établir la *véritable* justice, équilibrer les deux principes, harmoniser ou marier, pour ainsi dire, *dans le même individu*, le Droit avec le Devoir, l'Egoïsme avec l'Abnégation, la Liberté avec l'Egalité, durent tomber martyrs du salut humain, et être accusés d'immoralité et d'athéisme.

Personne comme Jésus Christ ne vint, dans l'ancien monde, pour mieux équilibrer ou marier ces deux principes et c'est à juste titre qu'il prit le nom d'Epoux, de Médiateur (Messie), de Sauveur ou Rédempteur.

Et personne comme lui ne subit un martyre plus atroce et plus humiliant.

Il fut crucifié entre deux voleurs!—Barabas fut plus digne des sympathies du peuple que lui! Barabas fut considéré comme plus honnête, plus innocent que le fils de Marie!

Christ se sacrifia! et sa *bonne nouvelle* ne fut d'abord qu'une nouvelle, sa doctrine n'était qu'en théorie sans être même écrite; elle ne fut pratiquée d'abord que par une faible minorité des adeptes de ses disciples.

Et cette minorité, partout persécutée, n'ayant où reposer sa

tête parmi les idolâtres, finit par ne connaitre que le Devoir sans jamais jouir du Droit.

Lorsque le Passif dépasse l'Actif, il y a nécessairement faillite.

Et lorsque la faillite morale devient universelle, lorsque la société est pervertie jusque dans son dernier membre,—

Lorsque toutes les parties du corps social s'agitent et que par des convulsions, pour ainsi démoniaques, elles frappent tout ce qu'il y a de plus sain dans la société; il n'y a plus de remède: la nature doit sauver la nature.

L'homme sauvage, type de l'homme primitif, doit alors *fatalement* (inévitablement) venir pour régénerer l'homme perverti; car l'un, poussé par l'Egoïsme naturel, devient téméraire; et l'autre, rendu craintif par le Devoir, ne résiste pas.

L'un est guidé par la nature, l'autre, façonné par les philosophes, les moralistes et les théologiens, n'est guidé que par ses tyrans.

Les barbares vinrent renverser l'ancien monde, Rome et Bizance, et régénérer l'Occident et l'Orient.—Voilà les races teuthoniques, les Arabes et les Turcomans.

Les uns embrassent le Chistianisme, les autres l'Islamisme.

Ces deux religions ayant le même but de rendre les croyants héritiers de la terre, en reconnaissant le Droit et le Devoir, furent adoptées par deux races pleines de la sève de la vie et de l'activité; car elles étaient remplies de l'Egoïsme *primitif*.

Je n'entends pas ici l'égoïsme énervé des sociétés corrompues et perverties.

Lorsqu'il fait froid, on désire naturellement la chaleur.

Lorsqu'il pleut beaucoup on désire le soleil;

Et lorsque la terre brûle sous les rayons continuels et ardents du soleil on désire le froid et la pluie.

De même, dans le froid du Droit exclusif de l'Egoïsme primitif et sauvage, on dut avoir besoin de la chaleur du Devoir ou de l'Abnégation.

Et plus tard, lorsque l'équilibre fut rompu par la surabondance du Devoir général et brûlant d'une Abnégation exclusive et inflammatoire, on devait sentir le besoin du froid de l'Egoïsme et de la fraicheur du Droit.

En un mot, on voulait s'appartenir.

La pluie est féconde, le soleil est vivifiant.— Le Droit est fécond, le Devoir est vivifiant.

Mais la vie sans fruits est stérile, et le Devoir sans Droit étant aussi stérile, il en résulte la servitude; et l'on veut être libre.

Plus le Devoir brulait et demandait d'hécatombes en holocauste, plus il rendait stérile la société et plus facilement les barbares pouvaient y entrer comme des torrents et la renverser sans obstacle.

L'Empire Romain ne se composait que d'une majorité d'esclaves ou de victimes et d'une minorité de patriciens et de leur satellites énervés.

L'ancien monde n'avait plus de défenseurs ni à l'Occident ni à l'Orient.

Les Vandales, les Goths, les Normands, les Huns, les Francs, les Germains, les Teuthons en un mot, passent en Italie, dans les Gaules, en Espagne, dominent enfin en Occident et en deviennent les Seigneurs.

En Orient, les Musulmans s'emparent de l'Asie Mineure, de l'Egypte, et par l'Afrique, passent en Espagne et en France. Ces deux races de barbares, semblables à deux branches d'un cataclysme, embrassent les trois continents et viennent se rencontrer et se choquer sur les frontières de la Gaule.

Egyptiens, Hébreux, Grecs, Romains, Gaulois...tout ce qui dans l'ancien monde avait soif du Droit, ne leur opposa aucune resistance.

Et c'était naturel, car les esclaves n'éprouvent aucun intérêt à défendre leurs maitres;—il n'y avait aucun lien pour unir les hommes et les rendre forts.—Le paganisme était en décadence, le christianisme était parodié dans le catholicisme. L'église officielle de Rome et de Byzance en reniant le Christ, était devenue l'instrument du despotisme: le Droit selon elle ne provenait que du diable, le Devoir seul sanctifiait et sauvait l'homme.

La terre brûlait, et faute d'une pluie régulière et repartie avec justice, on désirait et on avait besoin même d'un déluge.

Tout subit le joug excepté les enfans de la nature: les barbares de l'Orient et ceux de l'Occident; quant aux déshérités et aux esclaves de l'ancien monde, le nouveau joug leur parut plus léger que celui sous lequel ils se courbaient naguère.

En effet, la société prit un tout autre aspect: les vendeurs *de corps et* D'ÂMES[1] disparurent. Au lieu de patriciens et d'esclaves, de prétoriens et de plébéiens, on ne vit plus que des seigneurs et des serfs, des conquérants et des conquis.

[1] Apocalypse, xviii. 13.

Le peuple devint l'instrument de ses propres tyrans: il persécuta, massacra, extermina les apôtres de ses propres libertés ainsi que les adeptes de ceux-ci.

Les Ariens, les Hugenots, tous les réformateurs, tous les protestants, en un mot, tombèrent victimes de ceux mêmes pour le salut des quels ils se sacrifiaient.

Les nouvelles doctrines qui tendaient à l'affranchissement du peuple, persécutées par les Gaulois, les Grecs et les Romains, par tout ceux enfin qui étaient fanatisés dans le culte exclusif du Devoir, allèrent se réfugier chez les peuples de race teuthonique.

Car la foi, l'existence même des Anglo-Germains ne se basaient que sur le Droit, et tout ce qui tendait en faveur de ce principe était bien venu chez eux.

Le protestantisme inventa le système constitutionnel, baptisa ou évangélisa la république en y faisant reconnaître dans chaque citoyen l'Oint du Seigneur et en y instituant la liberté personnelle comme base, ou élément de la liberté publique.

Le Droit et le Devoir de chacun et de tous y furent reconnus et adoptés pour ainsi dire comme dogme; tandis que de leur côté le catholicisme et l'orthodoxie grecque consolidèrent plus que jamais le despotisme par le soi-disant *Droit divin*.

Le bien doit sortir de l'excès même du mal.

Plus le catholicisme abusa de la crédulité de ses adeptes, plus l'exaspération devint générale lorsqu'il s'empara du corps aussi bien que de l'âme de ces pauvres croyants. Les catholiques abusés durent tôt ou tard finir par penser comme les protestants.

Les intelligences du dix-huitième siècle, guidés par l'expérience, au lieu de prêcher une nouvelle doctrine, trouvèrent plus expéditif de frapper à coups de hache le catholicisme. Ces nouveaux prophètes se donnèrent le nom de philosophes.

Le Matérialisme, le Scepticisme même devint à la mode, tout fut Voltairien.

Ces philosophes plus modestes dans leurs prétensions à l'immortalité, se gardèrent bien de convoiter la cigüe de Socrate ou le bucher de J. Hus, ils se bornèrent à imiter Lucien, qui se moquait de toutes les divinités du paganisme, sans jamais avouer la sienne.

On sait qu'il n'est pas difficile d'obtenir le nom d'athée,

lorsqu'on n'est pas adorateur du pape, et surtout lorsqu'on refuse de faire du Christ le compère des pharisiens et le complice des despotes. Pourtant le nombre des athées se multiplie chaque jour davantage à mesure que les crimes de l'église *officielle* et de la royauté se multiplient.

Qu'importe le nom, lorsque le but et le dévouement sont grands et salutaires. On devient Paria; on se fait comme Christ Anathème, pour sauver l'humanité de l'Anathème.

C'est par l'Athéïsme ou par le Scepticisme qu'on a chassé du ciel les divinités du paganisme; c'est par l'athéïsme aussi qu'on entreprend de briser l'autorité du pape.

Mais ces prophètes déguisés en Athées, devaient aussi avoir leur Messie. La terre était en douleurs et enfanta la grande révolution!

A sa vue, l'Autel s'ébranle, les droits féodaux s'écroulent et entrainent dans leur chute le soi-disant *Droit divin!*

Mais qui sont les soldats de cette révolutions, les guerriers intrépides de ce nouveau monarque, qui vient ainsi régénérer la France et toute l'Europe avec elle?

Toujours les descendants des gaulois, les français, les adorateurs de l'Egalité.

Pour eux, la Liberté ne fut après plusieurs siècles d'inégalité matérielle, spirituelle et morale, qu'un moyen pour parvenir à l'Egalité.

Mais ils ne se servirent, un moment, du Droit que pour retomber sous le joug de Devoir.

Le choc des principes produit d'abord la confusion, le chaos, d'où peut sortir une nouvelle création.

Dans cet état de chose, il n'était pas difficile ou premier ambitieux venu de réduire le peuple à son ancienne Egalité devant un despote.

L'Empire s'éleva bientôt et sans obstacle sur les ruines de la République, et sur les ruines de l'Empire vint ensuite se rétablir, avec la restauration, toujours le *Droit divin.*

Par la Sainte-Alliance les rois devinrent solidaires les uns des autres et le Droit de l'homme fut partout persécuté. On crut même un moment qu'il avait disparu pour toujours.

Mais loin de là; et c'est du Droit que l'on pourrait dire avec justice: „les foudres de l'enfer de prévaudront point contre lui." Comme il est naturel à l'homme et qu'il émane de Dieu même et par conséquent véritablement divin, il est impérissable de

sa nature et lorsqu'il paraît anéanti il se retrouve latent dans l'existence même du Devoir.

Les efforts que firent l'Empire et la restauration contre la Liberté furent vains. La servitude dans ses amours illégales enfanta la Liberté; ou, pour m'exprimer plus clairement, c'est toujours parmi les opprimés que se trouvent les aspirants à la Liberté.

La lutte est continuelle quoique muette sous le despotisme; elle n'attend que l'excès de la tyranie pour éclater.

Charles X. amène 1830 — une nouvelle victoire et une nouvelle défaite.

Louis Philippe amène 1848 — une nouvelle action et une nouvelle réaction.

La seconde République amène un second Empire.

Mais pourquoi donc cette continuelle succession de victoires et de défaites; pourquoi tant de difficultés et d'obstacles pour consolider la Liberté sur le sol de la France?

Et pourquoi en Suisse, en Angleterre et en Allemagne, aux Etats Unis de l'Amérique le Droit et la Liberté ont-ils toujours été les bien venus et y ont-ils toujours trouvé une terre hospitalière?

Parce que les Prophètes, les Apôtres, les martyrs de la liberté gauloise ou française étant en minorité eurent toujours d'un coté, à combattre les tyrans et de l'autre à convertir un peuple qui faisait la force du despotisme par le culte de l'Egalité.

Parce que ce qui était difficile chez les descendans des Grecs, des Romains et des Gaulois (la liberté individuelle) était très facile et même naturel chez les races nouvelles.

L'Anglais et l'Allemand étaient libres et indisciplinés dans leur origine, comme les Bachi-bouzous, farouches, froids et cupides, leur âme ne connaissait d'autre peur que celle des divinités infernales, mais leur corps sentait le besoin des climats plus chauds et plus fertiles.

En contact, par leurs conquêtes, avec le reste du monde classique, baptisés par l'esprit évangélique, les farouches devinrent altiers, les cupides économes ou intéressés, et l'intérêt les poussa à faire de la liberté individuelle le principe de la liberté publique.

Parlez leur du Droit et de la Liberté ils vous comprennent — mais ils s'effarouchent ils deviennent rétifs dès que vous leur parlez du Devoir et de l'Egalité.

Le respect pour les anciennes lois et coutûmes, le majorat

dans les familles, les titres féodaux, l'intérêt personnel, tout ce qui tend à l'inégalité aura toujours des partisans et des défenseurs zélés parmi eux.

Ils seront toujours tolérants et prodigues pour tout ce qui concerne la Liberté et très avares pour ce qui est en faveur de l'Egalité.

Tandis que le Gaulois, le Romain et le Grec tendent toujours à perpétuer les doctrines classiques de l'antiquité et à soutenir le système catholique du Devoir.

Si le Français se soulève pour secouer le joug, sa colère s'appaise aussitôt que la gloire l'éblouit et que l'Egalité redevient le principe exclusif des nouvelles doctrines.—Le lion populaire devient agneau et se laisse paître même par une verge de fer.

Les Anglais et les Allemands sortis du sein de la nature raisonnent avec leur propre tête, leur propre intelligence et calculent par conséquent mieux; tandis que les descendants des Gaulois n'ont, pour la plupart, que le raisonnement qui leur a été façonné par les doctrines druidiques et le système catholique.

Tout ce qui est libéral en France est franc ou teuthonique.

Tout ce qui est égalitaire en Allemagne et en Angleterre, est gaulois.

Les Français formeront le cœur des Anglais et des Allemands.

Les Anglais et les Allemands formeront l'esprit des Français.

Ces deux races, établiront l'une par l'autre l'équilibre entre les deux principes du Droit et du Devoir, de la Liberté et de l'Egalité.

Mais que dites-vous? m'objectera-t-on. Qui vous a dit, que le Français est l'abnégation personnifiée, le sentiment du devoir incarné sur la terre; l'agneau pascal toujours prêt à tendre sa gorge au couteau, soit du vendeur (le clergé), soit du mangeur (le pouvoir).

Où voyez-vous plus d'égoïsme, plus d'intérêt personnel qu'en France?

Oui, en pratique et surtout dans la classe intermédiaire c'est vrai; mais en théorie, en doctrine, en dogme?—Le Devoir l'Abnégation, sont les bases de la foi, la religion invétérée et exclusive du Français.

Et voilà le mal qui est devenu le pire, et le pire qui engendrera le bien.

Les croyances populaires ont une immense influence sur les grands évènements; elles deviennent les obstacles les plus tenaces au progrès, et surtout lorsqu'elles n'existent que dans le dogme sans être pratiquées.

Dans cet état de choses la société est doublement pervertie; d'abord dans son origine par une imparfaite ou fausse doctrine; et plus tard par le mépris et la non pratique de cette même doctrine.

Si le Français pratiquait les préceptes de sa foi, le mal ne serait pas pire, et le bien ne serait pas prochain.

Expliquons nous plus clairement sur ce qui vient d'être dit:

Qui est plus matériel, plus charnel, plus avare, plus gastrodotte[1] que le prêtre? Et cependant il ne professe, il ne prêche que le spiritualisme, la chasteté, la charité et le jeûne.

Qui s'arroge plus le droit de tout faire que le roi, le seigneur et le prélat? Et pourtant les premiers ne forcent qu'au *Devoir* et le dernier ne prêche que le *Devoir*.

En France, l'Egoïsme n'est pas un principe dogmatique; c'est un symptôme, une protestation contre le dogme exclusif de l'Abnégation.

Là, où les uns s'efforcent d'étouffer l'un des deux principes de l'éternelle justice, les autres doivent protester et se révolter avec violence à l'insu même de l'homme, et jusqu'à ce que l'équilibre soit rétabli.

Voyez le catholicisme et la philosophie germanique: l'un et l'autre sont exclusivement spirituels. Le premier méprise la matière, la seconde a poussé l'audace jusqu'à la nier cette matière.—Voilà leur orthodoxie en théorie.

Mais en pratique, personne ne vit plus pour manger que les Allemands, les Anglais et le prêtre catholique; personne, comme eux, ne satisfait son corps; rien ne s'aurait émouvoir ces soi-disant spiritualistes que l'intérêt et toujours l'intérêt personnel.

D'un autre côté la philosophie française, en protestant contre le spiritualisme exclusif des catholiques, tomba dans l'extrémité contraire et devint exclusivement matérielle. Les philosophes français poussèrent leur sensualisme jusqu'à nier l'existence de l'esprit; et pourtant aucun peuple ne se fait tuer pour une *idée* comme le français.

[1] Je me sers du mot *gastrodotte* pour nuancer un peu plus fortement ma pensée. Gastronome veut dire connaisseur des lois du *ventre* ou des règles de l'art culinaire; c'est le *gourmet*. *Gastrodotte* veut dire esclave du ventre; *gourmand*.

L'un des caractères qui distinguent le plus une société d'échue de l'état normal de l'homme: c'est la profession d'un principe et la pratique d'un autre.

La société tolère la pratique de ce que la Foi condamne, mais tant qu'elle est dans cet état d'hypocrisie, elle ne vous permet pas de le professer.

Plus le français devient égoïste plus il donne de preuves qu'il proteste, à son insu même, contre une Foi qui lui impose le Devoir et l'Abnégation.

Plus la philosophie germanique est spirituelle plus elle proteste contre le matérialisme inhérant dans la race teuthonique.

Pour finir, je dois compléter mon idée et par conséquent récapituler ce que j'ai dit, en partant toutefois d'un autre point de vue.

Comme Jésus Christ, je me servirai des verbes matériels *manger et boire*, dans l'intention de leur donner un sens spirituel et matériel tout à la fois:

„Prenez et mangez," dit le Sauveur, " ceci est mon corps. Buvez en tous car ceci est mon sang."[1]

„Si vous ne mangez la chair du Fils de l'Homme et ne buvez son sang, vous n'aurez pas la vie en vous."[2]

„Celui qui mange ma chair et boit mon sang demeure en moi et moi en lui."[3]

Chez les sauvages, le plus fort ou le vainqueur mangeait le faible et le vaincu.

Chez les barbares et les civilisés, celui qui opprime, c'est-à-dire, le privilegié, s'arrogeant pour lui seul et pour sa caste le Droit, a de tout temps, été appelé *dévorateur, mangeur.*

On a toujours vu des loups et des brebis, des bourreaux et des victimes, des oppresseurs et des opprimés, des *mangeurs* et des *mangés.*

On a vu aussi au commencement de cette épitre que toutes les créatures vivent et se nourrissent les unes des autres et que toutes ensemble, selon l'expression de Lamenais et d'autres, se nourrissent de Dieu.

Mais celui qui mange sera mangé à son tour, la fille qui mange au sein de sa mère sera à son tour mangée par sa fille.

[1] St. Matthieu xxvi. 26, 27 et 28.
[2] St. Jean vi. 54 [3] Ibid, vi. 57.

Passons des individus aux peuples, aux nations, et pour abréger nos assertions, quittons la haute antiquité et commençons par les Hellènes.

Les Romains, comme barbares, soumettent, au commencement de leur république, les Hellènes et d'autres peuples, et les *dévorent* pour ainsi dire.

Les Romains en *mangeant* les Hellènes, en se nourrissant de leur chair et de leur sang, sentent bientôt que leur cœur bat et que leur sang circule *Hellèniquement.*

Les Romains s'hellènisent, et les Hellènes se romanisent. Les Hellènes demeurent ainsi dans les Romains et ceux-ci dans les premiers.

Plus tard, les Greco-Romains en mangeant, par la persécution et le martyre, les premiers Chrétiens finirent par se christianiser et les Chrétiens par se paganiser.—Les uns demeurèrent ainsi dans les autres.

Les Franco-Germains, en dévorant les Gaulois et les Romains, finirent par se galliser et se latiniser en devenant Catholiques.

Mais le druidisme, se résumant, comme toutes les théories anciennes, dans le *Devoir* et le catholicisme contenant une grande dose de christianisme,[1] l'un et l'autre passèrent comme une espèce de levain dans la chair et le sang des Germains.

La chair et le sang des peuples deshérités du fils de l'Homme, finirent par rendre les Anglo-Germains régénérateurs du christianisme par leur protestation contre les abus de l'Eglise de Rome.—Le christianisme les a rendus Protestants et le *trop* du devoir Gaulois finira par les *humaniser.*

L'Anglais et l'Allemand qui eurent l'énergie de protester et de se révolter contre une église marâtre, et la force de braver les foudres du vatican et soutenir leur Droit, deviendront véritablement *hommes* lorsqu'ils seront Gallisés (ou Gaulisés).

D'un autre côté, le français ne saura apprécier le Droit, conquérir et *conserver* la Liberté qu'en se germanisant.

En nous mangeant, pour conserver la pensée de Jésus-Christ, les uns les autres, nous finirons par nous compléter en demeurant les uns dans les autres.

Le Christ se sert exprès des verbes *manger* et *boire,* comme pouvant avoir un double sens, matériel et spirituel: *saisir, comprendre,* c'est *dévorer, digérer* une idée, une doctrine, une vérité.

[1] Comme le Pharisaïsme contenait du Mosaïsme.

Celui qui écoute et adopte une doctrine, la dévore intellectuellement et s'en nourrit en esprit. Celui qui la persécute, la dévore matériellement en en faisant périr les apôtres.

En mangeant et en mangeant toujours, on finit par s'identifier avec l'objet dont on se nourrit.

Le VERBE par Excellence, le VERBE de la VIE, c'est l'ÊTRE, l'Existence matérielle et spirituelle en même tems. — Le Droit et le Devoir, la Liberté et l'Egalité, pris ensemble ou confondus l'un dans l'autre, engendreront l'être complet, l'homme naturel ou moral. Voilà la solution du problème social.

Celui qui ne mange pas la chair et ne boit pas le sang du VERBE n'aura pas la vie.

Toutes les nations qui ont méprisé ou persécuté l'un des deux principes du *Verbe :* l'ÊTRE; Hébreux, Grecs, Romains, Gaulois . . . . ont cessé de vivre comme Etats, et ne seront régénérés que lorsqu'ils reconnaitront et pratiqueront ces deux principes de l'Existence.

Mangeons nous les uns les autres. — Ecoutez-moi mes disciples; combattez-moi mes adversaires; aimez-moi mes amis; frappez-moi mes bourreaux, déchirez mon corps et mon honneur, mangez mes biens, sucez le fruit de mes sueurs de trente ans;

Car vous deviendrez tous mes frères en *Vérité ;* nous finirons tous par nous identifier les uns dans les autres.

Les défenseurs du Slavonisme en Roumanie, ont déjà commencé à se Roumaniser; les ciocoïs ont fini par devenir les avocats des paysans.

Mange Autrichien la chair du Maghiar, de l'Italien et du Roumain, suce leur sang, car tu finiras par te maghiariser . . . Déjà, en 1848, des Allemands, des Autrichiens même, combattaient contre toi dans les rangs des Maghiars et des Italiens.

Convoites-tu aussi la Moldo-Valachie? — Mange la; car tu mettras ainsi dans ton sein un tison qui brulera tes entrailles et le feu régénérateur qu'il allumera sera salutaire, même pour toi.

Mange, o Moscovite ! la chair du Polonais et d'autres peuples; suce leur sang, car tu finiras par renverser toi-même le Czarisme.

Laissons donc, mon ami, les Anglais et les Français rivaliser de puissance ou d'égoïsme et se manger mutuellement; ils ne se détruiront pas, comme vous les dites dans votre désespoir mais ils se perfectionneront les uns par les autres.

Les premiers, par le Droit et l'Egoïsme.

Les seconds, par le Devoir et l'Abnégation.

Et si les uns professent un principe et en pratiquent un autre, c'est qu'à leur insu et par instinct ils reconnaissent leur invincible puissance; c'est un pas dans la voie au bout de la quelle ils finiront par *professer* et *pratiquer* en même tems, les deux principes qui composent la vie.

L'âme isolée n'est pas la vie;

Le corps isolé n'est pas la vie.

Mais l'âme et le corps font l'homme.

Mais le Droit et le Devoir font la société.

Mais la Liberté et l'Egalité font la Fraternité, ou pour mieux dire l'Humanité.[1]

[1] C'est au figuré qu'on s'est toujours servi du mot fraternité. Humanité est le mot propre, dans son sens matériel et moral.

HISTORIA

DEL

PARTIDO LIBERAL

EN ESPAÑA.

—

INTRODUCION.

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EN ESPAÑA.

INTRODUCION.

Por ORENSE (J. M.)

BRUSELAS,

15 DICIEMBRE 1852.

INTRODUCION.

La ignorancia que he observado en Francia y otros Payses, de los hechos mas culminantes de la historia contemporanea de España, ha puesto la pluma en mi mano para que la verdad sea conocida.

Muchos creen á la Peninsula en una situacion, y con ideas semejantes á la de los siglos anteriores; este falso conocimiento de los hechos de este siglo, puede ser muy perjudicial á mi patria, y á los payses que tengan con ella relaciones diplomaticas ó comerciales, durante la nueva lucha que se presiente entre los Pueblos y los Gobiernos.

Las insurrecciones, invasiones, batallas, muertes, proscricciones y desgracias que hemos presenciado, nos han hecho envidiar la calma que gozaron nuestros abuelos; pero aquella calma produjo los males que hemos pasado nosotros.

Esperemos de la justicia de la Providencia, que asi como la Inglaterra despues de su Revolucion en el siglo XVII crecio en

prosperidad y gloria, sucederá lo mismo á la Peninsula, y que nuestros trabajos y esfuerzos, lograran ver una España al nivel sino superior á las otras naciones, como la fue en el siglo XV al concluir las guerras con los Arabes, que duraron siete siglos, sin cansar la constancia Castellana.

Los tres siglos de funesto reposo que siguieron al generoso esfuerzo de Padilla y los Comuneros en el siglo XVI nos han conducido á la postracion y al gran atraso en que estamos aun. Si en Villalar hubiera taiunfado la bandera de las comunidades, España hubiera tenido la posicion que cupó en Europa á la Inglaterra.

La historia de la Revolucion Española leida con meditacion hará ver su semejanza en muchos puntos, con las de Inglaterra y Francia que la precedieron : en otros brilla la originalidad Peninsular.

Se repitio hace años que en Europa la libertad era antigua y el despotisno moderno, y tal es la verdad. Cierto que la libertad de los siglos medios era imperfecta; pero las Cortes en España, los Estados Generales en Francia y los Parlamentos en Inglaterra, prueban que los sucesos de Francia en 1789 y los de Cadiz en 1812 eran unicamente una resurreccion. Las Cortes de Cadiz sosteniendo en el discurso preliminar de su famosa Constitucion, que era sacada de las antiguas leyes de Aragon y Castilla, y otros haciendo notar que era ignal á la de Francia de 1791, decian unos y otros la verdad.

Los Reinados de Carlos 3°. y Carlos 4°. prepararon la Revolucion Española, como los de Luis 14 y 15 la de Francia, y como los de Enrique 8°. Isabel y Jacobo 1°. la de Inglaterra. Mas el eclipse Parlamentario que duro pocos años en Inglaterra,

fue de 175 años en Francia, y de tres siglos en España (1).

En Inglaterra el protestantismo habia precedido á la Révolucion y el voltaireanismo en Francia; en España la Inquisicion habia impedido un trabajo semejante, y de aqui la tendencia religiosa de la Constitucion de Cadiz, en medio de su radicalismo politico.

La Revolucion Inglesa termino en 1688 al cavo de 40 años; mas de 60 van pasados en Francia y 44 en España, sin vislumbrarse el fin de sus sacudimientos.

Cuatro veces ha triunfado en España en este siglo el systema liberal, y otros tantas ha sucumbido, por faltas de los hombres que estaban en el poder, y por las intrigas de la Europa.

Los cuatro triunfos han sido como en Inglaterra y Francia no solo faciles, sino que han ocurrido cuando menos se esperaba.

Ecsaminemos vrevemente estos cuatro periodos, que comprenden con las reacciones que signieron casi medio siglo.

El primero ocurrio despues que España sufrió la corrupcion de la Corte de Carlos 4°. y el favoritismo impopular de Godoy, Principe de la Paz. Un movimiento popular obligó á abdicar el 19 marzo 1808 á Carlos 4°. en su hijo Fernando 7°. Napoleon quiere sustituir á este su hermano José. El mismo Pueblo que sufrio á Godoy veinte años, hizó una guerra heroica á Napoleon, apesar de abandonarle Fernando 7°. la corona.

Zaragoza rivaliza con Sagunto y Numancia, las Aguilas Imperiales triunfantes en toda Europa, pasan bajo los horcas cau-

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(1) Las Cortes despues de la muerte de Padilla, fueron solo un simulacro: El Pueblo las llmaba Cortes sordo-mudas.

dinas en Bailen, (1) y si á este triunfo siguieron mil derrotas, ellas despiertan la Europa y el nombre Español es sinonimo de heroismo, como cuando lidio con igual constancia contra los Romanos y los Moros : El atentado de Bayona costó caro á Napoleon y la España fue la causa principal de su caida, demostrando á la Europa que no era invencible.

Obtenida la venganza, España, como cansada de su gran esfuerzo, se deja dominar. Fernando 7°. en 1814 hallo en el general Elio un Monk Español.

Pero si les Diputados de las Cortes de Cadiz y de Madrid, iban á los Presidios y á la emigracion, la Constitucion de 1812 era popular entre la clase media é instruida de la Nacion, y se hacia un trabajo en la opinion que derrivo á Ferdinando 7°. al cavo de seis años.

El Pueblo hallo sus heroes en Quiroga y Riego, y el egercito que devia ir á establecer el despotismo en America, proclamó en 1820 la Constitucion de Cadiz : segunda vez el Pueblo Español se vio libre en el siglo XIX.

El liberalismo habia crecido durante la opresion : ya no se contentó con solo leyes politicas, quitó la mitad del diezmo, los mayorazgos, y los Frailes ricos. La libertad hubiera durado, si en 1823 no hubiera echo el Duque de Angulema, en nombre de toda la Europa absolutista con 100,000 Franceses, lo mismo que Elio en 1814. Riego murio en el cadalso como Padilla. La Inglaterra se contento con protestar.

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(1) Lamartine dice en la historia de la Restauracion Libro 7°. « Dupont cer» cado por los Ingleses y la milicia national, dio el primer exemplo de capitu» lar. » Ni una sola compañia Inglesa habia en Julio de 1808 en España.

Los Españoles esperaban que bien el egercito, bien el Pueblo frances se sublevarian en 1823. Sus deseos fueron vanos, y el decaimiento fue general en la Peninsula; quien habia deconocer en la España de 1823 la España heroica de 1808! quien en la Francia de 1823 la Francia de 1793!

La suerte de España fue en 1823, la de Castilla despues de la batalla de Villalar en el siglo XVI, y la de Aragon á la muerte del Gran-Justicia, decapitado por Felipe 2°.

Duró diez años la segunda tirania de Fernando 7°. Los frances lavaron su mancha en 1830; pero no deshicieron en España la obra de los 100,000 hijos de S^{n} Luis, y el nuevo Rey electivo, á quien se atribuia este abandono, fue mirado con odio por los patriotas Españales, á quienes engaño.

Si en 1814 hecho abajo el ejercito Español la libertad, la restablecio en 1820, y ya en 1823 tuvo que venir un egercito estrangero. En ambas ocasiones se establecio el despotismo sin mascara.

Se restablecio y sucumbio otras dos veces la libertad, cayendo el pueblo Español bajo la ferula del partido doctrinario ó moderado, no menos funesto que el otro.

La emancipacion de la America Española que empezó por la invasion de Napoleon, y que tomo nuevo impulso con los sucesos de 1820, concluyo de efectuarse en 1825. Perdio la España las conquistas de Hernan-Cortes y Pizarro, y la Inglaterra tuvo en el comercio de aquellas regiones, la compensacion á la influencia que perdia en Europa, dominada completamente por el despotismo de la Santa-Alianza.

El tercer periodo de mando del partido liberal, provino de una Revolucion de Palacio. M^{a}. Cristina Viuda de Fer-

[illegible] para asegurar la corona en las sienes de su hija D.ª [illegible] D.ª Carlos hermano de Fernando, a [illegible] todos los elementos del [illegible] manos del partido liberal. El Ejército y [illegible] en particular, tomaron con [illegible] 1833.

[illegible] numeroso que en 1812 y 182[illegible] menor, porque el Estatuto Real [illegible] Constitucion de Cádiz, y por que [illegible] Padre [illegible] de Napoleon, y [illegible] 1820 [illegible] libertad contra [illegible] Alianza con Inglaterra [illegible]

L[illegible] contra D.ª Carlos, que contaban [illegible] despues de una revolucion en 1835 para liberalizar el Estatuto Real, hicieron otra en 1836

narios, que elojiando la Constitucion de 1837, querian volver á un sistema como el del Estatuto. Hablar de un modo y obrar de otro, es comun en los moderados.

D°. Carlos contaba con un egercito, y no se atrevieron á ser tan reaccionarios como despues lo fueron en 1844; mas con la ley de Ayuntamientos y otras, se preparaban á concluir con el partido progresista, cuando en 1840 ocurio el cuarto triunfo liberal.

La Consecuencia del pronunciamente de 1840 fue quitar la Regencia á M°. Cristina, y tomarla el Général Espartero, Duque de la Victoria, que habia concluido la guerra civil.

Se cometio la falta de conservar la Constitution de 1837 y las reformas fueron tan pocas, que muchos liberales se lanzaron en la oposicion, siendo en general los inocentes instrumentos de Luis-Felipe y M°. Cristina, que á su vez arrojaron de España al Duque en 1843.

El partido moderado que se creyo ya seguro, se quito la mascara y fue tan cruel con el partido progresista y con los ecsaltados que le ayudaron, que casi dejó atras á los realistas de 1823. Mas de 200 personas fusilo en el 1°r. año de su dominacion. La Constitucion de 1837 se abandonó por otra mas retrograda, y con el matrimonio Montpensier en 1846, acabó de poner el sello á su impopularidad.

A los hardides electorales de Francia, aun mas descarados, a las leyes represivas de imprenta, añadieron el suprimir los milicia nacional, porque no contaban como Luis-Felipe con la clase media, y en lo unico bueno que tenia aquel Rey, que era la lenidad, se separaron de su marcha: á las costumbres de la Corte de Carlos 4°. se unio el juego de bolsa y

otras hablidades importadas de Paris : la crueldad de Fernando 7°. se sobrepaso en Galicia y Alicante.

El partido realista disminuia desde 1812, el liberal aumentaba, pero se dividia, saliendo de su seno ese partido retrogrado ; que habiendo mamado el sistema doctrinario Frances, confiscaba la libertad conservando de ella solo el nombre.

El sistema realista negaba la Representacion Nacional, el moderado la concede, pero á condicion de que le dejen falsear las elecciones, tener mayoria y perseguir á los que le haen la oposicion de veras.

Los realistas suprimian los Periodicos, segun su sistema para obedecer no se necesita discutir. Los moderados consagran la libertad de Imprenta en la Constitucion; pero las leyes organicas decen, persecucion personal y pecuniaria á quien no escriba en nuestro sentido, libertad por alavar las ideas ó personas de los que mandan.

El Pueblo no se dejó engeñar y conoció, que era el mismo despotismo de antes, con mas hipocresia.

Realistas y moderados suponen á la verdadera libertad enemiga del orden, cerrando los ojos á los ejemplos de Inglaterra y de los Estados Unidos, donde las revoluciones y conspiraciones son desconocidas, al paso que la Europa moderada y realista es una carcel y un campo de egecucion.

Los retrogrados han alucinado á algunos ignorantes haciendoles creer que su sistema era el Ingles, por que establecian dos Camaras ; quitando la libertad de Imprenta,el juicio por jurados, y sobre todo la completa seguridad individual de Inglaterra, en lugar del sistema Ingles, daban en sus Constituciones

una cosa contraria, esto es la tirania del poder, con el aparato parlamentario.

Al trazar los triunfos y reveses del partido popular en España, he pasado por alto las tentativas que ocurrian en el intermedio, y que prueban aun mejor que los triunfos, que las ideas liberales tenian raices y sinceros amigos en la Peninsula; acreditabanlo en los dias de desgracia.

Los Minas huyendo á Francia en 1814, despues de una insurreccion intentada en Navarra. El General Porlier ahorcado en 1815 en Galicia. El General Lacy cogido en Cataluña en 1817, y fusilado en las Baleares. Vidal, Coronel muerto en Valencia en 1818. Bazan tambien Coronel, muerto en Murcia en 1825. El General Torrijos y Manzanares muertos en Andalucia en 1831. El General Zurbano en Logroño en 1844. Bonet en Alicante en el mismo año. El Coronel Solis en Galicia en 1846. Abad en Aragon en 1848, por no hablar de otras tentativas en que la suerte no fue tan funesta ó en que los Jefes eran menos conocidos; estos hechos prueban la constancia Española y el odio que les gobiernos absolutistas y retrogrados incitaban. Nadie huviera intentado lidiar con quien tenia la fuerza y el tesoro, sin contar con la opinion para secundar sus esfuerzos. Ni se diga que los otros partidos tambien hallaban martires, nada tiene de particular los hubiese en favor de sistemas, que crearon por siglos grandes intereses.

Los Pueblos grandes se manifestaban siempre afectos al nuevo orden de ideas, y seguian la marcha ascendente de la Revolucion. No faltaban algunos distritos rurales y personas en los demas que tenian los mismos sentimentos, los bien acomodados generalmente. Esta tendencia de los Pueblos grandes, y de las clases

que habian recivido educacion, es commun á la Revolucion de España con la de Inglaterra y Francia.

Tambien lo fue el declararse por ella, aunque solo en 1833, una parte de la familia Real. D^a. M^a. Cristina y el Infante D^n. Francisco hacian en España lo que los Orleans en Francia, Guillermo 3°. y Ana en Inglaterra, y D^a. Maria en Portugal.

El egercito dio cien vueltas, como en Inglaterra en el siglo XVII. La inclinacion de los soldados hacia el sistema liberal en España, se esplica por su contacto con los habitantes de los pueblos grandes.

El clero como en Francia, y como el clero catolico en Inglaterra, fue sostenedor del antiguo orden de cosas.

La clase media fue liberal, pero sin querer que se adoptase una conducta energica. La alta nobleza no se declaro contra el pueblo como en Francia, ni defendio la causa libéral como en Inglaterra.

La majistratura se ha prestado bajo todos los sistemas á perseguir al vencido (1). Empleados ha habido en demasia para todos los partidos; pero sobre todo han aumentado y mandado á sus anchas bajo el sistema centralizador de los doctrinarios: no tenian que partir la influencia con el clero, como en tiempo del realismo, ni con las corporaciones populares, como en tiempo de los progresistas.

Al lado de esta marcha general, habia varias escepciones, lo que ha complicado mas las cosas publicas.

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(1) Sucedera' esto siempre que no haya jurado, a' menos que se nombren los Jueces por el Pueblo, en vez de serlo por el Gobierno.

Las influencias esteriores prepararon los aconteismientos de la Peninsula. Las Universidades mamaron antes de 1808 las ideas francesas, que tambien por el comercio entraron en las poblaciones maritimas.

Con la apertura de caminos y establecimiento de diligencias se multiplicaban los viageros y fueron medio eficaz de estender en la Peninsula los habitos modernos de discusion, y ecsamen de los sucesos politicos.

Aun han contribuido mas las emigraciones que han sido numerosas y repetidas. Pasaron de 100,000 los soldados y oficiales del egercito Español que vinieron de 1808 á 1814 prisioneros á Francia, y esparcieron á su regreso las ideas liberales que habian generalmiente oido.

Salieron en 1814 los que habian tomado partido por Jose Napoleon, que eran mas de lo que en general se cree, porque domino seis años la Corte y muchas Provincias.

Emigraron en 1823 muchos miles del egercito, milicia national, empleados y particulares, amigos de la Constitucion de 1812.

Emigraron en 1839 y 40 mas de 30 mil carlistas.

De las colonias tambien vinieron muchos por paises étrangeros y en las otras oscilaciones ha sido un continuo salir gente de España : la mayoria volvia, y con nuevas ideas hijas de lo que oia y observaba.

En una palabra desde 1808 han salido mas Españoles á ver la Europa, por las causas mencionadas, que antes en mil años, y asi se han modificado los efectos del aislamiento anterior, y se ha observado en la Peninsula el mismo fenomeno que las cruzadas produgeron en Europa.

Mas si la accion de la opinion ha sido favorable á la revolucion, la de los Gobiernos todos de Europa le ha sido siempre funesta.

Napoleon fue enemigo de los liberales Españoles.

La Santa Alianze apadrino' á Fernando 7°. en 1814, contra las Cortes.

En 1823 Luis XVIII envio 100,000 Franceses á entronizar el despotismo.

Los Gobiernos del Norte han dado su espoyo á D°. Carlos.

Luis-Felipe y los ingleses al unirse á Cristina fue contrariando las reformas radicales, sin las cuales no merecia la pena de correrse los riegos y disgustos de una Revolucion.

Inglaterra en 1814 déjó que Fernando 7°. persiguise á los Cortes, con cuyo Gobierno habia tratado para la guerra contra Napoleon; se contento con dar algo á los proscritos.

Tampoco estorvaron los ingleses la caida de Espartero en 1843, ni le dieron despues la proteccion que de 1840 à 1843 recibio Mª Cristina de Luis-Felipe.

La Republica en 1848 trato á los democratas Españoles tan mal ó peor que Luis-Felipe.

En una palabra la revolucion Española ha sido siempre contrariada por todos los Gobiernos de Europa, sin que hasta ahora ninguno la haya protejido.

La diplomacia estrangera ha sido en Madrid un agente poderoso de reaccion.

La revolucion española ha sido menos violenta hasta ahora que las de Inglaterra y Francia; no fue por eso menos encarnizada la guerra que se la hizo.

En los momentos de reaccion en 1823 los liberales fueron tratados como si hubieran atropellado por todo, asi fueron ya menos mirados en sus triunfos de 1835, 36 y 40. Es decir que los antirevolucionarios hicieron revolucionarios á los liberales Españoles.

En 1812 no solo hubo la mas completa tolerancia para escrivir en favor de las ideas antiguas, sino que las reformas fueron puramente politicas. Siguieron los Frailes, continuaron los diezmos y mayorazgos, se respetaron todos los abusos, solo se dejo hablar y escrivir contra ellos, y sin embargo en 1814 los diputados influyentes fueron arrastrados á los presidios de Africa, y hasta la inquisicion se restablecio.

De 1820 á 1823 la conducta equivoca del Rey alarmaba la opinion. Disgustó la persecucion del Egercito de la Isla, el libertador, el volver á estancar el tabaco y sal, libre durante un año y otras medidas

Los realistas tuvieron facultad de hablar, votar en las elecciones, y seguridad personal, ninguno tuvo que salir de España en 1820, la unica vengenza del partido popular, era cantar contra los que combatian las reformas.

En 1823 turieron que salir mas de 20 mil liberales, otros tantos fueron encarcelados, los insultos no tuvieron termino, en los pulpitos se hablaba contra ellos como si hubieran adoptado el Protestantismo ó el Judaismo.

Cierto que desde 1826 fueron ya mas tolerantes; pero las impresiones de 1823 fueron el principal impulso para resistir desde 1833, y la espuela para los sucesos de 1834 y 1835.

Apesar de que la reforma politica era un palido reflejo en 1834 y 35 dela de 1812, la revolucion procedia sin los mira-

mientos de entonces. Los Frailes se quitaron completamente, despues de quemar muchos conventos. Los escesos de Madrid en 1834 mandando los moderados, se pretestaron con el colera. Los indios de Manila decian de los estrangeros cuando estalló alli, lo que se dijo de los frailes en Madrid.

Los diezmos se suprimieron enteramente. El clero ha sido pagado por la Tesoreria, desde 1841.

La mayoria de los bienes del clero se vendio : Sus ventas se han respetado, porque en general los compradores eran del partido moderado.

En vano este partido ha celebrado el concordato, en vano reconoce cuantos grados y empleos ha dado Dⁿ. Carlos, en vano ha sacado los Obispos, de lo mas decidido por el antiguo orden de cosas, en vano restablece monjas y canonigos, la question de los biénes nacionales impedira que ambos partidos se unan.

El clero no puede tener con los moderados la influencia politica que en otros tiempos, en que por medio del confesor regentaba la monarquia.

Comparativamente habia mas tolerancia con los carlistas que con los progresistas ó democratas que hacian la oposicion al partido moderado; este á su vez se halla dividido en fracciones, por querer mandar, no por seguir una marcha politica diferente.

El partido democratico se ha formado de la parte mas ecsaltada del partido progresista, que desaprobó la Constitucion de 1837, y la falta de energia para las reformas que se observó de 1840 á 1843 y despues en los discursos y escritos de los hombres del mismo partido, que se han ido aprocsimando á sus antiguos enemigos los moderados.

Se reconoce moralidad personal en los Jefes del partido progresista; pero sino saben castigar la inmoralidad de sus enemigos y de los subalternos, el Pueblo nada ganará con que tomen el mando. Han perdido tambien mucho prestigio diciendo que esperaban que la Corte les entregaria el poder, olvidando que las tres veces que le obtuvieron en 1835, 1836 y 1840 fue, no por eleccion libre de la Corona, sino en virtud de movimientos populares, que compelieron á aquella.

Los partidos politicos todos han tenido una gran tendencia á apoyarse y mimar, no al partido que va adelante y tiene naturalmente el porvenir, sino á los que son mas retrogrados: asi los progresistas se inclinan á los moderados y estos á los Carlistas.

Los partidos Carlista, moderado y progresista todos han llegado á su apojeo, han mandado, se ha visto lo que hay que esperar de ellos, y han matado á tal punto el espiritu publico que escepto la juventud, la masa popular hasta duda que el mismo partido democratico si llega á mandar, haga las reformas y sobre todo las economias en los gastos publicos, por que el Pueblo español suspira.

Veamos lo que el partido democratico promete en España.

Abolir las quintas y matriculas de mar, ó sea la conscriccion de tierra y mar.

Suprimir los Pasaporte y licencias, el papel sellado y contribuciones de pequeño rendimiento.

Desestancar el tabaco y sal.

Quitar los derechos de Puertas y consumos.

Ir reduciendo el Arancel para llegar á la supresion de Aduanas.

Repartimiento de terrenos comunes, realengos y valdios.

Reducir el egercito á cuadros, y cuerpos modelos.

Establecer la milicia nacional, como garantia contra la tirania.

Bajar á la mitad la contribution directa.

Reducir á la mitad los gastos publicos, ó sea establecer un presupuesto de 600 millones de Reales.

Dejar á los Pueblos el nombramiento de Alcaldes.

Suprimir la centralizacion administrativa.

Libertad de imprenta, sin deposito ni edictor responsable.

Sufragio Universal.

Libertad individual, de asociacion, y reunion pacifica.

Hacer que las elecciones sean una verdad.

Dejar en completa libertad la enseñanza publica, ó sea independente del Gobierno.

Hacer gratuita y general la primera enseñanza.

Establecer el juicio por jurados : quitar al poder egecutivo el nombramiento de jueces.

Libertad de bancos y establecimientos de credito.

Independencia de la Iglesia, entera separacion del Estado y pago directo del clero por el Pueblo.

Asilo para les impedidos, enfermos ó sin trabajo.

Estas ideas son las de los liberales de Europa y conduciran á que en materias economicas se llegue al sistema del impuesto unico, directo, general y progresivo, en una palabra á que el Gobierno le paguen los ricos y á que no sea como hasta aqui, que los pobres paguen sin compensacion y los ricos se hagan mas ricos, á la sombra de un présupuesto, que aniquila las clases que no mandan y concentra todos la vida en el poder.

Estas reformas si las hacen los Gobiernos ó esta revolucion

si las hacen los Pueblos, pondran fin á la alarma que ha ocasionado el socialismo. Los doctores socialistas escriviran cuanto quieran, de sus esfuerzos se sacaran ideas y acaso ensayos utiles, lo demas se desechara, pero sucedera lo que en los Estados-Unidos, que ninguna alarma ocasionaran ni estas doctrinas, ni los hombres que las profesan. La alarma en Europa es hija de que tienen razon, y que la seguiran teniendo, hasta que los Gobiernos quiten los 4 millones de soldados y un millon de funcionarios publicos, para cuyo sostenimiento es preciso esa multitud de impuestos indirectos, que agobian á los Pueblos y hacen crecer la pobreza. La benificiencia no basta, es preciso curar el mal radicalmente.

Ni el orden publico ni la propiedad tienen nada que temer de las reformas, como se vé en la Union-Americana, el riesgo esta en que siga sin curarse la enfermedad Europea.

El despotismo se ha ensayado durante 300 años, España ha sido su escuela practica, con las minas del Potosy, con sus inmensas colonias, con su silencio sepulcral, sostenido por la inquisicion, con un Gobierno á quien no contrariaba la opinion publica, con un Pueblo morijerado, con clases pobres trabajadoras, con variedad de climas, sin camaras, ni imprenta, con la union mas perfecta entre el Clero y el Gobierno, con la intolerancia religiosa, cerrada como la China, estraña enfin á la polemica religiosa y politica, sin ningun estimulo ni escitante y ¿ en que vino todo eso á parar? en la catastrofe de 1808, en que se pudiera decir sin escandolo que la Africa empezaba en los Pirineos y alfin de todo en que la revolution penetrase y tuviera que pasar con menos preparacion, por los mismos duros trances que en el resto de Europa. No cave volver á ensayar

el despotismo ó sistema antiguo; su resultado ha sido igual en todas partes.

No menos desastroso es el Gobierno doctrinario ó moderado, que tiene todos los inconvenientes de la libertad, sin sus ventajas, y sin la baratura de ambos Gobiernos absolutista y verdadero liberal.

Lo prueba el ejemplo de Francia y de España; bajo su dominio el descontento ha sido general, las tentativas revolucionarias frecuentes, y la miseria de la clase probre se ha aumentado lejos de disminuirse. La inmoralidad ha crecido al punto de esclamar hace años el defensor de este sistema el Diario de los Debates, en España nada hay organizado sino el robo; en Francia hubo que castigar á dos ministros, ademas de los otros agios que denunciaba la opinion, en los caminos de hierro y otros contratos : Fundado en la immoralidad no puede durar mucho este sistema.

La libertad tiene que ser una cosa real, y no una ficcion como en Francia y en las Republicas Españolas de America, en cuyo caso nada bueno produce, por que el Gobierno tiene que ser complicado y corruptor, para sostenerse sin el opoyo de la opinion publica. La fuerza ó la opinion, tales son las dos bases de todo Gobierno.

Como los partidos viven no solo de su vida interior y de sus esperanzas, sino del movimiento y espiritu que anima á los otros Pueblos, ademas de la idea que hemos dado de ellos en España, trazare un cuadro de lo que desean en los otros paises, asi su indole y marcha futura se hará aun mas patente.

Los Carlistas desean en Europa el triunfo completo de la politica Rusa, cuya consecuencia seria poner en Francia á Eu-

rique 5°. á Dⁿ. Carlos en España y á Dⁿ. Miguel en Portugal, siguiendo la Italia bajo el dominio del Austria y teniendo que sostener la Europa el inmenso egercito que la devora y las contribuciones consiguientes.

Los moderatos desean en Francia la familia de Orleans, y á los Torys en Inglaterra, sus periodicos alavaron la ida á Hungria de los Rusos y la dominacion de Italia por los Austriacos. Ellos mismos intervinieron en Portugal en 1847, y en 1849 en Roma. Cuando la Revolucion de Francia en 1848 ofrecieron su amistad á la Inglaterra, esta les aconsejo que dejasen el campo á los progresistas, y dieron bajo pretesto de energia, el escandalo de arrojar al Embajador Ingles, de quien hubieran sido humildes esclavos, si la Inglaterra hubiera dicho que ellos eran los hombres necesarios.

Los progresistas desean que los Wigs manden en Inglaterra, apesar de que nada han hecho por ellos, sino dar consejos á Mª. Cristina. En Francia en 1848 en lugar de la Republica deseaban la Regencia de la Duquesa de Orleans, con un ministerio liberal. Sus simpatias en Alemania é Italia son en favor de una libertad semejante á la que hoy disfruta el Piamonte.

Los democratas desean naturalmente que en todas partes triunfe la causa de los Pueblos. Desean en Inglaterra el triunfo de los radicales, en Francia que se establezca una Republica de propaganda, para que dé ayuda y proteccion á los pueblos. Desean ver Italia, Polonia y Hungria independientes y libres, que Alemania sea otra Francia en el norte, para contener la Rusia, y que asi unida toda la Europa bajo un sistema radical de verdadera liberal y de reformas, puedan suprimirse los egercitos y ser en todas partes aliados los Pueblos, y quitarse las Adua-

nas: desapareceria toda idea de conquistay de fuerza, sometiendo las diferencias á la decision de los demas Pueblos. Desean la union con Portugal, estendiendo el sistema foral de las provincias Vascongadas á toda la Peninsula. Este sistema es el natural progreso de la Constitucion de Cadiz de 1812.

Los 37 años ultimos prueban que en la Europa en general y en la España en particular, marchan las ideas á conseguir un sistema, en cuanto cave, analogo al de los Estados-Unidos, y en oposicion tanto al sistema antiguo, como al del moderantismo, que es solo la hypocresia de la libertad: con los egercitos, que los moderados no disuelven, son en el fondo como los realistas, no gobiernan con la opinion sino con la fuerza. El temer á cuatro discolos es un vano pretesto, pues para ellos bastarian los cuadros, que en toda Europa serian algunos miles de hombres, y la gente honrada armada seria bastante para defender la propiedad y la familia. Se pretende defender esto, pero en verdad lo que se defiende son los grandes presupuestos.

Que los socialistas son un pretesto se patentiza con solo observar, que los socialistas son de ayer y la opresion antigua: el remedio al mal socialismo es adoptar francamente las grandes reformas, sobre todo las economicas.

Dada en esta introduccion una idea general de los acontecimientos de España, en la primera mitad del siglo XIX, en los libros seguientes entraré en mas detalles sobre dichos sucesos, y sobre los hombres que figuraron en ellos.

TRACTS

OF THE

SOCIETY OF THE FRIENDS OF ITALY.

TRACT No. II.

THE

CHARGE

OF

TERRORISM IN ROME,

DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

REFUTED BY FACTS AND DOCUMENTS.

THE DOCUMENTS FURNISHED

BY MR. MAZZINI.

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2. To use every available constitutional means of furthering the cause of Italian National Independence, in Parliament.

3. And generally to aid, in this country, the cause of the independence and of the political and religious liberty of the Italian people.

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PRELIMINARY NOTE BY MR. MAZZINI.

My dear Mr. Masson,

I send back Mr. MacFarlane's libel. You do not expect—no honest, fair-play seeking Englishman expects, that I should refute such trash, or desecrate the name and honour of Italy through such mud as that. I might as well undertake to refute Messrs. D'Arlincourt, Chenu, La Hodde, and Cochrane. But I send some documents concerning the so-often repeated accusation of terrorism, as exercised by the Roman republican government, hoping that they may be made available by the "friends of Italy," and with men, friends or foes, of good faith, set the question at rest.

I have no need to say that the note to Zambianchi, quoted against me last year by some of the continental reactionary press, has nothing to do with San Calisto, or doomed monks. It is simply an order to the commander of a small body of custom-house soldiers *(finanzieri)*, asking him to send some twelve or twenty of his men to a flying column, which was to leave Rome under Colonel Ghilardi—now living in Madrid—and harass, guerilla-like, the French invaders.

I knew well, when I devoted, some twenty years ago, mind and soul to the emancipation of Italy from popes, kings and foreign invaders, what dangers, persecutions, and calumnies I should meet

with. But I knew, too, that the cause of a man engaged in such a scheme rests between God and his own conscience, in far higher and purer regions than those in which libellers, hired writers, and calumniators grope and crawl. And I have to thank God for this, that no danger or foul play have ever been, or will ever be, powerful enough to make me deviate an inch from the aim I feel bound to pursue, or irritate me to reaction and unworthy revengeful feelings. Twenty years, attended with the usual amount of cares, woes, and deceptions, have rolled around me since my first step in the career. But my soul is as calm, my hands are as pure, my faith is as unshaken and bright with hope, for my awakened country, as in my young years. With these gifts, one may well endure with a smile such little annoyances as may arise from such writers as Mr. Cochrane and Mr. MacFarlane.

I am, dear Mr. Masson,

Ever faithfully yours.

JOS. MAZZINI.

2, *Sydney Place, Brompton,*
August 21.

TERRORISM IN ROME.

It is not because Mr. MacFarlane has put *his* name to the calumny that the Roman Republic was a "Reign of Terror," that the Society of the Friends of Italy has thought it proper to devote a Tract specially to that subject. It is because the calumny, having been repeated by numerous writers, of whom Mr. MacFarlane chances to be the last, has become a standing accusation against the leaders of the recent national movement in Italy, and a standing argument against confiding in them for the future. Falsehoods, once put into print, have an amazing longevity; we mean, however, at least to place in the hands of the public such materials for refuting the calumny in question, as will make it personally criminal in any one that shall have seen them, ever again to repeat the calumny himself, or ever again to hear it repeated by others without directly giving it the lie.

The Roman Republic was proclaimed on the 9th of February, 1849. It was an imperative necessity of the circumstances in which the Roman states were then placed. The Pope had fled to Gaeta two months and a half before, leaving the whole burden of the government in the hands of the National Assembly. Two deputations had been sent to request him, in the name of the Assembly, and in the name of the people, to return, and resume the reins of government. Both deputations had been repulsed. The Pope had appointed a commission to govern in his name; the persons designated for the office had refused to act. He had appointed a second commission, which had in like manner refused to act. Rome was absolutely without a government. The Chambers appointed a provisional government, and declared themselves dissolved. For two months the Provisional government conducted the administration; after which, incapable of prolonging a situation so full of danger, and, yielding to the earnest solicitations addressed to it from all parts of the states, it convoked the people in the primary assemblies, and appealed to the universal suffrage of the inhabitants of the states for the election of a Constituent Assembly. The appeal was responded to. By the votes of 343,000 adult male persons, out of a total population of 2,800,000 souls, a Constituent Assembly, consisting of one hundred and fifty members, was invested with the task of government. The Assembly met on the 6th of February, 1849; and at one o'clock in the morning of the 9th, after an uninterrupted sitting of fifteen hours, that remarkable decree was passed which declared the abolition of the secular papacy, and proclaimed that portion of central Italy, which had hitherto been the patrimony of Popes, a free and independent republic. The article abolishing the secular papacy was passed with only *five* dissenting voices, and that constituting the republic, with only *eleven* dissenting voices, out of one hundred and forty-four members present.

On the 10th of February, the Constituent Assembly appointed an

Executive Committee of three citizens, through the medium of whom the government might be carried on until such time as the constitution of the republic should be fully matured. The citizens appointed to this office, by a majority of votes, were Messieurs Armellini, Saliceti, and Montecchi. Ministers of the different departments of the public service were at the same time appointed.

For a period of seven weeks, or from the 10th of February to the 30th of March, the government of the republic was carried on by the Executive Committee, in conjunction with the Constituent Assembly, and the ministers of the different departments. Whether, during this period, the government of the republic was one of terrorism or not, may be judged from the following documents, or extracts from documents, selected from the official acts of the republic, as published at the time in the *Monitore Romano*, or government gazette :—

(1.) *Proclamation of the Prefect of Police, in reference to some acts of violence committed against some servants in livery in one of the streets of Rome.*

"ROMAN REPUBLIC.

"CITIZENS,—Public tranquillity is now the supreme law of the land. It confers honour on the republican principle, which is elevated on the ruins of despotism. Whoever dares to disturb it, on whatever pretext, is an enemy of his country.

"Yesterday, in the street of the Corso, some acts of violence were committed against servants in livery, which acts we energetically reprove.

"Severe measures will be immediately taken to prevent such acts from being repeated.

"*Rome, the 12th of February*, 1849. LIVIO MARIANI, *Prefect of Police.*"*

(2.) *Proclamation of the Prefect of Police, on the occasion of a violent placard.*

"ROMAN REPUBLIC.

"To-day there has been placarded a warning addressed to priests, which has all the marks of a moral violence done to a respectable class of citizens.

"We highly disapprove of this act of unbridled licence, and we are resolved to take the most vigorous measures against the authors, the printers, and the criers of such writings. They are evidently secret enemies of the republic, and a people that did not punish them would dishonour itself. The republic is not anarchy. liberty is not licence. Let the citizens be reassured; the government of the republic will maintain the principles of order and of civil tolerance, which are the truest title to glory of our sacred revolution.

"*Rome, the 14th of February*, 1849. LIVIO MARIANI, *Prefect of Police.*"†

(3) *Act of the Assembly, abolishing the Censorship.*

"ROMAN REPUBLIC.

"The Constituent Assembly considering that, if the press can be submitted to measures of repression when an overt offence is committed, it ought not to be submitted to any preventive censure; and, considering that the offence is properly regarded as taking place, at the moment of the publication of the prohibited print, decrees :—

"1. Every office of censorship, whether established at the custom-house, or elsewhere, for any kind of printed works, engavings, or figures, is and shall continue abolished.

"2. There is reserved, however, the right of criminal procedure against the same prints, engravings, or figures, when once issued, if they are of a kind the publication of which is forbidden by law.

"By order of the Assembly,
"ARMELLINI, SALICETI, MONTECCHI.
"*Rome, the 4th of March*, 1849." "*The Executive Committee.*"‡

(4.) *Extracts from a Proclamation of the Minister of the Interior, Saffi, appealing generally to the citizens of the republic, 5th March.* (Actes Officiels, p. 25).

* * * * * * *

"CITIZENS,—We have cleared the ground of many wrecks, but we have not yet proceeded far with the new edifice.

* Actes Officiels de la République Romaine. Extraits et Traduits du *Moniteur Romain*. Page 5. Paris: Amyot. † Actes Officiels de la République Romaine, p. 6, 7. ‡ Actes Officiels de la République Romaine, p. 22, 23.

"The republic has obligations to fulfil. She has to prepare herself, with the rest of Italy, for the war of independence—for the great labour of national restoration; she has to substitute, within her own bounds, once for all, the rule of law and right for that of the passions and arbitary power; without this, Italy, deceived in her expectations, would raise a cry of malediction against us.

"In order to heal the deep wounds made in the administration of the state, by a corruption of very ancient date, great sacrifices are necessary. This must be; and those to whom figures and money are everything, may console themselves by the reflection, that the sacrifices of the moment will save them from far greater sacrifices in the future.

"Let such as are capable of generous sentiments look at Venice, and imitate her true Italian virtue.

"As for the adversaries of the existing order of things, the republic respects religiously the inviolability of free opinions. She fears neither the test of discussion, nor the authority of the past, nor the sophisms of absolute power; but she will chastise severely all those who disturb public order, and who conspire against her.

"On this point, let us be well understood. The government of the republic imposes sacrifices, but it desires to impose them itself alone, under precise laws, within the limit which it believes necessary for reorganizing the impoverished finances, and not beyond, protecting always the sacred rights of property. It is resolved to prosecute and punish conspirators, but it is resolved to do this itself, and by recognized tribunals.

"Every arbitrary act, every violence exercised against property and persons, every disorderly action of citizens against citizens, every act which can be characterized as political revenge, is the sad inheritance of an epoch, stained by sacerdotal despotism—an epoch which the republic has closed for ever in the book of the past.

"The bloody acts which have taken place, though happily extremely rare, in some parts of the territory, and which so unfortunately disturb this general and marvellous agreement of the whole nation, in the work of its redemption, are an atrocious injury to the purity of republican principles.

"By these crimes, the majestic and virgin idea which to-day is elevated on the Capitol, is soiled, and the new league of love and pardon, sworn in Rome by the true believers in the future of humanity, is profaned. By these crimes, the work of life and the harmony of liberty are broken, and trodden under foot.

"The Constituent Assembly and the government created by it, declare by my voice, traitors to the country, and parricides of the republic, the authors of such scandals, and will take care by severe laws to prevent such misdemeanours and any other attempt against the new political order, and against the national honour, from being carried into effect. The republic, the better to attain this end, appeals to the active assistance of all the citizens, who ought all to watch over the security and the perfecting of the common life."

* * * * * * * * *

These four documents (others might be quoted), present an authentic picture of the state of the republic during the first few weeks of its existence; as well of the condition of mind prevailing in the country at large, as of the cares, desires, and manner of action of those who were invested with the government. And what do they indicate—a reign of terror? a country mad with revolutionary violence, and a government rejoicing in the midst of the confusion? On the contrary: they indicate a country singularly calm and quiet, considering the extraordinary circumstances in which it was placed; and a government bent only on measures approved by the highest civilization, pursuing these in a spirit almost sedate, and far more severe towards its own too eager and misjudging friends, than towards its acknowledged enemies. We believe that the only fault of the documents is, that they represent too strongly, as a matter of history, those acts of excess which did accompany the revolution—a fault which becomes a high merit, when we consider that the documents were put forth at the critical moment, when, to have treated the acts of excess less sternly, or to have hinted at any excuse for them, might have led to their repetition on a larger scale.

Amongst the acts of excess which were in the mind of the minister Saffi, when he penned the foregoing proclamation, seem to have been those

committed at Imola, a town, of some twelve thousand inhabitants, in the extreme north of the Roman states, and distant about three hundred miles from Rome. Now, fortunately, we can cite a most unexceptionable witness to prove that, so far from being accessory to the outrages, the government of the republic shewed the most signal detestation of them. Signor Farini, formerly Deputy Minister of the Interior, under the government of the Pope, the historian of the moderate party in Italy, and a political adversary of the government of the republic, thus expresses himself:—*

"The assembly had determined to take measures for the repression of political assassinations; and it decreed extraordinary inquisitions and modes of criminal procedure more rapid than those generally in use. The minister of the interior, Saffi, published a proclamation, in which he complained bitterly of the attacks made against the property and the life of citizens, and in which the criminals were held up to infamy, and to the hatred of all good citizens. * * * * But he also wrote officially, and especially to the governors of provinces, to encourage them to the adoption of severe and rigorous measures. Count Francois Laderchi, of Faenza, governed the province of Ravenna. He was a man as full of love for the liberty and independence of Italy as endowed with moderation and courage. Saffi wrote to him privately, as follows, upon the assassinations of Imola: 'My heart is filled with the deepest grief. This is a terrible affliction, to which it is absolutely necessary to apply a remedy. I see the immense difficulty of governmental action in the face of so complete a dissolution of society as exists in some places. Have a complete understanding with the governors of neighbouring provinces; give each other the hand, and act, I beseech you, from the bottom of my soul, so that the civil life of those unhappy provinces may be assured. The government has done what depended upon it. It has given you all extraordinary powers, full liberty of action, all that is necessary to conquer, as far as possible, the evil. I have an entire confidence in you, and in the good will of the citizens, who will aid you in this holy mission.' And Laderchi did his duty." * * * * *

That it may not be supposed that there is no other evidence for the true

while the government was calmly and rationally pursuing those plans of genuine reform, which would have opened up for Rome and Italy a new career of civilization, events were happening all round, which made the existence of the republic daily more and more precarious. In the south, the Pope and the King of Naples were taking counsel together; in the north, the war between Charles Albert and Radetzky was gradually turning to the advantage of the Austrians. Out of the Peninsula, France was secretly cherishing her infamous design of interference. England was looking on in a mood of mind composed partly of generous interest, partly of prejudice, against a government calling itself a republic; while Russia, at a distance, was watching the course of the struggle, and breathing her peculiar influence into it, through those numerous invisible channels which connect St. Petersburgh with all continental Europe. At length an event occurred which brought this opposition of parties to a crisis. On the 23rd of March —the very day on which the foregoing dispatch of Mr. Freeborn was written—the fatal battle of Novara restored Lombardy to the Austrians, and placed Charles Albert and the royalist, or Piedmontese party, completely *hors de combat* in the struggle for the independence of Italy. The whole duty of continuing that struggle was thus, by the force of inevitable circumstances, if not also by the force of real fitness, thrown upon the republicanism of Italy, as represented and concentrated in the two governments of Rome and Venice. Nothing remained for these governments but either, on the one hand, to abdicate on the instant, and leave Italy to be overrun again by the gathering tide of absolutism; or, on the other hand, to remain firm, and fight, to the last, against the greatly increased odds. To their honor, they chose the latter alternative; and, for more than three months, Europe witnessed the spectacle of two small states—the one a mere city, the other, a city with a territory attached—maintaining a cause which all else in Italy had been compelled to abandon.

As soon as the news of the battle of Novara reached Rome, the assembly and the government took the steps which the gravity of the situation demanded. The executive committee was dissolved, and the supreme power was placed in the hands of the members of a triumvirate, consisting of Armellini, one of the dissolved committee; the previous minister of the interior, Saffi; and the patriot, Mazzini, whose arrival in Rome about this time had been accepted by the assembly and the people with shouts of exultation, as a special arrangement of Providence for the encouragement and invigoration of the cause. This change of the manner of rule took place on the 29th of March; the assembly in decreeing it, however, did not abdicate the exercise of its own powers.

Was the government of the triumvirate, thus appointed, more deserving of the name of a reign of terror than that of the executive committee? Let us see.

The official acts of the government during the first week of its triumvirate (March 29—April 6), are represented by eight documents, published during that period in the "Monitore Romano." The first is a proclamation to the people, calling upon them to nerve themselves for the defence of their liberties and the republic; the second is a proclamation calling upon all citizens possessing fire-arms, but unable themselves to employ them, to lend them for the service of the state; the third is a more peremptory order to the same effect; the fourth is a decree placing the national guard of Rome under the orders of the minister of war; the fifth is an act of assembly investing the triumvirate provisionally with the power of pardoning persons under sentence of law; the sixth is a decree setting apart the buildings till then occupied by the "Holy Office," or inquisition, in Rome, as lodgings for poor families; the seventh is a proclamation con-

taining the political programme of the triumvirate; and the eighth is a decree for the emission of treasury bonds to the amount of 251,000 crowns. The following is an extract from the most important of these documents—the proclamation, of date April 5th, containing the political programme of the republic:—

"To provide for the safety of the republic; to protect it from dangers within and without; to cause it worthily to maintain its ground in the war of independence—such is the task entrusted to us.

"This commission signifies for us respect, not only for a form of government, for a name, but also for the *principle* represented by this name, and by this form of government; and this *principle* is for us a principle of love, of civilization, of fraternal progress, by all and for all, of moral, intellectual, and economical improvement for the entire body of the citizens. The republican flag, raised in Rome by the representatives of the people, does not represent the triumph of one fraction of citizens over another. It represents the common triumph—a victory gained by the many, acquiesced in by the immense majority, of the principle of good over the principle of evil; of the common right over the will of a small number; of holy equality, the gift of God to all the human species, over privilege and despotism. We cannot be republicans without being better, and without proving that we are worth more than all the powers now overthrown for ever. Liberty and virtue, the republic and fraternity, ought to be inseparably united. It is for us to set Europe the example. The republic in Rome is an Italian programme; it is a hope, a future for twenty-six millions of men, our brothers. It has to prove to Italy and to Europe, that our cry, *God and the People*, is not a lie; that our work is eminently religious, a work of education and morality; that the accusations of intolerance, anarchy, and violent upturning of things, directed against our holy banner, are false; that, thanks to the republican principle, united as one family of good men, under the eye of God, and, following the impulse of those who are the first amongst us in genius and virtue, we march on to the attainment of true order—law and power re-united.

"It is thus that we understand our mission; and it is thus that we hope all the citizens will, by little and little, understand it with us. We are not the government's party; we are truly the government of the nation. The nation is republican. The nation embraces all those who profess sincerely its republican faith; pities and instructs all those who do not yet comprehend its sacredness; crushes in its omnipotence of sovereignty all who shall attempt to violate it by open revolt, or by secret intrigues, provocative of civil dissensions.

"Neither intolerance, nor weakness. The republic is at once conciliating and energetic. The government of the republic is strong; therefore, it fears not. Its task is to preserve intact the rights and the free accomplishment of the duties of every one; therefore it does not lull itself in a vain and culpable security. The nation has conquered—conquered for ever. Its government ought to exhibit the generous and serene calm, not the abuses of victory. Inexorable as to principles; tolerant and impartial as to persons; equally incapable of transaction and of mistrust; neither cowardly nor offensive; such ought a government to be, in order to be worthy of republican institutions.

"Economy in employments; morality in the choice of officials; capacity, proved where possible, by trial, placed at the head of the different administrative departments.

"Order and severity of verification and control in financial matters; limited expenses; war to all wastefulness; expenditure of the money of the country, exclusively for the good of the country; the inviolable exaction of every sacrifice, when the necessity of the country demands it.

"No war of classes; no hostility to acquired wealth; no wanton or unjust violation of property; but a constant tendency towards the material amelioration of the classes least favoured by fortune; and a firm determination to re-establish the credit of the state, and to lay a check upon every culpable egotism of monopoly, trick, or passive resistance, tending to dissolve or impair it."*

Nothing surely can be more just, moderate, and high-toned than the spirit of this progamme; which, considering the exciting nature of the crisis at which it was put forth, and the temptations that existed to the use of violent language, could only have emanated from men of lofty and noble

* Actes Officiels de la République Romaine, p. 44, 47.

intentions, capable of tempering their own strongest and most vehement resolutions with gentleness of thought and manner. And that the moderation and firmness of the triumvirs did not consist in mere words, is proved by the following extract from a dispatch of Mr. Freeborn to Lord Palmerston, which may be taken as a certificate of the continued tranquillity of Rome, during at least the first week of the government of the triumvirate.

"*Rome, April* 6, 1849.

"My Lord,—Your lordship will have learned by my dispatches preceding this, which I have had the honour to address to you, that the tranquillity of this city had not been materially disturbed, and that the laws had been carried out with moderation on the part of the government, and obedience on the part of the people.

"With regret I have now to report to your lordship, that since the intelligence has been received of the defeat of the Piedmontese army, a spirit of reaction—and to a considerable extent—has shown itself, but which the government has hitherto succeeded in keeping down. I fear, however, that civil war is rapidly approaching, and which may be productive of serious and sanguinary results."*

We think this a more valuable testimony than if it had been more absolute and confident in its terms. It shows, that while there was a great deal of excitement among the Roman population, consequent, as was natural and inevitable, upon the defeat of Charles Albert, and the sudden increase of danger thereby caused, the government not only preserved its own calmness, but possessed such a hold over the minds of the people, and that people Italians, as to prevent their excitement—greatly to Mr. Freeborn's surprise—from breaking forth in disorderly acts. We question if, in similar circumstances, any British government, Whig or Tory, could have done as much with the people even of orderly and unexcitable London.

Mr. Freeborn's anticipations that, after all, the popular excitement would prove too strong for the government, were not fulfilled. From the 5th of April—the date of the foregoing proclamation of the triumvirs—till the 25th of April, when the news was spread in Rome, that the French troops had landed at Civita Vecchia, the triumvirs carried out their programme to the letter. The following are their official acts published during this period:—On the 8th of April, a letter to the President of the Constituent Assembly, reassuring the people that the triumvirs had no intention, as was falsely rumoured, of treating with foreigners for the restoration of the Papal power. On the 9th, a decree inflicting a fine on the canons of the chapter of the Vatican for refusing the services of their office at the act of worship, ordered by the government to take place on Easter-day. On the 10th, a decree, establishing *bureaux* of statistics throughout the republic, for the collection and arrangement of accurate data, on which the government might proceed in its intended measures of civil, economical, and legal reform. On the same day, a decree intended to stimulate, by the imposition of penalties, such defaulters as had not made their due contributions to the forced loan, ordered by the assembly on the 17th of February. On the 11th, a decree for the emission of notes, to supply the place of money, till it should be coined. On the 14th, a short declaration of the assembly and the triumvirate, announcing their unshaken resolution to continue the struggle; on the same day, a proclamation of the triumvirs to the same effect. On the 15th, an act abolishing the government monopoly of salt. On the 16th, a decree relative to the mode of organization of the army of the republic. On the 21st, an act abolishing the tobacco monopoly. On the 23rd, an address to the army; and on the 25th, a decree, suspending the tax on shopkeepers, for liberty to exercise

* Correspondence respecting the affairs of Rome. Document, No. 10.

their trades, and remitting the arrears of this tax. This last decree was intended as a small boon to the national guard of Rome, which having been formed before the republic, with a conservative intention, consisted almost entirely of middle class shopkeepers, &c., to the exclusion of working men and the people. The enthusiasm of this body, amounting to about 13,000 men, in their military duties, showed that the class of society from which it was drawn was heartily on the side of the republic.

Until the landing of the French invaders, therefore, it is clear from the most exact and abundant evidence, that there was a marvellous degree of concord and tranquillity in the Roman states; and that the proceedings of the government, while strict in everything that was essential to the maintenance and honour of the republic, were regular, impartial, and tolerant. The only instance to the contrary, that even the bitterest enemies of the republic have been able to allege, is that of Ancona. We will state this case fairly and fully.

Ancona is a port-town of the Roman states, with a population of about 30,000, situated on the Adriatic coast, about two hundred miles distant from Rome. Here, on the 30th of March—that is, the day after the appointment of the triumvirate in Rome, a serious riot broke out, in consequence of the intelligence just received, that the Sardinian army of Charles Albert had been defeated. Maddened by the news, a furious mob rushed through the streets, and five persons were killed. The disturbance was protracted; day after day fresh assassinations took place, "chiefly of persons of respectability, supposed to entertain principles opposed to the revolutionary government;" and at last, the British consul, Mr. Moor, wrote in great alarm to Sir George Hamilton, her Majesty's ambassador at Florence, stating that his (the consul's) life was in danger, and that the British residents in the town were in consternation. Sir George immediately applied to Admiral Sir William Parker, requesting him, if possible, to send a ship of war to the spot to protect the British residents; and at the same time wrote home to Lord Palmerston, announcing the circumstances, blaming the Roman government for their apathy, and urging his lordship to dispatch a man of war to Ancona, in case Admiral Parker

(Extract.) "'*Spartan*,' *Ancona, April 19th*, 1849.

"I arrived here this morning at 8 a.m., and have just communicated with Mr. Moore, our consul here.

"This place seems in a melancholy state. Murders have occurred in the open day; but they seem to have limited these atrocities to themselves; and, as there are six English vessels here, I see no cause of alarm to British subjects, which amount to four families."*

This report of Captain Symonds, while it abates considerably, by its cool and officer-like precision, the exaggerated accounts of the civilian consul as regards the danger to which the British residents were subject, really shows that Ancona was in a state requiring severe measures. A reign of terror in miniature had clearly established itself there; and a band of misguided wretches, on pretence of political animosity, were selecting victims at their pleasure from among the citizens of anti-republican opinions. But assuredly, to none—not even to Consul Moore, or Sir George Hamilton himself—were these atrocities a matter of more indignant anxiety than to the triumvirate whose authority they were defying, and whose fair fame they were sure to compromise. Here is the instruction addressed by the triumvirate on the subject to Captain Felix Orsini, representative of the people, who was sent to Ancona, with full powers, to use military force for the arrest and punishment of the assassins:—

"*Rome, 19th April*, 1849.

"SECRET INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIUMVIRATE TO CAPTAIN FELIX ORSINI.

"You will proceed to Ancona with a mission of repression, which may be expressed in two words, *to restore the town of Ancona to the republic*. Assassination is not the republic. Ancona is at present a prey to organized assassination. It must be repressed and punished. At any price, the anarchy of the town must be put a stop to. The safety of the country, and the honor of our flag are concerned, both in the opinion of the country itself, and in the eyes of foreigners.

"You will perhaps find, at Ancona, two representatives of the people, the citizens Bernabei and Dall'Ongaro. If so, you will address yourself to them as a third Commissary of the republic. You will tell them, from us, that the information we have received in the interval since their departure from Rome, regarding the state of affairs at Ancona, and the new assassinations committed, impose on us, as a duty, measures of repression more energetic even than those which we indicated in their special instructions. You will tell them that Rome cannot, by inactivity or a false moderation, resign herself to the imputation of being an accomplice in assassinations; and that, for the sake of morality, and to prevent reaction, for which the absence of security would be the best pretext, and in order not to render foreign intervention inevitable, justice must be done upon the crimes that have been committed. You will tell them that we have given inexorable orders to the agents of the republic in the province of Ascoli and elsewhere, to crush and annihilate reaction; but that we regard organized assassination as the worst of reactions, and that the republic is lost if, instead of representing the country, it confines itself to the representation of a faction.

"The promoters and directors of the assassinations must be arrested, and punished according to law; subordinates who shall be thought to have been misled and deceived, may be dealt with in a spirit of clemency, as far as may be compatible with law.

"The government is resolved to have its orders executed, *were it necessary even to concentrate on Ancona half the forces of the state*.

"The government doubts not that the two Commissioners will unite with you in the fulfilment of this mission. Should they not be disposed to do so, the government will first of all see that the law is enforced, and *will then give in its resignation*. This must be told to all true patriots.

"You will come to an understanding with the governor of the province, as regards the necessary steps to be taken. He will feel the need of effacing the recollection of his past inertia, by redoubled energy of action.

"As soon as the arrests and the execution of our orders shall have taken place, you will return to Rome.

"You will have under your orders the police, the national guard, and all the troops now at Ancona. "For the Triumvirate, J. MAZZINI, A. SAFFI."†

* Correspondence respecting the affairs of Rome.—Document No. 26.

† The originals of these secret instructions, and those which follow, are in the possession of the extraordinary commissioner, to whom they were addressed.

Two days later, the triumvirate addressed a private letter to the same commissioner, as follows:—

Private letter of the Triumvirate to Felix Orsini, Extraordinary Commissioner at Ancona.
(Entirely confidential.) "*Rome, 21st April*, 1849.

"CITIZEN COMMISSIONER,—The government has received reports from Ancona, concerning acts of assassination just committed on the persons of Servanzi, and the brothers Angelucci. These reports mention as accomplices in the assassinations, the police-agents, * and * , and as having taken an active part in it, persons named * , * , * , and * . The complicity is also extended to the Englishman, * * ; and there are suspicions which the triumvirate cannot believe, regarding others. It is also stated that the same persons implicated in the last assassination are the authors of, and accomplices in all the murders in Ancona; and moreover, that six new police-agents, and one named * , were recently committed accessory to the first.

"The triumvirate, without cherishing or rejecting at present any conviction on this subject, seeing that it has not the data on which to form a judgment, is deeply impressed with the gravity of the case; and, while its desire is to realize a government of purity and love, it is horror-struck by the atrocities that have taken place.

"The government is, consequently, unflinching in its resolution, that the rigour of the law reach every one who has, materially or morally, taken part in these iniquities; and it informs you of all that has come to its knowledge, in order that the same may serve to instruct and regulate you in the measures you have been charged with for striking down the guilty, and protecting the laws, the order, and the honour of the republic.

"In addition, the government orders you to take the most scrupulous care that the aforesaid Servanzi, and the other who was wounded with him, may have the most assiduous attention paid them in the hospital where they are; and that they may be guaranteed from all fear that any more such acts of barbarity shall be committed against them.

"The government, I must tell you, would regard you alone as responsible for any further evils that might arise; and it addresses these instructions to you, by an extraordinary channel, in order that you may take the necessary steps as speedily as possible. "For the Triumvirate, A. SAFFI."

When these instructions were sent off to Ancona, the town was still far from being restored to order. On the 19th, an Irish friar, named O'Keller, was shot dead in the streets; and as this was the first assassination of a British subject that had taken place, it renewed the terror of the English residents; and Sir George Hamilton, on hearing of it, and ignorant as he was of the steps which the Roman government had spontaneously taken, thought it his duty to remonstrate with the triumvirate, through Mr. Petre, the English agent at Rome. It was in these circumstances that the following letter was written by Mazzini, on his own responsibility, to the commissioner at Ancona:—

"Since your departure, it has transpired that the number of police at Ancona is inferior to what was counted on. On the other hand, the reports received render it all important to proceed energetically with measures of repression and punishment against those who are guilty of the atrocities that have occurred. Orders have, therefore, been sent by express to Ascoli, to send you by the most rapid means a portion of the 2nd Leggeri regiment. When this force reaches you, *act;* half measures do no good. Besides the crime which stains the flag of the republic—besides the cry which unjustly accuses the government of connivance or culpable moderation, we have threatening remonstrances from without—France and England. There must be rapid and severe dealing; and we count for this on your zeal.

"Have an understanding with the governor of Ancona. Go on with arrests. Organize a commission after the manner of a council of war, with a defender of the law for the prosecution, and an advocate for the prisoners, chosen by you from among the military men, or lawyers of the place. *If necessary, place Ancona in a state of siege, till our task is accomplished.* "Yours, J. MAZZINI, *Triumvir.*"

These orders were decisive. In obedience to the last of them, the Commissioner of the Republic placed Ancona in a state of siege. The following is the decree to that effect, as given at Ancona on the 27th, and published in the *Monitore Romano* on the 30th of April:—

"ROMAN REPUBLIC.

"Whereas, the authors of the frequent assassinations that have stained Ancona with blood have associates here and in the surrounding towns;

"Whereas, justice must have free course, and the government of the republic is ready to yield rather than permit crime and barbarity to remain unpunished;

"Whereas, many employés, profiting by the disorganization inevitable during the first moments of the revolution, do not do their duty, betray the republic and the nation, impoverish the public treasury, and render useless all the generous efforts of the people;

"The Extraordinary Commissioner of the Roman Republic, Captain Felix Orsini, in virtue of the full powers conferred on him by the triumvirate, in its decree of the 19th of April current, No. 2700;

"Orders:—

"Art. 1.—The town of Ancona is declared in a state of siege.

"Art. 2.—No one can enter or quit the town at any hour, without a special permission from the governor, or the delegate appointed by him.

"Art. 3.—Every twenty-four hours, from nightfall to daybreak, the citizens must have lights in their windows. The municipality will aid poor families who cannot support this expense.

"Art. 4.—All assassinations committed shall be summarily tried in a military manner by a council of war.

"Art. 5.—Every attempt, either against person or property, shall be tried in the same manner.

"Art. 6.—Every citizen, civilian or military, convicted, by the deposition of one witness, of not having prevented an assassination, or any other crime, of not having denounced it if he could not prevent it, or of not having arrested the guilty party, shall be considered an accomplice, and tried according to Article 4.

"Art. 7.—Every civil functionary convicted of having wilfully failed in his duty, shall be dismissed and punished according to Article 4.

"Art. 8.—It is prohibited to all, except members of the National Guard, to carry firearms in the town.

"Art. 9.—All who, by their antecedents, are known as enemies of the government, or associates of the authors of the assassinations, shall be brought before the council of war if taken carrying arms of any kind.

"Art. 10.—The present arrangements shall have the force of law till a new order.

The Extraordinary Commissioner of the Roman Republic,

Ancona, the 27th of April, 1849. FELIX ORSINI, *Captain.**

The result of this peremptory measure was that order was re-established at Ancona, or, in the striking words of the triumvirate, that "Ancona was restored to the republic." The whole affair would be accurately represented to English eyes, if we were to fancy that, on some occasion of immense national agitation, riots were to break out in Portsmouth; that these were to become too serious to be repressed by the local authorities; that the government thereupon were to send down from London special commissioners to do their best in the matter; and that, finally, all less energetic measures having failed, they were to empower one of these commissioners to place Portsmouth in a state of siege—in short, the case of Ancona, instead of being a just subject of reproach against the government of the triumvirs, ought to be appealed to as the precise case which most conspicuously illustrates the genuineness of their professions of zeal for social order.

The resolute conduct of the Roman government, in the affair of Ancona, is the more remarkable when we remember with what a burden of other cares that government was at the same time engaged. At the very time when the triumvirs were sending dispatches to Ancona, and threatening to concentrate on it half the troops of the states, rather than suffer it to continue in a condition disgraceful to the republic, these troops were all too little for a work of absolute life or death to the republic—the repulsion of

* Actes Officiels de la République Romaine, p. 83, 84.

the French invaders On the very day when Ancona was placed in a state of siege, the French army was on its march from Civita Vecchia to Rome; and in that very *Monitore* of the 30th, in which the proclamation of the state of siege at Ancona appeared, there appeared also the hurried orders of the triumvirs, establishing hospitals, and making other necessary preparations for the expected attack on Rome. Singular and honourable sight! A republic nerving itself in every fibre for a struggle which was to determine its very existence; and in the immediate presence of which all other matters might well have been forgotten; and yet, turning round at the same moment to rebuke and punish a refractory and criminal portion of its own children!

To give a detailed narrative of all the events of the Roman struggle from the 25th of April to the 4th of July—the march of the French upon Rome, their attack and repulse, and the glorious and protracted defence with which the Romans astonished the world, is not within the scope of our present purpose.* We have only to observe the attitude of the Roman republican government during this, the last stage of its proceedings, so as to see whether in such trying circumstances it still preserved its high principle, its spirit of pacific reform, and its respect for law and good order.

This portion of the history of the republic is also most authentically written in its official acts. Here are two which will convey an idea of the state of mind with which the government and population of Rome waited the approach of the invaders, who came to suppress their liberties:—

(1.) *Proclamation of the Municipality of Rome, April 27th.*

S. P. Q. R.

"ROMANS,—The first word that your municipality addresses to you, is a word of gratitude. We thank you for believing us worthy to represent the interests of this illustrious city in these moments, which seem designed by God to render it even more glorious among the cities of the earth From the height of the Capitol we have thrown our eyes round on those great monuments which are about it; and we have learnt that the holy memory of our fathers is something far more than mere recollections of art and of genius. They are for us a history, and a lesson.

(2.) *Decree of the Triumvirs, for the protection of the French residents in Rome, April 28th.*

"ROMAN REPUBLIC.

"Having faith in the generous principles, as well as in the courage of the Roman people; being convinced that, while determined to defend to the last extremity the independence of their country against all invasion, the people of Rome does not consider the French people responsible for the errors and faults of their government;

"Relying unboundedly on the people, and on the sanctity of the republican principle;

"The triumvirate decrees:

"The foreigners, and especially the French, dwelling peaceably in Rome, are placed under the guardianship of the nation;

"Whoever shall attempt to do them the least wrong shall be considered guilty of an offence against the honour of Rome;

"The government will take care that no one violates the duties of hospitality.

"*The Triumvirs*, ARMELLINI, SAFFI, MAZZINI.*

"*Rome, the 28th April*, 1849."

Such was the spirit in which the Romans and their government prepared for the attack of the French army; such were the documents and proclamations put forth in the midst of a city, engaged in furbishing arms, and collecting ammunition for the defence, and on the point of being exposed to the bombs and cannons of 30,000 besiegers. It were truly wonderful, surely, if the same spirit was preserved after the attack had commenced. And yet such was the case. As if the defence of Rome had been destined to act as a moral education for the Romans, their magnanimity increased from day to day; and the nobility of sentiment which animated the hearts of the triumvirs diffused itself in a manner which must have surpassed even their expectations, through the breasts of the entire people. The first attack and repulse of the troops of Oudinot took place on the 30th of April. A few days after, a Neapolitan army, of 15,000 men, commanded by the King of Naples in person, invaded the Roman territory, and marched to Albano, about fifteen miles from Rome. On the 10th of May, the second attack and repulse of the French troops took place; and it was not till the 17th of May that, in consequence of the propositions of M. Lesseps, who had been sent as plenipotentiary from France, to come to an understanding with the Romans, there was any cessation of hostilities. Let us see what was the conduct of the Romans and their government during this terrible period, when they had two invading armies to contend with. Here are two proclamations of the triumvirs, issued on the 4th of May, four days after the first attack:—

Proclamation of the Triumvirate regarding the Inviolability of Persons and Property, and regarding Protection to Foreigners.

"Persons are inviolable. The government alone has the right to punish.

"Property is inviolable. Every stone of Rome is sacred. The government alone has the right to modify the inviolability of property, when public utility makes it necessary.

"No one whatever is allowed to make arrests, or domiciliary perquisitions, without the direction or assistance of a military officer.

"Foreigners are under the special protection of the republic. All citizens will answer for the reality of this protection.

"The military commission, just organized, will judge with speed, according as the exceptional state of affairs and public safety demand, all acts of sedition, reaction, anarchy, or violation of the laws.

"The National Guard, which was ready to fight for and save the republic, will be ready also to keep pure from all stain, our honour in the face of Europe. It is the National Guard that is specially charged with the preservation of order, and with the execution of the arrangements now made.

"*The Triumvirs*, ARMELLINI, MAZZINI, SAFFI.†

"*Rome, the 4th of May*, 1849."

* Actes Officiels de la République, p. 77, 78. † *Ibid*, p 93.

Decree of the Triumvirate regarding the Inviolability of Public Monuments.

"IN THE NAME OF GOD AND THE PEOPLE.

"Whereas, works of art, and moveables existing in monuments and public establishments, or other places belonging to the state, are national property, which cannot be spoiled or taken away without criminality towards the republic;

"The triumvirate decrees:—

"The national property is placed under the safeguard of the Roman people.

"Spoilers or robbers of such works of art shall be regarded as enemies of the republic and of the national honor, and as such shall be punished with all the rigor of the law.

"The trial of such crimes is entrusted to a military commission.

"*The Triumvirs*, ARMELLINI, MAZZINI, SAFFI."

"*Rome, the 4th May*, 1849."

On the following day, the following was issued:—

Proclamation of the Triumvirate regarding some Neapolitan Prisoners.

"ROMANS,—Some Neapolitan prisoners, the first fruits of the victory we are to gain, are to come into the town.

"IN THE NAME OF GOD AND THE PEOPLE, THEIR PERSONS ARE TO BE SACRED.

"They are Italians deceived—deceived by the king, who leads them. Let them be made aware that their brothers are here, under the banner of the republic; and that here, and not in the camp of a traitor, is the Italian cause defended. Let them be made aware that the Romans know as well how to pardon as how to conquer.

"Long live the republic!

"*The Triumvirs*, ARMELLINI, MAZZINI, SAFFI."

"*Rome, the 5th of May*, 1849; 3 *o'clock, p.m.*"

Two days later, a still nobler act of grace took place:—

Decree of the Triumvirate, Setting Free upwards of Four Hundred French Prisoners.

"ROMAN REPUBLIC: IN THE NAME OF GOD AND THE PEOPLE.

"Whereas, Rome and the French people are not, and cannot be, at war with each other;

"Whereas, Rome, in virtue of her right and her duty, defends her inviolability, but deplores every attack directed against the two republics as a crime against their

"*Florence, May* 2, 1849.

"I see in to-day's newspapers, that Lord Lansdowne has been questioned in the House of Lords relative to the reported sale of works of art at Florence and at Rome. I have the honour to inform your lordship, that no sale whatever of any of the contents of the public collections at Rome, or Florence, has taken place."*

And again, on May 3:—

"From the accounts of the state of Rome, given by travellers arriving from that city, it would appear that if the French government counted upon a great reaction in favour of the papal government, which should manifest itself as soon as the French troops touched the Roman soil, they have been much deceived, as no such reaction has taken place, at least in Rome, where a hatred of priestly government seems to be deeply rooted in the minds of the great mass of the people."†

On the 5th of May, Mr. Freeborn, announcing to Lord Palmerston the invasion of the Roman territory by the Neapolitan troops, writes again as follows:—

"The republic, of course, must succumb under such force; but I must in justice say, that the men in power have, under all the circumstances, shown courage and moderation. * * * No works of art have either been secreted, or offered for sale; on the contrary, they have been restored, preserved, and protected."

The following is a still more interesting testimony. It is from Commander A. Cooper Key, who had sailed, by Admiral Sir W. Parker's orders, to Civita Vecchia, to observe the state of affairs, and who paid a visit to Rome for the purpose of looking after the safety of the English residents there. In writing to Admiral Parker, on the 10th of May, he gives an account of this visit:—

"Having been informed that, owing to the preparations that were being made for resistance at Rome, the English residents had great difficulty in quitting it, I deemed it my duty to go there to endeavour to extricate them before a second attack was made. For this purpose I went in the *Bulldog*, the same afternoon, to Palo, and, leaving her at that anchorage, proceeded by land early on the 7th to Rome, having obtained permission from General Oudinot to pass through his advanced posts. Arriving at Rome, I found the gates barricaded and fortified, the walls of the city much strengthened, and every appearance of a determination to make a vigorous resistance.

"I went without loss of time to the triumvirate; acquainted Mazzini that I had come to assist the British residents in leaving Rome, and requested him to aid me in doing so. He showed every disposition to do all in his power for the benefit of our countrymen, but said the impediment was purely a military one: the horses required for posting are the property of the government, and the loss of those which would be required to take away the foreigners would considerably weaken them; also, that if foreigners were permitted to go to Civita Vecchia, information would be conveyed to the French, and the horses fall into their hands. This was reasonable; but, on my showing him how unwise it would be to detain foreigners in Rome at this moment, and how little their cause could suffer from the information conveyed, I obtained permission for foreigners to leave Rome in any direction, with private or hired horses, and I guaranteed that the horses should not be detained by the French army. Within two days nearly all who were anxious to leave were gone—those remaining doing so from their own dilatoriness, or possessing property from which they would not separate. This property was considerable, but the triumvirate promised to take it under their special protection.

On the afternoon of the 7th, the Roman government decided on releasing the French prisoners. They were brought out in the streets, and received with every mark of good feeling by the people, who cheered them, gave them food, and showed them round St. Peter's and the monuments; the French, in return, saying that they had been deceived, having entered the Roman territory with the idea that they were to join the Romans against the Austrians and Neapolitans. They were then permitted to return to their own head-quarters."

* Correspondence respecting the affairs of Rome. Document No. 24.
† *Ibid*, Document No. 25.

The only specific charges of terrorism or ferocity which have, we believe, ever been preferred against the government or people of Rome during the siege, relate to the murder of three Jesuits, on the bridge of St. Angelo, and the shooting of five or six priests in the barracks of San Calisto. They are, undoubtedly, the only charges of this nature which could be brought, with the slightest foundation in fact, to support them.

The three Jesuits who were murdered by the populace on the bridge of St. Angelo had just been arrested, in a house near the ramparts, from which shots had been fired down upon the soldiers defending the barricades, and from which it was discovered that a telegraphic communication had been kept up with the enemy. They were torn from the hands of the National Guard, who were conveying them to prison, and fell victims to the sudden and uncontrollable outburst of popular fury, which their treachery had aroused.

The barracks of San Calisto were under the military command of one Zambianchi, with a company of *finanzieri*. Apparently actuated by the same fanatical and revengeful spirit, which it required such rigour and determination on the part of the government effectually to repress at Ancona, he caused these priests, who were taken prisoners by him, on suspicion of plotting against the defence, to be shot by the soldiers under his command; but it was only in the very last days of the siege that the government became aware, or, more accurately speaking, in the absence of direct evidence, suspicious of the facts.

Of Zambianchi's *sole* criminality, there is the evidence of his own boastful confessions, in a letter addressed by him to the French General Rostolan, which may be found in Vol. I., page 330, of Torre's "Memoirs of French Intervention at Rome," and, still more explicitly, in a document, in his own handwriting, in the hands of this society. The only way in which it has ever been attempted to implicate the government in the guilt of Zambianchi, was by the publication, in certain foreign reactionary journals some twelve months or more ago, of a letter of the Triumvir Mazzini to Zambianchi, conveying a military order to him to execute

all the requirements of the defence; we cannot presume to
ly the people who slew three monks caught firing upon the
treacherously communicating with the enemy; we cannot for
retend that the government, charged with the supreme direc-
mortal and heroic struggle, could be always successful in dis-
d preventing, or punishing, every act of illegal violence and
history of the defence of Rome, the general conduct of its
the personal character of the members of its government,
ir declarations, and all their acts, unitedly impress us with the
aviction that no government or people, placed in similar cir-
ever showed themselves more devoted in courage, and at the
ore conspicuous in moderation and humanity, and in the pre-
order, than the government and people of Rome during the
siege.

ciations of M. Lesseps, the French Envoy, with the assembly
nent of the republic, formed, as all know, a very important
history of the invasion. Of more candid and honour-
ion than the General with whom he came to co-operate, M.
no sooner arrived at Rome, on the 15th of May, and examined
imself, than he became convinced that the French government
ed on a complete mistake, if they had imagined that the
me were willing to accept a French settlement of their national
r his first glance at the state of affairs, he wrote to General
ollows:—

ritical situation we are in, it appears to me extremely important
y species of engagement. I see a whole town in arms. * * * I find
irst glance, the aspect of a population determined to resist; and, re-
ggerated estimates, one may reckon on at least about 25,000 serious
If we enter by sheer force into Rome, not only shall we pass over the
e foreign adventurers, but *we shall leave on the pavement men of the
hopkeepers, and young men of family—all those classes, in short, that de-
d society in Paris.*"*

he evidences which opened the eyes of M. Lesseps to the real
ng at Rome, was probably a letter addressed to him by Mazzini,
of the triumvirate. The following is an extract:—

blic is planted amongst us by the will of an assembly, sprung from
rage; it has been received with enthusiasm, and has encountered no
And remark well, monsieur, that never would opposition have been
less dangerous—I will even say never so provoked—not, indeed, by its
he peculiarly unfavorable circumstances in which it was placed at its
nt.

try came out of a long anarchy, inherent in the inmost organization of
vernment. The agitations inseparable from every great change, and
the same time by the emergencies of the Italian question, and by the
retrograde party, had thrown it into a feverish agitation, which ren-
sible to any daring attempt, to any appeal to interests and passions.
my—no repressive force; in consequence of former dilapidations, our
impoverished—exhausted. The religious question, handled by able
l hands, might have served as a pretext, with a population gifted with
nstincts and aspirations, but little enlightened. Nevertheless, as soon
lican principle was proclaimed, one first incontestable fact produced
. The history of the papal government details itself in its *émeutes:*
been a single *émeute* under the republic. The assassination of M.
deplorable, but isolated—an individual excess, rejected, condemned
ed, perhaps, by imprudent conduct, and the authorship of which re-
en, was followed by order the most complete. * * * I write alone,
e midst of the most profound calm. The garrison quitted the town

sion à Rome." Memoire presenté au Conseil d'Etat. Par Ferdinand
Page 23.

yesterday evening; and, before the arrival of new troops, at midnight, our gates, our walls, our barricades, were, by a simple word passed from mouth to mouth, manned without noise, without boasting, by the people in arms. There is at the bottom of the heart of this people a well-defined determination — the abolition of the temporal power invested in the Pope; hatred of the government of the priests under any form, mitigated or changed, in which it can be presented—I say hatred not of the men, but of the government. Towards individuals, our people has always, thank God, shown itself generous, since the establishment of the republic; but the mere idea of the clerical government of the king-priest makes it shudder. It will struggle with rage against every project of restoration. It will throw itself into schism sooner than submit."*

This letter evidently produced an effect on M. Lesseps, and influenced the tenor of his dealings with the Roman government. In his published account of his mission to Rome, he writes as follows:—

"A first message sent to the Roman Assembly had for its object to direct their attention to manœuvres, which I believe to be contrary to the influence of France, as well as to the interests of Italy. These manœuvres concerned the great question of a religious schism, or a new protestantism. The following note, which I transcribe from my memorandum-book, indicates the motives of my procedure:—'I suspect Mamiani —a remarkable and very influential man—of wishing to favour a religious schism; his writings ought to make one fear it. He has frequent conferences with English travellers; he sees Protestant missionaries of all nations. To seek to carry him off from these influences, and to persuade him that France, which he distrusts, ought to be the sole hope of Italian liberties; to turn him from his ideas of schism, and, if need be, to denounce those tendencies to the patriots of the assembly, making them regard them as a treason to the cause of Italian liberty, which cannot exist apart from Catholicism.'"†

With such half-blind frankness did M. Lesseps, himself a dupe of the bad faith of the government he served, pursue his difficult task of reconciling the Romans and the French; a task rendered absolutely impossible by the more secret instructions of the French government, of which Oudinot was the depositary. How, on the 19th of May, the Roman Assembly rejected the first propositions of Lesseps, which demanded the opening of the gates of Rome to the French troops, on the mere promise that the French would act as brothers, and let the Romans [illegible]

confidence; how Oudinot then promised that he would not re-commence the attack on the city before Monday, the 4th of June; and how, in spite of this solemn promise, he was guilty of the infamy of beginning the attack at three o'clock on the morning of Sunday the 3rd, thus taking the citizens when off their guard—all this must be familiar to those who remember the contemporary accounts given in the newspapers. Before quitting Lesseps and his negotiations, however, let us add two more extracts from his memoir of his mission. The first is from a note written by him, on the 28th of May (*i. e.* before the aforesaid convention), in answer to M. de Rayneval:

"It is not more accurate to say that the Roman republic is accessory to the assassination of M. Rossi, than it would be to make our republic of 1848 responsible for the crimes of 1793. The Roman republic, which otherwise I am not called on to recognize, succeeded by universal suffrage to the government which was the direct inheritor of the murder of Rossi;* and it was proclaimed by an assembly which had for its mission to choose the form of government suitable to it. This is a fact. I am not here to discuss the results."

That the Roman republic achieved the signal result of actually gaining over to its side, by the force of facts, and against his own interests and prepossessions, this imprudently honest French envoy, is rendered still more evident by the following passage, in which he sums up his impressions of the character of Mazzini, as obtained during their mutual intercourse. The passage does honor to the heart of M. Lesseps:—

"I fear the less making known here the opinion I had of Mazzini, with whom I was already in open strife—namely, that during the whole series of our negotiations, I had but to congratulate myself on his loyalty, and the moderation of his character, which have earned for him all my esteem. I ended by shaking strongly, if not dissipating, his prejudices against the French government; now that he has fallen from power, and that he seeks, doubtless, an asylum in a foreign land, I ought to render homage to the nobleness of his sentiments, to his conviction of his principles, to his high capacity, to his integrity, and to his courage."

From the 3rd of June, when Oudinot so treacherously recommenced his attack, to the 30th of June, when the assembly resolved that the heroic city could defend itself no longer, Rome, as all know, was one continued scene of combat, fire, ruin, and carnage; and yet to the last the same admirable spirit characterized the acts of the government, and pervaded the whole population. We seek in vain for any other subjects of attack against the Roman people or government, than those to which we have already replied. There are none to be refuted.

We believe that all those who may have followed us through this tract, will be prepared with us to acknowledge that the Roman republic, during the short period of its existence, was not only a meritorious attempt at a new system of things, in a much oppressed country—not merely the best government which Rome and central Italy had known for ages, but that it positively presented a spectacle for the whole of Europe to be proud of. That it was the highest example of ability and virtue which modern democracy has yet exhibited, and a phenomenon of all but unparalleled interest and promise in modern political history.

* Rossi was assassinated on the 15th of November, 1848, three months before the republic came into being.

THE END.

2. TRACT No.

3. TRACT No.
RORISM

4. MONTHLY
OF THE
1. PROGRESS
2. PROGRES

GR

TRACTS

OF THE

SOCIETY OF THE FRIENDS OF ITALY.

TRACT No. IV.

M. MAZZINI'S LECTURE,

DELIVERED AT THE

First Conversazione

OF THE

FRIENDS OF ITALY,

HELD IN THE

GREAT HALL, FREEMASONS' TAVERN,

ON THE EVENING OF

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1852.

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2.—To use every available constitutional means of furthering the cause of Italian Nation Independence, in Parliament.

3.—And generally to aid, in this country, the cause of the independence and of the politica and religious liberty of the Italian people.

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M. MAZZINI'S LECTURE.

On the evening of the 11th of February, 1852, the first Conversazione of Members and Friends of the Society of the Friends of Italy, was held in the Great Room, Freemasons' Hall, Great Queen Street, London. P. A. Taylor, Esq., the Treasurer of the Society, took the Chair, and introduced M. Mazzini to the meeting.—The Lecture which M. Mazzini then delivered is here reprinted with explanatory Notes, in accordance with, it is believed, the unanimous and earnest desire of all who had the privilege of hearing it.

After a few simple prefatory remarks, M. Mazzini proceeded as follows:—

Three duties are incumbent, I think, upon any man who rises in a foreign land to claim sympathy, or more direct efficient help, for his own country: to state candidly, unreservedly, his own case, his objects, his aims, what he struggles for, from whence his right, the right of his country, is derived; to prove that his aim is not a noble dream, to be perchance realized in far distant uncertain time, but an actual claim of real stirring life, checked or suppressed by evil agencies which may and can be removed—not the fond thought of a solitary worshipper of the ideal, but the feeling, the heart-pulsation of the millions—not a prophecy, but a line of contemporary history; and, lastly, to declare unambiguously, without any cowardly, Jesuitical reticence, what he wants from the land where his appeal is put forward. Thank God and my country, I can fulfil these duties. What we, the National Italian party, are, what we want, what we hope, what free England ought to do for us, may be frankly stated to an English audience, without fear or tactician-like precautions. We have nothing to conceal. We may be wrong or right, mistaken or sanguine in some of our intellectual views, but we are, and ever will be, true—true to others as to ourselves. It is a comfort, a comfort that soothes even exile, to be able to say so in a time in which all daring of moral sense seems to be extinct under the atheistical, conventional ties of what they call the political, diplomatic, official world—that is, of a world, the

mission of which ought to be, speaking out boldly and powerfully the word of the silent unofficial millions. It is a comfort to me, in a time in which no statesman ventures to say to the usurper at his own door, "you have broken your oath; you have, without the least shadow of necessity, and merely for personal ambition's sake, shot, butchered, transported, pillaged; therefore, we cannot transact business with you;"—and, when even republican manifestoes* have promulgated from Paris to the world the impious doctrine now in course of expiation, that a *fact* is to be accepted, though the righteousness of that fact is denied—to feel that I can eagerly seize this first occasion of expressing summarily the aims and views of the Italian national party, with a wish that everything I say may be remembered by each of you, and prove a test for judging what we have done, and what we shall endeavour to do.

I.

First, then, what we are. The ruling spirit; the general creed—for individual exceptions you will not take to account—of our national party. It is not enough that we have, and claim a right; you must know the direction in which we mean to exercise it. Life is no sacred thing, unless it fulfils, or struggles to fulfil, a mission. *Right* is a mere assumption, unless it springs from the intended accomplishment of a *duty*. There have been in these troubled days so many errors engrafted on truth, so many sects and heresies defacing our own pure religion of God-like humanity, and there have been—there are still—so many calumnies and accusations heaped, intentionally or not, on Italian liberalism and on myself, that it has grown impossible to state simply one's own belief; but one feels bound to declare, first, what that belief is *not*. This, then, I am going to do, as briefly and explicitly as I can.

We are not Atheists, unbelievers, or sceptical. Atheism is despair; scepticism weakness. And we are full of hope, faith, and energy, that nothing, time or events, will quench. Our whole life is an appeal, a protest against brute force. To whom, if not to God? Between God, the everlasting truth, and force—between providence and fatality—can you find an intermediate safe ground for a struggling nation? We believe in God, as we believe in the final triumph of justice on earth; as we believe in an ideal of perfection to be pursued by mankind, in the mission of our country towards it; in martyrdom, which has no sense for the godless; in love, which is to me a bitter irony if not a promise—the bud of immortality. The analysing, dissolving, dissecting materialist doctrine of the eighteenth century may prove unavoidable, wherever and whenever you want to probe, to ascertain

* Note. The Manifesto of M. Lamartine as Member of the Provisional Government of France and Minister of Foreign Affairs, in February, 1848, did not recognise the Treaties of 1815 as rightfully binding, but accepted them as existing facts.

the degree of rottenness that is in the state. It cannot go beyond; and *we* want to go beyond. We want to accomplish an act of creation; to elicit life—collective, progressive life—for the millions, through the millions. Can we do that through anatomy? The cold, negative, destroying work of scepticism was being completed under French influence, was coming to a close with French influence in Italy some twenty-four years ago, when first I felt that life was "a battle and a march," and chose the way that I shall never desert. It had undermined and destroyed Papacy, though the form was left behind, still erect, weighing like an incubus on the heart of the nation, a gigantic corpse, aping life. But everybody in Italy knows that it is a corpse. And there it lies in its state robe, on its state coffin called a throne, with a death scroll in its hand signed "Gaeta," from which no glittering of French or Austrian bayonets can dazzle our quick Italian eye away. What need have we now of the anatomist's knife? Give us the light of God, the air of God —freedom; the corpse will sink to dust and atoms. Thank God, we have in Italy no other corpse to bury. Aristocracy, royalty, have never been possessed, in our land of municipalities, of real active life. They have been cloud-like phantoms, brought across the history of the Italian element by foreign winds and storms. They will pass away, as soon as we shall be enabled to enjoy our own pure, radiant skies, and breathe unmixed the air that flows from our own Alps.

Materialism has never been a thing of pure Italian growth. It has sprung up as a reaction against Papacy, and from influences exercised at times when our genuine spontaneous life was lost, by foreign schools of philosophy. But it is a proud characteristic of the Italian mind—and history, when more earnestly and deeply sifted, will prove, I trust, the truth of what I say—that it naturally and continuously aims at the harmonising of what we call synthesis and analysis—theory and practice—or, as we ought to say, heaven and earth. It has a highly religious tendency—a lofty instinctive aspiration towards the ideal, but coupled with a strong, irresistible feeling that we ought to realize as much as we can of that ideal in our terrestrial concerns; that every thought ought to be, as far as possible, embodied into action. From our Etruscan towns built and ruled according to a certain heavenly scheme, down to our proclaiming Jesus sole King of Florence, in the 16th century*—from the deep religious idea with which the soldier of ancient Rome identified his duties towards the city, down to the religious symbol, the Carroccio,† led in front of our national troops in the middle ages—from the Italian school of philosophy, founded in the south of the Peninsula by Pythagoras, a religious and a political society at once, down to our great philosophers of the 17th century, in each of whom you will find a scientific system, and a political Utopia—

* Note. Vide B. Varchi, Guicciardini, Sismondi. A similar circumstance is recorded of the Scotch Covenanters, in their time of persecution.

† See Note A, Appendix.

every manifestation of free, original, Italian genius, has been the transformation of the social earthly medium under the consecration of a religious belief. Our great Lombard league was planned in Pontida,* in an old monastery, the sacred ruins of which are still extant. Our republican parliaments in the old Tuscan cities were often held in the temples of God.

We are the children and inheritors of that glorious tradition. We feel that the final solution of the great religious problem, *emancipation of the soul, liberty of conscience, acknowledged throughout and for all mankind*, is placed providentially in our hands; that the world will never be free from organised imposture before a flag of religious liberty waves high from the top of the Vatican; that in such a mission to be fulfilled lies the secret of our initiative, the claim we have on the heart and sympathies of mankind. How should we wither our beautiful faith in the icy streams of atheism? We, whose life has been twice—never forget it—the unity of Europe, how could we, now that we are bent on a more completely national existence, trample down that privilege under some fragmentary negative creed, spurning the parent thought, and leaving individuality to float in the vacuum of nothingness?

We are not Anarchists, destroyers of all authority, followers of Proudhon, the Mephistopheles of democracy. The whole problem of the world is to us one of authority. We believe in authority; we thirst for authority. But we feel bound to ask—where is it? With the Pope—with the Emperor—with the ferocious or idiotic princes, now keeping our Italy dismembered into foreign vice-

red trace which they left behind their graves is still the most powerful enemy that French revolution has to encounter within the heart of the millions. We have nothing to do with it. True terror—terror to the foes—is energy, energy of bold, continuous, devoted action; the rushing to the frontier of countless, shoeless, penniless volunteers, intoxicated with the Marseillaise and with worship for the sacred name of indivisible France—the true saviours in 1793 of the republic; it is the proclamation, in which the Sicilian patriots of 1848 said to the government, "We shall rise and conquer on such a day if you do not fulfil your promise," and the subsequent rising; it is the Lombard barricades begun, at the very moment in which Imperial concessions were placarded, by people who had only in their possession 400 fowling-pieces; it is our own removing all sentries from our doors in Rome, whilst all our troops had been sent out to meet and drive back the King of Naples at Velletri, and the French invaders were under the walls, and threatening advices were coming of an intended attempt from a Popish party against our persons. Against whom should we apply terrorism in Italy? There were in France, during the great revolution, sufficient causes—not to justify, but to explain the course adopted:—a powerful aristocracy in arms at the frontier, a powerful clergy in the Vendée, in Paris a court plotting with the foreign enemy, a threatening germ of Federalism in the provinces. But where in Italy is the internal enemy? Do not half of our Lombard martyrs' names belong — since 1821, since Confalonieri's * sufferings at the Spielberg—to what you call our aristocracy? Did a single man stand up, ready to encounter martyrdom, for the Pope, when we, first in 1831, then in 1849, decreed the abolition of his temporal power? Is there a single foreign honest traveller in Italy—you see that I do not speak of Messrs. Cochrane and Macfarlane—who can trace there the existence of a powerful element hostile to our national party? Is there a man of good impartial sense who doubts that, had French and Austrian troops not interfered, the Pope, far from being reinstated in Rome, would be by this time in Avignon, or Madrid, or perhaps in Dublin? The French troops had landed, Austrians and Neapolitans were marching, and we, compelled as we were to concentrate all our forces in Rome, had not a single soldier—Ancona excepted—throughout the provinces, when we sent a circular to all municipalities in the Roman territory, asking them to declare formally and solemnly whether they wished for the re-enthronement of the Pope or the maintenance of our own republican government? I grounded no hopes on such a manifestation; I knew that no European government would side by the weak. I wanted an historical record that I could exhibit, in after times, to

* Count Frederic Confalonieri was engaged in the revolt of Milan against the French in 1814, of which Austria profited, to substitute herself for France. He was engaged in the Piedmontese revolution of 1821; fell into the hands of the Austrians; and was imprisoned 15 years in the fortress of Spielberg. He died in 1847.

vitality, through the ranks of Italian patriots, until it shone, by the popular will, on the unsullied flag of Rome and Venice. Depend upon me it will shine there again,—shine on the Alps, shine on the sea, blessing the whole of Italy, equally unsullied, and teaching the nations a fragment of God's everlasting truth.

II.

I have told you what we are: the creed of the Italian national party. It is for the sake of promoting, of realizing as much as possible this creed of ours, that we want to be a nation. We want to be. These things that I now say to you would be death in Italy. A fragment of this paper seized in the hands of one of my countrymen in Lombardy, in Rome, in Florence, in Naples, would lead him to imprisonment for life, if not to death. Such is our liberty of expressing thought. A meeting like this would be treated as insurrection; dissolved by musketry and the charge of bayonets. A bit of tricoloured ribbon forgotten in the corner of a drawer—and let it be a woman's drawer—brings the owner to prison, often to a more degrading punishment. A rusty dagger, the lock of a musket found in a house, is death or imprisonment for life throughout all the Lombardo-Venetian territory. A threat written in the darkness of night, by an unknown hand, on the wall of a house, is imprisonment or heavy fine to the inhabitants of the house. An Italian Bible read by three persons in a private room is, in Tuscany, in the country of Savonarola, imprisonment and exile. The secret denunciation of a spy—perhaps your personal enemy—is imprisonment and rigorous surveillance *(precetto)*. Bengal tricoloured illuminations have led to the galleys for twenty years Dreosti* and his young companions in Rome. Some statistical notes found on a young man, Mazzoni, at the threshold of your consular agent, Freeborn, have been deemed sufficient, a few weeks ago, to doom him to a dungeon. Men like Nardoni† and Virginio Celpi, marked as thieves, condemned for forgery, rule, under French protection and Popish blessing, over property, life and liberty. Prisons are full; thousands of exiles are wandering in loneliness and starvation, from Monte Video to Constantinople, from London to New York, from Tunis or Malta to Mexico. Go wherever you will, that living protest of the Italian national party, the Italian emigration will meet your eye. It has passed before me, an exile since twenty-two years, in silent, still deeply eloquent continuity; from the remnants of the patrician monarchical emigration of 1821 to the professional middle-class men of 1831; from the young, pure, enthusiastic, prophetic spirits of 1833 to the deluded thousands of Lombard volunteers in 1848, to the Roman men of the people in 1849; some appealing from exile to suicide, some withering in scepticism, the suicide of the soul; others worn out by poverty and cares; all telling me, as I fancied, like ghosts of my country, her woes,

* See Note D, Appendix. † See Note E, Appendix.

her hopes, and her errand—live, suffer, and struggle. Such is the political condition of Italy. You have all read Mr. Gladstone's revelations concerning Naples. Prevail on the writer to go and sojourn for a certain amount of time in Sicily, in Romagna, in Tuscany, in Lombardy, on the Venetian lagoons—in that unconquerable mother of great woes and destinies, Rome. I pledge all my being that similar pages will flow from his honestly indignant, though inconsistently conservative pen. The absence of all political liberty, of all personal security, of all guarantees of justice; the systematic corruption of Italian souls through Jesuits, spies, and ignorance; the systematic and unavoidable plundering of our financial resources; the deadly influence of narrow, weak, suspicious despotism, on our industry, on our trade, on our navigating power—all these must be by this time granted facts with you; my task is higher than a long, sad enumeration of actual Italian suffering. Are we to be or not to be? Are we doomed, for the sake of a pope, as the French government said,* or of an emperor, as some of your so-called statesmen still say, to be the Pariahs, the Helots of the nations; or are we entitled to live amongst you the free, full, unfettered, untrammelled life that God grants? This is the question—an entirely moral one between you and us. It matters little that we are more or less physically tortured—that we are pressed more or less heavily by taxation—that we feed on cheap or high-priced loaves. I speak of our soul's bread, education and action. We are twenty-five millions of Italians, writing the same language, blessed with the same deep blue skies, nursed by the same maternal songs, imbued by the same tendencies, worshipping the same national geniuses—Dante, Colombo, Galileo, Michael Angelo—starting from a glorious common tradition, thrilling at the sight of the one tricolored national flag, and at the blessed mysterious words of *patria*, Italy, Rome. We long to love and be loved. We think that we have thoughts to impart to our sister nations—thoughts to receive from them; great deeds to achieve through our united efforts; and fragments, as I have said, of the law of God to unveil and to apply. We want to commune, to progress—to worship no lies, no idols, no phantoms,—but truth, genius, and virtue. And the very configuration of our country, the only true peninsula in Europe, speaks of unity; and our national frontiers are the Alps and the sea. Are we not, then, entitled to a national life, to a national compact, to a national flag? And when the foreign oppressor comes and tells us "You shall remain dismembered, slaves, speechless, unhonored, without a name, without a flag, without an acknowledged mission in Europe," are we to submit, or to struggle? That is the question now before you. If you resolve it in the affirmative, you are bound to help us as far as it lies in your power. Could you ever resolve it in the negative, then, indeed, you would be unworthy of the liberty that blesses

* See Note F, Appendix.

your shores. Liberty is a principle, or nothing. The great problem to be solved, by all those who believe in one God, is not that men to a certain amount or under a certain degree of latitude should be free, but that *man*, the being created in the image of God, shall be free; that the very name of slavery shall be cancelled from the face of the earth, from the spoken language of all those who can whisper a word of love.

We *shall* struggle—struggle to the last. Help us if you can; for, with my hand on my heart, and a serene yet bold look meeting yours, I can tell you ours is a holy struggle, commanded to us by Providence, and meant for good. Yes, we shall struggle; and when I say this, I speak the mind, the unconquerable decision of the millions. We are ripe for liberty and independence. Before 1848 and 1849, I would have uttered these words with hesitation; not now. Thank God, we have proved to all Europe that liberty is with us the watchword of a whole people, and that we could fight and bleed, fall and not despair, for it. Ours is a popular cause. In March 1848, we drove away a powerful organised Austrian army. Between the city and the sea not a single foreign soldier was to be seen; those who remained had sought refuge in the fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, and Verona. Our volunteers had reached the Tyrol. Who fought those wonderful battles, if not the people? Who are they—the men who died, during the five days, at the barricades of Milan? The official list has been published by Cattaneo. They belong, most of them, to the people. Who, if not the people, fought in 1849 in Bologna,* keeping the Austrians during days out of an open town, accessible on every side? Who, if not the people, kept the French troops at defiance in Rome† for more than one month? Who, if not the people, endured patiently and uncomplainingly, during eighteen months at Venice,‡ continued fighting, pecuniary sacrifices, bombardment, privation, and cholera morbus? Who, if not the people, fought heroically against Haynau at Brescia,§ after the defeat of Novara? And now, even now, does not the list of condemnations, weekly appearing in the official gazettes of the Roman States, of Venice, and of Milan, bear witness to the tendency of our popular classes? From a valuable series of documents, published in Italian Switzerland, on the national struggles of 1848 and 1849, the Society of the Friends of Italy will have, I trust, one of these days, to draw the materials of a tract in which the feelings of our popular classes will be evinced by facts and cyphers. Meanwhile, let me record here, with pride, that in 1848, from Sicily to the Italian Tyrol, one single watchword, "Italia," was to be heard on the lips of our multitudes; that, before 1848, all attempts of the Austrian government to organise a second Galicia, by a communistic war of the peasantry against the landlords in Lombardy, proved unsuccessful against the

* See Note G, Appendix.—† See Note H, Appendix.—‡ See Note I, Appendix.
§ See Note J, Appendix.

patriotic feeling of our agricultural population; that such was the predominance of the national element over all others in the Lombardo-Venetian provinces, that the March insurrection was decided upon and realised when liberal concessions from the Emperor, concerning the press and internal administration, were giving hopes of a materially better state of things; and that now, after almost all the revolutionary generation of 1848 and '49 has been swept away by the storm, dead, imprisoned, or wandering in foreign lands, our secret—for secret it must be—organisation throughout the land is so powerful that loan notes, clandestine publications, and messengers are despatched, from town to town, with nearly the same degree of security that you have in your own intercourse from London to Dublin and Edinburgh. Thousands belonging to our popular classes are involved in this mysterious underground propagandism, and the secret lies unrevealed. They can shoot or send to the galleys; our clandestine press they cannot seize. These are telling facts. Few struggling nations can exhibit similar proofs of a constant unanimous will.

III.

And now to my third point. What do we want from you? What can England do for us? First, you can give us moral strength; create a strong, compact, organised public opinion in our favour; collect facts, information, positive data concerning our wants, our rights, our struggles, our sufferings; and, through pamphlets, lectures, newspaper articles, scatter them through the land. Speak loudly, unceasingly for us. Do not allow base calumnies to circulate unanswered, against our national party. Oppose to them our solemn declarations, our programmes, our acts whenever we have had a field for action. Let the name of Rome appear inscribed on your flags whenever you meet for popular manifestations. Let no meeting take place for liberal popular objects without a voice rising to say, "Remember Rome and Italy. Remember that freedom is a general principle, or a merely selfish impotent concern. Remember that at no long a distance from your shores a mighty nation, from which your forefathers drew the best part of their life, civilisation and art, lies groaning under Austrian brute force and papal soul-corrupting despotism." Let this Society of the Friends of Italy, to whom we owe our actual meeting, be your nucleus of operation, and soon become the enlarged field of a continuous relentless propagandism for Italian liberty and independence.

Secondly, you can give us parliamentary official help. Through petitioning, through electioneering questions, through personal influence and suggestions, summon your representatives, and through them your statesmen, to a more complete view of your national life; to a better moral understanding of England's part and mission in Europe. Tell them that the life of a nation is twofold—internal

and external, national and international; that between these two there must be harmony, oneness of purpose, to be accomplished through different manifestations; that England's vital principle is religious, political, commercial liberty; and that it must be represented abroad as within your shores. Tell them that England proclaimed, since 1831, through her statesmen, non-intervention as the ruling principle of her policy in international matters; that England meant then that the principle should be universally accepted, and that each people was to be thenceforward free to settle undisturbed and independent its own domestic concerns; that such a principle, though incomplete and unequal to the fulfilment of our duties—for we must always be ready to interfere for good—would still have proved sufficient, if honestly carried into execution, for the triumph of right and liberty throughout all Europe; but that it has been, and is, grossly, insultingly, and systematically violated by the despotic powers, until it has come to this, that though any absolutist emperor, king, or prince, interfere for evil, England should never be allowed to interfere for good. Tell them that, should England have energetically told Russia "you shall not crush Hungary," and told France "you shall not crush Rome," Rome and Hungary would now be free; that Rome and Hungary, recollecting the promises of 1831, were claiming such a word from England; that England's silence was a shame and a sin; that shame, as well as invasion, is death to a nation; that from a will far superior to all political calculations every sin is, sooner or later, expiated; and bid them look to once proud and powerful, now fallen, France. Tell them that the circle traced by continental scheming despotism is drawing every day closer to your shores; and that imperialist resentments, combined with old autocratic jealousy and plans, ought not to be despised. Tell them that, even if immediate danger were not impending, it is the duty of statesmen to look not merely to the emergencies of the day, but to more distant times; not merely to the transient present, but to the future of their own country; that England is more and more isolating herself in Europe; that whilst no despotic power is actually or ever can be friendly to England, no people amongst those who are inevitably called to organise themselves as nations will be, once liberty conquered, her friend and ally, unless the seeds of friendly alliance are sown during the struggle; that systematic indifference will lead to nothing in a not far distant future, when the map of Europe shall have to be redrawn, but to old political connexions being lost without any new being found; to old markets for England's industrial activity being closed without any new being opened. And tell them never to forget that the best national defences for England are now placed abroad; that her best resistance to corrupting papal encroachments would be the free emancipated Rome of the people; and that a single bit of our Italian tri-coloured flag carried from Naples to Milan, and appealing from there to Hungary and Vienna,

would more powerfully divert from England's shores all schemes of invasion or indirect war than any calling out of militia or increase of naval forces and expenditure.

Thirdly and lastly, you can give material help—the material help that European capitalists and loanmongers are lending daily to despotic powers; the material help which, like the body to the soul, is the condition, *sine qua non* of every struggle even morally carried, of every proscribed manifestation of thought.

IV.

I have told you what we are, and what we want—what you can give. My brief task is over. May your own soon begin! Through gratefulness for the hospitality I have found on your shores, through intense admiration for many qualities of English mind and heart, through sacred individual affections, which I shall never betray, there is not a thought dearer to me, after the emancipation of Italy, than that of a cordial active sympathy, and of a powerful future alliance, between your nation and mine.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.—*The Carroccio* was a large car, drawn by four white oxen. When the inhabitants of a city took the field against the enemy, the Carroccio occupied the centre of the camp. An altar was raised on the car, over which floated the flag of the Republic; a select body, comprised of the bravest young men, was chosen to defend it. The Archbishop of Milan officiated at the altar, raised on the Carroccio, at the battle of Legnano in 1167, when the Lombard League gained a decisive victory over Frederick Barbarossa. The fight was most terrible around the sacred car. The German cavalry had succeeded in penetrating to the Carroccio, and was on the point of getting possession of the flag, when its chosen guard renewed their oath of dying in its defence, and repulsed the enemy.

NOTE B.—*The League of Pontida*, A. D. 1167.—The emperor Frederick Barbarossa endeavoured to make himself absolute master of Italy. The Lombard Republics and the Pope leagued together against him; the former to defend the liberties of their country, the latter, because the emperor sustained against him the pretensions of the Anti-pope Victor. It was in a Capucin monastery at Pontida, between Bergamo and Milan, that the league was concluded, on the 8th of April, 1167, by the Delegates of the Republics and the Pope. Milan had already been twice compelled to capitulate through famine; on the last occasion the city had been razed to the ground, and the conqueror had caused the very soil to be ploughed up and sown; and yet, only 19 days after the proclamation of the League, on the 27th of April, the populations of the confederated cities were already flocking to Milan, to rebuild its walls and reinstate the citizens who had been expelled from it. After two fruitless campaigns, the Emperor descended again upon Italy, for the seventh time, in 1176, nine years after the formation of the League, and was completely routed by the Italians at Legnano, a fortified town some fifteen miles from Milan, on the road to the Lago Maggiore. Italy might then have definitely acquired her independence, but the Pope, Alexander III., being now recognised by Frederick, declared himself satisfied, abandoned the League, laboured to weaken it, and supported the imperial power in Italy, judging it less dangerous to Papacy than the Italian Republics. The peace of Constantine, which closed this great war, is memorable in this, that it marks the epoch when the Papacy deserted the banner of the peoples, to pass into the camp of their oppressors. (Vide V. Muratori, Sismondi.)

NOTE C.—*Count Louis Bolza*, of a patrician family of Como, is perhaps the most detested name in Italy; as the man has been Austria's most devoted police agent and spy. Astute and ferocious, he sought out and provoked disorders for the pleasure of denouncing them and of quenching

them in blood. Essentially depraved, given up to the worst vices, he had nevertheless the one instinctive faculty of love of offspring. The future of his children never ceased to occupy his thoughts, and feeling the horrible inheritance which he left to them in his name, his history, and his iniquitous profession, he left them certain express directions in his will, which fell into the hands of the people of Milan when they took him prisoner. "Change your name if it is possible; but, at all events, never accept employment in the Austrian police. Woe to him who enters there. The Austrian police corrupts everything with which it comes in contact; once having treated with it, it is impossible to retreat; everything must be sacrificed to it; dignity, morality, your whole soul. One ends by identifying oneself with its appetites and its requirements. My daughters too, let them never marry an *employé* of the police." This man was taken prisoner at Milan, on the 20th of March, 1848, the second day of the barricades, by the people which he had so long tortured, but was released unhurt. He is still living at Trieste.

NOTE D.—*Dreosti*, a young Roman, was arrested with some twenty companions, and convicted of having taken part in an illumination at Rome, consisting of tricoloured Bengal lights, on the 9th of February, 1850, in commemoration of the Republic. He was condemned to twenty years of the galleys. The Roman people still religiously continue to commemorate the anniversary of the proclamation of their Republic. The details of its commemoration this present year will be found in the March Number of the Monthly Record of the Society.

NOTE E.—*Nardoni*, Colonel in the Pontifical Army, knight of all the orders of knighthood instituted by the Popes, and now one of the most important personages of the clerical party and of those most in favour with Pius IX. This man is the same *Nardoni* who in 1812 was condemned by the Assize Court of Fermo, for *theft* accompanied with aggravating circumstances, to five years forced labour in chains, and to be branded with the letters L. F. (*Lavori Forzati*) on the left shoulder. See the Roman journals of 1848 and 1849, which reprinted the judgment of the Assize Court of Fermo.

NOTE F.—The incompatibility of Papacy and liberty was not merely admitted, but loudly proclaimed by the Catholic party and the majority of the French Assembly, in the sittings of the 18th, 19th, and 20th October, 1849. M. Odillon Barrot, President of the Council, said: "Although the separation of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, be throughout Europe necessary for liberty of conscience, for true and durable liberty, this principle cannot be admitted for Rome." M. Thiers: "We are entitled to deny to the Romans their right of overthrowing, in the name of their own sovereignty, the temporal power of the Pope, necessary to Christian Europe." M. Thurjot de la Rosierè: "What are the Roman States .... The Roman States were created not by their own efforts, but by the power, the labour, and the sword of Catholicism ..... The Papacy is a creation of Catholicism; without the Pope there would be no Roman States, there would not even be a city of Rome ..... The Roman States have been created for the residence of the Popes ..... The sovereignty of the Pope has been established by all Catholics, and all Catholics have therefore the right of defending it. If the Roman States attempt to overthrow the government which Catholicism has imposed upon them, Catholicism must prevent them ..... The sovereignty of the Catholic peoples is superior to

the sovereignty of the Roman people . . . . . There can be no Roman Nationality." M. de Montalambert: "If the Pope were to make concessions . . . . . he would no longer enjoy his great popularity amongst Catholics . . . . . If he were to establish—I don't say liberty of the press or the national guard—but merely the Deliberative Consulta in matters of taxation, which his *motu proprio* refuses, I avow that our confidence in him would be diminished." See the French *Moniteur*—sittings of the Assembly of the 18th, 19th, and 20th October, 1849.

NOTE G.—*Bologna*, 1848. In the beginning of August the Austrian General, Welden, after the Lombard Campaign, so fatal to the Piedmontese, approached Bologna at the head of 5,000 men. The Papal Government, secretly in accord with Austria, had left the city without troops, that Austria might destroy the national party there which was desirous of war. The clerical party, which was in power in the city, had opened the gates to receive the enemy. The people rose alone, and after a long and bloody combat, expelled the Austrians on the 8th of August, 1848.

Bologna, May, 1849. Austria invaded the Republic in the north, whilst Naples, Spain and France attacked it in the south and west. On the 7th May, an Austrian General attacked Bologna with 12,000 men. All the Republican troops had been recalled to Rome; there were but 1000 soldiers left, who, seduced by their officers, who were acting secretly in the interests of the Pope, refused to fight. Nevertheless the people resisted alone, and the town only yielded on the 16th, after six days of continuous bombardment.

NOTE H.—*Rome*. The history of the short, but memorable existence of the Roman Republic is sufficiently well known. On the 9th of February, 1849, the Assembly, chosen by universal suffrage, proclaimed the Republic, by a majority of 150 to 11 votes; against the downfall of the Pope, there were but 5 votes. The downfall of the Pope, and the establishment of the Republic, was agreed to by all the municipalities not occupied by the enemy. In the month of May, 1849, the Roman States were invaded by 30,000 French, 25,000 Austrian, 25,000 Neapolitan, and 12,000 Spanish soldiers—a combined force of upwards of 90,000 men. The Republic had only been able to arm 13,000 soldiers. It resisted Austria at Bologna and Ancona; it beat and expelled the Neapolitans; it held in check the French army for two months before Rome, repulsing it twice, on the 30th of April and the 3rd of June. The city of Rome sustained 27 days investment and siege, resisted for 12 days after breaches had been opened and under bombardment, and held its defences for 9 days after the enemy had forced an entrance through the breach. The Roman army had not a single deserter, and dissolved itself rather than consent to enter into the service of the Pope. During the siege of Rome there were no arrests, no political condemnations; and the French prisoners were set at liberty without conditions. See Society's Tract No. II.

NOTE I.—*Venice* defended itself for 17 months. Abandoned by the King of Sardinia, unsupported by Lombardy, left to fall again under the yoke of Austria, condemned by English and French diplomacy, the Venetian Assembly replied, on the 2nd of April, 1849, to the summons of Radetzky to surrender, by this memorable decree: *Venice will resist Austria at all costs* (ad ogni costo.) The bombardment continued from the 24th of May to the 6th of August, 1849, the day of capitulation. The Austrians had batteries of the strength of 180 cannon against the city and its forts. Upwards of 80,000 projectiles fell in the fort of Marghera alone.

only capitulated after having exhausted its provisions and its ıns of war; water had become bad and difficult to obtain; the ·as black and unwholesome; and for 30 days cholera had begun to he bombs reached three quarters of the city, and the people were to crowd themselves together in the remaining portion; there was e ice for the wounded, no quinine for those attacked by fever, ·ench vessels had brutally refused to supply either ice or medicines ıospitals) and the troops were reduced to a third of their original y fever and the fight. Venice at length yielded, on the 6th of ; on that day not another ration of bread was left for the soldiers nagazines. To meet the cost of this long defence, the citizens of incurred a debt of about 40 millions of francs. (See the history iege, published at Capolago, in the "Collection of Documents of red War.")

ı J.—*Brescia*, 1849. Brescia, a city of 40,000 inhabitants, domi- ɔy a castle occupied by the Austrians, rose on the 23rd March, the Piedmontese army engaged Radetsky on the banks of the

Piedmontese army deserted the field in two days' time; but the brave ft to itself, resisted until the 2nd of April. The barricades and ıscs were defended with desperate courage from day to day. The :ion was exposed to the cross fire of the fort within the city, and of ieging corps. At length it yielded, hopeless of succour, and having ted its munitions of war. The official report of Haynau admits ıe Austrians lost 1476 soldiers, 33 officers, 3 colonels, and General t. What was above all admirable in this defence was, that the ns learnt, on the 29th of March, of the defeat and the Armistice of , and that they still resisted for 3 days. (See "Collection of ents of the Sacred War.")

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ITALY.

"Do not force me to throw on the field of battle all the resources and energies of a great nation."

"Let us place our confidence in God, that he may guide our efforts in the sense most conducive to the interests of humanity and of civilisation."

Discourse of the Emperor of the French, at the opening of the Session of 1856.

LONDON:

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THE

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE appearance of a pamphlet, which solves with remarkable boldness and perspicuity the Italian question, —a question the most important under discussion, since the conclusion of the treaty of peace—has necessarily excited attention amongst the political men of the day.

The pamphlet, *Italie*, of which the following is a translation, was written in the French language and printed in London; it was interdicted circulation in France by order of the Government. I will not fathom the motives that led to the prohibition of a work, which professes entire devotion to the French Government, and almost veneration for the Emperor Napoleon III.

The lucidity of the composition has engaged me, in my enthusiasm for the cause of liberty and of justice, to take up my pen, and reproduce, as faithfully as my humble talents permit, the elevated thoughts of the author; thus attempting to render his work, and the cause of Italy, popular in my own country.

I leave to the public the task of examining the value and importance of this pamphlet. The reader will appreciate the noble sentiments it contains, and its advocacy of the interests of a Neapolitan Prince, for twenty years unjustly persecuted by his brother, the King of Naples.

I felicitate the author of *Italie*, in whom, from the first page, I recognise one of the firmest partisans

of the Bonaparte family; felicitate him, sincerely, on his attachment to a dynasty which does not lead him from the straight road of right and justice.

The time elapsed since the publication of this pamphlet has changed nothing with regard to the question of Italy: it is as vital, as much the order of the day, amongst the people and amongst the sovereigns, even more so, than at the commencement of the Conferences.

The general conviction is profound, that the mention of reform in Italy, at the Congress of Paris, by one of the most noble characters, cannot rest a dead letter; whatever may be done, by monarchs or diplomatists, they will be forced to decide on the grand question of the oppression of a nation by another nation; the maintenance of this oppression is an anomaly and a disgrace to civilised Europe.

The war Europe has just endured, has effected nothing for the grand question of independence; its neglect has been, and remains, an impediment to the establishment of order in Europe, and of the rights of nations.

It is for this reason we have, not peace, but a truce. An arbitration between justice and injustice, must necessarily result under the protection of the new standard which France now bears.

I believe in this new phase, for I believe in progress.

I have faith in a new era for Italy, and agree with the Count de Cavour, that "when two great monarchies, like England and France, desire to accomplish any purpose, it must be accomplished without resistance;" and I have but to exclaim with the noble Italians, "Viva Italia! viva reforma, viva civilization!"

B. S. DE T.

London, May, 1856.

ADVERTISEMENT.

At the moment of our sending this work for impression, the Conferences of Paris still continue.

What will be their result?

No one knows; yet there is one sentiment universally understood. All those who anticipate the re-establishment of things past, the abasement of France, and the overthrow of the Napoleon dynasty, pronounce for peace.

All those who admit that there are sufferings to cure, legitimate desires to satisfy, and nationalities to restore, demand a continuation of the war; and they think that the Emperor Napoleon III. has been the instrument called by Providence to direct and accomplish this European transformation. This mission, most difficult, but sublime and glorious, the Emperor of the French not only accepts, but freely acknowledges.

For ourselves, the question of peace or of war is an idle question, a treacherous one, for it means nothing.

The real, the supreme question is this: to put an end to the sufferings of Europe, avowed by the Emperor Napoleon III.

If peace does not annihilate these sufferings, it is a bad peace. If war does not raise the oppressed nationalities who turn towards France with affection, devotedness, and hope, it is an evil war.

A bad peace will be infallibly broken; a useless war will bring shame and remorse, with the necessity of recommencing another contest at a future and not distant period.

We desire passionately a peaceful but honourable solution; if otherwise, let us forge arms, as the Emperor has said, with as much wisdom as heroism; let us conquer, on the field of battle, the definitive transformation of the past; let us aid in the re-establishment of those who suffer, and prepare the advent of the new society founded on "justice and on truth."

He who traces these words is not an Italian. But he feels for Italy a compassion the most sacred, the most profound. What opprobrium has she not borne! What tears has she not shed! Italy, twice the initiatrice of humanity! Trodden down, and held in contempt by the barbarians; tarnished and degraded by the German rule; imbrued in blood, and dishonoured by her own children! Is there a grief she has not suffered? Yet she lives!—noble, majestic, crowned with every glory, immortal, veiled with that divine sadness which is not death, but only sleep,—the sleep which announces a resurrection. It is the Lazarus, who waits from his friend, the Christ, a call of love.

What kind of peace or war can there be, if there is nothing done for Italy—one of the great miseries of Europe? We have already said. The peace will be broken, and a sanguinary war re-commence, with a doubt for the west, with a hope for Russia, and with an encouragement for those convulsive and revolutionary agitations, which burst forth only because the logical and normal development of generous and irresistible aspirations are obstinately compressed.

These convictions of ours, we know, do not please the sophists of the journal *La Presse.* They forbid the nationalities, which they believe vanquished and extinct, to hope; and they precipitate them for ever into the hell of Dante. It is criminal, in their eyes, for Poland or Italy to hope or wish to revive.

But what has France to gain in the destruction of these two nationalities? Nothing, but loss of consideration for her policy, the weakening of her moral influence, and shame for the forgetfulness of her historical mission. For whose profit do these sophists condemn Poland and Italy? For the profit of Austria and of Russia. Yet they are Frenchmen, and call themselves democrats!

These sophists exert all their efforts to establish liberty of exchange; and we do not blame them. But when the question concerns the liberty of a people, the slavery imposed upon nationalities, they remain unmoved.

The crime is odious; but what is still more odious, is its justification; it is the malediction thrown on those who dare to hope, who dare to believe, that there is a justice, a truth, a God,—words to them probably void of sense, and which have no place in the code of this school of Atheists.

March, 1856.

I.

La Revue des Deux-Mondes has lately made the observation, that there is something mysterious in the origin, in the development, and in the object of this war, which it has been agreed upon to name so falsely, or rather so perfidiously, the Eastern war. But *La Revue des Deux-Mondes* proclaims this opinion without examining it, perhaps even without comprehending it. The most powerful and the most opposite interests are united, to denaturalize this immense struggle, of which the sense is mysterious only for those who voluntarily close their eyes, in order not to see.

What is the question? On the one hand there is an order condemned to be transformed, or to perish; and on the other, there is an order which claims imperiously its birth, and its establishment; for the society of Europe suffers from the absence, more or less complete, of truth and justice.

Is it intelligence or sincerity that is wanting, in *La Revue des Deux-Mondes*, which prevents it from owning what is comprehended by all the world, but particularly by those ingenious sophists who, under the seducing pretext of simplifying questions, complicate and abase them, while they perfidiously, or innocently,—which, we will not pronounce,—prepare the evil revolutions they pretend to avert?

What these sophists preach, is far from being a great peace; it is a great war,—a war interminable, springing up to infinity; for they give no satisfaction to desires, legitimate, political, moral, or religious; and they present no remedy to soften gradually the profound sufferings of nations.

We do not know revolutionists more formidable, more

indefatigable, more successful in their efforts, or so fatal to France and Europe as those two writers, brilliant and serious at the same time, M. Emile de Girardin, and M. Saint Marc de Girardin.

Have they not inevitably led to a catastrophe the monarchy of 1830 and the republic of 1848, while loudly proclaiming that their sole desire was to defend and preserve them?

At this moment, the Eastern war, with the immense questions which it has not created, but only rendered palpable, gives them occasion to continue their work of anarchy and revolution. These two political men, and their school, so numerous, constitute themselves the protectors of barbarism against civilisation, of the East against the West, of Russia against France, of Russia, *powerful, loyal, and pacific,* as we are informed by the author of *La Politique Universelle.** The Eastern war is therefore only obscure for those who envelop it in darkness to conceal their doubts, their fears, their shameful passions, their regrets for institutions and ideas they knew not how to defend, perhaps their treachery. They love and recommend peace, as they comprehend it, to provoke a more fearful war, a fresh conflagration; a calculation, clever and infallible, but also infernal.

In fact, the Eastern war, and the questions linked with it, logically and inseparably, are not so mysterious as one may imagine, or as others are interested in making it appear. In taking note of official declarations, rather

* To those who admire Muscovite good faith, and trust in their official assertions, we oppose an official document, emanating from the Grand Duke Constantine, admiral of Russia, a prince who is represented as the personification of what is most intelligent and most firm-minded in his country. In his letter addressed to Vice-admiral Wrangel, the 7th December, 1855, the Grand Duke Constantine says textually,—"The official *lie*, so much in use amongst us." "In our official phraseology, truth finds no place; it is dissimulated, and buried in forms of language,—there is no reader who can extract it from them."

The Emperor Napoleon I., speaking of the Czar Alexander, said: "He deceived me like a Greek of the Lower Empire. The Russians write without any respect for truth."

Russia deceives not; we render her that justice. Those only are deceived who are willing to be so.

reserved and prudent, than sincere and explicit, the Eastern war is a war of independence and civilisation,—a war of general interests against Russia, viz., against the principle which Russia represents, and which she cannot abdicate or modify without destroying herself, without descending from the dazzling height to which she has been raised, and in which she is maintained by the blindness and complicity of the statesmen and the powers who only obey her will from the certainty they feel of not being able to free themselves from her domination. Yet they defer only for a moment that ruin to which Russia leads them, whilst like the serpent she is fascinating them, insensibly, but fatally.

From the commencement of the eighteenth century, particularly since the dismemberment of Poland, Germany is nothing more than the docile instrument of Russia, who will crush her at a moment's warning. No one is deceived, and Germany has no illusion on the subject.

The solution given to the Eastern war will decide the future fate of Europe, as to her independence and her civilisation.

Either France will triumph, and with France, Europe, who lives and breathes in her; or victorious Russia will impose her principles on the fallen West, prostrate, and proclaiming its incapacity to resist and live.

Is it this which the counsellors of peace propose?

There is no room in the world for the two ideas; the one represented by Russia, the other by France. Europe will be organised by the inspiration of France, or she will bow down before Russia. She will be free, or enslaved.

This is the real sense, the only sense of the Eastern war. It is perfectly useless to endeavour to falsify it, or to elude its logical consequences.

If France is not the first, as she may and ought to be, she is the last; but there is one truth:—to those who courageously accept the accomplishment of a duty, divine inspiration and force never fail. France knows,

and the conscience of Europe acknowledges, that she is in the world to manifest "*gesta Dei.*"

Public opinion, independent, and not obliged to maintain the reserve imposed upon Governments—free from the spirit of faction, which impresses upon the periodical press of France an indelible stain — has not been deceived a single moment upon the sense, the only true one, which we have attributed to the war of the East. It is a war of two principles, of two ideas, which seek to modify and regenerate, or to destroy, the European world; to regenerate, and unfold for Europe a glorious future, if France predominates; and to destroy, if Russia accomplishes those ambitious views which she dissimulates neither to her friends or enemies. Let not Europe forget these words of the Muscovite ukases: *le Catholicisme s'en va, l'Occident s'en va.*

To protect Turkey; to enfranchise the Christians of the East, in order to prepare them for a complete emancipation; to break the preponderance of the Muscovite in the Black Sea, by destroying his fleets and fortresses; to dare to oppose Russia, for the first time since 1815, and through the initiative of France; it is true these are magnificent results, if we only consider the Eastern question itself as a private discussion between Russia and the Ottoman empire; and if we could make an abstraction of the superior interests necessarily implied in the Eastern question.

They marvellously understand this, who advise the localising of the war in the East, and energetically oppose either the abasement or dismemberment of Russia, or the taking from her the provinces of Poland, which assure to her the preponderance now, and by preparing the subjection of Germany, it may be, will gain for her hereafter the universal dominion to which she aspires.

Those who attempt to prove that France ought to remain at home, dishonour and paralyse her, recommending, innocently or perfidiously, humility and false moderation to her, while they reserve dominion for others.

A journal, otherwise honourable, yielding to an impulse without reflection, affirms, that there exists in France no motive for her to interest herself in the extinct nationalities of Italy, Hungary, and Poland.

These are the doctrines which have logically conducted to the catastrophe of the Bourbon monarchies of 1815 and 1830, and the republic of 1848; and would in the same manner hurry to an abyss the re-established empire.

Extinct nationalities! This exclamation, false as odious, does not prevent the Italian and Polish nationalities from existing or suffering; nor will it prevent them from rising and fighting heroically, at the appointed time, on the field of battle. If they fall, they only fall to reseize the arms which they have laid down, but never broken; and to recommence the struggle, to end only in the re-establishment of this principle, at the same time conservative and creative, that every people has a right to live, by the idea which Providence has confided to it: that it is criminal before God, to compress the expansion of the national life of a people who have a long, historical, and glorious existence.

The assassination of one man is punished. Shall we, then, ratify and glorify the assassination of a people, raised to a system by the spoliating monarchies?

To prove that the Eastern question is not merely an Oriental question, but an European one; that there are interests infinitely graver than those of the Christians of Turkey, or the neutrality of the Black Sea; we have only to invoke a single authority, who has the right to pronounce upon the signification of the Eastern war, and of the consequences logically attached to it.

The Emperor Napoleon III., in one of his speeches, has said, that his policy was, "*to cause justice and truth to prevail everywhere.*" In truth, it would be more than inconsistent to wish to protect the independence of the Ottoman empire, to manifest so lively an interest in the fate of the Christians of Turkey, and to abandon the independence of Italy and of Poland, to have but indifference and even contempt for the people of Italy

and Poland, that "*key-stone of the arch*." Memorable words, which were pronounced by Napoleon I.

It is in vain to desire a true peace and deplore the calamities of war, as long as these two immense sufferings are allowed; the inexhaustible causes of European disorder. As long as justice and right are withheld in Poland and Italy, the peace will be in reality an armistice; and the war will, ere long, begin again with more intensity than ever.

The blood, the gold of England and of France will have been sacrificed in vain! Efforts so prodigious and results so inconsiderable are calculated rather to encourage than to humiliate Russia.

M. Emile de Girardin and his disciples, so numerous and so devoted to Russia, preach the great peace, which would only necessitate the greater war; for it does not destroy any of the causes which, sooner or later, will infallibly bring on the most disastrous of wars. For ourselves, we counsel the great war, to terminate this struggle with one blow; in order to obtain an honourable peace, and one that may be durable. To obtain this end, we must annihilate the causes which periodically renew the war, by giving satisfaction to legitimate desires and elevated aspirations, and by displacing the frontiers which were fixed in 1815 by violence, and in a spirit hostile to France, to the people, and to the nationalities.

The school of peace at any price, by letting the false prevail over the true, and violence over justice, proves that it has no sentiment of right, and moreover it prepares new and more sanguinary revolutions. It favours, as much as lies within its power, barbarism against civilisation.

The Emperor Napoleon III., by proclaiming the generous principle of the re-establishment of truth and justice wherever they have been violated, prepares a peace, durable and true, and opens a new era for France and for Europe.

No event has more power to found a long peace,

than the Eastern war, if its real character is only comprehended, and if its consequences are courageously accepted.

The Emperor Napoleon III. said, at the banquet offered to him by the municipality of London, "*All those who suffer, turn their eyes to the West.*" He avowed, then, that there were other sufferings than those of Turkey. The Emperor Napoleon III., by investing, in a manner, with an official sanction, the address of the Generalissimo Rybinski, who regards him as the real head of Europe, and clearly proclaims that Poland looks alone to him for her deliverance, has permitted the suffering nationalities to hope. These words, inspired by an intelligence as elevated as it is benevolent, are in his hands a lever, with which he can overturn a world, and draw from under it a new one. These words, can they be but a menace for his opponents, and a sterile promise for others, for those who suffer? We do not believe it. True greatness disdains means like these.

Italy, then, may hope. She also, though indirectly, has received the counsel to wait while still preparing for the immense struggle, which may doubtless be retarded, but must break out, at one time or other, between the new spirit represented by France and by the Napoleon idea, and the old spirit incarnated by the other powers, which has irrevocably lost its motive to exist.

The Emperor Napoleon III., after the attempt in April, said to the French Senate: "I fear not assassination; I have a mission to accomplish." To protect Turkey, to raise the powers against Russia, to elevate France, is to exercise a glorious mission; but this is not all the mission which Napoleon III. recognises for himself, and which his enemies acknowledge for him. What he has accomplished is only the commencement of a mission more vast. It would be to deny it, or to abase it, to wish to limit it to the Eastern question; a grave question, but completely effaced when compared to other European questions, over which the mission of Napoleon III. is destined to extend itself.

Let not Italy despair. There is for her a reparation and a future. The regeneration of this country, begun by the Emperor Napoleon I., interrupted by the opposition of the old dynasties, uncomprehended or abandoned by those even whose interest and duty it was to receive and develope it progressively, Napoleon III. will gloriously accomplish. There is a new order to create; and in this evolution, pacific or stormy, Italy will firmly attach her destiny to the French policy, to the name of Napoleon, which, in whatever way it may be considered, is an idea, a programme, a symbol, and a promise,—a deliverer announced to the people.

II.

Yet, although it is permitted to Italy to hope, it is not permitted to us to indicate clearly the object of her hopes; for the Italians themselves are not agreed upon what they have to conquer. They have generous aspirations, but vague and undecided; and they seek, without finding, a common thought, a tendency comprehended and accepted universally.

It is this difficulty for the Italians to produce oneness in thought, and one united effort, which brought on the disasters of 1848 and 1849. Italy failed, not because she had not heroism and devotion enough, but because she was divided. Mazzini, Montanelli, Charles Albert, Pius IX., Manin, Ferdinand, king of Naples, were the chiefs of the parties. What an immeasurable difference of ideas, how irreconcilable! What contradictory opinions represented by each name!

In the first place this idea presents itself, the only real object to which Italy ought to tend, the unity of her territory and of her nationality. Without this unity, Italy will remain always the victim of political factions, of her own distractions, or of foreign influences, as hostile to her genius as to her power.

Italy cannot attain her complete and normal development, until she becomes one and indivisible.

Is it in the power of Italy, by herself, to arrive at this object? Does she at present possess the necessary forces to realise this ideal, to make it live and prosper?

We dare not believe it, although we firmly believe that she will ultimately accomplish this, either by violent revolutions, or a pacific progress.

Her actual state is but a fiction, an illusion. They must disappear from Europe, those fragments of nations,

those absorptions of nationality by nationality, often even for the profit of a single family. We declare, distinctly and impressively, that the materialist and atheistical school, notwithstanding its humane and even pious pretences, while recommending the unity of money and liberty of exchange, sanctions the division of a people, the oppression and slavery of its mind and body. In the programme of this school, the human soul, the soul of a people, figures not; and the body is reckoned only as memorandum for material uses.

United, though imperfectly, in the Roman epoch, Italy imposed her language and her civilisation on the people she had conquered. As Christian, dominating and transforming the world by her religious idea, she became miserably divided; and, notwithstanding her persevering efforts, has never been able to reconstitute her territorial or political unity. The popes and the German emperors have equally failed in their efforts to create an Italian unity; the first, because they wished to reign in the name of him who has said, "My kingdom is not of this world;" and the second, because they have always represented the invasion of the barbarians. So many efforts lost, seem to authorise the supposition, that in the Italian spirit there is something mysterious, or at least has been to the present moment, which opposes itself to the unification of Italy; for which, however, she is admirably prepared by her geographical configuration, isolating her, if we may so speak, from the rest of Europe, and by her past grandeur; for what we are now, we have become only by our conformity to Italian civilisation. The revival of Italy has been that of Europe. The two ideas the most powerful, civil and divine law, Italy gave to the world which she regenerated. The ideal in art is also the marvellous creation of Italian intelligence.

Italy has had the most brilliant glory, the most unspeakable misery. Benedictions and maledictions, mingled together in one soul.

The efforts of 1848 and 1849, which appeared so easy,

which it was believed would be decisive—the generous sentiment which inspired the heroic Charles Albert, so worthy of creating the Italian unity, and so unfortunate by the treachery of others, "*l'Italie par elle-même*"—have produced nothing but a dreadful catastrophe.

Italy fell, bleeding, under the Austrian dominion, deceived or betrayed by the sovereigns of Tuscany and Naples, and by the sophist Mazzini, who is only a transformation of the Jesuitism which he would have annihilated at Rome.

Thus her want of power to put an end to the German conquest on the one hand; and on the other, her incapacity to heal her own internal divisions, have brought on Italy all the evils she endures at the present moment.

Provinces, governments, peoples, and sovereigns have not felt the necessity of sacrificing, promptly and for ever, their respective interests, in order to found the Italian unity.

There have been battles at Milan, at Venice, at Florence, and at Messina, but everywhere these efforts have been isolated, consequently they became sterile.

The people of Piedmont were alone equal to the grandeur of an Italian war; but they fell, proving to themselves and Europe that they are worthy of the supremacy to which they aspire, by a national and generous sentiment.

Past experience, therefore, appears to prove that Italy will not attain her unity for a long time, if left to her own efforts; should she become one, it must be with the aid of others.

There is an imperious necessity for her to seek aid from those who have an interest, nobly comprehended, to see her united, powerful, and glorious; who have a real force to employ for the development and the defence of the principle represented by the West.

Once only has Italy, since she lost the government of Europe, after tracing her unity and initiating her people to a new life, had a glimpse of the creation of her own political and territorial union, that essential

condition for the resurrection of her nationality. She was to have received this benefit, the first of all, and the foundation of all force, from foreign intervention, in some manner; we say foreign, *in some manner*, for everywhere, where France has borne her banner and her ideas, she has borne them only to break oppression, to awaken a people subjugated, or incapable, of themselves, of rising to a more perfect existence. She has always shown herself as a friend and ally, by offering her blood and her treasure for the enfranchisement of others.

This mission of French nationality has been often forgotten, or misunderstood. The programme, the dogma, "*l'Italie par elle-même*," is real and sublime; the only one worthy of a people resplendent in its past history with every glory. But this dogma, put to the proof, called on to manifest and realise itself, has proved powerless to overcome the German invasion and the internal Italian dissensions. Italy has need, then, of a generous and devoted alliance.

Independent States are fortified and completed by alliances. Italy, paralysed by her interior organisation, enchained by the Germans and the Slaves, can she believe herself dishonoured by accepting an alliance which will assure to her what she ardently desires to have, and cannot obtain by herself?

There are benefits we receive without compromising our honour, without renouncing our independence; for there are benefits as useful and honourable to those who offer, as to those who receive. The solidarity between men, as between people, is a devotion, a sacrifice even, if you will, but an imperious and necessary duty. A people is strong only, at the cost of raising others who are not so, of teaching them to exist for themselves, and to live their own life. A grandeur and preponderance employed in subjugating others, to gratify ambitious and egotistical passions, is nothing less than a force essentially Satanic, and of which the existence is of short duration. On the contrary, by raising others, we elevate and strengthen ourselves.

It is this tie, eminently moral, which seems to attach Italy to the West. It is this law, truly divine, which, since 1789, governs the relations between France and Italy. Nor will it cease its providential office, till the moment when Italy shall be raised to the knowledge and realisation of her national unity. It is then only, and not before, that the dogma, "*l'Italie par elle-même*," will receive its entire application. Italy, by endeavouring to rise by her own powers, has uselessly wounded herself, and only descended lower and lower into the abyss, compromising or driving from her those who have the will to aid her, but who will do it only at the moment skilfully chosen, and with the certainty that the blow will not be struck once more in vain.

In fact, the French Revolution of 1789, whose transformations—republic, consulate, and empire—have only been the logical development of its idea and its action, has followed this law with regard to Italy, by awakening movement, by establishing progress, by founding social and national unity, by ennobling her people, and by proving her-self the energetic protectress and civiliser of humanity.

If Europe of 1856 is more free, more powerful, than she was in the eighteenth century, she owes it to the commotion, violent but restorative, which the revolution has communicated to the spirit of man.

All that is good, in Europe, proceeds from this: all that is evil, that afflicts us, arises from that which the revolution has not had the time to change, or annihilate, or which it has been prevented from effecting by the blindness of monarchies; and—why not own it?—often by the thoughtless opposition of those whose only hope was the revolution, and its representative, the Emperor Napoleon I. What have they gained, the Germans and Spaniards, in sustaining a struggle which, though heroic, was fratricidal, and destructive of liberty! What have they gained, the Poles, who have trusted the promises of Russia? They have lost the institu created by France; and if they have regained somet

it is because France has not completely fallen,—it is because she is left standing, and that she has been a terror for some and a hope for others. We have seen in 1848 a phenomenon sufficiently significant. A breath from Paris overturned the monarchies of Vienna and Berlin, believed to be so formidable, so solidly established, yet which only reposed, and repose still, on such fragile foundations. Monarchies, factitious and monstrous, created by violence, having no root, historical or national. The breath from Paris is withdrawn; and governments and people are returned to their old habits, betraying on all sides their incapacity to make a movement or a progress. The people of Germany can only dream of liberty; they are incapable of creating it. If given to them, they have neither the courage nor the intelligence to preserve it. Yet, by the side of this want of power, what lofty pretensions do they not manifest?

There is instructive information on the nature of the German spirit, given by the Germans themselves. Schlosser has said that, before 1789, there was not in Germany a single man who would dare to proclaim the truth openly; and, had there been one found, another man could not have been found to comprehend it!

In 1840, Bulow-Cumerow, a high Prussian functionary, sincerely owned, that the good institutions which Prussia possessed, after God, she only owed to the French revolution.

We call to mind the irony, poignant and withering, of Borne, of Heine, of Venedey, directed against the Prussians, who pretend to represent Germany. Is there a progress in Germany? Material, industrial,—yes; moral, political,—no. The national assembly of Germany of 1848, liberal and revolutionary, refused to announce a wish in favour of the re-establishment of Poland. This fact alone is sufficient to establish the profound corruption of the German spirit.

In every country where the Emperor Napoleon I. transported his victorious arms, in withdrawing them he

has left an enfranchisement, a progress, a hope. He has thrown the germs of a new life, by causing to penetrate through the profoundest strata of society the idea of the dignity of man. After the Emperor Napoleon I., the sovereigns who believed they had vanquished him, the people who abandoned and misunderstood him, and who have so fatally and so cruelly paid for their unfortunate mistake, perceived, some with fear, others with pious gratitude, Europe arise, and advance boldly towards a future immense and glorious. The France of 1789, and its most energetic and intelligent personification, Napoleon I., has been an initiation creative, though severe; unfortunately terrible and sanguinary; but, in its permanent results, beneficent and civilising. The calamities which accompanied the creation of the new order are almost effaced from the memory of men; and those who formerly condemned, admire and profit by it.

Italy, as well as Germany, Spain, and Poland, have felt the vivifying and restorative action of the French Revolution of 1789, and of its chief, who necessarily must have been all-powerful, and armed with formidable and absolute force, in order to break the obstacles opposed to him by the hatred of the fallen royalties, the religious and political castes, and the infancy of the people, whom he forced to receive the light as their own salvation.

We too easily forget the obstacles which the Emperor Napoleon I. met with in the accomplishment of his vast projects. What is really astonishing is, that he succeeded in so short a time, through so many enmities and difficulties, to accomplish so much good to France and to Europe.

The France of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries borrowed from Italy the arts and the revival of literature; in the eighteenth century she returned to Italy the ideas she had developed and enlarged.

Taken possession of by the Emperor Napoleon I., often without comprehending her formidable organiser, often anathematising him, Italy, profoundly moved, and

struck as with a revelation, felt within her those noble aspirations, which she had dreamed formerly, without the power to realise them, and now felt with the consciousness and strength to accomplish them.

Italy perceived, unfortunately when too late, the error she committed, by not attaching herself more energetically to the Emperor Napoleon I., and by endeavouring to maintain alone her independence and her standard.

Error, so common to others, so fatal to all! Are there not now even those who reproach the Emperor Napoleon I. with having failed in his providential mission? Whence these reproaches? From those who were the first to abandon him, and who powerfully aided his enemies in overthrowing him. Do we not see at the present moment, in Paris, a Polish prince solicit, insincerely perhaps, the re-establishment of Poland, from the heir of him whom he combated, with Alexander, at the battle of Austerlitz, and whom he betrayed, in 1805 and 1812?

The action of France upon Italy, interrupted by the catastrophe of 1815, has been suspended, to be re-commenced with greater perseverance and more intelligence. France will not fail in her mission, and Italy, better enlightened with regard to her interests, will avoid the illusions and hesitations which precipitated the fall of Napoleon I., retarded her own regeneration, the reconstruction of her political and territorial unity, and the definitive establishment of her nationality.

There is a simple and striking truth, which ought to regulate the relations of France and Italy. France has nothing to fear, if Italy, breaking the yoke of the stranger, rises to a complete unity, or, at least, to an imperfect unity, but strong and progressive. Italy, incapable herself of destroying her own divisions, or of overturning the German conquest, has an interest the most supreme in attaching herself strongly to France, and to the Napoleons, and of accepting generously every sacrifice to establish French preponderance in Europe.

France has never been great, and can never be so, but by raising and ennobling the nations "*All those who suffer turn to the West*," the Emperor Napoleon III. has said, with an inspiration the most generous. Is it possible for France not to devote herself, to justify the faith the people have in her, and to realise what is expected from her alone? It is her duty, the law of her nationality; and the Emperor Napoleon III. has a perfect knowledge of his personal mission, and of the mission confided by Providence to the people he governs.

There would be danger in misconstruing these relations between France and Italy: for France, the duty of offering herself, of devoting herself; for Italy, the duty of accepting nobly the French intervention. We believe also in the solidarity of peoples. The evil which one people inflicts on another is never a benefit to it, and brings its punishment sooner or later. This is the divine law. Evil bears within itself the necessity of its own destruction.

France, by raising others, exalts and fortifies herself: whilst others, in receiving her support, are completed and strengthened. The good pertains logically to those who give as well as to those who receive it.

This solidarity, this reciprocal action, in fact, is obligatory to France and to Italy, from the most elevated considerations, which exercise an influence over the future fate of humanity, decisive and salutary.

In face of the German Protestant nationality, and the slave nationality, of which the great majority is opposed to Catholicism and the civilisation of the West, the Latin and Catholic family, in its ramifications, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, presents itself weakened, divided, and decayed, making superhuman efforts to rise, and often despairing of success. In this Latin Catholic family, France alone is progressive and creative, stirring the world from its foundation, to bring to light the sources of a new life. France alone carries in her breast the mysterious destinies of the Latin family, its decay and fall, or its more extended development.

It is a law of their destiny, then, for France and Italy to draw closely together, and to unite in a generous and indissoluble alliance, in the view of restraining Germany and the Slaves; these last appearing destined to destroy the European society, or to develope it, according as they are united to the Muscovite idea, or to the idea represented by Poland.

After the fall of Poland, which, among the Slaves, represents the spirit of movement and progress, the Slavo-muscovite people recognised in Czarism its most formidable concentration. Czarism has loudly proclaimed, that it alone personates the divine idea, which is, to regenerate the world by destroying the West, and the Roman Catholic religion.

By a re-action, we would willingly believe providential, France, during the last sixty years, under pain of perishing herself, and of seeing the other members of the Latin family perish, has given an immense extension to her action. The question has been clearly put,—" to be, or not to be ?" To vanquish or transform the world, who rose against her, France exercised a dictatorship under the republic, and in the epoch of the first empire, a dictatorship, which, while it was execrated and misunderstood, was yet indispensable to purchase the salvation of France and of Europe.

It is, it seems, a law of history. Every initiation must be accomplished at the cost of pain, of sacrifice. The science of human life has been, up to this present moment, bitter. A new idea can only be incarnated by a martyrdom ; to attain life, the Gospel says, we must accept death.

Therefore, for France and Italy, the supreme interest which governs every other is, to have a good understanding, and to unite sincerely and firmly, as long as the struggle is not definitively decided between the West and the East, between the Latin and Catholic genius, and the German, and more particularly the Slave, which, although opposed, are yet often leagued against the West, with this difference, that more especially since the dis-

memberment of Poland, Russia occupies the first rank, and Germany is descended to the part of a weak instrument, to be broken, sooner or later, with facility. For to those who think seriously, and do not allow themselves to be deceived by appearances, Germany is no longer independent; as recent events have victoriously proved, she has lost even the sentiment of her independence; is troubled and discouraged by the presentiment that she will disappear in the overflowing of the Slave nations. What is the future destiny reserved to Germany, placed between the two powerful unities, the West represented by France, and the East by Russia, or Poland; for, notwithstanding all the past, the quarrel between Russia and Poland is not decided; and if we may trust the logical development of facts and ideas, it is Poland which eventually must and will prevail.

This is no digression. From the time that the Emperor Napoleon I. shook the thrones and the people of Europe, forcing them to follow France or to oppose her, there are no isolated questions: all are fatally tied together, and modified by a reciprocal action. Good and evil are communicated from one people to another, by an impulsion, so to speak, mechanical.

Europe becomes and will continue to become one. This Italian dogma, "*Italie par elle-même*," is a true dogma, yet it has been a dangerous illusion; for persevering in it, Italy has only rivetted the chains she wished to break. But Italy of 1848 deceived herself generously; she expiated her error on the field of battle, by the blood of her martyrs; proving to herself and to her enemies that she is neither daunted nor dead. There are defeats which awaken the strength of a people, by revealing to it a restoration in the future. Italy, in 1856, preserves all her hopes, though there are sophists who forbid the vanquished nationalities to hope, or to rise again, at a future day.

Those who in 1848 were really criminal, were the few men who surprised the government of France: bold in exterminating the people of Paris, they were humble

and grovelling before the monarchies against which they had declaimed for eighteen years, and perjured to the people whom they had promised to enfranchise.

We have, as we believe, established the necessity of a firm union between France and Italy; it is the law of their common safety. We have given an explanation of those organising dictatorships imposed by France on herself, and on the people of Europe; dictatorships providential in this sense, that they serve as a transition, an arm to break resistance; a means of causing a new idea to be accepted, and a kind of education for France herself, as well as for others.

We have said, that there are no isolated questions, no separate interests; Europe becomes one, and France is but the force to commence and to terminate this European transformation successfully.

Here involuntarily arises the Polish question, so universally known, yet so little comprehended,—a question to which is attached so much hatred, so much sympathy, so many illusions, so many hopes; a question obscure even for those who, by an inspiration of conscience and by a prophetic intuition, reclaim the re-establishment of Poland, that "*key-stone*" of every political arch in Europe, without which nothing is done, and nothing can be done, either for France or Italy, or for the supremacy of those ideas and those persuasions contained in this word, the West.

The union of France and Italy, would it be powerful enough to modify the Slavo-German world by lowering Germany, and drawing to the West the Slaves who are inclined towards it, of themselves, by a mysterious impulsion, which we believe is one of the laws of Providence? It is permitted to doubt. France, both under the Republic and the Empire, endeavoured to rally the Latin family into a focus. Yet, though she was directed by a vast genius, she failed before the opposition of the Slaves and Germans, who are nevertheless divided by irreconcileable hatreds.

What was the cause of this monstrous union? How

explain the impotence of the Latin family, and of France herself, to resist the opposition of the Germans, and of the Slaves?

It is the effect of the fall of Poland. Poland, ten centuries ago, united itself to western Europe by two ideas: one, a profound aversion against the Germanic spirit; the other, the Catholic idea, represented by the church of Rome, and the civilisation created in the West. These two ideas constituted Poland, in opposition to the Slaves, separated from the Roman Catholic unity. The entire existence of Poland is contained in this mission, which she accomplished for ten centuries; not without glory, not without success. Her struggle against Germany and against the Slaves, or rather the Slavo-muscovites, was to defend the religious and political idea, such as it is manifested in the West. Yet the West allowed Poland to be dismembered, and has ever since been struck with a malady she cannot cure. The West, in abandoning Poland, mutilated herself. It refused to accomplish a duty; it suffered a crime to be committed, and it bears the punishment of that crime. The murder of Poland cemented the union between the Muscovites and the Germans more strongly than the most elevated sentiments could have done. We have seen it in the Conferences of Vienna, in 1855, and though we earnestly desire our anticipations may deceive us, we shall see it again in the Conferences of Paris.

Evil is only destroyed by destroying the causes which created it. It is then, by a conviction most profoundly considered, that we say: there is only one means to save the West, which is, to re-constitute Poland. If Poland is allowed to remain under the Muscovite and German domination; if it is forced to admit that the West abandons it, and condemns its hopes, the Polish opposition against the Germans, and against the Slaves, will change its character and its tendencies; the Germans and the Slaves may come to an understanding, and if they do so the West will have to combat a new

invasion of barbarians, perhaps even ignominously to suffer it.

France, in her function of representative of the West, has, then, two problems to solve, under pain of compromising her own existence: strictly to unite herself to Italy, in developing all her energies; to sustain the Polish opposition, to raise Poland her ally by community of religions and political convictions, and by means of an independent Poland to modify Germany, and transform the Slave world. For we maintain, and it cannot be said too strongly or too often, the future, not only of Italy, but of Europe, depends on the solution which will be given to this problem, viz., What will be the idea which will raise and unite the Slaves? Will it be Muscovite or Polish? If the first, it is a cataclysm imminent for the West; if the second, Poland will serve as a basis and a link to create the harmonious union between the genius of the West and the genius of the East.

The Emperor Napoleon I. had, if not the knowledge, at least the presentiment of the future fate of Europe being thus linked to Poland by her enslavement, or by her independence. He did not, therefore, shrink from the war of 1812, which was for him a duty, a mission, and, so to speak, a fatality. He believed that he had done nothing, as long as Russia was not rejected beyond the Dnieper, which she had only crossed through the complicity of the English oligarchy, and by skilfully availing herself of the enmity of the Germans against France.

Disposing freely of all the forces of the Empire, sovereign of Italy, and by himself, or the kings he had named, commanding a part of Germany, he did not believe his power firmly established, as long as there was a Russia aggrandised by the Polish provinces, animated by hatred against France, and giving encouragement to European hostilities.

The war of 1812, undertaken with the view of the re-construction of Poland, was one of the sublimest

inspirations of the Emperor Napoleon I. He did not succeed, and his power fell.

As in 1812, so in 1856, all solutions without Poland are incomplete: for all the dangers which menace Europe at this moment will return, and return augmented, and accompanied with this knowledge, which of itself alone is a misfortune, that the West has shown the absence of all courage, of all intelligence, or of all union, to reduce the preponderance and the ambitious projects of Russia, and to wrest from her the means of troubling hereafter the peace and independence of Europe.



III.

We have proved that for Italy a generous and powerful alliance is an imperious necessity, to enable her to put an end to the German invasion, to her own internal divisions, and to re-constitute, more or less completely, her territorial and political unity.

We have equally proved another fact, decisive for the regeneration of Italy, that France alone can offer that alliance, generous and protective, which she requires. There would be irreparable danger for France not to offer this alliance, and for Italy not to invoke it warmly, and accept it nobly. It is a duty, as salutary and important for the one, as for the other.

This is the way in which we comprehend the line of policy chosen by the Emperor Napoleon I. to regenerate Italy, by good institutions; and to strengthen her, by preparing progressively her unity and independence. A policy inspired by judicious foresight, and an earnest and elevated solicitude for the preservation of the civilisation of the West.

The monarchies of 1815 delivered France and Italy to Austria, or rather to Russia, who possesses the art of employing this power, with the most wonderful ability, for the accomplishment of her ambitious views. It has been remarked—Austria prepares her tomb with her own hands. Believing it was in her power to make use of Russia, she has fallen a victim to her own artifice. The revolutions of Naples and of Piedmont, in 1820 and 1821, only failed from this treachery.

The monarchy of 1830, in the last years of its existence, was happily inspired. It boldly and strongly supported the establishment of liberal institutions, moderate, but progressive; a method infallible, though acting by

slow degrees, of creating a feeling in common to all the Italians, and of eventually repulsing the barbarians beyond the Alps. It was wisdom, and heroism in that monarchy; not elevated, nor offering magnificent hopes, we own; but a cruel experience too soon, by events, has justified that policy, which has been so severely judged. The men of 1848, who breathed only invectives against the monarchy of 1830, perjured in their promises, shamefully abandoning the political traditions of France, allowed impassibly to be accomplished the infamous subjection of Italy. The manifesto of M. Lamartine, promising to recognise the people who should raise themselves, was a formal contradiction to the word "*fraternité*," which the provisionary government had proclaimed so pompously and so perfidiously. M. Lamartine, and after him M. Cavaignac, accorded permission to Austria and Russia to subjugate Italy, the Hungarians, and Wallachia. The Prince President of the Republic had only to accept the facts accomplished, or which were to be accomplished so fatally. Before thinking of Italy, and he did think of her seriously, he had to save France, laid open to Russia by one party, and by others threatened in having doctrines imposed upon her, equally premature and impossible. France has regained, by a miraculous effort, the height from which she descended in 1815. Powerful now at home, free to dispose of her forces, victorious, she may and ought to interest herself warmly in those who suffer; and truly, Italy is one of her solicitudes.

What is the evil, origin of all the rest, which paralyses Italy, which has opposed and still opposes itself in the way of the complete or progressive re-establishment of the Italian unity? This evil, we denounce it loudly, is, that the Italian governments are Italian only in name. The Sardinian government alone is strictly Italian, and worthy, were it possible to accomplish it, of becoming the government of all Italy. The people of Lombardy and Venice endure slavery with abhorrence, but with

courage and honour. They have abdicated neither faith nor hope. An Austrian Grand-Duke administers Tuscany, under the orders of the ministry of Vienna.

Our desire of making two grand sub-divisions of Italy, we acknowledge will meet with serious difficulties. The suppression of Tuscany and the Roman States might raise the opposition, not only of the sovereigns, but of the people of these countries, who are habituated to a humble and provincial existence, and who love, rather than are acquainted with, Italian unity.

We attribute, perhaps, too much energy, too much love of their country to the sovereigns and to the people, to whom the independence and greatness of Italy appear only in the form of a magnificent dream.

The dissolution of the Roman States, however desirable it may be in a political and even in a religious point of view, presents very serious obstacles. The Pope, it is supposed, would not be really independent, were he not an Italian sovereign. This is an error, but an error too general, and it has endured too long, not to be held in consideration. The error touches too nearly the mysteries and fears of the conscience. There are some who perceive or pretend to see in the suppression of the temporal sovereignty of the Popes, a measure of hostility against the Pope, against the Papacy itself, against the spiritual idea, the religious institution. We have indulgence for these illusions, without sharing them; for we know Catholics, severe in their convictions, who judge this temporal sovereignty attached to the Popes as the most fatal gift with which Papacy and Catholicism has been endowed.

In fact, where is the advantage of a terrestrial crown for the Vicar of Him who taught this doctrine, "My kingdom is not of this world?"

What we demand, what has been demanded also by so many Popes, is that the Pope may be an Italian, devoted to Italy, and an enemy of foreign dominion;

the Papacy indeed continues, and the Popes reign, but for a few years longer. The Gregory the Sevenths, the Innocent the Thirds may again have their parts assigned to them in this world. Should the north of Italy become free and strong, the other princes will easily become Italian, and may, perhaps, acknowledge themselves, that they can reap no advantage by prolonging the weakness and anarchy of their common country. We suppose them generous enough to sacrifice their individual interest to the interest of Italy. How is it that Italy and Germany remain insensible to the immense advantages created by the French nationality? France is the first nation in the world, and Italy is a field of battle for every quarrel, sanguinary or political; but the most profound, the most crying misery of Italy is Naples.

What can we say, after all that has been said of this kingdom, and the King of Naples?

"The country is sacred," says Michelet, "he who yields it up, incurs the penalty of death. The crime of violating its integral nationality is the greatest of crimes."

We may comprehend, we may excuse everything but treason. Obedience to Russia dishonours and debases the Italian princes, and renders them completely incapable of fulfilling their political mission.

At the first popular breath, at the first menace of the powers interested in the fate of Italy, the royalty of Ferdinand will disappear. His acts have rendered him odious and impossible in Italy, as well as to the governments and people of Europe. No one trusts to him, and he trusts in no one. Too much blood separates the king from the people.

The first reform, then, to execute, and without which nothing is to be done, is to change the governments which, directly or indirectly, betray Italy. This will be the first and most difficult step, in the reconstruction of the Italian unity,—that supreme interest of Italy.

Another reform, to operate for the same end, would be to simplify the actual territorial divisions, by constituting two Italies: a North and South. The It

the North, under the royalty of the dynasty of Sardinia, uniting to the Sardinian States, Lombardy, Venice, Tuscany, and the Duchies of Modena and Parma. The Roman States, Naples, and Sicily, should constitute the Italy of the South. And these two Italies should be united by a federative system, and governed by the same institutions.

But to whom may be confided the destinies of southern Italy? The present King of Naples has broken his crown, with his own hands. A crown is not worn with dignity and utility when steeped in blood, degraded, and rendered ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of Europe. The *Times*, certainly not a revolutionary journal, has however declared, in positive terms, that a change of sovereigns in Naples is inevitable. For ourselves, we shall abstain from pronouncing a judgment so absolute and so imperious. Without excluding the probability that at Naples this change is inevitable, we firmly believe that the King of the Two Sicilies, if he can comprehend his own interest, and desires to preserve his throne, must abdicate the despotic power he arrogates to himself, in contempt of the oaths he has taken, and re-establish institutions, wisely liberal and progressive; that he must become sincerely an Italian prince, instead of a Muscovite one; and that he must cease the scandalous and obstinate persecution he exercises against his brother, without being able to reproach him with one single fault, or forgetfulness of his duties as a brother and as a prince.

Yet, admitting that the King of Naples agrees to these concessions, we cannot trust to them completely; for, and this is for him an immense misfortune, perhaps an irreparable one, his word, his solemn oaths are no longer a guarantee, no longer inspire confidence,—the terrible but just punishment of perjury.

The engagement to make concessions—the concessions themselves even—do not suffice. At this moment it is indispensable for the good government of the kingdom that the King of Naples should give a security, a

certainty that he will faithfully execute his engagements, and that he will no more drench in the blood of his subjects those institutions which he had freely given and sworn to maintain; but to wear such a crown! Suspected, watched, and debased by odious recollections! How false and dangerous a position for the King of Naples himself, and for the Neapolitan and Sicilian people, so easy to govern.

A change is imminent in Naples: and this change also implies the abdication or the deposition of the king. Where choose another, with the certainty of his not following in the steps of him to whom he succeeds?

If, however, the change which is foreseen should be only a change of system, what will be the guarantee, the security for it? Who may force the King of Naples to respect his oaths? Who will inspire the people of Naples and Sicily with confidence? Evidently there is a necessity to create a mediator, a protector, a second king, or, according to the legal Neapolitan formula, an "*alter ego*," noble enough not to desire the crown for himself, powerful enough to take from the king the hope or the wish to return to despotism, and to prevent him from bringing into Italy German or Muscovite influences, in hatred of the influence of the West, which can have no other interest or desire but the strength and real independence of the Italian people.

But to whom may be confided this august mission of "*alter ego?*"

Providence often prepares certain men by proving them, to accomplish designs which are only made manifest hereafter. These men have frequently no presentiment of their future destiny; for it is by little and little that they have created it. Cromwell and Washington, at the commencement of their career, did they imagine, the first, that he would become protector of the English republic, and the second, the illustrious founder of the United States of America?

In 1836, his royal highness Charles of Bourbon, Prince of Capua, brother of the king of the Two Sicilies,

married, in London, Miss Penelope Smyth. Every formality prescribed by the civil and canonical rites was fulfilled. This marriage was rigorously legal, not only according to the laws of the country in which it was accomplished, but to the laws which governed the kingdom of Naples and the royal family of Naples; for at the period at which this marriage was contracted, the civil Neapolitan law, and the prescriptions which governed the royal family, were not opposed to it.

His royal highness had an absolute right to marry whom he pleased, and to transmit his titles to his wife and his children.

Miss Smyth has become her royal highness, and her children, a prince and princess their royal highnesses. A consultation, held in 1841, by J. Dodson, Queen's Advocate for the United Kingdom, by order of Lord Palmerston, minister of the British crown, pronounced the perfect legality of the marriage of their royal highnesses the Prince and Princess of Capua, in all that concerns the marriage itself, and its consequences, civil and political. Lord Palmerston, in his character of minister of the crown, ratified this consultation. Can there be a higher or more impartial authority, to declare the union of their royal highnesses legal before men, holy and inviolable before God?

Yet, the King of Naples believed he might attack this marriage of the Prince of Capua and Miss Symth, thus destroying the foundation of all society, and the most sacred ties of family. The Prince of Capua has never forgotten what he owes to his brother and his king, the sovereign of Naples; but he has resisted his arbitrary will, and remained united to the wife he chose. The brother and the king then pronounced despotically the exile of his brother, and the confiscation or sequestration of his personal fortune, his domains, and his revenues. After having destroyed the conservative principle of family, the King of Naples destroyed another conservative principle, that of property. Revolutionaries, communists, the wildest, the most outrageous,

could they have done more? From this moment
king of Naples is a king only in name. He has viol
the duties of a king, in the persecution of a broth
prince, the chief of a family, and a proprietor.

The father of his royal highness the Prince of Ca
by the last act of his will, assured to him certain ad
tages. The reigning King of Naples suppressed this
the last wish of his father and his king. This fact le
no doubt respecting the moral character of the Kin
Naples, and of the manner in which he underst
the duties of a man and of a brother, and his missio
a king. If he acts thus to a brother, a prince, how
he act towards his subjects? We all know. His m
of governing are, proscription, confiscation, mass
and something more odious even than these violen
—degradation!

The honourable conduct which the prince of Ca
has ever maintained, the nobleness of soul with w
he supports the persecutions of his brother, have
ciliated for him the consideration and esteem of fo
governments. Thus Lord Palmerston has consid
it a duty to interpose in his favour, and to put a ter
the persecutions directed against the Prince of Ca
which not only dishonoured the King of Naples him
but also the monarchical principle which he represe

Lord Palmerston, by the official communicatio
14th May, 1836, gave his energetic support to
demands made by the Prince of Capua to the Kin
Naples. He particularly insisted on the legality of
marriage, and its political consequences; in fine
recommended to the justice, or at least to the benevol
of the king, the distress of his brother, who he beli
was innocent, at the same time rendering to his me
as a husband and a prince, the most striking justice

This communication, presented in the name of
British empire, is fundamentally the defence of
Prince of Capua, and the most severe condemnatio
the King of Naples. We will give some of the
striking passages.

Lord Palmerston affirms, "that the situation of the Prince of Capua, which no crime, either political, legal, or moral justifies, tends to produce an unfavourable impression, it would be most desirable to destroy. The Prince of Capua is in the greatest pecuniary distress, and unprovided with resources sufficient to place him in a state of living in a manner conformable not only to his natural position as prince royal, but even in the condition of a simple gentleman; and this circumstance tends *to cast a stigma in a manner truly deplorable on the honour and character of the royal house of Naples;* a pecuniary distress, not only painful to the prince himself, but what is more, *extremely derogatory to the dignity and the honour of the royal family of Naples.*

"It is on this point that the Government of her Majesty the Queen is most desirous to solicit for Prince Charles the benevolence of his Neapolitan Majesty; for the spectacle is a painful one, and not only derogatory to the dignity of the crown of Naples, but most hurtful to the interests of monarchy in Europe."

To these remonstrances, presented by the Government of Great Britain, the King of Naples opposed a real denial of justice; for the concessions which he did make officially could not have been accepted without dishonouring the prince, as a husband and as a father, and causing him to violate the oath he had taken in the presence of God. The King of Naples, representing moral order, as he himself supposes, and head of the society politic, endeavours to impose on a prince, his brother, perjury, and the forgetfulness of the first of duties.

What were these concessions? The Prince of Capua explained and discussed them, in a letter which he addressed in 1842 to Lord Aberdeen.

The king exacted a letter of submission, although the Prince of Capua had committed no crime, and although he has ever conformed himself, and still conforms himself scrupulously, to the duty and fidelity of a loyal subject to his sovereign.

The King of Naples exacted from the Prince of C
the formal engagement to submit to every measur
it should please him to ordain; that is to say, obe
to the unknown and arbitrary will of the king; pr
tions no one would dare to make to the meanest of

The King of Naples exacted, that the children b
this marriage—on the one hand so unfortunate, c
other so happy and worthy of all respect and ad
tion—should renounce bearing the title of their fa

In other terms, the king exacted, that the Pri
Capua should give away his birthright, his here
titles, thus imprinting, with his own consent, a
upon the princess his wife, as well as his children
he should renounce, as it were, his consort an
offspring.

And these demands, so scandalous, so terril
king—protector of the family, the representati
moral and political order—pretending to reign by
right, officially proposes them!

In this way are dug the gulfs into which have
royalties abased, and destroyed, by means of thei
preparing.

Lord Palmerston has had the generous coura
express this truth to the King of Naples, who ha
the misfortune to despise it: "You compromis
monarchical principle in Europe." And the Ki
Naples, by persevering in his conduct, appears cle
answer, "Let the monarchical principle perish, rathe
a concession be made, or an acknowledgment of h
done wrong." The King of Naples is not the firs
has provoked, and in some manner justified, a r
tion.

There rests another question, that of the domain
revenues belonging to the Prince of Capua, whic
King of Naples, protector of right and of property
caused to be seized and sequestered, and illegally
fiscated. What other means have the socialists
communists of governing mankind? But no; the
of Naples, as a compensation or equivalent fo

domains belonging in full proprietaryship to his royal highness the Prince of Capua, and transmissible to his legitimate heirs, offers a life pension! and further subject to reductions he reserves to himself to make hereafter. Confiscation, and for compensation a derision, a miserable revenue to the Princess of Capua and to her two children.

The first dogma of monarchy says, "All justice proceeds from the king;" yet such is the justice which emanates from the King of Naples.

The King of Naples combats revolutionary, socialist, and communist doctrines; yet to this extent he teaches and practises them himself.

One more fact, the last, to complete our exposition of the conduct of the King of Naples towards his brother.

The revenues of the confiscated domains of the Prince of Capua amount, for the year 1856, to a sum of 50 millions of francs.

In considering a sum so enormous, tempting even for a king, an involuntary yet logical question presents itself—a supposition at once painful and incredible.

Does the King of Naples prolong the exile of his brother—does he persevere in proclaiming the nullity of his marriage—does he give this unheard-of and revolting example of a persecution of twenty years—only in order to dispense with the necessity of restoring 50 millions of revenue, which he has taken possession of, or rather which he has caused to be seized illegally, and expended illegally, by the most scandalous and manifest violation of the rights of property and of family?

Does the King of Naples persevere in his implacable hatred of twenty years against his brother, not only because he is jealous of his popularity, but because he is prompted by avarice, and desirous of enjoying in future the personal fortune of the Prince of Capua?

Lord Palmerston has said, and no one has it in his power to contradict him, that the Prince of Capua has committed no crime, legal, political, or moral.

His royal highness, then, it would seem, suffers this obstinate persecution because he is innocent, and because he has sacrificed all to a sublime sentiment of duty, which honours him, as a prince and as a man! It may be, Providence permits this spectacle, on the one hand, of a king, violator of every right, human and divine; and on the other, of a prince accepting, heroically and piously, a real martyrdom, rather than perjure himself, to prove to the people of the Two Sicilies that it reserves for them, prepared by long trials, a better fate in future, and a more worthy prince.

We see at Naples, in the king, the complete absence of goodness, the inexplicable exasperation of a brother against a brother, the destruction of the rights of family and of property; and at Paris his royal highness the Prince of Capua, who does not hesitate to accept the most painful sacrifices, that he may not violate the religion of his oath, made before the altar of God. He has generously abandoned all but honour, with which, when it is the will of the Almighty, we may regain what we have been deprived of by the hatred of men. We ask of the people of Naples and of Sicily where, in the political and moral order, is the real representative of royalty?

found consolation and alleviation, he owes it to the family of her whom he has chosen for his wife. To Lady Dinorben, sister of the Princess of Capua, a lady as remarkable for her noble and elevated character as for the goodness of her heart, which is ever liberal and generous. We know that Lady Dinorben has evinced for her brother-in-law those attentions and that attachment which have been so cruelly and scandalously denied to him by the King of Naples. Those virtues and those duties, which we would have wished to find in the heart of a king, spring naturally from the heart of a woman. There is nothing more profoundly sad than the crown which does not reflect those virtues without which the name of a king is an accusation or an insult.

The brothers and sisters of his royal highness the Prince of Capua have imitated the example given by the King of Naples. They have forgotten him! With one exception, so much the more worthy of admiration that it is the only one. Her imperial majesty of Brazil honours the misfortune of her brother and sister-in-law with touching and affectionate generosity.

At this epoch, no one may hold the sovereign power but on condition of exercising it worthily; to be the first, but to administer to all.

There is a serious interest in studying and knowing what have been the sentiments and acts of the Prince of Capua, during the twenty years of severe and often cruel trial to which he has been exposed, without having in the least merited it. The Prince of Capua has known how to rise above his misfortune: his sentiments and his acts, at all times, honour him as a prince and as a man, in complete and striking contrast with the sentiments and acts of him who reigns in Naples. There is between the brothers and the princes an antagonism, fearful, but instructive. To the long and inexcusable persecutions ordained by the King of Naples, the Prince of Capua opposes the resistance which he derives from the firmness of his character, and the finest inspirations of the heart. For twenty years, he has never changed!

It is rarely now that we meet with characters of such an elevated stamp. Let us be permitted, then, to offer to the Prince of Capua our respect and admiration, that need not be suspected, for we have not the honour of knowing personally the Prince of Capua and his family.

His royal highness had but to pronounce a single word, to obtain the favour of returning to Naples, and to be reinstated in his dignities and his revenues; but this word was a perjury,—he has not deigned to pronounce it. He refused to deny his wife, his children, or to give the lie to affections and oaths he had pronounced before men and before God. At the moment in which this union destined to suffer such cruel vicissitudes was formed, one might have supposed that the prince wished to dazzle his future wife by his brilliant fortune and high rank. One might have supposed that Miss Penelope Smyth was more in love with the prince than the man,—more taken with titles, fortune, and grandeur, than with what constitutes the real value of a man,—his character, his mind, and his heart. Far from it; there has been but this mutual deception: privations, humiliations, and exile, have only rendered stronger, and more noble, the ties of marriage, and more sympathetic their mutual affection.

A man who can inspire a love so durable possesses, we cannot doubt it, the most eminent qualities of the heart and mind; and the wife, one of the most remarkable beauties of England, who has known how to remain devoted and to preserve the lasting attachment of her husband, must be endowed with the most elevated virtues.

If the Prince and Princess of Capua are happy, it is that they are happy in each other, that they have forgotten the splendours of a brilliant position, which appeared to be inalienable, for the domestic joys of a family, the mind, and heart. This fidelity to his word, this contempt of what the world esteems the most, and prefers to every thing, is the greatest distinction of the Prince and Princess of Capua, and proves them both

worthy of the highest elevation of rank. Called to the crown, if it be the will of Heaven, or in the nearest station to the crown, the Prince of Capua will carry there the virtues which have sustained him in his misfortune, by teaching him what is truly great and imperishable in human nature.

The Prince of Capua, wounded in his most intimate affections, embittered and outraged, has he once deviated from the fidelity of that attachment he owed to his king? Has he profited by the hatred the king has drawn on himself from all sides? Has he ever yielded to the temptation of vengeance, so easy and so excusable in his case? The malcontents (and the King of Naples knows how many they are) prayed the Prince of Capua to deliver them from oppression. He might have roused them against his brother, and taken possession of the Sicilian crown, but he would not. He would not give way to his just resentment, and resisted the desire, so noble, of serving his oppressed country.

We comprehend and respect this sentiment, truly great, which leads the Prince of Capua to reject all ideas of vengeance, or usurpation. He has felt that it did not become him to desire or provoke a change in Naples, nor to lend his name to those who would agitate to obtain one. But his reserve need not extend further; if the change were accomplished without his participation, his royal highness the Prince of Capua would have to reproach himself seriously, in his character of Italian prince and head of a family, if he did not seek by legitimate means to obtain the re-establishment of his rights as a prince, and the restitution of his domains, confiscated against all right and all justice.

The Prince of Capua, during the last six months, has changed his residence in Spa for Paris. Is this change inspired by a political idea? Is it that the Prince of Capua imagines that the Allied Powers of the West have views on Naples, that they are disposed to restore Italy, to withdraw her from Austrian and Muscovite influences? Or does he hope the Allied Powers will aid him in

claiming his rights as prince and head of a royal family. We know not. The British Government, however, has officially recognised the justice of his cause, and the public declarations of the most eminent statesmen of England have imprinted on the crown of the King of Naples a stigma that will never be effaced. A crown so tarnished cannot be worn without dishonour for royalty, and danger for the people.

Lord Palmerston has judiciously remarked, that the violence exercised by the King of Naples against his royal highness the Prince of Capua tends to lower and weaken the monarchical principle in Europe. England, then, bound by her official and preceding declarations, has a powerful interest to demand and obtain the re-establishment of the Prince of Capua in his rights of prince royal, and head of a family.

It is very evident, that this re-establishment would logically and inevitably provoke a change in the political system adopted hitherto by the King of Naples. Two or three vessels sent by the Allied Powers would be sufficient to bring about a pacific change, if the King of Naples would frankly accept it, a violent one if he resisted. The King of Naples must either become Italian, and enter into the great Western Alliance, or be broken as an instrument in the hands of Austria and Russia.

The king himself must decide this question.

France would not refuse her concurrence to England, her ally. There is between the powers an idea and action in common; and the future happiness of the world requires that this community of thought and action should be strengthened more and more.

The exposition of the relations between France and Italy, which we have presented, show that France has a peculiar interest in energetically supporting everything which would tend to raise, strengthen, and unite Italy. This interest springs from her geographical position, her permanent political traditions, and the conformity of her religious genius. So many ties which unite France to Italy!

We have motives for believing that his royal highness, in fixing his residence at Paris, which is become the centre of European ideas, has been willing to ascertain if in the conflict there were hopes for Italy, or for himself. The Prince of Capua, assuredly, is convinced that France, as allied to England, and from considerations peculiarly her own, cannot but desire the good of Italy, intimately and indissolubly connected, as the two countries are, by glorious reminiscences, by the benefits the one has generously given, and the other as generously accepted. The Prince of Capua, who is penetrated with the profoundest respect and sincerest admiration for his majesty the Emperor Napoleon III., would be well disposed to confide to him his interests and the interests of Italy.

If such are the convictions of the Prince of Capua, and we will admit that they are, we can only engage him to persevere in them ; it would prove, on his part, a policy, elevated, intelligent, and really Italian.

Animated by these convictions, the Prince of Capua would be one of the ties which would attach southern Italy to the Western Alliance, above all to France. He would be the firm and faithful representative of this alliance at Naples, as Charles Immanuel is at Turin; both equally interested in rejecting beyond the Alps the German and Muscovite domination and influence ; as in sustaining themselves upon France, while equally rendering her their support, that she may attain to her natural grandeur, and be mistress of her liberty of action. France, we have this assurance by her nationality and the genius of her Emperor, will ever act in the sense most conformable to the interests of civilisation and of humanity.

J. Unwin, Gresham Steam Press, 31, Bucklersbury, London.



DELLE PERSONE E DELLE COSE D'ITALIA

DELLE PERSONE
E DELLE COSE D'ITALIA

DI

G. CESARE PEROCCO

GENNAIO, MDCCCLIV



LONDRA. — Tipogr
Torchi di JAMES J

A GIUSEPPE MAZZINI

I

CITTADINO,

Fra chi vi loda e chi v' infama senza conoscervi, v' ha chi vi ama perchè v' intende, chi vi parla libero perchè siete la incarnazione della libertà, chi vi dice la verità nuda ed aperta perchè sa che voi stenebrate le scellerate nequizie degl' ipocriti colla face inestinguibile dei diritti e della coscienza del genere umano, chi confida nelle virtù e valor vostro perchè tutta la vostra vita, siccome quella del mitico Ercole, brilla di solenni battaglie combattute contro i mostri che opprimono le nazioni.

Ed io sono uno di coloro che vi amano a fede; ed ora vi parlo libero e vi dico risolutamente la verità, non infruscata da codardi timori, ned avvilita da piacenterie ambiziose e risibili. Sentitela dunque; poichè, se la mente e la fama mia non si convengono con la mente donatavi dalla provvidenza

e con la celebrità delle vostre opere egregie, almeno si conviene questo cuore che per Italia batte tanto forte quanto possa battere il vostro ferventissimo.

II

E se voi ordinate l'opera cittadina alla rigenerazione popolare della nostra patria comune, anch'io, da teneri anni a questi che mi consolano ricordandomi una gioventù decorsa senza ginie briache di evirato captivo e senza pianto femminiere à enerve riarso di fortune, mi ressi alle leggi di armonia, suprema ispiratrice di consigli di amore, che à matura ad azione sintetica di giustizia e ad estrinsecazioni sublimi di archetipi di bellezza, ne splendide forme; e posi con tutte le mie forze a ritirare li animi de' giovani dagli esempli corruttori di età pitocche, menzognere, ebbre di feste snervatrici, invereconde ed effemere, dirizzandoli alacremente agli studi del nostro grande passato; li quali ritraggono sapienza per rifare in nazione una, indivisibile, libera, indipendente, largamente ope-

III

Se voi non serviste a' re, io, nonchè aver abborrito dal servirli, li odiai dalla culla. Non mi sarei mai permesso di abbassarmi a scriver loro una linea, non dico di preghiera, chè m' umilia solo pensandolo, ma neppur di consiglio in cui si potesse scorgere ch' io sperassi da loro il minimo de' benefizi a pro degli uomini.

Dai re, nè chiesi, nè sperai, nè volli nulla giammai. Quanto viene dai re confonde l' intelletto, corrompe il cuore, disonesta l' atto del generoso, spegne ogni aspiro alto e solenne de' liberi.

Ciò seppi dalla storia grondante di nobilissimo sangue di popolo, dalle lagrime e dalla macera povertà del popolo, compagne desolate della disfatta del senso comune, operata dalle arti infernali di que' liberticidi, e serbata dalla logica de' crismatizzati, togati e gallonati loro paladini—brutta, infame, schifosa per sentenze improntate di laida servilità — perchè avessimo quella ch' ei, buffonando, dissero pace, mentre sapevano che, se non era morte, era ignavia de' miseri schiavi, dalla quale provennero la presente varietà, incostanza, contraddizione di opinioni vulgari, la irresolutezza suspicace nel muovere a rivendicare il libero e conveniente esercizio degl' imprescrittibili diritti di uomo individuo e collettivo; e, quello ch' è di più malauguroso, la sazievolezza delle opere dalle li-

bere ed erette anime profondamente e lungamente pensate, e sapientemente e gagliardamente vôlte a rifonderci nella odierna civiltà ch' è in sul ritogliere e ridarci la potenza da essi usurpataci. V' ha ancora di peggio. La sazievolezza s' è conversa in dilegio. Conciossiachè quelle opere, intendendosi solo col meditarle; e, poi che l' hai intese, richiedendo perseveranza di fatica e perenne sagrifizio per conseguire il fine al quale contendono, affliggono i donneschi nervucci de' nostri presbiti dami educati alle pallide ombre poliziesche, i quali, per non avere sufficiente virtù di patire la cura della molle inerzia ignorante e scamisciata, maledicendo e schernendo respingono i rimedi e chi le reca, affollando de' polmoni in gridare forsennati ch' ei di salute ne han di troppa, e, non l' avessero pure, che sapria guarire senza dottori; perchè li schiavi appresero da' tiranni, ingegnosissimi nell' inventare nuovi vocaboli ed a mutare in peggio il senso degli antichi, che inerzia vuol dire prudenza, ignoranza sapienza, rompere in qualsivoglia libidine godere della vita.

Male generale da noi, non ancora levato fuori, benchè le fresche sperienze che si fece della fede dei re persuadano i più sinceri adoratori di monarchia, se ve n' ha, i re averci ricaptivato perocchè, anzi che riuniti da sapiente amore di libertà e di patria, eramo ignoranti ed egoisti, egoisti ed ambiziosi, ambiziosi e contendenti, contendenti e ringhiosi, ringhiosi ed inconciliabili, inconciliabili e nemici, nemici e divisi, divisi e deboli, deboli ed agevole preda della logica

delle fraudi e delle armi de' medesimi, che con forche, povertà ed ignoranza ci fecero e ci conservano sì pravi e ridicoli a nostra fatale pernicie...

Eppure le forche sanguinenti de' re depongono contro la inesprimibile codardia di venti quattro milioni di nepoti di Bruto e di Scipione!...

Eppure la miseria di venti quattro milioni di possessori della più bella e più ubertosa terra che il sole rallegri della sua luce contrasta con la trasmodata ed avvelenatrice ricchezza di otto tiranni e di pochi nobili blasonici e bancari, cui sopportano tanto vilmente!...

Eppure la ignoranza di venti quattro milioni d' Italiani, contrapponendosi alla sapienza de' nostri avi, che diffusero la civiltà per tutte le nazioni, è un insulto fatto loro che ce la legarono in gloriosa eredità, ed è vituperio delle presenti e delle future generazioni!...

I §

Ma le forche inalberate sul Sebeto, sul Tevere, sul Trasimeno e sull' Arno, a Felsina, a Modena, a Parma e Piacenza, sull'Olona e sull'Adda, fra l'Adige e 'l Po, sulle vie di Vinegia, sui ridenti colli di Berga, sopra le amene sponde del Sile, del Piave, del Meduna, del Livenza e del Tagliamento, ne' celebri campi di Eraclea e di Aquileia, sulle Alpi leponzie e de' Reti, su quelle giulie e de' Carni, non dicono nulla al Popolo d' Italia? Forse che da esse non ispenzolano ogni di da mille corpi

de' suoi martiri? Non gli voglion proprio dir nulla i sepoleri che si aprono quotidianamente alle vittime compassienevoli de' suoi clamidati tiranni? Nulla i mari e le terre straniere corse da milioni de' suoi, o fuggiti dal ferro popolicida, o fatti esulare dall' antico gufo di Polizia—il signor Ponza di San Martino—e quando all' ombra e d' accordo con Pinelli, Ratazzi e Galvagno gesuiticamente li guerreggiava potenti campioni della Democrazia: ed adesso che a loro danno usa ministerialmente dell' illustre mestiere di spia e di boia d' Austria e di ogni tiranno, servendosi delle sue e ad una volta delle spie d' Austria cugina de' Savoini e de' loro intimissimi, delle spie e de' sgherri di costoro, delle spie, de ruffiani e de' sgherri di tutto il mondo oppressore, calunniandoli, espellendoli o sfrattandoli, e per giunta tentando di corrompere la loro fede incorruttibile? Nulla proprio gli vagliono le improperevoli e fanciullesche invettive delle clericali e delle monarchicocostituzionali effemeridi, oggioso ma lucrativo mezzo con cui uomini [illegible]

icano piovono frizzando nell' anima de' traballanti
oncussori di questa baldracca Europa occidentale e
neridionale, dannata come la orientale a cedersi a
ciente a' tiranni delle razze celtica e slava; le quali,
er legge di gravità, di compensazione e di progresso
naturale e civile di umanità, dagli Urali, dal Cau-
aso e dai Carpazî, discendono a coprire le di lei
ianure, ed a modificarla ed informarla al principio
li monarchia universale, oggetto rimoto di ciasche-
luna, ove non provegga con gli Stati Uniti di Ame-
ica e con la crescente Democrazia a fare loro ar-
gine, a rovesciare le forze invasive e ad obbligarle
a comporsi con quello di universale republica!
Sento la ragione giuridica e la coscienza degli uo-
nini innalzarsi alla somma Idea, imprecare alla
irannide, ed armate improntare contr' essa, decise
li non posare finchè non sia aperto, o che per lun-
ghi anni dobbiamo mordere il freno de' captivi, od
agitare grandemente la energica vita de' liberi!
Sento il cielo, la terra, il mare e tutti li esseri sor-
gere alla vendetta del sangue de' figli del Popolo,
e che il Popolo non senta?... —E quando sentirà,
o Cittadino, se non sente ora che i re, contro lui
congiurati, ci trattano da bimbi, e, peggio che da
bimbi, da schiavi, da oche e da somieri da vimena
e da cavezza?... — E quando sentirà, se non sente
ora che il settentrione, nell' oriente, aspira a schiaf-
feggiare l' occidente ed il mezzodì diplomàtico?
Ora che i piccoli principati stanno per iscomparire
per sempre e confondersi nella grande monarchi o
nella maravigliosa republica delle odierne genti
civili?...

E come sentire un Popolo dalla più turpe indigenza lasciato in balia del più sgomentante terrore? Il terrore e l' inopia inoffata da' re non solo le rendono impassibile alle strage de' suoi, ma lo dispongono a credersi proprietà assoluta di que' beccai delle nazioni, ed a recarsi a vanto di lasciarsi scannare da loro. "I morituri ti salutano, o Cesare," gridano, come quelli di Claudio, li presenti schiavi disfatti miseramente da Claudi peggiori. E bastasse che si lasciassero lietamente sgozzare, vogliono anzi tôrre a' re il diletto di succhiellare con lo stocco nel loro cuore impietrito. Essi diventano gli sterminatori di se stessi. Da Giulio Cesare a Domiziano assai illustri personaggi lodava C. Cornelio Tacito perchè sapessero levarsi la vita da se quando avversata dal principe, nemico ugualmente delle virtù e de' vizi grandi sì in inclita nobiltà che in potentissima fortuna. Ora non più così. Non più per fastidio di repubblica asservita, o per odio implacabile contro chi la svilisce e tartassa; ma per vanità di onore di schiavo, si viene sùbitamente e furiosamente al sangue. — Contrasto veramente considerevole fra la antica e questa odierna nostra ragione di uomini di età parimenti schiave! Quelli si ammazzavano per isfuggire onta di accopatori cesarei ed esoso vivere captivo, costoro perchè hanno a tedio e in non cale una vita che non conoscono. I primi, che la volevano libera, la distruggevano perchè così non vivesse al calpestro, questi che sensualmente la accarezzano, la tolgon

fuori mattamente ad esizio di libertà cui non sanno.

Il medesimo è il fine; ma pegli uni c' è causa onesta, pegli altri, o non ce n' è, oppure è pessima.

Sicchè si vede li presenti nostri eroi di duello e sucididio essere la più compassionevole gente di servitù che mai s' abbia veduto negli annali delle umane calamità.

E da questo ch' esposi si conosce dunque chiaramente la tirannide, non solo estinguere la libertà e la memoria della medesima, ma procedere tanto avanti da non istar contenta finchè non abbia fatto perdere all' uomo anche il concetto che dee avere della sua esistenza; e di consequenza non l' abbia convertito in automa od in cosa da usarne a talento.

Pertanto non ci maraviglieremo se a' giovani di questa tirannide che avanza tutte le passate, paia di non ssere punto uomini quando, per una parola stolta, dalla loro ignoranza stimata ingiuriosa al gramissimo onore schiavesco..., con bestiale impeto non corrano a crivellarsi vicendevolmente i corpi.

Di fermo che s' ha a venire in codesti termini; avvegnachè quando altri non sia padrone di vivere, perchè la sua testa può da un' ora all' altra essere consacrata dalla bipenne all' irrisione sanguinaria di un re, quando uomo non ha pane da mangiare per nutrirsi e vivere, se non procaccia di guadagnarselo coll' arco della schiena, ed a prezzo di viltà od infami o feroci—perchè un re non lo concede che a tal patto, se sempre lo concede—in qual pregio può

mai avere una vita che, se a lui non fosse di peso, è certo detestabile per la umana dignità? E vale qualche cosa dessa che può essergli tolta ad ogni istante, dessa che, se pur vale, vale quanto un tozzo di pane amuffito, compero con viltà e con delitti? E che valore è codesto?... E se non val nulla, e se quindi e' l' ha per tale, come volete che apprezzi quella degli altri cittadini chiusi nella medesima sfera oppressiva ed annullatrice dell' idea di persona fisica e giuridica? Oh si che ha liberi e nobili risentimenti lo schiavo, la cui anima è ghiacciata perennemente dal terrore! E voi pure sognate credendo l' uomo, che si ciba appena del pane dello schiavo, voglia sorgere su e scaraventarsi contro le forche e chi le fece innalzare per appendervi i figli del Popolo!

E sorgesse anche per un complesso di cause, sempre o frequentemente impensate od imprevedute da' vati politici, quanto dura, se alcuni intanto ch' ei combatte, non gli appresti vivanda di campo e vivanda di sostentare in casa la moglie ed i cari suoi bimbi?

Quanto un fuoco fatuo.

E noi lo si seppe quel che fece il vero Popolo nelle recenti lotte ch' ebbimo a lottare contro re e republiche—O poco e male, o nulla e peggio ei fece —Chi fece più e fece bene davvero, fu la calda intelligenza di giovani forniti la meglio parte di beni di fortuna — Il vero Popolo operò, come a Milano, coll' oro di quella dedereccia nobilèa spagnolesca

fintanto che si seppe e si potè soddisfarlo di ventre e di tasca. Quando vide che agire da libero non gli fioriva nulla di bene materiale, e che finalmente poteva costargli la vita, le sue collere effemere contro i tiranni e' le mutò in ischiamazzi ed in minaccie verso li ambiziosi di antica imbecillità, che, impostisi suoi capi senza ch' ei li conoscesse, lo spinsero in un' azione il di cui oggetto e' no 'l capiva perchè non era peranco stato discusso, accettato o rifiutato uniformemente ed universalmente. E quantunque avesse quel barlume ch' era secondo l' azione delle potenze umanitarie, le quali tendevano, siccome tendono e tenderanno perpetuamente a ristorarsi de' mali plitici e sociali, abbattendo le tirannidi che li producono, e' non sapeva pigliar i mezzi d' incarnarli perchè non gli furono indicati, nè scelti, nè organizzati. Non aveva scuola di dottrina e di sperienza ad usarli e rinnovarli, se fosse accaduto che per disastri o mala loro natura non gli potessero più servire, chè ogni provvedimento a cotesto, a sommo biasimo loro, mancava.

È dunque fatto incontrovertibile l' uomo del terrore e della crosta di cruschello essere lacrimabile spettacolo d' inettezza a sentire e ad operare generosamente e nobilmente per se e per il civile consorzio.

Io ho sempre creduto che a voler cavarne alcun bene, lorchè, galvanizzatolo, si reputi possibile muoverlo a rivendicarsi a se, convenga saper fare e praticare due cose. Una è di levargli del cuore le paure de' re, compromettendolo co' re, e così po-

nendolo nell' alternativa, o di correre la loro vendetta implacabile, se, abbandonandosi delle sue forze, benchè vincintore o sicuro di vittoriare, ritorna a loro perchè lo massacrino; o di proseguire nella lotta, di porre la sua legittima sovranità invece di quella ch' eglino si usurparono per avvilirlo fino alla bestialità, di appropriarsi quanto gli tolsero facendolo argomento di publica salute, di libera e fiorente potenza. L' altra è di rimettere in suo arbitrio la libertà e le cose che si acquistò. Poichè è solo quando ch' ei crede di fare, e vede realmente di aver fatto per se che moltiplica maravigliosamente le sue forze ad accrescere, fermare viemmeglio e tutelare, e con pietosa equità patria compartire e con civile prudenza usare della libertà e delle ricuperate fortune.

Chi c' è dentro in questo momento lo tira agevolmente a deliberare a favore de' consigli di sociale sapienza per istabilire ed assodare il governo delle libertà e delle fortune dette. Imperocchè ei, che possiede tutto senza sospetto di autorità vessatrice, rammentandosi di queglino i quali conferirono a renderlo signore di ogni cosa, vedendo la modestia loro di astenersi da qualunque atto autoritativo, e che non si fiammisero più che non farebbe il più oscuro de' suoi, udendoli proporre materie che stanno come corrispondente conseguenza di quelle che saviamente gli proposero dapprincipio acciochè il suo libero moto raggiugnesse il sublime effetto, cui tocca e maneggia; siccome colui, il quale è fatto meglio a cose di senso che ad intellettive speculazioni, contentamente li ascolta, tranquillamente si

consulta con essi, e segue alacremente i loro avvisi prudenti ed infuocati di amore di libertà.

Anzi incontra, perch' esso è sempre sensibile e trascorrente, ch' essendo grandissimo, adegui i grandi benefizi con opere di eccessiva munificenza; ed a que' che glieli procaccio cade obbligo di badare a non abusarne in verun modo, poichè gli nuocerebbe, e sarebbe di tristissimo esempio in ordini freschissimi di libertà, nati da un Popolo che vinse combattendo per inspirazione e direzione di pochi, non per proprio convincimento.

Diffatti, sbollito l' entusiasmo degli animi appresso la vittoria, agli sguardi viene come segno di virtù preferita chi da quella ricevè più degli altri; e, se non odio, desta invidia, contenzione e dissidenza, le quali passioni ognuno sa partorire fastidi: a lui, perchè lo costringono a scusarsi dell' inescusabile: alla cosa pubblica scapiti gravissimi, perchè, gettendola in lotta di parte, possono menarla a disfare li ordini di libertà a' quali tolse di fresco a governarsi.

Ma fa peggio di colui che imprudentemente accetta troppo dalla riconoscenza popolare, quegli che si arroga di certi premi, checchè si possa giudicare delle sue virtù; giacchè, se con esse avesse ancora passato tutti, od uguagliato i preeccellenti uomini per la grandezza e splendor loro, nessun diritto gli concede di farlo. E' così rinnova i modi della tirannide, perchè fare di tal guisa è esercitar atto della stessa, mentre chi riceve que' premi dalla mano dal Popolo, è bensì colpevole d' imprudenza, poichè con essi s' inizia il disordine delle ineguaglianze, che

finalmente ci traggono al principato; ma non condannabile di spirito tirannico.

Noi, Cittadino, nella testè cessata nostro insurrezione rivoluzionaria se n' ebbe meglio della seconda che della prima specie di così fatti uomini; quantunque si vedrà dalla presente opera eziandio quelli della prima, eccettuati pochissimi, per fatto essere identici agli altri; imperocchè le Dittature che assunsero furono per necessità che crearono, non per elezione coscienziosa e spontanea di Popolo.

E ben si conobbe ch' era così dal fine miserando ch' ebbero per tutta la Penisola.

Que' superbi erano ignorantissimi, avvegnachè rimanendo infoscati dalla cupidità dell' imperio, non s' avvedevano che, per l' odio che si aveva al medesimo da' cittadini tornati di recente in libertà, e da' reprobi che parteggiavano per l' antico signore, dagli amici e da' nemici di libertà contemporaneamente sarebbero stati balzati fuori con il maggior loro disdoro e disavventura cittadina.

Non riffiettevano, se non erano scellerati, i miserabili principi di commedia, che comportandosi così, stimando il Popolo assai generoso per soffrirli, non si poteva averlo altrettanto disposto per diffenderlo dagli avversari delle vittoriose innovazioni.

Una, due e più sconfitte di costoro non bastano per assicurare il trionfo delle rivoluzioni.

E li avversari sono i re che, maestri di tradimenti e di frodi, hanno un incalcolabile numero di seguaci e fautori della loro causa.

Cotesti si distinguono in visibili, in visibili ed in-

visibili, ed in invisibili; ed eccone il vero ritratto.

Della prima schiera sono le milizie, i birri, i polizieschi, le magistrature di qualsiasi attribuzione, la nobiltà, e tutte le famiglie loro, i loro parenti, amici ed aderenti, i quali, per instinto ferino, per principio di oppressione, per interesse ladro, avendo sempre sciabolato, legato e schiaffeggiato, infamato, condannato, depauperato, calpestato e sbeffato il Popolo, sono manifesti ed implacabili nemici delle sovranità nuove, nemicissimi delle popolari.

Formano la seconda que' disumani viventi della chiericia, sendo parte cortigiani ed in parte sangue de' re e de' loro servidori aulici. Hanno anch' eglino istinto d' insanguinarsi le mani nelle vene del Popolo che pensa, che sente e che opera per libertà, anch' eglino contradiano per principio al governo della Democrazia; perchè, per ragione di ammaestramento domestico e civile, per indole della setta cattolica, i cui dettati tirannici informano le menti e 'l cuor loro a non apprezzare ed a non amare nè virtù nè patria, anzi a tenere a vile perfino que' dolci, potenti ed inviolabili affetti che, svolti nella culla e sul seno delle nostre madri, ci legano indissolubilmente alla casa ed a tutte le gioie innocenti della pace, dell' amore e dell' amicizia, fuorchè ricordi di orgoglio feroce, di umano non possono aver nulla che li accomuni agli altri uomini. Sicchè non han da volere ned uguaglianza di natura ned uguaglianza di diritto fra noi, invece devono abborrire dall' armonia fra gli uguali di natura e di diritto, osteggiare aspramente l' una e l' altra di queste cose sulle quali si appoggia la De-

mocrazia governativa; e per le quali si sviluppano nel migliore e maggior modo possibile le sue potenze intime ed esterne; devono cavar del capo le più sottili invenzioni a fare dell' uomo e della società civile, l' uomo e la società delle angoscie, de' cenci, della fame, della brutalità, delle catene e della ignoranza. E se li ho chiamati visibili ed invisibili, gli è perchè, se hanno del liopardo, hanno ancora la formidine del consiglio; e questi contrari li compogono colle arti della volpe che sa fare da scimmia e da gatto. Come al verno le lumache ritirano le corna, si chiudono nel guscio e s' interrano fra' ceppi della siepe, così fanno li cherci quando la condizione politica de' publici negozi spira aria da irrigidire le sacre ed inviolabili membra de' re di corona... Allora, smettendo la scoverta sevizie d' inquisizione rosseggiante di sangue umano, s' appigliano alle insidie invisibili. Mascherando la truce loro politica della mite religione dell' amore e del perdono, dal pergamo, e più sicuramente dal confessionale, scagliano li avvelenati loro dardi contro i pensieri e li affetti intesi a rinnovare ed a consolidare la sovranità popolare; perchè dal confessionale — uffizio di Polizia autorizzato dal crudele Sisto V, vicario visibile del Cristo invisibile: superba onoranza della gendarmeria della sedicente S. Sede, dico la furibonda Compagnia di Gesù — frugando ne' nascondigli dell' anima e nelle pieghe più fitte del cuore delle mogli e delle figlie, delle padrone e delle ancelle, e di tutta la credula famiglia de' loro ignorantissimi allievi, cavan fuori tutto quanto si fa da' mariti, da' figlioli e da' servi; e sapendo

quel che si dice, quel che si desidera, quel che si legge, le nostre relazioni e quel che si fa, da un canto ci raccomandano alla Polizia ed alla sua berrovaglia, e dall' altro ci ribellano l' amore de' nostri cari, che, sgomentati da essi co' terrori della umana e della divina giustizia, ci riguardano come oggetti della vendetta di entrambe; epperciò ci odiano religiosamente in nome del Padre, del Figlio e dello Spirito Santo. Odiandoci, ci fan da spie e da sicari.

È troppo vero codesto e da ricordarsene ogni momento quelli che, soffrendo le nequizie de' governi de' re, anzi che imputare la cagione de' loro patimenti alle segrete rivelazioni fatte dalla donnesca debolezza a que' scellerati, l' attribuiscono frequenti volte a' più onesti cittadini.

Ma se questo è troppo vero, è parimenti un vero mostruoso che ancor si tolleri la più esecrabile parte degli uomini, la quale, abusando della celeste parola, se ne fa arma per dividere i connubî, per tôrre le mogli a' mariti, la mamma a' bimbi, i figli a' padri ed a' fratelli, le fantesche a' padroni ed a' servi, le famiglie alle famiglie, li amici alli amici, la società a' suoi doveri, l' umanità a' suoi diritti, turbando, scompigliando, mettendo tutto sossopra, facendo disertare la vita dalla vita, la ragione dalla ragione, confondendo e mescolando tutte le potenze, o la seguano, o se le oppongano, in uno stampo di servitù, da cui esce questa misera immagine di civil convivenza, forata il cuore da' stocchi di tirannia, sparuta per fame, orba della mente per supina ignoranza.

Se Italia non isbarbica del suo terreno questa

erba letale ad ogni germe di virtù e di valore, credete, Cittadino, che Italia possa divenire l' Italia di Dio e del Popolo? I cattolici hanno un loro Dio che li ordina ed utorizza a far le spie e li dicollatori del Popolo; ed hanno un Popolo che al cospetto del Dio loro si accusa in colpa di voler diventar libero, potente, e d' irsene fuor de' lacci della logica d' ignoranza stata loro inspirata divinamente, come osano affermare, per fare di costui un impiagato somiero. E questo Popolo si accusa col labro della donna ch' è la parte sua più cara, più intima ed inseparabile. E se il Dio nostro è prevenuto dal Dio loro, e se il Popol nostro è incatenato per leggi di sangue, di fame e d' ignoranza, rivelate loro dal loro Dio, ditemi, di qual Dio e di qual Popolo mai è dessa questa nostra Italia crocifissa?...

Ah! detronizziamo quel Dio scellerato, leghiamo in fascio e gettiamo ne' gorghi dell' Oceano questa lebbra de' cherci cattolici; spezziamo il sillogismo oppressore di un Dio bugiardo e di un sacerdozio polluto di sangue umano; laviamo l' anima e 'l corpo del Popolo anneriti nella fucina clericale col sangue di un tal Dio e di un tal sacerdozio; diamogli pane e sapienza; e l' Italia sarà di un Dio di amore e di giustizia, e di un Popolo di libertà, di virtù e d' ineluttabile possanza.

Ma finora non ce n' è segno di voler farlo e di saperlo fare.

I più, cioè le intiere moltitudini, credono ancora all' idolo ed al ministro. Alcuni vorrebbero levar loro d' innanzi il superfluo delle divine pietanze,

lasciando loro le tonde fantesche ventenni e l' epa vitelliana. Pochi li vorrebbero via, ma devoti al principio di autorità, che non intendono, perchè lo pigliano per l' autorità di principio — il quale si separa da ragione di gradi e di uffici di persona, al contrario di quello che vi s' incarna e vige orgogliosamente — si sentono assalire dalla febbre di morte all' idea, dicono, di un Popolo senza freno di religione. Credono erroneamente che questa si spenga uccidendo i corpi delli malvagi che l' adoperano ad esizio della libertà : maggiore ed unico bene degli uomini. Eglino non sanno concepire l' autorità della religione indipendente da oggetti sensibili, si la religione dell'autorità esercitata da questi in danno di quella, e perciò della stessa libertà. Tanto può su noi l' abitudine d' obbedire al principio di autorità che, anche allora che ripugna colla ragione e col diritto, non sappiamo risolverci a seguire l' autorità di principio di vero eterno, il quale illumina e diffende l' una e l'altro! Il più scarso numero, ridendosene dell' inferno degli schiavi, e volando per il paradiso de' liberi, sono decisi a volerlo godere qui, facendo prima un purgatorio del Dio Belial e de' suoi sacerdoti truculenti.

Ma non hanno a mano tutto ciò che si richiede a farlo con sicurezza—E quanti sono coloro che, abborrendo da qualsiasi tirannide, studiassero ciascheduna nella sua origine, nella natura, mezzi e fini suoi, e pigliassero dal tempo migliore occasione e lumi e potenza ad annichilirla? Pur troppo, Cittadino, voi vedrete da quest' opera ch' eglino non solo le religiose, ma neppure le civili prepotenze

dirittamente estimarono. E vi so dire di parecchi che hanno fama di uomini forniti di buone lettere, di peregrina sapienza e di dottori di libertà — fama non so ben dire se acquistata od arraffata—che san nulla o pressochè nulla della essenza e forma delle cose dell' antica, media e recente età d' Italia. Quanto dunque volete che sappiano di quelle che appartengono alla chiericia?... Sia perchè la odiano, che non s' appresero alle di lei discipline teoriche e pratiche, o venga dal corpulento amore di saper tutto fuorchè qualche cosa che corrisponda a dignità, diritto e dovere di uomo, di famiglia e di republica—ed io credo l' uno e l' altro—è vero per ogni verso che non ne san nulla. E ciò mi spaventa.

Di che come potramo levar di mezzo il clero cattolico se non san nulla di quel che forma la sua potenza e 'l mezzo di conservarla? Quando piglieranno a volerlo, se, imbrancato co' re, li previene colle proprie arti e li disperde colle loro bombe! Ed ammesso che ci riescano, come poi ordineranno la società nuova, non conoscendo la vecchia disciolta, e ciò che è d' uopo sapere ed avere preparato perchè i recenti ordini sieno appropriati alla civiltà in generale, ed in particolare alla condizione politica, economica e militare del loro paese?

Io, Cittadino, mi persuado ch' eglino non sapranno mai purgarci di questa lordura; e noi, se vi ci si acconcia ancora, non s' ha più a parlare dell' Italia di Dio e del Popolo.

Noi però si dee adoperare anche quel grande loro desiderio di disfarsene; e sarà di molto rilievo sapendolo opportunemente voltare nel fatto.

Resta da ultimo che si accenni agl' invisibili. Costoro sono indefinibili, epperciò, senza dubbio, peggiori. Ei si celano agli sguardi scrutatori della Polizia papescoaulica d' Italia, nè punto s' immettono ove la calda e solenne parola della libertà attrae a se le anime sensibili ancora e capaci di amore. Non istanno apertamente nè contro di questa nè contro di un' altra parte. Osservai che la loro avversione al parteggiare non nasce da coscienza che abbiano di reità palese delle parti, ma da brama avara di giovarsi di quella che sovrasti, consolidi il suo potere, e dia materialmente di che vantaggiarsi sopra li altri. Quindi cotal gente d' uomini, che non gittan dadi, ma operano a sciente, non fallano mai. Sono tipi posticci della prudenza politica. Da loro piovvero diluviando le dottrine che servono mirabilmente a scusare la pusillanimità, la codardia, la perfidia, il tradimento, l' empietà, la scelleranza ed ogni altra opera vile ed infame. Diffatti, codesti bindoli politici, per prudenza, lodano ad una volta Cristo e Barabba, e l' uno e l' altro ugualmente bestemmiano e crucifiggono. Se loro giova, cantano le intraprese de' re come i fatti degli antesignani delle popolari legioni. Si adattano alla predica del padre gesuita come all' aringa del republicano al banchetto della Democrazia. Caritativi opportunemente, opportunemente frustano le spalle di chi chiede alla carità consunto della fame. Tendono la mano a chi va alla forca colla stessa disinvoltura con cui la tendono al boia. Nulla più del possibile, gridano, nulla più del conveniente. E 'l possibile lo

ripongono in aspettare il destro di dare di becco ne' frutti o della regia o della popolare vittoria. E 'l conveniente è di spiccare i più belli e più saporiti, mettendosi di sopra a chi li coltivò maturandoli pel Popolo. Gl' invisibili, con questa ch' ei vogliono stare tanto distanti da' regi che da' repubblicani—cui ora i galeotti di Casa sabauda con nuova frase domandano LI ESTREMI — sostanzialmente si burlano d' ambidue, facendo le lustre di essere il miglior arnese politico e sociale che mai si fosse. Eppertanto con il vanto della prudenza arieggiando d' impassibilità, si sofficcano ovunque, istigano gl' incauti a scovrirsi, infiammano i focosi ad agire, tranellano i feroci ed i miti, v' aggiungono preghiere, se consigli non bastino, perchè si rompano il collo anzi di costì che di costà.

Querelansi i veri cittadini che talora gli sforzi loro abortiscano, annaspano per rinvenirne la cagione, talvolta sfiduciano di se, degli uomini e della civiltà progressiva; e non considerano che avrieno conseguito il fine loro se, prima di por mano all' opera, avessero conosciuto i loro pretesi cooperatori.

Se noi volessimo cernere, stacciando politicamente, separeremmo di assai cruschello dalla farina d' Italia; e si vedrebbe dal fiore quello che convenisse di fare avanti di affidarci ad un' azione che potrebbe ancora tornar foriera di servitù prolungata e più misera.

Reputo avervi bisogno urgentissimo dello staccio, in ispecialità a' dì che corrono; avvegnachè la evidente mostruosità de' regi tradimenti, la quale

on eccedette mai tanto quanto di presente trascorse
aspettazione de' più consumati concussori del
lobo, avendo accesi di odio inestinguibile contro
monarchie li petti di un grandissimo numero de'
ostri, eziandio di que' che sarieno stati contenti
erfino all' austriaca costitutione del 1815, e mos-
igli a republica, portò che una nugolata degl' in-
isibili si sparnazzessero per tutti li angoli del mon-
o, postisi il nome nostro cui sapevano essere il
alismano contro tutte le ferite che potrebbero loro
enir fatte dalle indagini diligenti ed accurate sulla
ita che vissero e che menano; e per vari accor-
imenti di efficaccia sicura li circonvenissero, spil-
andone i segreti quando disfogavano ira giustis-
ima tanto in parole che in fatto contro ogni segno
i parte regia.

Siccome hanno il doppio viso di Giano per af-
rsi ad ogni ventura, così, se arguiscono dalle pa-
ole che sentono e da' fatti che veggono, i nemici
e' re poter vincere, rivelano loro una parte di ciò
he costoro covano contro di essi per iscavallarli nel
oto.—Adoperano però che l' autore della rivela-
ione resti anonimo, ch' ei non si curano della glo-
ia di denunziare alla patria i suoi implacabili ne-
ici. Vogliono serbarsi possibili ad ogni bandiera.

N' ebbimo nel 21, nel 31, nel 34, nel 43, el 48,
el 49, ne abbiam tuttodì, ne avremo sempre a gran-
e e totale rovina delle cose nostre, se non istrap-
eremo loro del volto la lurida maschera.

Senonchè i re, espertissimi in confondere coloro
he li combattono, alle insidie congiungono l' oro—
scino del cuore umano, onnipotenza predicata

nel consesso parlamentare dalla sedia ministeriale del costituzionale Piemonte da Ponza di S. Martino, ministro, vecchia stumia di Polizia, allievo distinto de' gesuiti, conte e piemontese; — e coll' esca dell' oro t' impigliano di leggeri que' miseri le fibre de' quali non fremono più al mercimonio dell' onore. Ma gl' invisibili se la dicon meno coll' onore che coll'oro. Dunque all'amore dell'oro posporranno quello d' Italia. Dunque non le regie macchinazioni a' republicani, si le republicane riferirannoa re; imperocchè da' republicani ebbero una lunga e perpetua lezione di povertà, che a poco a poco, se non si provegga, si risolve in fede ideologica. Nè s' inducono a credere che questi attuino il proposito loro, sapendo a prova che nel bel mezzo secolo XIX — grisolatra all' intutto—non si viene al fatto di una republica senza preordinare li elementi sociali così da rendere necessario il libero e conscio intervento di ciascuna persona giuridica nell' amministrazione della cosa publica, delle sue produzioni reali, de' suoi acquisti, e consumi di lusso, di comodo e di bisogno primo.

Ho detto libero e conscio intervento di ciascuna persona giuridica per far intendere che preordinare separatamente dalle persone li elementi sociali, oltre che essere fatica gittata—come testè lo abbiamo veduto in Francia, e meravigliamolo tuttora —è di funestissima consequenza.

Ciò si vedrà appunto da quest' opera, che, non a caso di certo, intitolai: DELLE PERSONE E DELLE COSE D' ITALIA.

Gl'invisibili sono un morbo che infierisce endemi-

camente nelle mediocrità poetiche, letterarie, filosofiche, mediche ed avvocaziali, ne' piccoli proprietari—camerlinghi, consiglieri, e, Dio loro perdoni, sindaci di villaggio — specialmente ne' negozianti, nella gente di teatro, e negli amici de' Corrieri, delle Diligenze e della Posta. Pantano maledetto della età nostra è codesto, il quale lorda e guasta ogni veste di savviezza e di onoranza, di valore e di virtù.—È cesoia che stronca i fili per i quali l' intima e sovrana bellezza de' consigli de' grandi intelletti, si comunica a tutta la umanità viva e morta: alla viva, dandole maggiore prestanza per opere di armonia; ed alla morta richiedendo le aride ossa che ascoltino la sua parola per rivivificarla e comporla all' atto armonico delle singole nature dell' universo sensibile e soprasensibile assoluto e relativo.

E ripigliando dalla ultima osservazione fatta sulle conseguenze derivanti a' capi delle rivoluzioni popolari dall' arrogarsi premi esclusivi e principali dopo vinti e fugati i tiranni, dico la maggiore e più funesta non essere l' abbandono in cui lasciagli il Popolo—che comprende di aver combattuto li antichi padroni, i quali pur gli davano biscotto e fescenini con di varie sostanze alloppiate, onde s' addormentasse chetamente, per accollarsene altri di nuovi, vani, avari e superbi, che lo lasciano vôto di ogni cosa, e quindi disposto a rivolgersi a chi gliene dia — sibbene la ristaurazione dell' antica tirannide.

Costei dunque, fra le sue sconfitte, si vede avere

chi aguzza li appetiti de' signori novellini che, educati alla scuola del principio di autorità, adulati da adulatori al regio salario, prendono a fare i riservati, scantonano li eguali, perchè modesti e disinteressati, vegliano poliziescamente sulle parole e gli atti loro; e se odano che biasimino lo spettro della tirannide momentanea, li bandiscono per ammattiti, sussurroni, spie, e per quel peggio che possono. Non avendo quindi l' appoggio de' buoni, si voltano a' pessimi, pronti per oro a vendere anima e corpo, irritano così Popolo e capi, ingeriscono lo spirito e 'l fatto divisionario, creano le parti; e le parti vengono fomentate a sùbite ed impronte trascorrenze.

In questo mezzo tempo non c' è nè azione politica, nè civile, non economica, nè militare.

C' è anarchia a vantaggio de' pessimi che, presa l' imbeccata da' regi, principiano a dire della insolenza degli esaltati, della comunicola dottrina degli oratori da piazza, della inevitabile rovina delle libertà ricuperate, se non si rimandino immantinenti que' ma' visi che cercano di pescare nel torbido: uomini della licenza se non sieno da bargello, di mano pronti come di lingua, troppo conti di novità per non dover essere spioni : stomachi da sfatare questa beatezza di cose per ingoiarsi Italia e 'l mondo. Ed i pessimi, che così dipingono se stessi, s' avvolpacchiano per guadagnarsi nome di ottimi dalla stessa sventura che affrettano.

Qui gli astutiti fanno il bergolo; quegli che si era nascosto per timore de' republicani, fa capolino dalla finestra, si stroppiccia contentamente le ma-

ni, e saluta l' avvento del Signore; chi s' era fatto di popoleschi, sperando il pane d' oro, si vola fuor di schiera, va a' grandi usci, picchia, entra, e riferisce a' partigiani del principe tutto quello ch' ei fece per tirare i sedicenti liberali al lacciuolo, giura di esserne riuscito, si accapara la gratitudine e la riconoscenza del venture sire, chiede ed ottiene oro per finire l'ordito; quale si tira dal clero, si riconcilia con Dio, ed a' piedi di una birba di prete cattolico abiura la libertà in nome della formidata tirannia.

I birri e l' antica guardia pretoriana — la soldatesca — abituati a bravare ed a dar delle baionette ne' fianchi ed a stringere i polsi di quella che appellavano canaglia, quantunque Popolo com' essi e migliore di essi, calar le orecchie alle voci di scontento, dichiararsi pronti a sostenere la buona causa della legge e dell' ordine.

I soffioni inizzare le parti già inasperate; i nobili fonder oro agli affamati; il clero predicar giustizia insieme e perdono a' traviati, consigliare l' ignoranza a tornare al dovere.

Impiegati, banchieri e negozianti promuovere, aiutare e ribadire lo fatto.

Gl' invisibili uscir fuori di buio e lasciarsi innocentemente cadere nella parte della forza vincitrice.

Ecco sostuito nuovamente all' impero dell' ambizione quello dell' antica tirannide. E la ristabilita irannide — edotta di quello che le convien fare, anto per le vecchie quanto per le recenti speienze — non castiga li ambiziosi decaduti, perchè ostoro trovan modo di salvarsi o con lo celere calagnare, o col rifondere codardamente il loro torto

nelle moltitudini : castiga il Popolo, il Popolo ferocemente vessa e dipela. De' pochi, i quali giustamente si apposero circa il fine di quegli ambiziosi, essa già ne trasse vendetta allegra avendoli fatti infamare da' loro stessi compagni d' insurrezione, e consacrando la infamia sul loro fronte col mezzo degli emissari spediti dietro i loro passi, acciocchè non possano neppur dolersi dignitosamente dell' esiglio. E voler di più sarebbe compromettersi di sevizie impolitica innanzi al mondo diplomatico, a cui arride questa tirannica prudenza, la quale indolcia l' amarezza degli schiavi perpetuando vieppiù la cattività loro — prudenza trasandata dalla Austria che, mai sazia di vendetta, non sarebbe stata contenta all' averci vinti in guerra coll' orrido mezzo de' nostri aulici capi, e spintici a rammingare dispersi fra genti straniere ed inique, di averci infamati colla bocca de' monarchicocostituzionali allobrogi, infamatici già prima con quella de' suoi delatori, se, oltre di essersi inebbriata dello scempio de' nostri usando strangolo, fucile, bombe e bastone, a noi esulanti, da lei vilipesi innanzi di tutta Europa ed America civile, reietti dalla patria e dalla famiglia, affannati nell' anima, e travagliati da divisioni intestine, perchè c' impallidisce financo la speranza di rivedere il nostro unico cielo, non toglieva il pane publicando i nostri beni e rapinandoci le fortune.

Dunque, Cittadino, se noi ora agguardiamo spassionatamente questo misero fatto abbiamo di assai tristi documenti da trasmettere a' nepoti divulgan-

doli a vantaggio de' presenti. Il primo è che imporci capi del Popolo, ignorati dal Popolo, senza un Programma emanato da coscienza e sciénza di Popolo, per usufruire li effetti delle sue opere, è perdere noi e lui ad un medesimo tempo. Il secondo è che, sostituendosi a noi ed a lui, la tirannide, poderosa si mette fra ambidue, e noi rende quasi impossibili alle nuove cose, perchè ce lo aliena. Esponendogli destramente la nostra ignoranza, la nostra debolezza ambiziosa, e di conseguenza tutti li orridi errori che si commise a danno suo, ei che fu tenuto lontano da' publici consigli e non partecipò punto de' beni dalla rivendicata libertà sperticatamente promessigli, udendo dire a' principi ciò stesso ch' egli pure rimproverò all' insolenza nostra, ci va diritto alla catena, e ci maledice con que' scellerati che gliel' annodano più strettamente sul cuore. E perchè noi non s' abbia più modo a tirarlo a migliori sperienze, i suoi tiranni, come udiste, ci diffamano e ci dividono facendoci così fare le più ridicole parti che mai si vedesse ne paesi esteri; acciocchè da queste si persuadano in qual conto debbano tenerci se muoviamo a rinnovarci. Il terzo è che il principe ristabilito ineterna l' odio del Popolo contro di noi, perocchè gravi su lui, pretessendo di essere astretto ad indennizzarsi de' danni patiti per cagione de' suoi capi, ed a procurare elementi da ristorare la cosa publica e privata.

E codesto non è egli un fatto vero? E se non lo è, ditemi, Cittadino, perchè Italia ora è acefala? Perchè de' tanti capi, che segui, voi solo rimanete

con la antica fede scritta indelebilmente nella vostra bandiera, sublime per que' due indefinibili Dio e il Popolo, ne' quali insiste operosamente l' Amore infinito che nell' atto progressivo di umanità sintetizza le armoniche estrinsecazioni delle singole potenze dell' essere? Perchè alcuni di costoro si discostarono dal Popolo per approssimarsi a' re, sotto specie di giovarsene a comune pro, con tanto di gesuitica impudenza mentendo il principio cui finora ostentavano di seguire? Perchè dopo i mali che ci afflissero per la presuntuosa ignoranza ed avara ambizione loro, fra noi non c' è più consonanza di voleri e di azione, abbenchè tutti facciamo sacramento di non voler vivere che sotto il nostro stendardo? Perchè ora ogni spia, ogni asino, ogni petulante ed ogni villano che viene parteggiando, senza che si sappia di qual buco sia uscito e quanto delatore, ciuco, arrogante e bifolco e' sia, diventa improvisamente un Temistocle od un Aristide, un Bruto ed un Marcello, un Gracco ed un Cassio, un Cola da Rienzo ed un fra Girolamo, un Michelagnolo ed un Ferruccio, un Giovanni da Procida ed un Maso Aniello, un Francesco Pesaro ed un Platone, un Aristotile ed un Cicerone, un Tacito ed un Machiavello, un Archimede ed un Galileo, un fra Paolo ed un Acquapendente, un Lucrezio ed un Dante, un Varrone ed un Pico, un Livio ed un Guicciardino, un Giordano ed un Campanella, un Vico ed un Romagnosi, e trincia su te e su Dio e sentenzia da redivivo Salomone? Perchè dunque taluno vorrebbe creare una republico puramente politica, e quale richiedela tutta sociale? Perchè

taluno crede possibile di unire Italia, ricostituendo i municipî all' esempio de' nostri antichi, o confederandola in republiche? Perchè vi ha ancora chi spera, o meglio finge di sperare nella fede de' principi, e si allunga fino ad una confederazione fra loro? Perchè qualche altro, avversandola pe' recenti casi, fantastica italiano rifiorimento, serbando l' autonomia di ogni stato al reggimento di un' assiderata costituzione monarcale? Perchè altri introvede la futura nostra redintegrazione nazionale entro i lobi di qualche sincipite imperiale o regio? Perchè di certi omaccini, attanagliando tutte le loro potenze per parere granduomini, con un cinismo ineffabile ributtano codesti disegni, cui appellano castelli in aria, vociando ch' ei sono convinti il Popolo alla sua volta dover prendere a fare da se nulla bisognando della pedagogica sferza; ed intanto grassi e rubizzi oziano e russano su pe' divani de' caffè? Perchè coloro che non credono fanno una panzanella di ciascuna di tali parti per venderla a caro prezzo a' ventricoli da struzzi politici? Perchè tante puerili contenzioni fra i seguaci di uno stesso principio? Perchè così villana insolenza di flagellare poliziescamente chi, conoscendo addentro ciò che fa per Italia, si crede in buon diritto di non apporre il suo sotto il nome di qualche maestro misterioso? Perchè intanto che si perde un tempo inapprezzabile in gare, in astiose preferenze, in formulari politici, e che si recita questa commedia ad esilarare li cupi ingegni della Polizia diplomatica della decrepita Europa d' oriente, d' occidente e di mezzodì, la emigrazione fu trascurata e presa all' incanto

dal maggior offerente? Perchè dessa che, con uniformità di principi, di sentimenti e di azione, mostrandosi fraternale, dignitosa nelle avversità, costante nella sua fede, sempre accinta a misurarsi contro le nequizie de' coronati e le contraddizioni della fortuna, mai cedevole alle larghe promesse dell' avversario corrompitore; perchè dessa, che, a' suoi domestici ed a' tiranni stranieri uniti loro allo stesso patto di tagliar fuori qualunque libertà vera e quantunque veramente la professi, dovrebbe provare sopra la miseria nella quale la inabbissarono per lei stare alto l' amore d' Italia, e quindi il perenne e sublime proposito di sopportare, non tanto la privazione de' mezzi da soddisfare a' più urgenti bisogni, ma la calunnia, le energumene ire de' loro sicari, lo stesso martirio; e così convincere il Popolo pensante e sensibile il suo sagrifizio, ornato di virtù private e cittadine, offrirlo a lui come pegno che mallevi di quanto saprà fare il dì presignato alla compensazione de' mali suoi; perchè, all' opposito, con discordanza di principi, con opposizione di sentimenti e di azione, in varie torme, come di lupi famelici, immodeste, altiere, indecorose, arroganti, sdegnose di tollerare le sventure loro nobilissime, sendo causate dall' infausto esito della più giusta, più santa e più bella delle ragioni, manifestando di tal guisa che erano preparate a divorare, non a sostenere con forte animo i travagli richiesti per coltivar i frutti della libertà; perchè, ripeto, s' affigge turbolenta, minacciosa ed irrifflessiva alle porte de' Comitati, che si avria da credere costituiti per soccorrerla, non badando se questo fra essi siasi

composto per comperarla, se quello per venderla, se uno ad impinguare sotto colore di dispensarle le offerte de' ricchi e generosi, o se un altro debba stimarsi tale da correrle debito di apprendersi a lui del modo di comportarsi de' magnanimi alle prese co' re e loro cugini e fautori, co' brutali che tripudiano nell' avvilimento della sventura, co' spioni, co' politici da cattedra, i quali, per un bezzo ed un ninnolo all' ucchiello dell' aggiustacuore, mercanteggiano la scienza per confondere la coscienza del genere umano? Perchè imperversa, mormora, dilania la fama di chi non gliene dà, o perchè non ne ha, oppure perchè non vuole, o perchè è saviezza non dargliene, effinchè, anzi che a' caffè ed a' chiassi, vada alle afficine, a' negozi commerciali, si occupi appo avvocati, notai, banchieri, agricoltori, e guadagni onoratamente quanto disonestamente consuma in que' luoghi d' ozio, di maldicenza, frequentemente di spionaggio e di tafferugli, di guasto di affetti e di nervi, defraudando chi non può farlo, o per età, o per maggior importanza di studî, o per morbi proprî o di quacheduno de' suoi, o per uffizi di somma importanza commessigli da coloro che sopravedono la publica cosa? Perchè soffre che se le aggirino in mezzo di molti pretesi emigrati che, in suo od in nome de' suoi capi, consumano atti da averne ribrezzo il perdutissimo degli uomini? Perchè quindi intervengono i sinistri avvenimenti de' moti republicani, avendo tra noi il fiore de' ribaldi, o scappati di galera, o stipendiati da' re per ispiarci; e contro noi il Popolo nauseato delle eterne futilità politiche, stillanti del suo purissimo

sangue, onde non muoverebbe frasca a secondarci nelle intraprese, che pure, riuscendo, cimentiamo per lui? Perchè non ordinarla secondo le arti o le scienze che professa, ripartendola in tante sezioni quanti sono gli stati italici a' quali appartiene? Perchè non eleggere una Commissione di uomini penetrativi, giusti, pratici e severi, che ricerchino del nome, del cognome, dell' età, della condizione, del luogo di nascita di ciascuno, di quello ove apprese od esercitò l' arte o la scienza, delle cause e del tempo nel quale emigro, delle cose operate od in guerra o nell' ordinamento politico, civile ed economico del Popolo, de' mezzi da sostentare convenientemente la vita, di cio che fece avanti il moto italico, di ciò che fa od intende di fare, obbligandolo ad esibire documenti o testimonianze inappellabili; acciocchè sia tolto via ogni modo di scusa a colui, che, od introdottosi fra noi senza motivo, o trattenendosi senza un fine identico a quello per il quale sopportiamo l' esiglio con fede di farlo valere a benefizio d' Italia, dobbiamo considerare come nostro nemico? — Teme forse l' analisi del suo passato e del suo presente la emigrazione, la quale dovrebbe insuperbire di far conoscere agli uomini con la veridica e semplice biografia de' suoi membri, che aver voluto la libertà della sua patria, per lei era volere il governo della virtù, pratica rappresentatrice del principio del giusto e dell' equo, del buono e dell' utile, del vero e del bello?...—E tanti che, provvidentissimi, eppur cupidi di libertà, sono disposti a conseguirla animosamente, percossi dell' animo da' recenti casi deplorati da tutta la Penisola

, avendo costato indarno tante carissime vite,
rato odio contro a' loro autori, benchè in-
come emergerà dalla presente opera; perchè
ominciano a guardarsi a' piedi innanzi di fare
so verso il punto a cui dee muovere chiun-
Italiano davvero? Perchè la gioventù, ci-
te instruita ed educata, oscilla ancor essa
ublica e monarchia? Perchè alcuni vogliono
ibera ed indipendente, e poi non vi mettono
ulla sua unità e sulla maniera di reggimento
che dovrebbe adottare? Perchè, finalmente,
ublicani, più che da' regicoli, i pensieri, le
' fatti paiono sfumaticci, talora riposti a stu-
ando contradditori, se non assurdi, e spesso
osi e di pernicie gravissima al rinnovamento
omini e delle cose nostre?...
rse mestieri ripetere ciò che ho detto? Esa-
la condotta de' capi, e poi avrete da aggiun-
n di assai a quanto vi diedi in iscorcio.

sì come mai il Popolo può dar segno di or-
la carnificina che i re fanno de' suoi?
alcuno mi dirà ch' io disperi della risurre-
i questo povero Lazzaro, chè, se ne dubitassi,
ei la perpetua ed immortale giustizia, ned in
opera avrei messo la parte che ragiona DE'
DI RIFARE ITALIA REPUBLICANA, la quale,
di poco frutto, almeno torrà altrui il diritto
liarmi di non averlo desiderato grandissimo.
edo, ma credo ancora più all' essenziale che
naginario.

§ II

E se al terrore si marita la povertà, co' quali s' interza la ignoranza — infallibili spegnitoi di tutte le possibili aspirazioni degli uomini a solenni opere di libertà — chi vorrà sensibili le fibre del Popolo?

Voglio riportare ciò che gli si prende da' nobili di Blasone e di Banca, e ciò che gli si lascia, perchè si dica se la sua povertà non sia turpe, e se la sua morale non sia immorale; e se non debba esecrarsi qual matricida chi, potendo, non va contro alla politica e religiosa tirannìa che in tanta abbiezione lo inabbissò.

È dal 1845 a questo giorno ch' io noto minutamente e diligentemente quanto fu e si fece, quanto è e si fa in Italia, percorrendo e frugando ogni sua parte; la quale fatica riuscì a me improba e dispendiosa, sospetta oltre modo agl' imperiali, regi, granducali, ducheschi e papettini — toglietene S. Marino, cui pur visitai, ma che c' entra punto — poichè mi perseguitarono con polizieschi e con birri, con ispie in guanti bianchi e con cincischiatori di pensieri e di forme italiche, e con carcerieri di una politezza ed amorevolezza maravigliosa ed inestimabile...; e, ciò che più rivolta l' anima, con una feccia da allibirne il manigoldo più sicuro al solo guardarla, dico con la poltiglia dell' ergastolo, manesca, sanguinaria, atta a qualunque opera prava, amnistiata dagli aulici e da' papeschi a condizione che disonesti, infami, divida, ammazzi qualunque sappia, voglia e possa scavalcarli, donata da loro

del nome di republicana comunistica e dunque di tremendo flagello della proprietà, della famiglia e della società..., tanto per beffarci, quanto perchè rinnovellassimo il fatto de' Troiani côlti alla ragia dal virgiliano Sinone : quasi che troppi altri che, come noi, vollero libertà, non lo avessero prima e dopo rinovellato, e non lasciassero a noi un triste ricordo delle regie lusinghe,cui dementi scordammo in un grande momento d' Italia per angosciarci di mali con pochi studi riconoscibili e con non di molti rimedi sanabili.

Mi caricai spontaneamente di questa soma, persuaso che, senza li appunti più minuti e perspicuamente rilevati sopra le persone e le cose nostre, qualsivoglia argomentazione sull' avvenire d' Italia, più che vaga ed incerta, possa condurre in grandissimi errori chi la elegga per guida nello sdrucciolevole cammino della smilza politica.

Ora, dagli appunti fatti sopra le cose italiche, i quali ho ordinato a ragione di rinnovamento sociale; e specialmente dalla parte di quest' opera che discute De' mezzi fungibili d' Italia, tiro fuori quel tanto che basta a provare quale sia la povertà e la moralità del nostro Popolo.

Dalle Alpi al mare siciliano v' ha di vasti tenimenti di origine feudale, ed una innumerevole quantità di capitali di Banca e di Commercio quasi esenti di onere publico, i quali ad alcune carogne nobili blasoniche e bancarie — cameriere incipriate de' re, avare ed inumane amministratrici delle fortune erariali e private — con massimo detrimento della publica cosa, producono quanto sovrabbon-

derebbe a fecondare i singoli ordini del consorzio civile di arti nobilissime, di onesti e varî commerci, e di ricchezze diffonditrici larghe e copiose di comodo e di lusso.

So che la produzione fondiaria e bancaria di questa gente di uomini privilegiati, ragguagliata con quella delle terre libere e del rimanente denaro circolante d' Italia, approssimativamente, è tre volte maggiore.

Unendo a codesto quel che ritraggono dagli uffici più cospicui che fungono ne' particolari governi della Penisola, si stupirà la ciffra ingentissima che cotal servidorame ricevono da' re, a' quali profitta levarla dalla bocca delle insassite moltitudini, perchè con essa si assicurano dell' estorsivo amor loro e dell' asinina obbedienza di queste. Assorbono meglio di 5/7 di contribuzioni dirette ed indirette di ciascun comparto piliticosociale del nostro paese. E questo è un fatto che i ladri bilanci finanziari de' ministri segretari di stato de' nostri tiranni non possono distruggere, bensì contraffare col mezzo di ciffre statisticlie comandate coll' oro alla mano, e forse satireggiare con giornali comperi, de' quali Italia ribocca di troppo. È fatto ch' io sosterrò in faccia a' re cogl' irrefragabili documenti che posseggo, se sentirò che m' accusino di menzogna: documenti cui non ho publicato, perchè, trattili astutamente dalle ombrose Cancellerie, comprometterei nella vita e negli averi li aulici schiavi che mi v' introdussero.

Sicchè, sommando insieme i 3/4 di rendita fondaria e bancaria co' 5/7 che s' ingoiano de' pesi na-

zionali, a me non dovrebbe bastare la vista di dire quel che faccia il residuo per il Popolo.

Pure, dovendolo metter fuori a lezione comune, conterò dapprima le famiglie e le persone de' re e de' loro nobili, e poi le popolesche che lavorano per ingrassarle ed incadaverire se stesse fra i ceppi e li scherni, aggiungendovi quanto le une e le altre derivano dalla nostra patria, con generali e particolari confronti.

Abbiamo 8 famiglie regnanti di gente franca e germanica, o di sangue o di parte. Di non regnanti, ducali, principesche, baronesche, comitali e marchesane, di semplicemente nobili e cavalieresche, di bancarie e speculative di ogni risma, tolte le bruciate delle tasche, havvene un nodo di 3,968. Presa la media di 5 per una, in tutte fanno 19,880 persone (1).

Sottraendole da' 24,000,000 d' Italiani, questi rimangono 23,980,120 persone, ovvero 4,696,024 famiglie, riducendoli sopra la stessa media di 5 per cadauna.

Ora le rendite fondiarie e bancarie d' Italia formano la ciffra di 6,800,000,000 di franchi, e le erariali di 912,740,000, ed in tutte e due di 7,712,740,-000. Dunque i 19,880 nobili blasonici e bancarî ne sciupano 5,100,000,000 di rendite fondiarie e ban-

(1) Distinguo la nobiltà feudale, o barbara, dalla preesistente antichissima e puramente italica, quale è la viniziana. Disferenziansi entrambe da' villani, sicarî, ladroni e spie, nobilitati dal secolo XV — epoca dell' assodamento delle nuove tirannidi — fino a questo vôlto a distruggerle.

carie, mentre 23,980,120 popoleschi se ne sminuzzano 1,700,000,000 soltanto. Del pari vótano l' erario italico di 651,957,144; epperó ne lasciano al Popolo 260,782,856.

Sommando ciò ch' ei si pappano di fondiario, bancario ed erariale, e comparandolo con il quoto totale, risultante delle quantità da spartire fra il rimanente de nostri, avremo la enorme ciffra di 5,751,957,144 franchi divisibili in 3,976 famiglie, od in 19,880 persone; e la inconsiderabile di 1,960,-782,856 pur divisibili in 4,796,024 di quelle, od in 23,980,120 di queste. Che è quanto dire 3,976 famiglie d' Italia godono 3,791,174,288 franchi l' anno di più delle popolesche residue di 4,796,024. Per la qual cagione conseguiterà dapprima questa generale ed incredibile sproporzione che 3,976 : 5,751,957,144 :: 4,796,024 : 1,960,782,856.

Dividendo fra le famiglie e le persone nobili di Blasone e di Banca li 5,751,957,144 franchi, e' si otterrà un quoto annuo di 1,446,669,03 e qualche millesimi per ciascuna famiglia, 289,333,80 nulla di millesimi per persona, 792,69 e di alcuni millesimi il giorno pur per ugnuna, non considerando le piccole differenze nascenti dal non aver tenuto conto scrupuloso delle minime frazioni.

Facendo il medesimo rispetto alle popolesche, rileverete che 4,796,024 famiglie, dalla loro ciffra complessiva detraggono, ciaschedúna, franchi 408,-62,06 l' anno, ogni persona 81,72,04, equivalenti a franchi —,22,03 al dì.

Perlocchè è dimostrato il dividendo delle famiglie nobili di Blasone e di Banca superare quello

lelle popolesche di franchi 1,446,260,30,96; ed il quoto parziale, preso dallo stesso e devoluto annualmente a ciascun loro membro, avanzare di 289,252,15,95 quanto ogni anno spetta a ciascun individuo delle altre; e ciò pure che un nobile di codesto stampo può spendere quotidianamente sorpassare quello che può spendere un uomo del Popolo di 792,46,97.

Si ha dunque quest' altra mostruosa sproporzione speciale di 1 : 1,446,669,03 :: 1 : 408,62,06; 1 : 289,333,04 :: 1 : 81,64,05; 1 : 792,69 :: 1 : —,22,03.

Ma là dove ragiono DELLA INTELLIGENZA ITALIANA APPLICATA AD ORDINARE LE NOSTRE COSE A PRINCIPIO DI EQUAZIONI SOCIALI, mi accadde di osservare un fatto assai più straziante. Conobbi che per 4/5 del Popolo d' Italia, ovvero delle genti minori, i 22 centesimi e 03 millesimi riferiti a ciascun suo individuo non suonano in argento od in rame, si in biscotto ed in necci, in cervoia ed in acre bevanda, in iscrepolati, angusti ed oscurissimi abituri, in vesti rattoppate, sudicie e grámissime, in arnesi da lavoro, in medico, in mammana ed in prete.

Questi 4/5 sono un accessorio delle grandi proprietà de' nostri signori di Blasone e di Banca, il quale si riproduce per essi come li alberi fruttiferi delle medesime, come il frumento, la segala, il biado, e l' erba che si sfalcia.

E l' ultimo 1/5, Cittadino, è di que' delle arti e dell' industria, del commercio, delle lettere e scienze complessivamente e specialmente considerate. I pri-

mi pigliano 16 centesimi da ciascuna persona de' 4/5, i secondi, cioè quelli delle lettere e delle scienze, il resto. Sembra tenue compenso al paragone di quello che creano, perfezionano e vendono, ma è soverchio perchè al poveroPopolo rimane solamente la schiena da cambiare col bruno e scarso pane.

E 'l 1/5 sta in mezzo a' 4/5 delle genti minori e la fastosa aristocrazia. Lo divido e distinguo in due parti. La prima appello creativa ed ordinatrice solvente di opera di esecuzione; l' altra stipendiata imitatrice ed esecutrice de' di lei ordini; ed è degli operatori di qualsivoglia specie.

Entrambe, non ha ancora un secolo, costituivano un nobilissimo ordine. La prima, inamorando del principio concentrativo, di poco tempo in qua si guastò.— Sdegnò e frodò la seconda; e, trattasi di mezzo, vôlse a salire negli alti seggi altra volta vietati a coloro che non erano insigni per nobiltà redata dalle tarlate pergamene de' loro nonni barbogi; e salse ad estinguere ogni resto di morale fugando lealtà ed onore—Giunsero le necessità deste dalla filosofia giuridica di ovviare ad un tale principio colle armi popolari, conciosiachè fosse passato in abusi per la umana natura incomportabili; e dessa che, non sospetta politicamente, sendogli devota per interesse più che per scienza che ne avesse, creando le cose soddisfatrici dell' orgoglio de' potenti e produttrici della maggior quantità e miglior quantità di piaceri, si aveva perennemente con cotestoro; partecipe de' segreti e di ciò che mulinavano contro que' di sua parte,—i quali ben conosceva deliberati e pronti a novità, ma per man-

za di provvidi e maturi consigli e di spediti ar-
nenti di materiale ed economica potenza, diffi-
nente capaci di resistere lungamente ne' rischi
ana guerra ineguale — destramente le colse e
acemente ne profittò. Quindi si pose capo de'
oleschi a lei prossimani; arbitrò fra loro e la
ilèa esterrefatta da' sùbiti casi; scavalcò quelli
uesta; si assise su' primi gradini de' troni; si
se sulle porte delle basiliche, nelle sedie questo-
e pretorili, nelle Banche, nelle Zecche, nelle fila
lla milizia profana e sacra e ne' consessi della
ienza; invase di fatto la giurisdizione politica,
ile, economica, militare e religiosa, voltando e
rando a suo talento chi l' ha di diritto, qualunque
; s' imbrancò cogl' imparruccati giusdicenti au-
i e papeschi di Blasone e di Banca chè, ricorsi a
nel giorno delle sollevate moltitudini, sciarmate
ma formidabili, mosse in loro aiuto e le salvò;
ionfatrice della rivoluzione, abusò dell' autorità
uridica de' re e de' loro satelliti captivati alla sua
fluenza, per rimunerare il Popolo, che le diede il
aneggio della somma delle cose, con fucilate, pa-
boli, carceri, esigli, confiscazioni, deportazioni,
goscie, terrori, calunnie, e colla più obbrobriosa
elle servitù; per torgli speranza di risorgere, si
lleò difensivamente ed offensivamente con nobiltà
Polizia di tutti i paesi del mondo, con le grandi
Banche, co' principali stabilimenti di arti, d' indu-
trie e di commercî, con letterati e uomini di scienze
— particolarmente delle economiche—ordendo così
uella immensa tela del monopolio delle fortune e
el pensiero che involge e soffoca nel loro nascere

le manifestazioni di qualsivoglia libertà; superba della solidarietà degli assassini del genere umano, spia ovunque, scuopre ovunque, paga ovunque chi spia e chi le rivela come chi strozza ne' polsi e nella mente le potenze che la abbominano; scaltrita nello costumare delle arti proprie degli schiavi, con le quali si va cavaliere degli altri sprezzando e calpestando ogni legge umana e divina, qual meraviglia, se, venuta al suo fine con esse, con esse s' ingegni, non tanto di conservarsi, sì ancora di accrescere la sua con la rovina di chi la emula o tenta di frangere le catene delle quali lo avvinse? E non è forse lei che cospira quotidianamente co' banchieri contro le grandi proprietà de' nobili e le piccole de' popoleschi, le une e le altre comperando poco più che cogli onesti interessi de' capitali che loro dà a mutuo...; sostituendosi a quelli con blasoni novizzi, a questi col feroce diritto di usarli quai somieri? E non è così per lei che l' agricoltura abbandonò fecondissimi terreni d' Italia, onde venne li oggetti artificiali col giuoco dell' accrescere e dell' abbassare i valori de' metalli coniati, aumentassero di quantità, qualità e prezzo e sbilanciassero enormemente i rapporti fra gli oggetti ed i valori degli oggetti d' arte e quelli della natura, per cui nacquero tante inutili teorie di rinnovamento sociale, e così ridicoli precetti di filosofia politica? È lei che caccia i re nelle battaglie o che li serra nelle basiliche a poltrire in pace codarda. È col suo oro che i popoli si ribellano a' re, quando i re, per ragioni dinastiche, o per desiderio di conquiste, o per levarsi d' intorno codesti giudei, sfoderano la spada, od

estendono la mano verso umanità che a gran passi si dilunga dalle reggie. Fu lei che travolse i principî della filosofia del diritto e che gettò la ragione in balia del sofisma della forza brutale, il genio sotto la toppa de' ladri, l' amore a scherno de' lussurianti trafficatori della nostra carne, la virtù fra le strettoie della estrema povertà... — E 'l assai orrida cosa costei, a cui ride la malvagia sorte di fare eziandio il sensale di usura, e di essere aguzzino e carbonio de' miseri che dispolpa ed asfissia per se e per que' spaventi degli uomini!

Dunque se è creativa e si appropria le altrui creazioni col denaro, se i capitali che le promuovono e le fanno eseguire sono suoi, qual cosa rimarrà alla seconda parte ch' è di quelli che le conducono?

Rilevo da' miei appunti ch' ella fa 1/9 di 1/5 delle genti minori, ed 1/5 è di 959,204 famiglie e 4 persone, ovvero di 4,796,024 capi. Pigliandone 1/9, si ha 106,578 famiglie ed 1 persona, ovvero 532,981 capi. Quindi li altri 8/9 residui sommano in 852,626 famiglie e 3 persone, ossia in 4,263,133 capi.

Abbiamo veduto che a' 23,980,120 cittadini di quelle genti non si può assegnare più di 1,960,782,-857 franchi; e presentemente si vedrà quanto si abbia ciascuna di queste parti nelle quali cola il frutto de' sudori di tanto Popolo.

Io non so di alcun capo della seconda che con mente e con braccio guadagni più di 1 franco il dì. È facile dunque da 1,960,782,837 dedurre 4,263,-133 franchi, e conoscere così che per la prima parte avanza un dividendo di 1,956,519,724. Di conse-

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guenza, partendo alla stessa guisa che fu usa
lo avanti, ogni famiglia può disporre annual
di 18,357,63, ogni persona di 3,671,52,06, e
ciascuna persona di 10,05,08 il giorno; e cias
miglia dell'altra di franchi 1,825, ogni persona
l' anno, e di 1 quotidianamente. Perlochè pr
cotale sproporzione di rapporti che 106,57
956,519,724 : : 852,626 : 4,263,138; cioè ch
18,357,63 : : 1 : 1,825; oppure che 1 : 3,67
06 : : 1 : 365; e quindi che 1 : 10,05,08 :
1,00.

Per le quali relazioni si apprende che da 4
000 famiglie equivalenti a 24,000,000 di p
d' Italia, sottratte le 963,180 famiglie e 4 p
ovvero 4,815,904 persone che si dividono f
li 7,712,740 franchi, quoto complessivo dell
rendite, rimangono 3,836,819 famiglie ed 1 p
senza un quattrino da riporre quale element
turo capitale, e senza speranza di riserbarlo
mai; perchè la loro povertà sta in ragion
dell' insaziabile desiderio di cumulare de' gr
ed inversa del progresso della età nostra, la
a voler dire la verità è, più che gretta, esos
zievole, chè in teoria si vanta quello che in
non è. E s' io non muto è perchè è meschi
tanto ch' io vedo esserle mestieri di rinnova
sto, altrimenti cadrei nell' empia sentenza
disperati che affermano la perpetuità del m
tremo : lo che sta contro alle immutabili e s
leggi di armonia che con soavi proporzioni
buiscono ed accordano in uffici di vicen
amore le singole nature, dalle quali abbia

spettacolo sorprendente dell' universo — da troppo pochi studiato ed inteso nel suo doppio ordine di mensurabilità ed incommensurabilità; quantunque parecchi cervellini poeticoscientifici, profani affatto a Fisi ed a Psiche, con voluminose fatuità si sbraccino ad infinocchiare li orbi ch' ei numerarono le molecole, come che, nuovi Iddii, abbiano potuto decomporre il creato, messo in un fornello fuori dell' esistente mensurabile, e poi riffusolo in un loro stampo e cavatolo com' è; e giurino di aver veduto l' anima, quasi noi s' ignorasse non esserle stato fatto di maravigliare Èroto alla luce del fanalino, si di sentirlo nel mistero del silenzio profondo e delle tenebre spesse... — Ma chi non osa oggidì, che la più brutta sfacciatagine, sostenuta da ugola canina, da pugni da pugillatore e da giall' oro, ha diritto di essere e di farsi credere la più squisità delle squisitissime squisitezze? — Così superstiziosamente idolatra del ridicolo è diventato questo gran mondo di schiavi scelleratamente imbecilli!

Leggete dunque quest' ultima enormità che 963,-180,4 : 7,712,740,000 : : 3,836,819,1 : 0,00, o, se volete sostituire alle famiglie le persone, che 4,815,-904 : 7,712,740,000 : : 19,184,096 : 0,00; e poi, Cittadino, maleditemi se dico ferocemente crudeli coloro che con ingenua ironia appellano sovrano, onnipotente un tal Popolo a cui nulla danno, eccettuati i patiboli de' re; ed a cui tôrrebbero la camicia per divenire quello che non diverranno giammai.

L' opera nostra dee volegere, non ad enfiarlo di lodi lasciandolo nello squallore, ma a studiarlo e

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conoscerlo ne' suoi mali fisici e morali, a porgerli rimedi che lo risanino e lo tornino robusto e gagliardo, a precederlo ne' rischi, a dividere seco i mali ed i beni della lotta incessante contro la tirannide, a rinnovare col suo volere libero la privata e la publica amministrazione delle persone e delle cose d' Italia. In somma, fatti utili, e non parole schernevoli, rifanno questo Popolo lebbroso e derelitto.

E se l' opera sarà drizzata alla parte che dissi stipendiata ed esecutrice, colla quale entrano i piccoli possidenti — ambidue speculazione de' nobili di Blasone e di Banca, e di quella che domandai creativa ed ordinatrice solvente di opera di esecuzione; —e così di costi per castella, borgate e campagne si diffonda negli animi un eguale sentimento di opposizione al monopolio politico ed economico degli aulici e de' papeschi, e si ordinino le idee ad un modo conforme di sottrarsene, e le forze fisiche ad attivarlo contemporaneamente e sinteticamente, io sono certo il nostro Popolo dover sorgere tosto e rinnovellarsi di vita novella, conseguitando l' amore rigenerativo di cui ferve la civiltà presente, benchè ancora vincolata agli arbitrî della forza brutale.

In un altro libro (1) profilai la maniera odotta-

(1) "Del Principio di azione sintetica, od Osservazioni su ciò che ciascun Governo costituito o provisorio d' Italia dee fare per se e preparare per une futura Assemblea nazionale." Fu stampato a Modena dagli eredi Soliani nel aprile 1848, e cortesemente giudicato dall' *Italia Centrale*, che si publicava in quella città. Opera inutile, per-

bile ad organizzare i mezzi che menano ad un tal fine, e li effetti di questo; ma nel lavoro ora dedicatovi, anzi che per cenni, con larga e piena ragione di principio, di mezzi e di oggetti mi sono aintato a svolgerla come meglio ho saputo. E co-

chè di que' di la ignoranza si confondeva coll' entusiasmo, la riflessione col timore e coll' interesse. Per la prima era un geroglifico, per la seconda un' utopia.

Per altro G. Montanelli se ne rammentò sette mesi dopo, e fu applaudito da tutta Italia, ed altrove, siccome autore del disegno della Costituente di 1 e di 2 stadio, ch' era una copia di quanto misi in tal libro, meno quelle osservazioni teoricopratiche che feci circa il modo di tradurlo nel fatto della unificazione republicana d' Italia. Usai di troppa delicatezza avvertendolo per il *Pensiero Italiano* ch' altri fu autore e svolgitore di quel disegno innanzi ch' egli lo annunziasse come suo, e lo legitimasse col *Monitore* fattorino ministerialmente lezioso. L' avviso fu riportato intieramente dal *Popolano*. Ma G. M. non ne fe motto. Forse perchè nel *Pensiero Italiano* mi firmai Karilào Traspadano. Il publico pensava all' avvenire orbo, poco del presente, incurioso delle cose passate. In quest' opera parlerò diffusamente di G. Montanelli cittadino, professore, giornalista, ministro ed esule. Ora lo lascio contento di un occhio solo..., la Casa savoina, nè gli pronunzio la perdita di questa luce d' inferno, perchè non creda che, fatto cieco di tutti e due li occhi, io lo giudichi republicano; giacchè quello che perse fu di republica, secondo che suona l' ultimo suo scritto, di cui dissero meraviglie i giornali di un occhio solo, dico quelli di S. S. R. Maestà Emanuelle II, re delle donne di Gallura... (Vedi Dante) Marchese d' Italia...

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desto vi sarà manifesto dai capi XXXII (1), LXI (2),

(1) "Un' associazione de' Possidenti, ad oggetto di promuovere il massimo de' prodotti agricoli col minimo degli oneri privati e publici rende inutili e vituperevoli, gl' impieghi amministrativi e finanziarî di quelle irte arpie de' Ministri, Governatori, Presidenti, Direttori, Delegati, Commissari, Intendenti, Questori, Consiglieri di Finanza, di Polizia o Buon Governo o Publica Sicurezza, di Censura, di Belle Arti, di Edilità e di Ornato, di Magistrato Camerale, di Camera de' Conti e di Commercio, di Società di Arti, Industria, eccett., di Banche e di Ragionerie Centrali, di Estimo Censuario, di Registratura, di Catasto e d' Ipoteche, di Testatico e Caseggiatico, di Publiche Contribuzioni e Costruzioni civili e militari, di Gabelle, di Controllerie, di Cartabollata, di Arsenali, di Armerie, di Magazzini, delle Polveri, de' Nitri, Sali e Tabacchi, di Miniere e di Zecche, di Boschi e Foreste, di Società montanistiche e di Assicurazioni, od ammesse e pertinenti al Governo, di Lotto, di Notariato e di quella infamia del Fisco; di que' capi d' opera delle Accommandite, de' Prestiti volontarî, delle Case pie, degli Ospizî, delle Scuole di carità, de' Luoghi di pegno o di Monte, delle fraterie, monacherie, e confraternite, de' Legati pii; ed avanti a tutto de' signori maresciali e generali di milizia e di acre birraglia, col loro stato maggiore, eccett., — che ci suggono il sangue e stan sopra colla punta della spada perchè non respiriamo— co' Scribi e le altre saette che i re avventano ad incenerire la vita del Popolo."

(2) "Le Arti, l' Industria e 'l Commercio d' Italia rifioriranno mettendoli in relazione colle richezze del suolo equamente distribuite e col loro aumento maggiore possibile, altrimenti deperiranno all' intutto, come dee avvenire in

cxxxix (1), cxxvii (2), e finalmente dal cxxxv(3).

A me intanto parve di essermi sentito schiantar l cuore quando nell' opera mi fu mestieri dipingere la condizione nella quale versano 19,184,096 persone d' Italia. Avrei voluto che altri, con sublime parola di profonda pietà, descrivesse questo spettacolo commoventissimo di vedere infangata l' inopia servile la più libera un tempo e più ricca, la più potente e più gloriosa delle umane famiglie: questa Italia paradisiaca, genitrice feconda di genî

utti gli stati che non provvedono ad equilibrare fra loro valori degli oggetti d' arte con quelli della natura, non considerando la presente rovina della Economia universale lipendere della enorme eccedenza che quelli de' primi anno sui secondi."

(1) "L' associazione degli elementi produttivi d' Italia si effettua incarnando le idee dell' utile nazionale ed umanitario in una legge immutabile di equità e di giustizia, derivata dai rapporti che intercedono fra i differenti gradi di bontà, valore ed utilità de' prodotti di arte e di natura popolarmente noti e publicamente apprezzati."

(2) "LaScienza del vero Libero Cambio abbatte le menzogne del beffardo e ladro Libero Cambio inglese crudelmente applicato al Piemonte da C. Cavour, scimmia ruffiana del monopolio del più sozzo paese, ch' è per ruinare per sempre, perchè dà la comunione de' prodotti delle varie nazioni con compensi relativi alle differenze del loro valore per ragione d' origine, di provenienza, di quantità e di qualità ed all' utile proporzionale di ciascuna."

(3) "La rivoluzione sociale è l' applicazione delle equazioni di diritto e di dovere di ogni persona giuridica all' uso delle sue potenze e delle sue cose d' arte e di natura."

che, a modo del nostro sole corruscantissimo, si spaziano per tutte le regioni dell' universo piovendo ovunque tesori di vita illustre: questa Italia da' cervelli etnéi e da' petti vulcanici, che trae armonie in qualsivoglia maravigliosa opera d' arte da' stupendi suoi tipi, come dalle sue aurore e da' suoi occasi, dalle Alpi nevose e dalle vaporose ed iridate scene messenie della fata Morgana, dalle tempeste de' suoi mari e dalle tepide aure che da Palermo ad Aquileia ricreano le sue bellezze incomparabili, dalla amenità de' poggi e dal lusso orientale delle riviere sicule, partenopee, tiberine, etrusche, ligustiche ed adriache, da' suoi campi diffusi, ingemmati di spighe feconde e di rosseggianti grappoli, di frutte soavi e versicolori, intersecati da fiumi e da gementi ruscelli, smaltati d' erbe e di pinti fiorini— festa de' pastori, cura delle vergini, dolci rimembranze della vita primaverile—questa Italia dalle sintesi eterne, dai prodigi di amore e di odio, di gravità e di cortesia, di dignità e di facilità, di perspicace ed acuta intuizione e di svolgimento nobilmente elegante de' veri intuiti: questa Italia che a' piedi ha le conchiglie oceanine, a' fianchi la voluttà delle creazioni più sorprendenti della natura, al capo la corona delle rocche alpestri ingombra di selve e di torri: questa Italia che val mille mondi perchè tutti i mondi s' inchinarono a lei per udirla cantare quelle sue armonie dalle quali impararono tante volte la vera civiltà, tranne la gratitudine, cui presero per la calunnia e le catene di cui osarono sfigurarla ed avvincerla, gl' infami!

Se non che ne' nostri la grand' anima vid' io

chiusa ed attrappita perchè, mostrandosi, il terrore la percuote a morte. Ei non sentono più perchè il terrore, armato di sangue e di rapine, velò il loro cielo col lenzuolo de' loro morti, disertò la loro terra colla scure de' suoi sicarî. Non vogliono più perchè il terrore negò loro l' esercizio della facoltà di volere, imponendo quello della cieca obbedienza.

E quale de' nostri sfogazzati parolai discese nel mistero delle anime, contò i loro sospiri e le loro lagrime, interrogò i loro visceri aggruppati dall' aspide della angoscia e della disperanza di partecipare de' tanti doni largitici dalla clementissima natura, entro ne' covili di 19,184,096 creature d' Italia a vedere i loro occhi infossati, i volti pallidi e giallastri, magri o tumidi per pellagra — madre tremenda di cretini, protesta vivente e terribile contro la crudeltà de' re, de' nobili, de' banchieri e di quell' altro vivaio di canaglia da monopolio—noto la movenza dimessa, la parola breve e mesta, la oblivione, il matto entusiasmo, la sbrigliata allegrezza, la sconnessione de' concetti, l' amor della desidia, il criterio schiavesco, la nausea dell' attenzione, la ingenua apatica per tutto quello che arresta gli spiriti intelligenti, attivi e colti, l' uggia in cui hanno le cose nuove per non aver abito e voglia d' investigarne la natura, e di conoscere la sua virtù, quel loro ghigno cretinesco che fanno a riforme religiose, politiche ed economiche, e la prontezza con la quale antomaticamente si muovono a sostenere la tirannide politicoreligiosa contro chi la guerreggia per destarli da questo mortale letargo?

Chi mai de' nostri apostoli umanitarî ha studiato

le cause rimote e prossime di tanta degradazione del Popolo d' Italia? S' affiss' egli a studiare i rimedi nel passato e nella presente ordinazione degli umani negozi?

Ah! i primi sono bimbi da mandare alla beva; ed i secondi una caparbia manata di ambiziosi che, sterili di maschia sapienza, vanno sazievolmente gonfi di teorie magistrali o dittatorie secondo che loro fa meglio, o capitanare genti da comporre a' regi voleri, a cavarne premi esclusivi, o destare moti vertiginosi da' quali, a' miseri che li fanno, si è già detto derivare maggiore sterminio di vite, di libertà e di fortuna. — Codeste teorie sono arma a doppio taglio con cui stoccheggiano il cuore di que' franchi, sinceri e dignitosi cittadini, per la bocca, gli scritti e le generose azioni de' quali vengono rinunziati siccome vanità che paiono persone; e cacciano i buoni, che non hanno coraggio nè scienza d' iniziare i moti, a precipitarsi contro qualunque nemico, senza conoscere se sia di polso e da fenderli, od imbolsito e da credersi alle improntitudini di chi impicca e dispicca con la ragione del pazzo.—Io li detesto costoro che, predicando sciocche dottrine, le quali si collidono col senso pratico degli uomini e colla ragione delle cose, ch' entrovi non hanno nulla di che persuaderci ch' ei conoscano quelli e queste, con nausente arroganza vogliono reggere le coscienze ed amministrare questo tribolato orfanotrofio ch' è Italia. — E più li disprezzo conciosiadio che con le parole dicano: fra noi non v' ha nè primo ned ultimo; e poi se, li badi ne' fatti, vedi che non si contentano di essere meno di Alfa

ad Omega. Anzi ti dêi ben guardare dal non venerarli e dal non istancarli di curve adulazioni e di umili preghiere, perchè altrimenti con democratica carità ti piantano addosso un processo di miriadi di capi di accusa, la cui spiatelata falsità, per fare che tu faccia, non verrai a capo di distruggere, essendosi essi fatto diritto di dire e di non provare per aver sempre ragione; e così n' esci spacciato di una sentenza, la quale di te fa il compendio di ogni laidume.

Si capisce dunque essermi stato forza di far ritratto del Popolo, chè non avrebbe conferito se cotal modo di gente si fosse recata a condurlo, sia perchè non lo conosce, quanto ancora perchè, o lo vede attraverso lo prisma della regia politica, o trammezzo le albagie di democratiche Eccellenze —causa della risoluzione de' legami fra proscritti e proscritti, fra loro e le nazioni alle quali appartengono; conciosiacosachè codesto rivaleggiare tra essi, come parecchi fanno, per essere i primi, elleno giustamente riguardino come umore pernicioso di futura tirannide, e non nicchino; perocchè da vivere sotto un tiranno di corona ad uno con indosso il feraiulo di Diogene non cangia punto.

E veramente finora, dalle proscrizioni attiche alle romane dittatoriali, triumvirali e cesaree; da queste alle fiorentine de' giorni di Dante fino a quelli di Filippo Strozzi, padre empio e superbo, e di Piero, figlio energumeno, di Bartolomeo Albizzi, del buon Jacopo Nardi, di Bartolomeo Cavalcanti, di Luigi Alamanni e via; dalle veniziane del secolo XII al XV alle liguri —infierendo le lotte

fra' nobili di parte guelfa e que' della ghibellina, o tralle principali famiglie, ch' erano bastarda semenza feudale, intese a padroneggiare esclusivamente della publica cosa, come s' è veduto in quelle del 1270, quando i Fieschi ed i Grimaldi, con i Vento e molti altri, dall' esiglio videro li Spinola e' loro aderenti contenere orgogliosamente li ordini della imperiale republica, e lorchè i Fregosi si mutilavano le membra cogli Adorni, ed i Fieschi s' infilzavano co' Dorieschi; de' quali il vantato Andrea nel 1538 alla battaglia di Lepanto sagrificava Italia a Carlo V, conferendo alla vittoria de' Turchi sulle genti cristiane coll' abbassamento della potente republica di Venezia : la cui fama abbomino cosi nelle sue opere, per le quali non si fece tiranno di Genova, prevedendo del suo sangue non avere un petto che, succendogli, sapesse far dimenticare l' usurpo dell' imperio con ispietatezze convenienti a' nuovi principati, affinchè mettano solide radici— dalle liguri alle papesche de' tempi di Cola tribuno di Roma al pontificato dell' esecrando Falari di Gregorio XVI e del perfido conte Giovanni Mastai Feretti, ironicamente detto Pio IX; dalle francesi, sabaude, austriache, polonesi, napoletane e modenesi, del Direttorio della republica, di quelle tigri umane di Carlo Felice, e del sanguinario traditore Carlo Alberto, di Francesco e Ferdinando I° d' Austria, di Nicolò I° gotorpèo, di Ferdinando I° di Borbone e di Francesco IV brunsvichese d' Este—che su' cannoni fece scrivere l' umano ed italico motto : " contro i liberali " — alle recenti del 1848 a questi dì, per le quali Italia piange tant

figli in preda alle ingiurie de' stranieri e delle estreme necessità, io, Cittadino, ho imparato assai bene i fuorusciti non averne mai raccappezzata una, benchè, de' tanti, alcuni delle diverse nazioni insorte questo ultimo mezzo secolo—termine dell' evo plastico e principio di governo di uomo giuridico e libero — dignitosamente comportino le effese della malvagia fortuna ed indefessamente adoperino, affratellati con noi, a tornare a libertà la patria captiva. Fra cotesti è da ricordare i promotori e' fautori della Etnodemocrazia slava e tedesca; i quali, non lasciandosi imbeccherare da' sillogismi de' capi della Democrazia del mezzogiorno e dell' oriente, che s'impuntano a credere il nebbioso occidente, minacciato dal settentrione de' suoi monopolî inumani, voglia e possa ricomporre solidamente li elementi sociali di Europa, cui primo vandalicamente scompose da duecent' anni a qui, si dovrebbero innalzare al disegno di un rinnovamento sociale universale, usando specialmente de' loro, fidenti e certi i germi di civiltà innestati e sviluppati in così fresche e vigorose genti produrlo senza ruina dell' autonomia e delle creazioni artificiali delle altre, anzi recar loro nuova virtù a darne di più peregriue e meglio rispondenti alla libertà di tutte, quindi unformi fra loro, quantunque etnograficamente differenti, autonomicamente distinte e giuridicamente independenti; e così effettuare la seconda sintesi delle potenze civili del mondo in cui s' infutura la prima de' Romani, modificata alle aspirazioni di questa età gravida di portenti.

Ricercando la cagione della inefficacia di cotanti

sforzi della emigrazione per raggiungere un sì nobile scopo, vidi ch' ella è riposta nella scuola de' re, della quale, i capi del Popolo, sendone intinti fin da fanciulli, hannoci messo di troppo ne' moti desti contro tirannide; imperocchè, distraendo i popoleschi — rasi di logica ed assennata politica governativa, ma sentimentalmente diretti a finire qualunque oppressore con armonia di azione sintetica — a metafisiche disputazioni circa la forma di politico reggimento, cui ciascuno voleva imporre esclusivamente, lasciando ogni ragione di sostanza, loro ignota, partorissero le contenzioni di parte, calcando le vestigie di Cesare Dittatore, il quale, anzi che onorato e grande cittadino d' Italia republicana, preferiva di essere il primo de' barbari Elvezi. E le contenzioni, e non il vindice ferro di Bruto e di Cassio, dettero la pinta al capitombolo de' Dittatori effemeri, che, caduti, ebbero l' esiglio e le altre cose che i re sogliono dare a' vinti. Esuli, rinfrescano più accanitamente li stessi umori pe' quali Italia rigiacque; avvegnachè, al cospetto de' re che li tollerano al modo de' re, si persuadano di avere maggiore libertà di farlo; e, con l' anarchia nell' esiglio, pretendono di darci armonia di opere multiformi, messe a ricuperare libertà: quasichè non sia loro stata data dal Popolo viva e potentissima, e per il parteggiare non l' abbiano gittata sotto a' speronati stivali de' profughi scettrati, acciocchè, ristandosi, si riavessero della paura, e nelle vôte e silenziose aule spavaldi tornassero.

Epperò dico che, se amo immensemente coloro, che pur vollero aver nome ed autorità di capi, li

amo solo come uomini di mente e di privata virtù, ma non li stimerò mai degni di timoneggiare la republica finchè quella, cui appelliamo Solidarietà de' popoli, non vegga essere prima Solidarietà di diritti e di doveri, di principî e di persone, di azione e di oggetto fra noi, al bando della nostra terra natale, e fra' nostri, che col sangue nutrono e pagano quotidianamente la lor servitù. E se ciò non avvenga, non cessero un istante dall' ammonire questi infelici per colpa loro, altamente gridando : " Fratelli, se il dì della estrema vendetta sia tosto, vi sovvenga, che la fatte voi, e non noi; che i suoi frutti sono vostri, non nostri; che, prima di recarceli in mano, vi corre obbligo di sapere se, ottenendoli, invece del nostro principio, attuaste un consiglio vostro suggeritovi dalle necessità che ci spingono a sollevarci. Se non conoscete quel che fummo e quel che siamo, quanto femmo e ciò che faciamo, quel che volemmo e quanto vogliamo, voi ricaptiverete Italia introducendoci nel governo della vittoria vostra. Il 1848 e 49 accettaste idolatrando i nostri esuli, discordi fra loro di principio, di mezzo e di fine, non tutti galantuomini, abbenchè ognuno di loro ricantasse miracoli del proprio; ed Italia, in due mesi perse la testa, in cinque si coperse di cadaveri, per esigli si stremò, impallidì per angoscie, fu sobbillata da' re vittoriosi."

Che importami si bandisca Solidarietà, se sta nelle parole? Anche i re cavan dell' esofago di caldissime orazioni di libertà temendo le basiliche sommerse dalle rivoluzionarie procelle. — Ned io, ned altri ci crede.—E se sperienza toglie fede alle loro,

perchè dunque la presterà alle parole nostre?....

Dunque io doveva sobbarcarmi alla descrizione del misero modo di vivere di 19,184,096 Italiani uguali a zero in denaro!...

E Voi, alto di mente e forse troppo dato alle rivelazioni del cuore, vedrete e saprete come tanto Popolo dia quasi solo di che esercitare le magistrature politiche e criminali; chè la pauperie immoralissima lo stiga ad opere ree cui i re, i quali la vogliono, puniscono con ergastolo e forca e peggio. —Le genti popolesche sono cosa flagellata a morte, non persone giuridiche. Quindi nè morale, nè senso politico hann' elleno. Asseriscono istinto di vendette sociali; ma, per le ragioni che porto nell' opera, e per quanto svolsi incidentemente in questa Dedica, non lo sanno muovere al fatto.

È dunque, o non è, burla ineffabilmente atroce pretendere ch' ei senta?

§ III

Ma è atrocissima, se con le teorie d' ignorante democratismo se gli persuada potersi riavere della servile timidezza e del disperato abbandono, generati dal terrore e dalle improntudini politicosociali alle quali si lascia andare spinto dalle necessità prime... — E come potrallo l' ignorante, e, per maggior suo danno, contento della nuda schiavitù?

La ignoranza di un Popolo è conseguenza del terrore e della maggior povertà; e si misura co' gradi di queste. — I re l' accrescono e la serbano colla di lui passività personale ed erariale; ed a poco

a poco la mutano in sapienza di tacere e di servire. — È solo quando il Popolo sa tanto..., ch' ei cominciano il loro periodo dinastico assoluto, e si rubano la gloria sanguinaria di clementi, perchè non v' ha più virtù da fustigare, di giusti, perchè li ordini di libertà non sono più possibili, di munifici perchè gl' ingegni agilmente li servono. — Questa è la pagina storica di cui si scutano contro l' arme infrangibile de' fatti: fatale per lui, di poi che di costi lo impigliano e lo spronano alle industrie di preferenza, e ci va poco a copire che il miglior servo è meglio pagato e più onorato. — Dunque sicurezza, denaro, onori di preferenza sono cose che di nemico lo fanno amico fidatissimo de' suoi oppressori. Anzi e' principia ad amarli, già ignaro di republica, e conto di ciò che giova verso chi la spense.—Amante di tirannide, perchè, non potendo amare libertà, deve pure amar qualche cosa, non sa più nè volere nè ordinare se non vuole e non ordina co' re. — Inveterato in servitù, e' non somiglia nè a' nobili nè alla sua natura: è l' identica od approssimativa espressione dell' anima de' re. Fatto il callo, la sua logica è più sottile della loro, è più tremenda per libertà.

Trattando delle cose nostre, ricordo ch' io distinsi li attori nazionali in quattro categorie: una de' nobili di Blasone e di Banca; due di creatori e committenti, e d' imitatori ed esecutori; l' altra di quelli che si fanno rappresentare dal cruschello.

Le tre prime, per principio, per potenza e per oggetto, peggiorano la condizione politicosociale della terza, tenendo al principio regio o di autorità o

concentrativo. — È d' uopo spiegare quel che vagliano rispetto ad istruzione ed educazione.

Tra' nobili di Blasone e di Banca, coronati e non coronati, 29/100 sono addentro a qualunque teoria e disciplina; ed 1/9 di 1/5 delle genti minori da' 44/100 di uomini creativi, dotti, atti ad insegnare grandi cose, se la inerzia prudente de' governi tirannici non facesse loro preferire l' utile de' schiavi a' gloriosi pericoli de' maestri di libertà. Delli 8/9 dello stesso 1/5, 67/100 sanno leggere e punto scrivere. Rimane l' accessorio delle fortune di tutte queste categorie, dico il facchino, cioè 19,184,096 persone che non sanno nè leggere nè scrivere. Dunque de' 24,000,000 de' nostri, 5,765 nobili e 234,452 persone di 1/9 di 1/5 delle genti minori versano in ogni modo di studi; li altri 14,115 de' primi e le 298,439 di queste hanno istruzione civile sociale bastevole a soddisfare agli uffici ordinari del vivere cittadino; 2,856,283 de' rimanenti 8/9 dello stesso 1/5 leggono appena e punto scrivono, e quindi avanzano 2,406,834 teste che non san nulla. Epperò avete 21,590,930 Italiani di un' assoluta ignoranza. E per convincersene deesi andare nel reame di Napoli, e nel Governo della divina rivelazione..., in Valdichiana e Maremma, ne' versanti delle coste pennine, percorrere Liguria e 'l principato di Monaco, pigliare dalle Alpi marittime, e, lungo la cozzie e le graie, recarsi alle leponzie, valicare il Pennino e quindi guardare a' ducati, quinci a' beatissimi somieri de' Savoini, girar da' Rezî fino a' Carnî ed a' Giulî, frugar Sardegna ed Elba, e quanto si disumana pe' nostri tiranni.

Ora de' 2,409,070 prendo li 240,217 ne' quali è raccolta la sapienza d' Italia. — Costoro, che guasterebbero la condizione e la fortuna loro potentissima usandone ad illuminare il Popolo intorno a' suoi diritti, tenendo dalla forza, l' adoperano a renderlo contento della mazza che gli spacca il cranio. — Nè le grida generose di alcuni li faranno cessare di un abuso così nefando. — Demostene non potè salvare la republica quando il sofisma della forza nuotava sulle melate labbra di Aspasia e di Pericle. E M. Tullio ebbe tratta e punzecchiata la lingua lorchè Roma soffrì il regio diadema da Antonio appresto a G. Cesare, che, passato il Rubicone confortato da Curio con le parole " vincat utilitas", corse ad immergere il ferro matricida ne' visceri della republica. Fra Gerolamo morì fra le fiamme crepitanti per aver voluto libera Firenze prostituitasi a' Palleschi. Non fa ancor sessant' anni F. Pesaro, rinfacciando nel Senato veneto le macchinazioni de' suoi contro la republica, videle mostruosamente trionfare per S. Fermo e Z. Valaresso, inutilmente deplorando nell' esiglio l' asservita sua patria. — E le dottrine politiche di Aristotile, gli scorpioni che C. C. Tacito lanciò nel seno de' tiranni, il ritratto fattone dal Segretario Fiorentino; le satire di quel gran cuore di C. Persio Flacco aretino, dell' acre e sboccato Giovenale, di Ariosto, del Berni, di Alfieri e del Giusti, — forte linguaggio d' impotente libertà; — le commedie da Aristofane al Goldoni; le tragedie da Eschilo al Niccolini; gl' indirizzi ad addolcire l' asprezza o nequizia delle incomposte leggi criminali, civili e

repubblicani del Campanella e del
popoli risoluti valsero meno dell
made e delle lisciature di Lisia,
Petronio, delle industrie del Gu
aringhe dello spione e sordidamer
spo di Vercelli, del piaggiare di
Giovio, de' giullari e de' strioni, d
narchi e delle viltà de' storici che
codeste prove speciali della poten
libertà non sono più di commende
di un glorioso passato, di sublin
tradiscono dalle grandi anime attr
rate, perchè le aperte avevano spi

Ed un tale Popolo a cui la fe
grandi appose a crimenlese saper
economia e di milizia; quindi senz
sente, incurante dell' avvenire, è li
de' sensi e di non credere in nulla

L'analisi comparata delle opere
natura, seguita dalla sintesi che
elementi di qualsivoglia civiltà
quella, si colorisca della luce delle
può servire a rinnovarlo politic
mente: perchè per esso non imm

verosimili e ripugnanti fra loro, di poi che l' esagerazione sta co' tempi ne' quali di libertà, fontana perenne di eccelse armonie, non ce n' è, è tempo ormai d' insegnare al Popolo la scienza del diritto in quella de' fatti; ed il precipuo è riordinare il Censo italico, — appellato fondamento delle republiche democratiche (1) da quel divino ingegno di G. B. Vico, profeta e svolgitore della presente rivoluzione sociale assai avanti che questi nostri economarchi ne balbettassero (2)—perchè da lui rinascono le libertà con i mutui presidî delle uguaglianze, il valore, e 'l coraggio e la stima della persona giuridica, l' azione privata integra e creativa, la publica giusta ed eroica.

Ciò che toccai, pigliatelo come riverbero di ciò che l' opera narrerà circa la istruzione e la educazione de' nostri; e dal Capo XLVII che ragiona DELLA RIABILITAZIONE GIURIDICA DEL POPOLO D' ITALIA, E COME LA POSSA ACQUISTARE, si vedrà li grandi mezzi che ci ha largito Iddio per rifarci prestamente e risalire il seggio del' avita sapienza.

E dopo queste conseguenze della brutalità sanguinaria, ladra e spegnitrice di pensiero e di affetto, degli abbominandi scettrati, desidero di aver imperio sulle folgori e su' tremuoti per incenererli e per subissarli.

(1) *Scienza Nuova*, lib. II.

(2) Il Cittadino A. Herzen, de' nobili russi, permetterà dunque ch' io dubiti della esattezza di ciò che afferma alla pagina 67, capo IV dal suo *Développement des idées révolutionnaires en Russie*, publicato a Londra nel 1853.

IV

E raffrontandomi con Voi per alcune parti ch' ebbimo comuni nell' ufficio di rinnovare li ordini italici, mi trarrò addosso biasimo di vano, che ambisce di aggrandirsi avvicinando i grandissimi; il quale mi verrà da' quelli che vinsi più fa nel campo politicosociale, e che ora mi attaccano da' muri delle Ambasciate e dalle caserme de' birri.—Li descrissi in questa opera con evidenza di fatti.—E quell' anima grande di L. Kossuth sa che nello scorso novembre andai per lui, richiedendolo de' suoi legati De Domini, Matcovich e Kaiser venuti in Toscana per lega offensiva e difensiva contr' Austria, credendoli traditori, e dovendoli mettere nelle cose di Toscana. — Ebbi ragione di crederli tali.

Certo si che le oneste opere mie mi dettero animo a parlarvi, ma non per aver fama e favori, si per dirvi la verità senza dipartirmi dal vostro vessillo.

Ecco la verità. Voi, inamorato della parte soggettiva della rivoluzione, trascuraste di troppo il mezzo e l' oggetto suo. Voi credete la idea essere la forza, e ne converrei se la diceste motrice. Ma Voi la confondete col mezzo che muove, e coll' avvenire a cui tende, e state lungi dal reale.

Io, con questa opera, incarno la IDEA nelle PERSONE e nelle COSE, portandomi con entrambe all' oggetto della nostra rigenerazione.

Il Vostro, G. C. PEROCCO.

Londra, 12 gennaio 1854.

ADDRESS

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ADDRESS OF THE SOCIETY

OF

THE FRIENDS OF ITALY.

A SOCIETY has just been formed in London under the name of the *Society of the Friends of Italy*. This Society now addresses the English public in exposition of its views and plans.

I. *What have we Englishmen to do with Italy?* This is a question often asked by those whose wish it is to cast sarcasm and contempt on such efforts as our Society proposes to make. They contrive even to give their antipathy a specious form. "Is there not," they say, "scope enough for benevolent exertion at home, that we should seek a theatre for it abroad? If we *will* be active, have we not the pauperism of our own country to deal with; have we not the chronic misery of Ireland, and a host of domestic evils besides? Why export our philanthropy to the south of Europe; why send our thoughts to the banks of the Tiber, when our hands may find plenty to do on the banks of the Thames; why spend on behalf of olive-skinned Italians at a distance aught of that collective charity which is already too little for the haggard sons and daughters of our own land?" Now all this might be very just, were charity one of those commodities that are diminished by being given away. Were it true, that the more of our sympathy we permit to overpass the limits of our island the less we have in reserve for our own British purposes, then there might be grounds for prohibiting any large outlay of interest on foreign affairs. But it is not so. Charity may have just degrees, but it has no fixed limits; it increases by multiplicity of exercise; it rebounds from object to object; and he whose comprehensive benevolence extends to what is remote loses nothing of his perception or his feeling for the wretchedness that is near. We appeal to the experience of all whether, as a general rule, it is not the same men that conduct both our domestic and our foreign enterprises of benevolence; whether the men who are foremost in well-doing at home are not also the most ready to promote any good cause abroad; and whether those who are so assiduous in quoting against us the maxim that "Charity begins at home," perverting it while they quote it, are not very often persons whose own charity stands sadly in need even of that commencement.

But were the notion true to its utmost extent that it is only by taking away from our interest in affairs at home that we can have any to bestow on affairs abroad, *we should still hold* it to be the bounden duty of English-

men to take a deep interest in the affairs of Italy. There are times, we believe, when it would be better and nobler, because it would be serving a greater principle, to submit to an interruption of all our current processes of charity, of all our questions of domestic interest, were that necessary, than to refrain from taking an active part in what is going on abroad. It has not been so arranged that, even for Englishmen, the most splendid and most imperative field of duty shall always lie in England. The historic theatre is shifted from land to land; now Spain, now Hungary, now Russia may be the scene of the grandest and most productive events; and, wherever over the surface of the earth the hand of Providence is most palpably at work, thither ought the thoughts of men most eagerly to follow, and on that spot ought their gaze to be most anxiously concentrated. If there is any common life in humanity at all, this surely is the way in which it must manifest itself. And Italy!—are there not symptoms that *there* something is going on worthy of the attention of all the rest of the world, worthy of the attention even of busy and domestic Englishmen? *Here* we are buying and selling, seeing sights, complaining of abuses, and discussing, bitterly it may be, but still freely and peacefully, remedies for this and for that form of social distress: *there*, over a soil still reeking with the blood of patriots, young men are being dragged to the scaffold and to the dungeon for thinking free thoughts, and a whole people, goaded to madness, glare fiercely on the armed foreigners that insult and overbear them, and, longing for the hour of action, sullenly gnash their teeth. In which of the two lands is the human spirit more profoundly agitated; in which is the more terrible problem working itself out? Surely, whatever are our views and prepossessions, it is for us of the one land to care something for what is happening in the other.

It is beginning to be felt that a larger and more generous principle than that of Non-intervention, at least in the wretched form in which it is at present interpreted and acted on, must preside over the mutual relations of peoples—a principle involving all that is sound and true in the so-called principle of Non-intervention, but superadding new conceptions, and providing for higher necessities and higher aspirations. It is beginning also to be felt that it is out of these national contests with which Europe has recently been convulsed, and with which it is still distracted, that this principle is to be evolved. A great problem is being solved, therefore, in these European agitations—a problem in which all nations and all men are equally interested. It is out of the conduct of the nations more immediately engaged in the struggle, according as that conduct is magnanimous and brave; and out of the thoughts and actions of the nations that look on and arbitrate, according as these thoughts and actions are just and appropriate—that the true rule of international polity will arise. To think and feel rightly in the matter of these national contests, is, therefore, the duty of all men.

After all that has been said of the theoretical Indifferentism of Englishmen towards foreign questions generally, we believe that the real cause of their inactivity in the Italian Question lies less in that than in their practical ignorance. If we *knew* the state of Italy, if we but had the actual

picture of the condition of that peninsula before our eyes, this apathy would be shaken off, and our interest in the Italian question would be all but ungovernable. The ignorance even of educated Englishmen in all that regards foreign affairs is proverbial and deplorable; and with regard to no country is this ignorance more fatally manifested than with regard to Italy. Englishmen who have travelled in the peninsula may know something of it; but of the thousands of respectable gentlemen that stay at home, busy in earning money during the day, and at ease amid their families in the evening, few know anything more of Italy than that it is a country shaped like a boot in the map, with a sunnier sky than England, and abounding in olives and singers.

What *is* Italy? Italy is a country half as large again as Great Britain, naturally one of the richest and most beautiful, and historically the most glorious, on the face of the earth; inhabited at present by upwards of twenty-four millions of human beings, as finely organised as any that the world can show, one in race, one in language, one in all the great features of national character, one in the memories, and above all in the sufferings of the past, one in aspiration towards the future. There are not greater ethnographical differences between the Italians of localities the most distant from each other than there are between the Englishmen of different English counties, or between the Frenchmen of different French departments; and what petty local jealousies did exist between Italian cities and neighbourhoods have either disappeared or are fast disappearing under the influence of a common national patriotism. These twenty-four millions of Italians are divided into seven states under separate masters. In one of these—the Lombardo-Venetian territory, counting a population of between five and six millions—a band of Germans, strangers to the soil and its people, hold the rule, maintaining it by means of barbarian soldiers, collected from central and Eastern Europe, and scattered in garrisons through the towns and cities. These foreigners, encamped in a country over which they have no right but that of force, govern it for themselves or rather for the master whom they represent, drain it of its wealth, interfere in all its social relations even to the most minute, direct its education, exercise a censorship over its books, insult and hate and maltreat its inhabitants. In the other states, the native rulers, generally of foreign descent, are, either willingly or perforce, the slaves of the same Austrian power, governing in its interest and according to its maxims. In Piedmont alone, in consequence of the recent revolutions, is there any real degree of independence or any approach to political freedom; and even now there hangs over that country the threat of Austrian invasion, unless it shall retrograde and be as it was. In the Kingdom of Naples, counting nearly six millions of inhabitants, a sovereign, appointed, as the theory is, to be the shepherd of these millions, prowls among them like a human wolf. In the Papal states, with two millions and a half of inhabitants, the special misery of ecclesiastic rule, lacerating the very heart and demoralising the very conscience of the people, is superadded to the horror of secular despotism. In Tuscany and the smaller states, it is no better. Nowhere in all Italy, save now partly among the Piedmontese,

can a man think, speak, or act, as a being made in the image of God. From one end of that noble peninsula to the other, a continuous network of foreign domination, native official tyranny in the service of the foreigner, and priestly bigotry co-operating for ends of its own, is nailed down over a prostrate and struggling people.

Let Englishmen but make the case their own. Let them imagine a fourth part of the soil of England in possession of the Czar of Russia—governed in his name by Russian functionaries, and garrisoned by soldiers in Russian uniform. Let them suppose the wealth of this portion of England drained away to fill the treasury of St. Petersburg, its young men levied to serve in the armies of the Czar in other lands, its courts of justice subjected to Russian control, its schools and colleges regulated by Russian superintendents, its literary men under Russian censorship, all its journals suppressed with the exception of an official Russian Gazette or two, its very catechisms and grammars tinctured to the Russian taste, public meetings of every kind prohibited, the streets patrolled by Russian sentinels, and every English man, woman, child, and thing at the mercy of Russian insolence. Let them farther fancy that the rest of this wretched island of Great Britain were divided into six or seven other states, governed absolutely by Dukes or Princes, the liveried servants of the Czar, and in constant communication with the court of St. Petersburg. Let them fancy that in these states also the people were nothing; that there were no free newspapers, no public meetings, no means of political activity; that society was held down from above by the pressure of military strength, and pervaded within by a remorseless system of secret police, which kept the prisons always full, and sent annually its scores of victims to the scaffold. And fancying all this, let Englishmen fancy what they would in these circumstances do. Conspire—in the name of freedom, and of all that is holy, conspire; organise, and combine, and scheme, and plot, and dig underground through the whole of England, if they could, one vast connected mine of free association; watch the ripe hour of action; and then, rising in a mass, put the torch to the ready train, and, if possible, blow Russian and Despot and all their accursed trappings and machinery out of the land together! That is what every Englishman with a soul in his body will say that Englishmen would do. That is what many even of those thoughtless Englishmen who now malign poor Italy for acting in the same manner, would be among the first to advise.

There is one portion of Great Britain to which such a supposition should come as something more than a mere fancy. There was a time when Scotland was treated as a conquered province of England, was filled with English garrisons, and governed for an English monarch by English justiciars and nobles. These English invaders were not of a different race from the invaded population; they spoke the same tongue, and many of them had near and dear kinsmen among the Scottish families. Surely this was a lighter yoke than that of the Austrians in Lombardy. And yet, it pleased the Scottish people to be discontented with it; and the struggle whereby they cast it off is justly accounted the most glorious

assage in Scottish history, and the men who acted the chief part in that truggle are justly the heroes of every Scottish heart.

And why should that which was lawful for Scotchmen once, and which would be lawful for Britons now, be unlawful for Italians? "Oh," we ear it sometimes said, "there is a difference; the Italians are not fit for reedom." Who told you that? How do you know who is fit and who s not fit for freedom? By what marks do you, a mere mortal like the est of us, consider yourself entitled to judge whether your neighbour is it to be free or not? Is it by looking at his face? Look, then, at the aces of such Italians as you meet; or turn over the leaves of a collection f European portraits, noting the faces of the Italian poets, statesmen, rtists, and philosophers, included so numerously in the list, the faces of Dante, Columbus, Michael Angelo, Tasso, and Bonaparte—and say, Are these so very evidently the features given to slaves? Is it by nference from his past history? Where is there a nation in the world hat has a history like that of the Italians, stretching back in an unbroken ine of Roman greatness through three thousand years, and identical hrough more than half of that time with the general history and govern- nent of the world? Is it by regarding the present state of his mind, and considering how he will fight for liberty, and how much he will endure n order to obtain it? Cast your eye back, then, over the last thirty ears; count the martyrs, count the exiles for Italian Independence, from 815 to 1848; see how Italy fought but the other day, and observe the nabated enthusiasm of her down-trodden populations at this hour. What proof remains yet unoffered, that the Italians are fit to be free, but his last and decisive one that they should succeed in becoming so? For his last proof, therefore, they have a right to demand a fair opportunity; nd meanwhile, it is surely competent to put the question on the other ide, "Are the Austrians their masters fit to govern?" If there are narks by which it may be known whether a man is fit to enjoy liberty, here are, doubtless, marks also by which it may be known whether a nan is fit to exercise despotism. Face and physiognomy? Look at he portraits of the Austrian Emperors! Past History? Read the Austrian annals! Present intentions? Find them in the instructions f Viennese ministers of state! Our admiration for the deep and great ualities of the German race is almost unbounded; but we protest that mong the Austrians of diplomatic history we cannot, by any species of nvestigation, detect evidence of a governing faculty a whit more respec- able than that of the Turks.

But, if all these moral considerations should be insufficient to convince s that we, as Englishmen, are bound in charity and in rectitude to take n interest in Italian affairs, there may be a blast from another trumpet. *f England does not see that she has anything to do with Italy, Italy sees hat she has a great deal to do with England.* We allude not to her nterest in us as one of the great powers of Europe, we allude not to her nterest in us as buyers of her goods and contractors for her railways; we llude to this new and very warm interest she is taking in us as perverse anderers from the true Christian fold, as heretics who have been going

down to the pit, generation after generation, since the days of Cranmer, Knox, and Luther.

Truly, one knows not whether to laugh or to be angry at this new demonstration. On the one hand, when we consider from whom this demonstration comes—from a Pontiff who, a few months ago, was a fugitive from his own capital, bereft of his temporal sovereignty by the solemn and unanimous decree of his own subjects, and supported only by foreign governments, our own included, who had no more to do with the matter than the Emperor of China has to do with the salary of the British Lord Chancellor—when we consider this, the change in the position of parties is almost as ludicrous as the trick in a pantomime. On the other hand, when we consider with what formal gravity on the part of the Papacy the demonstration was made and is persevered in; with what frank simplicity this Church, which will not permit to Englishmen an open Bible and hardly an act of private Protestant worship within its Italian dominions, sends us over missionaries and bishops, and quotes our glorious principle of toleration as a reason why we should receive them; finally, what expenditure of public and Parliamentary trouble, if not, as some think, permanent national injury, this Papal policy has cost and may yet cost us—when we consider all this, we confess that our sense of the historic humour of the proceeding, is modified by the feeling that we are the passive parties, and that the joke, if it be one, is palpably at our expense.

And how do we read the lesson? It is not for us, in this place, to discuss the manner in which, within the boundaries of England, the Papal policy should be met. Our feeling is that on no account should any desire to retaliate lead us to take a really retrograde step; and that, if the Pope wishes to preach to us for our good, as doubtless he sincerely does, he should have as free license to do so as our English laws allow. But there is another aspect of the question strictly within our scope. We may view this Papal policy with regard to England, as an element for determining what should be the counter-policy of England with regard to Italy. The Pope is two things—he is the Ecclesiastical head of Catholic Christendom; and he is the Temporal Despot of Central Italy. We regard him here only in the second capacity; and we say that at once the fairest, the easiest, and the severest counter policy we can devise against the Pope, if we seek to devise such at all, will be a policy having not England but Italy for its scene of operations. When a country is invaded by a military force, it is sometimes accounted a noble thought in the general of the invaded country to change a defensive into an aggressive war; in other words, to leave his countrymen to defend themselves as they best can for a little, and march direct across the frontier against the capital of the invading government. That soon brings the invading army back. So Agathocles, when the Carthaginians had defeated him in Sicily, crossed the sea and appeared in the neighbourhood of Carthage. Let us imitate this strategy. Let us meet the Pope where he is weakest and will feel it most—in his own dominions. Let us make war—not a war of arms, but that kind of war which all acknowledge to

be legitimate, a war of intellect, of sentiment, and of political action—on the Papal misgovernment of Central Italy. Who knows what knots of spiritual error are bound round that temporal root? Who knows what new epoch of emancipation, moral, intellectual, and religious, might have dawned for the confederacy of European nations had that severance between the spiritual and the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, which was spontaneously and unanimously decreed by the Roman People, who alone had the right to decree it, been allowed to take effect? Here, without any effort of ours, but by a natural and legitimate course of events proper to Italy itself, a great Reformation, such as we Englishmen were supposed to have been praying for and longing for, was peacefully and harmoniously consummated. The thing was done to our hands; toleration, freedom of speech, religious and intellectual liberty, were let in where they had been before unknown; the worm-eaten archives of the Inquisition were tossed into the light of the sun; and Rome, from a cage of priests, because a corporation of citizens. And what did we do on that day of Providence after our own hearts? The vote of our people was bold and immediate. "Mazzini and Italy" was the universal cry. But our government thought differently. Our government did not know Mazzini; our government rather liked the Pope than otherwise, and spoke of him as a generous man to whom his subjects had been ungrateful; above all, our government recoiled from extremes. Accordingly when the French interfered to restore the Pope, it was with the official acquiescence of England. Thus Italy lost all she had won; and an opportunity was let slip for settling who knows what large problem in the civilisation of the whole earth. Verily we have had our reward!

II. *What can we, as Englishmen, do for Italy?* This is a question on which we have already touched; it remains, however, to show, a little more in detail, what features there are in the present which should induce us to give to our interest in the Italian Question some practical shape, and what the special means are by which our Society proposes to facilitate this end.

There are two stages in the growth of ideas such as that of the national Independence of Italy. The first is when, uttered and preached by a few solitary thinkers, they do not find a sufficient echo in the heart of the masses; when, in short, they may be a prophecy, but are not a reality, a fact. As spectators of the growth of such ideas, we can then admire, and sympathise with them; but we cannot act for them. We must be prudent and preach prudence, even while our souls are moved; lest we should, by ill-timed encouragement, provoke to premature attempts and to bootless sacrifices. But there is a second stage, which follows on the first at a greater or a less interval. It is when the idea formerly preached by the few has grown to be the hope of the many,—when the martyr of today is replaced by the combatant of to-morrow,—when a people torn and mangled by brute force, decimated of its best men through the scaffold, the dungeon, and exile, still, in that weak and ungeneralled state, carries on an incessant struggle, generals itself, or contents itself with captains

and bold leaders of bands, and through a long series of repeated and ever stronger attempts, marches on and on to victory. When such a stage has been incontestably reached, then it is the imperative duty of all who believe in the oneness of the human race, who recognise the noble as it is manifested in their fellow beings, and who profess to be the worshippers of truth and justice; it is the imperative duty of all such to stand up and bear witness that the cause for which this people is contending and bleeding is a righteous and just one, to protest against its enemies, and to shorten as much as possible and render as bloodless as possible that struggle which the law of History declares to be unavoidable.

This second stage has evidently arrived for the national cause of Italy. A while ago it was the cry of shameless men:—"The Italians do not desire liberty; they are very happy as it is; were it not for a few conspirators, and demagogues, and hot young spirits, they and the Austrians, and the Pope, and the King of Naples, and all the rest of them, would get on very amicably together." This was always fundamentally a lie, but, even had it been the truth, what impression ought such a fact to have produced on us? We should then certainly have been absolved from all duty of actively participating in the cause of Italian Independence. It is not for one people to force liberty upon another; liberty is too grand a boon to be forced on those that do not feel the want of it. But surely it had been no cause for congratulation had it been so. It had surely rather been a cause for shame and sorrow that a people once so great as the Italians had fallen so low; that a people with eyes so bright and brows so majestic should have hearts so craven; that a people so gifted and impassioned with the universal genius of song and beauty should have suffered so total an eradication of all moral principle. The Italians happy!—to those who had flaunted that phrase in our faces, our reply should have been, "We despise them for being happy; would to God they were once well miserable!" And should we have seen a few men, young or old, miserable amid the general happiness, melancholy exceptions to the general mirth; should we have discerned here and there in the towns or amid the mountains of Italy a solitary man or two still nursing the dream of liberty, still thinking the thought of Dante, still gnawed by the pain that leaves not the noble heart, and striving to communicate that pain to others—how then ought we to have greeted such men? With the name of conspirators, demagogues, hot and insubordinate spirits? Despicable they who had done so! It would have been the duty of all to sympathise with those men, to admire them, to pity them; to moderate certainly, if possible, their excessive impetus towards action, and to prevent them from rash enterprises which would but sacrifice themselves and others and compromise their cause; but, had that been impossible, to follow them at least to the scaffold with respect, and to shed a tear over their unfortunate tombs. As each martyr changed his place above, for his place beneath, the Italian earth, our thought should have been "One more for Italy." And, as these martyrdoms became frequent and numerous, we should have marked the omen with interest, hailing every fresh symptom that the struggle was becoming

ıd the championship of the national cause being transferred from
uals to the people. This is the law of all heroic movements.
was a time in the struggle for the Independence of Scotland when
e representative of that struggle, the one man of mark in all Scot-
at had not taken oaths, double and triple, to the English Edward,
e western chieftain Wallace. Yet Scottish Independence was won
ıeless, and the legitimacy of the process no one gainsays. Extend,
ıe parallel to Italy. Strange that men should read history with
eyes than they observe contemporary events; that they should
and depreciate in the present those very kinds and ways of action
form all that is poetic and admirable in the past! Success, suc-
still the test; the worshipful thing is still the *fait accompli!*
unately, however, that old cry of the happiness of the Italians in
lavery, always essentially a lie, is now a lie convicted. Never
ıan it be repeated, except by a sheer exercise of mendacious impu-
The cause of Italian Independence has openly and incontestably
l its second stage. Since 1815 the Italian people have been
protesting against the arrangement imposed on the peninsula by
ıgress of Vienna—have always pleaded and published their claims
onality. The attempts to assert these claims, in fact, at first put
by force, have been regularly gaining in power and unanimity.
ımorable years 1821, 1831, and 1848 are epochs along which the
of the cause in the Italian mind may be most easily measured.
etween these epochs, and connecting them together in a less visible
r, is to be traced a series of local and partial demonstrations,
g the propagation and acceptance of the national thought in almost
district of Italy. The forces of the misguided Italian princes were
sufficient to maintain the system of despotism; the strength of
a was then required, in addition, for that purpose; more recently,
ıis has been insufficient, and the recreant might of France has been
into the arena. A combination of all cabinets and all forces is
arcely powerful enough to keep down, for what everybody feels to
a transitory period, the strong Italian spirit. From Sicily to
the cry is one—Liberty, Independence, Nationality. There have
ıousands of martyrs, thousands of exiles. The popular will has been
ng as to compel Princes and Pope into the hypocrisy of liberalism.
med by civilisation in this their new character, Pope and Princes
ıbandoned as soon as they deserted its cause. We have seen a
lying from the metropolis of the Christian world, his thunders of
munication falling scatheless and unnoticed, his tiara not finding a
defender among his subjects. We have seen Austrian armies
away from the Italian soil by almost unarmed populations; we
een a French army defied and held in check by the valour and the
ıorised military skill of the first of Italian cities. Whatever diffe-
about the means, there is not a single Italian writer of high repute,
ingle intellectual man in Italy that does not belong really to the
ıal Party. In spite of military terrorism — in spite of all the
ns of a police, ecclesiastical, secular, internal, and foreign—

the struggle yet continues. The regular press is overpowered and extinguished; a clandestine press rises up, as if by enchantment, which no police can put down! A word is whispered by leaders—"Do not smoke;" not a single cigar is seen in the streets of populous towns, except in the mouths of gensdarmes and hired spies! A military foreign chief walks into a theatre; instantly boxes, pit, and every other part of the house are deserted by the spectators!

The cause of Italian Independence is, therefore, just; it has reached its full tide; and the people are ripe for its final victory. Bayonets—foreign bayonets, French bayonets—alone prevent this result. Remove other foreign troops from the soil of Italy, leaving the Italians to deal with the Austrians, and Italy would be a free nation ere many months should have passed.

Is the inertness of Englishmen *now* in this cause to be forgiven? Are we, the protectors of the black race, to see unmoved one of the most renowned portions of the white race trampled on and given over as a prey to physical force? And this even were it not true that we have a personal interest in the matter; were it not true that the Power that mainly rules in Italy pretends also to rule over *our* minds; were it not true that it is chiefly in Italy that what remains of the great and all-interesting problem of Freedom of Conscience is to be worked out; were it not true that Rome is the centre of that only partially-broken web of error and corruption which still entangles multitudes; were it not true that there is that in Italy which proves that, were she once emancipated, she might again start forward as of old in the career of humanity, and amply discharge, by new intellectual, moral, and political service, all her debt to the assisting nations?

But what *can* we do to assist Italy? Many things.

In the first place we can take care to be well-informed in all that pertains to Italy; we can lay it as a duty upon ourselves, individually and collectively, to acquire and maintain a *competent knowledge of Italian affairs*. The great impediment, as we have already said, to any efficient activity on the part of Great Britain in the question of Italian Independence is the ignorance of British men and women as to the real state and views of the Italian people. Moreover, believing as we do that thoroughly correct action in any matter whatever must be based on correct knowledge, our earnest desire is that whatever course of conduct Englishmen may adopt with regard to Italy should proceed, not on a few generalities and never so amiable enthusiasms, but on as thorough and intimate an acquaintance with the whole case as it is possible for Englishmen to attain. We desire that Englishmen should know as many particulars as possible respecting the physical, moral, intellectual, and religious condition of Italy and its inhabitants. We desire that Englishmen should find themselves able to be mentally present, as it were, in the various centres of Italian life and industry—in Rome, in Milan, in Turin, in Genoa, in Venice, in Florence, in Lucca, in Naples; not present as the mere tourist and pleasure-seeker is, but present as strict judges of what they see—as social and political critics. We desire that Englishmen should

have before them all the materials for an impartial decision of the question as between the Italian people and their rulers; that they should see by actual and numerous specimens the nature and working of the Austrian rule in Lombardy, the nature and working of the Papal rule in the Roman States, and the nature and working of the Neapolitan rule in the Kingdom of the Sicilies. We desire that, of every Italian incident reported in the newspapers, or not reported there—whether that incident tells in favour of the one side or in favour of the other—they should be able to form a literally accurate, and not a vague or distorted, impression. In short, we desire that the real and whole truth of the Italian case should be submitted to the honest judgment and investigation of the British public; confident that then the right enthusiasms and the right generalities will attain the sway which we seek for them.

Again, founded on this correct knowledge, and accompanying its growth, there may be *an expression of national opinion*. With all our insular habits, and all our indifference towards foreign affairs, England is not yet so far sunk in reputation as not to be listened to when she is evidently in earnest. Recent events, indeed, and the apathy of our government have robbed England of much of her *prestige* among the nations. Russia, and not England, is now universally regarded on the Continent as the country whose will determines the balance. During the recent struggles in Hungary and Italy, English residents abroad saw their personal respectability evidently diminishing in consequence of the impression produced by the conduct of the English government at home. Still Britain has some moral power left. Underneath the opinion of her government, and legally capable of an independent expression through the press, through conversation in social circles, and through public meetings, lies the opinion of the mass of the people. That, we believe, is, in the main, right and generous. There was something stoutly English, though the demonstration came too late to be of much avail, in the cheers for Kossuth and Hungary, and those others for Mazzini and Italy, which rang through many a public hall in our large towns, not long ago. It is to be hoped that the fervour then excited has not cooled down, and that, on a fitting occasion being given, it may again, and more promptly than before, blaze forth in emphatic manifestation. And though, if bereft of its due outlet through the special organ of our government, this enthusiasm of the British people cannot do all it might, still even alone it may do something. Even a bully trembles and desists in the presence of spectators who show by words or by gestures their scorn for what he is about; and even the boldest man finds his courage nerved to a higher pitch by the expressed sympathy of those whom he honours. And, to some extent, the same is true of governments and nations. So firm is our faith in the necessary inter-dependence of all parts of this physical and moral universe to which we belong, and in the power even of silent thought and feeling, much more of opinion strongly expressed, to find a way for itself into the general fabric of things, that we can believe a time might arise when, were we Britons, standing on our own soil, only *wishing* as vehemently the

freedom of Italy, as the Italians, standing on theirs, are ready to act for it, the very substance of the earth would lend itself as a conveying-medium between us, and the wish of the Island would shoot, as a decisive stimulus, through the act of the Peninsula.

Feeling and talk, however, are small matters; and he who, deeply moved by any wrong of which he hears or reads, does not avail himself of whatever way may be open of showing his feeling in appropriate action—nay, who does not strive to create a way, if none exists—is but a sentimental poltroon. The last and chief duty, therefore, incumbent on England in the matter of Italy, is *a course of appropriate national action*. It is not much that individuals, or even that corporate portions of the community, can do directly and immediately towards this end. Something, indeed, may be done negatively. British capitalists of honourable feeling may refrain from lending their money to the despotic Italian Governments, or to any that are in league with them; and British public opinion may exert itself to multiply such cases. On the whole, however, the *action*, properly so called, that is legally possible for Englishmen upon Italy resolves itself chiefly into this—action upon Italy through a prior constitutional action upon our own British Government. In international affairs, the people may think and speak in their own name; the power ultimately to decide the mode of direct action on other nations—the power, by ship or diplomatic message, to convey to Austria, to Russia, or to Portugal, as the case may be, the *Yea* or *Nay* of England in any matter England cares for—rests with the Government. It is by constitutional action on the Parliament and Government of this country, therefore, that we can carry our national sympathies with the Italian cause to any effective practical issue. And, as preliminary to this, it is above all necessary that we should know what our Government is spontaneously doing or inclined to do in the matter. It is necessary that Englishmen should be able, as far as possible, to strip the veil of secrecy from the diplomatic conduct of their Government in the Italian question; that, in a question so momentous, and in which to be dilatory is to be useless, they should not be left merely to form their opinion of the past behaviour of their government from Blue Books a year old, but should have a sharp and clear insight into what Government is doing or undoing from moment to moment. It is necessary that, while all England may be enthusiastically saying *Nay* to the policy of despotism in Italy, Englishmen should have the guarantee of actual knowledge to convince them that, in passing through the organ of their Government, this message is not frittered into something that may sound liker a *Yea* in the ears of foreign Cabinets. Thus informed of what is actually done or meditated by Government, Englishmen may work by the usual means upon Parliament, and work less in the dark. Opportunities for Parliamentary discussion may be made and turned to the best account. And much, very much remains to be done in this way. How finally the will of England in the matter of Italy ought to take shape in Parliamentary decisions and in Ministerial dispatches, is a large and weighty question. It is hardly for us, at this stage, to pursue the inquiry so far. This only we

ll say that we cannot believe that circumstances are such that Britain, a nation, may not, with all due diplomatic prudence and all due zeal peace, find means for acting in behalf of Italy more peremptorily, fe liberally, more honestly, and more creditably than she has hitherto e. Even on the narrow platform of the Non-interference principle much could be effected! The time may come when again in the rse of European events the Austrians may be driven from the Italian by Italian courage; when again the foot of an intrepid Roman nvir may be trampling, amid the acclamations of all Italy, on the of the secular Papacy. Then England may do a noble work and eve her former error. As a strong diplomatic word before might ibly have kept the French from the shores of Italy, so a similarly l thing might have a like effect again. Thus, were it but by mere ference in behalf of Non-interference—by mere English resolve that should have fair play—England might do much for Italy. Only e rule of procedure, whatever it is, be honest, consistent, and earnest comes a British Statesman; and let Britain be prepared to support rule with the whole weight of her influence, her conscience, and her cter.

e *Society of the Friends of Italy* has been formed to assist in carry- ut these views. To promote a correct knowledge of the Italian on, to stimulate the expression of just public opinion on the Italian on, and to urge the Parliament and the Government of the country p propriate course of national action in the Italian question—such e ims of this Society. It purposes nothing but what is strictly - It proposes to act upon Italy by stirring up England to act ta ly. It assumes no right of direct operations upon the land in which s an interest. Its funds are not to be expended in subsidies for r in any other way contrary to the spirit and habits of Englishmen. to pronounce nothing, to dictate nothing, as to the form or forms o nal government which it might be desirable to see set up in Italy. u estion of the future internal organisation of Italy, it regards as g ng exclusively to the Italian people. It is strictly a society of sh men, working, within the English territory, and according to sh methods, for the freedom and independence of the Italian nation. e a peal, then, to the British public in behalf of this Society. We l to all classes. We appeal to working men; we appeal to the wealthy; peal to men in stations of official influence; we appeal to journalists men of letters. We appeal to clergymen, we appeal to laymen; we al to Churchmen, we appeal to Dissenters. Confident as we are that u estion of Italy is one which may call forth a more general, a more national enthusiasm in Great Britain than any other foreign question could be named, it is our earnest wish to avoid, in the constitution of Society, all that is sectarian or exclusive. We invite all who can co- rate with us at once to do so; we invite all who think they can co- rate with us to *try* to do so. Nor do we ask too much. We do not that you, as Englishmen, should devote your days and nights to the

POSTSCRIPT.—MR. GLADSTON

Since the preceding address was written, an event
tance as regards the history of the Italian question in t
publication of the letters of the Right Honourable W.
on the State prosecutions of Naples. We earnestly re
to the attention of all who shall chance to read the pr
find, stated in the most exact and minute manner by
facts as these—that there are at least between 15,000 an
in the Neapolitan States on political charges; that m
Parliament elected a year or two ago, under a Consti
King of Naples, are now either in prison or in exile; t
use means the most atrocious to convict those against v
descending even to the wilful forgery of false evidence,
possible only among the basest of mankind; that th
prisoners in the Neapolitan states is characterised by a
and that the men so treated are not, as might be suppo
tionists, but, in many cases, to use Mr. Gladstone's
and character in their country as Lord John Russell
are here, and far more conservative in their politica
Graham or Lord Aberdeen. The tenor of Mr. Glads
may be judged of from the following specimen:—"It
corruption in low quarters, not occasional severity, th
incessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law, b
over and maintain it. It is such violation of human
on for the purpose of violating every other law unwritte
it is the wholesale persecution of virtue when united wi
such a scale that entire classes may with truth be sai
Government is in bitter and cruel as well as utterly ill
nation really lives and moves and forms the main-spring
provement; it is the awful profanation of public religi
the governing powers, with the violation of every m
fear and vengeance; it is the perfect prostitution of th
it, under veils only too threadbare and transparent, the
and clumsiest forgeries, got up wilfully and deliberate

No. 1.] [3*d*.

"PEOPLES' INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE"

"TRACTS."

THE

SWISS QUESTION:

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF

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

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THE

SWISS QUESTION.

A GREAT question is now being agitated in Switzerland, which, in consequence of the special position in which the Treaties of 1815 have placed that country, may become at any moment an European question. On the one side we have a friendly nation—a nation which has played an important part in the history of civilization, which has taken an active part in the great movement of religious reform, and which has held up to us all the example of commercial freedom—indicating by the votes of a majority of its population, influenced by weighty reasons which we shall presently explain, a desire to modify and ameliorate its constitution; on the other side we have foreign governments, the French and Austrian predominant amongst others, expressing their intention of preventing any such constitutional modification. It is important that the English public should not be taken by surprise upon this question, as they have been with regard to other recent international questions, for want of positive and accurate information.

The Swiss question is not understood in England. We believe that it has never been clearly stated and defined by any one of the organs of the periodical press. The agitation that has, especially for the last few years, prevailed in this little country so important to Europe, is an acknowledged fact. It shows itself at one time under the form of a local insurrection, of a sudden radical change effected in one of the Cantons which constitute the Confederation; at another time under that of an armed attack upon one Canton by another: and yet no one has hitherto inquired whether all these febrile movements may not indicate an organic disease seated somewhere in the very centre of the State, beyond all immediate or visible causes. These movements are, according to one party, the outbreaks of the democratic element: that is true; but how is it that the democracy of the Canton of Vaud or of Berne is so decidedly hostile to the democracy of the small Cantons, Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden? According to others, they are owing to the plots of the Jesuits: that also is true; but how is it that, in a country free since 1308,* a few Jesuits are able to excite civil war, and to reduce populations naturally peaceful to the sole resource of an appeal to arms? Is there in this republican land no public opinion, no legally represented majority able to find a pacific solution of the questions which time brings to the surface? Is there no central moderating power which, when that public opinion is once proved to exist, gives to it the force of law, leaving the career still free for further progress? These questions, we repeat, have never been either solved or even suggested in this country. English journalists, and English statesmen also, we fear, have persisted in judging each isolated fact by itself according to the inspiration of the moment, and in considering the condition of Switzerland in detail only. They have acted like the geologist who should attempt to study the nature of a volcano by the smoking fissures scattered at the base, instead of ascending to the seat of the fire, to the central crater. As a natural consequence they have not succeeded. And hence, from this absolute ignorance of the real and vital conditions of the country, arises the absolute nullity of English diplomacy in Switzerland.

* It was in this year that the three small Cantons Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden, by their victorious insurrection against the tyrannical government of the Emperor Albert I. of the House of Hapsburg, laid the first stone of the Swiss League. Lucerne joined them in 1332, Zurich in 1351, Zug and Glaris in 1352, and Berne in 1353. These *eight ancient Cantons* successfully repulsed the Austrian invasions, and created, by the celebrated battles of Sempach and Noefels, the military renown of Switzerland. The number of confederated Cantons was increased to thirteen by the admission of Solothurm and Fribourg in 1481, Basle and Schaffausen in 1501, and Appenzell in 1513. At a later period, subsequently to the religious movement of the Reformation, were added the other Cantons.

This, however, is the case with English diplomacy everywhere except in France and the Iberian Peninsula. The absence of a regulating principle, of a settled general policy founded on the progressive principle which constitutes British nationality, deprives British agents abroad of all initiative—of all power for good. Inert, passive, having no high political mission to fulfil, they do not feel the necessity of searching into the national questions of the countries in which they reside. Events surprise them unprepared; and, in general, they cannot even seize their true spirit when they have taken place. The superiority which a predetermined object, and a plan perseveringly studied, ripened, and developed, give to the Absolutist Powers is indisputable, and is preparing the way for very grave consequences, very deplorable for Britain.

The special case of Switzerland, to which we now call public attention, is doubly serious. Not only is there in question in that country one of those great principles of national independence and liberty which no other State, acknowledging for itself a mission of progress in Europe, can permit to be violated without degradation, but the actual peace of Europe is at stake. The importance of Switzerland is far beyond what might be imagined from its population of 2,000,000 upon a surface of less than 15,000 English square miles. Its position is a central one between France, Germany, and Italy. From the great strategetical importance of its territory, and by virtue of the stipulations of the Treaties of Vienna, which we shall have occasion presently to notice, its frontier cannot be encroached upon by one power without others immediately intervening to guarantee and secure their own. Could one even suppose an intervention on the part of foreign Powers acting not in hostility to, but in *combination* with, each other, and were this country willing to resign itself to the disgrace of being a passive eye witness of the perpetration, in the very heart of Europe, of a crime similar to that of Cracow, it would not have the opportunity of so doing? The pretext for non-interference in the case of Cracow, which was afforded by the rapid consummation of the foul deed before there was time to take a step towards preventing it, would be wanting in the case of Switzerland. Animated by an unconquerable spirit of liberty and of reaction against the foreigner, imbued with military habits and of acknowledged bravery, and backed in the midst of their Alps by insurmountable positions, the Swiss would, without doubt, prolong the struggle against all French or Austrian intervention; and, answering by the three branches of their population—French, Italian, and German—to the sympathies of the numerous malcontents of those three nations, they would be able, if need were, to establish, as a means of defence, three centres of insurrection in the very heart of the attacking powers. It is impossible, in thinking of all this, not to be seized with a sort of terror at beholding the passive improvidence of a policy which, from love of peace, anticipates none of the causes of war, and which forgets that war cannot break out in Europe without Great Britain being in some way or other involved in it.

The question which agitates Switzerland is a national question. The want of a solution to this national question is the cause, we will not say of all the secondary differences that agitate the country, but of the irregular, illegal, and dangerous manner in which parties seek to decide them. There does exist in Switzerland a public opinion, a majority capable of solving them pacifically, progressively; but this majority has no legal representative: there exists no central power able to give the force of law to its decrees, nor is it possible to constitute any such power. The federal compact given to Switzerland in 1815, under the influence of foreign Powers sitting at Vienna, excludes that possibility. Since that epoch, especially during the last seventeen years, all those in Switzerland who truly love their country have called for the abrogation of this compact, and for the organization of something more central,—more national. The Powers oppose this. Whether the Powers, even by the strict letter of their own Treaties, would be released

from such guarantee upon a revision by the Diet of the compact of 1815, is a question which has been raised in the official communications between Messrs. Ochsenbein and Bois le Comte. This is not, however, a point which we propose to discuss here: we are willing to assume that the Powers did succeed, by the Treaties of Vienna, in forcing Switzerland into the position in which they declare that she is placed with regard to them. And on this position we raise the question of RIGHT. The inviolability of Switzerland was guaranteed by them in consequence only of the existence of such compact; they threaten to withdraw that guarantee, the day that compact is annulled: and we have lately seen their representatives declare, in their official notes * addressed to the Directory of Berne, that the good understanding between Switzerland and the Powers would be assured so long as there was no infraction of the compact, and no longer. It matters not that since 1815 thirty-two years have ripened the tendency to draw closer the national union, and have placed the compact at variance with the moral and material wants of the country. It matters not that the want of a national authority condemns to perpetual combats and violence those who have no tribunal before which they can settle their differences. This state of anarchy, and consequently of weakness, pleases the Powers allied for the enslavement of nations. It helps them to throw discredit on the sole republican flag that exists in Europe; it serves to ensure to them, whenever they may desire it, a pretext for invasion, and to enable them to maintain in a state of absolute impotence one of the most important countries, strategetically speaking, in Europe. Here is the very heart of the Swiss question.

Switzerland is a confederation of republics; and we have only to pronounce the words *federal republics* to suggest to the mind the idea of a double series of legally recognised rights and duties—the one appertaining to *each* of the States or localities which form the Confederation; the other to the whole: the first defining and circumscribing the sphere of activity of individuals as citizens of the different States; the second defining that of the same individuals as citizens of the common country: the former settled by the representatives of *each* State; the latter by the representatives of the *whole* country. Nothing of the kind takes place in Switzerland. The States, or Cantons as they are called, are governed by authorities,† emanating more or less directly, more or less democratically, from the populations of the Cantons. Switzerland—the Confederation—has no representatives of its own. There is a central legislative body or parliament, called a Diet; but it is composed of the delegates of *each* Canton, chosen not by the people of Switzerland, but by the Great Council of *each* Canton. There is an Executive Federal Government called a Vorot, which is in no manner however the choice of the nation: it is by turns the State Council of one of the three Cantons—Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, within which the Diet assembles alternately for two years at a time. The cantonal spirit then is alone represented in Switzerland; the national spirit has no voice.

Each of the Cantons sends to the Diet two delegates, who together have only one vote. This sole vote is given alike to all the Cantons, whatever be their importance, extent, or population—the burdens of the Cantons being meanwhile distributed according to the number of inhabitants. Zurich‡ has 224,150 inhabitants, and pays more than 77,000 francs taxes; she sends nearly 4,000 men to the Federal army. Zug counts but 14,710 inhabitants: she pours into the general treasury only about 2500 francs;

* See the note of M. Guizot at the end, by which M. Bois le Comte's official communications with the Directory have been authorized and regulated.

† The Great Councils and the Little Councils: the former possessed of the legislative, the latter of the executive power.

‡ See the Statistical Table at the end, giving the population, language, and religion of each Canton.

her contingent is but 250 men. Zug and Zurich have each one voice in the Diet. Berne reckons 357,710 souls, and pays about 92,000 francs into the Federal treasury; she furnishes at least 4600 soldiers. Uri has but 13,00 inhabitants, pays less than 1200 francs contributions, and sends some 30 soldiers to the Federal troops. Berne and Uri have each one voice in the Diet;* and so of the other Cantons. We have only to imagine the small Cantons uniting for a purpose: and we arrive at the result of a minority of 500,000 souls giving law to a majority of more than 1,500,000. A still smaller figure is sufficient to check all deliberation, and to prevent a majority from being formed. This is what happens every year in all important questions.

But there is yet more. As if the power of the Cantons were not sufficiently assured by this vice of the Federal representation, the system of *instructions*, or imperative mandates, steps in to prevent the chance of a national inspiration making its way to the heart of some one of the representatives whom the Cantons send to the Diet. The deputy is strictly bound by the instructions given him by the Great Council of the Canton which sends him; his heart, his understanding, his love of his country, abdicate their influence at the threshold of the hall of assembly. Discussion cannot enlighten him; neither eloquence nor the most powerful appeal of his compatriots can move him; he is there only as a machine charged to repeat the *yes* and *no* of his constituents. If any subject present itself on which his instructions say nothing, he has no other resource but to reserve the matter for reference to his Great Council for further instructions. He will return hereafter with their *yes* or *no*. Were the enemy at the gates—had a threat of invasion been made in the interval between the giving the *instructions* and the meeting of the Diet—were Switzerland on the point of becoming the battle-field of two of the Powers who have guaranteed its neutrality—that would not prevent the adjournment of the decision. We need only look back to 1798, or to 1813, to find examples of this indecision, when in the first case the French armies, and in the second the allied forces, violated the Swiss territory.

We think it useless to enter into further details. Every man of sense must see that there is in the constitution of the so-called central power only a second exercise of the cantonal sovereignty, and that a national inspiration can only make its way on the supposition that a majority, not of the Swiss people, which would be saying nothing, but of the Cantons, should abdicate, in an impulse of patriotic enthusiasm, all local spirit, all habitual jealousy, all partiality for interests which the very vices of the constitution have implanted and nurtured, and should rise to a high and holy feeling for the interests of their common country, for independence, and for Swiss progress. By any one acquainted with the human heart such a hope will be felt to be realizable only in very exceptional moments; and such moments must be the more rare, as differences of language and religion raise very real barriers between Canton and Canton. If there exists a country in Europe where the whole government should have been organized with a view to promote union, without the least fear of depriving local liberties and rights of indispensable securities, it is Switzerland. There, local life needs no legislative encouragement to show itself powerful and indomitable in what ought really to pertain to it; supported by historical tradition, by the manner in which the Cantons one after the other voluntarily entered the Confederation, resting upon diversities as vital as those which we have just indicated, it runs no possible danger. The activity of the cantonal element in Switzerland might with perfect safety and ought to be harmonized with the idea of nationality; no one there thinks of suppressing it, and it would be impossible if it were wished.

* The vices of the compact were ably developed seventeen years ago in the popular little work of the Pastor T. Bornhauser, entitled "Trenherz und Schweitzerbart."

The word Unity, as opposed to Federalism, which a daily paper has just taken upon itself to inscribe on the banner of the Swiss reformers,* has never been once pronounced or even dreamt of by a single patriot.

We have remarked that it is sufficient for the small Cantons, representing at most a third of the Swiss population, to come to an understanding on any point, in order to give the law to the other two-thirds, and perpetually to hinder the adoption of any measure called for by the great majority of the nation. Those acquainted with Switzerland know too well to which side this minority, converted by the compact of 1815 into a factitious majority, habitually leans. The population of the small Cantons—Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, &c.—for the most part Catholic, are carefully kept in almost absolute ignorance by the clergy and a few magnates or rich men of the country; they do not know how to read; and, if they did, they would read only what the priest approved. Having for the most part no manufactures and, leading principally the life of herdsmen and shepherds, they have scarcely any contact with the great Cantons; and as the right of *free establishment*—the right for every Swiss to locate himself in any part of the national territory he may choose—does not exist, it is easy for the authorities of any Canton to prevent the lengthened residence on their territory of such inhabitants of the progressive Cantons as are suspected of preaching large and innovating principles. Fribourg is given up to Jesuitic influence. Neufchatel is Prussian†, and brings to the Diet the policy of Berlin. With such elements it becomes impossible, under the present system, ever to arrive at national unity of views. Thanks to this state of things, the foreign Powers thrust themselves unperceived into every important deliberation. They have not to intimidate or corrupt the central government of a compact body of two millions of men; they address themselves to the Cantons individually—to the small Cantons especially, now with threats, now with the bait of some petty concession which they desire, or with the promise of support in some question affecting their interests. The military capitulations,‡ the ecclesiastical concessions to Rome, the establishment of the Jesuits—all that is now the disgrace of the country, or the source of its disorders, was obtained in this way. When, in 1834, the notes of the foreign Ambassadors—backed, we feel ashamed to say, by the support of the English Ambassador, Mr. Morier—demanded and obtained a flagrant violation of the right of asylum, in the expulsion *en masse* of the Italian, German, and Polish exiles, the Powers had not to apply to a national government—for such there was none—a national government would have rejected their demand with dignity, for all Switzerland then thrilled with generous indignation: they applied to the Grand Council of a Canton, which happened at that period to be the Vorort, or depositary for the time, of the Federal authority. That Canton was Zurich. Calculating the impediments that might be thrown in the way of the exportation of its silks, influenced by an entirely local party, and led away by a feeling of

* See a leader in the *Times* of July 15, surprising for its insolence and untruthfulness, and which one would almost say had been dictated by the Austrian Embassy—so completely does it aim at falsifying the question and deceiving the public as to the true character of the threatened intervention.

† The principality of Neufchatel, devolving by inheritance upon the royal family of Prussia in 1707, was, nevertheless, added by the Allied Powers to the Helvetic Confederation in 1815, although still remaining Prussian, and governed by a nominee of the Crown; because, from its complete separation from Prussia itself, it would be, in case of war, at once at the mercy of France, and also because the absolutist Powers saw that they should thereby acquire another means of influence in the councils of the Confederation.

‡ The term "military capitulations" signifies the enrolment of Swiss in the military service of foreign governments. Six or seven Swiss regiments are at the present moment to be found in the service of the despotic Governments of Rome and Naples. They are raised exclusively from the Catholic Cantons.

reaction against Berne (whose behaviour was nobly hospitable), it yielded. This—we speak of the reaction against Berne—is, in fact, another example of the sad but inevitable effect of the singular organization imposed on Switzerland by the Compact of 1815. By refusing to Switzerland a capital, and by vesting the Federal Executive in three Cantons alternately for two years each, an antagonism has been created between Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne, which destroys all chance of unity and stability in the system of government. One has only to observe the policy followed by the Vorort sitting, for instance, at Berne, to foretel the opposite policy which Zurich or Lucerne will follow when the central authority passes into their hands.

The end, then, which the Powers proposed to themselves in 1815—the disunion and permanent weakness of Switzerland—has been completely attained. Cantonality is the only element that possesses legal life: the nation has been suppressed. There is not even uniformity of coins, weights, or measures in Switzerland. Twenty-four or twenty-five* different legislations cross and jostle each other in the heart of this little country; and there exists no high Federal tribunal of appeal with power to settle disputes between Federal authorities and Cantons, or between Canton and Canton, or to adjudicate in the case of individual Swiss subjects complaining of civil or criminal injustice at the hands of the local authorities. Whilst Switzerland is justly admired for its freedom of commerce with surrounding countries, a multitude of tolls hampers the internal circulation of its products between Canton and Canton. But details are here superfluous. Suffice it to repeat that there exists in Switzerland no universal right of citizenship—that no native-born Swiss has the right, by virtue of his birth, to establish himself in whatever part of Switzerland he may choose. There are citizens of Zurich or of Berne—there are Vaudois and Genevese: the Swiss citizen does not exist. Out of his own Canton the individual Swiss is but a foreigner. He may be expelled from any other Canton to which he may have transferred his abode unless it may have pleased that Canton, with a view to a reciprocal advantage, to acknowledge the right of free settlement.

From the state of things we have described has arisen, as an inevitable consequence, the absolute discredit of the Diet—the degradation, in public opinion, of every Federal authority. How is a power to make itself respected which is not even respected by the elements that constitute it? Suppose a decree passed by the Diet against the opinion of the great Cantons, and by means of that factitious majority of which we have spoken: is it to be supposed that those great Cantons—the real majority—will conform to it? No: intrenching themselves behind the cantonal sovereignty—the only sovereignty recognised throughout the Compact as the fundamental element of the Swiss Federation—they will leave it unexecuted. Reverse the supposition: the small Cantons will hasten to follow the example, and to invoke the precedent of disobedience. This has been seen; this *will* be seen in a few days, when the Diet will decree the dissolution of the Catholic League, formed within the State by the seven Cantons, of which we shall presently speak. We may be certain that the League will not dissolve.

In this impotence of the Federal authority is the source of that tendency to employ illegal means—of those appeals to force—which we have seen multiplied in Switzerland for some time past. They are the irregular expression of an opinion which can find no regular organ by which to manifest itself. When men think of cutting short the Jesuit question, by assaulting Lucerne or Fribourg, it is because they know the opinion of the country is against the Jesuits; and that yet that opinion will be unable to find a voice in the Diet; or that, even if it should succeed, as it is now doing, in finding one, its decree will remain a dead letter—ineffective and disobeyed. The Powers know this: and when they recommend peace they play the hypocrite. They rejoice at this state of things, and love to perpetuate it for their own ends. They love

* Some Cantons, Appenzell for instance, are subdivided into two.

to keep that sword of Damocles, intervention, suspended over the head of Switzerland.

Opinion has, however, advanced in Switzerland since 1815: everything around her has changed, and her own interior has changed also. When, in 1815, under foreign influence, the Compact was proclaimed on the ruins of the constitutions established by the *Act of Mediation*, Switzerland was delivered up to the aristocracy; the people were not even consulted, the Governments and Great Councils founded the alliance on the basis pointed out to them. Since that time aristocracy has fallen almost every where. The principle of the sovereignty of the people has gained almost all the great Cantons one by one—Tessin, Argovie, Solothurm, Zurich, Saint-Gall, Thurgovie, Vaud, Berne, Schaffausen, Geneva, &c., have, since 1830, pressed onward in their democratic movement almost entirely without spilling blood. The internal life of each of the members of the Confederation has thus been reformed and invigorated; but the law which should rule their collective life has remained the same; the child's dress still compresses the limbs of the grown man. A powerless compact of foreign and unpopular origin, the expression of a state of things which now belongs to the past, weighs like a nightmare on the national heart beating with new force and new inspirations.

Here, we repeat it, in the want of harmony between its wants and its institutions, dwells the national question of Switzerland.

And this want of harmony is felt not by a few thinkers, by a few agitators, without an echo in the country. It is felt by the large majority of the Swiss people. We will not here recapitulate the public meetings, the associations, the organs of the public press, which have manifested it. We have a better proof than all this—a legal fact which no one can call in question. The opinion in favour of altering the Compact has long been so powerful that, in spite of the spirit of cantonality, so flattered, so promoted by the institutions themselves, and by all the influences agitating around Switzerland, the Diet itself—the Diet with its representatives of Cantons, and its imperative *mandates*—was twice obliged to give way, and to proclaim the defects of the Compact of 1815, its incompatibility with the subsequent growth of the spirit of nationality in Switzerland, and the necessity of a Federal reorganization.

These decisions of the Diet, however, bore no fruit; and the extraordinary spectacle of a Government incapable of procuring the execution of a decree put forth fifteen years back is the most decisive proof we could bring of the vices inherent in the constitution of such Government itself. But not the less, let it be remembered, has the principle been proclaimed by the body which is considered to represent legally the votes of the country.

The question, since the first decision of the Diet in 1832, has become singularly mixed up with religious differences. And, in explaining the causes of the non-realization of this decision, we propose to give a rapid view of the secondary questions, religious or otherwise, which have subsequently arisen. The events of which Switzerland may at no distant time become the theatre will thus be better understood, and this short preparatory labour is the more necessary, because the journal already alluded to has endeavoured to take advantage of these secondary questions, in order to falsify the real state of things in Switzerland, by giving a colour of religious intolerance to that which is essentially a controversy upon internal organization. We have already said that the local cantonal element is in Switzerland an historical traditional element that no one dreams, that no one could ever dream, of annihilating. No one can, on the other hand, dream of denying the existence of a national element—of a sentiment of general progress, of common interest, of common country, which has, for good or evil, sustained the existence of the Confederation, during more than five centuries, through all sorts of dissensions, dangers, and wars; and the want of a more and more complete harmonization of these two elements in their

development is not, as some would wish to insinuate, the ambitious whim of a few individuals anxious to play a great part: it has been the problem, the permanent desire, of the noblest hearts, the highest intellects of Switzerland, from Nicolas de Flue down to Müller the historian; it has shown itself more powerful at every step made by the democratic spirit—every time, in other words, that the general opinion of the country has gained ground upon the spirit of aristocracy.*

Of the political condition of Switzerland before 1789 we need not say much; a species of Federative alliance existed between the Cantons, but the institutions of the middle age were throughout the country predominant. Already, however, prior to the French Revolution, the popular idea might be seen fermenting here and there; and the events of 1789 only served to give it a bolder impulse. With the insurrections of Basle, of Vaud, and of Geneva, the desire of a more intimate union of the Cantons began to show itself. But the French Government, carried away by the idea of conquest, committed an error; and in 1798 the Directory abolished not only the Federal Compact of the Cantons as then existing, but the separate existence and constitutions of those Cantons themselves, and implanted one single constitution for the whole country upon the varied soil of Switzerland. This exaggeration of the national principle, and the radical vice of foreign usurpation, justly awakened the cantonal spirit. Here and there an open struggle took place, and repugnance was manifested everywhere. The *Act of Mediation* which Napoleon, with a more profound acquaintance with the country, gave in 1804 to Switzerland was very differently received.

The *Act of Mediation* recognised the triumph of the popular element; local right was respected by the liberty granted to each of the nineteen Cantons then composing the Confederation, of giving itself its own constitution, provided only that it should not be in contradiction with the recognised popular principle; the national sentiment was recognised, at the same time, above all by the enactment of the right of free establishment, and also by the reasonable importance granted to the amount of population of a district, by giving two votes in the Diet to the Cantons containing more than 100,000 inhabitants, and one only to those less populous. These were the merits of Napoleon's constitution. On the other hand, however, the constitution was defective in the weakness which it was calculated to entail upon the central power: an intentional result on the part of Napoleon, whose policy it was that France only should be powerful as a nation. There were, besides this inherent weakness of the central power as organized by Napoleon, the uncongenial elements of an all-powerful foreign influence, and the necessity of continual sacrifices which the French alliance imposed. The merits of the Act of Mediation, to which we have referred, caused it to be received with acclamations, and maintained for a period with zeal, and even to be the cause of some internal progress. Its inherent defects, and accompanying drawbacks decided the Swiss to range themselves, in 1814, on the side of the conquering Allies, who invaded, it is true, but in the name of liberty and of independence, the nationalities violated by the ascendancy of Imperial France. The *Act of Mediation* was then annulled; the Confederation divided into twenty-two Cantons; the Compact of the 7th of August 1815, negotiated at Vienna, and promulgated at Zurich, substituted for anterior legislation; and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland recognised on the 20th of November 1815, by France, Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, and their Allies, who formally guaranteed the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Confederation. The Compact of the 7th of August, 1815, effaced the ameliorations of the *Act of Mediation*, and organized the Federal Constitution in the manner we have shown, and as it still remains.

* A good historical sketch of Swiss events has recently appeared from the pen of M. Cincourt, Paris.

As we have already remarked, the popular voice had no share in this remodelling of the Constitution: the Councils only voted upon it. And the Compact was accepted because the people were anxious to escape from a merely provisional and temporary state of things, and because they did not and could not imagine that this was to be a final institution, never to be modified in accordance with internal progress, or with the necessary development of the national idea. But the object of the Powers was soon perceived, and from that time the reaction began. The aristocracy, protected by the absolute Powers and profiting by the uncertainties and the improvidence which accompany great changes, had nearly everywhere repossessed themselves of their power. Everywhere, also, the popular principle silently pressed on towards the struggle which was to burst forth in 1830, and in the following years. Religious controversy now came to add a new element to the popular discontents. On the one hand it was perceived with alarm that the reorganization of the Confederation provided no metropolitan bishop for Catholic Switzerland, and that the supreme government of that church fell naturally into the hands of the Catholic Nuncio, who established his residence at Lucerne, thus opening the way immediately to the direct influence of Rome; on the other hand, the Jesuits, everywhere dreaded, were seen reappearing, founding establishments in various places, and endeavouring, little by little, to appropriate to themselves the education of the country. In 1830-31, a series of popular movements overthrew almost everywhere, as we have already said, and without bloodshed, the power of the aristocracy. A more violent collision took place in 1832, between the town and the rest of the Canton of Basle, at the end of which the Diet was obliged to recognise the separation of the Canton into two departments—Basle-Ville and Basle-Campagne—each enjoying from that time a half-vote.

With the triumph of the popular principle the question of the revision of the Federal Compact was imperiously called for. The principle of life being changed in *each* State, it was clear that the principle of life of the *whole* must also be modified. All these internal revolutions expressed new wants and new ideas, which must necessarily bring about new relations between the States which had accomplished them. The principle of ruling by a majority of the people having been once accepted in each Canton, it became impossible that the contrary principle could continue to reign in all that concerned the general interest, or that the minority of the population of Switzerland could give law in their Diet to the majority. The national idea had, moreover, gained in power in proportion as the Swiss citizens had gained in dignity. The force of argument within the Diet and the agitation in the country became at length so overpowering that, on the 17th of July, 1832, by a majority of sixteen voices against five, the Diet itself proclaimed that the revision of the Compact had become indispensable. The five opposing Cantons themselves did not deny the principle: they contented themselves with saying that the fitting opportunity had not yet arrived. A Commission of fourteen members, selected from the highest in authority and from the most distinguished intellects of the Diet, was charged to draw out the plan of a new Compact. It was presented on the 15th of December, and was extremely moderate—often too timid, and leaning, perhaps, too much toward the cantonal interest, but incontestably better than the old one.

Then were seen in action all the vices of the Federal Constitution which we have pointed out in the preceding pages. It had been impossible to avoid acknowledging the principle; parties reserved themselves to refuse its application. In the interior, the Cantons of Schwytz, Uri, Unterwalden, Basle-Ville, and Neufchâtel,* stimulated principally by the intrigues of Austria, organized against all change the league called the League of Sarnen, from the name of a locality of the Canton of Unterwalden where its representatives assembled. Without the country, the Ambassadors of the absolutist

* See the table at the end, for the population of each Canton.

Powers began to alarm the Cantons by notes analogous to those which Monsieur Guizot is now sending to Switzerland; and subsequently, by their conduct in the affair of the proscribed exiles resident in Switzerland, they succeeded in sowing fear, mistrust, and division amongst the Cantons. We regret that we have not space here to set forth this matter in detail, because it lays bare, better than anything else could do, the tactics by which the foreign Powers influence the national affairs of Switzerland. Let it suffice to say, that upon the simple fact of some Italian, Polish, and German exiles joining a public association, organized with a view to the reform of the Federal Compact, they raised the bugbear of an armed revolutionary propagandism threatening the tranquillity of Europe; exacted the expulsion of all the proscribed political parties; formed a military cordon round Switzerland; endeavoured to give the question of a reform of the Compact the aspect of originating in an idea of external propagandism; and succeeded in deceiving the credulous, alarming the timid, and encouraging the discontented. The plan of the Commission was rejected; and the realization of the Diet's decree indefinitely postponed. Nevertheless, it was never abandoned; and when, in 1844, it was proposed to declare that there was no longer any occasion to consider it further, a majority consisting of ten votes and two half-votes* pronounced for the continuation of the question It was from the moment—and we entreat attention to what appears to us an important point of view—it was from the moment when all parties could not but acknowledge that there was nothing more to hope from the central authority, and when all parties felt themselves confined within the fatal circle drawn by an organization powerless for good, but perpetuating itself by its very defects—that a tendency to the extra-legal struggle first insinuated itself into the ranks of the progressive majority. It appeared a sad but necessary evil to be encountered for the safety of the country—for its rescue from the double burden of a retrograde minority in the interior, and a despotic foreign influence. The religious question on which we are about to say a few words, brought an additional source of irritation to men's minds. It was, however, treated, wherever it arose, with justice and moderation on the part of the progressive majority; and we beg our readers to compare the few facts that we are about to cite, with the assertions put forth without proof by the *Times*, in the article referred to above. They will then see how much faith this journal deserves in foreign questions.

Under a negotiation, traceable to French influence under Louis XIV., the constitution of the Canton of Glaris granted to the Catholics a share in the executive power very superior to their numerical proportion with the Protestants of that Canton. Equality was re-established in 1837. There is certainly nothing there which constitutes an attack upon religious tolerance.

There were disturbances in Le Valais in 1840 and in 1844, but it was from the first purely a political question there. A constitutional reform, establishing the just principle that each district of the Canton should share in the composition of the Great Council according to its population, was accepted by the majority. The minority established in the Haut-Valais—a part of the Canton given over to the influence of the military, clerical, and landed aristocracy—resisted, and organized a separate Government. A struggle ensued, and victory declared for the majority. The Jesuits had taken an active part in the revolt of the retrogressive party; nevertheless, there was no reaction against them. Later on, the Jesuits and their partizans, after having laboured hard, and succeeded in gaining over the peasantry to their cause, renewed the attack: they conquered, and re-established the old system of inequality. The proscription of Protestant worship, even in the sanctuary of the family, was one of the first acts of the triumphant party.

* The divided Cantons, such as Basle, Valais, &c., have their votes also divided.

In Argovie, at the time of a liberal revision of the constitution, the opposition on the Catholic side assumed a factious and unconstitutional aspect. It was after the discovery of some plots tending to provoke civil war, and of certain secret assemblies held in the convents, that the Great Council decreed, in 1841, by an immense majority formed of Catholic as well as of Protestant deputies, the dissolution of the convents. The decree was peacefully received by the Argovian populations. Some Catholic deputies presented appeals to the Diet, and there were several discussions, from 1841 to 1843, upon the subject, the conclusion of which was the approval of the part taken by the Great Council of Argovie. The measure adopted appeared to everybody so exclusively political that several Catholic Cantons, such as Tessin, Solothurm, &c., were the first to defend Argovie in the Diet; and the only request addressed to it by the Diet was, that the unoffending convents for women should not be comprehended in the general suppression. Here is all that constitutes the religious episode in the history of Switzerland since 1815, until the affair now pending of the Jesuits. The Jesuits and the Apostolic Nunciate had, particularly since 1840, laboured with the greatest activity in gaining over to themselves the population of Lucerne; and a decree of the Grand Council of that Canton, in 1844, committing the education of the clergy to the "Fathers of the Society," convinced Switzerland of the fact. The moment was ill chosen; blood was flowing in the passes of Le Valais, and general opinion accused the Jesuits established at Briggs of having fomented these civil struggles. It was asked where the encroachments of the *Ultra-Montane* or Romanist party would stop; and it was remembered with alarm that Lucerne being one of the three Vorort towns, the central direction of Swiss affairs would in turn necessarily fall under the influence of a sect irreconcileably inimical to the conquests gained by liberal opinion since 1830.

Complaints became so general that the Diet at length addressed an invitation to Lucerne, in the name of the country at large, calling upon them to expel the Jesuits. The invitation was haughtily refused. It was after this refusal, and in consequence of the confessed impotence of the Diet, that the armed attacks made upon Lucerne and Fribourg by the ardent spirits of some reforming Cantons, who organized themselves under the name of the "Free Troops," took place. These attempts proved abortive; but they furnished to the retrograde party a pretext which they had long sought for organizing themselves. The *Sonderbund*, or Separate League, was formed in 1845.

The existence of this League, and the revision of the Compact, are the two vital questions upon which the Diet, sitting at the present time in Berne, is called upon to decide.

The Separate League, as avowedly and officially confessed, embraces the seven Catholic Cantons—Lucerne, Fribourg, Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug, and Le Valais. It has a permanent Council sitting at Lucerne, a common treasury, an army, a commander-in-chief, and is pledged to offer resistance against all internal or external attack, be it from the other Cantons or from the Federal power. It is supported, and almost openly so, by Austria.

It is evident that, even under the actual Compact, the Catholic League is illegal. The last section of Article V., and Article VI. are sufficiently decisive. By the last section of Article V., it is enacted that "Whatever differences may arise between the Cantons, they shall abstain from all acts of violence, and, above all, from the use of arms, *and they shall conform in everything to the decision given*" (by the Diet). And Article IV. is in the following words:—"The Cantons shall not form amongst each other any connexions prejudicial to the Federal compact." Moreover, the instructions given to the representatives of the Cantons for the present sitting of the Diet have already decided the question. Berne, Zurich, Grisons, Argovie, Thurgovie, St. Gall, Schaffausen, Vaud, Tessin, Geneva, Basle-Campagne, Solothurim, Outer-Appenzell, and Glaris, will vote for the dissolution of the

League; Basle-Ville itself will vote for a friendly invitation to the same effect. There is here, then, the immense majority of Switzerland, and comprehending several Catholic Cantons. The same party will also vote for the expulsion of the Jesuits.

But, nevertheless, we may rest assured that the League will not dissolve itself. Encouraged by the absolutist Powers, it will resist; and when, the principle having been voted, the time arrives for carrying it into effect, and deciding upon the coercive measures to be taken, we shall see all the old difficulties and dissensions reappear. And, whilst the Cantons which represent the *majority of the Swiss population* will consistently vote for the immediate execution by the Federal forces of the Diet's decree, a few different opinions broached by some smaller Cantons, struck by timidity or seduced by other means, will cause that majority of votes to be neutralized. Then appeals to force, violent and extra-legal attacks, will reappear; and with them the menaces and, perhaps, the interference of the foreign Powers, which the notes of France and Austria enable us already to foresee.

Such is, at the present moment, the true position of Switzerland. Let us sum it up in a few words.

Switzerland feels herself suffering in her material and economical, in her political and in her national, life. For want of the right of free settlement, her industry, instead of being developed in unison in the grand common emporium of a united country, is carried on in twenty-four small rival workshops. Harmony between labour, intellect, and capital is impossible; foreign rivalry becomes more and more threatening to her manufacturers; and, while in one part of the country capital exists unemployed for want of labour, we see the inhabitants of another forced to emigrate or to dishonour themselves by entering the service of foreign despotism. By transit duties, tolls, taxes, and *entrepôts;* by cantonal custom-houses; by twenty-four different systems of coins, weights, and measures, her industry is fettered, restricted, and rendered stationary. A Federal authority, fallen into contempt, having no direct relationship with the citizens of the common country, and without power to enforce the execution of its decrees; inequality erected into an established rule, in the midst of a republican land, by an absurd and aristocratic mode of representation; a complete want of harmony between the knowledge and education of the different Cantons; a civil law, multiform, confused, and capricious; rivalries and jealousies where there ought to be only love, peace, and association of labours—continually undermine the inward life of Switzerland. Her outward life is null: she has no voice, no influence, no mission, in Europe. She has no strength, no unity to resist the invasions with which she is incessantly threatened. And all this is by virtue of a Compact which effaces all idea of nationality, which enables local interests to bear the palm from the general welfare, and which puts it in the power of a minority to neutralize all the votes and all the ideas of progress of the great majority of the country. The large numerical majority of the Swiss people desires to substitute for this Compact another Compact, truly Federative, which, without destroying the administrative rights of the Cantons, shall harmonize them with the political rights of the country at large, and which, by a just and reasonable expression of the national idea, shall give to the majority the means *legally* and *peacefully* of progressing towards a still closer union of the States which constitute the nation.

The absolutist Powers, with whom we regret to see constitutional France uniting herself, oppose themselves to the realization of this desire. They declare that, in spite of the changes which have taken place all around Switzerland since 1815, and in spite of those which have been worked out within the bosom of each of her Cantons, the Compact shall remain eternally the same. They threaten intervention in case of a change. And thus they condemn Switzerland to inevitable anarchy, by leaving to the majority no means of progress except a recourse to extra-legal modes, to civil contests,

and to force. If they see the mere symptoms of such things arise, they menace, equally, intervention.

Our task has been the recital of facts upon which we beg the serious thought of an English public. At any moment the gravest events may now be taking place in Switzerland, and we shall not be at all surprised if we are compelled to witness there, in the very heart of Europe, the first act of a drama of which the occupation of Cracow was the prologue.

To the Treaties of Vienna, guaranteeing the neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of her territory, Great Britain was a party. In the intervention with which Switzerland is threatened she will be compelled to play some part; what that part should be we leave, for the present, to the consideration of a thoughtful Public. With respect to this important international question, the object of the People's International League, in the publication of this pamphlet, has been simply, in the words of their address, "to supply the elements of judgment, trusting the consequences to English sense."

POSTSCRIPT.

Since this statement was sent to press, news has arrived of the following resolutions having been passed at a meeting of the Diet at Berne on the 20th instant, by the votes of those Cantons whose instructions we referred to in page 9:—

1. "That the Alliance of the seven Cantons is incompatible with the essential stipulations of the Act of August 7, 1815.
2. "That the above Cantons are rendered responsible for the observance of the decision.
3. "That the Diet reserves to itself, if circumstances should require it, the power of taking ulterior measures for enforcing the decision."

The Cantons constituting the Separate League have already refused to dissolve; have protested against the resolutions of the Diet, and are taking active measures to resist, by force of arms, the execution of the Decree.

"M. Le Comte,—The situation of Switzerland is daily becoming more serious. The ensuing Diet may perhaps be induced to come to resolutions the consequences of which will grieve the allies of Switzerland, and the friends of order and peace in that country. The Government of the King would consider themselves neglectful of their duty if, in circumstances like the present, they did not offer to a friendly people, now threatened with most dangerous internal disturbance, advice, inspired by a thorough acquaintance with political movements, and a sincere devotedness to the real welfare of the Confederation. Party spirit has done its utmost to give a false colour to our intentions, and to cast doubt on our motives. You have neglected nothing to refute these errors; but in spite of this, either from blindness or ill will, they still persist in leading astray the minds of the people as to our politics and thoughts. They pretend that, if we do not allow the Diet the right of imposing the will of the majority upon a minority of the Cantons, we attack the principles of the independence of a free people. To prove the falsehood of this assertion, it suffices to say that Switzerland is not a single State, but an association of States, which, in granting to the Diet certain powers, considered necessary for the common interest, have, however, reserved to themselves essential rights of sovereignty in all things appertaining to their internal government. Such is Switzerland as recognised by treaties; and it is on account of this organization that these treaties have been concluded. If the Diet, lending an ear to mistaken insinuations, should attack the laws which form the basis of the Confederation and of treaties—if, under pretence of attending to the safety of the Confederation, it should pretend to command, or forbid the cantonal governments passing any measure which, in its opinion, might one day endanger this safety—such erroneous interpretation of the Federal pact would be but the first step towards the destruction of the individual existence of each Canton; that is to say, towards the suppression of the Federal pact itself, and of the treaties concluded relative to it. The powers allied to Switzerland, in protesting against such an undertaking, are far from wishing to strike a blow at the independence of the States which compose the Confederation. On the contrary, they give proof of the respect they bear to its independence and to treaties. These considerations, which

would be perfectly founded in the case of the adoption of a resolution regular in appearance, and accepted by the majority of the Diet, would acquire additional strength were the cantonal independence to be attacked in the name of a minority, or by irregular and violent means. Thus the Government of the King acts both according to right and to a wise policy, in endeavouring to prevent, by representations as friendly as they are urgent, a struggle (which might prove fatal) between States to which they are equally devoted; and by the declaration that, in case such a struggle should break out, they reserve to themselves the right of free examination and judgment. We have attacked neither the independence nor the liberty of Switzerland, and give no plausible pretence to the reproach of an arbitrary intervention, or abuse of power. Every nation has an incontestable right to change its internal government; but the suppression of the constitutional bases of the Confederation would not be a free change of institutions emanating from the people: it would be the oppression of independent states, obliged to bend beneath the yoke of more powerful allies; it would be a forced union of several states into one. The Governments who have till now negotiated with Switzerland as a Federation composed of divers independent States would have, according to the principles of the rights of nations, the right to refuse to recognise the new state of things, before they had appreciated, in their own interests, the legitimacy and utility of the change. There is, moreover, another important consideration which Switzerland should never lose sight of in her transactions with foreign powers: Europe, in granting Switzerland, by the Treaty of Vienna, besides a great extent of territory, the precious prerogative of neutrality, has desired, in attaching the enjoyment of these advantages to a Federal constitution, to guarantee the tranquillity of a country the external peace of which is of the highest importance to Europe. On account of its position, Switzerland could not fall under the efforts of anarchy or civil broils without producing serious consequences to several of the pincipal states of the Continent. If Switzerland were to place herself beyond the conditions she has accepted—if she became for her neighbours a focus of revolutionary propagandism, which might disturb their tranquillity—they would have the right to consider themselves disengaged from their obligations. I leave to you, Count, the care of deciding what use you will make of this letter, inspired by the sole desire of preventing the internal tranquillity of Switzerland and her position in Europe from being exposed to dangerous trials and fatal changes. "GUIZOT."

THE SWISS CONFEDERATION.

Cantons.	Population.	Religion.	Language.
Berne	357,710	Great majority Protestant	Chiefly German
Zurich	224,150	Protestant	German
Lucerne	105,600	Catholic	German
Saint-Gall	157,700	Mixed	German
Argovie	152,900	Mixed	German
Tessin	103,950	Catholic	Italian
Vaud	178,880	Protestant	French
Fribourg	77,660	Catholic	Chiefly French
Solothurm	54,380	Catholic	Chiefly German
Grisons	98,020	Mixed	Chiefly German; some Italian
Thurgovie	80,540	Chiefly Protestant	German
Valais (High and Low)	77,570	Catholic	Haut-Valais, German; Bas-Valais, French
Neufchâtel	56,640	Protestant	French
Uri	13,930	Catholic	German
Schwytz	36,018	Catholic	German
Unterwalden	23,150	Catholic	German
Glaris	28,960	Protestant	German
Zug	14,710	Catholic	German
Basle (Town and Country)	55,340	Mixed	Chiefly German
Schaffausen	28,050	Protestant	German
Geneva	53,560	Mixed	French
Appenzell	57,510	Mixed	German

Protestant population about	1,236,928
Catholic population about	800,000
Total population	2,036,928

Espagne
Traduction du N° suivant (XXII)

INTRODUCTION.

Frappé de l'ignorance où se trouvent la France et d'autres pays par rapport aux faits les plus importants de l'histoire contemporaine d'Espagne, je me détermine à prendre la plume pour faire connaître la vérité.

Bien des gens croient la Péninsule dans une situation et avec des idées semblables à celles des siècles antérieurs : cette erreur pourrait être très-nuisible à ma patrie et aux nations qui auront avec elle des relations diplomatiques ou commerciales durant la nouvelle lutte qui se prépare entre les peuples et leurs gouvernements.

Les insurrections, les invasions, les batailles, les massacres, les proscriptions et les malheurs dont nous avons été témoins, nous ont fait envier le calme qui fut le partage de nos ancêtres; mais ce calme a produit les maux que nous avons soufferts.

Espérons de la justice Providentielle que, de même que l'Angleterre depuis sa révolution du XVIIe siècle, la Péninsule croîtra en prospérité et en gloire, et que nos travaux et nos efforts auront pour but de rendre l'Espagne sinon supérieure, du moins égale aux autres nations ainsi qu'au XVe siècle, à la fin des guerres contre les Arabes, guerres qui durèrent sept cents ans sans lasser la constance Castillanne.

Les trois siècles de funeste repos, qui succédèrent aux

généreux efforts de Padilla et des *Communeros* dans le XVIe siècle, nous ont conduit à la prostration et à la tardivité où nous sommes aujourd'hui. Si le drapeau des communes eût triomphé à Villalar, l'Espagne aurait eu, en Europe, la position qui échut à l'Angleterre.

Cette histoire lue avec attention, montrera qu'à part les traits d'une originalité toute Péninsulaire, la Révolution Espagnole ressembla en plusieurs points à celles d'Angleterre et de France qui la précédèrent.

On a souvent répété qu'en Europe la liberté était de vieille date et le despotisme récent ; rien n'est plus vrai. Il est certain que, dans le moyen âge la liberté était imparfaite ; cependant les Cortès en Espagne, les États-généraux en France et les Parlements en Angleterre prouvent que les événements de 89 en France et de 1812 à Cadix n'étaient qu'une résurrection. Les Cortès de Cadix soutenant dans le discours préliminaire de leur fameuse constitution qu'elle était tirée des anciennes lois de Castille et d'Aragon, et ceux qui faisaient remarquer qu'elle était semblable à la constitution française de 91, étaient également dans le vrai.

Les règnes de Charles III et de Charles IV préparèrent la révolution Espagnole comme ceux de Louis XIV et de Louis XV, celle de France et comme ceux d'Henri VIII, d'Elisabeth et de Jacques Ier, celle d'Angleterre. Mais l'éclipse parlementaire qui dura peu d'années dans ce dernier pays, fut de 175 ans en France et de trois siècles en Espagne (1).

En Angleterre le protestantisme, et en France le vol-

(1) A dater de la mort de Padilla, les Cortès ne furent plus qu'un simulacre. Le peuple les appelait Cortès sourdes-muettes.

irianisme avaient précédé la révolution. En Espagne, nquisition avait empêché tout travail de ce genre : de , la tendance religieuse de la constitution de Cadix au ilieu de son radicalisme politique.

La révolution Anglaise se termina en 1688 au bout de ans ; plus de 60 ans ont passé pour la France et plus 44 pour l'Espagne sans que ces deux pays entrevoient core la fin de leurs secousses.

Quatre fois, à notre époque, le système démocratique triomphé en Espagne, et autant de fois il a succombé r les fautes des hommes qui étaient au pouvoir et par s menées de l'Europe.

Les quatre triomphes ont été, comme en Angleterre et France, non seulement faciles, mais inespérés.

Parcourons rapidement ces quatre périodes qui, avec s réactions qui les suivirent, comprennent presque un mi-siècle.

La première date du moment où, par la corruption de cour de Charles IV et le favoritisme impopulaire de odoy prince de la Paix, l'Espagne se trouva poussée à out. Un mouvement populaire force Charles IV à abdi- uer, le 19 mars 1808 en faveur de son fils Ferdinand VII. apoléon veut substituer à celui-ci son frère Joseph. Le ême peuple qui avait supporté Godoy pendant vingt ans, t une guerre héroïque à Napoléon quoique Ferdinand VII ui eût cédé la couronne.

Sarragosse rivalise avec Sagonte et Numance ; les aigles mpériales triomphantes dans le reste de l'Europe, pas- nt sous les fourches caudines à Bailen (1) et, si mille

(1) Lamartine dit dans l'*Histoire de la Restauration*, liv. VIIe :

défaites suivirent cette victoire, elles n'en réveillèrent pas moins l'Europe et firent du nom Espagnol le synonime d'héroïsme comme au temps de nos luttes contre les Romains et les Maures.

L'attentat de Bayonne coûta cher à Napoléon, et l'Espagne fut la cause principale de sa chûte en ce qu'elle apprit à l'Europe qu'il n'était pas invincible.

Une fois vengée, l'Espagne, comme fatiguée du grand effort qu'elle venait de faire, se laissa dominer. Ferdinand VII trouva, en 1814, dans le général Elio, un Monk Espagnol.

Mais si les membres des Cortès de Cadix et de Madrid allaient aux bagnes ou dans l'exil, la classe moyenne et instruite restait attachée à la constitution de 1812 et il se faisait, dans les esprits, un travail qui, au bout de six ans, renversait Ferdinand VII.

Quiroga et Riego furent les héros du peuple, et l'armée qui devait aller rétablir le despotisme en Amérique, proclama en 1820 la constitution de Cadix : pour la seconde fois dans le XIXe siècle l'Espagne se vit libre !

Le libéralisme avait grandi durant l'oppression : les lois politiques ne lui suffisaient plus ; aussi supprima-t-il la moitié de la dîme, les majorats et les riches congrégations. Le règne de la liberté eût été assuré si, en 1823, le duc d'Angoulême n'eût pas fait, au nom de l'Europe absolutiste, avec 100,000 français ce qu'Elio avait fait en 1814. Riego mourut sur l'échafaud comme Padilla. L'Angleterre se borna à protester.

« Dupont cerné par les Anglais et la milice nationale, donna le premier exemple de capitulation. » En juillet 1808, il n'y avait pas une seule compagnie anglaise en Espagne.

Les Espagnols avaient espéré que ou l'armée française ou le peuple se soulèverait en 1823. Vain espoir! L'abattement fut général dans la Péninsule. Qui aurait pu, dans l'Espagne de 1823, reconnaître l'Espagne de 1808! qui, dans la France de 1823 aurait retrouvé la France de 93!

Alors, le sort de l'Espagne fut celui de la Castille après la bataille de Villalar, et celui de l'Aragon à la mort du *Gran Justicia* décapité par ordre de Philippe II (1).

La seconde tyrannie de Ferdinand VII dura dix ans. Les Français lavèrent leur honte en 1830; mais ils ne détruisirent pas l'œuvre des 100,000 fils de Saint-Louis, et le nouveau roi électif à qui l'on attribuait cet abandon, fut abhorré des patriotes Espagnols qu'il avait trompés.

Si en 1814 l'armée espagnole avait renversé la Liberté, elle la releva en 1820; et, en 1823, il fallut, pour l'abattre de nouveau, envoyer chez nous une armée étrangère.

(1) La constitution de l'Aragon, la plus libérale qu'ait jamais eue peuple monarchique, fut en vigueur pendant plusieurs siècles jusqu'à Philippe II.

Tout le monde connait le fameux *sinon, non!* des aragonais; mais ce qu'on ignore généralement, c'est que pour soutenir cette fière formule, l'Aragon avait institué le tribunal du *Gran-Justicia* dignitaire nommé par le peuple et chargé, comme les Ephores de Sparte, de recevoir toute plainte des citoyens contre le roi.

L'aragonais Antonio Perez, secrétaire de Philippe II, poursuivi par ce monarque, se réfugia en Aragon et invoqua le bénéfice des lois du pays. Quoique Philippe eut fait intervenir l'Inquisition, Perez fut mis en liberté. Il s'en suivit un conflit qui forme un des épisodes les plus intéressants de l'histoire d'Espagne. Bref, une armée pénétra dans la province et en vainquit les habitans soulevés pour la défense de leurs droits. Lanuza, le Gran-Justicia, périt sur l'échafaud avec plusieurs nobles qui l'avaient aidé à résister à l'absolutisme. Dès lors, comme en Castille depuis la chûte des *Communeros* sous Charles-Quint, il n'y eut plus ni constitution ni cortès, mais seulement un simulacre de représentation qui n'en couvrit que mieux la tyrannie du pouvoir royal et de ses ministres.

Dans les deux cas, le despotisme s'établit sans déguisement aucun.

La liberté triompha et succomba deux fois encore, et le peuple Espagnol tomba sous la férule du parti doctrinaire ou modéré non moins funeste que l'autre.

L'émancipation de l'Amérique Espagnole, qui commença par l'invasion de Napoléon et à laquelle les événements de 1820 prêtèrent une nouvelle impulsion, acheva de s'effectuer en 1825. L'Espagne perdit les conquêtes de Fernan-Cortès et de Pizarre, et l'Angleterre eut, dans le commerce de ces contrées, une compensation à sa perte d'influence sur l'Europe complètement dominée alors par le despotisme de la sainte alliance.

La troisième phase de pouvoir du parti libéral provint d'une révolution de palais. Pour assurer la couronne à sa fille Isabelle et vaincre don Carlos frère du roi, que soutenaient le clergé et tous les éléments de l'ancien régime, Marie Christine, veuve de Ferdinand, se jeta dans les bras du parti libéral. L'armée et les grandes villes principalement prirent avec ardeur parti pour la reine en 1833.

Le parti libéral était plus considérable qu'en 1812 et qu'en 1820; néanmoins l'enthousiasme fut moindre qu'alors parce que le Statut Royal n'avait point la popularité de la constitution de Cadix et que bien des gens craignaient qu'à sa majorité, Isabelle II ne fit ce qu'avait fait son père en 1814. Aussi l'Espagne qui avait porté les premiers coups à l'Empire et qui, seule, avait proclamé la liberté en dépit de la sainte alliance, dût-elle former la quadruple alliance avec l'Angleterre, la France et le Portugal.

Les populations qui repoussaient Don Carlos, purent au moyen de la presse et de la tribune faire en 1835, une révolution pour élargir le Statut Royal; elles en firent une autre un an après pour compléter leur victoire, et la Constitution de 1812 fut jurée une troisième fois.

Mais les Cortès commirent l'énorme faute de faire une nouvelle Constitution tout imbue des doctrines modérées, établissant un Sénat et donnant au roi le veto absolu au lieu du veto suspensif de la Constitution de Cadix : grave erreur politique, qui coûta cher au parti populaire.

Le peuple vit avec peine qu'on abandonnait sa Constitution favorite, et l'enthousiasme pour celle de 1837 fut de pure convention.

Marie-Christine usant de ses prérogatives comme régente, alla changeant de ministère jusqu'à remettre le pouvoir aux doctrinaires qui, tout en vantant la Constitution de 1837, désiraient revenir à un système analogue au Statut. Parler d'une manière et agir d'une autre, est chose très-ordinaire chez les modérés.

Comme Don Carlos s'appuyait sur une armée, ils n'osèrent point d'abord se montrer aussi réactionnaires qu'ils le furent en 1844 ; mais au moyen de quelques lois et surtout de celle sur les municipalités, ils se préparaient à en finir avec les progressistes, lorsqu'en 1840 eut lieu la quatrième victoire du parti libéral.

Le *pronunciamiento* de 1840, eut pour résultat d'ôter la régence à Marie-Christine et de la donner au général Espartero, Duc de la Victoire, lequel avait mis fin à la guerre civile.

On fit encore la faute de conserver la Constitution de 1837, et les réformes qu'on adopta furent à tel point insignifiantes, que grand nombre de libéraux se lancèrent dans l'opposition, servant ainsi, en général, à leur insu, Louis-Philippe et Marie-Christine qui, à leur tour, renversèrent le Duc et le chassèrent en 1843.

Alors les modérés se croyant assurés au pouvoir, jetèrent le masque et se montrèrent si cruels envers les progressistes et les exaltés, leurs anciens alliés, qu'ils laissèrent bien loin en arrière les royalistes de 1823. Dans la première année de leur domination, ils firent fusiller plus de 200 personnes. Ils abandonnèrent la Constitution de 1837 pour une autre plus rétrograde encore et achevèrent de mettre le comble à leur impopularité par le mariage Montpensier qui eut lieu en 1846.

Aux tripotages électoraux de France les plus scandaleux, aux lois destructives de la presse, ils ajoutèrent la suppression de la garde nationale parce qu'ils ne pouvaient, comme Louis-Philippe, compter sur la petite bourgeoisie. Du reste, ils n'imitèrent point l'espèce de mansuétude de ce roi, seule chose bonne qu'il y eût en lui. Aux mœurs dissolues de la cour de Charles IV, ils allièrent les jeux de bourse et autres habiletés importées de Paris, et dépassèrent Ferdinand VII en cruautés en Galice et à Alicante.

Le parti royaliste avait diminué dès 1812; le parti libéral s'était accru mais il s'était divisé et avait donné naissance à ce parti rétrograde qui, tout nourri du système doctrinaire Français, confisquait la liberté et n'en conservait que le nom.

Les royalistes nient le système représentatif; les

modérés l'admettent, mais à la condition, toutefois, qu'on leur laissera fausser les élections, avoir la majorité et poursuivre quiconque leur fera une opposition sérieuse.

Les royalistes supprimaient les journaux ; selon eux, pour obéir il n'est pas nécessaire de discuter. Les modérés consacrent, dans la Constitution, la liberté de la presse ; mais leurs lois organiques disent : prison et amende pour qui n'écrira pas dans notre sens ; liberté d'applaudir aux idées et aux actes de ceux qui commandent.

Le peuple ne s'y laissa pas tromper ; il vit que c'était là le même despotisme que par le passé avec l'hypocrisie en plus.

Royalistes et modérés supposent que la vraie liberté est ennemie de l'ordre, refusant, en cela, de voir ce qui se passe aux États-Unis et en Angleterre où les conspirations sont inconnues tandis que l'Europe modérée et royaliste est une prison et un champ de supplices.

Les rétrogrades ont pu persuader à une partie ignorante de la nation que leur système de gouvernement, par cela qu'il institue deux chambres, est semblable à celui de l'Angleterre ; cependant ils détruisent le jury, la liberté de la presse, la liberté individuelle, et n'établissent dans leurs Constitutions que le contraire du système anglais : c'est-à-dire un pouvoir tyrannique avec des dehors parlementaires.

En esquissant les triomphes et les revers du parti populaire en Espagne, j'ai passé sous silence les tentatives qui eurent lieu dans les intervalles, et qui prouvent, mieux encore que le succès, que les idées libérales

avaient dans la Péninsule de profondes racines et des amis sincères sachant honorer leur cause aux jours de malheur.

Les Mina se réfugiant en France après avoir tenté une insurrection dans la Navarre ; le général Porlier, pendu en Galice (1815) ; le général Lacy, pris en Catalogne et fusillé aux Baléares (1817) ; le colonel Vidal, tué à Valence (1818) ; le colonel Bazan, mort en Murcie (1825) ; les généraux Torrijos et Manzanarès, fusillés en Andalousie (1831) ; le général Zurbano, à Logrono (1844) ; Bonet, la même année, à Alicante ; le colonel Solis, fusillé en Galice (1846) ; enfin Abad, en Aragon (1848) ; (sans parler d'autres tentatives qui n'eurent pas un résultat aussi funeste ou dont les chefs étaient moins connus), sont autant de faits qui prouvent la persévérance Espagnole et la haine que les gouvernements absolutistes ou rétrogrades inspiraient à la nation. Sans l'appui de l'opinion publique, qui eût osé attaquer de front un pouvoir ayant en main la force et les trésors? Que les autres partis aient eu aussi leurs martyrs, il n'y a rien là qui doive surprendre. On comprend que des hommes se sacrifient en faveur de systèmes qui, pendant des siècles, avaient créé d'immenses intérêts.

Les grandes villes se montraient toujours attachées aux idées nouvelles et elles suivaient la marche ascendante de la révolution. Il en était ainsi de bon nombre de districts ruraux, et il n'y avait point de localité qui ne comptât des partisans du progrès ; c'étaient généralement les personnes jouissant de quelque aisance. Cette tendance des villes et des classes éclairées, est commune aux révolutions d'Espagne, de France et d'Angleterre.

Elle se manifesta même, mais seulement en 1833, chez une partie de la famille royale. Marie-Christine et l'Infant don Francisco, faisaient alors en Espagne ce que les d'Orléans avaient fait en France ; Guillaume III et Anne, en Angleterre ; et Dona Maria, en Portugal.

L'armée tourna cent fois comme en Angleterre, pendant le xviie siècle. En Espagne, la tendance des soldats vers le système libéral s'explique par leur contact avec les habitants des grandes villes.

Ainsi qu'en France et en Angleterre, le clergé catholique soutint l'ancien ordre de choses.

La classe moyenne fut libérale, mais opposée à toute mesure énergique. La haute noblesse ne se déclara pas contre le peuple, comme en France, et ne défendit pas la cause libérale, comme en Angleterre.

La magistrature, sous tous les régimes, s'est montrée prête à persécuter les vaincus (1). Quant aux fonctionnaires, il n'y en a eu que trop pour tous les partis ; mais leur nombre et leur pouvoir se sont surtout accrus sous le gouvernement centralisateur des doctrinaires : c'est qu'ils n'eurent point alors à partager leur influence avec le clergé, comme sous le royalisme, ni avec les corps populaires, comme au temps des progressistes.

En dehors de cette marche générale, il y eut diverses exceptions ce qui ne fit que compliquer d'avantage les affaires publiques.

Les influences de l'extérieur préparèrent les événements de la Péninsule. Avant 1808, les Universités s'é-

(1) Il en sera de même tant qu'il n'y aura pas de jury, à moins que les juges ne soient élus par le peuple.

taient déjà nourries des idées Françaises qui, d'ailleurs, par le commerce, pénétrèrent dans le littoral.

L'ouverture de routes et l'établissement de diligences firent affluer grand nombre de voyageurs qui répandirent efficacement dans la Péninsule les habitudes modernes de discussion et le goût des affaires publiques.

Les nombreuses et fréquentes émigrations ont contribué plus encore à ce résultat. De 1808 à 1814, plus de cent mille soldats et officiers de l'armée espagnole furent emmenés prisonniers en France; à leur retour ils répandirent les idées libérales dont ils étaient pour la plupart imbus.

En 1814, tous les Espagnols qui avaient pris parti pour Joseph Napoléon durent sortir du territoire. Ces partisans étaient beaucoup plus nombreux qu'on ne le croit généralement, car Joseph avait tenu pendant dix ans la capitale et plusieurs provinces.

En 1823, nouvelle émigration comprenant plusieurs milliers de citoyens, militaires, gardes-nationaux, fonctionnaires et simples particuliers, tous attachés à la Constitution de 1812.

Enfin plus de 30 mille carlistes émigrèrent à leur tour en 1839 et en 1840.

Beaucoup d'habitants des colonies vinrent aussi en Espagne en passant par d'autres pays tandis qu'un mouvement continuel avait lieu dans un sens contraire. Le plus grand nombre revenait rapportant son tribut d'idées nouvelles. En un mot, il y a eu, depuis 1808, plus d'Espagnols quittant leur pays pour se rendre dans le reste de l'Europe, qu'il n'y en avait eu pendant mille ans avant cette époque.

De là, une modification profonde aux effets de notre isolement antérieur ; de là, pour l'Espagne, le même phénomène que les croisades avaient produit pour l'Europe.

Mais si l'action de l'opinion a été favorable à la révolution, celle de tous les gouvernements Européens lui a toujours été funeste.

Napoléon fut l'ennemi des libéraux Espagnols.

En 1814, la sainte-alliance prit parti avec Ferdinand VII contre les Cortès.

En 1823, Louis XVIII envoya 100 mille Français pour rétablir le despotisme.

Les gouvernements du Nord ont prêté appui à Don Carlos.

Louis-Philippe et les Anglais ne s'allièrent à Christine que pour empêcher l'accomplissement des réformes radicales qui avaient été le stimulant et l'espérance des révolutionnaires.

En 1814, l'Angleterre permit que Ferdinand VII persécutât les membres des Cortès avec le gouvernement des quels elle avait cependant été alliée pour la guerre contre Napoléon ; et elle se borna à donner quelques subsides aux proscrits.

Les Anglais n'empêchèrent pas non plus la chûte d'Espartero en 1843 et n'accordèrent pas, depuis, à ce général, la protection que de 1840 à 1843 Marie Christine avait reçue du roi des Français.

La République de 1848 traita les démocrates Espagnols pire que ne l'avait fait Louis-Philippe.

En un mot, loin de favoriser la révolution Espagnole, tous les gouvernements de l'Europe n'ont fait constamment que l'entraver.

La diplomatie étrangère a été, à Madrid, un puissant agent de réaction.

La révolution Espagnole a été jusqu'ici moins violente que celles d'Angleterre et de France; cependant la guerre qu'on lui a faite n'en a pas été moins acharnée pour cela.

En 1823, aux moments de réaction, les libéraux furent traités comme s'ils eussent opéré un bouleversement radical : aussi se montrèrent-ils moins reservés lors de leurs victoires de 1836 et de 1840. Ils devinrent révolutionnaires par le fait même des contre-révolutionnaires.

Il y avait, en 1812, complète liberté d'écrire en faveur de l'ancien ordre de choses et les réformes opérées furent purement politiques. Les couvents subsistèrent, on maintint les dîmes et les majorats; on respecta tous les abus, seulement il fut licite de parler contre. Et cependant, en 1814, les députés influents se voyaient traînés aux bagnes d'Afrique et l'Inquisition même était rétablie!

De 1820 à 1823, la conduite équivoque du roi alarmait l'opinion. La persécution exercée contre l'armée libératrice de *la Isla* (2), le rétablissement du monopole pour le

(2) Les bataillons qui, en janvier 1820, suivirent Riego et Quiroga, n'ayant pu pénétrer à Cadix, se fortifièrent, à deux lieues de là, dans la ville de San-Fernando appelée vulgairement la *Isla de Leon*; de là le nom d'armée de la *Isla* donné aux troupes qui proclamèrent la Constitution de 1812.

Les hommes qui depuis 1814, étaient aux bagnes ou dans l'exil, arrivèrent alors au pouvoir, mais loin de se montrer reconnaissants envers l'armée libératrice, ils commencèrent à l'accuser de démagogie et finirent par la dissoudre.

Des persécuteurs de Riego et de ses soldats, sont sorties les deux fractions de modérés qui, depuis, ont causé tous les malheurs de l'Espagne. A peine avaient-ils abattu les patriotes que la réaction releva la tête et que commencèrent les conspirations et les complots fomen-

sel et le tabac restés libres d'impôt durant un an et d'autres mesures vexatoires causèrent du mécontentement.

A cette époque, les royalistes purent parler et voter librement; leur sécurité personnelle fut entière et aucun d'eux ne dut s'expatrier. Le parti populaire, pour toute vengeance, se borna à chansonner ses ennemis.

En 1823, plus de 20 mille libéraux furent forcés de fuir, 20 mille autres furent emprisonnés; l'insulte leur fut prodiguée à tous : en chaire, on tonnait contre eux comme s'ils eussent adopté le Protestantisme ou le Judaïsme.

Il est vrai qu'à dater de 1826, les royalistes se montrèrent plus tolérants; néanmoins les souvenirs de 1823 créerent en grande partie la résistance de 1833 et furent un stimulant pour les événements de 1834 et de 1835.

Quoiqu'à ces deux époques la réforme politique ne fut qu'un pâle reflet de celle de 1812, la révolution ne procédait point avec les réserves d'alors. Un grand nombre de couvents ayant été brûlés, les congrégations religieuses furent abolies.

Les excès qui eurent lieu dans la capitale en 1834 sous les modérés, furent mis sur le compte du choléra (3).

tés par Ferdinand VII qui, comme Louis XVI, traitait avec les ennemis de son pays et ruinait le gouvernement constitutionel.

(3) A cette époque le choléra ayant éclaté dans la capitale, le bruit se répandit que les religieux empoisonnaient les eaux pour empêcher la réunion des Cortès qui allait avoir lieu pour la première fois depuis 1823. Cette accusation fut accueillie d'autant plus facilement que le clergé, en général, avait prédit hautement que les cortès n'auraient pas lieu. La multitude exaspérée se rua sur les couvents, y tua plus de 80 moines et obligea les autres à fuir ou à se cacher. Le gouver-

Quand ce fléau éclata à Manille, les Indiens disaient des étrangers ce que l'on disait des religieux à Madrid.

La dîme fut entièrement supprimée. Dès 1841, le clergé a été rétribué par l'État.

La majeure partie des biens ecclésiastiques fut vendue. Ces ventes ont été respectées parce qu'en général les acheteurs étaient des modérés.

C'est en vain que ce parti a célébré le concordat; c'est en vain qu'il reconnait tous les grades et emplois donnés par Don Carlos; en vain a-t-il tiré les évêques des rangs les plus dévoués à l'ancien ordre de choses; en vain rétablit-il nonnes et chanoines, la question des biens nationaux empêchera que jamais les deux partis ne s'unissent.

Le clergé ne peut avoir, avec les modérés, cette influence politique qui, jadis, régentait la monarchie au moyen du confesseur.

Comparativement, il y avait plus de tolérance pour les carlistes que pour les progressistes ou démocrates qui faisaient opposition au parti modéré; celui-ci, à son tour, se trouve divisé en fractions désireuses du pouvoir, mais animées néanmoins des mêmes vues politiques.

Le caractère réactionnaire de la Constitution de 1837, la faiblesse des chefs du libéralisme de 1840 à 1843 et la

nement resta d'abord inactif soit par haine contre les prêtres soit qu'il crut un moment au crime qu'on leur imputait.

L'explication naturelle de cet événement est que le clergé avait non-seulement perdu tout son prestige auprès de la masse du peuple mais, de plus, qu'il en était abhorré pour avoir favorisé en 1823 l'invasion étrangère et prêché l'extermination des libéraux. Les esprits ainsi préparés depuis 11 ans, crurent ce qui, avant 1823, leur eût paru une monstrueuse absurdité.

tendance qu'ils avaient dans leurs écrits et dans leurs discours à se rapprocher de leurs anciens ennemis les modérés, déterminèrent un grand mécontentement chez les progressistes les plus avancés, et donnèrent définitivement naissance au parti démocratique.

On trouve de la moralité chez les chefs du parti progressiste ; mais s'ils ne savent pas frapper l'immoralité dans la personne de leurs ennemis et de leurs subalternes, le peuple ne gagnera rien à ce qu'ils aient le pouvoir. Ils ont, d'ailleurs, perdu beaucoup de leur prestige en manifestant l'espérance que la Cour les replacerait aux affaires. Ils oublient que si, trois fois déjà, ils ont eu en main le gouvernement, ce n'a pas été par le fait volontaire de la couronne, mais bien en vertu de mouvemeuts populaires qui violentèrent la royauté.

Tous les partis politiques ont été grandement portés à rechercher l'appui et les bonnes grâces non des hommes qui les devancent et qui ont naturellement pour eux l'avenir, mais au contraire de ceux qui les suivent : c'est ainsi que les progressistes penchent vers les modérés et ceux-ci vers les carlistes.

Du reste, ces trois partis sont parvenus tour-à-tour à leur apogée. Ils ont gouverné ; on a vu ce qu'on pouvait attendre d'eux. Ils ont, à tel point, détruit tout esprit public que,—la jeunesse exceptée — la masse du peuple en est arrivée à douter que la démocratie même, arrivant au pouvoir, effectue les réformes politiques et partant les réformes économiques auxquelles la nation aspire.

Celles que le parti démocratique promet en Espagne sont les suivantes :

Abolition de la conscription et de l'inscription maritime ;

Suppression des passe-ports, des patentes, du timbre et des impôts de peu de valeur ;

Le tabac et le sel libres de tout monopole ;

Suppression des octrois ;

Réduction progressive des droits d'importation et d'exportation jusqu'à suppression entière des douanes ;

Répartition des biens communaux, *realengos* et *valdios* (4) ;

L'armée permanente réduite à des cadres et à quelques corps-modèles ;

Etablissement de la garde-nationale comme garantie contre la tyrannie ;

La contribution directe et les dépenses publiques réduites de moitié ; soit un budget de 600 millions de réaux (1) ;

Nomination des Alcaldes (maires) par le peuple ;

Décentralisation administrative ;

Liberté de la presse : plus de cautionnement ni d'éditeur responsable ;

Suffrage universel libre et sincère ;

Liberté individuelle, liberté d'association, liberté de réunion pacifique ;

(4) Terrenos realengos. Terrains nationaux qui sont généralement sans valeur faute de culture.

Terrenos valdios. Terres incultes qui n'appartiennent pas aux particuliers. Il arrive souvent qu'on ne sait si ces terres sont propriété de la province ou de la commune et que, de fait, elles ne sont possédées par personne.

La répartition de toutes ces terres créerait plusieurs millions de propriétaires.

(1) 150 millions de francs environ.

Liberté d'enseignement. Enseignement primaire gratuit ;

Institution du Jury. Nomination des juges par le peuple ;

Liberté pour la fondation de banques et autres établissements de crédit ;

Séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat : le clergé rétribué directement par les fidèles ;

Asiles pour les infirmes, les malades et les gens sans travail.

Ces idées qui en général sont communes à tous les démocrates de l'Europe, conduiront, en matière économique, à l'impôt unique direct, général et progressif ; c'est-à-dire à un système financier tel que, — contrairement à ce qui a eu lieu jusqu'ici, — les riches seuls paient le gouvernement et qu'ils ne puissent plus augmenter leur opulence à l'ombre d'un budget qui épuise les classes deshéritées et concentre toute la vie dans le pouvoir.

Si les gouvernements adoptent ces réformes ou que les peuples opèrent cette révolution, l'alarme causée par le socialisme cessera aussitôt. Que les docteurs socialistes écrivent alors tout ce qu'ils voudront ; de leurs efforts sortiront des idées et peut-être des essais utiles : on laissera le reste. Mais il arrivera, comme aux États-Unis, que ni ces hommes ni leurs doctrines n'effraieront plus personne. La peur qu'ils inspirent en Europe provient de ce qu'ils ont raison, et il en sera ainsi tant que les gouvernements auront 4 millions de soldats et 1 million de fonctionnaires dont l'entretien exige cette quantité d'impôts indirects qui écrasent les peuples et augmentent le paupérisme. Les palliatifs ne suffisent pas : il faut guérir le mal radicalement.

Ni l'ordre public, ni la propriété n'ont rien à redouter des réformes : l'Union Américaine le prouve. Le danger consiste à ne pas extirper la lèpre Européenne.

Le despotisme s'est expérimenté chez nous, pendant 300 ans. Riche de ses mines du Potose et de ses immenses colonies; habitée par une population morale, travailleuse et résignée; dominée par un gouvernement libre de tout contrôle et intimement uni au clergé; courbée sous l'intolérance religieuse et plongée dans le silence sépulcral qu'entretenait l'inquisition; variée de climats; fermée comme la Chine; dénuée de représentation, de presse, de stimulant; étrangère enfin à toute polémique religieuse ou politique, l'Espagne a été l'école pratique du despotisme. Où tout cela vint-il aboutir? A la catastrophe de 1808, à ce que plus tard on put dire avec quelque raison que l'*Afrique commençait aux Pyrénées* (5), et, en définitive, à ce que la révolution pénétrât dans la Péninsule et dût y passer, sans transition, par les mêmes crises que dans le reste de l'Europe. L'ancien régime a fait son temps, les résultats en ont été les mêmes partout.

Le gouvernement doctrinaire ou modéré n'est pas moins désastreux; plus dispendieux que l'absolutisme ou la dé-

(5) Allusion aux paroles prononcées à la tribune française sous le règne de Louis-Philippe.

L'auteur en appelle de cette injure à tous les hommes intelligents et consciencieux. Le passé glorieux de l'Espagne, ses monuments, les grands hommes qu'elle a produits, son héroïsme récent lui donnent droit au titre de nation européenne civilisée.

Les vertus de ce pays lui sont propres, ses vices proviennent de son gouvernement. La preuve en est dans les provinces *Vascongadas* qui, régies depuis des siècles par le système démocratique des *Fueros*, sont dans un état beaucoup plus prospère que le reste de l'Espagne.

mocratie, il a, en outre, tous les inconvéniens de la liberté sans en offrir les avantages.

La France et l'Espagne en sont un exemple, sous leurs gouvernements doctrinaires, le mécontentement y a été général, les tentatives révolutionnaires fréquentes et la misère de plus en plus grande. L'immoralité y a été à tel point croissante que le champion du système, le journal des débats dût, il y a quelques années, s'écrier : « Rien n'est organisé en Espagne si ce n'est le vol! » En France, il fallut sévir contre les nombreux agioteurs que signalait l'opinion publique, et frapper deux ministres prévaricateurs. Fondé sur l'immoralité, un pareil système ne peut avoir de durée.

La liberté doit être une vérité et non une fiction comme en France et dans les républiques Espagnoles du sud, auquel cas elle ne produit rien de bon parce que le gouvernement a besoin d'être compliqué et corrupteur pour se soutenir sans l'appui de l'opinion publique. La force ou l'opinion, telles sont les uniques bases de tout gouvernement.

Comme les partis ne vivent pas seulement de leur vie intime et de leurs espérances, mais encore du mouvement et de l'esprit qui animent les autres nations, j'ajouterai à ce que j'en ai dit, un aperçu de leurs vues extérieures de telle sorte que leur caractère et leur marche future en deviennent plus évidents.

Les Carlistes rêvent le triomphe complet de la politique Russe; ce qui aurait pour conséquences de donner à Henri V la France, à Don Carlos l'Espagne et à Don Miguel le Portugal; de laisser l'Italie sous la domination de l'Autriche et de rendre obligatoire pour l'Europe l'immense

force armée qui l'opprime et la dévore aujourd'hui.

Les modérés voudraient voir les d'Orléans en France et les Torys en Angleterre. Leurs journaux applaudirent à l'entrée des Russes en Hongrie et à la domination de l'Italie par les Autrichiens. Eux-mêmes intervinrent en 1847 en Portugal et en 1849 à Rome. A l'époque de la révolution française de 48, ils offrirent leur alliance à l'Angleterre qui leur conseilla de laisser le champ libre aux progressistes, et, sous prétexte d'énergie, ils chassèrent l'ambassadeur anglais dont ils auraient été les très humbles esclaves si l'Angleterre leur eût dit qu'ils étaient les hommes nécessaires.

Les progressistes désirent que les Wighs soient toutpuissants en Angleterre quoique ce parti n'ait jamais rien fait pour eux si ce n'est de donner quelques conseils à Marie Christine. En France, ils eussent voulu, au lieu de la république, la régence de la duchesse d'Orléans avec un ministère libéral. Leurs sympathies, à l'égard de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie, sont pour une liberté analogue à celle dont jouit le Piémont.

Les démocrates désirent naturellement que la cause des peuples triomphe partout : pour l'Angleterre, les radicaux; pour la France, une république propagandiste donnant aide et protection aux peuples ; pour l'Italie, la Pologne et la Hongrie, l'indépendance et la liberté. Ils voudraient que l'Allemagne fut, au nord, une autre France qui contint la Russie et que, l'Europe étant unie sous un système radical de vraie liberté et de réformes, on pût supprimer les armées, sceller l'alliance des peuples et abolir les douanes. Alors disparaîtrait toute idée de conquête et de violence et les différends iraient tous finir dans un arbi-

trage général. Ils désirent, en outre, l'union de l'Espagne et du Portugal et l'application du système *foral* (6) des provinces Vascongadas à toute la Péninsule. Ce système est le développement naturel de la Constitution de 1812.

Les 27 dernières années prouvent qu'en Espagne et dans l'Europe, en général, la marche des idées tend à l'établissement d'un système analogue, autant que possible, à celui des Etats-Unis et aussi opposé à l'ancien régime qu'au modérantisme qui n'est que l'hypocrisie de la liberté. Avec leurs armées permanentes, les modérés ne sont, au fond, que des royalistes; ils ne gouvernent point par l'opinion, mais par la force. Craindre quatre brouillons n'est qu'un vain subterfuge; pour les mettre à la raison, il suffirait des quelques mille hommes que l'Europe aurait dans ses cadres, et les honnêtes gens armés sauraient bien protéger la famille et la propriété, c'est ce que l'on prétend défendre, mais, en vérité, on ne défend que les gros budgets.

Pour comprendre que les socialistes ne sont qu'un prétexte, il suffit de remarquer que les socialistes sont nés d'hier et que l'oppression est antique. Le remède contre le socialisme consiste à adopter les grandes réformes surtout les réformes économiques.

J'ai donné dans cette introduction une idée générale

(6) L'administration de ces provinces est indépendantes du gouvernement central. C'est une administration démocratique à peu près semblable à celles des cantons Suisses.

Le système *foral* appliqué à toutes nos provinces serait ce que nous pouvons désirer de mieux.

Toute la force de Don Carlos consista en ce qu'il se posait comme défenseur et soutien des *Fueros*.

des evénements qui se sont accomplis en Espagne pend
la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Dans les livres s
vants, j'entrerai dans de plus grands détails sur ces mê
faits et sur les hommes qui y ont figuré.

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LE

PEUPLE RUSSE

ET

LE SOCIALISME.



LE

PEUPLE RUSSE

ET

LE SOCIALISME.

LETTRE A MONSIEUR J. MICHELET,

Professeur au Collége de France,

PAR

A. HERZEN.

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

Cette lettre, imprimée à Nice en 1851, n'a jamais eu de circulation qu'en Piémont et en Suisse. Presque toute l'édition a été saisie à Marseille par la douane, qui a oublié de la renvoyer, sans égard aux réclamations.

Les temps ont changé ; pourtant, nous pensons que cette lettre ne sera pas dénuée d'intérêt pour le public.

Le célèbre historien a publié sur cette lettre, dans l'*Avénement*, un article plein de sentiments de bienveillance et de sentiments d'amitié personnelle pour l'auteur.



MONSIEUR,

Vous êtes trop haut placé dans l'estime générale, vos paroles sont accueillies par la démocratie européenne avec trop de confiance que votre noble plume vous a si justement conquise, pour qu'il me soit permis, dans une cause qui touche à mes convictions les plus profondes, de laisser sans réponse la caractéristique du peuple russe que vous faites dans votre beau travail sur Kosciusko (1).

Cette réponse est d'autant plus indispensable, qu'il est temps de faire voir à l'Europe qu'en parlant actuellement de la Russie, ce n'est plus d'un absent, d'un éloigné, d'un muet que l'on parle.

(1) Feuilleton du journal l'*Evénement*, depuis le 28 août jusqu'au 17 septembre 1851.

Nous sommes présents, nous qui avons quitté la Russie avec le seul but de faire retentir en Europe la libre verbe russe. La parole devient pour nous un devoir, quand un homme appuyé sur une grande et légitime autorité, vient de nous dire que : " il affirme, " qu'il jure, qu'il prouvera que la Russie n'existe pas, " que les Russes ne sont pas des hommes, qu'il leur " manque le sens moral. "

Voulez-vous parler de la Russie officielle, de l'empire des façades, du gouvernement byzantino-allemand ? D'accord, nous acquiesçons d'avance à tout ce que vous nous direz ; la défense ne nous incombe nullement ; le gouvernement russe a assez d'agents littéraires dans la presse parisienne, pour que les apologies les plus éloquentes lui fassent jamais défaut.

Mais ce n'est plus de la société officielle seule qu'il s'agit dans votre travail : vous avez agité la question

ne *croit* pas à son état actuel, il a la témérité d'es-
érer, et il espère d'autant plus qu'il possède moins.

La période la plus difficile pour le peuple russe approche de sa fin. Une lutte terrible l'attend ; son nemi s'y prépare.

La grande question, le *to be, or not to be* de la ussie, sera bientôt décidée. Mais avant le combat n'a pas le droit de désespérer du résultat.

La question russe acquiert des proportions graves, quiétantes ; on s'en préoccupe vivement dans tous s partis ; mais il me semble qu'on s'occupe trop de Russie du tzar, de la Russie officielle, et trop peu la Russie du peuple, de la Russie occulte.

Et même en ne considérant la Russie qu'à son int de vue gouvernemental, ne croyez-vous pas 'il fût utile de faire plus ample connaissance avec voisin incommode qui sait placer dans chaque coin l'Europe, ici un espion, là une bayonnette? Le uvernement russe touche à la Méditerranée par sa otection de la Porte-Ottomane, au Rhin par sa otection des cousins et beaux-frères d'Allemagne, à l'Atlantique par sa protection de l'*ordre* en ance.

Il faudrait, dis-je, apprécier à sa juste valeur ce otecteur universel, et voir si cet étrange empire eut, en effet, d'autre raison d'existence que cette cation hideuse que s'est donné le gouvernement St-Pétersbourg, d'être une borne jetée au travers la route royale de l'humanité.

L'Europe touche à un cataclysme terrible. Le

monde du moyen-âge finit; le monde féodal se meurt. Les révolutions politiques et religieuses s'affaissent sous le poids de leur impuissance; elles ont accompli de grandes choses, mais elles n'ont pas suffi à leur tâche; elles ont dépouillé le trône et l'autel de leur prestige, sans réaliser la liberté; elles ont allumé dans les cœurs des désirs sans offrir aucun moyen de les satisfaire. Parlementarisme, protestantisme, tout cela n'a été qu'ajournement, salut provisoire, endiguement, qui arrêta pour quelques moments la mort et la naissance. Ce temps est révolu. Depuis 1848, l'on s'aperçoit que ni les réminiscences du droit romain, ni une piètre légalité, ni une maigre philosophie déiste, ni un rationalisme religieux stérile, ne peuvent ajourner l'accomplissement des destinées sociales.

L'orage approche, on ne peut plus s'y méprendre; révolutionnaires et réacteurs en conviennent. Le vertige s'empare de tout le monde; une question lourde, une question de vie et de mort, opprime la poitrine. On est inquiet, agité; on se demande si l'Europe, ce vieux Protée, cet organisme usé, pourra trouver encore assez de force pour opérer sa régénération. On redoute la réponse, on frémit d'incertitude,

La question est grave en effet.

Oui, la vieille Europe pourra-t-elle changer son sang atrophié, et s'élancer à perte de vue dans cet avenir sans bornes qui nous entraîne d'une force irrésistible, passionnée, fatale, vers lequel nous nous précipiterons envers et contre tout, dussions-nous

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passer sur les ruines de nos maisons paternelles, disperser les trésors des civilisations écoulées, et les richesses de la dernière culture ?

Des deux côtés la position est également appréciée. L'Europe rentre dans la nuit morne et épaisse qui doit précéder l'aube de cette lutte décisive. Ce n'est plus une existence, c'est une attente, une anxiété. Tout est renversé. Plus de légalité, plus de justice, plus de simulacre de liberté ; une inquisition laïque et irréligieuse règne en absolue ; les lois sont remplacées par le code soldatesque d'une place assiégée. Une seule force morale préside, dicte et ordonne ; c'est la peur ; elle suffit. Toutes les questions sont repoussées au second plan devant le grand intérêt réactionnaire. Les gouvernements en apparence les plus opposés de principes, se fondent fraternellement dans une seule police œcuménique. L'empereur de Russie, sans cacher sa haine contre les Français, récompense le préfet de la police de Paris ; le roi de Naples, de sa main de geôlier, décore le président de la République. Le roi de Berlin, affublé d'un uniforme russe, court à Varsovie se jeter dans les bras de son ennemi l'empereur d'Autriche sous la bénédiction tutélaire de Nicolas, ce tsar schismatique qui, à son tour, offre ses troupes au Pontife de Rome. Au milieu de ce sabbat, de cette nuit walkyrienne de la réaction, toute sécurité individuelle a disparu ; aucune des garanties qui existent même dans les sociétés les moins avancées, en Chine, en Perse, n'est plus respectée dans les capitales du monde ex-civilisé.

On ne se retrouve plus. Est-ce bien là l'Europe que nous avons connue et aimée ?

En vérité s'il n'y avait pas d'Angleterre, libre et fière, si ce diamant enchâssé dans l'argent de la mer, comme dit Shakespeare, cessait de briller ; si la Suisse par crainte du César, persistait comme l'apôtre Pierre à renier son principe ; si le Piémont, ce seul bras libre et fort de l'Italie, si ce refuge, dis-je, de la civilisation chassée du Nord et se repliant derrière les Alpes sans oser passer les Apennins, venait soudain á se fermer aux sentimens humains ; si, en un mot, ces trois pays allaient être infectés du souffle délétère de Paris et de Vienne, l'on pourrait croire que la dissolution du vieux monde eût déjà été perpétrée par les mains parricides des conservateurs, et que la barbarie eût déjà commencé en France et en Allemagne.

Au milieu de ce chaos, de cette agonie en démence, de cet enfantement douloureux ; au milieu de ce monde qui s'écroule putréfié autour d'un berceau, les regards se dirigent involontairement vers l'Orient.

Pareil à une montagne sombre qui se dégage du brouillard, on y distingue un empire menaçant, hostile ; on dirait même qu'il s'avance comme une avalanche, ou comme un héritier impatient, prêt à accélérer la lenteur des derniers momens du moribond.

Cet empire, inconnu il y a deux siècles, s'est tout à coup presenté grossièrement, et sans invitation sans droit, il est venu s'asseoir, le verbe haut, au concile des souverains de l'Europe, en réclamant

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part du butin, à la conquête duquel il n'avait nullement contribué.

Personne n'osa lui contester ses prétentions de s'immiscer dans les affaires de l'Europe.

Charles XII tenta l'essai, mais son glaive jusque là invincible se brisa à la tâche ; Frédéric II voulut s'opposer aux empiétemens de la cour de Pétersbourg ; Koenigsberg et Berlin tombèrent au pouvoir de l'ennemi du Nord. Le tsar Napoléon pénétra à la tête d'un demi-million d'hommes jusqu'au cœur du géant. Il en sortit furtivement, seul, dans un misérable traineau de poste. L'Europe vit avec stupéfaction la fuite de Napoléon, les nuées de Cosaques volant à sa poursuite, les armées russes s'acheminant vers Paris, et jetant sur leur chemin, à l'Allemagne, l'aumône de son indépendance nationale. Vampire monstrueux, il ne semble exister que pour guetter les fautes des peuples et des rois. Hier nous l'avons vu presque écraser l'Autriche en l'aidant contre la Hongrie, demain nous le verrons proclamer la Marche de Brandebourg, province de l'empire russe, pour donner appui au roi de Berlin.

Et dire que, à la veille du grand combat, l'on sait si peu sur ce nouveau lutteur, arrogant, armé de pied en cap, et prêt à passer la frontière au premier appel de ses amis de la réaction ! A peine connait-on son armure, les couleurs de son drapeau, et l'on se tient à sa parole officielle, à des notions vagues, sans remarquer ce qu'il y a de contradictoire dans tous les récits qui circulent à son sujet.

Les uns ne parlent que de l'omnipotence du tsar, de l'insolence gouvernementale, de la servilité des sujets; les autres disent que l'impérialisme de Pétersbourg n'est point national, que le peuple, courbé sous le double joug du souverain et de la noblesse, souffre l'oppression mais ne l'accepte pas, qu'il n'est pas annihilé mais seulement malheureux. Et pourtant cette même population sert de ciment à ce tout colossal qui l'opprime. D'autres viennent ajouter que le peuple russe est une *vile multitude* d'ivrognes et d'ilotes, et tels autres encore constatent en Russie une race intelligente et bien douée.

Il y a pour moi quelque chose de tragique dans cette distraction sénile, avec laquelle le vieux monde confond toutes les notions concernant son antagoniste.

Dans cet amas d'opinions contradictoires, percent tant de connaissances immobiles, une si triste légèreté, des préjugés tellement tenaces, que, malgré nous, notre regard ne trouve d'autre point de comparaison dans l'histoire que celui de la décadence romaine.

Alors aussi, à la veille de la révolution chrétienne, à la veille de la victoire des barbares, l'on proclamait l'éternité de Rome, la folie impuissante de la secte nazaréenne, et la cécité des dangers qu'annonçait le mouvement du monde barbare.

C'est à vous, Monsieur, que revient à juste titre le mérite d'avoir parlé le premier en France de la Russie pepalaire; vous aviez déjà appliqué la main sur

e cœur, sur la source même de la vie ; la vérité allait aillir sous la pression de votre puissant génie, quand oudain par un mouvement de colère vous avez retiré ette main fraternelle, et la source aussitôt vous a apparu troublée et confuse.

J'ai lu, avec une profonde douleur, vos paroles irritées. Triste, le cœur gros, je cherchais en vain, je l'avoue, l'historien, le philosophe, et plus que tout cela, l'homme aimant que nous connaissons tous. J'ai hâte de le dire ; j'ai parfaitement apprécié la cause de votre indignation : la sympathie pour la malheureuse Pologne a parlé par vous. Nous aussi nous la connaissons, Monsieur, la sympathie pour nos frères polonais, et chez nous ce n'est pas de la compassion, c'est du remords, c'est de la honte. Aimer la Pologne ! nous l'aimons tous, mais est-ce bien la conséquence inévitable de ce sentiment que de lui victimer un peuple également malheureux, un peuple qui a dû prêter ses mains garrotées à un gouvernement féroce pour commettre des crimes ? Soyons généreux, et n'oublions pas que nous venons de voir un peuple qui, armé du suffrage universel et de baïonnettes citoyennes, n'en a pas moins consenti au rétablissement de l'ordre de Varsovie à Rome ; ne voyons-nous pas aujourd'hui.... mais regardez plutôt ce qui se passe sous vos yeux.... et pourtant nous ne disons pas que les Français ont cessé d'être hommes ; nous attendons.

Il est temps d'oublier cette lutte malheureuse entre des frères ; parmi nous, il n'y a pas de vainqueur ; la

Pologne ainsi que la Russie succombent à un ennemi commun. Le martyr, l'offensé lui-même, se détourne d'un passé également douloureux pour nous tous. L'ami illustre que vous citez, le grand poète Mickiewicz, en est une preuve.

Ne dites pas, Monsieur, en parlant des opinions du barde polonais, que c'est "de la clémence, que "ce sont des erreurs de saints." Non; ce sont là des fruits d'une longue et consciencieuse méditation, d'une intuition profonde des destinées du monde slave. Il est beau de pardonner à ses ennemis, mais il est quelque chose de plus humain encore : c'est de les comprendre, car comprendre c'est déjà absoudre, réhabiliter, se réconcilier.

—Le monde slave tend à s'unir ; cette tendance apparaît immédiatement après la période napoléonnienne. L'idée d'une fédération slave germait déjà dans les plans révolutionnaires de Pestel et de Mouravieff. Plusieurs Polonais ont pris part à la conspiration russe.

Lorsque la révolution de 1830 éclata à Varsovie, le peuple russe ne manifesta aucune animosité contre les rebelles du tsar ; la jeunesse était, cœur et âme, pour la cause polonaise. Je me rappelle avec quel enthousiasme nous nous précipitions vers les nouvelles de Varsovie ; nous avons pleuré comme des enfans au récit du service funèbre célébré dans la capitale de la Pologne, en honneur de nos martyrs de Pétersbourg. La sympathie pour les Polonais nous exposait à des punitions criminelles ; il fallait la refouler dans son cœur et se taire.

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Il est possible qu'un sentiment d'animosité, sentiment d'ailleurs parfaitement mérité, et celui d'un patriotisme exclusif, avait prédominé encore en Pologne lors de la guerre de 1830. Depuis, Mickiewicz, les travaux philologiques et historiques de plusieurs écrivains slaves, une connaissance plus approfondie des peuples européens acquise pendant le triste pélerinage de l'émigration, ont donné aux idées une tout autre direction. Les Polonais ont senti que la guerre n'était pas entre eux et le peuple russe ; ils ont compris qu'ils ne pouvaient combattre autrement que POUR LEUR LIBERTÉ ET LA NOTRE, ainsi que le disait l'inscription sublime de leur drapeau révolutionnaire.

L'héroïque émissaire Konarski, qui fut en 1839 torturé et fusillé à Vilna, appelait à la révolte les Russes et les Polonais sans distinction de nationalité. La Russie le remercia d'une manière qui fut aussi tragique que tout ce quelle fait depuis qu'une botte à l'allemande foule sa poitrine.

Un jeune homme enthousiaste, ardent, dévoué, officier russe du régiment en garnison à la forteresse, Moravaeff, résolut de sauver Konarski. Son jour de service arrivait ; il avait déjà tout préparé pour la fuite, quand, trahi par un malheureux co-accusé du martyr polonais, il se vit déjoué dans son projet. Le jeune homme fut arrêté ; chargé de fers, il est allé expier, aux mines de la Sibérie, le réveil d'un devoir supérieur à sa consigne. On n'a jamais entendu parler de lui.

J'ai passé cinq années en exil, dans les provinces éloignées de l'empire; j'ai eu l'occasion d'y rencontrer une grande quantité de Polonais exilés; il y en a dans chaque ville de district, des familles entières ou des malheureux isolés. Je m'en rapporterais volontiers à leur témoignage; j'en suis convaincu, que la sympathie ne leur a pas fait défaut parmi les habitants du pays. Il est bien entendu, Monsieur, que je ne parle ici ni de la police, ni de la haute hiérarchie militaire. Cette dernière ne se distingue nulle part par son amour pour la liberté, et encore moins en Russie. Je pourrais aussi vous citer les étudians polonais envoyés chaque an dans les universités russes, afin d'être tenus loin des écoles polonaises; qu'ils racontent l'accueil que leur faisaient partout leurs nouveaux camarades. Ils nous quittaient les larmes aux yeux.

Vous vous rappelez, Monsieur, qu'en 1847, à Paris, lorsque les émigrés polonais célébraient l'anniversaire de leur révolution, un Russe se présenta à leur tribune pour demander l'amitié et l'oubli du passé. C'était notre malheureux ami Michel Bakounine. Au reste je ne veux pas seulement en appeler à l'exemple d'un de mes compatriotes. Je choisis parmi ceux que l'on croit être nos ennemis, un homme que vous-même avez nommé dans votre belle légende sur Kosciusko. Interrogez à ce sujet le Nestor de la démocratie polonaise, demandez des renseignements à M. Biernacki, l'un des ministres de la Pologne révolutionnaire. Je m'en rapporte à cette noble intel-

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ligence, que d'ailleurs de longs malheurs auraient certainement pu aigrir contre tout ce qui porte le nom de Russe; il ne démentira pas mes paroles.

La solidarité qui lie la Pologne et la Russie entre elles d'abord et au monde slave ensuite, ne peut plus être contestée; elle apparaît dans toute son évidence. Plus encore; sans la Russie, le monde slave n'a pas d'avenir; sans la Russie, il se fondra, il avortera, il sera absorbé par l'élément germanique; il deviendra autrichien, il ne sera pas lui-même. Or, je ne crois pas que telles soient ni sa maison ni sa destinée.

En suivant le développement successif de votre idée, je dois vous avouer, Monsieur, qu'il m'est impossible d'accepter le raisonnement par lequel vous tâchez de prouver que l'Europe entière ne soit qu'une personne, dont chaque nation forme un organe indispensable.

Il me semble que toutes les nations germano-romaines sont nécessaires au monde européen, parce qu'elles existent, mais qu'il serait difficile de prouver qu'elles existent parce qu'elles étaient nécessaires. Aristote déjà, distinguait la nécessité préexistante de la nécessité postérieure. La nature accepte la fatalité des faits accomplis, mais il y a grande fluctuation et variété dans la possibilité des faits réalisables. Ce n'est donc qu'à ce titre que le monde slave a le droit de revendiquer son unité; d'autant plus qu'une même race le compose.

La centralisation est contraire au génie slave; la fédération, en revanche, découle de sa nature. Une

fois groupé et lié ensemble dans une association de peuples libres et autonomes, le monde slave pourra enfin commencer sa véritable existence historique. Son passé ne peut être considéré qu'au point de vue d'une préparation, d'une croissance, d'un purgatoire. Les formes historiques de l'état ne correspondaient jamais à l'idée nationale des Slaves, idéal vague, instinctif, si vous voulez, mais par là même accusant une singulière vitalité dans l'avenir. Les Slaves apportaient dans tout ce qu'ils faisaient, une étrange demi-attention, voire même, une apathie étonnante. Ainsi nous voyons la Russie entière passer de l'idolâtrie au christianisme, sans secousse, sans révolte, uniquement par obéissance passive aux ordres du grand-prince Wladimer, et sous l'influence de Kiev. On précipita sans regret les vieilles idoles dans le Volkhof, on se soumit au nouveau dieu comme à une nouvelle idole.

Huit siècles après, une partie de la Russie acceptait également la civilisation commanditée à l'étranger et munie d'estampille allemande.

Le monde slave ressemble à une femme qui n'a pas encore aimé, et qui par là même paraît ne prendre aucun intérêt à tout ce qui se passe autour d'elle; être inutile; oubliée, étrangère. Mais ne préjugeons pas de l'avenir; la femme est jeune et déjà une agitation inquiète soulève son cœur et le fait tressaillir.

Quant à la richesse du génie national, il nous suffit de montrer la Pologne, le seul peuple slave qui avait, en même temps, des périodes de force et de liberté.

HUNGARI NEW LE WAY

Le monde slave ne paraît hétérogène qu'à la surface. Sous la couche supérieure de la Pologne chevaleresque, libérale et catholique, et de la Russie impériale, assujettie et byzantine ; sous la domination démocratique du Vayvode serbe, sous la bureaucratie autrichienne qui pèse sur l'Illyrie, sur la Dalmatie et sur le Banat ; sous le pouvoir patriarcal des Osmanlis, et sous la bénédiction du Vladicà de Monténégro, il repose un peuple physiologiquement, ethnographiquement homogène.

La grande partie de ces populations slaves n'ont presque jamais subi l'esclavage d'une race conquérante. La dépendance dans laquelle se trouvaient divers membres du monde slave, se bornait le plus souvent à la reconnaissance de la souveraineté et à l'acquittement du tribut. Tel a été par exemple le caractère de la domination mongole en Russie. Les Slaves parvinrent ainsi à garder à travers les siècles leur nationalité, leurs mœurs, leur langue.

Or, d'après ce que nous venons de dire, la Russie ne pourrait-elle pas être le noyau de cette cristallisation, le centre vers lequel gravitât le monde slave, et cela d'autant plus que, jusqu'à présent, c'est la seule partie de la grande race qui se trouve provisoirement organisée en un état fort et indépendant.

Cette question n'impliquerait aucun doute si le gouvernement de Pétersbourg avait le moindre instinct de sa vocation nationale, si une idée humaine quelconque pouvait s'allier à ce despotisme désespérant et borné. Mais, dans la situation

actuelle, quel serait l'homme d'un peu de conscience, d'un peu d'honnêteté, qui oserait proposer aux Slaves occidentaux la réunion avec un empire soumis à un état de siège permanent, où le sceptre n'est qu'un ignoble bâton de caporal assommant par la schlague ?

Le panslavisme impérial, tel qu'il a été prôné jusqu'aujourd'hui par des hommes vendus ou égarés, n'a, bien entendu, rien de commun avec toute combinaison basée sur le principe de la liberté.

Ici, la logique même nous amène, inévitablement, à la question la plus grave, la plus légitime.

En supposant que le monde slave ait quelque possibilité d'une existence plus développée dans l'avenir, quel serait l'élement assez prononcé dans son état embryonnal, qui aurait le droit à ce développement ? Si les Slaves pensent que leur temps soit venu, l'élément dont je viens de parler, doit nécessairement correspondre à l'idée révolutionnaire de l'Europe.

Vous l'avez indiqué, vous l'avez touché, Monsieur, mais vous l'avez laissé échapper d'entre vos mains en essuyant une généreuse larme de compassion pour la Pologne.

Vous prétendez que " la base de l'existence du " peuple russe, est le *communaisme*," vous affirmez que " sa force lui est donnée par une sorte de loi agraire " par le partage continuel des terres."

Quel terrible *Mané-Thékèl* venez-vous prononcer ..... Communisme pour base ! partage des terres

pour force! Comment, Monsieur, ne vous êtes-vous pas effrayé vous-même en proférant ces paroles?

Ne fallait il pas s'arrêter, approfondir, ne pas lâcher la question, avant de vous être convaincu si c'était là une vérité ou un rêve?

Comme s'il y avait d'autres études, d'autres questions sérieuses au XIXe siècle, que la question communiste, que la question du partage des terres!

Entraîné par votre indignation, vous continuez: "il leur manque (aux Russes) l'attribut essentiel de "l'homme, la faculté morale, le sens du bien et du "mal. Le vrai et le juste n'ont aucun sens pour eux; "parlez-en, ils restent muets, ils sourient, ils ne "savent ce que vous voulez dire." Quels sont donc ces Russes, Monsieur, auxquels vous avez parlé; ou bien quelles sont ces notions du juste et du vrai que les Russes ne puissent pas comprendre? Car dans un temps si profondément révolutionnaire, il ne suffit pas seulement de citer les mots du *vrai* et du *juste* Ces mots n'ont plus de sens absolu et également obligatoire pour tous.

Le juste et le vrai de la vieille Europe, c'est le faux et l'injuste pour l'Europe naissante.

Les peuples, Monsieur, sont des produits de la nature; l'histoire n'est qu'une continuation progressive du développement animal. Nous n'avançons guère en envisageant la nature au point de vue approbatif ou improbatif; elle ne s'attend ni au prix Monthyon ni à un verdict de culpabilité. Ces catégories éthiques ne la saisissent pas; tout cela est trop

subjectif pour elle. Il me semble qu'en général
peuples ne sont ni totalement bons ni foncière
mauvais ; les peuples sont toujours vrais ; le pe
mensonge n'existe pas. La nature ne produit q
qui est réalisable selon les conditions données :
pousse en avant ce qui existe, par cette sainte a
[illegible], par cette inquiétude créatrice, par cette
[illegible] de se réaliser ; désir continuel et com
[illegible] ce qui vit.

Certains peuples peuvent avoir une existence a
[illegible]torique, d'autres une existence extra-histo
[illegible] *une fois entrés* dans le grand courant
[illegible] et indivisible, appartiennent à l'hu
[illegible], et réciproquement tout le passé de l'hum
[illegible]. Dans la grande histoire, c'est-à-
[illegible] la partie active et progressive de l'humani
aristocratie de l'angle facial s'efface peu à peu co

tout aussi justes à l'hégémonie universelle, pâlit, se décomposa, s'éteignit, et l'humanité inhumaine passa outre.

D'un autre côté, il me serait difficile, sans taxer toute la nature d'absurdité et de démence, d'accepter comme une race maudite, comme un mensonge, comme une juxta-position d'êtres qui ne sont pas hommes mais qui en ont toute la crapule, une nation qui s'est formée pendant dix siècles, qui a obstinément persisté à sauver sa nationalité, qui s'est soudée en un grand empire, et qui se mêle à l'histoire, beaucoup plus peut-être qu'il ne le faudrait.

Et tout cela m'est d'autant plus incompréhensible que la nation en question n'est nullement stationnaire au dire même de ses ennemis. Ce n'est pas là une population, qui, parvenue à une forme sociale assez correspondante à ses désirs, s'endort dans un *semper idem* comme la Chine; c'est encore moins une nation qui s'est survécue et qui dépérit actuellement dans un marasme sénil, comme les Hindous. Au contraire, la Russie est un empire tout nouveau, un édifice où tout respire encore l'odeur fraîche de la chaux, où tout travaille, se dégage, où rien n'est encore arrivé à son but, où l'on change continuellement, très-souvent de mal en pis, mais enfin où l'on change. C'est là un peuple, en un mot, qui a, d'après votre opinion, un étrange communisme pour base, et le partage des terres pour force....

Après tout, Monsieur, que reprochez-vous au peuple russe? quel est le fond de votre accusation?

" Le Russe, dites-vous, ment, vole, ment toujours, " vole toujours, et cela innocemment ; c'est sa " nature."

Je ne m'arrête pas, Monsieur, à la trop grande généralité de cette observation, mais je voudrais pouvoir vous poser cette simple question : qui donc est le trompé, le volé, le dupé ? Eh mon Dieu, c'est le seigneur, c'est l'employé de l'Etat, c'est l'intendant, c'est le juge, c'est l'agent de police, en d'autres termes, les ennemis jurés du paysan qu'il considère comme apostats, comme traîtres, comme demi-Allemands. Dépourvu de tout moyen de défense, il ruse avec ses oppresseurs, il les trompe, et en cela il agit parfaitement bien. La ruse, Monsieur, a dit un grand penseur, c'est l'ironie de la force brutale (1).

Le paysan russe avec son horreur pour la propriété territoriale, comme vous l'avez très bien remarqué, le paysan, dis-je, nonchalant, insouciant par nature, s'est vu, peu à peu et sans bruit, pris dans les filets de la bureaucratie allemande et du pouvoir seigneurial. Il a subi ce joug dégradant, avec une passivité désespérante, j'en conviens, mais il n'a jamais *ajouté foi* ni aux droits du seigneur, ni à la justice du tribunal, ni à l'équité de l'administration. Depuis bientôt deux siècles, toute son existence n'est qu'une opposition sourde, négative, à l'ordre actuel des choses ; il endure l'oppression, il la souffre, mais il ne trempe en rien dans ce qui se fait en dehors des communes rurales.

(1) Hégel, Œuvres posthumes.

L'idée du tsar exerce encore un prestige sur les paysans ; ce n'est point le tsar Nicolas que le peuple vénère, c'est un idée abstraite, un mythe, c'est une Providence, c'est un vengeur, c'est un représentant de la justice dans l'imagination populaire.

Après le souverain, le clergé seul pourrait avoir une influence morale sur la Russie orthodoxe. Le haut clergé représente uniquement dans le gouvernement la vieille Russie ; le clergé ne s'est jamais rasé la barbe ; par cela même il est resté du côté populaire. Le peuple a confiance dans les paroles d'un moine. Cependant les moines et le haut clergé, tout voués qu'ils se disent aux intérêts d'outre tombe, ne se préoccupent guère du peuple. Le "pope" a perdu toute influence à force de cupidité, d'ivrognerie et de relations intimes avec la police. Ici encore, le peuple estime l'idée et non l'homme.

Quant aux sectaires, ceux-là détestent l'idée et l'homme, le tsar et le pope.

En dehors du tsar et du clergé, tous les autres éléments de la société et de l'administration restent complètement étrangers, radicalement hostiles au peuple. Le paysan est mis, littéralement, hors la loi ; la justice se garde bien de le protéger, et toute sa participation à l'ordre existant se borne au double impôt qui l'écrase : l'impôt du sang, l'impôt de la sueur. Aussi, pauvre déshérité, comprend-il instinctivement, qu'on le gouverne non pour lui mais contre lui, que le problème entier du gouvernement et des seigneurs ne consiste qu'à lui extorquer le plus de travail, et le

plus d'argent possible. Comprenant cela, et d
d'un esprit délié, subtil, il les trompe tous et parto
Il n'en saurait être autrement, car s'il leur disai
vérité, cela serait déjà de sa part une sanction, u
acceptation de leur pouvoir ; et s'il ne les volait
(remarquez bien que l'on accuse le paysan de
quand il cache une partie du produit de son travai
il reconnaîtrait fatalement la justice de leurs e
gences, les droits des propriétaires, et l'équité d
juges.

Il faut avoir observé le paysan russe devant
tribunal pour bien apprécier sa position ; il faut av
vu de ses propres yeux son œil morne et consterné
le profond silence de sa bouche, l'expression scrut
trice de son regard, pour comprendre que c'est là
prisonnier de guerre civile devant un conseil mi
taire, un voyageur devant une bande de brigand
On s'aperçoit tout d'abord, que la victime n'a pas
moindre confiance dans ces êtres hostiles, acharn
implacables, qui le questionnent, le torturent et
dépouillent. Il sait que s'il a de l'argent, il sera
quitté ; s'il est pauvre, il sera condamné sans répit.

Le peuple parle un russe un peu ancien ; le gr
fier, le juge écrivent la langue moderne bureauc
tique, dépravée et à peine compréhensible. I
remplissent des in-folios de fautes grammaticales,
les débitent le plus vite possible au paysan ; c'est s
affaire à lui de comprendre ce grondement nasillar
sans accentuation, et d'aviser à son salut. Il le sa
aussi se tient-il sur ses gardes ; il ne dira jamais

seul mot de trop, rien ne transpire à travers son agitation, il reste là, l'air hébété, comme un nigaud, comme un muet.

Le paysan sort du tribunal aussi triste lorsqu'il est acquitté, qu'après sa condamnation. Il ne voit dans les deux cas que l'arbitraire ou le hasard.

C'est ainsi que cité comme témoin à charge, il est parvenu à mentir sous serment, à nier tout, à nier toujours, même lorsque les preuves sont irrécusables. Aux yeux du peuple russe, un homme condamné n'est pas pour cela flétri. Les déportés, les forçats, se nomment dans la langue du peuple *les malheureux*.

Le peuple russe n'a vécu que de la vie communale ; il ne comprend ses droits et ses devoirs que par rapport aux communes et à leurs membres. Hors d'elles, il ne reconnaît pas de devoirs et ne voit que de la violence. Le côté funeste de son caractère, c'est qu'il se soumette à ces violences, et non point qu'il les nie à sa manière, et qu'il cherche à s'abriter derrière la ruse. Il y a beaucoup plus de franchise à mentir devant un juge que l'on sait être agent d'un pouvoir inique, que de feindre le respect pour le verdict d'un jury trié par un préfet, dont l'iniquité révoltante est claire comme le jour. Le peuple ne respecte ses institutions que lorsqu'il y retrouve ses propres notions du droit et de la justice.

Il est un fait incontestable pour tout homme qui a observé de près le peuple russe. Entre eux, les paysans se trompent rarement ; ils manifestent les uns pour les autres une confiance presque illimitée,

ils ne connaissent ni contrats ni compromis par écri

Les questions d'arpentage sont nécessairement trè compliquées, grâce à l'éternel partage des ter d'après le nombre d'ouvriers, (1) et pourtant la cam pagne russe ne retentit jamais ni de plaintes ni d procès. Le seigneur, le gouvernement ne demande qu'à intervenir; l'occasion, les motifs leur manquen Les petits différends qui surgissent sont promptemen terminés par les anciens ou par la commune; tout l monde se soumet franchement à leur décision. L même chose a lieu dans les communes mobiles de associations ouvrières (artèl). Il existe des associa tions de maçons, de charpentiers, et autres, formée de plusieurs centaines d'individus appartenant à di communes différentes qui se groupent pour un tem donné, pour une année par exemple, et forment ain l'artèl. L'année révolue, les ouvriers partagent l produit selon le travail de chacun et d'après la déci sion de tous les associés. La police n'a jamais l satisfaction d'intervenir dans leurs comptes. J'ajoute encore, que l'association répond presque toujour pour chaque ouvrier.

Les liens entre les paysans d'une même commun se resserrent davantage quand la population se com pose non pas d'orthodoxes mais de sectaires. L gouvernement exécute parfois une sauvage irruptio dans quelque commune sectaire; il emprisonne, déporte, le tout sans plan arrêté, sans suite, sans pro vocation, sans nécessité aucune, tout simplemen

(1) Et non d'après le nombre des enfants.

pour répondre aux injonctions du clergé ou aux rapports de la police. C'est dans ces chasses aux sectaires qu'il faut voir réellement ce que c'est que le paysan russe, et quelle solidarité le lie à ses frères. Il faut le voir alors, dis-je, déjouant la police, sauvant ses co-religionnaires, cachant les livres et les vases sacrés, subissant les plus inhumaines tortures sans proférer une seule parole. Qu'on me trouve l'exemple d'une commune sectaire, dénoncée par un paysan, même par un orthodoxe ?

Ce caractère du Russe, rend les enquêtes policières extrêmement difficiles. Je l'en félicite de tout mon cœur. Le paysan russe n'a d'autre moralité que celle qui découle instinctivement, naturellement, de son communisme ; elle est profondément nationale ; le peu qu'il connaît de l'Évangile le soutient ; l'iniquité flagrante du gouvernement et du seigneur le lie encore plus à ses coutumes et à sa commune. (1)

(1) Les paysans d'une commune qui appartenait au prince Kosloffsky, achetèrent leur affranchissement, en payant une somme convenue au propriétaire. Le sol a été partagé entre les paysans en raison de la somme pour laquelle chacun a contribué au rachat de sa liberté. Cet arrangement semblait aussi juste que naturel. Cependant les paysans le trouvèrent si incommode et si peu conforme à leur habitude, qu'ils résolurent de répartir entre eux le montant de la somme de rachat, comme une simple dette de la commune et de procéder au partage du terrain d'après le système généralement adopté. C'est Haxthausen qui raconte ce fait dans ses *Etudes sur la vie populaire en Russie*. L'auteur lui-même a visité la commune en question.

— M. Tegoborski, membre du conseil d'Etat en Russie, dans un ouvrage *dédié* à l'empereur Nicolas, publié récemment à Paris,

La commune a sauvé l'homme du peuple de la barbarie mongole et du tsarisme civilisateur, des seigneurs vernis à l'européenne et de la bureaucratie allemande ; l'organisme communal a résisté, quoique

dit que le système du partage des terres lui paraît être défavorable à la culture (toujours de l'agriculture pour l'agriculture), mais il ajoute : " ce sont des inconvénients auxquels il est très difficile de remédier, car ce système du partage se rattache à l'organisation de nos communes, à laquelle il *serait dangereux de toucher* ; il repose sur l'idée fondamentale de l'unité de la commune et de l'égalité des droits qu'a chacun de ses membres à une part proportionnée du sol appartenant à la communauté. Par là, il consolide et fortifie l'esprit communal qui est un des éléments les plus conservateurs de l'organisation sociale. C'est en même temps un des meilleurs préservatifs contre l'invasion du prolétariat et des idées communistes. " (C'est facile à concevoir qu'un peuple qui possède des pratiques de la communauté n'ait pas beaucoup à craindre les idées communistes.) " Ce qui est remarquable, c'est le bon sens et la pratique avec lesquels nos paysans modifient eux-mêmes, selon les circonstances locales, les inconvénients de ce système ; c'est la facilité avec laquelle ils s'arrangent entre eux pour compenser les inégalités résultant de la qualité du sol, et la confiance avec laquelle chacun se soumet aux décisions des anciens de la commune — On devrait croire que ces sortes de répartitions de terrains, souvent renouvelées, donnent lieu à de nombreuses contestations et pourtant les intéressés ont rarement recours à l'intervention de l'autorité. Ce fait, *très surprenant en lui-même*, s'explique par une seule cause, savoir que ce système, quelque vicieux qu'il puisse être, s'est tellement identifié avec les mœurs et les idées, que les paysans en supportent sans mécontentement tous les inconvénients.

" Autant, dit le même auteur, l'idée de l'association est innée au paysan russe et se reproduit dans toutes les phases de la vie, autant l'esprit de corporation, l'esprit municipal, qui a formé le noyau de la bourgeoisie occidentale, est contraire à ses mœurs.

(*Etudes sur les forces productives de la Russie, par M. Tegborski, tome premier, page* 142 *et page* 331.)

fortement atteint, aux empiétemens du pouvoir; il s'est heureusement conservé jusqu'au développement du socialisme en Europe.

Pour la Russie c'est là un fait providentiel.

L'autocratie russe entre dans une nouvelle phase. Issue d'une révolution anti-nationale, elle a rempli sa mission; elle a réalisé un empire colossal, une armée nombreuse, une centralisati n administrative. Dénuée de principes, de traditions, elle n'a plus rien à faire; elle s'est donnée, il est vrai, une autre tâche, celle d'importer en Russie la civilisation occidentale, et elle y réussissait assez tant qu'elle faisait semblant de persister dans ce beau rôle de gouvernement civilisateur.

Ce rôle, elle l'a abdiqué aujourd'hui.

Le gouvernement qui avait rompu avec le peuple au nom de la civilisation, se hâta, un siècle après, de rompre avec la civilisation au nom de l'absolutisme.

Il le fit, aussitôt qu'il entrevit à travers les tendances civilisatrices, le spectre tricolore du libéralisme; il essaya alors de revenir vers la nationalité, vers le peuple. C'était impossible; le peuple et le gouvernement n'avaient plus entre eux rien de commun; le premier s'était déshabitué de l'autre, tandis que ce dernier croyait voir surgir du fond des masses un spectre beaucoup plus terrible, le spectre rouge. Tout bien pesé, le libéralisme était encore moins dangereux qu'un autre Pougatcheff. La panique et le dégoût des idées libérales devinrent tels, que

réciproquement, et

Faire de l'autocr
possible à la longue
stérile.

L'on s'en aperçoi
en Europe. La di
partout elle e. voie d
des menaces, des pr
se considère comme
mands; il se mêle
petites cours; c'est l
gène les uns, donne
Cela ne suffit pas à
gendarme de la ter
tions, de toutes les b
tant du principe mo
des airs aristocratic
Bourbon ou un Plan
étaient des Cavendi
rency.

Malheureusement
la monarchie féodale
passé, son idée soci
napoléonien de Pét

triste nécessité historique, une utilité passagère, et aucun principe.

Et le Palais d'hiver devient, comme la cîme d'une montagne à la fin de la saison, de plus en plus couvert de neige et de glace. La sève qu'on y a fait monter artificiellement, se retire de ces sommités sociales ; il ne leur reste que la force matérielle et la dureté d'un rocher apte encore à résister quelque temps aux vagues révolutionnaires, qui viennent se briser à leur pied.

Nicolas, entouré de ses généraux, de ministres, d'officiers, de bureaucrates, brave cet isolement, mais il s'assombrit à vue d'œil, il devient triste, préoccupé. Il voit qu'il n'est point aimé ; il s'aperçoit du morne silence qui l'entoure et qui donne libre accès aux mugissements lointains qui semblent s'approcher. Le tsar veut s'oublier lui-même ; il proclamé hautement que son but est l'accroissement du pouvoir impérial.

Ces professions de foi n'ont en elles rien de nouveau ; il a travaillé vingt-cinq ans sans repos, sans relâche, pour ce seul et unique but ; il n'a rien épargné, ni les larmes ni le sang.

Tout lui a réussi ; il a détruit la nationalité polonaise ; en Russie, il a éteint le libéralisme.

En vérité, qu'a-t-il donc de plus à désirer ? pourquoi est-il sombre ?

L'empereur sent bien que la Pologne n'est pas morte. A la place du libéralisme qu'il persécutait par une intolérance mesquine, car cette fleur exotique ne pouvait pousser sur le sol russe, n'ayant rien de com-

mun avec le peuple, il voit une autre question s'élev
comme un nuage gros de tempêtes.

Le peuple commence à frémir, à s'agiter sous l
joug de la noblesse; les révoltes partielles éclate
en permanence; vous même, Monsieur, en citez u
exemple terrible.

Le parti du mouvement, du progrès, demand
l'émancipation des paysans; il est prêt à sacrifier s
droits le premier. Le tzar flotte indécis, il perd l
tête, il désire l'émancipation et l'empêche.

Il a compris que l'émancipation des paysans équ
valait à l'émancipation de la terre; et que l'eman
cipation de la terre, à son tour, inaugurerait un
révolution sociale et consacrerait ainsi le communism
rural. Esquiver la question de l'affranchissement m
semble impossible; réserver la solution pour le règn
suivant, c'est plus facile; mais c'est lâche, et en fi
de compte, ce n'est qu'une heure de plus perdue
un mauvais relais de poste sans chevaux....

Maintenant vous pouvez apprécier, Monsieur, que
bonheur c'est pour la Russie, que la commune rural
ne s'est pas dissoute, que la propriété individuell
n'a pas brisé la possession communiste; quel bonheu
pour le peuple russe, d'être resté en dehors de tou
mouvement politique, en dehors même de la civilisa
tion européenne, qui, nécessairement, lui aurait min
sa commune, et qui aujourd'hui elle-même arrive pa
le socialisme à sa propre négation.

L'Europe, je l'ai dit ailleurs, n'a pas résolu l'anti
nomie entre l'individu et l'Etat, mais elle en a pos

le problème ; la Russie, elle non plus, n'a pas trouvé la solution. C'est en présence de cette question que commence notre égalité.

L'Europe, à son premier pas dans la révolution sociale, rencontre ce peuple qui lui apporte une réalisation rudimentaire, demi-sauvage, mais enfin une réalisation quelconque du partage continuel des terres parmi les ouvriers agricoles. Et notez, Monsieur, que ce grand exemple ne vient point de la Russie civilisée, mais bien du peuple lui-même, de sa vie intérieure. Nous autres, Russes passés par la civilisation occidentale, nous ne sommes tout au plus qu'un moyen, qu'un levain, que des truchements entre le peuple russe et l'Europe révolutionnaire. L'homme de la Russie future, c'est le *mougik*, comme l'homme de la France régénérée sera l'*ouvrier*.

Mais s'il en est ainsi, le peuple russe n'aura-il pas droit à un peu plus d'indulgence de votre part, Monsieur !

Pauvre paysan ! si intelligent, si simple de mœurs, se contentant de si peu ; on l'a choisi pour point de mire à toutes les iniquités ; l'empereur le décime par les conscriptions ; le seigneur lui vole son troisième jour ; le *tchinovnik* lui soutire son dernier rouble ; le paysan se tait, il souffre, mais il ne désespère pas ; il garde sa commune. On en arrache un membre—la commune se referme et se resserre davantage ; le sort de ce malheureux est digne de pitié, et cependant il n'émeut pas ; au lieu de le plaindre, on l'accuse.

Vous lui niez, Monsieur, le dernier refuge qui lui



"père?"

Et c'est ainsi
non pas à l'appréc
des autres peuples
vos belles légende

Il est de mon
sujet.

La famille, che
veloppée: c'est là
de cette race, la l

La famille poss
de la commune.

La famille rur
sieurs foyers; l'or
tions vivant sous l
lement par un gr
femme, généralen
partout dans la cl
à être respectée l
la famille.

Il n'est point
affaires confiée à
cheveux blancs

Passons aux seigneurs dans leurs rapports avec la famille serve.

Mais pour la clarté du récit, distinguons la norme des abus, les droits des crimes.

Le droit du seigneur n'a jamais existé chez les Slaves.

Le propriétaire ne peut légalement exiger ni les prémices d'un mariage, ni l'infidélité aux liens conjugaux. Si la loi était exécutée en Russie, il serait puni également pour le viol d'une femme serve, comme pour un attentat contre une femme libre ; c'est-à-dire qu'il encourrait les travaux forcés ou l'exil en Sibérie, avec perte de tous ses droits, selon la gravité des circonstances. Telle est la loi ; regardons les faits.

Je ne prétends point contester qu'avec la position sociale que le gouvernement a faite aux seigneurs, il ne leur soit très facile de débaucher les filles et les femmes de leurs serfs. A force d'oppression, de punitions, le seigneur trouvera toujours des maris qui lui céderont leurs femmes, des pères qui lui amèneront leurs filles, tout comme ce brave gentilhomme français, des *Mémoires de Peuchot*, qui implorait, en plein dix-huitième siècle, la grâce spéciale de placer sa fille dans le Parc-aux-Cerfs.

Il n'est pas étonnant non plus que le père et le mari les plus honnêtes, ne puissent trouver justice contre le seigneur, grâce à la belle organisation judiciaire en Russie ; tous les deux se verront alors dans la position de M. Tiercelin, auquel Louis XV

fit voler, par M. Berryer, sa fille âgée de onze ans. Toutes ces sales infamies sont parfaitement possibles, je l'avoue; il suffit d'en appeler au souvenir de ceux qui connaissent les mœurs grossières et dépravées d'une partie de la noblesse russe; mais quant au paysan, celui-ci est bien loin d'être indifférent au dévergondage de ses maîtres.

Permettez-moi de vous en citer une preuve:

La moitié des seigneurs assassinés par leurs paysans (les documents statistique en portent le chiffre de soixante à soixante-dix par an) tombent victimes de leurs exploits érotiques. Les procès sont rares; le paysan sait que le tribunal reste invariablement sourd à ses plaintes; mais il a une hache, il la manie d'une manière admirable, et il le sait.

Cela dit sur les paysans, je vous demanderai, Monsieur, de vouloir bien me suivre dans quelques réflexions au sujet de la Russie civilisée.

Vous n'avez pas été plus indulgent pour le mouvement intellectuel que pour le caractère populaire; d'un seul trait de plume vous en avez effacé tout le travail, un travail produit par des mains enchaînées.

Un des personnages de Shakespeare ne sachant comment humilier un adversaire méprisé, lui dit: "je doute même si tu existes!" Vous êtes allé plus loin, Monsieur; vous ne doutez même pas de la non-existence de la littérature russe.

Je cite textuellement vos paroles:

"Nous ne nous amusons pas à regarder en haut, "si quelques gens d'esprit de Pétersbourg, s'exer-

" çant dans la langue russe, comme dans une langue " savante, ont amusé l'Europe de la pâle représen- " tation d'une prétendue littérature russe. Sans mon " respect pour Mickiewicz, pour les erreurs des saints, " j'accuserais volontiers la facilité (disons même la " clémence) avec laquelle il a bien voulu parler sé- " rieusement de cette plaisanterie."

Je cherche en vain, Monsieur, la raison de cet accueil de dédain avec lequel vous recevez le premier cri de douleur d'un peuple qui se réveille en prison, élan que la main du geôlier s'efforce d'étouffer déjà à sa naissance.

Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas voulu prêter l'oreille aux accents déchirants de notre poésie si triste, de nos chants qui ne sont que des larmes sonores ? Quel est le voile qui est venu vous dérober la vue de notre rire convulsif, de cette ironie perpétuelle qui cache notre cœur profondément ulcéré, et qui n'est au fond que la conscience fatale de notre impuissance ?

Ah, que je voudrais pouvoir traduire dignement pour vous quelques pièces lyriques de Pouchkine, de Lermontoff, ou quelques chansons populaires de Koltsoff! Vous nous tendriez une main cordiale, Monsieur, vous seriez alors le premier à nous demander l'oubli de vos affirmations précédentes.

Après le communisme mougique, rien ne caractérise plus la Russie, rien ne présage autant son avenir, que son mouvement littéraire.

Entre le paysan et la littérature, se dresse le monstre de la Russie officielle, de la " Russie-mensonge,

" de la Russie-choléra," ainsi que vous l'avez parfaitement nommée.

Cette Russie commence par l'empereur, et continue de soldat à soldat, de greffier à greffier, jusqu'au plus petit adjoint d'un commissaire de police dans le district le plus éloigné de l'empire. C'est ainsi qu'elle se déroule et qu'elle gagne à chaque dégré, comme dans les *Bolgi* de Dante, une nouvelle puissance de mal, une plus grande intensité de dépravation et de tyrannie. Pyramide vivante de crimes, d'abus, de concussions, de bâtons de police, d'administrateurs allemands sans cœur et toujours affamés, de juges ignorants et toujours ivres, d'aristocrates toujours laquais ; le tout soudé par la complicité, par le partage du butin, et appuyé enfin sur six cent mille machines organiques à baïonnette.

Le paysan ne se souille jamais par le contact avec ce monde de cynisme gouvernemental ; il l'endure, voilà sa seule complicité.

Le camp opposé à la Russie officielle, se forme d'une poignée d'hommes résignés, qui protestent, qui la combattent, qui la dévoilent, qui la minent.

Lutteurs isolés, de temps à autre ils se voient traînés aux casemates, torturés, déportés en Sibérie, mais les postes ne restent pas longtems vacants ; de nouveaux combattants s'avancent ; c'est là notre tradition, c'est là notre majorat à nous.

Les conséquences terribles de la parole humaine en Russie, en augmentent nécessairement la force. La voix de l'homme libre est recueillie avec sympathie

et vénération, car pour l'élever chez nous, il faut absolument avoir quelque chose à dire. On ne se décide pas trop légèrement à publier ses pensées, lorsque au bout de chaque feuille, l'on voit poindre le gendarme, la troïka, la kibitka, et en perspective Tobolsk ou Yrkoustk.

J'ai assez parlé dans ma présente brochure de la littérature russe; je n'ajouterai ici que quelques réflexions générales.

Tristesse, scepticisme, ironie, telles sont les trois cordes de la lyre russe.

Lorsque Pouchkine commence un de ses meilleurs poèmes par ces mots calmes et lugubres: " Il n'y a " pas de justice sur la terre..... mais encore il n'y " en a pas là haut! C'est clair comme une simple " gamme musicale!" (1) ne croiriez-vous pas, Monsieur, sentir votre cœur glacé, entrevoir derrière cette apparente tranquillité, une existence brisée, deviner un homme qui s'habitue déjà à souffrir?

Lermontoff, accablé du dégoût de la société au milieu de laquelle il vivait, adresse, à peine âgé de 30 ans, à ses contemporains les paroles suivantes:

" Je contemple avec douleur notre génération; " son avenir est vide et sombre; elle vieillira dans " l'inaction, elle s'affaissera sous le poids du doute et " d'une science stérile.

" La vie nous fatigue comme un long voyage sans " but.

(1) *Mozart et Salieri.* Ce poème est traduit en allemand, par M. Kodenstadz.

" Nous sommes comme ces fruits précoces
" s'égarent parfois, orphelins étrangers parmi
" fleurs ; ils ne charment ni l'œil, ni le goût ;
" tombent au moment de mûrir....

" Nous nous précipitons vers la tombe, sans bo
" heur, sans gloire, et nous jetons avant le trépas
" regard d'amer dédain sur notre passé.

" Nous passerons inaperçus sur cette terre, fou
" morne, silencieuse et bientôt oubliée.

" Nous ne léguerons rien à nos descendans, ni un
" idée féconde, ni aucune œuvre de génie, et i
" insulteront nos cendres par un vers dédaigneux
" ou par le sarcasme qu'adresse un fils ruiné à u
" père dissipateur."

Je ne connais qu'un seul poète moderne qui a fait vibrer avec autant de force, les cordes sombre de l'âme humaine. Ce poète naquit aussi esclave et mourut également avant le réveil de sa patrie. C'est l'apologiste de la mort, le célèbre Léopardi, le qui se représentait le monde comme une ligue d malfaiteurs faisant une guerre acharnée à quelque fous vertueux.

La Russie n'a eu qu'un peintre généralemen connu : Bruloff. Quel est donc le sujet où l'artist a cherché l'inspiration, quel est, dis-je, le sujet d son tableau chef-d'œuvre, qui lui a valu quelqu réputation en Italie ?

Regardez cette étrange production.

Sur une immense toile vous voyez des groupe d'hommes stupéfaits, effrayés ; ils s'efforcent de s

sauver; ils périssent au milieu d'un tremblement de terre, d'une éruption volcanique, d'un véritable orage de cataclysme ; ils succombent à une force sauvage, stupide, inique, contre laquelle toute résistance serait inutile. Telle est l'inspiration puisée dans l'atmosphère de Pétersbourg.

Le roman russe n'est que de l'anatomie pathologique; ce n'est qu'une constatation du mal qui nous ronge, une accusation continuelle de soi-même, accusation sans répit ni miséricorde. Ici l'on n'entend point la voix douce descendue des cieux, et qui annonce à Faust le pardon de la jeune fille coupable. Ici l'on ne cherche pas de consolation ; le doute, la malédiction, seuls élèvent ici la parole. Et pourtant, si la Russie peut être sauvée, elle le sera par ce sentiment profond de notre situation, et par le peu de soin que nous mettons à le cacher devant le monde.

" Celui qui avoue franchement ses défauts, sent qu'il y a en lui quelque chose qui échappe et résiste à la chûte ; il comprend qu'il peut racheter son passé, et non seulement relever la tête, mais devenir, comme dans la tragédie de Byron, Sardanapale le héros, de Sardanapale l'efféminé."

Le peuple russe ne lit pas. Vous le savez bien, Monsieur, ce n'était pas non plus le peuple des campagnes qui lisait les Voltaire et les Diderot ; c'étaient la noblesse et une partie du tiers-état. La partie éclairée du tiers-état appartient en Russie à la noblesse. Cette dernière se constitue de tout ce qui a cessé d'être peuple ; elle a même un prolétariat

privilégiées du
l'histoire russe, d
de la noblesse,
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ici que le nombr
moins la moitié
après la loi du 3

Pendant le X
poursuivait le pr
riche, sonore et n
d'hui, langage sc
les idées les plus
mande, et la phra
conversation franç
l'inspiration du gé
caractère gouvern
mental alors signi
tionnaire.

Le trône impéri
Révolution de 89,
les plus beaux plis
phie européennes.
représentât des vill
planches, [illegible]

Au palais de l'Ermitage s'étalaient à l'envi Voltaire, Montesquieu, Beccaria. Vous connaissez, Monsieur, le revers de la médaille.

Cependant, un accent inattendu, étrange, commençait à troubler le concert triomphal des apologies pindariques de la cour. Ce son, vibrant d'une ironie sarcastique, d'une tendance fortement prononcée vers la critique, vers le scepticisme, ce son, dis-je, était le seul susceptible de vitalité, de développement ultérieur Le reste, temporaire et exotique, devait nécessairement périr.

Le véritable caractère de la pensée russe poétique ou spéculative, se développe dans toute sa force depuis l'avénement au trône de Nicolas. Le trait distinctif de ce mouvement, c'est une émancipation tragique de la conscience, une négation implacable, une ironie amère, un malheureux retour sur soi-même. Un rire fou l'accompagne parfois, mais ce rire n'a en lui rien de gai.

Jeté dans un milieu accablant, doué d'une grande sagacité, d'une logique fatale, le Russe s'affranchit brusquement de la religion, et des mœurs de ses pères.

Le russe émancipé est l'homme le plus indépendant de l'Europe. Qui est-ce qui pourrait l'arrêter? Serait-ce le respect pour son passé?.... mais l'histoire de la Russie nouvelle ne commence-t-elle pas par une négation absolue de la nationalité et de la tradition?

Serait-ce cet autre passé indéfini, la période de Pétersbourg peut-être? Ah celui-là ne nous oblige



considérons nu
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Vos doutes, i
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haines, nous les
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tiennent ; nous
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C'est de là, M
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nous pousse en
en Sibérie, à la
L'on se dévoue
ennui.... Il y a
dans notre vie, m
naire, rien de bo

Ne nous accus
ne respectons p
quand reprochez-

vénérer leurs parens ? Nous sommes libres, car nous commençons par nous-mêmes. Le traditionel en nous, c'est notre organisme, c'est notre nationalité ; ils sont inhérents à tout notre être ; c'est là notre sang, notre instinct, et nullement une autorité obligatoire. Nous sommes indépendans, car nous ne possédons rien ; nous n'avons presque rien à aimer ; il y a de l'amertume, de l'offense dans chacun de nos souvenirs. La civilisation, la science, on nous les a tendues au bout d'un knout.

Qu'avons-nous donc à démêler avec vos devoirs traditionnels, nous les mineurs, les déshérités ? Et comment pourrions-nous franchement accepter une morale fanée, une morale ni chrétienne ni humaine, existant seulement dans les exercices de rhétorique, et dans les réquisitoires des procureurs ? Quelle vénération voudrait-on nous inspirer pour ce prétoire de votre justice barbaro-romaine, pour ces voûtes lourdes, écrasantes, sans air, sans lumière, rebâties au moyen-âge, et replâtrées par les affranchis du tiers-état ? Ce n'est peut-être pas là le guet-apens des tribunaux russes, mais qui pourrait nous prouver que c'est de la justice ?

Nous voyons clairement que la distinction entre vos lois et les ukases, gît principalement dans la légende du préambule. Les ukases commencent par une vérité accablante : " le tsar l'ordonne"; vos lois portent en tête le mensonge offensant de la triple devise républicaine, l'invocation ironique du nom du Peuple français. Le Code-Nicolas est dirigé exclu-

sivement contre les hommes et en faveur de l'autorité. Le Code-Napoléon ne nous paraît pas avoir d'autre caractère. Nous traînons assez de chaînes que la force nous a imposées pour les alourdir encore d'autres dues à notre propre choix. Sous ce rapport nous nous trouvons parfaitement égaux à nos paysans. Nous obéissons à la force brutale ; nous sommes esclaves parce que nous n'avons pas le moyen de nous affranchir ; toutefois du camp ennemi, nous n'accepterons rien.

La Russie ne sera jamais protestante.

La Russie ne sera jamais juste-milieu.

La Russie ne fera pas de révolution, dans le seul but de se défaire du tsar Nicolas, et d'obtenir pour prix de sa victoire, des représentans-tsars, des tribunaux-tsars, une police-tsare, des lois-tsares.

Nous demandons trop peut-être, et nous ne parviendrons à rien. C'est possible, mais nous ne désespérons pas ; la Russie avant 1848 ne pouvait, ne devait entrer dans la phase révolutionnaire : elle n'avait qu'à faire son éducation, et elle l'a fait en ce moment. Le tsar lui-même s'en apperçoit ; aussi assomme-t-il à coups de massue, les universités, les idées, les sciences ; il s'efforce d'isoler la Russie de l'Europe, de tuer la civilisation ; il fait son métier.

Réussira-t-il ?

Je l'ai dit ailleurs : il ne faut pas se fier aveuglément à l'avenir ; chaque fœtus a droit au développement, mais chaque fœtus ne se développe pas pour cela. L'avenir de la Russie ne dépend pas d'elle

seule ; il est lié à celui de l'Europe entière. Qui pourrait prédire le sort du monde slave, lorsque la réaction et l'absolutisme auront vaincu la Révolution en Europe ?

Il périra peut-être, qui le sait ?

Mais alors l'Europe périra aussi.....

Et l'histoire continuera en Amérique.....

J'en étais là, Monsieur, lorsque j'ai reçu les deux derniers feuilletons de votre légende. Mon premier mouvement à cette lecture, fut de jeter mon travail au feu. Pour un cœur aussi noble, aussi sincère que le vôtre, il ne fallait pas attendre la justice d'une réclamation du dehors, en faveur d'un peuple méconnu. Votre âme sympathique, aimante, a pris le dessus sur le rôle de juge inexorable, de vengeur d'un peuple martyr. Vous vous êtes contredit, mais de pareilles contradictions sont sublimes.

J'ai cependant pensé en relisant ma lettre, que vous pourriez y trouver quelques nouveaux aperçus sur la Russie, et sur le monde slave ; je me suis décidé à vous l'envoyer. J'ai pleine confiance que vous me pardonnerez de bon cœur les endroits où j'ai pu me laisser emporter par une fougue barbare ; on n'a pas pour rien du sang cosaque dans les veines. Je tenais tant, Monsieur, à modifier vos opinions sur le peuple russe ; il m'était si triste, si pénible, de nous voir accablés par votre main ; je n'ai pu étouffer toujours la douleur de mes émotions ; j'ai laissé

courir ma plume jusqu'au bout. Je vois maintenan
que vous ne désespérez pas de nous, je vois que sou
le cafetan grossier du paysan russe, vous avez re
trouvé l'homme, je le vois, et à mon tour je vou
confesse que nous comprenons parfaitement l'impres
sion que le nom seul de la Russie doit éveiller dan
l'âme de tout homme libre. Nous la maudissons
souvent nous-mêmes, cette triste patrie. Vous le
savez, Monsieur, sans quoi vous n'auriez pas écrit ce
remarquables paroles : " tout ce que nous avon
" dit sur le néant moral de la Russie, est faible en
" comparaison de ce que les Russes en ont dit eux-
" mêmes."

Nous aussi nous sommes revenus de nos oraisons
funèbres sur la Russie, et avec vous nous disons :
" sous la tombe est une étincelle." Vous l'avez de-
vinée par l'intuition de l'amour; nous autres nous
l'avons vue, nous l'avons sentie. Cette étincelle ne
s'est pas éteinte dans le sang, ni dans les glaces de
la Sibérie, ni dans les profondeurs des mines et des
cachots. Ah, puisse-t-elle couver sous la cendre !
la bise âpre, sauvage, qui souffle de l'Europe, serait
de force à l'anéantir. La Russie se trouve serrée
entre deux Sibéries ; l'une blanche de neige, l'autre
blanche d'opinion.

L'heure de notre action n'a pas sonné ; la France
se prévaut encore à juste titre de l'honneur du pre-
mier pas ; elle aura même toute les difficultés du
choix, et cela jusqu'en 1852. L'Europe nous pré-
cédera sans faute dans la tombe ou dans la vie nou-

velle, non seulement en vertu de son droit d'aînesse, mais à cause du rapport général de la révolution sociale au monde slave, ainsi que j'ai tâché de le démontrer. Le jour de notre action peut être éloigné ; le jour de la conscience, de la pensée, de la parole, s'est déjà levé. Nous avons assez vécu dans le silence et dans le sommeil ; il est temps de raconter nos rêves et les fruits de nos méditations.

Et en effet, à qui la faute, s'il a fallu attendre jusqu'en 1847 pour "qu'un Allemand (Haxthausen) "eût découvert, comme vous le dites, la Russie "populaire, que l'on ne connaissait pas plus que "l'Amérique avant Colomb."

La faute en est à nous, je l'avoue, Monsieur, à nous pauvres muets, à notre pusillanimité, à notre parole paralysée par la crainte, à notre imagination frappée par la terreur. Nous craignons même de confesser hors de nos frontières, l'horreur que nous inspirent nos chaînes. Forçats nés et condamnés à traîner le boulet jusqu'à la tombe, nous nous offensons chaque fois que l'on parle de nous comme d'esclaves volontaires, comme de nègres gelés, et cependant nous nous gardons de protester publiquement.

Il faudrait se décider enfin à subir ces accusations, ou bien à leur mettre un terme, et à faire retentir la libre parole russe. Mieux vaut périr suspectés d'être hommes que de porter sur son front la marque éternelle du servage, et de plier sous le dur reproche d'être esclaves par goût.

Malheureusement, en Russie, la parole libre étou-

ne ; elle fait peur. J'ai essayé seulement de soulever un coin du voile épais qui nous dérobe aux regards de l'Europe ; je n'ai parlé que de tendances théoriques, d'espérances lointaines, d'éléments organiques pour l'avenir ; et pourtant ma brochure, sur le compte de laquelle vous avez bien voulu vous exprimer en termes si flatteurs, a produit en Russie une douloureuse impression. Des voix amies, que je respecte, l'ont condamnée. On l'a taxée d'aveu de culpabilité. Aveu !.... et de quel crime ? du crime de notre malheur, de nos souffrances, de notre désir de briser cette odieuse position.... Pauvres et chers amis ! qu'ils me pardonnent ce forfait ; je le répète encore.

Ah, Monsieur, il est lourd, il est atroce, le joug d'un long esclavage, sans lutte et sans espoir à court terme ! il finit par user les âmes les plus généreuses, les plus nobles, les plus dévouées. Où est le héros qui ne tomberait à la longue de lassitude, de désespoir, préférant à tous ces rêves un peu de repos avant sa mort ?

Non, je ne me tairai pas. Ma parole vengera ces existences infortunées, brisées sous la pression de l'absolutisme russe, de ce régime infernal qui frappe l'homme de prostration morale et d'atonie mortuaire.

Nous sommes forcés de parler, autrement l'on ne se douterait jamais de ce que ces hommes généreux enterrent de beau et de sublime au fond de leur poitrine, de ce qu'ils vont ensevelir sous les neiges de l'exil où leur tombe même ne portera pas leur nom

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U

criminel, que leurs amis sauront garder au fond de leur cœur, mais qu'ils n'oseront jamais proférer à haute voix.

Comment ! A peine avons-nous ouvert la bouche, à peine avons-nous épelé quelques mots de nos désirs et de nos espérances, que déjà l'on nous impose le silence, que déjà l'on voudrait fermer le cercueil sur le berceau de notre parole ? C'est impossible.

Il y a pour la pensée, un degré de maturité, où elle ne peut plus se laisser garotter ni par les liens de la censure, ni par des considérations de prudence. La propagande devient alors passion ; et suffit-il de chuchoter à l'oreille, là où l'on n'est pas sûr de briser la léthargie à coups de tocsin ?

Depuis l'insurrection des Strélitz jusqu'à la conjuration du 14 Décembre, il n'y a pas eu en Russie de révolte politique sérieuse. La raison en est bien simple ; il n'existait pas dans le peuple de tendances émancipatrices fortement prononcées ; en plusieurs choses l'on se mettait d'accord avec le gouvernement, en beaucoup d'autres le gouvernement avait devancé la nation. Les paysans seuls, exclus des avantages du régime impérial, opprimés plus que jamais, essayèrent un soulèvement. La Russie, depuis l'Oural jusqu'à Penza, Simbirsk et Kazan, tomba, pour quelques mois, au pouvoir de Pougatcheff. L'armée impériale se vit repoussée, battue par les Cosaques, et le général Bibikoff envoyé de Pétersbourg pour prendre le commandement, écrivait, si je ne me trompe, de Nijni, les paroles suivantes : "Les affaires

" vont très mal ; ce que je redoute le plus ce ne sont
" pas les hordes armées des insurgés, c'est l'esprit du
" peuple qui est mauvais, très mauvais."

Après des efforts inouïs, l'insurrection finit par être écrasée. Le peuple tomba dans un abattement sans bornes ; il se tut et laissa faire.

La noblesse en attendant, se développait pendant ce triste sommeil du peuple ; la civilisation commençait à pénétrer plus avant dans les intelligences, et comme preuve vivante de cette maturité politique du développement moral, impliquant nécessairement l'action, parurent ces hommes admirables, ces héros, ainsi que vous les nommez à juste titre, qui " seuls, " dans la gueule même du dragon, tentèrent le coup " hardi du 14 Décembre."

Leur défaite, la terreur du règne actuel, firent rentrer au fond de l'âme toute idée expansive, refoulèrent toute tentative précoce. Des questions d'un autre genre surgirent ; l'on ne voulait plus exposer sa vie pour l'espoir d'une Constitution, l'on s'apercevait qu'une Charte conquise à Pétersbourg, se briserait sous le parjure du souverain ; le sort de la constitution polonaise servait d'exemple.

Pendant une dixaine d'années, l'on poursuivait un travail intellectuel sans énoncer une seule parole, et l'on est arrivé enfin à un tel malaise, à une telle inquiétude, " que l'on payait par sa vie entière le bon-
" heur d'être libre un instant " et de pouvoir dire à haute voix une partie de sa pensée.

Les uns jetèrent leur fortune avec cette légéreté,

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cette insouciance, qui n'appartiennent qu'aux Polonais et à nous, et s'en allèrent demander ailleurs une distraction à leur affaissement ; d'autres incapables de surmonter le dégoût du régime de Pétersbourg, s'enterrèrent au fond de leurs campagnes. La jeunesse donna tête baissée, qui dans le panslavisme, qui dans la philosophie allemande, qui dans l'histoire ou dans l'économie politique ; en un mot, personne de ceux qui étaient appelés à la vie intellectuelle en Russie, n'a pu ni voulu rester tranquille et stationnaire.

L'affaire récente de Pétracheffsky envoyé aux mines à perpétuité, et de ses amis déportés en 1849, qui, à deux pas du Palais d'hiver, formèrent plusieurs clubs révolutionnaires, ne prouve-t-elle pas suffisamment par l'audacieuse imprudence des victimes, par l'improbabilité évidente du succès, que le temps des méditations passe, que l'agitation déborde l'âme, que l'on aime mieux courir la chance d'une perte certaine, que de rester témoin muet, impassible, de l'ordre de Pétersbourg?

Une légende fort populaire en Russie, raconte qu'un tsar, soupçonnant la fidélité de son épouse, ordonna de l'enfermer avec son fils dans un tonneau. Le monarque fit ensuite goudronner le tonneau et le fit jeter à la mer.

Durant de longues années le tonneau flottait sur les vagues.

Cependant, le tsarévitch grandissait et commençait, de sa tête et de ses pieds, à toucher les deux fonds du tonneau. Le manque d'espace le gênait chaque jour

davantage. Un jour il dit à sa mère : " Souverain
" ma mère, permets-moi de m'étendre de toute
" longueur de mes membres."

" Tsarévitch, mon fils, répondit la mère, prend
" garde de faire ce que tu dis ; le tonneau crevera
" et tu périrais dans les ondes salées." Le tsaré-
vitch se tut pour un moment ; puis, après avoir bien
réfléchi, il reprit encore : " Je m'étendrai, ma mère
" mieux vaut s'étendre une fois librement et péri
" ensuite."

Je viens de vous raconter, Monsieur, notre
histoire.

Malheur à la Russie, si elle ne trouve plus de ces
hommes téméraires, qui commettront des imprudences
au risque de payer d'une perte imminente le plaisir
de s'étendre une fois librement.

Nous sommes loin de cette crainte.....

Le nom de Michel Bakounine me vient involon-
tairement à l'esprit. Bakounine a fourni à l'Europe
un témoignage de la pratique révolutionnaire d'un
Russe.

Je me suis senti profondément ému, Monsieur, de
belles paroles que vous lui adressez ; malheureuse-
ment ces paroles ne lui parviendront plus.

Le crime international a été consommé ; la Saxe a
livré la victime à l'Autriche, le Hapsbourg l'a repas-
sée à Nicolas. Bakounine, on me l'écrit de Péters-
bourg, se trouve entre les mains de la Russie. Il est
à Shlusselbourg, (1) dans cette forteresse d'horrible

(1) Bakounine est détenu dans la forteresse de Pétersbourg. A. R.

mémoire où l'on tenait jadis enfermé comme une bête fauve, l'enfant royal Jean, petit fils du tsar Alexis, assassiné par Catherine II, cette femme qui, les mains teintes encore du sang de son époux, tua le prisonnier, et fit décapiter ensuite le malheureux officier, exécuteur fidèle de sa consigne.

Dans cette forteresse humide, baignée par les eaux glacées du Ladoga, point d'illusion, point d'espérance !

Qu'il s'endorme donc du dernier sommeil, qu'il meure, car il est impossible de le sauver. Martyr trahi par deux gouvernements traîtres, et dont chacun conserve dans ses mains sanglantes, des lambeaux de sa chair....

Que son nom soit béni, vengé....et par qui?....

,....Nous aussi, nous tomberons au milieu de notre route ; mais alors, de votre voix austère, grave et sonore, vous rappelerez encore une fois à nos enfans qu'ils ont une dette à payer.....

Je m'arrête au souvenir de ce martyr. C'est en son nom et au mien que je vous serre affectueusement la main.

ALEXANDRE HERZEN.

Nice Maritime, 22 Septembre 1851.

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L'ÉTOILE POLAIRE

(ПОЛЯРНАЯ ЗВѢЗДА)

REVUE DE L'EMANCIPATION RUSSE

REDIGÉE EN RUSSE A LONDRES

PAR

ISKANDER (A. HERZEN).

. . . . Да здравствуетъ разумъ.!
А. ПУШКИНЪ.

"*L'Étoile polaire*" (*) disparut derrière les nuages du règne de Nicolas.

Nicolas a passé ; et l'étoile reparait de loin, le jour de notre Vendredi saint, le jour où pour nous cinq gibets sont devenus cinq crucifix.

La première publication periodique en langue russe, affranchie des entraves de la censure, prend le titre que nous avons choisi pour témoigner la continuité de la tradition, la succession du travail, le majorat révolutionnaire. Nous nous rattachons par ce titre à nos pères.

(*) "L'étoile polaire" et la "Mnémosine" ont été deux publications périodiques faites par des membres de la conspiration de 1825. Rileieff et Bestoujeff ont été redacteurs de la première; le Prince Odoeffsky et Kuchelbecker de la seconde.

La Russie officielle, elle seule, a le verbe haut, elle parle à l'intérieur, elle se prépare à avoir un *écho* à Berlin, elle a des défenseurs même dans les journaux de Londres.

Nous proposons un organe à la Russie révolutionnaire.

Depuis le 2 Mars, la Russie entre dans une nouvelle phase. La mort de Nicolas est plus que la mort d'un homme : c'est la mort d'un système, suivi avec une consequence inexorable et complétement épuisé. Le système quelque usé qu'il fut, pouvait durer encore pendant la vie de Nicolas :— après lui— il faut changer de route, en bien ou en mal, mais il faut en changer.

Nous ne combattons pas les morts. Du moment où le Dr. Mandt a dit à voix basse à l'héritier : "La carotide ne bat plus"— la passion que nous mettions dans notre lutte a fait place à l'analyse froide du règne passé.

Deux pensées sans unité, souvent en contradiction flagrante— le caractérisent.

Continuation des tendances de Pierre le Grand à l'extérieur.

Réaction contre elles à l'intérieur.

C'est-à-dire, agrandissement de l'influence en Europe et en

religieuse, il s'oppose aux voyages en Europe, il achève la Pologne, il fait paraitre des reliques de saints que Pierre aurait expressément prohibées, et met enfin audacieusement sur son drapeau, comme pour tourner en dérision la grande devise révolutionnaire—Autocratie, Orthodoxie, Nationalité.

Autocratie—comme but. Voilà la naïve philosophie de l'histoire de Nicolas.

Tout lui réussit—non parcequ'il avait des talents extraordinaires; mais parceque la bassesse de l'Europe officielle était plus qu'extraordinaire.

L'heure culminante de sa vie fut celle où Paskewitch lui écrivit: "La Hongrie est à vos pieds." Nicolas s'oublia alors jusqu'à la magnanimité: il intercéda pour les généraux auprès du gamin féroce—qui les pendit en se parjurant.

Mais quoi la Hongrie!—toute l'Europe était à ses pieds, car chaque contrée avait son Gœrgey, plusieurs Gœrgeys.

Les journaux réactionnaires et ultramontains engageaient cet Agamemnon schismatique à se mettre à la tête des princes pour la défense de la police et de l'eglise.

Les bourgeois de tous les pays—pliaient leurs genoux gras devant Nicolas—et le priaient de sauver cette civilisation au nom de laquelle on lui déclara la guerre trois ans après. L'Autriche lui devait tant, qu'elle voulait *étonner* le monde par son ingratitude—et ce n'est pas peu dire lorsqu'on parle de ce pays classique des trahisons et des ingratitudes.

Le roi de Prusse—buvait à sa santé.

Les autres princes de l'Allemagne, les inconnus—mangeaient à ses frais—les dots des Grandes Duchesses.

Il triomphait. Et tout à coup près du chateau—cela veut dire près de la forteresse de Pétersbourg—on découvre la conspiration de Petracheffsky. Donc la pensée révolutionnaire n'est pas tuée, au contraire elle est plus profonde, plus contemporaine. Le spectre du 26 Decembre apparaissait rajeuni après 25 ans—lugubre *Memento mori* pour Nicolas.

En outre, un vide sinistre se fit sentir après le triomphe. La

stérilité de l'autocratie qui se fait but, se manifesta pleinement :—pas une bonne loi.—pas une amélioration—tout s'affaisse au contraire—tout blanchit avec les cheveux de Nicolas, tout se couvre de rides.

L'ennui est dangereux pour les trônes—il fallait faire quelque chose. . . . Un autre despote était précisément dans la même position. Un autre cherchait aussi de l'occupation : lui aussi, il avait vaincu la Pologne, et fait triompher l'ordre de Varsovie à Paris et à Rome.

Ils inventèrent la guerre.

Et la guerre changea tout. Nicolas est tombé le premier dans le gouffre qu'il a creusé—" . . . . *Cras tibi!*"

. . . . Nous ne savons rien de son successeur. Mais les circonstances au milieu desquelles son règne commence déterminent en partie sa position, à l'insu de sa volonté.

D'un pied peu sûr, Nicolas s'achemine vers le trône, qui appartient à son frère aîné. Il est accueilli par une insurrection—Il la mitraille—il s'en rend maitre, mais derrière les hommes qui tombent il voit une conspiration colossale—Toute la Russie y est. Le paysan, l'homme du peuple y est representé par le soldat;

par tout désarmer—la pensée et la parole,—finit par appeler aux armes toute la Russie, même les serfs.

A son cri, on s'ébranle, on s'arme—il meurt. Qu'y a-t-il donc de commun entre sa position le 26 Decembre 1825 et celle de son fils le 2 Mars 1855?

Est-ce que Alexandre II peut répondre à coups de mitraille à la défense héroique de Sebastopol? Est-ce qu'il peut ordonner le silence—lorsqu'on prend la parole pour lui offrir, les uns leur sang, les autres leurs biens pour défendre la Russie?—et pourtant la Russie n'a pas voulu la guerre, la guerre la ruine, elle n'a rien à gagner par elle—mais il ne s'agit pas maintenant d'appréciation, il s'agit de sauver l'intégrité du pays, il s'agit de corriger les fautes de Nicolas. Son fils répondra à cet élan—par la Sibérie, par les gendarmes, par un surplus d'absolutisme?—Allez donc!

En 1825—toute l'Europe était derrière Nicolas, il s'adossait à elle pour terrasser son peuple. En 1855 toute l'Europe est contre Alexandre II. Il est facile de mépriser les gémissements d'un peuple lorsqu'on est soutenu par ses voisins; mais il est bien difficile d'envoyer des hommes se faire tuer en ne leur offrant qu'une offense ou une dureté pour le voyage.

On a réveillé, excité un sentiment de nationalité au profit du Tzar!.... on a voulu que le peuple fit cause commune avec lui. C'est pour cela que le Tzar dépend du peuple—et il fant en profiter.

Le 26 Décembre fut aussi conçu pendant un élan patriotique, où le peuple faisait cause commune avec le gouvernement, pour la première fois depuis Minime et Pojarski. L'idée révolutionnaire russe est née le jour où notre armée fatiguée et extenuée—se reposa enfin aux Champs-Élysées.

.... Serait-il possible que quarante ans après, cette lutte des géans dans la Tauride passât sans traces—?

Quoi! le soldat de Sebastopol criblé de blessures, après avoir éprouvé sa force de granit—prêtera son dos au baton. Le paysan armé—retournera travailler aux champs de son maître—paisiblement—comme l'homme nomade des bords de la mer Cas-

pienne ira se perdre dans ses déserts après avoir gardé la frontière baltique—? Et la flotte anglaise qu'on a pu voir des toits de Pétersbourg— n'aurait rien appris—? Tout a été secoué, tendu, mis en mouvement et le peuple si rudement réveillé retomberait tout de suite dans sa léthargie !

S'il en était ainsi—mieux vaudrait pour la Russie être conquise, partagée. Quel intérêt pourrait-on prendre à un semblable pays ?

Mais cela ne sera pas, Nous sentons de loin la vie nouvelle— nous flairons une brise printanière venant de chez Vous. Nous n'avons jamais désespéré du peuple russe—nos écrits et nos paroles l'ont témoigné ; l'organisation d'une imprimerie russe à Londres l'a prouvé. La question difficile pour nous était la question de tems—elle se résout en notre faveur.

Pourtant ne nous y trompons pas. Les circonstances sont beaucoup —mais pas tout. Sans la part personnelle, sans le travail individuel, sans la volonté de l'homme, rien ne se fait, au moins rien ne s'achève. Et c'est en cela que consiste la grandeur et la poësie de l'activité humaine. Dans l'histoire—l'homme est créateur et arbitre,il tient dans sa volonté suprême l'accomplissement des destinées. Les circonstances l'aident, et plus les circonstances sont favorables, plus énorme est la responsabilité qui pèse sur lui, devant sa conscience et devant la postérité.

Nous vous appelons au travail ; nous vous offrons un organe.... ce n'est pas beaucoup, ce n'est presque rien, mais c'est physiologiquement important—nous avons créé l'initiative du mouvement, nous avons brisé la porte—A vous de marcher !

Le premier volume de "*l'Étoile polaire*" paraîtra le 1 Aout; le second vers la nouvelle année.

Nous ne voulons pas ouvrir la souscription avant le mois de Décembre, il nous faut voir, avant tout, si nous serons soutenus par

l'envoi d'articles de Russie. C'est alors que nous pourrons décider si la Revue paraîtra 4 ou seulement 3 fois pendant l'année 1856.

Notre plan est très simple. Nous voudrions avoir dans chaque volume un article général (philosophie de la Révolution,—? Socialisme) un article historique ou statistique sur la Russie ou le monde Slave. L'analyse d'un ouvrage remarquable d'histoire, de politique ou de philosophie et un article littéraire russe. (Nous voulons être très sobres quant aux traductions.) Ensuite—les *tutti frutti* du mélange, correspondances, bibliographie, chronique etc..

L'Étoile polaire doit être, et c'est un de nos désirs les plus ardents—un asyle pour les naufragés dans les marais de la Censure impériale, et pour ceux qu'elle a mutilés. C'est donc pour la troisième fois, que nous nous adressons à tous les Russes qui savent écrire et que nous les prions de nous envoyer des copies de poésies défendues—de Pouchkine, Lermontoff, Rileieff—de ces pièces que tout le monde connait (comme l'Ode à la Liberté, le Poignard, le Village, les strophes omises dans l'Onéguine, dans le Démon, la Gabrilliade, le Triomphe de la Mort, Polycrate de Samos etc. etc.). Les manuscrits se perdront à la fin—il faut les fixer par l'imprimerie.

Quant au premier volume—nous sommes très heureux. Un auteur d'un talent tout à fait hors ligne et d'une vigueur dialectique extraordinaire—nons a envoyé un article admirable sous le titre "*Qu'est-ce que l'Etat?*" Nous l'avons lu et relu dix fois—tout fier de l'audace et de la profondeur de pensée révolutionnaire de l'auteur russe.

Un anonyme nous a envoyé, une correspondance entre Belinsky et Gogol—cette correspondance qui nous a été lue par Belinsky lui-même en 47—a fait quelque bruit en Russie. Elle a passé par beaucoup de mains—même par celles de la police, il n'y a aucune indiscrétion à la publier. Belinsky et Gogol sont morts, Belinsky et Gogol appartiennent à notre histoire ; leur polémique

est trop importante pour ne pas en faire part au grand public— par des ménagements de fausse delicatesse.

Avec ces deux articles le premier volume pourra marcher sans crainte- Nous ajouterons outre les mélanges un fragment du "*cogitata et visa*" et un article par le rédacteur sur le livre de I. Michelet "*La Renaissance.*"

Le prix de chaque volume est de 8 Shill.

S'adresser à Londres à MM. Trübner et Ce 12. Paternoster Row, City, ou à Mr Stanislas, Polish Library 10, Greek Street, Soho.

Les manuscrits peuvent être directement adressés au rédacteur ou à l'imprimerie russe à Londres au nom de Mr Czernecki (dans les deux cas nécessairement affranchis.)

ISCANDER.

Richmond. (Surrey.)



KOSSUTH,

MAZZINI, URQUHART,

AND THE

CONFERENCES:

WITH A LETTER FROM GEORGE DAWSON, M.A.

BY

JOHN ALFRED LANGFORD.

PRICE THREEPENCE.

LONDON:
ROBERT THEOBALD, 26, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLV.

KOSSUTH, MAZZINI, URQUHART, AND THE CONFERENCES.

At the beginning of July, 1855, the inhabitants of Birmingham were astonished at seeing the walls of their town covered with the following announcement:—"The Country in Danger! The War for, not against, Russia! A Public Meeting will be held in Bingley Hall, Broad Street, on Thursday evening, July 5, 1855. Subject—The War for, not against, Russia. George Dawson, M. A., in the Chair. Admission free. David Urquhart, Esq., late M.P. for Stafford, and late Secretary to the British Embassy at Constantinople, Major Rolland, and Charles Attwood, Esq., will address the meeting. Chair to be taken at Half-past Seven o'clock."

The Meeting thus called was one of the most numerous ever gathered within the walls of a building. Between seven and eight thousand persons were assembled, to whom Mr. Dawson explained his own position in the following speech. He said:—

"The main purpose for which the meeting was called was to hear Mr. Urquhart express his opinions upon certain matters touching this ill-conducted, ill-aimed, and disastrous war, in which at present we are engaged. They would be called upon to adopt certain resolutions, which were strong—strong rather in their substance than in their phrase. These were to be moved, seconded, and adopted only by men that are in earnest, not by men who blame, but who, after they blame, refuse to punish—not by men who confine their punishment to a few hard words, easily spoken, soon forgotten, laughed down in Parliament, and too little remembered by at least the upper classes of this nation. They were met to say whether or no the conduct of the war has pleased them, does please them, and in the hands of the men that are mismanaging it, is likely to please them for the future. If it had not, they were to decide whether their displeasure was the result simply of misfortune on the part of those who had managed the war, or whether it was the result of culpable misconduct, sinful want of foresight, criminal want of feeling, frivolity in high places, stupidity in many places, imbecility in almost all places, bringing upon those who went out to fight ruin, starvation, speedy and inglorious death. Some of them might wish to go farther than that, and having proved—as he thought could be proved—that this war has been misconducted, would ask, was this imbecility the imbecility of men who knew no better, or was it the imbecilty of men who want nothing better, ask for nothing better? Are they fools or idiots, or are they knaves or cowards? Are they traitors, more in love with despotism than with Old England—more anxious to sustain Russia, the great broad buttress of all the slaveries and political wrongs of Europe, than to do as we poor, simple English people thought they would, perhaps, condescend to do—lift up the old flag for the old principles, draw the old sword for the old reasons, and having so drawn it, carried it to the old

conclusions—hard fighting in a just cause, speedy victory in a just cause."—*Birmingham Journal, July* 7, 1855.

The reasons which induced Mr. Dawson to preside at this meeting, also induced many of those gentlemen who usually take part in public discussions, to take part in this. The nation had long been dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, and demanded an honest, energetic and anti-Austrian opposition to Russia. Those who assisted Mr. Urquhart in Birmingham, believed that any display of life was better than silence, indifference and apathy, and hoped by enquiry, investigation, and public meetings to arouse the people to a sense of their disgrace. The press of the town confirmed this feeling, as is shown by the following extracts:—

The meeting of Thursday night may well be called a historical event, from the solemnity of the business, the momentous nature of the topics handled there, the calm and earnest spirit, the majestic and overwhelming unanimity which pervaded and possessed the immense assemblage. The vastness of the multitude which thronged the capacious hall had in itself something of sublimity. Here, indeed, was manifested the majesty of the people. But the numerical grandeur constituted the least portion of the majesty. The mere mass was imposing; but the grandeur lay in the fact that there stood a mass of earnest, convinced, moved, and glowing individuals. 'The multitude was of one heart and one soul.' One spirit dwelt in the mighty throng."—*Birmingham Mercury, July* 7, 1855.

"It is more than probable that the visit of Mr. Urquhart to Birmingham will have historical importance. On the first night of his addressing the people, more than 7,000 hard-working, hard-thinking, and earnest men, listened fixedly and intently to his terrible utterances—terrible, because containing so much irrefragable proof of our own negligence, ignorance, and passive criminality—terrible because if not proving the actual treason of our Government, yet proving their utter incompetency to carry on the destinies of this great nation to a high and noble issue. If he did not prove guilt, he proved unfitness, bad policy, blundering, and fatuity, and these things in the Ministers of a nation are equivalent in their results to guilt. England cannot afford to trust her welfare in the possession of such imbeciles, nor can she allow her honour to be at the mercy of such bunglers. We cannot have an unsuccessful war."—*Birmingham Daily Press, July* 9, 1854.

"The meeting in our town on Thursday night is another significant sign of the tendency of public feeling. But for the discredit into which our statesmen and our rulers have fallen, but for the squandering of treasure and of blood in a mismanaged war, the extravagant facts of Mr. Urquhart would have found few followers in Birmingham, and no public meeting would have given its assent to a resolution which would put in action the law and the penalty of treason and attainder."—*Birmingham Journal, July* 7, 1855.

The meeting was adjourned till the following (Friday) night, to hear Mr. Uuquhart on the "Right of Search, and the Corn Trade." A Committee was afterwards appointed to act in concert with committees in other towns, for the purpose of informing the people on matters of Foreign Policy and the War. This Committee consisted of Messrs. G. Dawson, M.A., T. H. Gill, Alderman Allday, S. Timmins, W. Potter, J. A. Langford, A. Dalzell, J. Mills, &c., &c.

On Saturday morning, July 7, Mr. Allday suggested that a public Conference should be held in Birmingham, to consider some of the subjects which Mr. Urquhart had introduced, bearing upon our Foreign Policy. The suggestion was adopted; Mr. Potter was appointed Chairman and myself Secretary of the Conference. It was agreed to hold meetings for four consecutive days, (they extended to five), and gentlemen from other towns were invited to take part in the proceedings. Circulars were sent

to a large number of the public men of England, all of whom replied most favourably to the objects of the Conference.* The subjects at first proposed for investigation were some four or five, but these rapidly grew to thirteen, and several others have since been added; but I believe I am right in saying that only five or six have been reported upon.

In consequence of a serious illness I was prevented from taking part in the proceedings for more than a week, and during that time the Committee was not summoned. The arrangements, however, were made for holding the Conferences, and here the first false step was taken. Mr. Gill's name was, without his consent, affixed to a very foolish circular; and in such a manner as to render Mr. Gill amenable to the law. This Mr. Gill indignantly resented, and failing to receive satisfactory answers to his questions respecting this mistake, he withdrew from the Committee. Thus at its very outset, by mismanagement and bungling, the Conference was deprived of the assistance of a gentlman, perhaps of all others, the best qualified to be of great and essential service.

The Conferences were opened by a mid-day meeting on Monday, July 16; Mr. Dawson delivering the inaugural address. This speech is too long to be reprinted here: it fully explained his reasons for taking part in these proceedings; and how, though disagreeing with Mr. Urquhart in so many things, he felt that these meetings might be of great service to the nation. It was from this feeling that he, and many more, attended these meetings and took part in these investigations, with an entire freedom from Urquhartian conclusions. M. Kossuth has so well expressed my object in joining this movement that I quote his words:—

"Hear Mr. Urquhart, profit by his knowledge, learn from him facts; he can teach you much, and you can learn much from him; but give not your judgment into his hands. Draw from the instruction he imparts to you the conclusions of your own common sense, and judge by yourself."—*Atlas, September* 8, 1855.

The Conferences met on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday evenings, and several reports were presented; and so far as my knowledge goes these reports were drawn up entirely independent of Mr. Urquhart. I can answer most positively for the two which I presented, that he never saw, or heard a line of their contents until they were read to the meeting. Thus far the Conferences were all I expected, and were fulfilling the objects for which so many of us had worked. On Friday night the Conferences were adjourned till August 13.

At the Wednesday night's meeting Mr. Urquhart said, "Mazzini held up Austria as the dynastic enemy of the world, and the result was they now saw the republican party in Italy openly associating itself with Russia," these words led to some warm discussion, in the course of which Mr. Urquhart said that Mazzini was a Russian agent. This statement he afterwards repeated to several gentlemen in private, stating also that M. Kossuth was cognizant of the same. As is well known MM. Kossuth and Mazzini have many warm and earnest friends at Birmingham, and these words caused much indignation and not a little uneasiness; and at the request of a few of these friends Mr. Dawson wrote to Mazzini, and I

* The *Birmingham Journal*, though opposed to the Conferences, thus writes of their purpose:—"Nothing but good could flow from a well-considered, unprejudiced, severely impartial inquest on the affairs of the nation."—*July* 25. It was to obtain such an inquest that I, and many others took part in the Conferences.

I *have never seen Mr. Urquhart*;
I was a Russian agent, as I do not v
hood, I suppose him to be mad or to
my name.

You may show this to him or to

London, July 21, 1855.

Dear Sir,—Not only am I *not* co
Russian money for agitating Italy, I
has received, nor has ever been offer
That's not a supposition, not a c

London, July 21, 1855.

These replies led to the foll

My dear Sir,—In consequence
received Russian money, and Kossut
has taken place between those gentl
the result of which is that Mazzini n
suth as emphatically denies his kno
has caused uneasiness among those
concerned equally incapable of sayin
will also see how materially it will a
zini's friends with yourself, unless th
As a common friend of Kossuth, Maz
work earnestly and thoroughly in y
people from a ruinous apathy and an
ten this. If you cannot offer an expl
have influenced me. I cannot co-ope

D. Urquhart, Esq.

In the meantime I must call upon you, at your earliest convenience, to furnish m with copies of your letters and the answers, in order that I may know what I am accused of.

While deploring the strange method you have adopted, permit me to add that I have no complaint to make in reference to your purpose; on the contrary, I hail with delight the singularity of your position, as compared with that of every other individual that has fallen into the toils of Mazzini, none of whom amongst the tens and hundreds whom it has been my painful task to encounter, has had the manliness or character to seek to know the truth.

I remain, my dear Sir,
Very faithfully yours,
D. URQUHART.

The result of this correspondence was a Meeting of some twelve gentlemen to hear Mr. Urquhart's explanation. Mr. Timmins, one of the gentlemen present, has prepared the following report of what passed at this Meeting, and I can answer for its strict veracity:—

In consequence of a previous arrangement, several of the friends of Kossuth and Mazzini met Mr. Urquhart, at the Queen's Hotel, to hear his defence of his statement that Mazzini was a paid Russian agent, and that Kossuth was cognisant of the fact. After some desultory conversation, issue was joined on the paragraph of a letter from M. Kossuth to Mr. Langford, in which the writer denied that he had ever known the fact, and, moreover, stated that he was cognisant that Mazzini was not a Russian agent. Mr. Urquhart remarked that Kossuth had obviously overstated his case, as he could not be cognisant of a negative. After some further conversation, Mr. Urquhart produced a file of correspondence between Kossuth and himself, and stated that when he visited Kossuth at Kutayah, in order to use his influence with the Turkish Government to prevent his extradition, he exacted a positive promise from Kossuth that he would in no way connect himself with Mazzini without giving him (Mr. Urquhart) due notice of his intention to do so. He exacted this promise, because he had learned some time previously, from the Italian, Regaldi, with whom he had travelled, that Mazzini was a Russian agent, and that Italian deputies from the so-called democratic party had visited the Russian Emperor at Vogonseih. He (Mr. Urquhart) had exerted himself successfully not only to prevent the extradition of the Hungarian refugees, but to get them sent to England, chiefly on account of the deep personal regard he had for Kossuth; and he consequently was most anxious that he should not in any way connect himself with Mazzini. Mr. Urquhart did not state that Kossuth admitted that he knew Mazzini to be a Russian agent, but rather that he assented to the fact when stated to him and when evidence was given.

Mr. Urquhart next read at full length letters he had written to Kossuth when Kossuth was in the United States, and in which he (Mr. Urquhart) distinctly asked Kossuth to deny, if he could, the connection he had formed with Mazzini, without giving Mr. Urquhart the notice he had promised. Kossuth replied, even to a second letter in the same spirit, without noticing the subject in any way; not only so, but asked the advice of Mr. Urquhart, as of a bosom friend, on some of the most important questions of the day, personal and political. The correspondence was recognised as in the hand-writing of Kossuth, and every letter read showed that he had, at that time at any rate, regarded Mr. Urquhart as a sincere friend, whose advice and assistance he was most anxious to have.

The gentlemen present entirely concurred with a remark of Mr. Dawson's, that, "after that, there was nothing more to say; and that it was for M. Kossuth to explain his part in the transaction."

As to Mazzini, Mr. Urquhart stated, giving where and date, that he called at a house known to be Mazzini's residence, and asked to see him; that he was asked his name, but said it was of no consequence; that he was afterwards ushered into a room where an individual was, whom he had every reason to believe to be Mazzini; that in the course of an hours conversation he stated that he knew Mazzini had received Russian gold, which the individual referred to admitted; and that after a general conversation the interview concluded. Mr. Urquhart did not, I believe, mention his name to the individual, but spoke of himself as one interested in foreign

affairs, and that he was personally unknown, as he had been out of England for some years.

Some further conversation took place, of which I heard but little, but it threw no new light on the matter as far as I heard.

SAMUEL TIMMINS.

This will be the most appropriate place to insert the following letter, which I have received from Mr. Dawson.

My dear Sir,—The history of my connexion with the "Conferences" is easily told. Mr. Langley, whom I supposed to be the forerunner of Mr. Urquhart, called upon me to say that Mr. Urquhart was coming to Birmingham, that a meeting was contemplated, and to request that I would preside. I agreed to be chairman of the meeting for reasons which I gave in my opening speech. At that meeting Mr. Urquhart proposed another meeting for Friday, to give him an opportunity of explaining his views on the question of the "Right of Search." This second Meeting I was unable to attend. On taking up the newspaper to read what was said at it I found that a Committee had been formed for the purpose of inquiry and that I was one of the members. To this I had no objection. Then came the proposal to hold a Conference. As this might do great good, and as there was plenty that required inquiry, I was favorable to this being held, and consented to preside at the first meeting. One evening meeting I attended, and then circumstances prevented my going again. After this first series of meetings my connexion with the Conference ceased. I was invited to take part in a Conference, not in a series of Conferences. I received *two* notices of committee meetings—these I could not attend. Soon after I left Birmingham for some weeks, and whilst in retirement I heard faint rumours of some most absurd doings and foolish sayings, with which I was in no way connected, and for which I was not responsible. From the beginning things were done in an irregular unbusinesslike mannner. Circulars were issued, moneys paid, agents appointed, meetings held, about which the committee were not consulted. Against this I should have protested had I been able to attend the committee meetings, as had I considered that after the first Conference I had anything to do with the affair. It may be said that my name was never withdrawn; to this I reply that my name was never given to anything beyond the first Conference, and that about all subsequent doings I was never consulted. Had I remained in Birmingham, or had I, in holiday time, contrary to my custom, busied myself with my usual affairs, I should probably have stated that I had no connexion with the Conferences after the first meetings, and that I had not been consulted about meetings elsewhere, &c.

I do not feel called upon to enter into any examination of the doings of the Conference, or the sayings of Mr. Urquhart. From that gentleman I have received nothing but courtesy and kindness: his large knowledge and indomitable perseverance command my respect; but I am utterly unable to agree with him in much that he does and more that he says. His violent abuse of democratic opinions has not moved me from my attachment to them; nor his love for Austria increased my trust in that power: his charge against Mazzini has notbeen sustained by any proof and has never changed for a moment my well-known opinion of the Roman Triumvir, though some words used by me appear to have been misunderstood.

As to the criticisms which have been so freely indulged in, and the abuse so lavishly poured out upon you and me and others, what does it matter? Fair criticism I respect; and I consider that most of what appeared in *The Birmingham Journal*, for instance, was fair: but as to the charge made against you by *The Sheffield Free Press*, why should you trouble?—why answer it? Those who know you know the charge to be false. If you have been wronged by that paper, have not suffered more? It charged you with seceding from the Conference from fear of losing your business: it called me George! It abused you; it pawed me with an insolent familiarity. It knows no better: "every creature after its kind."

From Mr. Urquhart we may all learn to hold on and work away, spite of all the abuse, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation that we may encounter.

I am, my dear Sir, yours right truly,

GEORGE DAWSON.

Edgbaston, near Birmingham,
Oct. 22, 1855.

The Kossuth-Mazzini controversy was interrupted for a time by the proceedings at Birmingham. In the *Birmingham Journal* for August 22, a letter appeared signed J. Oxford, charging some of the committee with being paid, and mentioning Mr. Dalzell by name. On the same night, in committee, the affair was hotly discussed, and then Mr. Allday and myself learned, for the first time, that the charge was, in the main, true. Several members of the committee had received money for the time which they had given to these inquiries. Still it was thought some answer should be given to this letter. Various means—such as a discussion between Oxford and Dalzell, a letter, or a public meeting—were suggested, but nothing was decided upon in committee: for, though I have been publicly charged with supporting this meeting, I opposed the consideration of Mr. Oxford's charge by the committee as a matter with which it had nothing to do. It was an affair between Mr. Dalzell, Mr. Oxford, and a few members of the chartist body. Mr. Potter and myself were the only persons at the committee who spoke against any further consideration of the subject; and it was upon my motion that we proceeded to the business of the night.

After the committee meeting broke up, the aggrieved few resolved to hold a meeting about Mr. Oxford's letter. This meeting was held on Thursday, August 30, and had nothing whatever to do with the Conference; though, from the fact that the chairman of the Conference-committee presided, and that all the speakers were members of that committee, it was not likely that the public would make the distinction. The meeting was fixed upon the Conference, and a more disorderly and disgraceful one was never held in Birmingham. Instead of proving the falsehood of Mr. Oxford's charges, it was a noisy abuse of the press, and the following resolution was carried with enthusiasm:—

"That this meeting, feeling deeply conscious of the injurious tendency of the anonymous writing so common to newspapers, deprecate all such practices as dishonest, and pledge themselves to labour to secure its speedy abolition."

The conduct of this meeting, joined with the facts which hadled to it, and other things which I had observed in connection with the movement, convinced me that however useful it might be that such investigations as the Conferences proposed to themselves should be made, the right men to conduct such investigations had yet to be found, and that so long as these inquiries were to be made by paid servants, no good could possibly flow from their labours. I, therefore, resigned my connection with the affair at once. The following letter, published in as many of the papers as I could reach, informed those whom it might concern of that resignation:—

Dear Sir,—Will you allow me space in your next impression to state that I have resigned the office of Hon. Secretary to the Conference committee?

I have also to enter my most emphatic protest against the resolution passed at the meeting last week. I sincerely hope that the vote of the few hundreds who were there is not to be taken as the verdict of the working men of Birmingham on so absurd a proposition. I should indeed be sorry to have to think so meanly of the men with whom I have so long worked, and by whom so many good and useful reforms have been achieved. If the cry is to be "Down with the press!"—and it appears it is—I, for one, can have nothing to do with any movement which accepts it. I have no complaint to make against "presscraft."

Allow me also to regret that absence from town prevented my attending th meeting, and giving Mr. J. S. Wright all the support I could; and to thank him f not allowing the meeting to pass without at least one protest against its foll The same absence from home must also be my apology for the placard which call the meeting. Had I known it, such a one would never have issued from my offic

My resignation of the office of Secretary in no wise alters my convictions as t the necessity of such inquiries as the Conference first proposed. I believe that great and necessary work has to be done in this way; but for the present it seem it must be done by each man as he is best able. With those who conducted las week's meeting, it is impossible for me to work.

I am dear Sir, yours truly,

Ann Street, Sept. 7th, 1855. J. A. LANGFORD.

The *Sheffield Free Press*, which is the organ of what it facetiously terms the "National Movement," and whose chaste pages are open t any abuse however base, and to any language however Billingsgat against any and all who do not swear by Urquhart, but whose keen sens of justice refuses to any one thus assailed the means of replying—th rabid organ of scurrility and abuse inserted, on Saturday, Sept. 15, a lett from Mr. Urquhart reiterating the charges of Russian agency. To thi letter Mazzini sent the following reply:—

To the Editor of the *Sheffield Free Press*.

Sir,—You inserted, days ago, in your paper, a most extraordinary letter fro Mr. D. Urquhart, in which, from the midst of copious unintelligible trash abou *confidence* and *foreigners*, I read that I have been employed by Russia to circumven Kossuth, and thereby cut him off from Turkey—that Kossuth declared to him, i 1849, at Kutayah,, that I was a Russian agent—that in 1827 Italian deputies wer to the Emperor Nicholas at Vognosich for revolutionary purposes—and that I Mazzini, have made an admission to him, Mr. D. Urquhart, that money for an Italia revolution was coming from Russia.

To these wild, unaccountable-for statements, I beg to give the following answers:—

I have never been, nor shall ever be *employed* by any Power: I believe a actually existing Powers to be unworthy of *employing* any honest man labouring h the cause of Right, Truth, and Justice.

I never have circumvented Kossuth, nor cut him off from Turkey: I think tha the manner of viewing the Turkish question is one of the very few secondary point about which Kossuth and I are still differing.

I do not believe that Kossuth has ever declared to Mr. D. Urquhart that I wa a Russian agent. Kossuth himself has settled the point in a recent number of th *Atlas*.

I do not believe any Italian deputy having gone from the national party to th Emperor Nicholas in 1827 at Vognosich or anywhere else; I was then, at all events a simple student at the University of Genoa, possessed with no influence whatev on the national party. My political career began with my imprisonment in 1830.

I never have received, directly or indirectly, any money from Russia.

I have never undergone the infliction of Mr. D. Urquhart's personal inter course. I have never seen him: he has never, to my knowledge, seen me. Mr. D Urquhart is, therefore, simply lying, or labouring under a strange hallucination whenever he speaks of personal admission made by me to him. Between the horn of the dilemma I grant him the choice.

As for your suggestion that a certain committee should call a public meetin in Sheffield and *challenge* me amongst others to be present and have the matter in vestigated, I beg to state that the *challenge* would prove altogether ineffectual. never grant anybody the right of dragging me to the bar to answer questions whi I despise, and accusers who are not worth my notice. English patriots would real be very weak and irrational, should they choose, on the first rambling affirmation to doubt a man who was in 1849—the time of Kossuth's *alleged* accusation—fightin for republican Italian liberty at Rome, and who, during twenty-five years of his li

has ever unhesitatingly spoken, written, and whenever possible, acted, against kings, emperors, tsars, popes, and all crowned or uncrowned lies shamming truth and guidance on this earth of ours.

I do not believe in the vitality of the Mahommedan Turkish Empire in Europe; and I think it unjust, unwise, and unstatesmanlike to persist in making a galvanised corpse a barrier to the encroachments of a young growing power like Russia, just as I always thought it unjust, unwise, and unstatesmanlike in Mr. Urquhart that he should oppose, *as he always did*, the free rising of our nationalities, in the hope of finding a useful ally against Russia in the rotten, doomed Austrian Empire. But I do not believe that Russia has any right of usurping what belongs to the Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian, Servian, Roumain, and other inhabitants of the soil. I do not feel bound to enthusiasm for a war which is fought side by side with imperial despotism, and which your Government has diverted from its proper liberal civilizing aim, for the sake of keeping up an immoral and absurd *status quo*, and of checking any national rising; but I hate Tsarism under any shape, and I wish it to vanish as speedily as possible from the face of God's earth. I would not feel in the least guilty should I accept money from Russia or any other Power, for the sake of making poor forsaken Italy free, and of cancelling, there at least, the curse of Austrian tyranny; but to no Power on earth would I yield an atom of my political creed, or of my most absolute freedom of action. And the very frankness of this statement ought, at all events, to prove an additional pledge for the truthfulness of my declaration, that no such a transaction has ever taken place, and that no man, sane or insane, will ever be able to prove before your committees anything to the contrary.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed), JOSEPH MAZZINI.

London, Sept. 22.

This letter produced a long, dreary, and tortuous article in the *Free Press* of September 29, to which Mazzini addressed a reply. The very *Free Press* could not insert this note until Mr. Urquhart's permission was obtained. That gentleman, with the fairness which he has always shown, had the letter immediately published. I print this letter here, with a short note of Mr. Dawson's introducing it to the *Birmingham Daily Press*:—

To the Editor of the *Birmingham Daily Press*.

Sir—M. Mazzini asks publicity for the note I send you: the language is strong, but if you have seen the article in the *Sheffield Free Press*, you will, I think, agree with me that the provocation was great.

I have seen some words of mine quoted by Mr. Urquhart and the *Free Press* in such a way as to make them seem like an admission on my part that I am convinced that M. Mazzini is an agent of Russia. I have never said so or thought so. I do not believe that M. Mazzini ever has been, is now, or is ever likely to be, an agent of any despotism. I have never heard anything like a proof of the charges made against him.

I am, Sir, yours truly,

GEORGE DAWSON.

To the Editor of the *Sheffield Free Press*.

Sir—I have read the article concerning my letter to you, in your number of September 29th.

I have been attacked by Catholic priests, Austrian spies, and the lowest police agents throughout Europe; *never* in such a paltry, despicable, irrational, misinterpreting, calumniating way.

They were either asses or scoundrels: the writer of the article is evidently a happy combination of the two.

With an everlasting farewell to the Urquhartist mud, in which I really cannot condescend to stoop twice, I am,

Oct. 1, 1855. JOSEPH MAZZINI.

On the evening of Tuesday, October 2, another meeting was held, for the avowed purpose of appointing a committee to investigate the allegations made by Mr. Urquhart against Kossuth and Mazzini. The meeting almost unanimously rejected the proposal, and passed the following resolution :—

"That, in the opinion of this meeting, the past and present acts of Kossuth and Mazzini are in accordance with the true and real spirit of democracy, and, therefore, views with feelings of regret the attempt made by a factious party to damage the characters of two of the most noble and patriotic sons of freedom, and that to appoint from this meeting a committee of enquiry, constituted of those who have called it, would be an insult to Kossuth and Mazzini."

On the same day as this meeting was held, I received a letter from M. Kossuth, which I immediately made public, prefixing a short note of my own, which, as it led to some further correspondence with Mr. Urquhart, I here reprint :—

To the Editor of the *Birmingham Daily Press*.

Sir,—I have received the following letter from M. Kossuth, respecting Mr. Urquhart's charges, and have much pleasure in sending it you for publication. It is a fit answer to the allegations of Mr. Urquhart, and a reply to the more noisy vituperation of Tuesday night.

Yours truly,

Ann Street, October 3rd, 1855. J. A. LANGFORD.

8, South Bank, Reg. Park, London, Oct. 1, 1855.

Dear Sir,—Yours of Sept. 29 has been just received. You suggest that I should write a brief note in contradiction to Mr. Urquhart's statements with reference to Mazzini and myself.

The answer of Mazzini, to which you allude, as published in a Birmingham paper, I did not yet see, the paper having not yet come to my hands; but as a Mr. Peter Hunter, Secretary to the Foreign Affairs' Committee, has written me a letter on the subject of Mr. Urquhart's defamatory publication in the *Sheffield Free Press*, Sept. 18, I have the honour to inform you, that I have just finished and mailed my answer to Mr. Hunter, for publication there, where the defamation has been published. My answer is rather long; but I thought it due to the public not to restrict myself to a bare denial of Mr. Urquhart's reference to me in support of his libellous charge against Mazzini, but to substantiate my denial by positive arguments. I regret that it is not in my power to furnish you a copy of it, but I have no clerk, and it would take me very much time to copy it, with my heavy hand. I therefore am bound to refer you to Mr. Hunter, at Sheffield, (Bedford Place.)

The purport of my letter, following the purport of Mr. Urquhart's allegations is:—

That it is not true that Mazzini had ever tried to circumvent me in order to cut me off from Turkey, and thus to isolate Hungary from Turkey. It is the Western Powers that employed craft, menaces, and even force, to cut me off from Turkey, and to prevent an alliance between Turkey and Hungary for this war; my connection with Mazzini did in no way interfere with the friendly relations between the Sublime Porte and myself; the barrier of momentary isolation consists in the alliance of *that* Austria having been forced by the Western Powers upon Turkey, which Mr. Urquhart and his neolyths would fain insinuate into public favour by presenting her as a victim. I prove these statements from the Blue Books.

It is equally untrue that I had ever told Mr. Urquhart at Kutayah that I knew Mazzini to be a Russian agent, from the fact that he is always pointing to Austria, never to Russia. I could not tell anything like that, nor entertain any such suspicion, because at the time of Mr. Urquhart's visit to me at Kutayah, I could not yet know anything of Mazzini's character or views, as I never have up to that time read one single word of Mazzini's either written or printed, could consequently not

know to whom he does point, and whether he does point to Russia or not. I state on what careful inquiries I subsequently came to make my choice between the parties in Italy; and give an account of the impression Mr. Urquhart's conversations then and there (1850 and not 1849) left on my mind, that is he who desired to deter me from any possible future connection with Mazzini, by charging him of being connected with Russia, consequently, that if any words to the effect have occurred in our interviews, it is he told them to me, and not I to him.

I mention that it is a startling fact that Mr. Urquhart should try to trouble the harmony between the two men the unity of whom Austria may well fear, while at the same time he labours to daub Austria.

I remind the committee that by giving publicity to the libellous letter of Mr. Urquhart, they laid themselves open to prosecution for defamation. I remind them that it is not competent in them to pretend to the authority of a tribunal, and finish by requiring from them to claim from Mr. Urquhart, and to communicate with me the correspondence alluded to, that I may be enabled to act as the occasion may require.

This is the purport of my letter given to you in a nutshell. You are free to make such use of this as you think proper.

Yours very faithfully,

To J. A. Langford, Esq., Birmingham. KOSSUTH.

The following is the correspondence above referred to:—

Castle Bromwich, October 8, 1855.

Dear Sir,—My attention has this moment been called to some expressions of yours, in a letter published in the course of last week, addressed to the *Daily Press*, in which you say that the letter of M. Kossuth is a fit answer to my allegations.

I could scarcely have believed such words to have proceeded from you, were it not that so many days have elapsed without their denunciation as a forgery. Accepting them, therefore, as yours, I must claim from you an explanation of their import.

It is now two months since, in consequence of a contradiction given privately to you by M. Kossuth, to a statement of mine, you wrote to me to say that where you had doubts you could not coöperate. I treared this letter as an imputation on my honour, and proposed an investigation of the facts in the presence of half-a-dozen gentlemen on your side, and half-a-dozen on mine. That meeting took place at the Queen's Hotel, you coming accompanied by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Timmins, and others, a short-hand writer attending to take down what passed.

The point to be examined was a matter of fact, which I alleged I could substantiate by documentary evidence. That point was, whether or not in our former intercourse, that is of M. Kossuth and myself, Mazzini was described as a Russian agent. This was the whole case; not whether he was so or not; but whether he was then believed to be so by M. Kossuth.

The result of this investigation was, the withdrawal on your part of the imputations against me. But you did not content yourself with this; you expressed yourself in the highest degree delighted with having made the imputation, as it had led to the revelation of matters of such deep importance, namely, the action of Russia through the revolutionary party on the present condition of Europe. It was consequently proposed to institute inquiry into the case, in reference to its political bearing; on which I offered to place the correspondence in the hands of any committee that should be formed, and further proposed that such committee should be composed exclusively of the partisans of Kossuth and Mazzini.

Next morning, you called again at the Queen's Hotel, and then, if possible, in still stronger terms, reiterated your delight at the results obtained the night before.

The letter of Kossuth which you now hold to be a sufficient answer to my allegations, does not disprove the evidence of the documents by me adduced. It, however, admits, as coming from me to him, the allegation of Mazzini's connection with Russia at a period anterior to that when he described me as the best friend of Hungary.

I now ask you to tell me what I am to understand between your then satisfaction with my proofs and your now satisfaction with Kossuth's refutation. Until I receive such explanation, which indeed appears to me at present impossible, I must

hold you to be in the position now in which you then placed me—that of a dish
oured man; and I therefore expect from you the adoption of the same course wh
I did adopt—the constitution of a tribunal of men of honour to examine and dec
upon the facts. I am quite willing to go into the case in the presence of twel
gentlemen, every one of whom shall be of your selection, and partisans of Mazz
and Kossuth.

I remain your obedient and faithful servant.

J. A. Langford, Esq, D. URQUHART.

Dear Sir,—In answer to your note of yesterday, I have only to reply that
have acted in such a manner in respect to the Kossuth affair as appeared to me p
fectly right. All the explanation I can give to the words quoted by you is, th
they mean simply what they express; nothing more. Kossuth's letter is to me
answer to your allegations. M. Kossuth has demanded, in the letter sent to Sh
field, the publication of the documentary evidence to which you refer, and this w
put the public in full possession of the case.

As respects your proposition to have a committee of twelve, I do not think th
any good would result therefrom; and as for my character, I am quite prepared
let time, which takes care of and proves so many things, take care of and pro
that.

With thanks for your little book, which I shall read, I trust, with as mu
interest and profit as the first series,

I am, dear Sir, yours,

Ann-st. Birmingham, Oct. 9, 1855. J. A. LANGFORD.

D. Urquhart, Esq.

Mr. Urquhart's letter requires one word of comment. It is curio
with what facility he appropriates one's words to his own purposes. W
have already seen how he used some spoken by Mr. Dawson. And no
he uses my gratulations that the meeting to which he refers had left
my mind no doubt of Mr. Urquhart's honour and integrity, to a beli
that his revelations had shown the action of Russia in the revolutiona
movement; whereas there was nothing in those revelations to prove an
thing of the kind. Mr. Urquhart then said that, for any proofs he had
the contrary, Mazzini might be one of the honestest men living; whi
his letters to, and the replies of, M. Kossuth only showed that once M
Urquhart was in Kossuth's confidence, and was consulted by him o
important questions. But being as they were only one or two letters ou
of a large file, and not having Kossuth's defence, no judgment could b
found, no verdict passed upon them. M. Kossuth has demanded a fu
examination; and if ever this occurs we shall be better able to come to
satisfactory conclusion on the matter. Until the affair is so examined,
shall take the past acts of the accused as my guide in judging them, an
still hold them, as I have ever held them, worthy of confidence, honou
and respect. Mr. Urquhart complains of my not writing to him befor
publishing Kossuth's letter in the newspapers; yet Mr. Urquhart pub
lishes this correspondence without in the slightest manner intimating t
me that it was his intention to do so.

As was to have been expected, my leaving the Conference was th
signal for vituperation and abuse. The *Sheffield Free Press*, with it
usual virulence, charged me with leaving it through fear of losing m
business, and with its usual impartiality *refused* to print my reply statin
why I did leave the "ranks." Other newspapers have, however, give
publicity to this letter, which is as follows:—

To the Editor of the *Sheffield of Free Press.*

Sir,—I ask you to insert this letter as a matter of justice. In last Saturday's paper you state in one of your leaders that "John Alfred Langford, frightened through threats of losing his business &c.," the rest in a moment. Were I to avail myself of the elegant and *very* forcible language which has distinguished the *Free Press*, I should say that this is "a most detestable and rotten lie."* As it is, I meet it with the most emphatic and unequivocal denial. For my means there is not a man in England who has sacrificed more for political principles than myself. A man who knows three trades by either of which he can get his living, and who values his indepency and his right to utter his convictions more than all the world can give or take away, is not the man to be intimidated by threats—nay not even by the loss of business altogether. Such a statement could only have come from ignorance; and you have entirely mistaken your man.

Again you say "he sneaks out of the ranks, &c." I might meet this statement with the same graceful phrase quoted above. I did not "sneak" out of the ranks. I left them openly, deliberately, and from conviction. I left them because the movement proved false to its original programme; and instead of being a Conference to enquire into matters of foreign policy, it became an organisation of scurrility, defamation, malignity, and abuse. I left it because I found that the larger part of its supporters were *paid* advocates, and worked as servants, not as convinced patriots, which they professed to be. I left it because its leaders treated with disdain, scoffing and abuse, the principles which had been, and still are, to me sacred—principles to be toiled for, suffered for, and if need be bled for. I left it because I saw it *was* doing harm, and *could not* do good; and not for the base motive which you have assigned—a motive it seems to me which could only have suggested itself to one to whom self-interest and the advocacy of a cause had become identical. I shall not notice any farther personal attack.

October 6th, 1855. J. A. LANGFORD.

I have now brought this narrative down to the present time, and it only remains for me to say a few words on Mr. Urquhart. Here I speak of him only as a public man, amenable to criticism and open to discussion. For his indomitable perseverance, his vast acquirements, and spotless integrity, I have the deepest respect. But he has offered himself as a leader for the people—as a restorer of a nation which he declares in perilous danger—as the saviour of England, which, as depicted by him, is rapidly approaching the "sere and yellow leaf," in the last stage of decadence and decay. It is of his qualifications for this office that I now say a few words. For this office, if such office be needed, Mr. Urquhart seems to me utterly unfit. His whole public life, in respect to this matter, has been a complete and utter failure.

It will be remembered that some fourteen years ago Mr. Urquhart made a tour of agitation similar to his present one. Committees were then formed in various towns, and the issue was that Mr. Urquhart was returned to Parliament. Who of us is not old enough to remember those long-winded, dreary, and desolate Urquhart-Anstey debates? Who is not old enough to remember how deeply he wished that those gentlemen did but know the beauty of silence and practice it, as far as the House of Commons was concerned. Mr. Urquhart calls for impeachment, and ignores the very means by which alone impeachment could be procured.

* Infamous humbug! most detestable and rotten lie! &c. Whiggery is no longer the respectable humbug which it used to be in the palmy days of its history. It has gone to rottenness and can breed nothing but maggots, and is consigned with Lord John Russell to the foulest *cloacum*, beneath the shambles of political corruption. &c. &c. *ad infinitum*.—*Sheffield Free Press.* One scarcely knows which to admire most, the erudition which has discovered such a word as *cloacum*, the beauty of the diction, the 'forcible feebleness' of the style, or the fairness which distinguishes the controversial chaof this superlatively silly and foul-mouthed newspaper. But I quit the subject; for *who can touch pitch and not be defiled?*

The House of Commons is the p[lace] for that, and he looks upon this assembly as only the debased h[ead] of a debased body. He opposes all kinds of political reform. The s[uf]frage has debased the upper and middle classes, and it would corrupt and debase the unenfranchised, if at any fatal moment they should obtain it. There is not a want nor aspiration of the people to which he is not opposed. This age—with all its faults the noblest the world ever yet saw—is to him only a sink of corruption and rottenness. Let it not be supposed that I am exaggerating here, or speaking without book. These are not the opinions held by Mr. Urquhart twenty years ago, they are his opinions of to-day. In the second series of *Familiar Words*, a book not yet a month old, I find authority for all I have said, and will now make a few extracts in proof of my assertions.

This is his definition of Civilization :—

> I should placeit in this form: it is a state of rudeness engendered by corruption, or again, a chimera with a brain of cobweb and a heart of mud, polluting whatever is within, destroying whatever is without.—*Page* 177.

Again, on the same subject he says,

> Civilization is, in fine, a monster without brain, or heart, or noble organ, but with a life of mere limb, such as belongs to the order of polipi destitute of cerebral functions. It might be compared to that kraken or squid of the abyss, except that the wretched limbs of that hideous growth do serve for pasture to the whales to which it is cast.—182.

It has been said by the *Sheffield Free Press* that Mr. Urquhart nor his followers ever said "down with the Press." Perhaps not in those distinct words; but the whole spirit of his agitation has been against its freedom. That Free Press for which Milton wrote an *Areopagitica*, and for which we have laboured so long, and but the other day attained, is to Mr. Urquhart the centre and source of all corruption. He quotes with approval, three sentences from "able editors," and adds a fourth "all his own."

> "The Press is bringing upon us the dark ages."
> "If the history of the Press could be written, England might yet be saved."
> "The day will come when the sign of a gentleman will be not to know how to write his name."
> "For my part, if asked in turn, I should say 'The Press is an invention for the developement of original sin.' "—263.

He says that Reform is a "delusion," and that "Reformers are sycophants." Of the manner in which he looks to the past I need not speak here. All his sympathies are with the anti-reformers of old times, and the anti-reformers of to-day. If he quotes with approval a deceased statesmen, it is Bolinbroke who sold England at the peace of Utrecht; or Swift, one of the basest of men. Of living men it is D'Israeli, D'Israeli, and still D'Israeli; the man who of all others is a type of all that is time-serving in statesmanship, and hollow in politics. I could multiply quotation on quotation in proof of this were it necessary.

Surely after such clear evidence of Mr. Urquhart's want of sympathy with this age, its aspirations, its hopes, its desires—his anti-democratic spirit, and hatred of all that the people mostly court, no one will even think of him as a man fit to be the leader of a great movement—the ruler, and as some of his friends have whispered, the dictator of England. From such a catastrophe may we ever be preserved!



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Miscellany: political.
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